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United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
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The United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) is a United Nations peacekeeping force in Abyei, which is contested between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan. UNISFA was approved on 27 June 2011 by the United Nations Security Council in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1990 after a flareup in the South Kordofan conflict earlier in June 2011.[1] The Ethiopian Army was the largest contributor of personnel, and until 2022, the only contributor of individual troops.[2][3] In February 2022 UNISFA was reconfigured into a multinational force with the arrival of a Ghanaian Battalion under Major Enoch Awudu. As a multinational force troops from a number of other countries have served in Abeyei, including Ghana, Nepal and Vietnam.

Key Information

History

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The peacekeepers began arriving in Abyei on 15 July 2011 after traveling overland from Ethiopia, just under a week after South Sudan formally declared its independence.[4][5]

The UNISFA mandate has been renewed annually since 2011.[6][7] Given that sporadic and spontaneous violence remained very high,[8] UNISFA's ability to control violence in Abyei has been questioned.[9] In its November 2024 resolution the UN Security Council ordered a strategic review of UNISFA's effectiveness no later than 15 August 2025.[7] In 2024 one of the UN peacekeepers was killed when their base in Agok was attacked.[10]

Command

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In the operation's initial years, the position of Head of Mission and Force Commander were jointly held by the same person. Beginning in 2014, both positions were held by a different person. However since Haile Tilahun Gebremariam died, the acting Head of Mission has been the Force Commander.

Head of Mission, UNIFSA
No. Name Nationality Tenure
1 Maj. Gen. Tadesse Werede Tesfay[11] Ethiopia 2011–2013
2 Maj. Gen. Yohannes Gebremeskel Tesfamariam[12] 2013–2014
- Maj. Gen. Halefom Ejigu Moges (acting)[13] 2014–2015
3 Haile Tilahun Gebremariam[14] 2015–2016 deceased[15]
- Brig. Gen. Zewdu Kiros Gebrekidan Officer-in-charge Head of Mission 12 August 2016 – 21 March 2017
- Maj. Gen. Tesfay Gidey Hailemichael (acting) 21 March 2017 – 23 April 2018
- Maj. Gen. Gebre Adhana Woldezgu (acting) 15 May 2018 – 23 Apr 2019
- Maj. Gen. Mehari Gebremariam (acting)[16] 23 April 2019 – 7 July 2020
- Maj. Gen. Kefyalew Amde Tessema (acting)[17] 2020–2022
- Maj. Gen. Benjamin Olufemi Sawyerr (acting)[3] Nigeria 2022– 31 May 2024[18]
- Brig. Gen. Ameer Muhammad Umrani temporarily acting[18][19] Pakistan 31 May 2024 – 11 July 2024
- Maj. Gen. Robert Yaw Affram (acting)[20] Ghana 11 July 2024 –
Force Commander, UNIFSA
No. Name Nationality Tenure
1 Maj. Gen. Tadesse Werede Tesfay[11] Ethiopia 2011–2013
2 Lt. Gen. Yohannes Gebremeskel Tesfamariam[12] 2013–2014
3 Maj. Gen. Birhanu Jula Gelalcha[21] 2014–2016
4 Maj. Gen. Hassen Ebrahim Mussa[22] 2016–2017
5 Maj. Gen. Tesfay Gidey Hailemichael[23] 2017–2018
6 Maj. Gen. Gebre Adhana Woldezgu[24] 2018–2019
7 Maj. Gen. Mehari Zewde Gebremariam[25] 2019–2020
8 Maj. Gen. Kefyalew Amde Tessema[26] 2020–2022
9 Maj. Gen. Benjamin Olufemi Sawyerr[27][3] Nigeria 15 March 2022 – 31 May 2024
- Brig. Gen. Ameer Muhammad Umrani temporarily acting[28] Pakistan 31 May 2024 – 11 July 2024
- Maj. Gen. Robert Yaw Affram acting[20] Ghana 11 July 2024 –

Contributing countries

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As of 31 May 2018, the total number of personnel in the mission is 4,571, all but a little over 100 of whom are Ethiopian.[2]

Country Experts Police Staff Officer Troops
Bahrain 2
 Benin 2
 Bhutan 1 1
 Bolivia 2
 Brazil 2
 Burkina Faso 1
 Burundi 3
 Cambodia 1
 Dominican Republic 1 2
 Ecuador 1 1
 El Salvador 1
 Ethiopia 78 5 79 4,288
 Ghana 3 4 6
 Guatemala 3 1
 Guinea 1 1
 India 1 3
 Indonesia 2 2
 Jordan 4
 Malawi 1
 Mongolia 1 1
 Namibia 3 4 2
 Nepal 3 1
 Nigeria 2 2
 Peru 2
 Russia 1
 Rwanda 2 3 4
 Seychelles 2
 Sierra Leone 1 2
 Sri Lanka 5 1
 Tanzania 2 9 1
 Ukraine 4 2
 Vietnam 2
 Zambia 1 1
 Zimbabwe 2 10 1

