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Central Command (Israel)
Central Command (Israel)
Central Command (Israel)
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Central Command
פיקוד מרכז
Pakmaz logo, depicting the Lion of Judah
Active1948–present
Country Israel
Part of Israel Defense Forces
Engagements
Commanders
Current
commander		Aluf Yehuda Fox
Insignia
Flag

The Central Command (Hebrew: פיקוד מרכז, Pikud Merkaz), often abbreviated to Pakmaz (פקמ"ז), is a regional command of the Israel Defense Forces. It is responsible for the units and brigades located in the West Bank (under the West Bank Division), Jerusalem, the Sharon, Gush Dan, and the Shephelah.

The commander of the central command is the one who is authorized to declare new cities in the Judea and Samaria Area.[1]

History

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During the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, the Central Command was in-charge of the war efforts against Jordan, particularly on the road to Jerusalem, occupying the "Small Triangle" (east Sharon), Lod, and Ramla. During the Six-Day War, the Command led the occupation of the West Bank from Jordan. As of the First Intifada, the Command primarily engages in security and counter-terrorism activities, as well as more conventional military measures, in the West Bank.

Towards the end of 2010 the deployment of IDF troops in and around the West Bank reached a new quantitative low with only half the number of infantry battalions serving where "dozens" were required during the first Intifada.[2]

Command organization 2025

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Central Command organization as of October 2025

Commanders

[edit]

All commanders of the Central Command were ranked Aluf (Major General).

See also

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References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Central Command (Israel)

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The Central Command (Hebrew: פיקוד מרכז, Pikud Merkaz; abbreviated Pakmaz), is one of the four regional commands of the Israel Defense Forces, tasked with securing approximately one-third of Israel's territory, including , , the , and surrounding areas. Headquartered in under the command of a major general, it oversees continuous operations aimed at dismantling terrorist , locating and neutralizing weapons caches, and apprehending suspects to protect Israeli residents from attacks originating in these volatile regions. Since its formation amid the 1948 War of Independence, the command has played pivotal roles in major conflicts including the , the , and counterinsurgency efforts such as during the Second , adapting to persistent low-intensity threats through a structure comprising the and Division, regional brigades, elite units like the Paratroopers and Brigades, and specialized support elements. Its operations, focused on routine security maintenance, have been essential in preventing large-scale terrorist incursions despite ongoing challenges from armed groups in administered territories, though these activities have drawn international scrutiny often amplified by biased reporting in global media.

History

Establishment and Pre-1967 Role

The Central Command of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), known in Hebrew as Pikud Merkazi, was formed in May 1948 amid the IDF's establishment on May 26 of that year, as part of the unification of pre-state groups into a single national army under centralized control. Initially, it managed operations along the central front, encompassing the vital corridor and surrounding areas facing Jordanian forces during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. This included coordinating armored convoys and infantry assaults to alleviate the siege of , where troops had severed supply lines, leading to severe shortages in the Jewish Quarter by mid-May 1948. Prior to the , Central Command units, drawing from and veterans, engaged in defensive battles and counteroffensives to secure and other strategic points along the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road, though full control of the city outskirts remained contested until the war's end. Post-armistice, its responsibilities shifted to territorial defense within Israel's central district—roughly from southward to the northern , including greater , the Judean Hills, and enclaves—focusing on border patrols, reserve force training, and infrastructure protection against sporadic incursions. In the 1950s and early 1960s, amid rising guerrilla activity from Jordanian-controlled territories, Central Command orchestrated retaliatory operations to deter cross-border raids, such as the October 1953 Qibya incursion, where IDF paratroopers and infantry destroyed terrorist bases in response to attacks that killed Israeli civilians. These actions reflected the command's emphasis on active defense doctrine, balancing deterrence with efforts to minimize escalation along the volatile armistice lines, under commanders like Yosef Avidar (1952–1953) who prioritized rapid-response capabilities. By 1967, under Maj. Gen. , the command maintained five brigades stationed near for contingency planning, though its pre-war posture avoided direct confrontation with pending broader strategic developments.

