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Battle of Chotusitz
Battle of Chotusitz
Battle of Chotusitz
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Battle of Chotusitz
Part of First Silesian War and War of the Austrian Succession

"Battle of Chotusitz and Czaslau" (engraving by G. P. Busch)
Date17 May 1742
Location
Chotusice, Bohemia
49°56′57″N 15°23′40″E / 49.94917°N 15.39444°E / 49.94917; 15.39444
Result Prussian victory
Belligerents
Habsburg monarchy Austria Prussia
Commanders and leaders
Charles of Lorraine
Karl Josef Batthyány
Von Daun
Liechtenstein		 Frederick the Great
Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau
von Buddenbrock
von Waldow
Strength
25,000 to 30,000[1][2] 25,000 to 28,000
Casualties and losses
5,100 to 7,000 dead or wounded or missing;
1,200 prisoners		 4,900 to 7,000 dead, wounded or missing
Map

The Battle of Chotusitz[a], took place on 17 May 1742, in Bohemia, now the Czech Republic, during the First Silesian War, part of the wider War of the Austrian Succession. Led by Charles of Lorraine, an Imperial force of around 25,000 men was advancing against French-occupied Prague, when it ran into a Prussian army of roughly equal size, commanded by Frederick the Great. Casualties were heavy on both sides, and the battle had little impact on the war in general, but is generally considered a Prussian victory.

The war ended with the Treaty of Breslau in June 1742, allowing Austria to recapture Prague in December. Hostilities resumed in 1744 with the outbreak of the Second Silesian War.

Background

[edit]

The War of the Austrian Succession was sparked by the death of Charles VI in 1740 and the succession of his daughter Maria Theresa. Salic law previously excluded women from inheriting the Habsburg monarchy;[b] the 1713 Pragmatic Sanction set this aside, allowing Maria Theresa to succeed her father.[3]

However, Austrian dominance of the Holy Roman Empire was increasingly threatened by the rise of Bavaria, Prussia and Saxony respectively. For their own purposes, each of these opposed the Sanction, and with French support invaded Crown of Bohemia, then the most important industrial area in Europe, comprising Silesia, Moravia and Bohemia. In December 1740, Frederick II initiated the First Silesian War by occupying Silesia. The single richest province in the Empire, generating 10% of total Imperial income, its loss was a serious blow to Austria.[4]

Victory at Mollwitz in April 1741 consolidated Frederick's hold on Silesia. After a French-Bavarian force captured Prague in November, Charles of Bavaria was crowned King of Bohemia, and on 12 February 1742 became the first non-Habsburg Emperor since 1437.[5] However, in a rare example of an Austrian winter offensive, by the end of February 1742, von Khevenhüller occupied much of Bavaria, including Munich, and most of Bohemia.[6]

Battle of Chotusitz is located in Czech Republic
Prague
Prague
Kutná Hora
Kutná Hora
Židlochovice
Židlochovice
Chotusice
Chotusice
class=notpageimage|
Key locations in text

The Austrians also used irregular troops known as "Pandurs" to attack Prussian lines of communication, inflicting considerable damage on both troops and morale, one officer writing 'these thieves and robbers...never show themselves in battle, like proper brave soldiers.'[7] In response, Frederick moved into Moravia in March, and established himself at Židlochovice, which allowed him to threaten Vienna.[8]

By stripping garrisons from the rest of Bohemia, Maria Theresa assembled a field army of 28,000 to retake Prague. Charles of Lorraine was given command, despite his reputation as a cautious, timid and defensively minded general.[9] Frederick advanced into North-East Bohemia, and by 16 May had 10,000 infantry at Kutná Hora, with 18,000 men under Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau a day's march behind.[10] During the afternoon of 16 May, Leopold's rearguard began skirmishing with Imperial cavalry, and the latter accelerated his march to close the gap with Frederick. At 2:00 am on 17 May, his exhausted troops stopped at the small village of Chotusice, three hours march from Kutná Hora.[1]

Battle

[edit]
Battle plan, Chotusitz

Instructed to hold until Frederick reached him, Leopold deployed south of Chotusice, his infantry facing south-east, with cavalry on either flank. The left was commanded by Waldow, the right by the 70 year old veteran von Buddenbrock, Leopold leaving room for Frederick's infantry to deploy when they arrived. Charles of Lorraine hoped to attack before Frederick could reach him but was not ready to do so until 7:00 am; as he advanced north from Čáslav, his army drifted slightly to the right, allowing Buddenbrock's cavalry to outflank them.[11]

Frederick arrived on the field at 8:00 am; to provide time to organise the infantry, he ordered the Prussian cavalry to charge, supported by field artillery. They drove the Austrian cavalry back, but the day was hot and dry, raising a huge cloud of dust and effectively blinding them. In the confusion, some units attacked in the wrong direction, allowing Karl Josef Batthyány and Liechtenstein to rally their men. Both sets of cavalry began looting each other's baggage trains, an act of collective indiscipline that rendered them useless for much of the battle.[1]

The Austrian artillery had been bombarding Chotusice, around 9:00 am, Daun's infantry stormed the town, slowly driving Leopold's forces from house to house. As they did so, they set it on fire, the smoke adding to the confusion caused by the dust, and making exercising command almost impossible. By 10:30, Frederick's fresh infantry were deployed in a great square of 24 battalions; wheeling left, they fired into the Austrian infantry outside Chotusice. His flanks exposed by the cavalry's disappearance, Charles decided to settle for a draw. He ordered a general retreat through Čáslav, leaving some of his heavy guns behind; Liechtenstein's cavalry held off the Prussians, and by noon, combat had ceased.[12]

