Hubbry Logo
TulkarmTulkarmMain
Open search
Tulkarm
Community hub
Tulkarm
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Tulkarm
Tulkarm
Tulkarm
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

32°18′45″N 35°1′36″E / 32.31250°N 35.02667°E / 32.31250; 35.02667

Tulkarm or Tulkarem (Arabic: طولكرم, Ṭūlkarm) is a city in the West Bank, Palestine and the capital of the Tulkarm Governorate. Netanya is to the west in Israel, while Nablus and Jenin are to the east. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, in 2017 Tulkarm had a population of 64,532.[1] Tulkarm is under the administration of the Palestinian National Authority.

Key Information

Al-Adawiah High School
Paris Street, Tulkarm, 2007.

Etymology

[edit]

The Arabic name translates as 'length of vinyard'[3] but is a distortion of the Aramaic name Tur Karma[4] ('mount of the vineyard'), which was used for Tulkarm by the Crusaders and by the mediaeval Samaritan inhabitants.[2][5]

History

[edit]

During the Ayyubid era, after the Muslim reconquest of Palestine under Sultan Saladin in 1187, the first families to settle in Tulkarm were from the Kurdish clan of Zaydan.[6] A military group, the Zaydan were dispatched to the Wadi al-Sha'ir area, which includes Tulkarm, by Saladin to buttress the defense of the western approaches of Muslim-held Palestine from the Crusaders who dominated the coastal area.[6]

The Zaydan politically dominated Tulkarm and the vicinity until the early 17th century. Around 1230, during the late Ayyubid period, a group of Arabs from southern Palestine immigrated to Tulkarm. They had originally migrated to Palestine from Arabia many generations prior and had become semi-nomadic farmers and grazers.[6] Among the Arab families were the Fuqaha clan, who were considered ashraf (related to the Islamic prophet Muhammad) and served as the ulama (religious scholars) of the village.[6]

During the Ayyubid, and later the Mamluk era (1260–1517), the majority of Tulkarm's lands were made part of a waqf (religious trust) to support the al-Farisiyya Madrasa, an Islamic religious school in Jerusalem, located north of the Masjid Al-Aqsa compound. Two-thirds of the village's farmlands were confirmed as part of this trust in 1354 by the deputy-governor of Damascus, Faris al-Din al-Baki. During Mamluk rule another wave of Arab immigrants arrived in Tulkarm from North Africa and nearby Nablus. They largely engaged in agriculture and animal husbandry, supplying hides to leather merchants in the coastal villages, retaken from the Crusaders in the second half of the 13th century.[6]

Ottoman era

[edit]

Tulkarm was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in 1517. Afterward, Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent (r. 1520–66) transferred Tulkarm's waqf to the al-Jawhariyya Madrasa (Commons), located in the Muslim Quarter, northwest of the al-Aqsa Mosque. Under this arrangement, Tulkarm's inhabitants paid a third of their harvest as a tax towards the waqf, called qasm. At the time of the waqf's reassignment, the population of the village was estimated at 522 (95 households) and the qasm consisted of eight carats of wheat and three carats of barley. The town's elite families administered the trust, which enabled them to reach higher social and economic status. The population increased through intermarriage with families fleeing violent feuds between the various clans of Jabal Nablus. By 1548, the population had grown to 189 households or roughly 1,040 persons.[6]

Tulkarm appeared in Ottoman tax registers in 1596 as being in the nahiya (subdistrict) of Qaqun, which was a part of the sanjak (district) of Nablus. The largest village in the nahiya,[6] Tulkarm had a population of 176 Muslim households (roughly 968 persons) and paid taxes on wheat, barley, summer crops, olives, goats, beehives and a press for olives or grapes.[7] During this early period of Ottoman rule, there were five neighborhoods (pl. harat) centered around the Shaykh Ali al-Jazri al-Mughrabi Mosque, today referred to simply as the "Old Mosque". The population was overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim, and most residents were fellahin (peasants who worked the land.) The elite families during that time were the Zaydan and the Lajjun-based Tarabay, the latter belonging to the Bani Harith tribe. Because of the decentralized nature of the Ottoman state, these families and their successors in later centuries ruled the area with a high degree of autonomy. The Zaydan had particular authority over Tulkarm, being appointed as the mutassalim (tax collectors or enforcers) on behalf of the central authorities.[6]