Post-Six-Day War Expansion

Following the (June 5–10, 1967), the IDF Central Command's responsibilities expanded to include security and military administration over the captured territories, referred to as and , in addition to its pre-war oversight of central proper, including the envelope and areas bordering . Major General , who commanded Central Command's forces—comprising seven brigades—during the war's central front operations against , directed the initial transition to governance in the newly administered areas. On June 7, 1967, Central Command's military authorities issued Proclamation No. 2, assuming full governmental powers in the , retaining applicable Jordanian laws except where they undermined Israeli security or public order, and establishing a framework for management. This structure placed Central Command in charge of a population exceeding 700,000 , requiring immediate measures to restore essential services, regulate movement, and suppress infiltration attempts from . Narkiss's tenure as head of the in the Administered Areas until mid-1968 involved coordinating with local notables for cooperation, which initially minimized unrest and enabled basic stability. The expansion entailed reallocating existing brigades, such as elements of the Jerusalem Brigade, to patrol and fortify the rugged terrain, while establishing new outposts and networks to monitor threats across the 5,800 square kilometers of added territory. By late , Central Command had integrated specialized units for area , setting precedents for ongoing counter-terrorism doctrines that emphasized proactive patrols and rapid response to maintain order amid sporadic . This shift transformed Central Command from a primarily defensive regional force into a hybrid military-administrative entity, responsible for both combat readiness and provisional rule until civilian mechanisms evolved.

Operations During Intifadas

The , erupting on December 9, 1987, primarily in the but rapidly spreading to and Samaria under Central Command's jurisdiction, involved coordinated Palestinian protests, strikes, and violent acts including stone-throwing and Molotov cocktails targeting IDF personnel and Israeli civilians. Maj. Gen. Amram Mitzna, as Central Command's head from 1987 to 1990, oversaw operations emphasizing riot control, mass arrests of organizers, curfew enforcement, and targeted demolitions of homes belonging to attackers to deter further violence. These efforts aligned with Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin's January 1988 directive for "force, might, and beatings" to break the uprising's momentum, involving specialized units for crowd dispersal using and non-lethal measures where feasible, though live fire was authorized against imminent threats. Central Command reorganized the into operational sub-districts led by brigadier generals and colonels to enhance localized responses, resulting in thousands of detentions and a gradual reduction in riot intensity by 1990, though the command shifted toward sustained routine security patrols thereafter. The Second , igniting on September 28, 2000, escalated to include frequent suicide bombings, shootings, and ambushes in Central Command's area, claiming over 1,000 Israeli lives by 2005 and necessitating a doctrinal pivot from policing to offensive . Under commanders such as Maj. Gen. Yitzhak Eitan during peak phases, Central Command executed from March 29 to April 21, 2002, a large-scale incursion into Palestinian-controlled cities like , , and to dismantle terror networks following the on March 27 that killed 30 civilians. This involved engineering units breaching barriers, infantry and armored assaults on militant strongholds, and intelligence-driven arrests yielding over 7,000 Palestinian detainees and seizure of extensive weaponry caches, significantly disrupting groups like and . Subsequent operations under Central Command included ongoing raids into refugee camps, establishment of checkpoints, and initiation of the security barrier construction starting in 2002 to prevent infiltrations, adapting tactics to while minimizing civilian exposure through precision targeting informed by . These measures contributed to a decline in attacks by mid-2003, though they drew international scrutiny for operational intensity.

21st-Century Counter-Terrorism Evolution

Following the Second Intifada (2000–2005), which saw over 1,000 Israeli civilians killed in suicide bombings and shootings largely originating from and , IDF Central Command shifted toward layered defensive strategies, including the construction of the security barrier beginning in June 2002. This barrier, comprising fences, walls, and surveillance systems spanning over 700 kilometers, reduced successful terrorist infiltrations by more than 90% by 2006, as evidenced by a sharp decline in suicide attacks from 57 in 2002 to fewer than 10 annually thereafter. The policy reflected a causal understanding that physical separation, combined with intelligence dominance, disrupted terrorist supply lines and operational freedom more effectively than prior reliance on Palestinian Authority cooperation, which had proven unreliable amid widespread incitement. Concurrently, Central Command refined offensive tactics through targeted eliminations of terrorist leaders and infrastructure, conducting over 250 such operations in the 2000s against , , and Fatah-affiliated networks in the . These precision strikes, often executed via helicopter missiles or ground raids informed by Israel Security Agency (ISA) intelligence, neutralized key figures like the operatives behind major attacks, while minimizing civilian exposure compared to broader incursions such as in 2002, which reasserted IDF control over cities and dismantled bomb-making labs. This evolution prioritized real-time human intelligence and signals intercepts over mass deployments, enabling sustained pressure without permanent reoccupation, though operations persisted to counter resurgent cells. Into the 2010s and early , Central Command integrated advanced technologies—drones for surveillance, AI-driven , and fortified checkpoints—into routine counter-terrorism, thwarting an average of 400–500 attacks annually through preemptive arrests and weapons seizures. Joint task forces with ISA and border police dismantled Iranian-backed routes funneling explosives and funding to groups, adapting to tactics like lone-wolf stabbings and vehicle rammings that bypassed static defenses. By 2023, amid rising influence post-Gaza escalation, monthly raids escalated, eliminating over 150 terrorists and destroying thousands of explosive devices in the first year alone. The October 7, 2023, attacks prompted further doctrinal adaptation, with Central Command launching intensified campaigns like Operation Break the Wave, followed by Operation Iron Wall in January 2025, targeting entrenched terror hubs in northern ( and Tulkarem refugee camps). This operation marked a return to semi-permanent deployments, including a new dedicated Jenin battalion, to eradicate Iranian-supplied rocket and IED networks, resulting in over 25 terrorist eliminations and hundreds of device neutralizations by mid-2025 while curbing attack frequencies. Unlike earlier reactive models, Iron Wall emphasized engineering demolitions of terror compounds and long-term presence to prevent reconstitution, reflecting lessons from Gaza's persistent threats and a rejection of negotiated withdrawals that historically enabled regrouping.