Aftermath

[edit]
Frederick II of Prussia

The battle left the basic strategic situation unchanged; Charles was still able to move against Prague, while the Prussian presence in Moravia remained a threat to Vienna. Habsburg policy was generally to avoid fighting on too many fronts at the same time; although Prussia was the most dangerous, but also the most difficult to defeat. Although recovering Silesia remained a Habsburg priority for decades, Maria Theresa was willing to agree a temporary truce with Prussia to improve her position elsewhere.[13]

This suited Frederick, who was short of money and men and also suspected France was preparing a separate peace. In June, the Treaty of Breslau ended the First Silesian War; Prussian troops withdrew from Bohemia, and Austria recaptured Prague in December.[14]

Battlefield memorial at Chotusice

Like other contemporaries, such as Maurice de Saxe, Frederick concluded morale was more effective in destroying enemy formations than firepower. At Mollwitz, the Austrians fled when faced with the steady, disciplined advance of the Prussian infantry; at Chotusice, it convinced Charles of Lorraine to settle for a draw. When the Second Silesian War began in 1744, Frederick told his officers the infantry had to do only two things; form up quickly, then maintain their formation.[15]

The battle also showed the Prussian cavalry still needed work, particularly in horsemanship; a contributory factor to their apparent indiscipline was the inability of many to control their mounts and this became an area of focus after 1743.[16] Von Gessler, who led Buddenbrock's charge, was promoted lieutenant general, and received the Order of the Black Eagle; at Hohenfriedberg in 1745, he commanded the cavalry charge claimed as a key factor in Prussian victory.[17]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]

Sources

[edit]
  • Anderson, Mark (1995). The War of the Austrian Succession. Routledge. ISBN 978-0582059504.
  • Armour, Ian (2012). A History of Eastern Europe 1740–1918. Bloomsbury Academic Press. ISBN 978-1849664882.
  • Berry, Jeff (30 March 2013). "Chotusitz 1742". Obscure Battles. Retrieved 14 July 2019.
  • Browning, Reed (1975). The Duke of Newcastle. Yale University. ISBN 9780300017465.
  • Carlyle, Thomas (1873). History of Friedrich II. of Prussia: called Frederick the Great. Vol. 5. Chapman and Hall.
  • Duffy, Christopher (2015). Frederick the Great: A Military Life. Routledge. ISBN 978-1138924659.
  • Grant, RG (2011). 1001 Battles That Changed the Course of History. Universe Publishing (NY). ISBN 978-0789322333.
  • Mitchell, Aaron Wess (2018). The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0691176703.
  • Russell, Lord John (1829). Memoirs of the affairs of Europe from the Peace of Utrecht, Volume 2. John Murray.
  • Showalter, Dennis (2012). Frederick the Great: A Military History. Frontline Books. ISBN 978-1848326408.
  • Smollett, Tobias (1818). The History of England, from the Revolution in 1688 to the Death of George II, Volume 3. George Cowie & Co.
  • Williams, Henry (1907). The Historians' History of the World: Germanic empires (concluded), Volume XV. George Cowie & Co.
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Battle of Chotusitz

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The Battle of Chotusitz was fought on 17 May 1742 near the village of Chotusice in (present-day ) between Prussian forces under King Frederick II of Prussia and Austrian forces commanded by Prince Charles of Lorraine, as part of the within the broader . The Prussians, numbering approximately 28,000 men with 88 artillery pieces, clashed with a slightly larger Austrian army of around 30,000 troops supported by fewer guns in an unplanned encounter battle initiated by Austrian advances. Despite initial Austrian successes against the Prussian , Frederick's timely with the main body turned the tide, resulting in a hard-fought Prussian victory marked by heavy casualties on both sides—about 4,800 Prussian dead and wounded, primarily , against roughly 6,400 Austrian losses including over 1,200 prisoners. The depleted Prussian prevented effective pursuit, allowing the Austrians to retreat in reasonable order, but the outcome demonstrated Frederick's tactical acumen in maneuvering outnumbered forces to exploit battlefield opportunities. Strategically, the battle compelled Austria to seek terms with Prussia, culminating in the Treaty of Breslau on 11 June 1742, by which ceded most of and the County of Glatz to Frederick, effectively ending Prussian involvement in the and allowing him to withdraw from the wider conflict temporarily. This victory solidified Prussia's hold on the resource-rich province seized in , enhancing Frederick's reputation as a formidable leader while highlighting the Habsburg monarchy's vulnerabilities in defending its inheritance against aggressive neighbors.