In the mid-17th-century most members of the Zaydan family, with the exception of the children and the elderly, were killed in a massacre by Tulkarm's inhabitants during Friday prayers.[citation needed] This was in reaction to the Zaydan having forced Tulkarm's residents to harvest and process the village's grains for taxation purposes. Consequently, political power in Tulkarm passed to the Badran clan, while the Fuqaha family took control of administering the "waqf" lands, firmly establishing them as the village's religious leaders. The Fuqaha had derived much of their authority from their classification as ashraf and their association with the Sufi Rifa'iyya zawiya of the village. The western neighborhood was mostly emptied of Zaydan members and would serve as the main area of settlement for newcomers.[6]

Tulkarm appears on sheet 45 of Pierre Jacotin's map drawn up during Napoleon's invasion in 1799, named Toun Karin.[8][9]

Tulkarm Municipality building

Following the adoption of the Ottoman Land Code in 1858, the musha (collective landownership) system was gradually abrogated and residents were required to register their property with the central authorities. The fellahin were wary of registering their names for fear of military conscription by the Ottoman state and instead entrusted various elite clans with the role of landlords, who were in effect absentee owners. This altered the area's social structure, with the Samara, al-Hajj Ibrahim and Hanun clans legally obtaining vast swathes of Tulkarm's lands. Leadership of the town's two main religious establishments were generally supplied by the Kur-based Jayyusi clan and the al-Barqawi clan of Shufa.[6] The Barqawi clan controlled the area around the town in the 19th century.[10]

The 1860s French explorer Victor Guérin visited Tulkarm, which he described as being of "considerable" size, with about 1,000 inhabitants.[11] During this time, the Ottoman authorities granted the village an agricultural plot of land called Ghabat Tulkarm in the former confines of the Forest of Arsur (Ar. Al-Ghaba) in the coastal plain, west of the village.[12][13]

Old City of Tulkarm

The Survey of Western Palestine in 1882 described Tulkarm as a "long straggling village, on high ground", surrounded by arable land and rock. There were several "good-sized" houses, mainly of stone in the village.[14]

Tulkarm became the administrative center of a new subdistrict (qada') Bani Saʿb-Tulkarm in 1876,[15] later becoming a municipality in 1892.[16] Tulkarm was also appointed a governor, bringing the residents who numbered only a few thousand and who were mostly fellahin, closer to the central government. This elevated status gave Tulkarm precedence over the nearby villages, which at that time also included Qalqilya. Tulkarm's center shifted from the Old Mosque to an empty space in the northwest as the town expanded northward with the construction of government buildings, a post office, a school and a hospital in that area.[17]

Around the turn of the 20th century, Tulkarm was one of the villages in which the Hannun family owned extensive estates. The Hannuns fostered close ties with clans in the village.[18]

Tulkarm became a major rail junction in 1908 on the Hejaz Railway line running up from Egypt and southern Palestine to Haifa and Acre in the northwest, Jerusalem, Nablus and Ramallah to the south, Lebanon to the north, and Syria and Transjordan to the east. The Ottoman Army used Tulkarm as one of its principal bases during the Sinai and Palestine campaign in World War I. It was bombed by British planes carried by HMS Anne. It was captured by British forces in 1918.[19]

British Mandate era

[edit]
The region of Tulkarm in the 1940s.