Organizational Structure

Command Hierarchy and Responsibilities

The Central Command, known in Hebrew as Pikud Merkazi or Pakmaz, operates within the Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) hierarchical structure under the authority of the , who serves as the supreme commander of all IDF forces. The commanding officer of Central Command holds the rank of () and reports directly to the Ground Arm Command and indirectly to the General Headquarters (GHQ), ensuring alignment with national defense priorities. Beneath the commander, the hierarchy includes a deputy commander, typically a , along with specialized branches for operations, intelligence, logistics, and manpower, each led by senior officers responsible for sector-specific execution. Central Command's primary responsibilities encompass the security and defense of central Israel, covering roughly one-third of the country's territory, including the Sharon plain, Gush Dan metropolitan area, Shephelah region, Jerusalem Envelope, and the Judea and Samaria (West Bank) territories. This includes operational oversight of counter-terrorism activities, such as raids and preventive arrests in response to threats from Palestinian militant groups, as well as border protection and rapid response to incursions. The command coordinates with the IDF's Civil Administration to manage security in Area C of Judea and Samaria, facilitating civilian governance while prioritizing force protection and deterrence against asymmetric threats. In addition to combat operations, Central Command handles logistical support for its units, intelligence gathering on local threats, and training exercises tailored to urban and rural warfare scenarios prevalent in its . As of April 2025, Avi Bluth served as the , directing these efforts amid heightened regional tensions. The command's structure emphasizes decentralized authority to brigade and division levels, allowing for agile decision-making in dynamic security environments, while maintaining accountability to higher IDF echelons for strategic compliance.

Units and Brigades as of 2025

The Central Command of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as of 2025 oversees four primary divisions responsible for security in central , the ( and ), , the , and the eastern border with . These include the 877th and Division for territorial control in the , the 98th Division for elite maneuver operations, the reserve 99th Division for infantry support, and the newly formed 96th Division "" for eastern frontier defense. The command also directly supervises specialized brigades focused on counter-terrorism and reserve forces. The 877th Judea and Samaria Division maintains routine security and counter-terrorism in the through six territorial brigades, each assigned to specific sectors: the 421st "Ephraim" Brigade ( and ), 426th "Etzion" Brigade (), 431st "Menashe" Brigade (), 434th "Yehuda" Brigade (), 442nd "Samaria" Brigade (), and 443rd "Benjamin" Brigade (). These brigades conduct patrols, raids, and infrastructure protection, with reinforcements such as additional companies deployed during heightened threats as of April 2025. The 98th "HaEsh" (Fire) Division, reassigned to Central Command on October 1, 2024, comprises elite paratrooper and commando units for rapid-response operations, including the 35th Paratroopers Brigade, 89th "Oz" Commando Brigade, and associated engineering and artillery elements. It has been active in West Bank counter-terrorism and Gaza rotations but remains structurally under Central for regional threats. The reserve 99th "HaBazak" (Flash) Division supports with infantry brigades such as the 900th "Kfir" Brigade, specialized in urban anti-terror raids in Judea and Samaria. The Kfir Brigade operates five battalions focused on West Bank security. The 96th "Gilead" Division, established in June 2025 amid multi-front tensions, reinforces the Jordan border with over 10,000 personnel and plans for five geographically based brigades, including initial reserve infantry like the 182nd "Uri" Brigade. Additional Central Command assets include reserve formations such as the 11th "Yiftach" Infantry Brigade, 179th "Ram" Armored Brigade, and 646th Paratroopers Brigade for augmentation during operations like the January 2025 West Bank offensive. Logistics and signals units, including the 340th Logistics Brigade, provide sustainment across the command.
DivisionKey Brigades/UnitsRole
877th Judea and Samaria421st Ephraim, 426th Etzion, 431st Menashe, 434th Yehuda, 442nd Samaria, 443rd BenjaminTerritorial security in sectors
98th HaEsh35th Paratroopers, 89th Oz Elite maneuver and counter-terrorism
99th HaBazak (Reserve)900th Kfir and urban operations
96th 182nd Uri (Reserve), expanding to five brigadesEastern border defense

