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Cambodia
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Key Information
Cambodia,[a] officially the Kingdom of Cambodia,[b] is a country in Mainland Southeast Asia. It is bordered by Thailand to the northwest, Laos to the north, and Vietnam to the east, and has a coastline along the Gulf of Thailand in the southwest. It spans an area of 181,035 square kilometres (69,898 square miles), dominated by a low-lying plain and the confluence of the Mekong river and Tonlé Sap, Southeast Asia's largest lake. It is dominated by a tropical climate. Cambodia has a population of about 17 million people,[8] the majority of which are ethnically Khmer. Its capital and most populous city is Phnom Penh, followed by Siem Reap and Battambang.[18]
In 802 AD, Jayavarman II declared himself king, uniting the warring Khmer princes of Chenla under the name "Kambuja".[19] This marked the beginning of the Khmer Empire. The Indianised kingdom facilitated the spread of first Hinduism and then Buddhism to Southeast Asia and undertook religious infrastructural projects throughout the region, the most famous of which is Angkor Wat. In the 15th century, it began a decline in power until, in 1863, Cambodia became a French protectorate. Following Japanese occupation during World War II, Cambodia declared independence from France in 1953. The Vietnam War embroiled the country in civil war during the 1960s, culminating in a 1970 coup which installed the US-aligned Khmer Republic and the takeover of the communist Khmer Rouge in 1975. The Khmer Rouge ruled the country and carried out the Cambodian genocide from 1975 until 1979, until they were ousted during the Cambodian–Vietnamese War. Peace was restored by the 1991 Paris Peace Accords and subsequent United Nations peacekeeping mission, establishing a new constitution, holding the 1993 general election, and ending long-term insurgencies. The 1997 coup d'état consolidated power under Prime Minister Hun Sen and the Cambodian People's Party (CPP).
Cambodia is a constitutional monarchy and multi-party state,[20] although the CPP dominates the political system.[21] The UN designates Cambodia a least developed country.[22] Agriculture remains its dominant economic sector, with growth in textiles, construction, garments, and tourism leading to increased foreign investment and international trade.[23] Corruption, human rights issues and deforestation have remained challenges in Cambodia's post-conflict development. The official and most widely spoken language is Khmer, and the most widely practiced religion is Buddhism. The country's culture and traditions are shaped by its Angkorean heritage and international influences over its history.
Etymology
[edit]The Kingdom of Cambodia is the official English name of the country. The English Cambodia is an anglicisation of the French Cambodge, which in turn is the French transliteration of the Khmer កម្ពុជា (Kâmpŭchéa, pronounced [kampuciə]). Kâmpŭchéa is the shortened alternative to the country's official name in Khmer ព្រះរាជាណាចក្រកម្ពុជា (Preăh Réachéanachâkr Kâmpŭchéa, pronounced [preah riəciənaːcak kampuciə]. The Khmer endonym កម្ពុជា Kâmpŭchéa derives from the Sanskrit name कम्बोजदेश Kambojadeśa, composed of देश Deśa ("land of" or "country of") and कम्बोज (Kamboja), referring to the descendants of Kambu (a legendary Indian sage from the ancient Indian kingdom of Kamboja).[24] The term Cambodia was already in use in Europe as early as 1524, since Antonio Pigafetta cites it in his work Relazione del primo viaggio intorno al mondo (1524–1525) as Camogia.[25]
Scholar George Coedes refers to a 10th-century inscription of a Cambodian dynastic legend in which the hermit Kambu Swayambhuva and the celestial nymph Mera unite and establish the Cambodian Solar royal dynasty (Kambu-Mera), that begins with the Chenla ruler Srutavarman and his son Sreshthavarman. Coedes suggests that the Kambu Swayambhuva legend has its origins in southern India, as a version of the Kanchi Pallava dynasty creation myth.[26][27]
History
[edit]Prehistory
[edit]There exists evidence for a Pleistocene human occupation of what later is Cambodia, which includes quartz and quartzite pebble tools found in terraces along the Mekong River, in Stung Treng and Kratié provinces, and in Kampot province.[28] Some archaeological evidence shows communities of hunter-gatherers inhabited the region during the Holocene: the most ancient archaeological discovery site in Cambodia is considered to be the cave of Laang Spean, which belongs to the Hoabinhian period. Excavations in its lower layers produced a series of radiocarbon dates around 6000 BC.[28][29] Upper layers in the same site gave evidence of transition to Neolithic, containing the earliest dated earthenware ceramics in Cambodia.[30]
Archaeological records for the period between the Holocene and Iron Age remain equally limited. An event in prehistory was the penetration of the first rice farmers from the north, which began in the third millennium BC.[31] Prehistoric evidence are the "circular earthworks" discovered in the red soils near Memot and in the adjacent region of Vietnam in the latter 1950s. Their function and age are still debated, and some of them possibly date from the second millennium BC.[32][33] Other prehistoric sites of somewhat uncertain date are Samrong Sen (not far from the ancient capital of Oudong), where the first investigations began in 1875,[34] and Phum Snay, in the northern province of Banteay Meanchey.[35]
Iron was worked by about 500 BC, with supporting evidence coming from the Khorat Plateau, in what later is Thailand. In Cambodia, some Iron Age settlements were found beneath Baksei Chamkrong and other Angkorian temples while circular earthworks were discovered at the site of Lovea kilometres north-west of Angkor. Burials testify to improvement of food availability and trade, and the existence of a social structure and labour organisation.[36] Kinds of glass beads recovered from sites, such as the Phum Snay site in the northwest and the Prohear site in the southeast, suggest that there were two main trading networks at the time. The two networks were separated by time and space, which indicate that there was a shift from one network to the other at about the 2nd–4th century AD, probably due to changes in socio-political powers.[36]
Pre-Angkorian, Angkorian, and Post-Angkor
[edit]During the 3rd, 4th, and 5th centuries, the Indianised states of Funan and its successor, Chenla, coalesced in what later is Cambodia and southwestern Vietnam. For more than 2,000 years, what was to become Cambodia absorbed influences from India, passing them on to other Southeast Asian civilisations that later became Thailand and Laos.[37]
The Khmer Empire grew out of the remnants of Chenla, becoming firmly established in 802 when Jayavarman II (reigned c. 790 – c. 835) declared independence from Java and proclaimed themselves a Devaraja. They and their followers instituted the cult of the God-king and began a series of conquests that formed an empire which flourished in the area from the 9th to the 15th centuries.[38] During the rule of Jayavarman VIII the Angkor empire was attacked by the Mongol army of Kublai Khan; the king was able to buy peace.[39] Around the 13th century, Theravada missionaries from Sri Lanka reintroduced Theravada Buddhism to Southeast Asia, having sent missionaries previously in the 1190s.[40][41] The religion spread and eventually displaced Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism as the popular religion of Angkor; it was not the official state religion until 1295 when Indravarman III took power.[42]
The Khmer Empire was Southeast Asia's largest empire during the 12th century. The empire's centre of power was Angkor, where a series of capitals were constructed during the empire's zenith. In 2007 an international team of researchers using satellite photographs and other modern techniques concluded that Angkor had been the largest pre-industrial city in the world with an urban sprawl of 2,980 square kilometres (1,151 square miles).[43] The city could have supported a population of up to 1 million people.[44]
After a series of wars with neighbouring kingdoms, Angkor was sacked by the Ayutthaya Kingdom and abandoned in 1432 because of ecological failure and infrastructure breakdown.[45][46]

The hill tribe people were "hunted incessantly and carried off as slaves by the Siamese (Thai), the Annamites (Vietnamese), and the Cambodians".[47][48]
Formerly part of the Khmer Empire, the Mekong Delta had been controlled by the Vietnamese since 1698,[49] with King Chey Chettha II granting the Vietnamese permission to settle in the area decades before.[50]
French colonisation
[edit]In 1863, King Norodom signed a treaty of protection with France.[19] The protectorate of France period lasted until 1953, with a brief interruption while the kingdom was occupied by the Japanese empire from 1941 to 1945[51] and simultaneously existing as the puppet state of Kingdom of Kampuchea in 1945. Between 1874 and 1962, the total population increased from about 946,000 to 5.7 million.[52] After King Norodom's death in 1904, France manipulated the choice of king and Sisowath, Norodom's brother, was placed on the throne. The throne became vacant in 1941 with the death of Monivong, Sisowath's son, and France passed over Monivong's son, Monireth, feeling he was too independently minded. Instead, Norodom Sihanouk, a maternal grandson of King Sisowath was enthroned. The French thought young Sihanouk would be easy to control.[51] Under the reign of King Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia gained independence from France on 9 November 1953.[51]
Kingdom (1953–1970)
[edit]In 1955, Sihanouk abdicated in favour of his father to participate in politics and was elected prime minister. Upon his father's death in 1960, Sihanouk again became head of state, taking the title of prince. As the Vietnam War progressed, Sihanouk adopted an official policy of neutrality in the Cold War. Sihanouk allowed the Vietnamese communists to use Cambodia as a sanctuary and a supply route for their arms and other aid to their armed forces fighting in South Vietnam. In December 1967 Washington Post journalist Stanley Karnow was told by Sihanouk that if the U.S. wanted to bomb the Vietnamese communist sanctuaries, he would not object unless Cambodians were killed.[53]

The same message was conveyed to U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson emissary Chester Bowles in January 1968.[54] In public Sihanouk refuted the right of the U.S. to use air strikes in Cambodia, and on 26 March he said "these criminal attacks must immediately and definitively stop". On 28 March a press conference was held and Sihanouk appealed to the international media: "I appeal to you to publicise abroad this very clear stand of Cambodia—that is, I will, in any case, oppose all bombings on Cambodian territory under whatever pretext." Nevertheless, the bombing continued.[55]
Khmer Republic (1970–1975)
[edit]While visiting Beijing in 1970 Sihanouk was ousted by a military coup led by Prime Minister General Lon Nol and Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak.[56] Once the coup was completed, the new regime, which demanded that the Vietnamese communists leave Cambodia, gained the political support of the United States. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces launched armed attacks on the new government to retain their sanctuaries and supply lines from North Vietnam. The king urged his followers to help in overthrowing this government, hastening the onset of civil war.[57]
Khmer Rouge rebels began using him to gain support. From 1970 until 1972, the Cambodian conflict was largely between the government and army of Cambodia, and the armed forces of North Vietnam. As they gained control of Cambodian territory, the Vietnamese communists imposed a new political infrastructure, which was eventually dominated by the Cambodian communists now referred to as the Khmer Rouge.[59]
Documents uncovered from the Soviet archives after 1991 reveal that the North Vietnamese attempt to overrun Cambodia in 1970 was launched at the explicit request of the Khmer Rouge and negotiated by then second-in-command Nuon Chea.[60] North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units overran Cambodian army positions while the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) expanded their attacks on lines of communication. In response to the North Vietnamese invasion, US President Richard Nixon announced that US and South Vietnamese ground forces had entered Cambodia in a campaign aimed at destroying NVA base areas in Cambodia .[61]
On New Year's Day 1975, Communist troops launched an offensive which, in 117 days, led to the collapse of the Khmer Republic. Simultaneous attacks around the perimeter of Phnom Penh pinned down Republican forces, while other CPK units overran fire bases controlling the vital lower Mekong resupply route. A US-funded airlift of ammunition and rice ended when Congress refused additional aid for Cambodia. The Lon Nol government in Phnom Penh surrendered on 17 April 1975, 5 days after the US mission evacuated Cambodia.[62]
Khmer Rouge regime (1975–1978)
[edit]
Estimates as to how many people were killed by the Khmer Rouge regime range from approximately 1 to 3 million; a cited figure is 2 million (about a quarter of the population).[63][64][65] This era gave rise to the term Killing Fields, and the prison Tuol Sleng became known for its history of mass killing. Hundreds of thousands fled across the border into neighbouring Thailand. The regime disproportionately targeted ethnic minority groups. The Cham Muslims underwent purges with as much as half of their population exterminated.[66] Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot was determined to keep his power and disenfranchise any enemies or potential threats, and thus increased his violent and aggressive actions against his people.[67]
Forced repatriation in 1970 and deaths during the Khmer Rouge era reduced the Vietnamese population in Cambodia from between 250,000 and 300,000 in 1969 to a reported 56,000 in 1984.[52] Most of the victims of the Khmer Rouge regime were not ethnic minorities but ethnic Khmer. Professionals, such as doctors, lawyers and teachers, were targeted. According to Robert D. Kaplan, "eyeglasses were as deadly as the yellow star" as they were seen as a sign of intellectualism.[68]
By 1978, the entire legal system was eradicated by the Khmer Rouge regime. Judges and lawyers were executed after being deemed "class enemies" and only 6–12 legal professionals actually survived and remained in the country.[69]
Religious institutions were targeted by the Khmer Rouge. The majority of Khmer architecture, 95% of Cambodia's Buddhist temples, were destroyed.[70]
Vietnamese occupation and transition (1978–1992)
[edit]In November 1978, Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia in response to border raids by the Khmer Rouge[71] and conquered it. The People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was established as a pro-Soviet state led by the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party, a party created by the Vietnamese in 1951, and led by a group of Khmer Rouge who had fled Cambodia to avoid being purged by Pol Pot and Ta Mok.[72] It was fully beholden to the occupying Vietnamese army and under the direction of the Vietnamese ambassador to Phnom Penh. Its arms came from Vietnam and the Soviet Union.[73]
In opposition to the newly created state, a government-in-exile referred to as the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) was formed in 1981 from three factions.[73] This consisted of the Khmer Rouge, a royalist faction led by Sihanouk, and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front. Its credentials were recognised by the United Nations. The Khmer Rouge representative to UN, Thiounn Prasith, was retained, and he had to work in consultation with representatives of the noncommunist Cambodian parties.[74][75] The refusal of Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia led to economic sanctions.[76]

Peace efforts began in Paris in 1989 under the State of Cambodia, culminating two years later in October 1991 in a Paris Comprehensive Peace Settlement. The UN was given a mandate to enforce a ceasefire and deal with refugees and disarmament known as the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).[77]
Kingdom (1993–)
[edit]In 1993, the monarchy was restored with Norodom Sihanouk reinstated as King, and the first post-war election was coordinated by UNTAC. The election was won by FUNCINPEC led by Sihanouk's son Ranariddh in a hung parliament. A power-sharing agreement was agreed with Ranariddh and Hun Sen of the Cambodian People's Party both simultaneously being co-Prime Ministers after the CPP threatened to secede part of the country if power was fully transferred to FUNCINPEC. The stability established following the conflict was shaken in 1997 by a coup d'état led by the co-Prime Minister Hun Sen, who ousted Ranariddh and other parties represented in the government and consolidated power for CPP.[78][79] After its government was able to stabilize under Sen, Cambodia was accepted into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on 30 April 1999.[80][81] Norodom Sihamoni was crowned Cambodia's king in 2004 after his father Sihanouk's abdication.[82]
During the 1990s and 2000s, reconstruction efforts progressed which led to some political stability through a multiparty democracy under a constitutional monarchy[83] although Sen's rule has been marred by human rights abuses and corruption.[84] Cambodia's economy grew rapidly in the 2000s and 2010s,[85] and it received considerable investment and infrastructure development support from China as part of its Belt and Road Initiative.[86]

A UN-backed war crimes tribunal, the Khmer Rouge Tribunal sought out to investigate crimes committed during the Democratic Kampuchea period and prosecute its leaders. Hun Sen has opposed extensive trials or investigations of former Khmer Rouge officials.[87] In July 2010, Kang Kek Iew was the first Khmer Rouge member found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity in his role as the former commandant of the S21 extermination camp and he was sentenced to life in prison.[88][89]
After the 2013 Cambodian general election, allegations of voter fraud from opposition party Cambodia National Rescue Party led to widespread anti-government protests that continued into the following year. The protests ended after a crackdown by government forces.[90][91] The Cambodia National Rescue Party was dissolved ahead of the 2018 Cambodian general election and the ruling Cambodian People's Party also enacted tighter curbs on mass media.[92] The CPP won every seat in the National Assembly without major opposition, effectively solidifying de facto one-party rule in the country.[93][94]
Prime Minister Hun Sen assumed office 40 years ago and is one of the world's longest-serving leaders. He has been accused of crackdowns on opponents and critics. In December 2021, Hun Sen announced his support for his son Hun Manet to succeed him after the next general election in 2023.[95] A July 2023 Human Rights Watch report showed election fraud and vote tampering in the June 2022 commune elections.[96] In the July 2023 election, the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) won by a landslide in an election, after the disqualification of a Cambodia's opposition, Candlelight Party.[97] On 22 August 2023, Hun Manet was sworn in as the new Cambodian prime minister.[98]
Geography
[edit]

Cambodia has an area of 181,035 square kilometres (69,898 square miles) and lies entirely within the tropics, between latitudes 10° and 15°N, and longitudes 102° and 108°E. It borders Thailand to the north and west, Laos to the northeast, and Vietnam to the east and southeast. It has a 443-kilometre (275-mile) coastline along the Gulf of Thailand.[17][83]
Cambodia's landscape is characterised by a low-lying central plain that is surrounded by uplands and low mountains and includes the Tonle Sap (Great Lake) and the upper reaches of the Mekong River delta. Extending outward from this central region are transitional plains, thinly forested and rising to elevations of about 650 feet (200 metres) above sea level.[99][100] In Cambodia forest cover is around 46% of the total land area, equivalent to 8,068,370 hectares (ha) of forest in 2020, down from 11,004,790 hectares (ha) in 1990. In 2020, naturally regenerating forest covered 7,464,400 hectares (ha) and planted forest covered 603,970 hectares (ha). Of the naturally regenerating forest 4% was reported to be primary forest (consisting of native tree species with no clearly visible indications of human activity). For the year 2015, 100% of the forest area was reported to be under public ownership.[101][102]
To the north the Cambodian plain abuts a sandstone escarpment, which forms a southward-facing cliff stretching more than 200 miles (320 kilometres) from west to east and rising abruptly above the plain to heights of 600 to 1,800 feet (180–550 metres). This cliff marks the southern limit of the Dângrêk Mountains.[103][104][105]
Flowing south through Cambodia's eastern regions is the Mekong River.[106] East of the Mekong the transitional plains gradually merge with the eastern highlands, a region of forested mountains and high plateaus that extend into Laos and Vietnam.[107] In southwestern Cambodia two distinct upland blocks, the Krâvanh Mountains and the Dâmrei Mountains, form another highland region that covers much of the land area between the Tonle Sap and the Gulf of Thailand.[108]
In this largely uninhabited area, Phnom Aural, Cambodia's highest peak rises to an elevation of 5,949 feet (1,813 metres).[109] The southern coastal region adjoining the Gulf of Thailand is a narrow lowland strip, heavily wooded and sparsely populated, which is isolated from the central plain by the southwestern highlands.[110]
The most distinctive geographical feature is the inundations of the Tonle Sap, measuring about 2,590 square kilometres (1,000 square miles) during the dry season and expanding to about 24,605 square kilometres (9,500 square miles) during the rainy season. This densely populated plain, which is devoted to wet rice cultivation, is the heartland of Cambodia. Much of this area has been designated as a biosphere reserve.[111]
Climate
[edit]
Cambodia's climate, like that of the rest of Southeast Asia, is dominated by monsoons, which are known as tropical wet and dry because of the distinctly marked seasonal differences.[110][112]
Cambodia has a temperature range from 21 to 35 °C (70 to 95 °F) and experiences tropical monsoons.[112] Southwest monsoons blow inland bringing moisture-laden winds from the Gulf of Thailand and Indian Ocean from May to October.[113] The northeast monsoon ushers in the dry season, which lasts from November to April.[114] The country experiences the heaviest precipitation from September to October with the driest period occurring from January to February.[115]
According to the International Development Research Centre and The United Nations, Cambodia is considered Southeast Asia's most vulnerable country to the effects of climate change, alongside the Philippines.[116][117] Nearly all provinces in Cambodia are affected by climate change.[118] Rural coastal populations are particularly at risk. Shortages of clean water, extreme flooding, mudslides, higher sea levels and potentially destructive storms are of particular concern, according to the Cambodia Climate Change Alliance. Climate change has also had a major impact on water levels, ecology and productivity of the Tonlé Sap in recent years, affecting the food security and agriculture of a large proportion of Cambodia's population.[119][120]
Cambodia has two distinct seasons. The rainy season, which runs from May to October, can see temperatures drop to 22 °C (72 °F) and is generally accompanied with high humidity. The dry season lasts from November to April when temperatures can rise up to 40 °C (104 °F) around April. Disastrous flooding occurred in 2001 and again in 2002, with some degree of flooding almost every year.[121] Severe flooding also affected 17 provinces in Cambodia during the 2020 Pacific typhoon season.[122]
Biodiversity and conservation
[edit]
Cambodia's biodiversity is largely founded on its seasonal tropical forests, containing some 180 recorded tree species, and riparian ecosystems. There are 212 mammal species, 536 bird species, 240 reptile species, 850 freshwater fish species (Tonle Sap Lake area), and 435 marine fish species recorded by science. Much of this biodiversity is contained around the Tonle Sap Lake and the surrounding biosphere.[123]
The Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve is a reserve surrounding the Tonle Sap lake. It encompasses the lake and nine provinces: Kampong Thom, Siem Reap, Battambang, Pursat, Kampong Chhnang, Banteay Meanchey, Pailin, Oddar Meanchey and Preah Vihear. In 1997, it was successfully nominated as a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve.[124] Other key habitats include the evergreen and dry Dipterocarp forests of Mondolkiri province, protected by Keo Seima Wildlife Sanctuary, Phnom Prich Wildlife Sanctuary, and Srepok Wildlife Sanctuary, as well as Ratanakiri province, and the Cardamom Mountains ecosystem, including Preah Monivong National Park, Botum-Sakor National Park, and the Phnom Aural Wildlife Sanctuary and Phnom Samkos Wildlife Sanctuary.