References

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United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

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The United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) is a mission authorized by the to maintain security in the disputed region, an oil-producing area claimed by both and , by monitoring the temporary demilitarized border zone, protecting civilians under imminent threat, and facilitating delivery.
Established on 27 June 2011 through Security Council resolution 1990 (2011) in response to deadly clashes between and Sudan People's Liberation Army forces that displaced over 100,000 residents and threatened broader conflict, UNISFA operates under a mandate renewed annually, most recently extended until 15 November 2025 by resolution 2760 (2024). The mission's deployment followed a bilateral agreement between and the , aiming to de-escalate tensions in the resource-rich enclave pending a on its status.
UNISFA, authorized for up to 3,250 military personnel and 640 formed police units, relies heavily on Ethiopian troops as the primary contributor, supplemented by contingents from countries including , , and , though actual strength has often fallen short of authorized levels due to operational constraints. While the force has contributed to averting full-scale war between and and supported local mechanisms, it has faced persistent challenges, including armed attacks on its bases, restrictions by host government forces, and limited success in fully demilitarizing the area or curbing nomadic violence during seasonal migrations. These incidents underscore the mission's difficulties in an environment of unresolved disputes and weak state control, with critics noting inefficiencies common to UN amid complex ethnic and resource conflicts.

Background and Context

The Abyei Territorial Dispute

The Abyei Area, spanning approximately 10,500 square kilometers along the border between and , has been a focal point of territorial contention primarily due to its substantial oil reserves and the competing claims of resident Ngok Dinka pastoralists, who identify with , and seasonal Misseriya Arab nomads from , who assert traditional grazing rights. The dispute traces its modern origins to colonial administrative decisions under Anglo-Egyptian rule in the early , when the region was transferred from province to presidential control in 1905, fostering ambiguities that persisted post-independence and fueled ethnic and resource-based conflicts during Sudan's civil wars. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed on January 9 between the and the /Army (SPLM/A), sought to resolve the broader north-south conflict by stipulating a for 's residents to determine whether the area would integrate with northern or the south, alongside provisions for from its oil fields, which account for a significant portion of Sudan's production. However, implementation faltered over disagreements on voter eligibility—pitting settled Ngok Dinka against transient Misseriya—and the precise boundaries of the Abyei Area as defined in the 1972 Accord, leading to escalated violence, including clashes in May 2008 that killed over 90 people and displaced 50,000. To adjudicate the boundaries, the parties submitted the dispute to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague via an agreement deposited on July 11, 2008; the tribunal's final award on July 22, 2009, delimited a narrower Abyei Area, excluding key oil-rich pastures like the Diffra fields based on a textual interpretation of historical maps and accords, thereby reducing the SPLM's territorial claims but affirming the referendum mechanism under the CPA. Despite this ruling, the referendum scheduled for 2011 was never conducted due to persistent bilateral mistrust and domestic political pressures, culminating in Sudan's unilateral military occupation of Abyei town on May 20-21, 2011, which displaced over 100,000 civilians and prompted international intervention. Intermittent clashes between Dinka and Misseriya militias have continued, exacerbating humanitarian crises and underscoring the dispute's role as a potential flashpoint for renewed interstate conflict even after South Sudan's independence in July 2011.

Establishment of UNISFA

The United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) was established by the UN Security Council through resolution 1990 (2011), adopted unanimously on 27 June 2011, in response to escalating violence and military clashes in the disputed Abyei Area between the governments of Sudan and the newly independent South Sudan. The resolution authorized the deployment of up to 4,200 military personnel, 50 police personnel, and appropriate civilian staff for an initial period of six months to neutralize armed groups, protect civilians, and support the demilitarization of the region. This action followed the 20 June 2011 Agreement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area, signed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, by representatives of the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/North (SPLM/N), which stipulated the withdrawal of all forces from Abyei except for a UN-monitored Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM). The establishment addressed a security vacuum created by Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) offensives in May 2011, which displaced over 100,000 civilians and prompted the expulsion of the UN's JBVMM from the area. Resolution 1990 explicitly tasked UNISFA with facilitating the resumption of JBVMM operations, ensuring safe passage for humanitarian aid, and verifying compliance with the demilitarization agreement to prevent further interstate conflict along the Sudan-South Sudan border. Deployment commenced shortly after, with the first contingents of Ethiopian troops arriving in Abyei on 12 July 2011 via overland routes from Ethiopia, marking the operational start of the mission. Initial troop contributions came primarily from , which provided the bulk of the authorized military force, reflecting its regional proximity and prior involvement in monitoring efforts. The Security Council emphasized that UNISFA's mandate was interim and contingent on the parties' , with no provision for offensive operations beyond , underscoring the mission's limited scope amid ongoing bilateral tensions. By August 2011, UNISFA had reached initial operating capability, enabling it to patrol key flashpoints and oversee the partial withdrawal of SAF and SPLM forces.