Major Operations and Engagements

Participation in Major Wars

During the 1948 War of Independence, predecessor units to the Central Command participated in defensive operations along the central front, including efforts to relieve the siege of and secure supply routes against Jordanian forces. These included engagements in the Jerusalem corridor and operations such as Operation Danny on July 9–19, 1948, which captured and to bolster control west of , though initial advances toward the city itself faced setbacks due to logistical challenges. The command's foundational role emerged from these sector-specific defenses, contributing to the establishment of Israeli positions in the central region amid and blockades. In the 1967 , Central Command, under Maj. Gen. , played a pivotal role on the Jordanian front, directing seven brigades to counter Jordanian offensives and capture key West Bank territories. Operations commenced on June 5, 1967, with paratrooper assaults and armored advances that secured and , culminating in the liberation of and the Old City on after intense urban combat against Jordanian positions at Augusta Victoria and Ammunition Hill. Narkiss's forces repelled initial Jordanian shelling and infantry probes, advancing to the by war's end, with the 16th Jerusalem Brigade tasked with recapture, enabling the unification of the city under Israeli control. This campaign resulted in Central Command overseeing approximately 70 kilometers of new frontlines, shifting its mandate to administer the captured areas. Central Command's involvement in the subsequent (1967–1970) focused on countering incursions from into the , conducting deep raids and defensive patrols to disrupt guerrilla bases east of the river. These operations, including artillery exchanges and cross-border strikes, aimed to neutralize threats to settlements and infrastructure, with heightened activity peaking in 1968–1969 amid escalating crossfire incidents. While the primary attrition efforts targeted Egyptian forces in Sinai, Central Command's eastern sector engagements prevented a secondary front, involving units like armored brigades in ambushes that inflicted casualties on infiltrators without major armored clashes. In the 1973 , Central Command maintained rear-area security and monitored the Jordanian border for potential incursions, but faced no large-scale engagements as refrained from direct participation despite Syrian urgings. Its role emphasized reserve mobilization and fortification of the against possible or Iraqi expeditionary forces, supporting the IDF's focus on Sinai and fronts without deploying significant combat elements forward.

Counter-Terrorism Campaigns in Judea and Samaria

The IDF Central Command, through its Judea and Samaria Division, maintains ongoing counter-terrorism operations across the region to neutralize Palestinian militant networks affiliated with groups such as and (PIJ), which have conducted attacks including shootings and bombings against Israeli civilians and . These campaigns involve nightly raids, intelligence-driven arrests, and targeted strikes on caches and sites, primarily in urban camps like , , and Tulkarem, where terror infrastructures have proliferated. Operations emphasize precision to minimize civilian involvement, with forces from brigades such as the (Brigade 50) and Commando Brigade executing joint actions with the (Shin Bet) and Border Police. Following the , 2023, -led attacks, which spurred a surge in terrorism—including over 100 significant attacks in 2023-2024 by local cells inspired or directed by Gaza-based groups—Central Command escalated activities, apprehending more than 3,700 wanted suspects by April 2024, including approximately 1,600 operatives. In the subsequent period through mid-2025, weekly raids routinely yielded dozens of arrests and weapon seizures; for instance, in early August 2025, forces confiscated about 30 firearms in a single week's operations, while September 2025 actions netted 70 wanted individuals. These efforts dismantled explosive labs and IED networks, with military assessments crediting them for significantly reducing attack capabilities compared to pre-2023 levels. Major pre-2025 campaigns included the August-September 2024 operation, where hundreds of troops raided terror hotspots, eliminating key PIJ figures and destroying explosive devices, described by IDF officials as part of broader efforts to uproot Iranian-backed infrastructures. By March 2025, Command leaders characterized the cumulative raids as the most intensive since in 2002, involving destruction of hundreds of terror-linked structures in refugee camps and a marked decline in operational threats from militant battalions. Despite these gains, challenges persist, as evidenced by October 2025 reports of over 40 arrests in intensified sweeps amid persistent attempts to smuggle arms and recruit.
Key Metrics from Central Command Operations (2023-2025)Details
Wanted Suspects Apprehended (by Apr 2024)3,700+ total; ~1,600 Hamas-linked
Weekly Arrests/Seizures (ex. Aug-Sep 2025)40-70 individuals; 30+ weapons per major wave
Structures Destroyed (cumulative to Oct 2025)Hundreds in refugee camps, including labs