The British Mandatory administration (1942–1947) in Palestine designated Tulkarm as the center of the Tulkarm Subdistrict.[20]

A road was constructed in 1920 to connect the town with Netanya on the coast. In order to cope with a significant increase in population and unorganized infrastructural development, a civil planning scheme was designed for Tulkarm and its satellite villages in 1945. At the time Tulkarm was divided into four main sections, with the bulk of commercial activity concentrated along the north–south and east–west roads. Meanwhile, the town continued to expand past its northern fringes, which had previously been characterized by green spaces.[21]

Tulkarm became a haven for Palestinian Arab rebel activity during the 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine against British rule. General Commander of the Revolt Abd al-Rahim al-Hajj Muhammad hailed from Dhinnaba, today part of Tulkarm municipality, and led many operations in the region.[22]

In the 1945 statistics the population of Tulkarm consisted of 8,090; of whom 7,790 were Muslims, 280 Christian and 20 "other",[23] with a land area of 1,672 dunams (urban) and 32,610 dunams (rural), according to an official land and population survey.[24] Of this, 2,399 dunams were designated for citrus and bananas, 276 plantations and irrigable land, 28,256 for cereals,[25] while 1,492 dunams were built-up areas.[26]

Jordanian rule

[edit]

During the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, Tulkarm was occupied by the Iraqi Army and later annexed as part of the Jordanian-held West Bank. The 1949 Armistice Agreements between Israel and Jordan left roughly 30,000 dunams of Tulkarm's 32,610 dunams of land, mostly agricultural, in Israeli territory. In consequence, many residents moved to Transjordan or went abroad in search of employment.[27] Straddling the armistice line, Tulkarm was cut off from nearby Arab towns. Its principal economic and social connection was with Nablus.[28]

In 1950, the Tulkarm Camp was established by UNRWA in the city, comprising an area of 0.18 square kilometres (0.07 sq mi). Most of the refugees who resided in the camp came from Jaffa, Caesarea and Haifa. Today it is the second largest Palestinian refugee camp in the West Bank.[29] A period of significant municipal expansion began in Tulkarm after a new civil development scheme was authorized in 1961. As part of this plan, in 1963, the hamlet of Jarrad in the southeast and other lands in the northeast (total of 1.8 square km) were annexed to the city, while the eastern village of Dhinnaba was incorporated into the municipality in 1964, adding another 0.75 square kilometres (0.29 sq mi) of territory. The village of Shuweika to the north and the smaller village of Irtah to the south were annexed in 1967.[30]

Contemporary period

[edit]
2018 United Nations map of the area, showing the Israeli occupation arrangements.

Since the Six-Day War in 1967, Tulkarm has been under Israeli occupation.[20] A military government governed Tulkarm until transfer in 1982 to the Israeli Civil Administration.

During the early months of the First Intifada, 16 May 1989, Muhammad As'ad Fokhah, 50 years old, from Shuweika, died in Megiddo prison after a three-day hunger strike. Yitzhak Rabin reported to a Member of Knesset that Fokhah died of a heart attack caused by dehydration and that the military investigation found that prison staff had acted in accordance with orders.[31]

In the wake of the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), control of Tulkarm was transferred to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) on 10 December 1995, becoming the third Palestinian city from which Israeli forces withdrew.[20] During the early years of the Second Intifada, Israel temporarily reoccupied Tulkarm. Israeli military administration over Tulkarm ended in 2005, when control of the city was handed back to the PNA.[32] Upon assuming control of the city, the PNA instituted new weapons restrictions limiting militants to a single registered weapon that may not be loaded or carried in public.[33]

On 19 October 2023, the IDF entered the city.[34] In August 2024, Israeli bulldozers destroyed miles of the city, including homes, businesses and infrastructure; Israeli soldiers blocked emergency responders from assisting residents. News reports include videos of this attack, as well as assertions by the Israel Defense Forces that it is rooting out terrorism; and that it "undertakes all feasible precautions to avoid damaging essential infrastructure," while acknowledging that these "operations in the area have caused unavoidable harm to certain civilian structures."[35]

Geography

[edit]