The Worldwide Fund for Nature recognises six distinct terrestrial ecoregions in Cambodia – the Cardamom Mountains rain forests, Central Indochina dry forest, Southeast Indochina dry evergreen forest, Southern Annamite Range tropical forest, Tonle Sap freshwater swamp forest, and Tonle Sap-Mekong peat swamp forest.[125]


The rate of deforestation in Cambodia is one of the highest in the world and it is often perceived as the most destructive, singular environmental issue in the country.[126] Cambodia's primary forest cover fell from over 70% in 1969 to just 3.1% in 2007. Since 2007, less than 3,220 km2 (1,243 sq mi) of primary forest remain with the result that the future sustainability of the forest reserves of Cambodia is under severe threat.[127][128] In 2010–2015, the annual rate of deforestation was 1.3%. The environmental degradation also includes national parks and wildlife sanctuaries on a large scale and many endangered and endemic species are now threatened with extinction due to loss of habitats. Reasons for the deforestation in Cambodia range from opportunistic illegal loggings to large scale clearings from big construction projects and agricultural activities. The deforestation involves the local population, Cambodian businesses and authorities as well as transnational corporations from all over the world.[129][130]
Plans for hydroelectric development in the Greater Mekong Subregion, by Laos in particular, pose a "real danger to the food supply of Vietnam and Cambodia. Upstream dams will imperil the fish stocks that provide the vast majority of Cambodia's protein and could also denude the Mekong River of the silt Vietnam needs for its rice basket." The rich fisheries of Tonle Sap, the largest freshwater lake in Southeast Asia, largely supply the impoverished country's protein. The lake all but disappears in the dry season and then expands massively as water flow from the Mekong backs up when the rains come. "Those fish are so important for their livelihoods, both economically and nutritionally", said Gordon Holtgrieve, a professor at the University of Washington; he points out that none of the dams that are either built or being built on the Mekong river "are pointing at good outcomes for the fisheries".[131]
In the 2010s, the Cambodian government and educational system has increased its involvement and co-operation with both national and international environmental groups.[132][133][134] A new National Environmental Strategy and Action Plan (NESAP) for Cambodia is to be implemented from late 2016 to 2023 and contains new ideas for how to incite a green and environmentally sustainable growth for the country.[135]
Administrative divisions
[edit]The autonomous municipality (reach thani) and provinces (khaet) of Cambodia are first-level administrative divisions. Cambodia is divided into 25 provinces including the autonomous municipality.
Municipalities and districts are the second-level administrative divisions of Cambodia. The provinces are subdivided into 159 districts and 26 municipalities. The districts and municipalities in turn are further divided into communes (khum) and quarters (sangkat).
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Politics
[edit]
Legislative powers are shared by the executive and the bicameral Parliament of Cambodia (សភាតំណាងរាស្ត្រ, sâphéa tâmnang réastrâ), which consists of a lower house, the National Assembly (រដ្ឋសភា, rôdthâsâphéa) and an upper house, the Senate (ព្រឹទ្ធសភា, prœ̆tthôsâphéa). Members of the 123-seat National Assembly are elected through a system of proportional representation and serve for a maximum term of five years. The Senate has 61 seats, two of which are appointed by the king and two others by the National Assembly, and the rest elected by the commune councillors from the 24 provinces of Cambodia. Senators serve six-year terms.[137]
Officially a multiparty democracy, in reality, "the country remain[ed] a one-party state dominated by the Cambodian People's Party and Prime Minister Hun Sen, a recast Khmer Rouge official in power since 1985. The open doors to new investment during his reign have yielded the most access to a coterie of cronies of his and his wife, Bun Rany", according to Megha Bahree, a writer on Forbes.[138] Cambodia's government has been described by Human Rights Watch's Southeast Asian director, David Roberts, as a "relatively authoritarian coalition via a superficial democracy".[139]
Prime Minister Hun Sen vowed to rule until he turned 74.[140][90] His government was regularly accused of ignoring human rights and suppressing political dissent. The 2013 election results were disputed by the opposition, leading to demonstrations in the capital. Demonstrators were injured and killed in Phnom Penh where a reported 20,000 protesters gathered, with some clashing with riot police.[141] From a humble farming background, Hun Sen was 33 when he took power in 1985, and was by some considered a long-ruling dictator.[142] Hun Sen was succeeded by his son Hun Manet as Prime Minister in August 2023 following an election that was deemed by independent and foreign media and politicians to be neither free nor fair.[5][6][7] Hun Sen remains the de facto ruler of Cambodia through his continued leadership of the Cambodian People's Party.[143] Following the 2024 Senate election, Hun Sen became president of the Senate, a role which gives him the power to sign off on laws in the King's absence.[144]
Since the 2017 crackdowns on political dissent and free press, Cambodia has been described as a de facto one-party state.[145][146][147]
Censorship
[edit]On 14 March 2018, the UN expert on the human rights situation in Cambodia "expressed serious concerns about restrictions on the media, freedom of expression and political participation ahead of a national election in July".[148] Some critics of the government have been arrested for allegedly spreading fake news about the COVID-19 pandemic in Cambodia.[149][150]
Foreign relations
[edit]
Cambodia has established diplomatic relations with other countries; the government reports 20 embassies in the country[151] including some of its Asian neighbours and those of "important players" during the Paris peace negotiations, including the US, Australia, Canada, China, the European Union (EU), Japan, and Russia.[152]

While the violent ruptures of the 1970s and 1980s have passed, several border disputes between Cambodia and its neighbours persist. There are disagreements over some offshore islands and sections of the boundary with Vietnam and undefined maritime boundaries. Cambodia and Thailand have border disputes, with troops clashing over land immediately adjacent to the temple of Preah Vihear in particular, leading to a deterioration in relations. Most of the territory belongs to Cambodia, and a combination of Thailand disrespecting international law, Thai troops upbuild in the area and lack of resources for the Cambodian military have left the situation unsettled since 1962.[153][154]
Cambodia and China have cultivated ties in the 2010s. A Chinese company with the support of the People's Liberation Army built a deep-water seaport along 90 km (56 mi) stretch of Cambodian coastline of the Gulf of Thailand in Koh Kong province; the port is sufficiently deep to be used by cruise ships, bulk carriers or warships. Cambodia's diplomatic support has been invaluable to Beijing's effort to claim disputed areas in the South China Sea. Because Cambodia is a member of ASEAN, and because under ASEAN rules "the objections of one member can thwart any group initiative", Cambodia is diplomatically useful to China as a counterweight to southeast Asian nations that have closer ties to the United States.[155]
Cambodia is the 70th most peaceful country in the world, according to the 2024 Global Peace Index.[156]
Military
[edit]
Hun Sen has accumulated highly centralised power in Cambodia, including a praetorian guard that 'appears to rival the capabilities of the country's regular military units', and is allegedly used by Hun Sen to quell political opposition.'[157] Cambodia signed the UN treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.[158]
Political culture
[edit]
Hun Sen was a former Khmer Rouge commander who was originally installed by the Vietnamese and, after the Vietnamese left the country, maintains his strong man position by violence and oppression when deemed necessary.[159] In 1997, fearing the growing power of his co-prime minister, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, Hun launched a coup, using the army to purge Ranariddh and his supporters. Ranariddh was ousted and fled to Paris while other opponents of Hun Sen were arrested, tortured, and some summarily executed.[159][160]
In addition to political oppression, the Cambodian government has been accused of corruption in the sale of areas of land to foreign investors resulting in the eviction of thousands of villagers[161] as well as taking bribes in exchange for grants to exploit Cambodia's oil wealth and mineral resources.[162] Cambodia is consistently listed as one of the most corrupt governments in the world.[163][164][165] Amnesty International recognises one prisoner of conscience in the country: 33-year-old land rights activist Yorm Bopha.[166]
Lawyers did not reappear until 1995 when the Bar Association of the Kingdom of Cambodia was created.[167][168]
Journalists covering a protest over disputed election results in Phnom Penh on 22 September 2013 say they were deliberately attacked by police and men in plain clothes, with slingshots and stun guns. The attack against the president of the Overseas Press Club of Cambodia, Rick Valenzuela, was captured on video. The violence came amid political tensions as the opposition boycotted the opening of Parliament due to concerns about electoral fraud. Seven reporters sustained minor injuries while at least two Cambodian protesters were hit by slingshot projectiles and hospitalised.[169]
In 2017, Cambodia's Supreme Court dissolved the main opposition party, Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), paving the way for a return to a yet more authoritarian political system.[170]
Corruption
[edit]Corruption affects the judiciary, the police, and other state institutions. There is favoritism. Lack of a distinction between the courts and the executive branch of government makes for a politicisation of the judicial system.[171]
Examples of areas where people encounter corrupt practices in their everyday lives include obtaining medical services, dealing with alleged traffic violations, and pursuing fair court verdicts. Companies deal with extensive red tape when obtaining licenses and permits, especially construction-related permits, and the demand for and supply of bribes exist in this process. The 2010 Anti-Corruption Law provided no protection to whistle-blowers, and whistle-blowers can be jailed for up to 6 months if they report corruption that cannot be proven.[171]
Human rights
[edit]
A US State Department report says "forces under Hun Sen and the Cambodian People's Party have committed frequent and large-scale abuses, including extrajudicial killings and torture, with impunity".[172] According to the 2016 Global Slavery Index, an estimated 256,800 people are enslaved in modern-day Cambodia, or 1.65% of the population.[173]
There are forced land evictions by senior officials, security forces, and government-connected business leaders.[174] Land has been confiscated from hundreds of thousands of Cambodians over more than a decade for the purpose of self-enrichment and maintaining power of various groups of special interests.[175] Credible non-governmental organisations estimate that "770,000 people have been adversely affected by land grabbing covering at least four million hectares (nearly 10 million acres) of land that have been confiscated", says Paris-based International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH).[176]
Economy
[edit]
Oil and natural gas deposits found beneath Cambodia's territorial waters in 2005 yield potential and remain mostly untapped, due in part to territorial disputes with Thailand.[177][178]

In 2012, Credit Bureau Cambodia was established with direct regulatory oversight by the National Bank of Cambodia.[179]
Fear of renewed political instability and corruption within the government discourage foreign investment and delay foreign aid, while there has been aid from bilateral and multilateral donors. Donors pledged $504 million to the country in 2004,[83] while the Asian Development Bank alone has provided $850 million in loans, grants, and technical assistance.[180] Bribes are sometimes demanded from companies operating in Cambodia when obtaining licences and permits, such as construction-related permits.[181]
Textiles
[edit]The garment industry represents the largest portion of Cambodia's manufacturing sector, accounting for 80% of the country's exports. In 2012, the exports grew to $4.61 billion up 8% over 2011. In the first half of 2013, the garment industry reported exports worth $1.56 billion.[182]
Better Factories Cambodia was created in 2001 as a partnership between the ILO and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the World Bank Group. The programme engages with workers, employers, and governments to improve working conditions and boost the competitiveness of the garment industry.[183] On 18 May 2018, the Project Advisory Committee (PAC) of the ILO Better Factories Cambodia Programme met in Phnom Penh to provide input into the draft conclusions and recommendations of the BFC's independent mid-term evaluation, as well as to discuss options on how to further strengthen the programme's transparent reporting initiative. The members of the PAC concurred with the findings of the evaluation related to the impact the programme has had on the Cambodian garment sector and workers, including:
- contributing to sustained overall growth of the garment industry
- improving the lives of at least half a million Cambodian workers of factories in the BFC programme and many more of their family members;
- ensuring that workers receive correct wages and social protection benefits
- virtually eliminating child labour in the sector
- making Cambodia's garment factories safer overall
- creating a "level playing field" for labour across garment sector
- influencing business practices through (1) using factory data to highlight areas for improvement and (2) being a core part of risk management strategies of international brands and buyers.[184]
Tourism
[edit]
The tourism industry is the country's second-greatest source of hard currency after the textile industry, specifically garment-making industry.[186][77] International visitor arrivals in 2023 topped 5.4 million based on the Tourism Statistics Report published by the Minister of Tourism.[187] Reasons for growing tourism include a booming domestic tourism market, government policies to attract the Chinese market, and investments in new infrastructure like the Siem Reap Angkor International Airport.[188][189] Tourism employs 26% of the country's workforce, which translates into roughly 2.5 million jobs for Cambodians.[190]
Besides Phnom Penh and Angkor Wat, other tourist destinations include Sihanoukville in the southwest, which has beaches, and Battambang in the northwest, both of which are stops for backpackers.[191] The area around Kampot and Kep including the Bokor Hill Station are also of interest to visitors. Tourism has increased steadily each year in the relatively stable period since the 1993 UNTAC elections.[192]

Most international arrivals in 2018 were Chinese. Tourism receipts exceeded US$4.4 billion in 2018, accounting for almost ten percent of the kingdom's gross national product. The Angkor Wat historical park in Siem Reap Province, the beaches in Sihanoukville, the capital city Phnom Penh, and Cambodia's 150 casinos (up from just 57 in 2014)[193] are the main attractions for foreign tourists.