Historical Context

Origins in the War of the Austrian Succession

The stemmed from the succession crisis precipitated by the death of Charles VI on 20 October 1740, which left his daughter as heir to the Habsburg dominions under the terms of the promulgated in 1713 to secure her inheritance despite traditions barring female succession in certain realms. Multiple European powers, including the Elector of Bavaria (as Charles VII claimant to the imperial throne), , and , contested the Pragmatic Sanction's validity, viewing the Habsburg territories—encompassing , , , and —as vulnerable to partition amid Austria's military weaknesses following the . , under the newly ascended Frederick II (r. 1740–1786), seized the opportunity to assert longstanding Hohenzollern claims to the prosperous province of , initiating hostilities without formal declaration by invading on 16 December 1740 with an army of approximately 30,000 men crossing the River. This Prussian incursion marked the onset of the (1740–1742), a Prussian-Austrian conflict that formed the core of the broader succession war in , as Frederick aimed to secure Silesia's economic resources—rich in agriculture, textiles, and minerals—to bolster Prussia's status as a . Initial Austrian defenses under General Wilhelm Reinhard von Neipperg faltered, with Prussian forces capturing key fortresses like Ohlau and Breslau by early 1741, though the on 10 April 1741—where Prussian infantry and cavalry overcame numerical inferiority through disciplined firepower and oblique order tactics—decisively entrenched Prussian control over despite the loss of commander Kurt Christoph von Schwerin in the field. Emboldened, Frederick invaded in August 1741 with 65,000 troops, besieging but withdrawing by October due to supply line overextension and the onset of winter, allowing Austrian forces to regroup under Maria Theresa's vigorous mobilization of Hungarian levies and imperial recruits. By early 1742, Austrian armies commanded by Prince Charles of Lorraine, reinforced to over 100,000 men across fronts, counteroffensives threatened Prussian gains in , prompting Frederick to redeploy southward from with 28,000 troops to intercept the Austrian advance near the Bohemian-Silesian border. This maneuver, driven by the strategic imperative to prevent the loss of amid distractions from Bavarian and French allies besieging and , directly precipitated the clash at Chotusitz on 17 May 1742, where Prussian tactical resilience against a larger Austrian force would compel negotiations leading to the Treaty of Breslau (11 June 1742), ceding nearly all of to Prussia and temporarily extricating Frederick from the war. The engagement underscored the war's causal dynamic: Prussia's opportunistic expansionism exploiting Habsburg vulnerabilities, countered by Austrian determination to preserve , within a multinational contest over imperial legitimacy and balance of power.

Prussian Campaigns Prior to Chotusitz

The Prussian invasion of commenced on December 16, 1740, when Frederick II crossed the River with an army of about 30,000 men, capitalizing on the power vacuum following Emperor Charles VI's death and Austria's succession crisis under . Prussian forces swiftly captured Ohlau on December 15 and induced the surrender of Breslau, the provincial capital, on December 19 after a brief , securing most of with minimal resistance due to the dispersed Austrian garrisons. By March 1741, Austrian Wilhelm Reinhard von Neipperg assembled around 20,000 troops to , prompting Frederick to concentrate his forces near Mollwitz. The ensuing on April 10, 1741, saw Prussian cavalry initially routed, leading Frederick to withdraw temporarily, but a resolute under Kurt Christoph von Schwerin reversed the tide, inflicting heavy losses on the (approximately 2,500 killed or wounded versus 1,000 Prussians) and forcing Neipperg's retreat into . This victory, despite tactical flaws exposed in Prussian cavalry performance, affirmed Frederick's hold on and encouraged allied interventions by , , and against . Post-Mollwitz, Frederick methodically reduced remaining Austrian strongholds, besieging Neisse (Neiße) from late April; the fortress capitulated on May 28 after bombardment and starvation, yielding vital artillery and supplies. Seeking to alleviate logistical strains in and forage in enemy territory, Frederick invaded neighboring in mid-June 1741 with roughly 25,000 men, advancing to but encountering stubborn resistance and Neipperg's maneuvering forces; unable to invest the city effectively amid supply shortages, he negotiated a withdrawal convention by late July, returning to without territorial gains but having disrupted Austrian reinforcements. In late 1741, as Bavarian and French allies under Charles Albert captured on November 26, Frederick maintained operations in , repelling minor Austrian probes while pursuing separate peace feelers with ; however, Austria's rejection and subsequent offensives by Prince Ludwig von Khevenhüller into southern in early 1742 compelled Frederick to mobilize anew, launching a preemptive thrust into in April to relieve pressure on his province and threaten Austrian communications.

Austrian Strategic Position in 1742

In early 1742, the under had achieved a measure of recovery from the existential threats of the previous year, primarily through diplomatic and military initiatives that stabilized the western fronts. Having been crowned Queen of on June 25, 1741, following her dramatic appeal to the Hungarian Diet in Pressburg (now ), secured vital reinforcements, including around 20,000 Hungarian troops, which bolstered the Austrian forces amid widespread desertions and losses earlier in the war. This infusion helped offset the fragmentation caused by Prussian occupation of and the Franco-Bavarian advance into and in 1741. Strategically, prioritized expelling the French and Bavarians from southern Germany to safeguard , temporarily acquiescing to Prussian control of to avoid overextension across multiple theaters. A pivotal achievement came in the winter campaign led by Ludwig Andreas von Khevenhüller, who commanded the Austrian army on the . On January 17, 1742, Khevenhüller defeated a Bavarian force at Schärding, exploiting the weakened state of the invaders after their failed siege of Vienna. This rapid offensive culminated in the capture of on February 19, 1742, compelling French Marshal François de Belle-Isle to evacuate with heavy losses and retreat toward the , thus relieving pressure on Austrian heartlands and freeing up troops for redeployment. These successes demonstrated effective logistical maneuvering in harsh winter conditions but highlighted ongoing vulnerabilities, as Khevenhüller later evacuated Bavarian gains in summer due to insufficient forces to hold them against renewed French reinforcements. The respite proved short-lived, as Prussian King Frederick II exploited Austrian distractions by reoccupying in late 1741 and advancing into northern by late April 1742, with an army of about 25,000 men aimed at drawing out and destroying Habsburg forces to force territorial concessions. responded by concentrating a field army under , her brother-in-law and a newly appointed commander, tasked with intercepting the Prussians near the Silesian border to protect and prevent a march on . This force, swelled by Hungarian levies and irregulars like pandours, emphasized numerical superiority over the highly disciplined Prussians but suffered from inconsistent training, reliance on raw recruits, and divided command structures amid commitments in , the , and against Saxon allies of the anti-Habsburg . Overall, Austria's position reflected a precarious balance: enhanced manpower from domestic and British subsidies enabled offensive potential, yet the faced a coalition of , , , , and Spanish forces in , straining finances and logistics without decisive qualitative edges. Maria Theresa's refusal to cede underscored a commitment to reclaiming lost provinces through direct confrontation, prioritizing the eastern front after western stabilization, though this exposed risks of Prussian tactical innovation outmatching Austrian mass.