The city is situated on the western edge of northern West Bank, about 15 kilometers (9.3 mi) west of Nablus further southwest of Jenin and 15 kilometers (9.3 mi) east of the Israeli coastal city of Netanya. It is bordered by the 1948 ceasefire line, with Israel's Central and Haifa Districts to the west, and Palestine's Qalqilya and Ramallah and al-Bireh Governorates to the south. Its central location between a plain and a mountain has made it commercially and strategically significant and has had a great impact on its growth. In the past, Tulkarm was a caravan station and a trading center for products from the city's surrounding villages and farms, as well as a point from which armies crossed to Egypt and the Levant (al-Sham).[citation needed]

Tulkarm is at the crossroads of three historically important arteries: A road which runs north from the Latrun area along the edge of the coastal plain to Mount Carmel, Mount Tabor, Mount Gilboa, Nazareth and the Galilee and the Golan Heights, a road which winds northward along the outer tier of hills from the Ajalon valley to the Jezreel Valley, and a road that rises from the Mediterranean Sea at modern-day Netanya east to Nablus. In the past it was a junction of the coastal railroad from north of Haifa to Cairo and a branch of the narrow gauge Hejaz railway to Damascus.[citation needed]

Demographics

[edit]
Historical population
YearPop.±%
1548 1,040—    
1596 968−6.9%
1860s 1,000+3.3%
1922 3,350+235.0%
1931 4,540+35.5%
1938 5,700+25.6%
1945 8,090+41.9%
1961 11,401+40.9%
1967 20,002+75.4%
1997 39,805+99.0%
2007 61,941+55.6%
2017 64,532+4.2%
Source: [6][11][36][37][23][38][39][40][41][1][42]

According to the 1922 census of Palestine conducted by the British Mandate authorities, Tulkarm had a population of 3,350 (3,109 Muslims, 208 Christians, 23 Jews, eight Samaritans, one Baha'i, and one Druze).[36] At the time of the 1931 census, Tulkarm had a population of 4,827 (4,540 Muslims, 255 Christians, 18 Jews, six Samaritans, and one Druze) with 541 in nearby suburbs (516 Muslims, 15 Jews, and 10 Christians).[37]

The village statistics of 1938 list Tulkarm's population as 5,700 with 629 in nearby suburbs (including 17 Jews).[42] The village statistics of 1945 list the population as 8,090 (7,790 Muslims, 280 Christians, and 20 "other").[43]

The populations of Tulkarm, Dhinnaba, Shuweika and Irtah steadily increased by an average of 2% annually between 1931 and 1961, with a drastic increase after the 1948 War as the area experienced an influx of Palestinian refugees. The Jews presumably left/fled during the war. Following the 1967 War, the population saw a temporary decrease as some residents fled to Jordan. In the 1967 census by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics the population of Tulkarm city was recorded as 10,255, Tulkarm Camp as 5,020, Dhinnaba as 1,342, Irtah as 925, Shuweika as 2,332 and Khirbet Jarrad as 128, a total of 20,002.[39] Most of the inhabitants were Muslims, although there was a community of 103 Christians according to the census.[44]

In the first census by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) in 1997, Tulkarm had a population of 33,921 and the Tulkarm Refugee Camp had a population of 5,884. Palestinian refugees made up 31.4% of the city's residents and 94% of the camp's inhabitants.[40] The sex ratio for the city was 50.7% male and 49.3% female. Over half (52.2%) of the city's population was under the age of 20, 44.5% were between the ages of 20 and 64 and 4.1% were over the age of 64.[45] In the 2007 PCBS census Tulkarm's population grew to 51,300 while the camp's increased to 10,641. The sex ratio for the city was 50.3% male and 49.7% female.[41]

Church of Saint George, Tulkarm.