Cambodia's reputation as a safe destination for tourism has been hindered by civil and political unrest[194][195][196] and several examples of crime committed against tourists visiting the kingdom.[197][198][199]
Cambodia's tourist souvenir industry employs people around the main places of interest. The quantity of souvenirs produced is insufficient to face the increasing number of tourists. Most products sold to tourists on the markets are imported from China, Thailand, and Vietnam.[200]
Transport
[edit]Cambodia has two rail lines, totalling about 612 kilometres (380 miles) of single, one-metre (3-foot-3-inch) gauge track.[201] The lines run from the capital to Sihanoukville on the southern coast. Trains are again running to and from the Cambodian capital and destinations in the south. After 14 years, regular rail services between the two cities restarted – offering a safer option than road for travellers.[202] Trains run from Phnom Penh to Sisophon (trains often run only as far as Battambang). As of 1987, only one passenger train per week operated between Phnom Penh and Battambang and a US$141 million project, funded mostly by the Asian Development Bank, has been started to revitalise the languishing rail system that will "(interlink) Cambodia with major industrial and logistics centres in Bangkok and Ho Chi Minh City".[201]

In 2004, the number of road fatalities per 10,000 vehicles was ten times higher in Cambodia than in the developed world, and the number of road deaths had doubled in the preceding three years.[203]
The Mekong and the Tonle Sap River, their tributaries, and the Tonle Sap provided avenues, including 3,700 kilometres (2,300 miles) navigable all year by craft drawing 0.6 metres (2.0 feet) and another 282 kilometres (175 miles) navigable to craft drawing 1.8 metres (5.9 feet).[204]
With increasing economic activity has come an increase in automobile use, while motorcycles still predominate.[205] "Cyclo" (as hand-me-down French) or Cycle rickshaws were more popular in the 1990s and are increasingly replaced by remorques (carriages attached to motorcycles) and rickshaws imported from India. Cyclos are unique to Cambodia in that the cyclist sits behind the passenger seat.[206]
Cambodia has three commercial airports. In 2018, they handled a record of 10 million passengers.[207]
Science and technology
[edit]A National Committee for Science and Technology representing 11 ministries has been in place since 1999. While seven ministries are responsible for the country's 33 public universities, the majority of these institutions come under the umbrella of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports.[208]
In 2010, the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports approved a Policy on Research Development in the Education Sector. This move represented the first step towards a national approach to research and development across the university sector and the application of research for the purposes of national development.[208]
This policy was followed by the country's first National Science and Technology Master Plan 2014–2020. It was officially launched by the Ministry of Planning in December 2014, as the culmination of a two-year process supported by the Korea International Cooperation Agency. The plan makes provision for establishing a science and technology foundation to promote industrial innovation, with a particular focus on agriculture, primary industry and ICTs.[208][209] Cambodia was ranked 103rd in the Global Innovation Index in 2024.[210]
Energy
[edit]Cambodia has potential for developing renewable energy resources. It serves as a model to learn from for other ASEAN countries in terms of conducting solar power auctions.[211] To attract more investment in renewable energy, the government could improve renewable energy governance, adopt clear targets, develop an effective regulatory framework, improve project bankability and facilitate market entry for international investors.[211] Cambodia is "highly vulnerable" to the negative effects of climate change and it is advised that the country focuses more on developing renewable energy as part of climate change mitigation measures.[212]
Trade unions
[edit]
Cambodia ranked among the worst places in the world for organised labour in the 2015 International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) Global Rights Index, with the country ranked in the category of countries with "no guarantee of rights".[213]
In April 2016, Cambodia's National Assembly adopted a Law on Trade Unions. "The law was proposed at a time when workers have been staging sustained protests in factories and in the streets demanding wage increases and improvements in their working conditions".[214] Concerns about Cambodia's new law were shared not only by labour and rights groups but international organisations more generally: the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Country Office for Thailand, Cambodia and Lao PDR noted that the law had "several key concerns and gaps".[215]
Demographics
[edit]| Year | Pop. | ±% p.a. |
|---|---|---|
| 1962 | 5,728,771 | — |
| 1980 | 6,600,000 | +0.79% |
| 1994 | 9,900,000 | +2.94% |
| 1996 | 10,700,000 | +3.96% |
| 1998 | 11,437,656 | +3.39% |
| 2004 | 12,800,000 | +1.89% |
| 2008 | 13,395,682 | +1.14% |
| 2013 | 14,700,000 | +1.88% |
| 2019 | 15,552,211 | +0.94% |
| National Institute of Statistics: General Population Census of the Kingdom of Cambodia 2019, Chapter 2, p. 6[136] | ||
The French protectorate of Cambodia conducted its first official census in 1921. Only men aged 20 to 60 were counted, as its purpose was for the collection of taxes.[216] After the 1962 population census was conducted, Cambodia's civil conflicts and instability lead to a 36-year-long gap before the country could have another official census in 1998.[217]
As of 2010, half of the Cambodian population is younger than 22 years old. At a 1.04 female to male ratio, Cambodia has the most female-biased sex ratio in the Greater Mekong Subregion.[218] Among the Cambodian population aged over 65, the female to male ratio is 1.6:1.[83]
The total fertility rate in Cambodia was 2.5 children per woman in 2018.[219] The fertility rate was 4.0 children in 2000.[220] Women in urban areas have 2.2 children on average, compared with 3.3 children per woman in rural areas.[220] Fertility is highest in Mondol Kiri and Rattanak Kiri Provinces, where women have an average of 4.5 children, and lowest in Phnom Penh where women have an average of 2.0 children.[220]
Ethnic groups
[edit]
The majority of Cambodia's population is of ethnic Khmer origin (95.8%) who are speakers of the Khmer language, the country's sole official language. Cambodia's population is largely homogeneous. Its minority groups include Chams (1.8%), Vietnamese (0.5%) and Chinese (0.6%).[221][222]
The Vietnamese are the second-largest ethnic minority in Cambodia, with an estimated 16,000 living in provinces concentrated in the southeast of the country adjacent to the Mekong Delta. While the Vietnamese language has been determined to be a Mon–Khmer language, there are fewer cultural connections between the two peoples because the early Khmers were influenced by the Indian cultural sphere while the Vietnamese are part of the Chinese cultural sphere.[223] Ethnic tensions between the Khmer and the Vietnamese can be traced to the Post-Angkor Period (from the 16th to 19th centuries), during which time Vietnam and Thailand each attempted to vassalise a weakened post-Angkor Cambodia, and effectively dominate all of Indochina.[223] Chinese Cambodians are approximately 0.6% of the population.[222]
Largest cities
[edit]| Rank | Name | Province | Pop. | Rank | Name | Province | Pop. | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Phnom Penh | – | 2,281,951 | 11 | Chbar Mon | Kampong Speu | 50,359 | ||
| 2 | Siem Reap | Siem Reap | 245,494 | 12 | Bavet | Svay Rieng | 43,783 | ||
| 3 | Battambang | Battambang | 119,251 | 13 | Doun Kaev | Takéo | 43,402 | ||
| 4 | Sisophon | Banteay Meanchey | 99,019 | 14 | Svay Rieng | Svay Rieng | 41,424 | ||
| 5 | Poipet | Banteay Meanchey | 98,934 | 15 | Kampong Chhnang | Kampong Chhnang | 41,080 | ||
| 6 | Ta Khmau | Kandal | 75,629 | 16 | Kampong Cham | Kampong Cham | 38,365 | ||
| 7 | Sihanoukville | Preah Sihanouk | 73,036 | 17 | Pailin | Pailin | 37,393 | ||
| 8 | Samraong | Oddar Meanchey | 70,944 | 18 | Prey Veng | Prey Veng | 36,254 | ||
| 9 | Pursat | Pursat | 58,355 | 19 | Suong | Tboung Khmum | 35,054 | ||
| 10 | Stueng Saen | Kampong Thom | 53,118 | 20 | Kampot | Kampot | 32,053 | ||
Languages
[edit]The Khmer language is a member of the Mon–Khmer subfamily of the Austroasiatic language group. French, once the language of government in Indochina, is the language of instruction in some schools and universities that are funded by the government of France. There is a French-language newspaper and some TV channels are available in French. Cambodia is a member of La Francophonie. Cambodian French, a remnant of the country's colonial past, is a dialect found in Cambodia and is sometimes used in government, particularly in court. Since 1993, there has been a growing use of English, which has been replacing French as the main foreign language. English is taught in universities and there is a press in that language, while street signs are bilingual in Khmer and English.[225] Due to this shift, mostly English is now used in Cambodia's international relationships, and it has replaced French both on Cambodia's stamps and, since 2002, on Cambodian currency.[226]
Religion
[edit]Theravada Buddhism is the official religion of Cambodia, practised by more than 95 per cent of the population with an estimated 4,392 monastery temples throughout the country.[227] Islam is followed by about 2% of the population. There are three varieties of the religion. Two of which are practised by the Cham people; the third is practiced by the descendants of Malays, who have lived in the country for generations. Cambodia's Muslim population is reported to be 80% ethnic Cham.[228]
Health
[edit]
Cambodian life expectancy was 75 years in 2021,[229] an improvement since 1995 when the average life expectancy was 55.[230] Health care is offered by public and private practitioners and research has found that trust in health providers is a key factor in improving the uptake of health care services in rural Cambodia.[231]
Cambodia's infant mortality rate has decreased from 86 per 1,000 live births in 1998 to 24 in 2018.[232] In the province with worst health indicators, Ratanakiri, 22.9% of children die before age five.[233]
According to some estimates, unexploded land mines have been responsible for over 60,000 civilian deaths and thousands more maimed or injured since 1970.[234] The number of reported landmine casualties has decreased, from 800 in 2005 to 111 in 2013 (22 dead and 89 injured).[235] Adults that survive landmines sometimes require amputation of one or more limbs and have to resort to begging for survival.[234] Cambodia is expected to be free of land mines by 2025[236] with the social and economic legacy, including orphans and one in 290 people being an amputee.[237] In Cambodia, landmines and exploded ordnance alone have caused 44,630 injuries between 1979 and 2013, according to the Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System.[238]
In the 2024 Global Hunger Index (GHI), Cambodia ranks 68th out of 127 countries with sufficient data. Cambodia's GHI score is 14.7, which indicates a moderate level of hunger.[239]
Education
[edit]
The 2019 Cambodian census estimated that 88.5% of the population was literate (91.1% of men and 86.2% of women).[136] Male youth age (15–24 years) have a literacy rate of 89% compared to 86% for females.[240]
There have been improvements to the education system, especially in terms of primary net enrolment gains, the introduction of programme based-budgeting, and the development of a policy framework which helps disadvantaged children to gain access to education. The country has invested in vocational education, especially in rural areas, to tackle poverty and unemployment. [241][242]
Traditionally, education in Cambodia was offered by the wats (Buddhist temples), thus providing education exclusively for the male population.[243] Education has underwent setbacks from child labour, A study by Kim (2011) reports that most employed children in Cambodia are enrolled in school and their employment is associated with late school entry, negative impacts on their learning outcomes, and increased drop out rates.[244] With respect to academic performance among Cambodian primary school children, research showed that parental attitudes and beliefs played a role.[245]
Crime
[edit]In 2017, Cambodia had a homicide rate of 2.4 per 100,000 population.[246]
Prostitution is illegal in Cambodia. In a series of 1993 interviews of women about prostitution, three quarters of the interviewees found being a prostitute to be a norm and a profession they felt was not shameful having.[247] That same year, it was estimated that there were about 100,000 sex workers in Cambodia.[247]
On 18 August 2019, Prime Minister Hun Sen signed a directive banning the Finance Ministry from issuing new online gambling licenses, while operators currently holding online licenses would only be allowed to continue operating until those licenses expire. The directive cited the fact that "some foreigners have used this form of gambling to cheat victims inside and outside the country" as justifying the new policy.[248] Cambodia had issued over 150 such licenses before the new policy was announced.[249]
Culture
[edit]
Traditionally, the Khmer people have a recorded information on Tra leaves. Tra leaf books record legends of the Khmer people, the Ramayana, the origin of Buddhism and other prayer books. They are taken care of by wrapping in cloth to protect from moisture and the climate.[250] Bon Om Touk (Cambodian Water & Moon Festival), the annual boat rowing contest, is the most attended Cambodian national festival. Held at the end of the rainy season when the Mekong River begins to sink back to its normal levels allowing the Tonle Sap River to reverse flow, approximately 10% of Cambodia's population attends this event each year to play games, give thanks to the moon, watch fireworks, dine, and attend the boat race in a carnival-type atmosphere.[251]
Every year, Cambodians visit pagodas across the country to mark the Pchum Ben (Ancestors' Day). During the 15-day festival, people offer prayers and food to the spirits of their dead relatives. For most Cambodians, it is a time to remember their relatives who died during the 1975–1979 Khmer Rouge regime.[252]
Cuisine
[edit]Rice is the staple grain, as in other Southeast Asian countries. Fish from the Mekong and Tonlé Sap rivers is a part of the diet. The supply of fish and fish products for food and trade as of 2000[update] was 20 kilograms (44 pounds) per person or 2 ounces per day per person.[253]
French influence on Cambodian cuisine includes the Cambodian red curry with toasted baguette bread. The toasted baguette pieces are dipped in the curry and eaten. Cambodian red curry is eaten with rice and rice vermicelli noodles. A dine out dish, kuyteav, is a pork broth rice noodle soup with fried garlic, scallions, green onions that may contain toppings such as beef balls, shrimp, pork liver or lettuce. Kampot pepper accompanies crab at the Kep crab shacks and squid in the restaurants on the Ou Trojak Jet river.[254]
Tea is grown in Mondulkiri Province and around Kirirom.[255] Te krolap is a strong tea, made by putting water and a mass of tea leaves into a glass, placing a saucer on top, and turning the whole thing upside down to brew. When it is dark enough, the tea is decanted into another cup and plenty of sugar added, and no milk. Lemon tea te kdau kroch chhma, made with Chinese red-dust tea and lemon juice, is refreshing both hot and iced and is generally served with a more hefty dose of sugar.[256] Regarding coffee, the beans are generally imported from Laos and Vietnam – while domestically produced coffee from Ratanakiri Province and Mondulkiri Province can be found in some places. Beans are traditionally roasted with butter and sugar, plus various other ingredients that might include anything from rum to pork fat, giving the beverage a strange, sometimes faintly chocolatey aroma.[256]
Cambodia has industrial breweries, located mainly in Sihanoukville Province and Phnom Penh. There are a growing number of microbreweries in Phnom Penh and Siem Reap.[257][258] As of 2019[update], there are 12 brewpubs or microbreweries in Cambodia.[259] Rice wine is an alcoholic drink. It is sometimes infused with fruits or medicinal herbs.[260] When prepared with macerated fruits or spices, like the Sombai liqueur, it is called sra tram (soaked wine).[261][262][263]
Dance
[edit]Khmer classical dance is the form of stylised performance art established in the royal courts of Cambodia exhibited for both entertainment and ceremonial purposes.[264] The dances are performed by costumed, trained men and women on public occasions for tribute, invocation or to enact traditional stories and epic poems such as Reamker, the Khmer version of the Ramayana.[265]
Cambodian folk dance, sometimes performed to mahori music, celebrates the cultural and ethnic groups of Cambodia. Folk dances originated in the villages and are performed, for the most part, by the villagers for the villagers.[266] The movements are less stylised and the clothing worn is that of the people the dancers are portraying, such as hill tribes, Chams or farmers. Typically faster-paced than classical dance, folk dances display themes of the "common person" such as love, comedy or warding off evil spirits.[266]
Music
[edit]Traditional Cambodian music dates back as far as the Khmer Empire.[267]
Popular music is performed with western style instruments or a mixture of traditional and western instruments. Dance music is composed in particular styles for social dances. The music of crooner Sinn Sisamouth, Ros Sereysothea, and Pen Ran from the 1960s to the 1970s is considered to be the classic pop music of Cambodia. During the Khmer Rouge revolution, some singers of the 1960s and 1970s were murdered, starved to death, or overwork to death by the Khmer Rouge.[268]
In the 1980s, Keo Surath, (a refugee resettled in the United States) and others carried on the legacy of the classic singers, sometimes remaking their popular songs. The 1980s and 1990s saw the rise in popularity of kantrum, a music style of the Khmer Surin set to modern instrumentation.[269]
The Australian hip hop group Astronomy Class has recorded with Kak Channthy, a native-born Cambodian female singer.[270][271]
See also
[edit]Notes
[edit]- ^ /kæmˈboʊdiə/ ⓘ; Khmer: កម្ពុជា, romanized: Kampuchea [kam.puʔ.ciə] [17]
- ^ Khmer: ព្រះរាជាណាចក្រកម្ពុជា, romanized: Preah Reacheanachak Kampuchea [prĕəh riə.ciə.naː.caʔ kam.puʔ.ciə]
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Buddhism is State's religion
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Cited sources and further reading
[edit]- Deth, Sok Udom, and Serkan Bulut, eds. Cambodia's Foreign Relations in Regional and Global Contexts (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2017; comprehensive coverage) full book online free.
- Path Kosal, "Introduction: Cambodia's Political History and Foreign Relations, 1945–1998" pp 1–26
- Strangio, Sebastian, Cambodia: From Pol Pot to Hun Sen and Beyond (2020)
- Un, Kheang. Cambodia: Return to Authoritarianism (2019) excerpt Archived 28 October 2021 at the Wayback Machine
- Morris, Stephen J. (1999). Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia. Stanford University Press. ISBN 0-8047-3049-0.
This article incorporates text from a free content work. Licensed under CC BY-SA IGO 3.0. Text taken from UNESCO Science Report: Towards 2030, 698–713, UNESCO, UNESCO Publishing.
External links
[edit]- Cambodia. The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency.
- Cambodia from UCB Libraries GovPubs (archived 3 July 2008)
- Cambodia profile from the BBC News
- Cambodia at Encyclopædia Britannica
Wikimedia Atlas of Cambodia
Geographic data related to Cambodia at OpenStreetMap- Key Development Forecasts for Cambodia from International Futures
- Government
- King of Cambodia, Norodom Sihanouk Official website of former King Norodom Sihanouk (in French)
- "Cambodia.gov.kh". Archived from the original on 5 October 2006. Official Royal Government of Cambodia Website (English Version)
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
- Ministry of Tourism (archived 2 February 2002)
Civil society
- Cooperation Committee for Cambodia)
- Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (archived 30 December 2010)
- Cambodian Centre for Human Rights
- Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights
- Action IEC Working For Cambodian Community Education Through Media and Culture
- Freedom in the World 2011: Cambodia.Archived 23 October 2011 at the Wayback Machine.
- Freedom of the Press 2011: Cambodia. Archived 7 January 2012 at the Wayback Machine.
Cambodia
View on GrokipediaEtymology
Name origins and historical usage
The English exonym "Cambodia" derives from the French colonial-era designation Cambodge, which was adapted from the Khmer endonym Kâmpŭchéa.[7] This Khmer term, in turn, traces its roots to the Sanskrit Kambojadeśa, meaning "land of the Kamboja," where Kamboja refers to an ancient Indo-Aryan tribal group originating from northern India or a legendary sage named Kambu Svayambhuva in Hindu mythology, whose descendants purportedly founded the kingdom.[8][9] The name's historical usage reflects the region's evolving political identities and external perceptions. In ancient Indian-influenced inscriptions from the Angkorian era (9th–15th centuries CE), the polity was designated Kambuja or Kambudesa, signifying the unified Khmer realm under rulers like Jayavarman II, who formalized its independence in 802 CE.[9] Prior to this, Chinese annals recorded the area under names like Funan (c. 1st–6th centuries CE), denoting a coastal trading kingdom, and Zhenla (Chenla, c. 6th–8th centuries CE), an inland successor state, though these did not directly employ the Kamboja root.[10] In the modern period, Kampuchea gained prominence as the official endonym following Cambodia's independence from France in 1953, when the state was proclaimed the Kingdom of Cambodia (Preăh Réachéanachâk Kâmpŭchéa in Khmer).[11] The Khmer Rouge regime reinforced this by renaming the country Democratic Kampuchea on January 5, 1976, via a new constitution that abolished the monarchy and emphasized revolutionary ideology.[12] Subsequent Vietnamese-installed governance retained Kampuchea as People's Republic of Kampuchea (1979–1989), but international diplomacy and post-1993 constitutional restoration favored the anglicized "Cambodia" for its pre-communist associations, despite persistent domestic use of Kâmpŭchéa.[12] This duality underscores how colonial legacies and ideological shifts influenced nomenclature, with "Cambodia" prevailing in English-language contexts to evoke continuity with the pre-1975 monarchy.[13]History
Pre-Angkorian era
The Pre-Angkorian era in Cambodia spans from the emergence of complex societies in the Mekong region around the 1st century CE to the late 8th century, preceding the founding of the Angkorian Empire by Jayavarman II in 802 CE. This period saw the development of the first Indianized polities, Funan and Chenla, which adopted elements of South Asian governance, religion, and art through trade and migration, while building on local Austroasiatic foundations. Archaeological sites like Angkor Borei and Oc Eo provide evidence of urban planning, hydraulic infrastructure, and international commerce, with artifacts including imported ceramics, beads, and coins indicating connections to India, China, and Rome.[14][15] Funan, the earliest documented kingdom, controlled territories in the Mekong Delta encompassing southern Cambodia, Vietnam, and parts of Thailand from approximately the 1st to 6th centuries CE. Chinese chronicles, such as those from envoys in the 3rd century CE, portray Funan as a centralized state with a hierarchical monarchy influenced by Hinduism, where kings bore Sanskrit titles and oversaw irrigation canals supporting wet-rice agriculture for a population reliant on monsoon floods.[16] The capital shifted between sites like Vyadhapura and Oc Eo (near modern An Giang, Vietnam), where excavations since the 1940s have yielded gold jewelry, linga statues, and over 100 Roman aurei coins dated to the 2nd–4th centuries CE, underscoring Funan's role as a entrepôt on maritime Silk Road routes.[14] Local legend, recorded in later Khmer texts, attributes Funan's founding to an Indian Brahmin named Kaundinya, who married a Khmer queen named Soma, symbolizing the fusion of Indic elites with indigenous matrilineal customs, though archaeological continuity suggests organic evolution from proto-urban settlements like those at Phum Snay, a 1st-millennium BCE cemetery site with evidence of metallurgy and social stratification.[17][18] Funan's decline, attributed to environmental shifts like siltation reducing delta navigability and internal strife, paved the way for Chenla's ascendancy around 550 CE. Chenla, initially a upland vassal polity north of Funan, achieved independence under Bhavavarman I, who conquered Funan's remnants by the early 7th century and promoted Shaivite Hinduism through alliances and warfare.[19] Under Isanavarman I (r. 616–637 CE), Chenla expanded to include much of modern Cambodia, constructing brick temples at Ishanapura (Sambor Prei Kuk), featuring gopura gateways and lintels with Vishnu and Shiva iconography that prefigure Angkorian styles.[14] Inscriptions in Sanskrit and early Khmer from this era, numbering over 50, detail land grants to Brahmins and reveal a feudal system of temples as economic centers.[20] By the late 7th century, Chenla fragmented into "Land Chenla" (inland highlands around Sambor Prei Kuk) and "Water Chenla" (delta lowlands), exacerbated by Java's invasions around 717 CE and dynastic feuds, leading to tributary relations with the Chinese Tang dynasty.[14] This instability fostered localized power bases, with archaeological surveys showing dispersed moated settlements and reservoirs indicating adaptive water management amid climatic variability. Chenla's cultural legacy, including the proliferation of stone stelae and hydraulic innovations, directly informed the Angkorian state's centralization, though its polities remained more decentralized mandala systems than rigid empires.[21]Angkorian Empire