Opposing Forces and Commanders

Prussian Army Composition and Leadership

The Prussian forces at the Battle of Chotusitz on May 17, 1742, were commanded by King Frederick II, who personally directed operations after leading a vanguard of approximately 10,000 men into . Assisted by Prince Leopold II, Prince of Anhalt-Dessau (the "Young Dessauer"), Frederick oversaw a highly disciplined army shaped by the reforms of his father, Frederick William I, emphasizing rigorous drill, rapid maneuvers, and firepower. The army totaled around 27,000 men, comprising 35 battalions, 70 squadrons, and supported by 85 pieces. units, primarily and , were equipped with flintlock muskets capable of 3-4 shots per minute, bayonets, and iron ramrods for faster reloading; they wore dark blue coats, white , and hats or mitre caps for . included heavy cuirassiers in white coats and breastplates, dragoons in , and light hussars in Hungarian-style attire, with key commands under Lieutenant-General von Waldenfels and Major-General von Buddenbrock on the wings. consisted of muzzle-loading field guns, valued for their mobility and destructive effect despite lacking dedicated at the time. Right-wing cavalry under General von Buddenbrock featured elite regiments such as Buddenbrock Cuirassiers (CR1, 5 squadrons), Möllendorf Cuirassiers (CR9, 5 squadrons), and Gessler Cuirassiers (CR4, 5 squadrons), reflecting the Prussian emphasis on shock refined since the setbacks at Mollwitz. This structure enabled Frederick's characteristic , leveraging superior infantry discipline and charges to counter numerical parity with the .

Austrian Army Composition and Leadership

The Austrian army at the Battle of Chotusitz on May 17, 1742, was commanded by , a Lorraine-born general serving the and brother-in-law to Empress . , appointed to lead the main field army after earlier campaigns, directed operations from the center, coordinating advances and support while delegating wings to experienced subordinates. His second-in-command for was , who oversaw both flanks with a focus on aggressive charges typical of Austrian tactics. The force totaled approximately 30,000 men, comprising a multinational composition reflective of the Habsburg Empire's diverse recruitment: German-speaking from the hereditary lands, Hungarian hussars, Croatian irregulars (pandurs and grenzer border troops), and allied contingents. formed the core with around 18,000-20,000 men in 24-30 battalions, including elite grenadier units detached from regiments such as and Terzy, and line formations like the Imperial Regiment (IR1), Hessen-Darmstadt (IR2), and Banal (IR12). These were organized into right and left wings under commanders like Prince Charles himself on the right and Count Batthyányi on the left, emphasizing linear formations vulnerable to Prussian oblique attacks but bolstered by charges. Cavalry numbered about 9,000-10,000 troopers across 40-50 squadrons, divided into three groups: the right wing under with dragoons (e.g., Althann DR1, D'Ollone DR19) and hussars (e.g., Bathyányi); the center under Kollowrat with cuirassiers (Serbelloni CR6) and dragoons (Arenberg DR2); and the left wing with elite units like Kaiser Cuirassiers (CR1) and Trauttmansdorf Dragoons (DR3). This arm, heavier in cuirassiers than the Prussian counterpart, aimed to outflank and envelop but suffered from coordination issues against Frederick's reformed . Artillery support included 50 guns, fewer than the Prussian total but concentrated in batteries for and infantry preparation, under Liechtenstein's post-battle reforms highlighting prior inadequacies. Light troops, such as 4-6 battalions of Croats and Grenzers, screened advances and harassed Prussian flanks with skirmishing tactics suited to Bohemian terrain.
ArmApproximate StrengthKey Units/Characteristics
18,000-20,00024-30 battalions; line regiments (e.g., IR1 Imperial, IR2 Hessen-Darmstadt); detachments; multinational but reliant on for cohesion
9,000-10,00040-50 squadrons; cuirassiers, dragoons, hussars; strong in shock charges but prone to pursuit vulnerabilities
50 gunsMobile batteries; effective in preparatory barrages but outnumbered by Prussians
Light Troops2,000-3,000Croats, Grenzers; irregular skirmishers for reconnaissance and disruption