Mandate and Objectives

Initial Mandate per Resolution 1990

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1990, adopted unanimously on 27 June 2011, established the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) for an initial period of six months to stabilize the security situation in the Abyei Area amid escalating tensions between Sudan and South Sudan following the latter's independence.) The resolution responded to reports of cross-border incursions and militia activities, authorizing the force to operate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to enforce compliance with prior agreements on demilitarization.) UNISFA's core tasks included monitoring and verifying the redeployment of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), (SPLA), and police units from the Area, as stipulated in the 2009 Agreement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Area and subsequent understandings between the parties.) The mission was also mandated to conduct operations via a dedicated unit, coordinated with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), to clear hazards impeding safe movement and humanitarian access.) Further responsibilities encompassed facilitating the delivery of in partnership with the (UNMIS) and protecting UNISFA's own personnel, equipment, facilities, and .) The resolution directed the Secretary-General to deploy UNISFA with an initial authorized strength of up to 4,200 military personnel (including infantry battalions, military observers, and staff officers), 50 police forming a unit, and 150 individual police officers, drawn exclusively from Ethiopia due to its regional proximity and prior involvement in Abyei monitoring via the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea.) UNISFA was instructed to support the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) in implementing security arrangements and to coordinate joint activities with UNMIS in adjacent operational areas, while adhering to UN zero-tolerance policies on sexual exploitation.) This framework emphasized neutrality and impartiality, with the force reporting directly to the Security Council through the Secretary-General.)

Subsequent Mandate Evolutions and Renewals

The United Nations Security Council first extended UNISFA's mandate beyond its initial six-month authorization through Resolution 2024 (2011), adopted on 14 December 2011, which prolonged operations until 27 January 2012 while reaffirming core tasks under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, including civilian protection and monitoring of Sudanese and South Sudanese forces' disengagement.) Subsequent early renewals, such as Resolution 2033 (2012) on 12 January 2012 extending to 27 June 2012, maintained the focus on security provision amid ongoing border tensions but began incorporating support for the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) to verify demilitarization along the North-South line.) These extensions reflected the protracted nature of the Abyei dispute, with the Council adjusting operational parameters based on reports of sporadic violence and non-compliance by local militias. Resolution 2104 (2013), adopted on 29 May 2013, marked a significant evolution by increasing the authorized troop ceiling to 5,326 military personnel at the request of Sudan and South Sudan, enabling enhanced monitoring of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDB) and assistance to ad hoc JBVMM committees, while also authorizing demining activities to facilitate humanitarian access.) Later adjustments trended toward reductions as security conditions permitted partial stabilization; for instance, Resolution 2469 (2019) on 13 May 2019 lowered the military ceiling to 3,550 troops and raised the police component to 640 (including formed units), extended the mandate to 15 November 2019, and called for a civilian deputy mission head to bolster administrative oversight.) Resolution 2609 (2021) on 15 December 2021 further reduced troops to 3,250 while preserving police levels, extending operations to 15 May 2022 and emphasizing capacity-building for the Abyei Police Service to transition security responsibilities.) From 2022 onward, renewals shifted to annual cycles, underscoring a sustained but scaled-back presence amid persistent communal clashes and nomad migrations. Resolution 2660 (2022) on 14 November 2022 prolonged the mandate to 15 November 2023, reinforcing UNISFA's role in protecting civilians from imminent threats and facilitating inter-communal dialogue.) This pattern continued with Resolution 2708 (2023) on 14 November 2023, extending to 15 November 2024 and urging Sudan and South Sudan to expedite Abyei's final status determination per the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.) The most recent renewal, Resolution 2760 (2024) on 14 November 2024, authorized operations until 15 November 2025, extended JBVMM support for one year, and demanded compliance with flight bans over Abyei to prevent aerial incursions, adopted with one abstention amid concerns over mission resource constraints.) Throughout these evolutions, the core mandate from Resolution 1990—neutral force protection, demilitarization verification, and humanitarian facilitation—remained intact, with adjustments driven by on-ground assessments rather than fundamental doctrinal shifts.