Operation Iron Wall (2025)

Operation Iron Wall was a major counter-terrorism campaign initiated by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), in coordination with Shin Bet and Israel Border Police, on January 21, 2025, targeting entrenched terrorist networks in northern Samaria, with initial focus on Jenin and its adjacent refugee camp. The operation aimed to dismantle organized terror infrastructures, known locally as "katayeb" or brigades, which had proliferated following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, enabling Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other groups to launch frequent assaults on Israeli communities and forces. The campaign commenced with airstrikes from drones and helicopters against terrorist targets, followed by ground incursions involving infantry, engineering units, and for the first time in two decades, armored tanks entering urban areas to provide and facilitate raids into densely built refugee camps. By early February, operations expanded to Nur al-Shams camp near and other hotspots, establishing semi-permanent IDF presence through a new dedicated Jenin battalion to maintain long-term control and prevent terror resurgence. This escalation reflected a strategic shift toward sustained in high-threat zones, reversing prior patterns of short-term raids amid rising militancy that had seen evolve into a de facto terror hub with IED labs and armed cells. Over the ensuing months, forces eliminated more than 100 terrorists—approximately 15 via aerial strikes—and arrested around 320 suspects, while neutralizing hundreds of explosive devices and destroying terror-related infrastructure, including weapon caches and command centers. IDF data indicated an 85% reduction in terror attacks in the operational zones by August 2025, attributing this to the disruption of command chains and operational freedom regained in previously no-go areas for Israeli troops. Logistical support was intensified, with dedicated supply lines ensuring continuous operations across multiple foci, marking one of the longest sustained IDF efforts in the region since the Second Intifada. Critics, including UN officials and humanitarian organizations, reported displacements of up to 40,000 residents and over 1,400 home demolition orders since the operation's start, framing these as excessive and aimed at demographic reconfiguration rather than security. However, Israeli assessments maintain that demolitions targeted structures used for terror activities, such as those shielding IED manufacturing, and that temporary evacuations were necessary to minimize civilian casualties during clearance operations in booby-trapped environments. Reports from outlets like Al Jazeera highlighted arson and forced labor allegations in Tulkarem, but these remain unverified by independent military audits and contrast with IDF claims of precision targeting to degrade militant capabilities without broader punitive intent. The operation's effectiveness in suppressing attacks underscores its necessity amid persistent threats from Iran-backed groups seeking to expand Gaza-style confrontations into Samaria.

Leadership

List of Commanders

The commanders of Israel's Central Command, a regional command of the Israel Defense Forces responsible for security in , , and adjacent areas, have historically been major generals ( in Hebrew). The following table lists them chronologically, based on official IDF records.
TenureCommanderNotes
May 1948 – May 1952Zvi Ayalon
May 1952 – 1953Yosef Avidar
April 1954 – November 1955Zvi AyalonSecond term
November 1955 – January 1958Zvi Tzur
January 1958 – January 1960Meir Amit
January 1960 – December 1965Yosef Giv
December 1965 – July 1968Uzi NarkissOversaw Six-Day War operations
July 1968 – October 1973Rehavam Ze'evi
October 1973 – June 1977Yona Efrat
June 1977 – November 1981Moshe Levi
November 1981 – October 1983Uri Or
October 1983 – January 1986Amnon Lipkin-ShahakLater IDF Chief of Staff
January 1986 – 1987Ehud BarakLater Prime Minister
1987 – 1989Amram Mitzna
1989 – 1991Yitzhak MordechaiLater Defense Minister
1991 – March 1993Dani YatomSecond term: January–April 1994
March 1993 – January 1994Nehemia Tamari
April 1994 – March 1996Ilan Biran
March 1996 – May 1998Uzi Dayan
May 1998 – July 2000Moshe Ya'alonLater IDF Chief of Staff and Defense Minister
July 2000 – August 2002Yitzhak Eitan
August 2002 – January 2005Moshe Kaplinsky
January 2005 – May 2007Yair Naveh
May 2007 – October 2009Gadi Shamni
October 2009 – March 2012Avi Mizrahi
March 2012 – March 2015Nitzan Alon
March 2015 – March 2018Roni Noma
March 2018 – July 2020Nadav Padan
July 2020 – August 2021Tamir Yadai
August 2021 – June 2024Yehuda Fox
June 2024 – presentAvi BluthCurrent as of October 2025