Terrain and Preparatory Movements

The terrain surrounding Chotusitz, located in northern approximately 10 kilometers southeast of , consisted primarily of flat to gently rolling open fields suitable for maneuver by and formations, though interrupted by localized obstacles. To the south of the village lay the Brslenka (or Brzenka) Stream, which divided Prussian positions and provided a natural barrier near the Austrian right wing during the ensuing engagement. On the western edge of the battlefield, the Cirkwitz Lake (or pond) offered dead ground for concealed deployments, while a low plateau rose west of Chotusitz itself, with the village featuring flimsy wooden structures that later became a focal point of combat. The left flank of the Austrian line featured broken ground with gullies and additional ponds, rendering it less favorable for large-scale operations. Prussian forces, having wintered in Moravia after earlier campaigns, concentrated around Chrudim in early May 1742 with approximately 35 infantry battalions and 70 cavalry squadrons under King Frederick II. On May 15, Frederick advanced westward with an advance guard toward Bohemia, aiming to link with allies and threaten Austrian communications; the main body followed on May 16 under Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau. The army encamped overnight at Sehuschitz, with infantry occupying Chotusitz at first light on May 17, while cavalry under generals such as von Buddenbrock positioned along the Brslenka Stream and near Cirkwitz Lake. Frederick's main infantry force, initially at Kutná Hora (Kuttenberg) about 6-7 kilometers away, marched rapidly to reinforce the vanguard upon reports of Austrian approach, arriving by around 9:30 a.m. Austrian forces under Prince of Lorraine, having advanced westward through in early May to relieve pressure on and counter Prussian incursions, encamped near Tschaslau (Čáslav) on May 16 after being spotted by Prussian scouts. Organized in four columns totaling around 25,000-26,000 men, aimed to surprise and isolate the Prussian vanguard under Leopold, which appeared detached from Frederick's main body. The Austrians moved northward from their camps south of Chotusitz starting around 5:00 a.m. on May 17, deploying in two lines flanked by as they closed to cannon range, initiating an encounter battle against the Prussian rear guard elements.

Course of the Battle

Initial Encounter and Deployment

On the morning of 17 May 1742, Austrian forces under Prince Charles of Lorraine, numbering approximately 26,000 men with 50 guns, advanced northward from their camp near Czaslau (modern Kutná Hora) toward the Prussian positions, seeking to exploit the separation of Frederick II's army. This movement caught the Prussian rear guard, commanded by Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau and comprising about 12,000 infantry and cavalry, in a vulnerable position near the village of Chotusitz around 5:00 a.m., as Frederick's main body of roughly 13,000 infantry remained three hours' march away at Kutterberg. The initial clash involved scattered Prussian foragers and outposts withdrawing under Austrian pressure, with Leopold hastily deploying nine infantry battalions south of Chotusitz village to form a defensive line facing southeast, supported by four battalions across the Brzenka stream under General Jeetze. Leopold positioned his , including units under Buddenbrock to the west and Walldow's cuirassiers advancing from Sehuschitz, on the flanks amid challenging featuring , , and rolling hills that limited maneuverability. By 7:00 a.m., the had completed their deployment in two lines flanked by wings—Liechtenstein's horse on the right and under General on the left—advancing to within range of the Prussian positions and opening fire with six heavy guns and four howitzers. This targeted Leopold's exposed lines, prompting a gradual Prussian fallback through Chotusitz village while maintaining cohesion against the Austrian . Frederick II, alerted to the engagement, marched his from 4:00 a.m. and arrived on the field by approximately 7:00-9:00 a.m. with the bulk of the , totaling around 25,000-28,000 men and 85-88 guns overall. He reinforced Leopold's center by deploying 24 battalions in a double line between Cirkwitz Pond and Chotusitz, leveraging the village and adjacent plateau for cover, while directing to contest the Austrian flanks and prevent . The Prussians thus formed an , with their right refused behind dead ground to absorb the Austrian momentum, setting the stage for subsequent counter-maneuvers.

Cavalry Engagements and Austrian Advance

The Battle of Chotusitz opened on the morning of 17 May 1742 with aggressive Prussian charges intended to preempt the Austrian deployment. Lieutenant-General Heinrich von Buddenbrock's cuirassiers, including the elite Kürassier-Regiment von Buddenbrock No. 1, assaulted the Austrian left wing south of the Cirkwitz lake, initially driving back the first line of enemy horse uphill but faltering against the second line in a prolonged disrupted by Austrian counter-charges and fire. Simultaneously, Lieutenant-General —no, wait, sources specify Waldow's cuirassiers targeted the Austrian right wing near the Brzlenka stream, penetrating their lines and wheeling across the rear to link with Buddenbrock's remnants, though disordered squadrons pursued fleeing foes westward without rallying for a decisive blow against the main Austrian position. These attacks, launched around 0700, achieved temporary disruptions but dissolved into confusion due to inadequate support and indiscipline, rendering both Prussian wings ineffective for further exploitation; Prussian bore the brunt of early losses, contributing to total of approximately 4,800. Austrian cavalry under Prince Liechtenstein responded by rallying disordered elements, reforming, and counter-charging toward the Prussian camps behind Chotusitz, where troops devolved into looting exposed baggage, further diminishing their combat cohesion. This set the stage for Prince Charles of Lorraine's general advance from the south, commencing after an hour of artillery exchange involving six Austrian heavy guns and four howitzers against four Prussian 24-pounders. The Austrian infantry formed in two lines, screened and flanked by substantial cavalry—approximately 6,000 troopers including Batthyányi's Austro-Hungarian horse on the left—launched a coordinated assault on the village of Chotusitz, held by nine Prussian battalions under Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau. Supported by flanking cavalry maneuvers that navigated challenging terrain, the Austrians pressed forward around 0830, overwhelming the defenders in house-to-house fighting and setting the village ablaze, temporarily forcing a Prussian withdrawal through the burning structures. Austrian cavalry on the right flank executed partial successes in charges despite boggy ground, but these were halted by resolute Prussian reserves, preventing a full envelopment. The advance inflicted heavy pressure on the Prussian center, contributing to Austrian casualties of about 6,400 including 1,200 prisoners, yet momentum waned as Frederick II prepared a counterstroke.