Today the population is almost entirely Muslim. Prior to Israel's occupation of the city in 1967, there were an estimated 1,000 Christians living in Tulkarm, but roughly half of the community emigrated in the aftermath of the war, while most of the remaining Christians gradually emigrated afterward.[46] There are two Christian families who continue to live in Tulkarm,[46] who are part of the same extended family.[47] There is a Greek Orthodox church in the city dedicated to St. George,[46] built in the early 19th century.[47][48][better source needed] The church is active and opens for visitors.[46]

Climate

[edit]

The climate of Tulkarm is Mediterranean and subtropical as the area surrounding it, with rainfall limited to the winter. The average temperature in the winter ranges from 8 to 16 °C (46 to 61 °F), while the average temperature in the summer ranges from 17 to 30 °C (63 to 86 °F). Tulkarm is distinguished by the moderating effect the sea breeze has on its climate because of its location in the mountains. The average temperature does not exceed 27 °C (81 °F) in August, while February's average temperature does not fall below 13.5 °C (56 °F). Humidity is moderate in summer, about 40-70%, though it rises in winter to between 70 and 85%. Tulkarm receives in excess of 550 millimeters (22 in) of rain yearly, which is dispersed and intermittent, characteristic of the Mediterranean Basin.

Climate data for Tulkarm
Month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Year
Mean daily maximum °C (°F) 17.0
(62.6) 		17.5
(63.5) 		19.6
(67.3) 		23.9
(75.0) 		24.2
(75.6) 		28.3
(82.9) 		29.0
(84.2) 		30.0
(86.0) 		27.9
(82.2) 		26.0
(78.8) 		23.0
(73.4) 		19.2
(66.6) 		22.76
(72.97)
Mean daily minimum °C (°F) 8.9
(48.0) 		8.7
(47.7) 		10.5
(50.9) 		13.6
(56.5) 		17.2
(63.0) 		20.6
(69.1) 		23.0
(73.4) 		23.6
(74.5) 		20.7
(69.3) 		18.5
(65.3) 		14.1
(57.4) 		10.9
(51.6) 		15.54
(59.97)
Average precipitation mm (inches) 124.9
(4.92) 		92.2
(3.63) 		52.8
(2.08) 		23.6
(0.93) 		2.7
(0.11) 		2.8
(0.11) 		2.2
(0.09) 		0.7
(0.03) 		1.2
(0.05) 		28.0
(1.10) 		77.4
(3.05) 		135.5
(5.33) 		538.3
(21.19)
Average precipitation days 13.9 11.7 8.6 3.6 1.4 3.2 2.0 0.7 0.8 3.9 8.0 11.8 63.7
Source: Israel Meteorological Service[49]

The rainy season starts in October and continues through May. Between December and February, almost 70% of annual rainfall occurs, while 20% of annual rainfall occurs in October and November. Rain in June and September is rare and comes to negligible amounts. July and August have no rain at all, except for one rainfall of 1.5 millimeters (0.059 in) on July 10, 1995, in Tulkarm city (Tulkarm Agricultural Department). The mean annual rainfall in the city of Tulkarm is 642 millimeters (25.3 in) for the period from 1952 to 1995 (Tulkarm Agricultural Department).

Economy

[edit]
Market in Tulkarm

Prior to the 1948 War, Tulkarm had a major agricultural sector, with grain, olives and fruits, especially watermelons, being the major crops cultivated by in the town's lands.[20]

Education

[edit]
An-Najah National University (Tulkarm branch)

Palestinian Technical University - Kadoorie which is the sole governmental university in Palestine, was established as an agricultural college in Tulkarem during the British Mandate by an endowment from the Iraqi-born Jewish philanthropist J.S. Kadoorie in 1930 and then became a university in 2007. Other institutions of higher learning include Al-Quds Open University and two campuses of An-Najah National University.

There are seven high schools in Tulkarm, three for girls (al-Adawiah,[50] Jamal Abd al-Nasser,[50] and Al-Khawaja) and three for boys (al-Fadilia,[51] Ihsan Samara, and Adnan Sefareni) and a vocational school for both genders.