Notable Commanders and Their Tenures

Maj. Gen. Avi Bluth assumed command on July 8, 2024, replacing , and continues in the role as of October 2025, overseeing intensified counter-terrorism operations in and amid persistent threats from Palestinian militant groups. Prior to his appointment, Bluth led the and Division, including the July 2023 counterterrorism raid in that dismantled terror infrastructure. Maj. Gen. commanded from approximately April 2021 to July 2024, a tenure marked by heightened vigilance following the October 7, 2023, attacks, during which Central Command forces conducted thousands of arrests and raids targeting terror networks linked to and Islamic Jihad. Fox's leadership emphasized coordination with civilian security and response to both Arab terrorism and isolated settler violence incidents. Maj. Gen. served from July 2020 to August 2021, navigating a period of escalating lone-wolf attacks and infrastructure demolitions; his subsequent promotions to Ground Forces chief and IDF deputy chief of staff highlight his operational expertise in multi-arena threats. Maj. Gen. Nadav Padan held the position from March 2018 to July 2020, focusing on intelligence-driven operations that neutralized over 500 terror suspects and prevented numerous attacks during a surge in vehicular and stabbing incidents. Maj. Gen. Roni Numa commanded from March 2015 to March 2018, leading responses to the 2015-2016 "knife " wave, which involved daily counter-terror raids and the erection of security barriers that reduced infiltration attempts by 90% in key sectors.
CommanderTenureKey Contributions
Avi BluthJuly 2024 – presentPost-October 7 counter-terror raids; strategic assessments in high-threat areas like and .
April 2021 – July 2024Arrests of thousands of militants; balanced response to dual threats from and .
July 2020 – August 2021Infrastructure targeting; foundation for later high command roles in IDF restructuring.
Nadav PadanMarch 2018 – July 2020Neutralization of 500+ suspects; prevention of attacks amid rising lone-actor violence.
Roni NumaMarch 2015 – March 2018Response to 2015-2016 terror wave; barrier constructions reducing infiltrations by 90%.

Controversies and Criticisms

Allegations of Excessive Force and Violations

The Netzah Yehuda Regional , subordinate to Central Command and tasked with border security and counter-terrorism in the area of the , has faced multiple allegations of abuses against Palestinian detainees. In May 2022, 78-year-old Palestinian-American Omar Assad died of a heart attack shortly after being detained, bound, and left outside overnight by brigade soldiers during a routine patrol; an IDF investigation concluded the incident involved negligence and abuse but not intentional killing, resulting in one soldier's conviction for aggravated abuse and reprimands for officers. The U.S. State Department cited this and prior incidents, including beatings and inhumane treatment, as grounds for considering sanctions against the unit in 2024, though none were ultimately imposed. Critics, including U.S. officials and media reports, described the brigade's culture as enabling "violent and aggressive" conduct toward Palestinian civilians, drawing on testimonies from former soldiers and patterns of complaints dating back years. Amnesty International has alleged that Central Command forces routinely employ excessive lethal force in the West Bank, documenting 22 Palestinian deaths by Israeli gunfire between January 2011 and December 2013, including nine children, often in contexts of stone-throwing or protests where non-lethal options were available. The report claimed a "callous disregard for human life" and policy failures in opening fire rules, based on eyewitness accounts, medical evidence, and video footage. Similar patterns were cited in U.S. State Department reports for 2022 and 2023, which noted credible accounts of unlawful killings, , and arbitrary detention by Israeli security forces in the West Bank, including during arrests and clashes. These allegations often originate from NGOs like and , whose methodologies have been challenged for relying heavily on unverified Palestinian sources, omitting security contexts such as imminent threats from armed militants, and exhibiting against as documented in analyses of their reporting practices. In operational raids against terror infrastructure, Central Command units have been accused of disproportionate force leading to civilian casualties; for instance, during 2023-2024 counter-terrorism actions in and other hotspots following the attacks, Palestinian sources and advocacy groups reported dozens of non-combatant deaths from airstrikes and ground engagements, framing them as violations of . The IDF's Advocate General's Corps received hundreds of complaints annually regarding such operations, investigating claims of mistreatment during detentions, but many cases were closed due to insufficient evidence or determination that force was justified under amid active threats from Palestinian militants. Specific judicial scrutiny arose in cases like that of Adam Malul of the (under Central Command), charged in 2023 with excessive violence against a detainee during an , highlighting internal accountability efforts amid broader allegations. Post-October 2023, allegations intensified with reports of over 500 Palestinian deaths in operations attributed to IDF actions, including claims of extrajudicial executions and in raids targeting and Islamic Jihad cells. UN and NGO monitors, such as those cited in 2024-2025 special rapporteur findings, described a of "arbitrary" lethal force and failure to distinguish civilians, though these assessments have been critiqued for disproportionate focus on Israeli actions relative to Palestinian-initiated , including over 100 and attacks thwarted or resulting in confrontations that year. Central Command's defensive posture, necessitated by heightened terror threats, has been defended by IDF reviews as calibrated to minimize casualties while neutralizing armed threats, with internal probes addressing isolated abuses through courts-martial.