Infantry Clash and Prussian Oblique Maneuver

As the cavalry actions on the flanks subsided, Austrian infantry under Prince Charles of Lorraine launched a coordinated on the Prussian center positioned around Chotusitz village around 8:00 a.m. on 17 May 1742, supported by fire from 6 heavy guns and 4 howitzers that set the wooden structures ablaze. Prince Leopold commanded 9 Prussian battalions in the defense, engaging in intense house-to-house fighting south of the village, which inflicted significant Austrian casualties but ultimately forced a tactical withdrawal by 9:30 a.m. as the position became untenable amid the flames and enemy pressure. Frederick II, having arrived with reinforcements, concealed approximately 24 fresh infantry battalions (totaling 12,000 men) behind a plateau west of Chotusitz to avoid premature exposure, forming them into an oblong square formation that allowed rapid wheeling to the left. This setup enabled the execution of an oblique maneuver, refusing the Prussian left flank while concentrating superior firepower on the Austrian right, striking their exposed side in echelon around 10:30 a.m. with disciplined volleys that exploited the enemies' extended line and fatigue from the village assault. The sudden appearance of these massed Prussian ranks delivered devastating enfilading fire, shattering Austrian cohesion and morale; the attackers, already disordered, recoiled under the weight of the , marking the turning point in the phase. This tactical stroke, leveraging numerical parity in (Prussian total estimated at 35 battalions against Austrian equivalents in two lines) and superior , compelled the to abandon their offensive by noon, retreating to preserve their despite overall numerical superiority of 30,000 to 27,000. The maneuver's success stemmed from Prussian 's enhanced training in rapid deployment and , contrasting with Austrian reliance on linear advances vulnerable to flanking concentration.

Decisive Phases and Austrian Withdrawal

As the Austrian pressed their assault on Chotusitz village around 10:00 a.m., setting its wooden structures ablaze and temporarily forcing back Prince Leopold's Prussian defenders, Frederick II orchestrated a decisive counteroffensive from his reserve position behind a low plateau. Drawing on approximately 24 fresh battalions—totaling some 12,000 —supported by 3-pounder field guns and heavier 12- and 6-pounder artillery, Frederick executed a leftward in an oblique formation, advancing under cover of dust clouds and dead ground between Cirkwitz Pond and the village to strike the exposed Austrian left flank. This maneuver, initiated around 10:30 a.m., leveraged the superior discipline and firepower of Prussian linear , delivering enfilading volleys that shattered the Austrian ranks advancing toward Chotusitz. Concurrent Prussian reinforcements under Lieutenants-General Buddenbrock and Waldow further disrupted Austrian cohesion; Buddenbrock's cuirassiers, having earlier clashed with Austrian horse, linked with Waldow's fresh squadrons to penetrate and push back the Austrian left-wing , preventing any effective counter to the assault. The combined pressure inflicted heavy casualties on the Austrians—estimated at over 6,000 killed, wounded, or captured—while Prussian artillery fire compounded the disorder, targeting exposed formations and compelling Prince Charles of Lorraine to recognize the peril to his army's flank and overall position. By noon, with their left collapsing and no prospect of breaking the Prussian center, Prince Charles ordered a general withdrawal through the town of Czaslau to the south, abandoning 18 artillery pieces and yielding the field to Frederick's forces. This retreat, though not a , preserved the bulk of the Austrian army for future operations but marked the battle's , as the Prussians' tactical concentration of force overcame numerical parity through superior maneuver and . The outcome stemmed causally from Frederick's refusal to engage frontally, instead exploiting and reserves to create local superiority, contrasting with the ' more conventional advance that exposed vulnerabilities.

Immediate Aftermath

Casualties and Material Losses

The incurred approximately 4,800 casualties, comprising killed and wounded soldiers, from an engaged force of roughly 25,000 men. Austrian losses were heavier, totaling around 6,400 killed and wounded out of approximately 28,000 engaged troops. These figures align closely with detailed contemporary returns cited by military historian Christopher Duffy, who records 4,819 Prussian casualties including officers and enlisted personnel.
SideKilled and WoundedTotal Casualties (including missing/prisoners where noted)Sources
Prussian~4,800~4,800–5,000British Battles; Duffy via secondary analysis
Austrian~6,400~6,400–7,000British Battles
Material losses were relatively light compared to personnel casualties, reflecting the battle's tactical nature without a full . The Prussians abandoned or lost an estimated 18 pieces during intense fighting around Chotusitz village, while Austrian withdrawals yielded few captured guns to pursuing Prussian forces due to the orderly under Prince Charles of Lorraine. No significant ammunition shortages or supply destructions were reported on either side, though Austrian proved less effective in , contributing to higher exposure.