The Angkorian Empire, centered in what is now Cambodia, emerged in 802 CE when Jayavarman II, having returned from exile in Java, declared himself chakravartin (universal ruler) at Mount Kulen, establishing Khmer independence and the devaraja (god-king) cult.[22] This act unified disparate Khmer polities under a centralized monarchy, initiating a period of expansion that encompassed much of mainland Southeast Asia, including parts of modern Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam.[23] The empire's heartland was the Angkor region, where hydraulic engineering—featuring vast barays (reservoirs) and canals—supported intensive wet-rice agriculture, enabling a metropolitan population estimated at 700,000 to 900,000 by the 13th century.[24] This agro-urban system integrated low-density farming zones with high-density civic centers, fostering economic surplus that funded monumental architecture and military campaigns.[25] Early rulers like Yasovarman I (r. 889–910) established Yasodharapura as the capital, constructing the Indratataka baray and temples such as Phnom Bakheng.[26] The empire predominantly adhered to Hinduism, with kings patronizing Shaivism and Vaishnavism, though Theravada Buddhism coexisted. Suryavarman II (r. 1113–c. 1150), a Vaishnava devotee, commissioned Angkor Wat around 1116–1150 as a funerary temple dedicated to Vishnu, mobilizing tens of thousands of workers in an unprecedented architectural feat symbolizing Mount Meru.[27] His reign saw conflicts with Chams and Dai Viet, reflecting the empire's military orientation, supported by large standing armies drawn from a agrarian base.[28] Jayavarman VII (r. 1181–c. 1220) marked a zenith, defeating Cham invaders who had sacked Angkor in 1177 and expanding territories to their greatest extent.[29] Adopting Mahayana Buddhism as state religion—the first such Khmer king—he erected the Bayon temple-mountain in Angkor Thom, featuring 216 enigmatic faces likely representing lokapalas or the king as bodhisattva, alongside hospitals, rest houses, and over 100 dharmashalas along roads.[29] This therapeutic infrastructure underscored a shift toward Buddhist cosmology, though Hinduism persisted. The era's public works strained resources, with Jayavarman's pacifist leanings post-victory contrasting earlier militarism. The empire's decline spanned the 14th–15th centuries, driven by systemic vulnerabilities rather than solely external shocks. Overreliance on the hydraulic network led to soil salinization and deforestation, while prolonged droughts—evidenced by tree-ring data from 1340–1420—disrupted rice yields, eroding food security for the dense population.[30] Internal strife, Theravada Buddhist iconoclasm against Hindu monuments, and overexpansion weakened cohesion. The 1431 invasion by Ayutthaya Thai forces exploited these frailties, sacking Angkor and prompting elite relocation southward to Phnom Penh, ending the Angkorian era.[31] Archaeological lidar surveys confirm a gradual urban contraction, not abrupt collapse, with peripheral areas persisting longer.[32]Post-Angkorian decline and foreign influences
The decline of the Angkorian Khmer Empire accelerated in the 14th century due to intertwined environmental, infrastructural, and military challenges. Prolonged droughts, evidenced by sediment core analyses from the region, disrupted the empire's extensive hydraulic network of reservoirs and canals, which had supported intensive rice agriculture for up to a million inhabitants; these failures likely caused crop failures and famine, prompting gradual depopulation.[33] Compounding this, the empire's overreliance on hydraulic engineering made it vulnerable to climate variability, with tree-ring data indicating severe dry spells from the 1350s to the 1420s that undermined economic stability.[34] Military incursions by the rising Ayutthaya Kingdom of Siam intensified the crisis, with the first major invasion occurring in 1352 under Siamese forces that briefly captured Angkor before Khmer counterattacks reclaimed it in 1358.[35] Subsequent raids destabilized the region, driving elite and commoner migrations southward toward more defensible riverine areas and eroding central authority. The pivotal blow came in 1431, when Ayutthaya's army under King Borommarachathirat II besieged and sacked Angkor Thom after a prolonged campaign, leading to the city's effective abandonment as a political center; Khmer chronicles and archaeological evidence confirm widespread destruction and the exodus of the royal court.[36] In the aftermath, King Ponhea Yat (r. 1405–1467) relocated the capital southward to Chaktomuk at the confluence of the Mekong, Bassac, and Tonle Sap rivers—near modern Phnom Penh—around 1434–1440, motivated by strategic defensibility against Siamese threats, access to trade routes, and fertile alluvial soils less prone to drought.[37] This shift marked the onset of the Middle Period (1431–1863), characterized by fragmented Khmer polities and heavy foreign domination. The kingdom became a tributary state to Ayutthaya, enduring periodic Siamese interventions that installed puppet rulers and extracted resources; for instance, Ayutthaya sacked the later capital of Longvek in 1594, further weakening Khmer autonomy.[38] Vietnamese influence grew from the east as the Nguyễn lords expanded into the Mekong Delta (Cochinchina) starting in the late 17th century, annexing Khmer territories through settlement and military pressure, which introduced Confucian administration and demographic shifts via Vietnamese migration. Khmer kings navigated dual vassalage, alternating alliances with Siam and Vietnam to preserve nominal independence amid civil wars and succession disputes; this precarious balance often resulted in territorial losses, with Vietnam controlling the delta by the early 19th century and Siam dominating the northwest. The era's instability fostered a "dark age" of reduced monumental architecture and literacy, though Theravada Buddhism consolidated as the dominant faith, reshaping social structures away from the Angkorian Hindu-Buddhist cosmology.[39]French colonial period
In 1863, facing threats from Siam and Vietnam, King Norodom of Cambodia signed a treaty with France on August 11 establishing a protectorate, under which France assumed control of foreign affairs, defense, and trade while nominally preserving the king's internal authority.[40] [41] This arrangement integrated Cambodia into the French Union of Indochina formalized in 1887, with French residents increasingly intervening in domestic governance, including taxation, justice, and infrastructure projects like roads and irrigation to facilitate resource extraction.[42] By the early 20th century, the protectorate had evolved into de facto colonial rule, as French officials dictated royal successions—such as elevating Sisowath over Norodom's heirs in 1904—and imposed corvée labor for public works, exacerbating peasant hardships.[43] The colonial economy prioritized export commodities, expanding rice cultivation on Cambodia's fertile plains to supply France and urban centers, with production rising from under 1 million tons annually in the 1890s to over 1.5 million by the 1930s through coerced labor and land concessions to French firms.[42] Rubber plantations, though more concentrated in Vietnam and Cochinchina, extended into eastern Cambodia, relying on indentured Khmer and Vietnamese workers under harsh conditions that included low wages and physical punishments, contributing to demographic shifts and rural discontent.[44] Infrastructure investments, such as the Phnom Penh to Battambang railway completed in 1929, served primarily to transport goods to ports, yielding profits for French enterprises while generating minimal local industrialization or wealth redistribution.[42] Resistance to French dominance manifested in sporadic uprisings, including the 1884–1886 rebellion led by Prince Si Votha, Norodom's half-brother, which rallied anti-French nobles and peasants in Battambang and Siem Reap provinces before being suppressed with Siamese aid.[45] During World War II, Japanese forces occupied Cambodia from 1941, permitting nominal French administration under Vichy control until a March 9, 1945, coup that ousted colonial officials and briefly installed a pro-Japanese government under Son Ngoc Thanh, fostering nascent Khmer nationalist sentiments amid forced rice requisitions and the 1942 "Umbrella War" protests against corvée labor.[42] Postwar, under King Norodom Sihanouk's reign from 1941, demands for autonomy intensified; Sihanouk's 1952 "royal crusade" involved abdication threats and diplomatic pressure in Paris, culminating in France's relinquishment of sovereignty on November 7, 1953, followed by Cambodia's declaration of independence on November 9.[46] [47]Independence and Sihanouk era
Cambodia achieved full independence from France on November 9, 1953, after King Norodom Sihanouk, who had been on the throne since 1941, pressed for sovereignty amid France's post-World War II weakening and the ongoing First Indochina War.[48] Sihanouk had dismissed the French-installed government in January 1953 and launched a "royal crusade for independence," mobilizing public demonstrations and refusing to compromise on partial autonomy, which compelled French negotiators to concede during talks in Paris that summer.[49] He returned triumphantly to Phnom Penh on October 29, 1953, to oversee the transfer of power, ending nearly a century of French protectorate rule that had begun in 1863.[49] The transition preserved the monarchy while establishing the Kingdom of Cambodia, though residual Issarak communist guerrillas continued low-level resistance into the mid-1950s.[50] The Geneva Conference of July 1954 internationally affirmed Cambodia's independence through agreements on the cessation of hostilities, prohibiting foreign troops and military bases, and mandating the withdrawal of remaining French forces by year's end.[51] Cambodia's delegation, led by Sihanouk's representatives, rejected provisions for regrouping internal resistance fighters akin to those in Vietnam and Laos, insisting instead on their integration into national forces under Phnom Penh's control to safeguard sovereignty.[52] This stance, coupled with the conference's final declaration recognizing no further foreign interference, solidified Cambodia's neutral posture amid emerging Cold War divisions.[53] In March 1955, Sihanouk abdicated the throne to his father, Norodom Suramarit, to pursue direct political leadership, founding the People's Socialist Community (Sangkum) party that secured overwhelming victories in the September 1955 legislative elections through a mix of patronage and suppression of rivals.[54] As prime minister from 1955 and head of state after Suramarit's death in 1960, Sihanouk centralized power, promoting non-alignment, economic modernization via foreign aid from both Western and Eastern blocs, and cultural revival, though his regime increasingly tolerated no opposition and relied on security forces to quash dissent.[55] Agricultural output grew modestly in the late 1950s, but by the 1960s, rural grievances over land reform failures fueled uprisings, such as the 1967 Samlot rebellion in Battambang province, where peasants protesting corruption and taxes clashed with army units, killing hundreds.[50] Sihanouk's neutrality frayed as Vietnamese communist sanctuaries expanded along the border, drawing covert U.S. actions and exacerbating internal communist recruitment, yet he maintained formal diplomatic balance until his ouster.[56]Khmer Republic and Lon Nol regime
The Khmer Republic emerged from the March 18, 1970, coup d'état led by General Lon Nol, who, as prime minister and defense minister under Prince Norodom Sihanouk, orchestrated the removal of the prince through a National Assembly vote amid widespread protests against Sihanouk's tolerance of North Vietnamese sanctuaries on Cambodian soil.[57] Lon Nol initially formed a military government, suspending the constitution and arresting Sihanouk's associates, before formally proclaiming the Khmer Republic on October 9, 1970, which abolished the monarchy and established a republican system under his presidency from 1972.[58] This shift marked Cambodia's abandonment of Sihanouk's neutrality policy, aligning the regime closely with the United States and South Vietnam in the fight against communist insurgents.[59] Lon Nol's regime pursued aggressive anti-communist policies, including the expulsion of Vietnamese forces from border areas and the mobilization of a national volunteer force that expanded the Cambodian army from approximately 30,000 to over 70,000 troops by mid-1970, though the force suffered from inadequate training, equipment shortages, and rampant corruption.[60] Domestically, Lon Nol promoted Khmer nationalism infused with Buddhist revivalism, enacting laws to promote Khmer language and culture while fostering anti-Vietnamese sentiment, which included pogroms against ethnic Vietnamese civilians in 1970.[61] The United States provided substantial military aid—totaling over $1.1 billion between 1970 and 1975—and conducted extensive aerial bombing campaigns, such as Operation Freedom Deal, dropping more than 500,000 tons of bombs on communist-held areas to support Khmer National Armed Forces (FANK) operations, though these efforts inadvertently displaced rural populations and bolstered Khmer Rouge recruitment by fueling grievances against the government.[60] Economically, the Khmer Republic faced hyperinflation exceeding 200% annually by 1974, driven by war expenditures, disrupted rice production, and black-market corruption within the military elite, leading to urban shortages and rural defections to the Khmer Rouge.[62] Lon Nol's leadership weakened further after a debilitating stroke in 1971, which limited his capacity to consolidate power or select competent advisors, resulting in factional infighting among generals and ineffective governance.[61] By early 1975, FANK forces, demoralized and undersupplied, collapsed as Khmer Rouge forces encircled Phnom Penh; the capital fell on April 17, 1975, after Lon Nol fled to Hawaii, marking the end of the republic and the Khmer Rouge's seizure of power.[58] The regime's pro-Western orientation and military dependence on U.S. support, while staving off immediate communist victory, ultimately failed to address underlying insurgent strengths built during Sihanouk's era and exacerbated by the civil war's destructiveness.[57]Khmer Rouge revolution and genocide
The Khmer Rouge, the armed wing of the Communist Party of Kampuchea led by Pol Pot, captured Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975, ending the Cambodian Civil War and overthrowing the Khmer Republic government of Lon Nol.[59] [63] This victory marked the culmination of years of guerrilla warfare, during which the Khmer Rouge expanded control over rural areas, exploiting grievances against urban elites and the Lon Nol regime's corruption and reliance on U.S. support.[64] The group immediately declared the establishment of Democratic Kampuchea, a radical communist state committed to an extreme Maoist vision of agrarian socialism that rejected urbanization, private property, and intellectualism as bourgeois corruptions. In the days following the takeover, Khmer Rouge forces enforced the mass evacuation of Phnom Penh, compelling approximately 2 million residents— including the sick, elderly, and children— to march to rural collectives without provisions, under the pretext of temporary relocation to avoid American bombing, though no such threat existed.[65] This "Year Zero" policy symbolized the regime's intent to reset society by abolishing money, markets, religion, and family structures in favor of communal labor brigades aimed at rapid rice production for export and self-reliance.[66] Policies included forced marriages to boost population growth, abolition of formal education beyond basic literacy for revolutionary propaganda, and destruction of cultural artifacts, libraries, and temples deemed remnants of feudalism or foreign influence.[67] The revolution swiftly devolved into genocide through systematic purges driven by paranoid ideology that viewed internal enemies—intellectuals identified by glasses or soft hands, ethnic minorities like Cham Muslims and Vietnamese, urban "new people," and even Khmer Rouge cadres suspected of deviation— as threats to the revolution's purity.[68] [69] Torture centers such as Tuol Sleng (S-21 prison) processed over 14,000 prisoners, extracting confessions via methods including waterboarding and electrocution before execution, with only a handful surviving.[70] Executions occurred en masse at sites like Choeung Ek, where archaeological exhumations revealed over 8,000 skulls and evidence of blunt force trauma, often to conserve bullets.[71] Starvation and disease compounded direct killings, as collectivized agriculture failed due to unrealistic quotas, lack of expertise after purging skilled farmers, and diversion of labor to infrastructure projects like dams.[72] Demographic analyses estimate 1.5 to 3 million deaths between 1975 and 1979, representing 21 to 40 percent of Cambodia's pre-revolution population of about 7.5 million, with causes including 500,000 to 1 million executions and the remainder from famine and overwork.[68] [73] These figures derive from survivor testimonies, mass grave excavations, and statistical modeling of excess mortality, though exact numbers remain contested due to destroyed records and the regime's secrecy.[74] The Khmer Rouge's internal purges, including the 1977-1978 elimination of Eastern Zone cadres accused of Vietnamese sympathies, intensified the violence, reflecting Pol Pot's doctrine of perpetual class struggle.[75] The regime collapsed on January 7, 1979, when Vietnamese forces, responding to Khmer Rouge border attacks and ideological rivalry, invaded and captured Phnom Penh after two weeks of combat, installing a pro-Vietnamese government.[76] [77] Khmer Rouge remnants fled to Thailand, continuing insurgency until the 1990s, but the invasion halted the genocide, though it initiated a decade of Vietnamese occupation amid international non-recognition of the new regime.[78]Vietnamese occupation and People's Republic
On December 25, 1978, Vietnam launched a full-scale invasion of Cambodia with approximately 150,000 troops, citing border incursions and atrocities by the Khmer Rouge regime as pretexts, though underlying motives included securing Vietnam's western frontier and countering Chinese influence via the Khmer Rouge alliance.[76] [79] By January 7, 1979, Vietnamese forces captured Phnom Penh, effectively ending the Khmer Rouge's control after less than four years of rule that had claimed an estimated 1.7 to 2 million Cambodian lives through execution, starvation, and forced labor.[76] [68] The invasion displaced hundreds of thousands of Cambodians toward the Thai border and initiated a decade-long occupation, during which Vietnam maintained a military presence of up to 180,000 troops at peak.[80] Vietnam promptly installed the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) as a successor state, with Heng Samrin, a former Khmer Rouge defector, appointed head of the State Presidium on January 10, 1979.[81] The PRK operated as a one-party communist government under the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party, heavily reliant on Vietnamese military and advisory support, which shaped its policies on land reform, collectivization, and suppression of dissent.[82] Early PRK measures included dismantling Khmer Rouge institutions, restoring private trade, and allowing limited Buddhist practices, which contributed to population recovery from 6.3 million in 1979 to about 8.2 million by 1989 through repatriation and higher birth rates.[83] However, the regime enforced conscription and labor projects, such as the K5 defensive belt along the Thai border, which involved millions of civilians in mine-laying and fortification efforts amid ongoing insurgency, resulting in thousands of additional deaths from disease, malnutrition, and accidents.[84] The PRK faced persistent armed resistance from Khmer Rouge remnants, non-communist factions like the Khmer People's National Liberation Front, and royalist groups, collectively forming the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, which retained Cambodia's United Nations seat until 1991 due to geopolitical opposition to Vietnamese expansionism from the United States, China, and ASEAN nations.[85] Guerrilla warfare persisted in western and northern regions, with Vietnamese forces conducting sweeps that inflicted heavy casualties; estimates indicate 15,000 to 25,000 Vietnamese soldiers killed between 1979 and 1989, alongside tens of thousands wounded, while Cambodian combatant and civilian losses remain imprecise but contributed to a protracted humanitarian crisis.[80] International non-recognition isolated the PRK economically, limiting aid and fostering dependency on Soviet bloc assistance, though domestic agricultural output rebounded modestly by the mid-1980s.[86] Vietnamese troops began partial withdrawals in 1982 but maintained significant forces until a full pullout on September 26, 1989, prompted by Soviet pressure amid perestroika, mounting casualties, and diplomatic stalemate.[87] The PRK, renamed the State of Cambodia in 1989, retained power despite the vacuum, as factional infighting weakened the resistance coalition. The occupation, while halting the Khmer Rouge's immediate reign of terror, entrenched Vietnamese influence and prolonged civil conflict, with long-term effects including mined border regions and demographic scars from displacement.[79]UN intervention and constitutional monarchy
The Paris Peace Agreements, signed on October 23, 1991, by representatives of Cambodia's four principal factions—the State of Cambodia (led by Hun Sen), the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge), FUNCINPEC (led by Prince Norodom Ranariddh), and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front—along with eighteen other nations, established a framework for ending the civil conflict, verifying the withdrawal of foreign forces, implementing a ceasefire, and organizing UN-supervised elections.[88][89] The accords created the Supreme National Council (SNC), comprising leaders from the factions, as the embodiment of Cambodian sovereignty during the transition, while mandating comprehensive UN oversight to neutralize administrative control, promote human rights, and facilitate the return of refugees.[90] In implementation, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) deployed in March 1992 with over 15,900 military and civilian personnel from 37 countries, marking the UN's most expansive peacekeeping operation to date; its mandate encompassed supervising the ceasefire, cantoning and disarming factional forces (targeting 100% demobilization of approximately 200,000 troops), repatriating over 360,000 refugees, monitoring foreign affairs and finance, and conducting a national census alongside human rights education.[91] However, the Khmer Rouge obstructed the process by refusing to demobilize fully, boycotting UNTAC verification in areas under their control, and withdrawing from the accords in 1993, which limited disarmament to about 70% of forces overall and allowed their continued insurgency. National elections occurred from May 23 to 28, 1993, under UNTAC supervision, with a 90% voter turnout among 4.7 million registered voters across 20 parties; FUNCINPEC secured 45.5% of the vote and 58 of 120 seats in the Constituent Assembly, while the Cambodian People's Party (CPP, successor to the SOC) obtained 38.2% and 51 seats, resulting in a hung parliament.[92] FUNCINPEC's plurality led to a coalition government in September 1993, with Ranariddh as First Prime Minister and Hun Sen as Second Prime Minister, forming a provisional administration that retained CPP control over key ministries like interior and defense despite the electoral outcome.[92] The Constituent Assembly adopted a new constitution on September 21, 1993, proclaiming the Kingdom of Cambodia as a liberal multi-party democracy under a constitutional monarchy, where the king "reigns but does not govern," serving as head of state for life with ceremonial powers, while legislative authority resides in a bicameral parliament and executive power with the prime minister and Council of Ministers.[93][94] This framework enshrined fundamental rights, separation of powers, and judicial independence, though implementation faced challenges from entrenched factional influences. Norodom Sihanouk, who had abdicated in 1955 and been deposed in 1970, was reinstated as king on September 24, 1993, following the constitution's promulgation, symbolizing national reconciliation amid ongoing Khmer Rouge resistance that persisted until their collapse in 1998.[95][96] UNTAC concluded its mandate on September 26, 1993, transferring authority to the new government, though sporadic violence and incomplete integration of former combatants underscored the fragility of the transition.Post-1993 stabilization and Hun Sen dominance