Responses to Settler Extremism and Internal Security Challenges

The Israel Defense Forces' Central Command, responsible for security in and , has employed administrative measures such as restraining orders and detentions to address instances of violence, often termed "" attacks or riots targeting Palestinian property and communities. In 2022, the Central Command head issued 42 restraining orders against far-right activists involved in such ; this number decreased to 38 in 2023 and 20 in 2024, reflecting targeted enforcement against individuals deemed threats to public order. These orders, issued under military authority, restrict movement and access to certain areas for suspects, aiming to prevent escalation without relying solely on criminal prosecutions, which face evidentiary challenges in remote incidents. Commanders have publicly condemned settler extremism, emphasizing its undermining of operational security. Outgoing Central Command chief Maj. Gen. Yehuda Fuchs, in July 2024, criticized government policies enabling "nationalist crimes" in the , stating they erode IDF authority and contribute to lawlessness. His successor, Maj. Gen. Avi Bluth, reinforced this in January 2025 following riots involving dozens of settler extremists who attacked troops, declaring that "any violent riot harms security and the ." Bluth's tenure has seen operational responses, including arrests during clashes, as in June 2025 when IDF forces detained six settlers after an assault on soldiers in a village. Internal security challenges have intensified with settler backlash against IDF enforcement, including direct assaults on military personnel enforcing demolitions or outposts. In November 2024, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu condemned violence against IDF officers, directing it be "dealt with to the fullest extent of the law" amid reports of settlers obstructing operations. Such incidents, rising in 2025, have prompted Central Command to coordinate with police for joint patrols and intelligence to preempt riots, though critics from settler communities argue disproportionate focus on Jewish actors relative to Palestinian terrorism. Despite these measures, enforcement gaps persist, with some outposts remaining un-dismantled and debates over whether responses adequately deter extremism without alienating allied populations.

Debates on Operational Effectiveness and Strategic Necessity

Proponents of the IDF Central Command's operations in and emphasize their role in significantly reducing terrorist incidents through proactive counter-terrorism measures, including targeted raids and infrastructure dismantlement. For instance, the security barrier constructed primarily under Central Command's oversight, completed in phases from 2002 onward, correlated with a sharp decline in suicide bombings, dropping from over 130 in 2002 to fewer than 10 annually by the mid-2000s, according to Israeli security assessments. Ongoing operations, such as the January 2025 launch of Operation Iron Wall, have eliminated key militant figures and neutralized explosive devices, curbing attack frequencies in northern areas like by mid-2025. These efforts, involving the deployment of tanks for the first time in two decades during the operation, restored IDF freedom of action in previously dominated by armed groups. Critics, often from organizations and left-leaning outlets like , argue that such operations reflect operational shortcomings, including rapid commander turnover that erodes tactical proficiency and leads to errors. A 2025 study highlighted short tenures—averaging under two years for brigade commanders—as fostering laxity and vulnerability, particularly in the Central Command's handling of post-October 7, 2023, terror surges, where 23 Israelis were killed in attacks prior to intensified raids. However, these critiques frequently overlook empirical outcomes, such as the elimination of over 100 militants in Iron Wall by September 2025, and tend to prioritize narratives of provocation over data-driven threat neutralization, reflecting institutional biases in sources like the UN or NGOs that undercount Palestinian . On strategic necessity, defenders cite Judea and Samaria's provision of critical depth against eastern threats, including potential incursions, and prevention of Gaza-like scenarios where 2005 disengagement enabled entrenchment and rocket barrages exceeding 20,000 since. Central Command's presence has thwarted thousands of attacks annually via intelligence-driven arrests, with reporting over 3,000 arrests in 2023-2024 alone, underscoring causal links between sustained control and reduced lethality. Opponents contend the military footprint sustains cycles of violence without political resolution, as in Crisis Group analyses pushing annexation critiques, yet evidence from partial withdrawals—like Oslo-era Area A handovers—shows spikes in bombings, affirming necessity absent viable Palestinian security alternatives. First-principles evaluation reveals that without Central Command's framework, demographic vulnerabilities and proximity to urban centers would amplify risks, as modeled in IDF strategy documents prioritizing force against uncured threats.