Prussian Pursuit and Austrian Retreat

Following the Prussian oblique attack that shattered the Austrian left flank around noon on May 17, 1742, Prince Charles of Lorraine ordered a general retreat through the town of Čáslav (Czaslau), with his forces crossing the Brzlenka River bridges by midday. The initial withdrawal occurred in some disorder southward, as routed Austrian and fled the field under pressure from pursuing Prussian elements, resulting in the capture of approximately 1,200 prisoners and 18 pieces by the Prussians. Despite these gains, the Austrian army as a whole managed to disengage in relatively good order, preserving much of its cohesion and avoiding total destruction, which allowed Prince Charles to regroup and inflict proportionally heavy casualties on the attackers during the final clashes. Frederick II, recognizing the exhaustion of his own forces, declined calls from his chief of staff for an immediate vigorous pursuit, citing the disordered state of his cavalry—still recovering from earlier charges—and the impracticality of advancing fatigued infantry over difficult terrain. This decision reflected the mutual attrition of the battle, with both armies suffering around 20% losses, leaving the Prussians too battered to exploit the victory aggressively without risking counterattack or logistical collapse. Instead, Frederick secured the battlefield and allowed the Austrians to withdraw unmolested beyond immediate reach, prioritizing the preservation of his army for potential negotiations or further operations. In the days following, Prince Charles maneuvered his remaining forces westward toward the to confront Prussian allies, including French contingents, effectively diverting Austrian strength from . Frederick, in turn, repositioned his army to a fortified encampment at (Kuttenburg), approximately 30 miles (48 km) east of the battlefield, where it rested and reorganized amid ongoing siege operations around . The limited pursuit phase thus transitioned into strategic standoff, culminating in the Treaty of Breslau on , 1742, which ceded most of to without further major engagements in the immediate theater.

Strategic and Military Analysis

Tactical Achievements and Shortcomings

Prussian exhibited superior , delivering coordinated volleys that halted the Austrian central advance despite being outnumbered and initially disorganized on the plateau near Chotusitz village. Frederick II's retention of reserves for a decisive flank on the Austrian left, combined with well-placed batteries, exploited enemy disorder following the village's ignition, forcing a withdrawal after three hours of intense combat on May 17, 1742. This improvisation, akin to elements of the by concentrating force on a weakened sector, compensated for the encounter battle's surprises and secured field command against 30,000 Austrians with only 27,000 troops. Shortcomings included ineffective Prussian cavalry charges on both wings, where squadrons under Buddenbrock and others broke against Austrian cuirassiers without achieving breakthroughs, reflecting ongoing retraining limitations post-Mollwitz. The army's divided deployment— with detachments still crossing bridges—exposed vulnerabilities on unfamiliar Bohemian terrain, compelling reactive positioning rather than optimal formation. Pursuit was minimal due to cavalry exhaustion and attrition, with Prussian losses nearing 4,800, allowing the an intact to Czaslau despite higher enemy casualties of approximately 6,400. Austrian achievements lay in their initial tactical aggression: Prince Charles of Lorraine's , arrayed in two deep lines with flanking superiority on the left, overran Chotusitz village and pressured the Prussian center, nearly fracturing it before reserves intervened. This demonstrated effective use of terrain for a surprise dawn assault, leveraging numerical edge and momentum from recent maneuvers. Austrian shortcomings stemmed from inadequate coordination after penetration; cavalry failed to exploit the breach, while fires—possibly from howitzer fire or accidental—disrupted advancing units, leading to bunching and exposure to Prussian artillery and volleys. The right wing's static response to Prussian oblique pressure allowed Frederick to redirect forces unchecked, highlighting rigidity in adapting to counter-maneuvers amid the chaos of an unplanned engagement.

Impact on the First Silesian War

The Prussian victory at Chotusitz on May 17, 1742, inflicted significant losses on the army under Prince Charles of Lorraine, numbering around 4,000 to 5,000 killed, wounded, or captured, compared to Prussian casualties of approximately 2,500 to 3,000, thereby breaking momentum in and forcing to prioritize negotiations with Frederick II to avoid further devastation. This outcome shifted the strategic balance, as the weakened withdrew westward to counter French and Bavarian threats elsewhere in the , enabling Prussian forces to consolidate control over temporarily before their own repositioning. The battle's decisive nature prompted the preliminary Treaty of Breslau, signed on June 11, 1742, which concluded the (1740–1742) for and confirmed Frederick's conquests. Under its terms, ceded nearly all of —encompassing about 36,000 square kilometers of territory, rich in agriculture, minerals, and a population of over a million—to , including the Duchy of Glatz, while retaining only the southeastern enclaves of Troppau (), Teschen (), and Jägerndorf. This formal recognition via the subsequent Treaty of Berlin on July 28, 1742, secured 's hold on the province, providing economic resources that doubled its revenue and bolstered its military capacity, thus elevating from a secondary power to a formidable contender against Habsburg dominance in . For , the peace freed up approximately 50,000 troops previously engaged against , allowing to redirect them toward reclaiming and confronting allied invasions in other theaters, though the loss of —representing one of the Habsburg monarchy's most prosperous regions—permanently eroded its fiscal and demographic base, sowing seeds for renewed . The truce halted active hostilities between the two powers until 1744, when tensions reignited in the Second Silesian War, but Chotusitz effectively validated Frederick's opportunistic intervention in the and preserved Prussian gains amid the broader conflict.