Following the United Nations-supervised general elections held from May 23 to 28, 1993, which marked the end of the transitional UNTAC period, the royalist FUNCINPEC party secured the largest share of votes at approximately 45 percent, while Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party (CPP) obtained about 38 percent, resulting in a coalition government with Prince Norodom Ranariddh as first prime minister and Hun Sen as second prime minister.[97] A new constitution was promulgated on September 21, 1993, restoring the constitutional monarchy under King Norodom Sihanouk and establishing a multiparty liberal democratic system, though the Khmer Rouge, having boycotted the elections, continued low-level insurgency in remote areas until mass defections and government amnesties weakened them significantly by the late 1990s.[98] This period saw initial stabilization through factional disarmament, international aid inflows exceeding $700 million pledged at the 1993 Tokyo conference, and gradual reintegration of former combatants, contributing to the cessation of widespread civil war by 1999 when the last Khmer Rouge holdouts surrendered.[99] Tensions within the coalition escalated amid mutual accusations of plotting with Khmer Rouge remnants, culminating in violent clashes on July 5-6, 1997, when forces loyal to Hun Sen launched attacks on FUNCINPEC positions in Phnom Penh, resulting in the deaths of dozens, including FUNCINPEC officials, and the flight of Ranariddh into exile; Hun Sen subsequently assumed sole prime ministerial control, framing the action as preemptive against a coup.[100] The events, described by critics including Human Rights Watch as a coup involving extrajudicial killings and purges, led to international condemnation and aid suspensions, though Hun Sen consolidated power through CPP dominance in military and provincial structures.[101] In the July 26, 1998, elections held amid ongoing instability, the CPP won 64 of 122 National Assembly seats, enabling Hun Sen's unchallenged premiership and further marginalization of opposition voices.[102] Subsequent elections in 2003 and 2008 reinforced CPP hegemony, with the party securing a plurality in 2003 (leading to a coalition after deadlock) and a supermajority of 90 seats in 2008, amid reports of voter intimidation and irregularities documented by observers.[103] Economic stabilization accompanied this political consolidation, with GDP averaging over 7 percent annual growth from 2000 to 2019, driven by garments (exporting $8 billion annually by 2019), tourism (reaching 6 million visitors pre-COVID), and Chinese-funded infrastructure, reducing poverty from 50 percent in 2000 to under 14 percent by 2019, though growth relied on low-wage labor and foreign investment with limited domestic value addition.[104][105] Cambodia ranked among the lowest globally in corruption control indices during this era, with Hun Sen's inner circle implicated in patronage networks extracting rents from natural resources and public contracts, as evidenced by scandals like the 2011 allocation of 45 percent of arable land to elites.[106] Hun Sen's dominance intensified through control of institutions, including a CPP-aligned judiciary and election commission, enabling systematic suppression of opposition; the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), which garnered nearly 44 percent in 2013 elections sparking mass protests, faced escalating crackdowns from 2014, including arrests of leaders like Kem Sokha on treason charges and media closures.[107] On November 16, 2017, the CPP-dominated Supreme Court dissolved the CNRP, citing alleged plots to overthrow the government, banning over 100 members from politics for five years and ensuring CPP victory with 97 percent of seats in the 2018 elections; international monitors, including the U.S. State Department, noted the move as undermining pluralism.[108][109] This era of stabilization thus intertwined relative macroeconomic progress with authoritarian consolidation, where electoral processes served to legitimize one-party rule rather than foster competition, as critiqued by organizations tracking democratic backsliding.[110]Hun Manet transition and contemporary challenges (2023–present)
In the July 23, 2023, general election, the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), led by long-ruling Prime Minister Hun Sen, secured 120 of 125 seats in the National Assembly, with official turnout reported at 84%.[111] The election faced widespread international criticism for lacking genuine competition, following the 2017 dissolution of the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) and restrictions on other parties, rendering it a one-sided affair that ensured CPP dominance.[112] [113] On July 26, 2023, Hun Sen announced his resignation after 38 years in power, stating he would hand the premiership to his son, Hun Manet, while assuming the role of CPP president and Senate president to retain influence.[114] [115] Hun Manet, a 45-year-old army general with a West Point education, was elected prime minister by the National Assembly on August 22, 2023, in a unanimous vote among CPP lawmakers, marking a dynastic succession amid assurances of policy continuity.[116] [117] Under Hun Manet, Cambodia has maintained the CPP's authoritarian governance model, with limited reforms despite initial pledges to enhance rule of law and democracy.[118] Political repression persisted, including arrests of activists, restrictions on free speech, and crackdowns on dissent, as documented by human rights organizations noting no reversal of prior trends under Hun Sen.[119] [120] Hun Sen's ongoing role as Senate president and CPP leader has ensured his de facto control, with Manet's administration prioritizing stability over pluralism, leading to international assessments of continued democratic backsliding.[121] In 2024, incidents such as the assassination of exiled opposition figure Lim Kimya in Bangkok highlighted unresolved threats to dissidents, while domestic evictions in areas like Angkor threatened thousands of families without adequate compensation.[122] [123] Economic challenges have compounded political issues, with growth projected at around 5-6% annually but undermined by endemic corruption, weak rule of law, and rising poverty in rural areas.[124] Hun Manet's government launched initiatives like a 2024 master plan for 174 development projects aimed at infrastructure and tourism, yet these have not addressed structural vulnerabilities such as overreliance on Chinese investment and garments exports.[125] Human trafficking linked to online scam operations, often involving forced labor in compounds run by Chinese syndicates, emerged as a major crisis, prompting U.S. sanctions and highlighting governance failures in border control and law enforcement.[126] [127] Foreign relations tilted further toward China, with increased debt and infrastructure deals, while tensions with Thailand over border disputes persisted without resolution.[126] Overall, Manet's tenure through mid-2025 has reflected continuity rather than transformation, prioritizing CPP consolidation amid external pressures for accountability.[119]Geography
Physical features and borders
Cambodia occupies 181,035 square kilometers in the southwestern Indochinese Peninsula of Southeast Asia, featuring a terrain dominated by low, flat plains with mountains in the southwest and north.[1] The central region consists of an alluvial plain drained by the Mekong River and its tributaries, including the Bassac River, which supports extensive floodplains and seasonal inundation.[128] The Tonle Sap Lake, the largest freshwater lake in Southeast Asia, lies at the heart of this plain, expanding from 2,700 square kilometers in the dry season to 16,000 square kilometers during the monsoon floods due to Mekong backflow.[1] Elevations average 126 meters above sea level, with the highest point at Phnum Aoral in the Cardamom Mountains reaching 1,810 meters, while the lowest point is at sea level along the Gulf of Thailand.[1] The southwest features the rugged Cardamom and Elephant mountain ranges, which form a barrier separating the interior plains from the coastal zone, while the north and east include the Dangrek Mountains and extensions of the Annamite Range, contributing to forested highlands and plateaus.[129] These uplands, often exceeding 500 meters, transition into denser tropical forests and escarpments that influence local drainage patterns and biodiversity.[128] Cambodia shares land borders totaling 2,530 kilometers: 817 kilometers with Thailand to the northwest, 555 kilometers with Laos to the northeast, and 1,158 kilometers with Vietnam to the east and southeast.[1] The Thai border follows the Dangrek escarpment and Mekong tributaries in parts, marked by historical disputes over territories like Preah Vihear Temple, while the Laotian boundary runs along the Mekong River upstream before veering into highlands.[1] The Vietnamese frontier traverses the Mekong Delta lowlands and Annamite highlands, encompassing fertile plains that facilitate cross-border agricultural and trade flows. To the southwest, a 443-kilometer coastline along the Gulf of Thailand includes sandy beaches, mangroves, and ports like Sihanoukville, providing access to maritime routes despite limited natural harbors.[1]Climate and natural hazards
Cambodia possesses a tropical monsoon climate, classified primarily as Am under the Köppen-Geiger system, with hot conditions persisting year-round and average annual temperatures around 27-28°C.[130][131] The country experiences two main seasons: a wet period from May to mid-November driven by the southwest monsoon, delivering heavy rainfall averaging 1,400-1,700 mm annually, concentrated between June and September; and a drier period from mid-November to April, marked by northeast monsoon winds bringing lower humidity and sporadic precipitation.[132][133] In Phnom Penh, mean yearly temperature reaches 27.8°C, with maximums up to 38°C in April and minimums down to 17°C in January.[133][134] Natural hazards pose significant risks, with riverine flooding as the predominant threat, accounting for nearly half of all disasters over the past four decades due to the Mekong River Basin and Tonle Sap influences covering 80% of the territory.[135] Between 1996 and 2013, Cambodia recorded 3,564 flood events compared to 1,343 droughts, highlighting floods' higher frequency.[136] Droughts recur every five to six years, impacting over 30% of cropland and exacerbating agricultural vulnerabilities.[137] Tropical storms and typhoons contribute to flash floods and landslides, as seen in September 2024 when Typhoon Yagi and subsequent heavy rains affected nine provinces, damaging thousands of homes and prompting evacuations.[138][139] In 2020, consecutive storms from October to November caused unprecedented flooding, killing at least 43 people and displacing over 176,000 households across 14 provinces including Phnom Penh.[140][136] Climate variability, including intensified rainfall patterns, is projected to heighten these events' severity.[141]
Environmental degradation and conservation
Cambodia has experienced significant deforestation, with natural forest cover at 6.62 million hectares in 2020, comprising 36% of its land area, but losing 97,200 hectares in 2024 alone, equivalent to 50.6 million tons of CO₂ emissions.[142] Illegal logging drives much of this loss, persisting in protected areas despite government crackdowns, as evidenced by satellite imagery from April 2023 showing ongoing activities and the December 2024 murder of environmental journalist Chhoeung Chhoeng by suspected loggers.[143][144] Protected areas have borne the brunt of recent forest loss, with corridors between parks often degraded for economic concessions that enable further illegal extraction.[145] Biodiversity suffers from these trends, including habitat fragmentation in regions like Prey Lang and the Cardamoms, where logging and agricultural expansion threaten species such as elephants and tigers.[146] Upstream hydropower dams on the Mekong River, primarily in China and Laos, exacerbate degradation by trapping sediment—reducing delivery to Cambodian floodplains by up to 70%—and blocking fish migrations, contributing to a projected one-fifth of Mekong fish species facing extinction.[147][148] The Tonle Sap Lake, vital for fisheries yielding part of the basin's 2 million tonnes annually, faces pollution from untreated wastewater and chemicals, with 2023 assessments revealing elevated risks in drinking water from heavy metals and pesticides, particularly affecting children.[149][150] Urban areas like Phnom Penh contend with rising air pollution, including ultrafine particles from traffic and industry, while solid waste generation has increased 10% yearly, straining waste management.[151][152] Conservation efforts include a network of protected areas covering over 20% of land since expansions in 2023 adding more than 1 million hectares, incorporating biodiversity corridors into national parks and sanctuaries established as early as 1925.[153] Quasi-experimental analyses indicate these areas have avoided significant deforestation across periods, with community forests and protected forests reducing loss rates compared to non-conserved lands.[154][155] REDD+ initiatives have shown moderate success in curbing deforestation relative to adjacent non-projected zones, though enforcement challenges persist due to downgrading for development and ongoing illegal activities.[156][157] Initiatives like tree-planting campaigns aim to restore 1 million saplings, but effectiveness is limited by weak governance and economic pressures favoring extraction over preservation.[158]Administrative structure
Cambodia is administratively organized as a unitary state divided into 25 provinces, encompassing 24 provinces and the capital Phnom Penh, which holds the status of an autonomous municipality equivalent to a province.[159] Provincial governors are appointed by the central government via the Ministry of Interior, which oversees local administration nationwide.[160] Provinces are subdivided into second-level units known as districts, categorized as rural districts (srok), urban municipalities (krong), or khan (special districts within Phnom Penh). As of the latest available data, Cambodia has 224 srok and 33 krong outside Phnom Penh, while Phnom Penh consists of 14 khan.[159] District and municipal chiefs are similarly appointed by the Ministry of Interior, ensuring alignment with national policy.[160] Third-level divisions comprise communes (khum) in rural districts and quarters (sangkat) in urban areas and Phnom Penh, totaling 1,652 units.[159] Commune chiefs and councils are elected, representing a limited element of decentralization introduced through organic laws in 2002 and 2006, though their authority is constrained by appointed superiors.[161] The village (phum) serves as the lowest administrative level, with 14,570 villages handling grassroots matters such as resident registration and minor dispute resolution.[159] Village chiefs are elected locally but operate under commune oversight. Ongoing reforms via the National Committee for Sub-National Democratic Development seek to devolve fiscal and administrative powers to communes and districts, yet central control persists through appointments and revenue dependencies.[162]Government
Monarchical system
Cambodia is a constitutional monarchy established by the 1993 Constitution, which defines the King as the head of state who "shall reign but not rule," embodying a ceremonial role focused on national symbolism and unity.[163] The King guarantees the country's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the rights and freedoms of citizens, while serving as the supreme arbiter to ensure the orderly execution of public powers.[164] Article 7 of the Constitution explicitly limits the monarchy to reigning rather than governing, subordinating royal authority to the principles of liberal multi-party democracy.[163] The Cambodian monarchy is elective rather than hereditary in direct succession; the King is selected for life by the nine-member Royal Council of the Throne, composed of senior figures including members of the royal family, high-ranking Buddhist patriarchs, and political leaders such as the Prime Minister and National Assembly President.[165] Eligible candidates must be at least 30 years old and descend from the Norodom or Sisowath royal bloodlines, with the King prohibited from designating an heir.[166] The current monarch, Norodom Sihamoni, was unanimously elected on October 14, 2004, by the Council following the abdication of his father, Norodom Sihanouk, amid concerns over Sihanouk's health and the need for political stability.[167] Constitutionally, the King's powers include appointing the Prime Minister upon the proposal of the National Assembly President, promulgating laws passed by the legislature, ratifying international treaties, granting pardons, and acting as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Khmer Armed Forces.[168] These functions require countersignatures from the Prime Minister or relevant ministers, ensuring they align with executive oversight.[163] In practice, the monarchy exerts minimal political influence, functioning primarily as a cultural and moral symbol amid the dominance of the executive branch under long-serving Prime Minister Hun Sen until 2023 and his successor Hun Manet.[169] This arrangement reflects a post-conflict restoration prioritizing symbolic continuity over substantive royal authority, with the King's public engagements often centered on diplomacy, Buddhism, and national ceremonies rather than policy-making.[170]Executive authority
The executive authority in Cambodia is exercised by the Royal Government, formally known as the Council of Ministers, which is led by the Prime Minister as head of government. Under the 1993 Constitution, the King serves as head of state in a ceremonial capacity, reigning but not governing, with powers such as appointing the Prime Minister limited to formalities following parliamentary processes.[163] [171] The Prime Minister holds substantive executive power, chairing the Cabinet and directing policy across administration, economy, defense, and foreign affairs, subject to legislative oversight.[168] [93] Appointment of the Prime Minister requires nomination by a political party or coalition securing a majority in the National Assembly, followed by a vote of confidence from the Assembly; the King then formally appoints the nominee and, upon the Prime Minister's proposal, the Council of Ministers.[93] [164] The Prime Minister may delegate authority to deputy prime ministers or other ministers, enabling flexible management of the executive branch, which comprises approximately 15-28 ministers and numerous secretaries of state handling specific portfolios.[171] [172] In practice, the executive's effectiveness relies on the Prime Minister's ability to maintain coalition support and navigate Cambodia's dominant-party system, where the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) has controlled appointments since 1993.[169] Key responsibilities include proposing laws to the legislature, implementing budgets, commanding the armed forces through the Ministry of National Defense (with the King as nominal supreme commander), and representing the government internationally, though the King performs symbolic diplomatic roles.[168] [93] The Prime Minister also oversees provincial governors and central agencies, centralizing control over subnational administration. Since August 22, 2023, General Hun Manet has held the office, appointed after the CPP's July 2023 election victory with 120 of 125 National Assembly seats, marking a dynastic transition from his father, Hun Sen, who served from 1985 to 2023.[173] [174] This continuity has preserved executive dominance, with reported expansions in infrastructure and military oversight under the new leadership.[175]Legislative and judicial branches
The legislative branch of Cambodia consists of a bicameral parliament comprising the National Assembly and the Senate.[176] The National Assembly, the lower house, holds 125 seats filled through proportional representation elections every five years, with members representing constituencies based on provincial and municipal boundaries.[177] [178] The Senate, the upper house, comprises 62 members: 58 elected indirectly by commune councilors and National Assembly members, two nominated by the National Assembly, and two appointed by the monarch.[168] The National Assembly possesses primary legislative authority, including the power to pass laws, approve the budget, and ratify treaties, while the Senate reviews and can amend or reject National Assembly bills, though its vetoes are typically overridden by a simple majority in the lower house.[163] The judiciary is structured hierarchically under the Constitution, which vests judicial power in the Supreme Council of the Magistracy, lower courts of first instance, appellate courts, and the Supreme Court as the highest appellate body.[179] [180] Article 128 of the 1993 Constitution declares the judiciary independent, with judges appointed by the king on recommendation of the Supreme Council, intended to insulate them from executive interference.[163] In practice, however, judicial independence is undermined by systemic political influence, particularly from the executive branch and the ruling Cambodian People's Party, which dominates appointments and prosecutorial decisions, leading to courts frequently aligning with government interests in politically sensitive cases.[181] [182] Reports document patterns of corruption, selective prosecution of opposition figures, and executive override of judicial processes, eroding public trust and the rule of law.[183] [184]Local governance
Cambodia's local governance operates within a centralized framework, with sub-national administration divided into provinces, districts, and communes under the oversight of the Ministry of Interior's Department of Local Administration. As of January 2024, the country includes one capital municipality (Phnom Penh) and 24 provinces, subdivided into 209 districts and 1,652 communes/sangkats, which are further broken down into 12,577 villages. Provincial governors and district chiefs are appointed by the central government—provincial governors by royal decree on the prime minister's recommendation, and district officials by the Ministry of Interior—ensuring alignment with national directives rather than local election.[185][186] The most devolved elected bodies are commune/sangkat councils, introduced through the 2001 Organic Law on Administrative Management of Communes/Sangkats and enabled by commune elections starting in 2002. Councils, typically comprising 7 to 11 members scaled by population, manage local planning, small-scale infrastructure like roads and irrigation, basic public services, and community dispute resolution. Elections occur every five years; in the June 5, 2022, vote across all 1,652 communes, approximately 11,622 seats were contested, with the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) winning 9,338 seats, or over 80 percent, amid the absence of viable opposition following the 2017 Supreme Court-ordered dissolution of the Cambodia National Rescue Party. Village chiefs are also elected but function primarily as extensions of commune authority, handling informal community matters without independent budgets.[187][188] Decentralization and Deconcentration (D&D) reforms, launched in 2005, have shifted some service delivery—such as education and health—to sub-national levels, supported by central fiscal transfers comprising over 90 percent of commune budgets. However, communes lack taxation powers, and higher tiers retain veto authority over local decisions, limiting substantive autonomy. Provincial and district offices often parallel central line ministries, duplicating functions and reinforcing top-down control, as evidenced by the Ministry of Economy and Finance's oversight of sub-national assets and expenditures. This structure prioritizes policy uniformity over local initiative, with empirical outcomes showing improved service access in some rural areas but persistent capacity gaps and elite capture at the commune level.[189][187][190]Politics