Strategic Role and Impact

Contributions to Israeli Security

Central Command has significantly bolstered Israeli security by conducting sustained counter-terrorism operations in and , a region prone to Palestinian militant activity. Launched on March 31, 2022, Operation Break the Wave responded to a wave of attacks that killed 45 Israelis in its first year, involving thousands of arrests, raids on terror cells, and weapon seizures that dismantled infrastructure linked to groups like and . These actions prevented numerous attacks, with IDF assessments crediting the operation with saving hundreds of lives through preemptive interventions. Post-October 7, 2023, the command's efforts contributed to thwarting over 1,200 major terror plots across , many planned in or from the , via intelligence-led operations involving the IDF, [Shin Bet](/page/Shin Bet), and border police. By 2025, raids described as the most intensive since in 2002 targeted militant strongholds in refugee camps and cities like and , degrading armed groups and reshaping militant dynamics through direct confrontations. This has stabilized the theater, restrained uprisings, and limited spillover from Gaza hostilities. The command's proactive posture, including reinforcement of settlements and offensive eliminations of threats, has maintained security for Israeli civilians and infrastructure amid persistent risks. IDF leadership tours in August 2025 underscored the focus on not waiting for attacks but initiating strikes to eliminate cells, ensuring defensive depth without major escalations. Ongoing activities in 2025 continue to dismantle networks, demonstrating the command's role in preserving operational superiority against evolving threats.

Challenges from Ongoing Threats

Central Command faces persistent challenges from Palestinian terrorism in the , including organized attacks by and cells, as well as lone-wolf incidents involving shootings, stabbings, and vehicle rammings. In 2024, the thwarted 1,040 major terror attacks in the and , reflecting the high volume of plots that necessitate constant vigilance and by Central Command forces. Despite these preventive measures, realized attacks remain a threat, with 120 significant terrorist incidents recorded from January to May 2024 alone, often originating from refugee camps serving as operational bases. The escalation following the October 7, 2023, attack on southern amplified these challenges, with increased attempts to smuggle Iranian-backed weapons into the and a surge in incitement via and mosques, straining Central Command's operational tempo. IDF operations, such as those targeting terror infrastructure in and camps, have destroyed hundreds of buildings and uncovered explosive labs since late 2023, marking the most intensive counter-terror campaign since the 1967 , yet the dense urban environments and use of civilians as shields complicate missions and prolong engagements. Weapon smuggling from Gaza and , including drones and advanced IEDs, further heightens risks to IDF patrols and settlers, requiring enhanced border security and intelligence coordination with the Palestinian Authority, which has limited capacity due to its own internal divisions. These threats demand sustained high-intensity activity from Central Command's brigades, such as the 98th Division and Yehuda Brigade, leading to fatigue among troops and the need for reinforced checkpoints and barriers, while the potential for coordinated multi-front attacks—linked to broader Iranian proxy networks—poses risks of spillover from Gaza or . Annual data indicates a decrease in successful attacks in compared to 2023 peaks, but the sheer number of thwarted plots underscores the ongoing instability, with over 1,460 terrorists arrested in the region that year. This environment challenges strategic planning, as operations must balance immediate neutralization with long-term deterrence amid fluctuating Palestinian driven by ideological and economic factors.

Integration with Broader IDF and International Efforts

The IDF Central Command operates as one of four regional commands under the unified structure of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), reporting directly to the and integrating into the broader IDF operational framework through joint planning, intelligence sharing, and multi-command maneuvers. This coordination ensures synchronized responses to cross-regional threats, such as originating in the that may impact adjacent areas under Northern or Southern Commands; for instance, Central Command units have reinforced central sectors with additional battalions to align with IDF-wide border defense enhancements approved in June 2025. The command's divisions, including the Judea and Samaria Division, contribute to IDF strategic documents emphasizing branch integration for multi-domain operations, including ground, air, and cyber elements, to maintain operational depth across theaters. In terms of international efforts, Central Command's activities align with IDF-wide partnerships, particularly following Israel's 2021 transfer to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) , which facilitated expanded joint exercises and regional threat discussions among CENTCOM partners. This shift enabled recurring multinational meetings and drills, enhancing for shared challenges like Iranian influence, though Central Command's focus remains primarily domestic counter-terrorism rather than direct overseas deployments. During heightened operations, such as those in 2023, the IDF—including Central Command elements—coordinated with CENTCOM for logistical and support, underscoring the command's role in broader U.S.-Israel valued at over $130 billion in assistance since 1948. Such ties prioritize maintaining IDF legitimacy and exchanges, as outlined in IDF , without compromising operational autonomy in sensitive areas like the .

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