Organizational Structure

Command and Leadership

The command structure of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) is headed by a civilian Head of Mission, responsible for overall political direction and coordination with local authorities, and a military Force Commander, who directs tactical operations, troop deployments, and security monitoring along the Sudan-South Sudan border in the Abyei area. These roles report to the UN Department of Peace Operations and are guided by Security Council resolutions, with the Force Commander overseeing sectors divided into North, South, and Central for operational efficiency. Since its establishment via Resolution 1990 on 27 June 2011, the Force Commander position has typically been held by senior officers from troop-contributing countries, with Ethiopians dominating early appointments due to regional proximity and initial troop commitments exceeding 4,000 personnel. In the mission's initial phase, the Head of Mission and Force Commander roles were often combined, but from 2014 onward, efforts were made to separate civilian and military leadership for enhanced oversight, though acting dual roles persisted amid personnel transitions and mandate renewals. Major General Robert Yaw Affram of Ghana has served as Acting Head of Mission and Force Commander since 11 July 2024, leading efforts to maintain neutrality amid escalating communal clashes and cross-border tensions reported in UN situation updates through 2025. He succeeded Major General Benjamin Olufemi Sawyerr of Nigeria, appointed on 1 February 2022 and assuming duties on 16 March 2022, whose tenure focused on joint patrols with the Abyei Police Service following the withdrawal of Ethiopian contingents in 2021 amid bilateral disputes. Prior leaders included Ethiopian officers such as Major General Kefyalew Amde Tessema, who handed over to Sawyerr after nearly two years emphasizing demilitarization verification under Resolution 2412. The Deputy Force Commander, Brigadier General Ameer Muhammad Umrani of Pakistan, assumed office in March 2024 and supports sector-level command, logistics, and coordination with over 20 contributing countries providing approximately 2,200 troops as of mid-2025. This leadership cadre operates from Mission Headquarters in Abyei town, prioritizing impartiality despite criticisms from Sudanese officials questioning UNISFA's enforcement of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism amid verified incursions by Sudan Armed Forces elements.

Contributing Countries and Troop Composition

The United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) was initially established in 2011 primarily with troops from Ethiopia, which provided the vast majority of military personnel as the sole major troop-contributing country, reflecting its status as a neighboring state with historical involvement in the region. This composition totaled around 4,000 Ethiopian troops at peak authorization, focused on demilitarization and monitoring along the Abyei border. Ethiopia's dominant role persisted until early 2022, when Security Council-mandated reconfiguration led to the phased withdrawal of its contingent amid bilateral tensions between Sudan and South Sudan, transitioning UNISFA to a multinational force to enhance operational impartiality and sustainability. The reconfiguration began with the deployment of Ghana's infantry battalion (GHANBATT) on 24 January 2022, consisting of 570 personnel (45 officers and 525 other ranks, including 68 females) responsible for Sector South operations such as patrols, civilian protection, and humanitarian facilitation from bases in Agok, Marial Achak, and other sites. Subsequent contingents included engineering and infantry units from countries like Viet Nam, with its engineers commended for infrastructure support as late as September 2025. By mid-2022, the military component neared completion of diversification, incorporating battalions and specialized units from Asia and Africa to cover demilitarization, joint operations, and capacity-building tasks. As of June 2024, UNISFA's uniformed personnel totaled approximately 2,950, including 2,416 troops under the 3,250 authorization and a smaller police contingent of 29 individual officers against 640 authorized, drawn from over 40 countries providing , staff officers, experts on mission, and limited police for and investigations. Major troop contributors included (635 troops), (570 troops), (490 troops), (270 troops), Viet Nam (183 troops), (171 troops), and (97 troops), with additional support from staff and experts across nations like , , and . This multinational structure emphasizes regional African and Asian participation, with no Ethiopian presence post-withdrawal, enabling broader mandate implementation despite occasional understaffing relative to ceilings renewed through November 2025.
CountryContingent TroopsKey Roles/Notes
635Infantry battalion in Sector South; civilian protection focus
570Infantry and support units
490Multirole contingent including patrols
270Utility and engineering support
Viet Nam183Engineering company for infrastructure
Police contributions remain limited to individual officers from countries such as Egypt (2), Ghana (3), India (1), Nepal (3), Nigeria (3), and Viet Nam (2), aiding local capacity-building without formed units. Overall, the composition prioritizes infantry for ground monitoring while integrating specialized assets, though reliance on voluntary contributions from developing nations introduces variability in readiness and gender balance (e.g., 10-15% female across major contingents).

Operations and Key Activities

Demilitarization Monitoring and Joint Integrated Operations

UNISFA was mandated under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1990 (2011) to monitor and verify the redeployment and withdrawal of (SAF) and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) from the Abyei Area, in accordance with the 20 June 2011 Agreement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area signed by and . This demilitarization provision aimed to create a neutral zone policed solely by the Joint Integrated Police units, excluding presence from either party to prevent escalation of border tensions. UNISFA observers and troops conduct regular patrols to confirm compliance, reporting violations such as unauthorized force movements; for instance, in 2022, multiple incidents restricted UNISFA access within the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) headquarters. The mission's monitoring extends to the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ) along the Sudan-South Sudan border, where UNISFA, through the JBVMM established by Resolution 2024 (2011), verifies the absence of heavy weapons and troop concentrations to maintain the buffer. Joint reconnaissance operations, such as those conducted in October 2017, have demarcated SDBZ limits and facilitated de-mining to enable safe patrols, though persistent non-compliance by both parties has limited full implementation. As of 2025, South Sudanese security forces' presence in southern Abyei continues to hinder UNISFA patrols south of the area, underscoring incomplete demilitarization despite repeated Security Council demands. In parallel, UNISFA conducts joint integrated operations with the Abyei Police Service (APS), providing operational support, training, and coordinated patrols to enforce law and order in the demilitarized zone. UN Police (UNPOL) components mentor APS on community policing and human rights standards, while integrated teams from UNISFA contingents (e.g., Ghanaian, Indian, and Pakistani battalions) and APS execute joint foot and vehicle patrols, particularly in volatile southern sectors. These operations include community outreach in villages to build trust and deter communal violence, as demonstrated by a December 2023 joint mission involving military observers, UNPOL, and Ghanaian troops across Sector South. When necessary, UNISFA troops provide interim security for oil infrastructure in coordination with APS requests, protecting assets vital to local revenue amid demilitarization efforts. Such collaborations have intensified since 2024 to address security gaps, though effectiveness remains constrained by APS capacity limitations and occasional intercommunal clashes.