Dominant-party rule and elections
The Cambodian People's Party (CPP) has maintained dominant control over Cambodian politics since 1979, following the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge regime by Vietnamese forces led by CPP precursors.[191] The party, originally the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party founded in 1951 and rebranded as CPP in 1991, has governed continuously, centralizing power through control of state institutions, media, and electoral processes. Under long-time leader Hun Sen until 2023, and subsequently his son Hun Manet, the CPP has ensured its hegemony by suppressing opposition and leveraging patronage networks, rendering Cambodia a de facto one-party state despite formal multiparty provisions.[192] [119] Cambodia's electoral system involves proportional representation for the 125-seat National Assembly, with elections held every five years since the 1993 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) poll.[193] In the 1993 election, the CPP secured 51.8% of valid votes but formed a coalition after FUNCINPEC's plurality win; however, a 1997 coup solidified CPP dominance, leading to outright majorities thereafter.[110] Subsequent polls, including 2003 (73 seats), 2008 (90 seats), and 2013 (68 seats), saw CPP gains amid allegations of irregularities, though the 2013 contest posed a rare challenge from the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP).[194] Opposition viability eroded sharply after 2017, when Cambodia's Supreme Court—widely viewed as CPP-influenced—dissolved the CNRP on charges of conspiring with foreign powers, banning its leaders for five years and vacating 55 parliamentary seats to CPP allies.[108] [195] This followed the 2016 arrest of CNRP leader Kem Sokha and media shutdowns, ensuring the 2018 election yielded CPP all 125 seats with 78% turnout but no credible rivals.[196] International observers, including the UN and NGOs, have consistently rated Cambodian elections as unfree and unfair due to voter intimidation, ballot stuffing, and lack of independent oversight, though the government maintains procedural compliance.[197] [198] The July 23, 2023, general election exemplified this pattern, with the CPP claiming 82% of votes and 120 seats, paving the way for Hun Manet's premiership on August 22, 2023.[193] [116] Turnout reached 84%, but critics highlighted the absence of opposition—stemming from CNRP's dissolution and bans on over 100 activists—alongside reports of threats and unequal media access favoring CPP.[112] [199] The National Election Committee, CPP-controlled, certified results without independent verification, underscoring systemic biases that perpetuate dominance rather than reflect voter preference.[200] Empirical data on pre-election arrests and rural CPP patronage indicate causal mechanisms of coercion over competition in sustaining rule.[201]Corruption and patronage networks
Cambodia consistently ranks among the most corrupt countries globally, with a score of 22 out of 100 on the 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International, reflecting perceptions of high public sector corruption among experts and business executives.[202] In the 2024 CPI, the score declined slightly to 21, placing Cambodia 153rd out of 180 countries and second-to-last in ASEAN, behind only Myanmar and ahead of Laos.[203] These low scores stem from entrenched practices including bribery, nepotism, and embezzlement of state resources, which undermine governance and economic development.[204] Patronage networks form the backbone of Cambodia's political system, particularly within the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), which has dominated since 1979 under leaders like Hun Sen until 2023 and his son Hun Manet thereafter.[205] These networks evolved from traditional patron-client ties into a mass-patronage structure post-Khmer Rouge, where elites secure loyalty by distributing public resources, contracts, and positions to allies, fostering mutual protection among the ruling class rather than broader societal benefits.[205] [206] The conferral of "oknha" titles—honorary designations for donors contributing at least $500,000 to national development—exemplifies this, as recipients often gain preferential access to logging concessions, mining licenses, and infrastructure projects, intertwining business elites with CPP patronage.[207] Cronyism permeates key sectors, with family and party loyalists controlling lucrative industries such as agriculture, timber, and real estate. For instance, companies linked to the Hun family have been accused of using arson and intimidation tactics, including releasing cobras on villagers, to seize farmland for economic land concessions, displacing thousands in provinces like Preah Vihear.[208] Political patronage grants exemptions from taxes and regulations to allies, embedding corruption in everyday governance and perpetuating economic inequality, as evidenced by the concentration of wealth among a small elite amid widespread poverty.[209] [210] Recent developments highlight the persistence of these networks in emerging threats like transnational crime. Cambodia has become a hub for online scams generating billions annually, with operations often shielded by connections to political and military elites who provide protection in exchange for kickbacks, as seen in scam compounds in Sihanoukville employing forced labor.[211] This fusion of patronage and illicit activities underscores how corruption sustains authoritarian durability, with the CPP leveraging clientelist ties to suppress dissent and maintain electoral dominance, as demonstrated in the 2018 dissolution of the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP).[212] [110] Despite government anti-corruption rhetoric, empirical outcomes show limited accountability, as patronage prioritizes elite cohesion over institutional reform.[213]Political stability versus authoritarianism
Cambodia has maintained relative political stability since the defeat of the Khmer Rouge in 1998, marking the end of decades of civil war and genocide, with the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) consolidating power under long-serving leader Hun Sen until his transition to his son Hun Manet as prime minister in 2023.[214] This stability has coincided with sustained economic growth, averaging around 7% annually from 1998 to 2019, enabling the country to achieve lower middle-income status by 2015 and fostering improvements in infrastructure, health, and education.[215] Proponents of the regime, including Hun Sen himself, attribute this peace and development to the CPP's firm control, which prevented the factional violence that plagued earlier post-conflict periods and allowed focus on reconstruction.[216] However, this stability has been achieved through increasingly authoritarian measures, transitioning from competitive authoritarianism in the 1990s and 2000s—characterized by multiparty elections with opposition participation—to hegemonic authoritarianism following the 2017 dissolution of the main opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) by the Supreme Court on charges of treason.[217] The 2018 and 2023 national elections exemplified this shift, with the CPP securing all 125 seats in the National Assembly in 2023 after major opposition parties were barred by the National Election Committee, amid reports of voter intimidation, media censorship, and arrests of critics.[218] [219] Hun Sen publicly threatened legal action against voters who spoiled ballots in 2023, signaling intolerance for even symbolic dissent.[220] International assessments underscore the authoritarian nature of this governance, with Freedom House rating Cambodia as "Not Free" in its 2024 Freedom in the World report, scoring 23 out of 100 due to systemic restrictions on political rights and civil liberties, including the suppression of independent media and civil society.[182] While the regime's patronage networks and control over institutions like the judiciary and security forces have minimized large-scale unrest, critics argue that this comes at the expense of genuine pluralism, with opposition figures like Kem Sokha remaining under house arrest or in exile, and protests—such as those by CNRP supporters in 2013-2014—routinely dispersed through force or legal preemption.[212] Empirical outcomes show low levels of political violence but persistent corruption and elite capture, where stability prioritizes regime survival over broader accountability, as evidenced by the CPP's organizational strength in rural patronage rather than broad ideological appeal.[221] [104] The trade-off reflects causal dynamics where authoritarian consolidation, while enabling short-term order and growth, risks long-term fragility by alienating urban youth and international donors wary of democratic backsliding.[222]Human Rights and Freedoms
Historical abuses and tribunals
The Khmer Rouge seized control of Cambodia on April 17, 1975, following the fall of Phnom Penh, and established Democratic Kampuchea under Pol Pot's leadership, initiating a radical communist transformation that led to widespread atrocities until the regime's overthrow by Vietnamese forces on January 7, 1979.[223] The regime's policies enforced immediate urban evacuations, abolition of currency, private property, and formal education, while compelling the population into agricultural collectives under brutal conditions, resulting in deaths from execution, starvation, disease, and overwork estimated at 1.5 to 2 million—roughly 21 to 25 percent of Cambodia's pre-1975 population of about 7.5 to 8 million.[68] [78] [67] Targeted purges eliminated perceived enemies, including intellectuals, ethnic minorities such as Cham Muslims and Vietnamese, and even internal Khmer Rouge cadres suspected of disloyalty, through a network of over 150 prisons and torture centers. S-21, also known as Tuol Sleng, operated as the regime's primary security prison in a converted Phnom Penh high school, where at least 12,000 to 14,000 prisoners—many former officials or ordinary citizens—were tortured to extract confessions of treason before execution, with only a handful surviving.[224] [225] Victims from S-21 were frequently transported to execution sites like Choeung Ek, approximately 17 kilometers southwest of Phnom Penh, where mass graves containing the remains of around 17,000 individuals have been identified, including women and children killed by blunt force to conserve ammunition.[226] [227] Post-regime accountability efforts culminated in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), a hybrid tribunal established in 2006 by Cambodian law with United Nations assistance to prosecute senior Khmer Rouge leaders for crimes from 1975 to 1979. In Case 001, Kaing Guek Eav (alias Duch), commander of S-21, was convicted in 2010 of crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, receiving a life sentence upheld on appeal for overseeing the torture and murder of at least 12,000 people.[228] [229] Case 002 targeted the regime's central committee: Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan were convicted in 2014 and 2018 of crimes against humanity, including murder, persecution, and forced transfer, as well as genocide against the Cham Muslim minority; both received life sentences, with convictions affirmed despite partial acquittals on appeal. Ieng Sary died in 2013 before a final verdict, and Case 003 and 004 investigations into mid-level officials faced Cambodian government opposition, limiting further prosecutions amid criticisms of political interference and incomplete justice.[229][230] The ECCC's proceedings documented extensive evidence, including survivor testimonies and regime archives, but operated at high cost—over $300 million by 2019—with only a few convictions, highlighting challenges in addressing systemic abuses where many perpetrators integrated into post-1979 Cambodian society.[231]Current restrictions on dissent
The Cambodian government maintains tight control over political expression through a combination of judicial prosecutions, legislative restrictions, and security force actions, effectively limiting organized opposition and public criticism. Under Prime Minister Hun Manet, who assumed office in August 2023, these measures have persisted and in some cases intensified, with authorities frequently charging dissidents under laws prohibiting incitement to commit felonies, plotting against the government, and insulting the monarchy.[119][232] In 2024, the regime escalated criminal penalties for peaceful dissent, including lengthy prison sentences for activists and journalists perceived as threats to stability.[119] Judicial mechanisms serve as primary tools for suppressing dissent, with courts routinely convicting opposition figures on fabricated or broadly interpreted charges. For instance, in February 2024, Candlelight Party official Chao Veasna received a three-year prison sentence for incitement after posting a video criticizing electoral irregularities.[233] Environmental activists affiliated with the Mother Nature group, including Yim Leanghy, Sun Ratha, and foreign national Alejandro Gonzalez-Davidson, were sentenced to six to eight years in prison in July 2024 for "plotting against the government" and "insulting the king" based on their protests against illegal logging and land grabs.[234][235] Investigative journalist Mech Dara faced arrest in October 2024 for "incitement to provoke serious social chaos" over social media posts exposing alleged official corruption, highlighting the use of such charges to silence reporting on governance failures.[236][232] Legislative changes have further entrenched these restrictions, notably a constitutional amendment passed in July 2025 that removed prohibitions on dual citizenship and enabled a new law in August 2025 allowing revocation of citizenship for individuals convicted of colluding with foreign powers to undermine the state.[237][238] This measure, unanimously approved by the National Assembly dominated by the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), targets exiled dissidents and those receiving external support, expanding the government's reach to curb overseas criticism.[239][240] Internet freedoms have correspondingly eroded, with authorities blocking independent news websites ahead of elections and prosecuting users for online dissent, as evidenced by the denial of bail to detained journalists and activists in mid-2025.[233][241] Security apparatus enforcement extends to transnational efforts, including securing deportations of Cambodian critics from Thailand and Malaysia, ensuring that even diaspora voices face reprisals.[242] These tactics have rendered meaningful political opposition inviable, with the CPP facing no credible challengers in recent elections due to the dissolution of parties like the Cambodia National Rescue Party in 2017 and ongoing harassment of remnants.[124][243] A UN Special Rapporteur in October 2025 described the human rights situation as "disturbing," urging the release of detained opponents and cessation of charges against civil society, underscoring the systemic nature of these curbs on expression.[244]Government defenses and empirical outcomes
The Cambodian government defends its governance model by emphasizing that sustained political stability since the early 1990s has been essential to avert a return to the civil war and Khmer Rouge-era devastation, enabling economic development that delivers concrete human welfare gains over abstract political liberties. In official statements, authorities assert that "stability and development first" safeguards core interests of peace, growth, and prosperity, countering Western criticisms by highlighting how post-conflict reconstruction prioritized basic needs like food security and infrastructure, which they equate with foundational human rights.[245] [246] This approach, they argue, reflects causal priorities: without order enforced against disruptive elements, investments in health, education, and poverty alleviation could not occur, as evidenced by the fragility of neighboring states with similar histories but weaker central control. Empirical indicators support claims of progress in socioeconomic outcomes under this framework. Poverty rates fell from over 50% in 2004 to 12.9% in 2019, driven by annual GDP growth averaging 7% from 1998 to 2018, lifting millions through garment exports, tourism, and agriculture.[247] [248] Life expectancy rose from 58 years in 2000 to 69 years by 2017, while under-five mortality declined from 107 to 29 per 1,000 live births over the same period, attributable to expanded healthcare access and vaccination programs.[247] Literacy rates improved to 80.5% by 2019, and the Human Development Index ranked Cambodia among the world's fastest improvers from 1990 to 2016, correlating with reduced multidimensional poverty in rural areas.[249] Government officials cite these metrics to contend that stability has yielded verifiable upliftment, contrasting with pre-1993 chaos where famine and violence claimed millions, though critics from organizations like Human Rights Watch—often aligned with donor-state agendas—focus on political metrics while downplaying such data.[245] These outcomes, however, remain uneven: urban-rural disparities persist, with COVID-19 reversing some poverty gains to 17.8% by 2020, and reliance on low-wage labor raises questions about sustainability absent broader institutional reforms.[248] The regime maintains that incremental liberalization follows development, as premature multiparty chaos risked elite-driven instability, a view substantiated by the 1997 coup and 2013 unrest that briefly stalled growth. Overall, Phnom Penh posits that empirical welfare advances validate authoritarian stability over contested freedoms, prioritizing causal chains from order to prosperity.[250]International criticisms and responses
International organizations and human rights groups have repeatedly criticized Cambodia for ongoing restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly, and association, particularly targeting opposition figures, journalists, and activists. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights in Cambodia, Vitit Muntarbhorn, expressed alarm in October 2025 over the "disturbing" situation, citing arbitrary arrests, judicial harassment of political opponents, and a shrinking civic space that stifles dissent.[244] Similarly, Human Rights Watch's 2025 World Report documented the Cambodian People's Party's (CPP) dominance in a single-party state, with controlled elections, dissolution of opposition parties like the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) in 2017, and subsequent arrests of over 100 CNRP members, many of whom remain imprisoned or exiled as of 2024.[119] Amnesty International reported in 2024 that authorities arbitrarily arrested at least 94 individuals since late July for criticizing the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Area, charging them under laws on incitement and defamation.[251] Criticisms extend to media freedom and internet controls, where the government blocked independent news sites ahead of the July 2023 elections, contributing to a decline in internet freedom scores.[233] The U.S. State Department's 2024 Human Rights Report highlighted credible instances of torture, cruel treatment, and lack of investigations into official abuses, including politically motivated convictions of environmental defenders from groups like Mother Nature Cambodia, who received sentences of six to eight years in 2024.[252] Forced evictions persist, with thousands of families near Angkor Wat facing displacement without adequate compensation, as noted in Amnesty's 2024 assessments.[123] Additionally, scam compounds operating with apparent government tolerance have enabled human trafficking, forced labor, and torture, affecting victims from multiple countries, according to Amnesty's June 2025 report based on survivor testimonies from 53 such sites.[253] Cambodian authorities have responded by defending their actions as necessary for national stability and sovereignty, rejecting foreign interference in domestic affairs. In October 2025, following the UN Rapporteur's report, government spokespersons stated that Cambodia does not claim a perfect human rights record but is undergoing reforms amid development, emphasizing legal processes over what they describe as biased external narratives.[254] Officials have refuted specific claims, such as Amnesty's Angkor eviction reports, asserting that relocations target illegal squatters and provide housing alternatives, while framing arrests as enforcement against threats to public order rather than political repression.[255] During the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review in May 2024, Cambodia accepted 232 recommendations but prioritized those aligning with its developmental goals, such as poverty reduction, over demands for releasing political prisoners.[256] The government under Prime Minister Hun Manet, who assumed office in August 2023, maintains that economic growth—evidenced by GDP increases and infrastructure projects—outweighs isolated criticisms, attributing dissent suppression to preventing instability akin to past civil unrest.[118] Despite these defenses, empirical outcomes show limited implementation of UN recommendations, with ongoing detentions and media closures indicating persistent authoritarian controls.[257]Military and Security
Armed forces structure
The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) comprise three primary branches: the Royal Cambodian Army, the Royal Cambodian Navy, and the Royal Cambodian Air Force, under the supreme command of King Norodom Sihamoni and operational leadership of a general officer appointed by the government.[258] Established in its modern form on November 9, 1953, via a Franco-Khmer convention, the RCAF underwent significant reorganization in 1993 through the merger of the Cambodian People's Armed Forces with non-communist resistance armies following the Paris Peace Accords.[259] [260] Total active personnel number approximately 100,000, with the structure emphasizing ground forces for territorial defense amid historical insurgencies and border disputes.[260] The forces operate under a unified high command headquarters that integrates divisions, brigades, and regiments across services, with ranks divided into three classes: enlisted personnel (rank and file), non-commissioned officers, and commissioned officers.[261] [262] The Royal Cambodian Army forms the core of the RCAF, with an estimated 75,000 to 85,000 personnel focused on land operations, internal security, and border protection across Cambodia's 25 provinces.[260] Organized into five to six military regions—each commanded by a major general assisted by a brigadier general chief of staff—the army deploys infantry units with integrated armor, artillery, and support elements, supplemented by provincial-level commands.[263] A 2001 restructuring reduced the number of full divisions in favor of brigade-level formations to enhance mobility and reduce redundancies, though legacy divisional structures persist in some operational planning, particularly for reinforcements from Phnom Penh.[263] Specialized units include airborne forces, military police, and intervention brigades for rapid response, reflecting adaptations to post-civil war threats like remnant Khmer Rouge activity in the 1990s.[263] The Royal Cambodian Navy maintains around 3,000 to 4,000 personnel, prioritizing riverine patrol on the Mekong and Tonle Sap systems alongside limited coastal defense along the Gulf of Thailand.[260] Its flotilla consists of patrol boats, landing craft, and support vessels rather than blue-water capabilities, structured into riverine flotillas and naval infantry units integrated with army commands for amphibious operations.[260] The Royal Cambodian Air Force, the smallest branch with approximately 1,000 personnel, handles aerial reconnaissance, transport, and limited combat support through a modest inventory of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.[260] Organizationally, it aligns with army regions for joint operations, featuring squadrons based at key airfields like Phnom Penh International and Battambang, with command echelons mirroring ground forces' hierarchy.[258]Internal security apparatus