Lessons for 18th-Century Warfare

The Battle of Chotusitz exemplified the effectiveness of the in 18th-century linear tactics, where Frederick II concentrated superior force on the enemy's left flank while refusing his right, enabling a decisive breakthrough despite numerical parity and challenging terrain around villages like Chotusitz and Klein-Chotusitz. This maneuver, executed by Prussian infantry under strict drill discipline inherited from Frederick William I's reforms, allowed rapid wheeling movements to overlap and shatter the Austrian line, demonstrating how tactical concentration could compensate for defensive vulnerabilities in the center. Prussian reforms proved critical, as reformed heavy squadrons delivered coordinated shock charges that repelled Austrian mounted assaults and exploited infantry breakthroughs, underscoring the era's reliance on for decisive exploitation rather than mere screening. With 85 guns to the Austrians' 50, Prussian provided sustained that pinned enemy reserves, highlighting the growing integration of mobile field pieces in offensive operations to suppress counterattacks amid the slow reloading cycles of volleys. Austrian shortcomings revealed pitfalls of uncoordinated advances in encounter battles, as Prince Charles of Lorraine's piecemeal commitment of forces—initially successful against the Prussian rear—failed to capitalize on momentum due to delayed support and overextended , a recurring issue in armies reliant on noble-officered rather than centralized command. This contrasted with Prussian , where rigorous training enabled quick reorientation from marching columns to battle lines, emphasizing discipline's role in mitigating the chaos of fog-of-war engagements typical of mid-18th-century warfare. The engagement reinforced that victory hinged on firepower and discipline over sheer numbers, with Prussian holding villages under barrage before counterattacking, influencing later doctrines like those in the Seven Years' War by prioritizing professional standing armies over mercenaries. Casualties—approximately 5,000 Prussian and 6,000–7,000 Austrian—reflected the high cost of frontal assaults but validated Frederick's approach of forcing battle on favorable terms through operational maneuver, a template for limited wars where preservation of forces enabled diplomatic leverage.

Historiographical Perspectives

Contemporary Accounts and Propaganda

Prussian official dispatches following the battle on 17 May 1742 described the engagement as a hard-won triumph attributable to Frederick II's tactical acumen, particularly the oblique order deployment and concentrated artillery fire that broke Austrian lines despite numerical parity. These reports, circulated within Prussian military circles and to Berlin, estimated Austrian losses at over 6,000 killed and wounded, emphasizing the flight of enemy cavalry and infantry to underscore Prussian discipline over Austrian élan. Such accounts served propagandistic purposes, portraying the victory as conclusive evidence of reformed Prussian army superiority after the earlier Mollwitz setbacks, thereby justifying Frederick's subsequent overtures for a separate peace to secure Silesia without further attrition. Austrian contemporary reports, including Prince Charles of Lorraine's submissions to , framed the action as a tactical standoff rather than outright defeat, highlighting the intact retreat of core forces under covering fire and crediting terrain and reserves for preventing . These narratives minimized losses—claiming around 4,000 casualties—and avoided admitting strategic failure, instead attributing the withdrawal to prudent preservation of Habsburg strength for broader campaigns against Bavaria and . 's correspondence reflected resilience, viewing Chotusitz as a reversible reverse that necessitated negotiation with Prussia to redirect resources, though she rejected permanent cession of and leveraged British mediation to limit concessions in the ensuing Treaty of Breslau. This downplaying preserved monarchical prestige amid domestic and allied pressures questioning her legitimacy. Propaganda on both sides amplified biases inherent in state-controlled narratives: Prussian pamphlets and court bulletins exalted Frederick's personal command—evident in his on-site rallying of wavering units—as divine favor for Protestant arms, fostering domestic support for the costly Bohemian incursion and masking cavalry indiscipline exposed during the fight. Austrian countermeasures, disseminated via Viennese gazettes, invoked imperial tradition and Maria Theresa's unyielding sovereignty to rally Catholic allies, portraying Prussian gains as ephemeral predation enabled by Habsburg distractions elsewhere rather than inherent weakness. These efforts reflected causal realities of 18th-century warfare, where battlefield outcomes hinged less on annihilation than on narrative control influencing diplomatic leverage, with Prussian sources credibly demonstrating tactical edge while Austrian ones realistically prioritized army survival over pyrrhic stands.

Modern Assessments of Frederick's Strategy

Modern historians regard Frederick's overarching strategy in the , culminating at Chotusitz on May 17, 1742, as a pragmatic adaptation to Prussia's resource constraints, emphasizing rapid offensive maneuvers to seek decisive battles and force negotiated settlements rather than territorial conquest or prolonged attrition. By invading with approximately 28,000 troops to draw Austrian forces away from , Frederick aimed to compel to recognize Prussian gains, a goal achieved through the battle's tactical success despite its inconclusive field outcome. Tactically, assessments praise Frederick's exploitation of superior and reserve deployment, where 24 battalions formed an oblong square to deliver devastating volleys against the Austrian , compensating for initial disarray amid fog-shrouded terrain. However, critics, including Dennis Showalter, highlight shortcomings in coordination—such as Buddenbrock's disorganized charges on both wings—and the absence of aggressive pursuit, attributing these to lingering post-Mollwitz reforms' incompleteness and Frederick's preference for preserving forces over annihilation. Prussian totaled around 4,800 killed and wounded, compared to 6,400 Austrian, underscoring effectiveness but revealing the strategy's reliance on linear over maneuverable exploitation.,%20OCR.pdf) In broader historiographical terms, scholars like Showalter evaluate Chotusitz as emblematic of Frederick's evolution from rigid geometric tactics toward flexible aggression influenced by French models, yet constrained by 18th-century linear warfare's limitations, where victory hinged on morale and drill rather than strategic depth. This approach yielded short-term dividends—the Treaty of Breslau on June 11, 1742, secured —but exposed risks of overextension, as the battle's "encounter" nature precluded the Frederick later refined, prompting later critiques of his early campaigns as opportunistic rather than systematically innovative.

References

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