Civilian Protection and Humanitarian Support

UNISFA's mandate, as established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1990 on 27 June 2011, authorizes the force to use all necessary means to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence within its capacity and area of operations in Abyei, including vulnerable groups such as women and children. This includes robust measures to deter attacks and respond to threats, with the mission conducting extensive ground and aerial patrols to monitor security hotspots and prevent communal violence. For instance, following clashes in early February 2024 that resulted in civilian casualties, UNISFA intensified patrols to safeguard populations and facilitate safe movement. The mission employs a tiered approach to civilian protection, encompassing community dialogues, early warning mechanisms, and capacity-building initiatives. Tier I activities involve facilitating conferences and engagements, such as the Entebbe conference from 17 to 19 May 2022, which yielded agreements reducing inter-communal conflicts among Ngok Dinka and Misseriya groups in the subsequent year. Tier II focuses on proactive patrols and an operational since 2018, with UNISFA logging 20,936 ground patrols in the period covered by the Secretary-General's report of 1 May 2025 to bolster physical security. Complementing these, Tier III efforts include training Community Protection Committees (CPCs), with 53 sessions reaching 2,374 participants—including 512 females—since 2017 to enhance local and . The of CPCs in northern on 30 June 2022, attended by over 700 community members, exemplifies efforts to institutionalize community-led protection. Community Liaison Offices further support these by bridging UNISFA with local leaders to resolve disputes and promote harmony. In humanitarian support, UNISFA facilitates the delivery of aid and ensures the free movement of relief workers in coordination with Abyei Area authorities, as stipulated in its core mandate. This involves protecting humanitarian personnel from threats and enabling access to displaced populations amid ongoing tensions. Specific operations include confidence-building patrols, such as the one conducted in Agok on 8 October 2023, which enhanced security for aid corridors and community access to services. Joint patrols by contingents from Ghana, India, and Pakistan in southern Abyei, intensified as of January 2024, have similarly aimed to secure humanitarian routes amid rising insecurity. These measures have contributed to increased reporting of issues like sexual and gender-based violence, rising from 5 cases in 2019 to 30 in the first half of 2023, indicating improved community trust and access to support mechanisms.

Capacity-Building for Local Security

UNISFA's police component is mandated under Security Council Resolution 1990 (2011) to strengthen the capacity of the Abyei Police Service (APS) through support, including personnel training, and coordination on matters. This objective aims to enable local institutions to assume primary security responsibilities, facilitating eventual mission drawdown. However, the APS has remained non-operational since UNISFA's establishment, limiting direct implementation and redirecting efforts toward interim community-based mechanisms. In the absence of a functional APS, UNISFA has prioritized capacity-building for Community Protection Committees (CPCs) and Joint Protection Committees (JPCs), training members to align operations with international policing standards such as community-oriented practices and basic investigations. A key initiative occurred on May 30, 2018, when UN police conducted a program to standardize CPC and JPC procedures, enabling them to handle local disputes and security incidents independently under UN mentorship. This training emphasized skills like evidence collection and conflict resolution, with CPCs in areas like Abyei conducting supervised investigations, such as vehicle theft cases, demonstrating practical application. Further efforts include mentoring for emerging local structures; on June 30, 2022, UNISFA inaugurated a CPC in northern Abyei's Diffra area, attended by over 700 community members, with commitments to initiate formal and advisory support for CPC operations alongside troop-contributing countries. UN police have also provided technical advice, advocacy, and to traditional systems to enhance capacities, fostering hybrid local security frameworks amid institutional gaps. Preliminary actions for APS reform were undertaken in February 2018, assessing needs for restructuring and capacity programs, though persistent challenges like political delays in APS establishment have constrained progress. Mandate renewals, such as Resolution 2713 (2023), continue to emphasize these building efforts, but empirical outcomes remain modest, with reliance on ad hoc community initiatives rather than a sovereign police force.