The Cambodian National Police (CNP), subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, serves as the primary civilian law enforcement agency responsible for internal security, public order, crime prevention, and investigation. It operates through specialized departments including the Security Police for intelligence and counter-subversion, Public Order Police for crowd control and traffic, Judicial Police for criminal investigations, and others such as Transport and Border Police. As of 2023, the CNP employs approximately 62,617 officers nationwide, with ongoing expansions including plans to station at least 10 commune-level police per the country's 1,646 communes by 2026 to enhance local enforcement. The force's Commissioner-General, a four-star general, reports to the Minister of Interior, who holds ultimate oversight, though operational autonomy exists in routine policing. The Royal Gendarmerie of Cambodia (GRK), a paramilitary unit integrated into the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF), complements the CNP by focusing on rural public order, border security enforcement, and rapid-response operations against unrest or organized crime. Numbering around 10,000 personnel organized into 10 battalions deployed across provinces, the GRK maintains a chain of command from Phnom Penh headquarters under the RCAF's General Department of Joint Staff, enabling military-grade capabilities like armed patrols and riot suppression. It has been commended by government officials for contributions to crime suppression, disaster response, and national stability, such as during 2024 drought relief efforts.[264] Coordination between the CNP and GRK occurs under the National Police Commissariat, with the RCAF retaining domestic security roles during crises, blurring lines between civilian and military policing. This structure has facilitated effective control over threats like drug trafficking and insurgencies, but international observers document patterns of partisan deployment to suppress political dissent, including arbitrary arrests, excessive force against protesters, and detention without due process. For instance, GRK units violently dispersed opposition gatherings in Phnom Penh in January 2014, with commanders acknowledging selective enforcement favoring the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP).[265] U.S. State Department reports from 2023-2024 highlight credible instances of torture, political imprisonment, and impunity for security personnel in targeting critics, often without independent investigation, attributing this to CPP dominance over appointments and loyalty networks.[232] [266] Government responses emphasize these actions as necessary for stability amid post-2013 election unrest, rejecting abuse claims as politically motivated exaggerations by exiled opposition.[267]Defense spending and capabilities
Cambodia's military expenditure reached $720.5 million USD in 2024, up from $668 million in 2023 and representing about 2.09% of GDP as of the prior year.[268] [269] This funding supports modest modernization amid reliance on foreign suppliers, primarily China and historical Soviet-era stockpiles, with spending trends reflecting incremental increases tied to regional border tensions and internal stability priorities.[270] The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces maintain approximately 124,300 active personnel across the army, navy, air force, and gendarmerie, with no dedicated reserves but including 10,000 paramilitary elements.[271] [270] The army, the largest branch at around 85,000 troops, is structured into 11 infantry divisions with integrated armor, artillery, and special forces units focused on territorial defense and counterinsurgency.[270] Its inventory features over 600 armored vehicles, including T-55 main battle tanks (estimated operational numbers around 200), BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, and Type 63 light tanks, alongside towed artillery and multiple-launch rocket systems like the Chinese PHL-81.[270] Recent acquisitions include Chinese tactical vehicles and rocket artillery to enhance mobility and firepower.[272] The air force operates a limited fleet of 25 aircraft, predominantly utility and transport helicopters such as Mi-8/17 models and Chinese Z-9 variants, with no combat-capable fixed-wing fighters in service as of 2025.[270] [273] Capabilities emphasize reconnaissance, troop transport, and light attack roles, constrained by maintenance challenges and an absence of modern interceptors or bombers. The navy fields 20 vessels, primarily patrol boats, fast attack craft, and riverine assets for coastal and Mekong River operations, bolstered by two Chinese Type 056 corvettes under construction for enhanced maritime patrol.[270] [274] Overall, Cambodia ranks 95th globally in military strength, with forces oriented toward ground-based deterrence against neighbors like Thailand and Vietnam rather than power projection, reflecting equipment obsolescence and dependence on external aid for upgrades.[270]Foreign Relations
Ties with China and economic dependencies
Cambodia maintains a comprehensive strategic partnership with China, characterized by mutual political support and alignment on key international issues. In April 2025, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Phnom Penh and held talks with Prime Minister Hun Manet, affirming the two nations' commitment to building an "all-weather community with a shared future" and emphasizing China's backing for Cambodia's national stability and development without external interference.[275] Cambodia has consistently supported China's positions in multilateral forums, including blocking an ASEAN communique critical of China's South China Sea claims during the 2016 foreign ministers' meeting, which reflected Phnom Penh's prioritization of bilateral ties over regional consensus.[276] This alignment stems from Cambodia's preference for China's non-interference policy, which contrasts with conditional aid from Western donors, enabling Phnom Penh to pursue domestic policies free from human rights-linked pressures.[277] Economically, China is Cambodia's largest trading partner and investor, with bilateral trade reaching a record $17.8 billion in 2024, including Cambodian exports of $1.75 billion primarily in garments and agricultural products, against imports of $13.44 billion dominated by machinery, electronics, and raw materials.[278] Trade volume continued to expand in 2025, hitting $14.2 billion from January to September, a 27% year-on-year increase, underscoring Cambodia's growing integration into Chinese supply chains but also widening its trade deficit to over $11.7 billion annually.[279] Chinese foreign direct investment has focused on infrastructure under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with cumulative loans, grants, and aid totaling $17.7 billion from 2000 to 2021, funding projects like hydropower dams, solar farms, and special economic zones that have boosted energy access and industrial output.[280] Notable examples include the $1.7 billion Funan Techo Canal, groundbreaking for which occurred in August 2024 and represents over 5% of Cambodia's 2023 GDP, aimed at enhancing Mekong River connectivity for cargo but raising concerns over environmental impacts and displacement.[281] Cambodia's economic dependencies on China manifest in debt exposure and investment reliance, with outstanding loans estimated at approximately $4 billion as of 2024, constituting a significant portion—potentially over 20%—of Phnom Penh's external obligations amid total public debt at 29-36% of GDP.[282] [283] This has prompted scrutiny over sustainability, as repayments strain fiscal resources, though Cambodian officials attribute growth in sectors like manufacturing—where Chinese firms dominate—to these inflows, with fixed asset investments reaching $1.43 billion in 2017 alone.[284] Critics, including Western analysts, highlight risks of over-dependence, citing Sihanoukville's transformation into a Chinese-dominated enclave with associated illicit activities post-2014 BRI surge, yet empirical data shows net infrastructure gains without default, as China has restructured debts and provided grants to mitigate pressures.[285] Phnom Penh defends the relationship as mutually beneficial, enabling rapid development absent from diversified partnerships, with recent 2025 agreements on supply chain resilience and Mekong-Lancang cooperation reinforcing this trajectory.[286]Relations with Vietnam and Thailand
Cambodia's relations with Vietnam are rooted in a history of conflict and interdependence, marked by Vietnam's 1978 invasion that toppled the Khmer Rouge regime and led to a decade-long occupation until 1989, during which Hanoi installed a pro-Vietnamese government that formed the basis of the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP).[287] This intervention, while ending the Khmer Rouge genocide, fostered long-term resentment among Cambodian nationalists over perceived Vietnamese dominance and territorial encroachments, including disputes in the Mekong Delta region historically claimed by Cambodia.[288] Diplomatic ties were formalized in 1967, but post-occupation relations emphasized economic cooperation, with bilateral trade reaching $10 billion in 2024, accounting for about 20% of Cambodia's total trade volume.[289] [290] Under Prime Minister Hun Manet, who succeeded his father Hun Sen in 2023, Cambodia has shown signs of strategic distancing from Vietnam, prioritizing diversification to reduce historical dependencies, including stalled border demarcation at 84% since 2018 amid mutual suspicions.[291] [292] A diplomatic reset occurred at the 2025 Ho Chi Minh City Summit, focusing on pragmatic economic interests rather than ideological alignment, though Vietnam expressed concerns over escalating Cambodia-Thailand border tensions in July 2025, highlighting Hanoi's interest in regional stability to protect its influence.[290] [293] Cambodian scholars describe the ties as thriving across sectors, yet underlying frictions persist from Vietnam's past military role and ongoing border issues, with Phnom Penh balancing closer alignment with China to counterbalance Vietnamese leverage.[294] Relations with Thailand have been characterized by recurrent border disputes, particularly over the Preah Vihear temple, awarded to Cambodia by the International Court of Justice in 1962 and reaffirmed in 2013, leading to deadly clashes between 2008 and 2011 that killed dozens and displaced thousands.[295] Thailand has historically contested the border delineation inherited from French colonial maps, refusing international mediation and viewing Cambodian claims as expansionist, which fueled nationalist sentiments on both sides.[296] Tensions escalated again in July 2025 with armed clashes along the border, prompting diplomatic interventions, including Vietnam's expressions of concern and Thailand's new Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul proposing a referendum in September 2025 to resolve the impasse.[297] [298] By October 2025, efforts toward de-escalation culminated in a peace accord signed at the ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur, presided over by U.S. President Donald Trump, signaling Thailand's willingness to pursue bilateral talks over confrontation and Cambodia's emphasis on peaceful dispute resolution to bolster regional stability.[299] [300] Despite these steps, the ASEAN framework's limitations in enforcing binding arbitration expose vulnerabilities in Thailand-Cambodia diplomacy, with economic interdependence—through cross-border trade and labor migration—serving as a pragmatic counterweight to territorial rivalries.[301] Historical competition over territory continues to strain ties, though recent resets prioritize mutual economic gains amid broader Southeast Asian dynamics.[302]Engagement with the United States and West
Diplomatic relations between Cambodia and the United States were first established on July 11, 1950, when U.S. envoy Donald Heath presented credentials to King Norodom Sihanouk.[303] These ties were severed by Cambodia on May 3, 1965, amid accusations of U.S. responsibility for regional instability during the Vietnam War escalation.[304] Relations were re-established in 1969, after which the U.S. extended $1.18 billion in military assistance and $503 million in economic aid to the Lon Nol regime from 1970 to 1975.[305] Concurrently, U.S. bombing campaigns targeting North Vietnamese sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia, including Operation Menu from March 1969 to May 1970, dropped 110,000 tons of ordnance across 3,630 sorties, with total bombings from 1969 to 1973 exceeding 500,000 tons.[306] [307] Following the Khmer Rouge victory in 1975 and the Vietnamese invasion in 1979, U.S. policy shifted to opposing the Soviet- and Vietnam-backed People's Republic of Kampuchea, maintaining recognition of the Khmer Rouge-led coalition in the United Nations until 1990. The 1991 Paris Peace Agreements, signed on October 23, facilitated Vietnamese withdrawal, deployed the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and paved the way for multiparty elections in 1993, enabling gradual normalization of U.S.-Cambodia ties.[308] Despite historical grievances, economic engagement has grown, with the U.S. becoming Cambodia's largest export market; Cambodian exports to the U.S. reached $9.93 billion in 2024, primarily garments and footwear.[309] A Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) signed in 2006 has supported bilateral trade discussions, yielding progress in reciprocal tariff commitments as of October 2025.[126] [310] U.S. assistance continues in targeted areas, including $675,000 for demining operations in 2025 and $31 million cumulatively for education since the 1990s.[311] [312] Relations remain strained by U.S. concerns over human rights, electoral irregularities, and political suppression, leading to targeted sanctions rather than broad measures; for instance, in September 2024, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Cambodian tycoon Ly Yong Phat and associated entities for facilitating human trafficking and forced labor in cyber scam operations.[313] Similar actions in 2025 targeted scam networks involving Cambodian-based entities preying on U.S. victims.[314] Cambodia's government has viewed such criticisms as interference, prioritizing sovereignty and economic diversification, particularly with China, while maintaining pragmatic U.S. trade ties.[315] Engagement with other Western nations reflects similar dynamics of economic cooperation amid human rights tensions. The European Union, Cambodia's fourth-largest trading partner, partially suspended Everything But Arms (EBA) preferences in February 2020—effective from August 2020—withdrawing duty-free access for sectors like travel goods and sugar, citing serious and systematic violations of labor rights and fundamental freedoms, including opposition suppression and forced evictions.[316] [317] Australia, marking 70 years of diplomatic relations in 2022, has provided development aid and fostered two-way trade valued at AUD $432 million in 2020, with ongoing discussions in 2025 to expand cooperation in agriculture, tourism, and security.[318] [319] Cambodian officials emphasize mutual benefits from Western partnerships, countering perceptions of over-reliance on Beijing by highlighting diversified foreign policy.[320]ASEAN and regional dynamics
Cambodia acceded to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on April 30, 1999, becoming its tenth member following the stabilization of its internal politics after the 1997 coup deferral.[321][322] This membership positioned Cambodia within a bloc emphasizing consensus-based decision-making, non-interference, and economic cooperation among Southeast Asian states.[323] ASEAN integration has provided Cambodia with platforms for regional diplomacy, enhancing its voice in multilateral forums despite domestic challenges like limited human resources and infrastructure deficits.[324] In political dynamics, Cambodia has often aligned its positions to preserve ASEAN unity while reflecting its external partnerships, notably blocking communiqués critical of China's South China Sea activities during multiple summits.[325][326] As a non-claimant state, Cambodia prioritizes bilateral resolutions and the ongoing Code of Conduct negotiations over confrontational statements, a stance that has drawn accusations from claimant states like Vietnam and the Philippines of undermining bloc cohesion.[327][328] During its 2022 ASEAN chairmanship, Cambodia opposed proposals for joint military exercises in the South China Sea, citing risks to regional stability.[329] On the Myanmar crisis post-2021 coup, Cambodia hosted envoys and supported the Five-Point Consensus but faced criticism for insufficient enforcement, reflecting ASEAN's broader challenges with the non-interference principle.[330][331] Economically, Cambodia's engagement has driven intra-ASEAN trade to $12.28 billion in the first nine months of 2025, a year-on-year increase attributed to the ASEAN Economic Community's tariff reductions and supply chain linkages.[332] Membership facilitates access to regional markets, attracting foreign investment in garments and agriculture, though Cambodia lags in services and digital integration compared to peers.[333] Under its 2022 leadership, ASEAN advanced post-COVID recovery initiatives, including digital economy frameworks that Cambodia has since leveraged for infrastructure upgrades.[334] Cambodia continues active participation, with Prime Minister Hun Manet attending the 47th ASEAN Summit in Malaysia in October 2025 to address integration amid global pressures.[335]Economy
Post-communist liberalization and growth trajectory
In 1989, under Prime Minister Hun Sen's leadership, the State of Cambodia—formerly the socialist People's Republic of Kampuchea—launched pivotal economic reforms to dismantle the command economy established during the Vietnamese occupation period. These included granting operational autonomy to state-owned enterprises, permitting them to determine prices independently, lifting the state monopoly on foreign trade (initially relaxed in 1987), enacting a law to attract foreign investment, and initiating selective privatization of public assets.[336][337][338] The reforms responded to chronic shortages, hyperinflation exceeding 100% annually in the mid-1980s, and agricultural stagnation under collectivization, aiming to revive private initiative after decades of state control that had reduced GDP per capita to approximately $200 by 1989.[339] The 1991 Paris Peace Accords, which ended major hostilities and deployed the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), paved the way for multiparty elections in 1993, resulting in a coalition government and the restoration of the monarchy. The ensuing constitution formalized the shift, with Article 56 declaring: "The Kingdom of Cambodia shall adopt the market economy system," thereby institutionalizing private property rights, competition, and reduced state intervention as core principles.[163][94] This legal framework encouraged foreign direct investment, which surged from negligible levels in the late 1980s to over $300 million annually by the mid-1990s, while domestic rice production doubled between 1989 and 1993 due to decollectivization and price liberalization.[340] The liberalization catalyzed a robust growth trajectory, with real GDP expanding at an average annual rate of 7.6% from 1995 to 2019, elevating Cambodia from postwar devastation—where output had contracted by over 80% during the Khmer Rouge era—to lower-middle-income status by 2015, with GDP per capita rising from $292 in 1993 to $1,621 by 2019.[341][342] Growth accelerated post-2000, averaging above 7% through the 2010s amid export diversification and infrastructure improvements, though punctuated by setbacks like the 1.5% contraction in 1998 from the Asian financial crisis and a -1.9% dip in 2009 amid the global recession.[343] This expansion reflected causal links from policy shifts enabling capital inflows and labor mobilization, rather than resource windfalls, though uneven distribution and reliance on low-skill sectors underscored vulnerabilities.[341]Primary sectors: agriculture and garments
Cambodia's agriculture sector remains a foundational element of the economy, employing approximately 2.6 million people and contributing around 16.7% to GDP in 2024, down from higher shares in prior decades amid gradual industrialization.[344] [345] Rice dominates production, covering over 70% of cropped agricultural land and accounting for about 50% of sector output, with harvests expanding significantly since 2005 through irrigation improvements and favorable farm-gate prices driven by export demand.[346] [347] In 2023, total agricultural exports reached nearly 8.45 million tonnes valued at $4.3 billion, underscoring rice's role in foreign exchange earnings alongside crops like rubber, cassava, and maize.[348] Despite output growth, yields lag regional averages due to limited mechanization, variable climate risks such as floods and droughts in the Mekong Delta, and suboptimal input use, prompting government policies focused on productivity-enhancing reforms like better seed varieties and market access.[349] [350] The garment sector, often bundled with footwear and travel goods under GFT industries, has emerged as Cambodia's leading manufactured export driver since the 1990s, constituting roughly 48% of total merchandise exports and fueling post-conflict economic diversification through foreign direct investment, primarily from East Asian firms.[351] Exports grew steadily, reaching levels that supported 5.6% overall GDP expansion in 2023, with projections for the garment segment alone hitting $19.9 billion by 2032 at an 8.2% compound annual growth rate from 2023 baselines, aided by preferential tariffs under agreements like the EU's Everything But Arms initiative.[352] [353] The industry absorbs a large female-dominated workforce, providing entry-level manufacturing jobs that have lifted rural migrants from subsistence farming, though it contends with vulnerabilities including U.S. and EU tariff hikes, supply chain disruptions from global events, and compliance pressures on factory conditions monitored by programs like Better Factories Cambodia.[354] [355] Labor-intensive assembly for brands targeting low-cost apparel has sustained double-digit export gains in segments like EU-bound garments, up 24% in early 2024, but dependency on imported fabrics exposes the sector to currency fluctuations and raw material costs.[356]Tourism and services expansion
Cambodia's tourism sector experienced robust expansion in the post-pandemic period, with international visitor arrivals totaling 6.7 million in 2024, a 22.9% increase from 2023 and 1.4% above the 2019 pre-COVID peak.[357] This growth generated $3.6 billion in revenue, reflecting an 18% year-on-year rise, and supported 510,000 direct jobs.[358][359] The sector's contribution to GDP reached 9.4% in 2024, up from 7.5% the prior year, underscoring its role as a key economic driver amid recovery from global travel disruptions.[360] Expansion was fueled by enhanced connectivity, including new flight routes and targeted initiatives like Muslim-friendly accommodations, attracting 430,000 visitors from that demographic.[361] Major source markets included China, which accounted for a significant share of business-related travel, alongside Thailand and Vietnam.[362] Government policies, such as visa facilitation and infrastructure investments in sites like Angkor Wat and Phnom Penh's riverfront, further bolstered arrivals, with early 2025 data showing 2.95 million international tourists from January to May, an 11.7% year-on-year gain.[363] The broader services sector, including hospitality, transportation, finance, and real estate, complemented tourism's momentum, with projections for 5.6% growth in 2025 driven by these subsectors.[364] Wholesale and retail trade remains dominant within services, but tourism's multiplier effects—spurring hotel developments and ancillary businesses—have amplified overall expansion, positioning services as a pillar of Cambodia's economic diversification beyond garments and agriculture.[341] Direct tourism contributions to GDP are forecasted to rise at 6.7% annually through 2034, potentially reaching 10.3% of GDP.[365]Infrastructure, energy, and trade imbalances