Challenges, Incidents, and Controversies

Attacks on Peacekeepers and Security Incidents

The United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has encountered numerous attacks and security incidents targeting its personnel, primarily amid intercommunal violence between Ngok Dinka and Misseriya groups, as well as involvement by Sudanese armed forces such as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). These events have resulted in peacekeeper fatalities, injuries, detentions, and material losses, underscoring the mission's operational vulnerabilities in a contested border region prone to sporadic armed clashes. Official UN reports document at least seven peacekeeper deaths attributable to hostile actions since 2022, with incidents often involving ambushes on patrols, assaults on bases, and looting of vehicles. In January 2024, violence escalated sharply in southern Abyei, leading to multiple strikes against UNISFA assets. On 27 January, an armed group attacked the UNISFA base in Agok, which peacekeepers repelled, but the assault killed one Ghanaian peacekeeper and wounded others while also targeting civilians in nearby areas. Continuing clashes the following day resulted in the death of a second peacekeeper from Pakistan on 28 January, amid broader intercommunal fighting that claimed over 50 lives total. On 5 February, fresh attacks in the same region targeted UNISFA patrols, including heavy fire on an armored personnel carrier during an ambush, though no additional fatalities were reported in that instance. Earlier incidents highlight a pattern of convoy and patrol vulnerabilities. In March 2022, UNISFA recorded three armed attacks on its peacekeeper within weeks, including one on 14 February that damaged vehicles and endangered personnel southern . By April 2022, three direct assaults on had occurred in the preceding two months, prompting Security Council briefings that condemned the violence and demanded accountability. More recent events in 2024 and 2025 reflect ongoing threats from organized militias and state actors. On 25 June 2024, intruders breached a UNISFA camp in despite warnings, attacking peacekeepers and requiring the to restore order, with investigations confirming the incident's hostile nature. In November 2023, attacks in included erroneous reports of a peacekeeper fatality, later corrected by UNISFA, though the violence damaged mission infrastructure. On 14 February 2025, armed elements carjacked UNISFA vehicles in northern , prompting condemnation and an ongoing probe into potential war crimes. Most severely, on 28 February 2025, RSF forces detained over 60 UNISFA peacekeepers in , an action the Security Council denounced as a grave violation endangering mission operations. UNISFA statements consistently classify these attacks as threats to its mandate, often linking them to failures in local disarmament and broader Sudan-South Sudan border instability, with perpetrators rarely held accountable due to jurisdictional disputes between Khartoum and Juba. The mission has repelled many assaults through authorized use of force, but recurring incidents have strained troop morale and logistics, contributing to two fatalities in UNISFA—the highest among UN missions in early 2025.

Failures in Preventing Communal Violence

Despite its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, UNISFA has struggled to curb recurrent communal clashes in Abyei, particularly between Ngok Dinka, Twic Dinka, and Misseriya groups, which often stem from land disputes, cattle raiding, and resource competition. These incidents have frequently overwhelmed peacekeeping responses, leading to civilian casualties, displacement, and refugees seeking shelter at UN bases, highlighting gaps in proactive deterrence and rapid intervention. For instance, in March 2022, intensified fighting between Twic and Ngok Dinka communities resulted in at least 36 deaths and widespread displacement by early March. Subsequent years saw elevated violence levels, with the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) recording over 140 political violence events and more than 110 fatalities in Abyei from January to mid-March 2023 alone, amid inter-communal clashes involving Twic Dinka, Ngok Dinka, and Misseriya fighters. In September 2022, clashes in the Agok area of Sector South, 28 km from Abyei town, displaced over 223 civilians who fled to a UNISFA contingent operating base for protection, underscoring the force's reactive rather than preventive posture. Analyses attribute these shortcomings to UNISFA's limited robust capabilities against decentralized militias, dependence on host-state consent for operations, and failure to achieve comprehensive disarmament, allowing armed youth groups to initiate spontaneous attacks beyond patrol coverage. By 2024, persistent dynamics persisted, with reports noting heightened inter-communal risks in southern involving Ngok Dinka, Twic Dinka, and Nuer elements, despite efforts. A Norwegian of International Affairs assessment concluded that since 2022, UNISFA's civilian protection efficacy has been questioned amid high levels of sporadic violence, as patrols and monitoring proved insufficient against entrenched communal armaments and unresolved border tensions. These failures reflect broader challenges in addressing localized, non-state threats without stronger enforcement mechanisms or local buy-in for demilitarization.

Criticisms of Neutrality and Effectiveness

Criticisms of UNISFA's neutrality have centered on perceptions of favoritism toward Sudan or specific communities, often voiced by Ngok Dinka residents who accuse the mission of biased patrolling in the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SBDZ) and enabling Sudanese territorial claims. In September 2021, local communities protested UNISFA's operations, alleging the force sided with Sudan to annex parts of Abyei territory, a charge echoed in UN statements noting hostility toward the mission. Similarly, UNISFA's provision of security for Misseriya grazers while restricting Ngok Dinka returns to northern areas has fueled bias claims, as has acquiescence to Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) presence at Diffra airfield. Quick-impact projects in northern Abyei have been accused of facilitating Sudanese population engineering by supporting nomadic groups aligned with Khartoum. Sudanese youth leaders have also charged UNISFA with bias for allegedly blocking meetings between Ngok Dinka and Misseriya to prevent conflict resolution. During the 2022 Ngok-Twic Dinka clashes, deployments in contested southern River Kiir areas led to accusations of partiality. Both Sudan and South Sudan have undermined the mission's perceived impartiality through reciprocal bias allegations, complicating operations. UNISFA's effectiveness in protecting civilians and maintaining demilitarization has faced scrutiny for persistent failures amid rising violence, with incidents increasing from 58 in 2021 to 126 in 2023 despite the mission's presence. The January 2024 attack near Thokpiny killed 54 civilians and two peacekeepers, highlighting inadequate response capabilities even adjacent to bases. Specific lapses include the murder of Ngok Dinka Paramount Chief Kuol Deng Majok in 2013 by Misseriya militia in peacekeepers' presence, unchecked communal clashes in Aneet town between Ngok and Twic Dinka resulting in multiple deaths, and inability to halt the 2022 Ngok-Twic conflict or 14-Mile disputes between Dinka Malual and Rizeigat, prompting protests and mission evacuations from sites like Gok Machar. In March 2023, Ghanaian troops were accused of inaction during a Misseriya assault on Amiet village. A July 2025 raid near a UNISFA base killed several, underscoring proximity-based protection shortfalls. Abyei youth in 2013 demanded mandate termination for failing to curb Ngok Dinka killings and enforce weapons-free status. Structural issues exacerbate these: delayed Formed Police Units (authorized 492 personnel but undeployed), post-2022 multinational transition reducing deterrence, road-limited patrols neglecting remote areas, and overreliance on "hearts and minds" over robust enforcement. Limited mandate and Status of Forces Agreement constraints further hinder violence curbing, per analyses.

Impact and Assessment

Measurable Achievements in Stabilization

UNISFA has supported stabilization through systematic monitoring of the Abyei Area's demilitarized zone, including verification of troop withdrawals and heavy weapons restrictions as mandated by Security Council resolutions. Since its establishment in 2011, the mission has facilitated joint integrated field training exercises and patrols with Sudanese Armed Forces and Sudan People's Liberation Army contingents, enabling de-escalation along the Provisional Administrative Boundary. These activities have helped maintain a buffer against cross-border incursions, with UNISFA reporting compliance in key sectors during periodic assessments. Operational metrics include extensive community engagement to mitigate conflict drivers, such as 127 awareness-raising sessions conducted with Ngok Dinka and Misseriya nomads between October 2024 and April 2025, aimed at fostering dialogue on resource sharing and migration routes. Additionally, the mission performed 258 visits to detention facilities in the same period to monitor conditions and prevent abuses that could exacerbate communal tensions. These rule-of-law interventions correlate with reported trends of declining intercommunal clashes, as noted in Security Council discussions attributing partial credit to UNISFA's deterrent presence. In mine action, UNISFA has integrated demining support via UNMAS to clear explosive remnants of war, enhancing safe access for civilians and patrols while reducing accidental casualties that fuel instability. Mandate provisions since 2011 have prioritized this, yielding incremental progress in contaminated areas, though quantitative clearance data remains aggregated within broader Sudan programs. Overall, these efforts have sustained a fragile equilibrium, preventing reversion to 2011-level displacements exceeding 100,000 persons.

Empirical Shortcomings and Broader Failures

Despite its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat and monitor demilitarization since deployment in June 2011, UNISFA has demonstrated limited success in curbing intercommunal violence in Abyei, with clashes between Ngok Dinka communities and Misseriya nomads persisting at high levels. For instance, between 2011 and 2024, recurrent seasonal migrations have triggered deadly confrontations, resulting in hundreds of civilian deaths and displacements, including over 75 fatalities in cross-border violence in Warrap State and southern Abyei in March 2024 alone. UNISFA's internal evaluations and external assessments, such as those from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, have noted that while overall security showed temporary improvements, sporadic and spontaneous violence has undermined civilian protection efforts, particularly since 2022. Specific incidents highlight operational shortcomings in rapid response and deterrence. In January 2020, Misseriya militias attacked Tajalei village, killing at least 33 Ngok Dinka civilians; survivors reported that UNISFA forces, despite proximity, failed to provide effective protection or intervene decisively, prompting accusations of inadequate preparedness and leadership deficiencies from UK officials and local authorities. Similar lapses occurred in early 2024, when intercommunal clashes in southern Abyei led to the deaths of two UN peacekeepers and multiple civilians, with UNISFA issuing condemnations but unable to prevent escalation or ensure accountability. The Abyei administration has publicly blamed UNISFA for territorial protection failures, citing insufficient patrols and reliance on reactive rather than proactive measures amid ongoing threats. Broader systemic failures stem from UNISFA's constrained mandate, which prohibits offensive operations without host state consent and limits enforcement against non-state actors, rendering it ineffective against root causes like unresolved grazing rights disputes and weak local policing. This has perpetuated cycles of violence, contributing to two consecutive years of crop failures by 2024 due to insecurity, exacerbating food insecurity for over 100,000 residents without addressing underlying political impasse between Sudan and South Sudan. Observers argue that UNISFA's troop strength of approximately 4,000, drawn from under-resourced contributing nations, combined with restrictive rules of engagement, has prioritized survival over mandate fulfillment, mirroring patterns in other African UN missions where superior armaments fail to translate into pacification. As of late 2024, heightened risks from Sudan's civil war spillover continue to expose these gaps, with UNISFA unable to enforce buffer zones or deter armed incursions effectively.