Cambodia's transportation infrastructure has expanded significantly since the early 2000s, driven by government master plans and foreign investment, particularly from China under the Belt and Road Initiative. As of 2024, the country operates three international airports in Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville, supporting tourism and trade logistics.[366] Road networks include nine expressway projects, such as the Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway, which enhances connectivity to key ports and reduces travel times for goods.[367] [368] A comprehensive logistics master plan outlines 174 priority initiatives, comprising 94 road projects, eight railway rehabilitations, and developments in inland waterways and maritime ports, aimed at addressing bottlenecks in regional trade corridors.[369] Despite progress, challenges persist, including incomplete connectivity on major routes, vulnerability to flooding, and maintenance gaps that elevate logistics costs and hinder efficient cross-border movement.[370] The energy sector relies heavily on imported fuels and hydropower, with domestic production insufficient to meet rising demand from urbanization and industry. In 2024, electricity generation draws from 41% coal, 25% hydropower, and 5% solar, supplemented by oil and planned liquefied natural gas imports.[371] Installed capacity includes approximately 1,331 MW from hydropower, 1,025 MW from coal plants, and 642 MW from oil, though output fluctuates seasonally due to Mekong River dependencies.[372] Cambodia imports electricity from Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand, with plans to boost import capacity by over 50% by 2026 to stabilize supply amid growing consumption that doubled from 2010 to 2019 before accelerating again post-2022.[373] Electrification has reached 98% of villages by mid-2022, up from 34% in 2010, but rural access remains uneven, and tariffs average $0.16 per kWh—one of Asia's highest—reflecting import reliance and infrastructure costs.[374] [375] Trade imbalances characterize Cambodia's external accounts, with persistent deficits stemming from high import needs for energy, machinery, and intermediates exceeding export earnings from garments and agriculture. In 2023, exports totaled $22.64 billion—primarily apparel to the United States—while imports reached $24.18 billion, yielding a $1.53 billion deficit; preliminary 2024 data indicate continued shortfalls, such as a May deficit equivalent to roughly $430 million.[376] [377] Agricultural exports, including rice targeting 1 million tons annually by 2025, provide diversification but remain secondary to labor-intensive manufacturing.[378] Imports of fuels and equipment, often from China and Vietnam, amplify vulnerabilities, as energy insecurity and infrastructure gaps elevate production costs and limit value-added processing, perpetuating reliance on low-margin assembly for export.[372] Chinese-funded projects, while bolstering connectivity, deepen economic ties that exacerbate import dependencies without fully offsetting trade gaps.[379]Fiscal challenges and debt sustainability
Cambodia's public debt-to-GDP ratio stood at approximately 35.3 percent as of December 2023, with projections reaching 38.5 percent by the end of 2025, driven by ongoing infrastructure investments and fiscal deficits.[283][380] External debt constitutes the majority, with total public and publicly guaranteed external debt at around 29.5 percent of GDP in 2024 projections under baseline scenarios.[381] Of this, Chinese loans under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) account for a significant portion, totaling $4.02 billion as of September 2024, down slightly from $4.1 billion in 2023 due to repayments, representing less than half of external public debt.[382] These loans have financed key infrastructure like roads, ports, and hydropower, but their concessional terms—often with grace periods and low interest—have raised concerns over long-term repayment amid limited fiscal space, though no new Chinese loans were contracted in 2024.[382][383] Fiscal deficits averaged around 2-3 percent of GDP in recent years, narrowing to 2.1 percent in 2024 from 3.9 percent in 2023 through expenditure cuts, yet projected to widen modestly to 3.5 percent in 2025 due to higher spending needs.[384][385] Revenue mobilization remains constrained by a narrow tax base, heavy reliance on indirect taxes like VAT (introduced in 2020), and an informal economy that limits direct tax collection to under 15 percent of GDP.[386] Public investment, often funded by external borrowing, outpaces domestic revenue growth, exacerbating vulnerabilities to external shocks such as tourism downturns or commodity price fluctuations, with budget execution showing deficits in expenditure adjustments through mid-2024.[387][388] Joint IMF-World Bank assessments classify Cambodia at low risk of external and overall debt distress under the Low-Income Countries Debt Sustainability Framework, with debt-carrying capacity supported by moderate growth (projected 6 percent annually) and concessional financing terms.[389][390] However, risks persist from currency mismatches—most debt denominated in U.S. dollars against riel-denominated revenues—and potential contingent liabilities from state-owned enterprises or public-private partnerships, particularly in BRI-linked projects where transparency on terms can be limited compared to multilateral lenders.[386][383] Sustainability hinges on broadening revenue through tax reforms, enhancing export diversification beyond garments and agriculture, and prudent borrowing to avoid over-reliance on any single creditor, as evidenced by stabilized debt ratios under baseline export growth scenarios reaching 32.3 percent of GDP by 2029.[381][386]Demographics
Population dynamics and urbanization
Cambodia's population stood at approximately 17.9 million as of 2025, reflecting a yearly increase of about 1.2 percent driven primarily by natural growth amid declining fertility and mortality rates.[391] The total fertility rate has fallen to 2.4 births per woman, below the replacement level of 2.1 in recent projections, signaling a demographic transition from high to moderate growth patterns observed since the post-Khmer Rouge recovery period.[392] Life expectancy at birth averages 71 years, bolstered by improvements in healthcare access and reductions in infant mortality to 18 deaths per 1,000 live births, though rural-urban disparities persist in these metrics.[391] Internal migration, particularly rural-to-urban flows accounting for roughly 57 percent of all domestic movements, further shapes population distribution by concentrating younger workers in economic hubs.[393] Urbanization has accelerated, with the urban population comprising 26 percent of the total in 2024, up from about 10 percent in 1960, fueled by job opportunities in garments, construction, and services that draw migrants from agrarian provinces.[394] The annual rate of urbanization reached 3.06 percent in recent estimates, outpacing national population growth and straining infrastructure in primate cities like Phnom Penh, which houses over 1.57 million residents as the dominant urban center.[1] Secondary cities such as Siem Reap (139,000 inhabitants) and Battambang (119,000) have seen slower but steady inflows tied to tourism and trade, yet they remain dwarfed by the capital's pull.[395] Projections indicate urban dwellers could reach 44 percent of the population by 2030, totaling nearly 8 million, as rural poverty and climate irregularities in provinces like those along the Mekong exacerbate out-migration.[396] This shift correlates with economic liberalization since the 1990s, where urban areas absorb labor displaced from subsistence farming, though it has led to informal settlements and uneven service provision; for instance, Phnom Penh's rapid influx has heightened demands on water, sanitation, and housing without proportional public investment.[397] Net rural-to-urban migration, comprising the bulk of internal flows since the 1980s repopulation, reflects causal pulls from wage differentials—urban incomes averaging twice rural levels—rather than broad policy directives, underscoring market-driven rather than state-orchestrated demographic changes.[398] While boosting aggregate productivity, these dynamics risk amplifying vulnerabilities like urban poverty cycles if rural development lags, as evidenced by persistent commune-level outflows linked to irregular monsoons and soil degradation.[399]Ethnic composition and minorities
The Khmer ethnic group forms the overwhelming majority of Cambodia's population, comprising approximately 97.1% or over 15 million individuals as of the 2019 census.[400] This dominance reflects historical settlement patterns in the lowland regions of the Mekong Delta and Tonle Sap basin, where Khmer culture, language, and Theravada Buddhism have shaped national identity since the Angkorian era.[401] Ethnic minorities account for the remaining 2.9%, totaling 455,610 persons, with a concentration in rural and highland areas.[400] The Cham, an Austronesian-speaking Muslim group descended from the medieval Kingdom of Champa, number 275,217 or 61.4% of minorities, primarily residing along the Mekong River, in Kampong Cham province, and urban centers like Phnom Penh; they maintain distinct Islamic practices and face occasional communal tensions rooted in historical Khmer-Cham conflicts.[400] Indigenous highland peoples, encompassing 24 distinct groups such as the Jarai (26,922), Punong (36,585), Tampuan (36,373), and Kreung (21,453), total around 180,000 and inhabit northeastern provinces like Ratanakiri (101,691 minorities) and Mondulkiri; these communities engage in subsistence agriculture, swidden farming, and animist traditions, though Christianity has grown among some, with literacy rates lagging at 77.1% compared to the national 88.5%.[400] [402] Vietnamese residents, estimated at 0.4-0.5% or 62,000-78,000, are concentrated in eastern border regions and Mekong islands, often involved in fishing and trade; census figures may undercount due to longstanding Khmer nationalist sentiments and periodic expulsions, as evidenced by 1970s and 1990s policies, leading independent estimates like the CIA's to suggest higher non-Khmer proportions overall.[401] [1] Chinese Cambodians, numbering 0.1-0.6% or up to 94,000, form a small urban mercantile class in Phnom Penh and provincial towns, historically targeted during the Khmer Rouge era but rebounding in commerce post-1990s liberalization.[401] Smaller border groups include Lao and Thai communities in the northwest, comprising less than 0.1% each, with cultural ties to neighboring states.[1] Government data from the National Institute of Statistics prioritizes indigenous and Cham classifications, potentially minimizing lowland minorities like Vietnamese amid political sensitivities, while international assessments adjust for underreporting based on migration patterns and historical displacements.[400] [1] Minorities exhibit higher fertility rates (3.3 children per woman versus 2.5 nationally) and younger median ages (23 versus 27), contributing to demographic pressures in remote areas.[400]Linguistic diversity
Khmer serves as the official and national language of Cambodia, spoken as the mother tongue by 95.8% of the population according to the 2019 General Population Census conducted by the National Institute of Statistics.[403] This Austroasiatic language, part of the Mon-Khmer branch, exhibits significant dialectal variation, including Central Khmer (the standard form used in media and education), Northern Khmer (influenced by Thai in border regions), and Western Khmer (spoken near the Thai frontier), though these are mutually intelligible and do not constitute separate languages.[404] Khmer's script, derived from ancient Brahmi via Pallava influence around the 7th century, is an abugida with 33 consonants, 23 dependent vowels, and 12 independent vowels, adapted uniquely to represent the language's phonology, including register tones absent in neighboring tongues.[405] Linguistic diversity in Cambodia remains limited, with a diversity index of 0.157 as measured in 2009, ranking it low globally due to Khmer's overwhelming prevalence.[406] Approximately 2.9% of the population speaks indigenous minority languages as their mother tongue, primarily Austroasiatic varieties among highland ethnic groups in the northeast (e.g., Ratanakiri and Mondulkiri provinces) such as Tampuan, Kraol, and Jarai, which number around 21 living indigenous languages per Ethnologue's classification.[404][403] These languages face varying degrees of vitality; for instance, some like Kreung are stable among communities of 20,000-30,000 speakers, while others, such as Kuy, exhibit institutional support through bilingual education but risk erosion from Khmer assimilation pressures in rural areas.[404] Non-indigenous languages add further layers: Cham (an Austronesian Malayo-Chamic language spoken by the Muslim Cham minority, estimated at 0.2-0.5% of the population), Vietnamese (also Austroasiatic, used by border communities comprising about 1-1.4%), and Sinitic dialects like Teochew among urban Chinese descendants (less than 1%).[407][408] Foreign languages reflect historical and economic influences rather than native diversity. French, a legacy of the 1863-1953 protectorate, persists among older elites and in legal terminology but has fewer than 500,000 speakers, mostly as a second language.[408] English has surged since the 1990s UN intervention and tourism boom, with proficiency concentrated in urban youth and Phnom Penh's service sectors, though rural bilingualism in Khmer-English remains under 10% per anecdotal surveys; it now overshadows French in schools and media.[407] The 2013 census identified 12 major languages overall, underscoring that while Cambodia hosts 29 languages total (21 indigenous plus 8 non-indigenous), effective diversity is constrained by Khmer's role in administration, broadcasting, and intergenerational transmission, with minority tongues often confined to domestic or ritual domains.[407][404] This monolingual skew, lower than in multilingual neighbors like Laos or Vietnam, stems from historical Khmer empire consolidation and post-1979 state policies prioritizing national unity over ethnic pluralism.[406]Religious practices
Approximately 93 percent of Cambodia's population practices Theravada Buddhism, which serves as the state religion under Article 43 of the 1993 Constitution.[409] This form of Buddhism, introduced from Sri Lanka in the 13th century and solidified after the decline of Hinduism-influenced Angkor, emphasizes monastic life, ethical conduct (sila), meditation (bhavana), and scriptural study in Pali.[410] Daily practices among lay Buddhists include offering alms to monks at wats (temples), merit-making through donations and rituals, and observance of the Five Precepts, which prohibit killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying, and intoxicants.[411] Monasticism plays a central role, with over 60,000 monks and novices as of recent estimates, organized into two main sects: the larger Mohanikay (majority) and the stricter Dhammayut, introduced from Thailand in the 19th century. Temporary ordination for males, often lasting three months during the rainy season retreat (vassa), functions as a cultural rite of passage, fostering discipline and community respect; women may become mae chi (nuns) but hold lower status without full ordination rights in Theravada tradition.[412] Syncretic elements persist, blending Buddhist rituals with pre-Angkorian animism, such as veneration of neak ta (guardian spirits) at local shrines and ancestor worship to ensure prosperity and ward off misfortune.[413] Key festivals underscore communal devotion: Pchum Ben (September-October), a 15-day observance where families offer food to monks to transfer merit to deceased relatives, reflecting beliefs in karmic continuity; Meak Bochea (February-March), commemorating the Buddha's first sermon with temple processions and candlelit circumambulations; and Bon Om Touk (October-November), the Water Festival featuring boat races and illuminations to mark the rainy season's end.[414] These events, revived after near-eradication under the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979), which demolished thousands of wats and executed clergy, now draw millions and reinforce social cohesion.[410][412] Religious minorities include about 2 percent Muslims, primarily ethnic Cham following Sunni Islam with practices like Friday prayers at mosques and Ramadan fasting, concentrated in Kampong Cham province.[409] Christians, numbering around 0.3-2 percent and mostly Protestant or Catholic among ethnic Vietnamese, conduct services in house churches or registered buildings, with growth tied to missionary activity post-1990s.[415] Indigenous highland groups (1-2 percent of population) maintain animist rituals involving spirit mediums, animal sacrifices, and nature veneration, often alongside Buddhism.[409] The government registers religious organizations via the Ministry of Cults and Religion, permitting practice but requiring adherence to harmony policies, amid occasional tensions over conversions.[416]Society
Education system and literacy rates
The Cambodian education system is structured into pre-primary (ages 3-5, optional), primary (grades 1-6, ages 6-11), lower secondary (grades 7-9, ages 12-14), and upper secondary (grades 10-12, ages 15-17) levels, followed by tertiary education.[417] Primary and secondary education together comprise general education, with the curriculum emphasizing Khmer language, mathematics, science, social studies, and moral-civic education, aligned to national standards set by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport.[418] Since the 2007 Education Law, nine years of basic education (primary plus lower secondary) have been compulsory, though enforcement remains inconsistent due to socioeconomic barriers.[419] Enrollment rates have improved post-1990s reconstruction, with primary gross enrollment exceeding 100% in recent years due to over-age entrants, while net primary enrollment hovers around 90-95%.[420] Lower secondary net enrollment is approximately 60-70%, dropping to 30-40% for upper secondary, reflecting high dropout rates linked to poverty, rural access issues, and child labor.[421] Early childhood education enrollment stands at about 38% for ages 3-5, limited by inadequate facilities and parental priorities.[422] Public schools dominate, accounting for over 90% of enrollment, supplemented by private institutions in urban areas.[423] Adult literacy rates (ages 15+) reached 83.8% in 2022, up from under 70% in the 1990s, with youth literacy (ages 15-24) at 96%.[424][425] Gender disparities persist, with female adult literacy at 79.7% compared to higher male rates, though gaps have narrowed through targeted programs.[426] These figures, derived from household surveys and UNESCO-aligned definitions of basic reading and writing ability, mask quality deficits, as international assessments like PISA equivalents show Cambodian students scoring below regional averages in foundational skills.[427] Persistent challenges include teacher shortages (many unqualified or undertrained), overcrowded classrooms, and rural-urban disparities in infrastructure, such as lacking sanitation and electricity in over half of schools.[428][429] Low learning outcomes stem from rote memorization-heavy curricula and insufficient resources, with only modest gains from donor-funded reforms despite increased public spending (around 3-4% of GDP).[430] Political influences and corruption in appointments further undermine merit-based improvements, prioritizing quantity over measurable proficiency.[431]Healthcare access and outcomes
Cambodia's healthcare system relies heavily on out-of-pocket payments, which comprised 55% of total health expenditures in 2021, posing significant financial barriers to access, particularly for low-income households.[432] Public infrastructure remains limited, with 0.7 hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants and a density of health workers below the World Health Organization's critical threshold of 2.3 per 1,000, as evidenced by 1.4 workers per 1,000 reported in 2012 data that has shown minimal improvement.[433][434] Private facilities, concentrated in urban areas, handle the majority of outpatient care, while public providers focus on inpatient services, leading to inefficiencies and uneven distribution.[435] Rural-urban disparities exacerbate access issues, as roughly 75% of Cambodians live in rural regions with fewer facilities and longer travel distances to care.[434] Rural residents are significantly less likely to seek medical treatment when ill, with utilization rates improving from a means ratio of 0.57 in earlier surveys to 0.89 by recent assessments, yet still trailing urban counterparts due to transportation costs and perceived quality gaps.[436] Government initiatives, including equity funds and NGO-supported clinics, have expanded basic services in remote areas, but high out-of-pocket costs and informal payments persist, deterring preventive care.[437] Health outcomes reflect gradual progress amid persistent challenges, with life expectancy at birth estimated at 70.74 years in 2024, up from 59.1 years in 2000.[438][439] Infant mortality has declined to 27.9 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2024 estimates, though rates remain elevated compared to regional peers.[440] Non-communicable diseases now dominate burdens, with over 230,000 new diabetes cases in 2024, a nearly 90% surge in cancer diagnoses (primarily breast and cervical), and rising mental health disorders, driven by urbanization, dietary shifts, and aging demographics.[441][442] Leading mortality causes include stroke (120.9 per 100,000), ischaemic heart disease (60.9 per 100,000), and lower respiratory infections (51.3 per 100,000), per 2021 WHO data, signaling a transition from infectious to chronic threats.[439] Total health spending reached 4.71% of GDP in 2022, with public outlays insufficient to cover universal health coverage goals, yielding a service coverage index of 58 in 2021—below Southeast Asian averages.[443][432] Infectious diseases like tuberculosis and malaria have decreased through donor-funded programs, but antimicrobial resistance and waterborne illnesses linked to poor sanitation continue to strain resources, particularly in underserved provinces.[444] Maternal and child health indicators have advanced via vaccination drives and family planning, yet socioeconomic inequalities sustain higher risks among ethnic minorities and the poor.[445]Social welfare and poverty reduction
Cambodia has made substantial progress in reducing poverty since the early 2000s, driven primarily by sustained economic growth averaging over 7% annually from 1998 to 2019, which lifted nearly 2 million people out of poverty between 2009 and 2019 alone.[446] [248] The national poverty rate, measured against the official poverty line, declined from 33.8% in 2009 to 17.8% in 2019, reflecting gains in rural areas through agricultural productivity improvements and urbanization.[447] [448] However, vulnerability persists, with many households remaining just above the poverty threshold and susceptible to shocks like inflation or natural disasters, as evidenced by a temporary rise during the COVID-19 pandemic before recovery.[341] [449] The government's social welfare framework centers on the Identification of Poor Households (IDPoor) program, launched in 2011 as a standardized means-testing system to identify and register vulnerable families using proxy indicators such as housing quality and asset ownership.[450] [451] IDPoor issues equity cards to eligible households—covering over 1.2 million by 2023—granting fee exemptions for health services, education, and agricultural inputs, which has improved targeting efficiency compared to earlier ad-hoc distributions.[452] [453] Complementary initiatives include cash transfer programs, expanded during the 2020 pandemic to reach 1.2 million households with $40-80 payments, and the National Social Protection Policy Framework (2024-2035), which aims to universalize coverage for maternity, disability, and elderly benefits.[454] [455] The National Social Security Fund (NSSF) provides contributory insurance for formal workers, covering occupational risks and health, though informal sector penetration remains limited at under 5 million contributors as of 2024.[456] Despite these advances, challenges hinder deeper poverty alleviation, including high inequality (Gini coefficient around 0.36 in 2019) concentrated in rural provinces, where 80% of the poor reside, and reliance on low-skill garment and agriculture jobs vulnerable to global trade disruptions.[457] Corruption in local targeting and uneven implementation of IDPoor—exacerbated by manual data collection in remote areas—have led to exclusion errors, with some studies estimating 20-30% of truly poor households untargeted.[458] Economic slowdowns, such as the projected 5.3% GDP growth in 2024 amid regional tensions, underscore the need for structural reforms like skills training and diversification beyond textiles to sustain reductions.[459] In 2024, the government extended aid to over 50,000 poor and disabled households, but fiscal constraints limit scaling without private sector involvement or reduced aid dependency.[460]| Year | National Poverty Rate (%) | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 2009 | 33.8 | [447] |
| 2019 | 17.8 | [448] [447] |
| 2020 (est.) | 18.0 | [461] |