Current Status and Outlook

Recent Developments Amid Sudan-South Sudan Tensions

On 14 November 2024, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2760 (2024), extending UNISFA's mandate until 15 November 2025, while urging Sudan and South Sudan to resolve their disputes over Abyei through dialogue and adhere to status quo arrangements to prevent escalation. The renewal occurred against a backdrop of heightened bilateral tensions, exacerbated by Sudan's ongoing civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces, which has disrupted cross-border logistics and forced UNISFA to redesign supply routes from South Sudan. Political instability in South Sudan, including internal factional disputes, has further strained cooperation on Abyei's administration, limiting joint mechanisms like the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mission (JBVMM). These tensions manifested in security incidents directly impacting UNISFA operations. On 23 June 2024, an alleged intrusion attempt at a UNISFA camp in Abyei resulted in one death and injuries, prompting the mission to reinforce perimeter security amid fears of spillover from Sudanese hostilities. In November 2024, multiple killings in Abyei town, attributed to communal clashes fueled by cross-border nomadic movements disputed between Sudan and South Sudan, drew UNISFA condemnation and calls for accountability from both governments. By 14 February 2025, carjackings of UNISFA vehicles in northern Abyei highlighted vulnerabilities, with the mission attributing such acts to weakened state control in border areas amid bilateral acrimony. Diplomatic efforts persisted but yielded limited progress. From 18 to 21 November 2024, UNISFA leadership engaged Sudanese officials in Port Sudan to address operational impediments, including taxation hindering mission mobility, yet South Sudan's reluctance to facilitate JBVMM re-establishment in key sectors persisted. In February 2025, Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix visited Sudan, Abyei, and South Sudan to advocate for enhanced bilateral coordination, emphasizing the need to mitigate how Sudan's conflict and South Sudan's internal pressures impede UNISFA's stabilization role. Overall, these developments underscore how unresolved sovereignty claims over Abyei's oil resources continue to amplify risks for UNISFA, with the mission's effectiveness constrained by the parties' failure to advance the 2011 referendum process.

Mandate Renewal and Prospects for Withdrawal

The extended the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for (UNISFA) until 15 November 2025 via Resolution 2760 (2024), adopted unanimously on 14 November 2024. This renewal maintains UNISFA's core tasks, including the protection of civilians, monitoring of the Temporary Administrative Unit, and facilitation of the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance, amid persistent intercommunal violence and unauthorized military presence in the area. The resolution also authorizes continued activities and extends the mission's police component for capacity-building with local forces. Prior extensions followed a similar annual pattern, with Resolution 2708 (2023) prolonging the mandate to 15 November 2024, emphasizing the need for and to demilitarize and withdraw their forces as stipulated in the 2011 Agreement on Temporary Arrangements for . These renewals reflect the Security Council's assessment that the underlying dispute over 's status—straddling and —remains unresolved, with no conducted as originally envisioned under the 2005 . Resolution 2760 (2024) specifically requests the Secretary-General to submit a strategic review of UNISFA by 15 August 2025, evaluating the mission's performance and potential adjustments based on progress toward demilitarization and local security handover. Prospects for UNISFA's withdrawal hinge on verifiable demilitarization by Sudan and South Sudan, alongside establishment of a joint administration and reduction in communal clashes between Ngok Dinka and Misseriya groups, conditions unmet since the mission's inception in 2011. Recent reports highlight South Sudan's non-compliance with withdrawal requests for its forces in southern Abyei, coupled with Sudan's broader instability from internal conflict, which has spilled over and hindered bilateral talks on border demarcation. While Sudanese authorities expressed openness in 2025 to resuming discussions with South Sudan on Abyei issues, including co-located forces, no concrete advancements have materialized, sustaining reliance on UNISFA for interim security. Security Council members continue to urge full evacuation of unauthorized troops, but ongoing violations—such as South Sudanese deployments aimed at countering violence—underscore limited feasibility for near-term drawdown, with the mission's troop strength capped at approximately 4,000 yet facing operational constraints.

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