Palestine Technical University – Kadoorie
Fadhiliya School

On September 24, 2016, the PA named a school in Tulkarem after Salah Khalaf. Tulkarem governor Issam Abu Bakr said that the school was named after “martyr Salah Khalaf in order to commemorate the memory of this great national fighter”.[52][53]

Culture

[edit]

The traditional costumes of women from Tulkarm were plain, dark-colored gowns with or without embroidery, as most rural women were from the north of Palestine.[54] Today, embroidery is the main source of income for the women of the city.[19] The most popular embroidered images are maps of historic Palestine. The Palestinian dish musakhan is popular in the city. Tulkarm shares many of its cultural features with neighboring Haifa, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilia, and Jaffa.[19]

A Tulkarm amusement park called Mega Land attracts tens of thousands of visitors on Muslim holidays.[55]

Sports

[edit]

Tulkarm has 2 semi-professional soccer teams; Thaqafi Tulkarm and Markez Shabab Tulkarm. Both are in the Palestinian League Division One.

Sister cities

[edit]

Tulkarm's sister cities include:[56]

Notable people

[edit]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Bibliography

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Tulkarm

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Tulkarm is a in the State of Palestine, serving as the administrative center of the in the northwestern . Positioned at approximately 32°19′N 35°2′E and an of 117 meters above , it lies in a fertile plain conducive to , with the local centered on the cultivation and export of fruits, olives, almonds, and . The city's name derives from "Tur Karm," meaning "Mountain of Vineyards," underscoring its longstanding role as an agricultural hub shaped by the region's alluvial soils and . While remains predominant, employing much of the in crop production and related trade, the area has faced economic constraints from geographic isolation and security measures, including restricted access to adjacent markets in . Tulkarm also hosts a densely populated established in 1950, home to over 27,000 registered , which amplifies local challenges related to and .

Etymology

Name Origins and Interpretations

The name Tulkarm (Arabic: طُولْكَرْم, romanized: Ṭūlkarm) originates from the Aramaic compound "Tur Karm," where tur denotes a mountain or hill and karm refers to a vineyard, collectively signifying "mountain of the vineyard." This etymology reflects the region's historically fertile coastal plain, conducive to viticulture, with archaeological and linguistic evidence linking the term to ancient Semitic agricultural practices in the area. The name persisted through the Islamic conquests, evolving phonetically in Arabic usage while retaining its descriptive essence tied to the local topography of low hills amid arable land. Earlier historical records from the Roman period, dating to the CE, identify the settlement as Birat Soreqa (or Berat Soraqa), interpreted as "well of the chosen vineyard," underscoring a continuity in vineyard-related nomenclature that predates the form. Canaanite-era references, though less precisely documented, similarly evoke cultivation, such as variants like "Tel Karmeta al-'Inab" (mound of the grape vineyard), aligning with the area's agricultural prominence. By the Ottoman era in the , the name had standardized as Tulkarm, a phonetic adaptation possibly influenced by dialectal shifts from tul (long or extended) to emphasize the elongated ridge, though primary derivations remain rooted in Tur . Interpretations of the name emphasize its descriptive rather than symbolic function, highlighting causal links between the site's (approximately 50–100 meters above ) and surrounding orchards, which supported economic vitality through , , and production until modern disruptions. Alternative folk etymologies, such as "bountiful " or "noble mound" (tell karim), appear sporadically in informal accounts but lack substantiation from , contrasting with the vineyard consensus derived from toponymic patterns in Aramaic-influenced Levantine place names. The persistence of this agrarian connotation underscores Tulkarm's pre-industrial identity as a viticultural hub, verifiable through Ottoman tax records noting yields in the district.

History

Ancient and Medieval Periods

Archaeological surveys in the Tulkarm area reveal evidence of human activity from prehistoric periods, including flint tools dating to approximately 8000 years ago, though these findings are regional rather than specific to the modern city's core. Nearby sites, such as Khirbet Irtah located 3 km south of Tulkarm, contain Roman-era remains, including a bathhouse and structures indicating a commercial hub, suggesting the site's strategic importance along ancient trade routes during the CE and later. However, no substantial evidence confirms a continuous at Tulkarm itself during the , , or classical periods; the locality appears to have functioned primarily as agricultural land amid broader Canaanite and Roman influences in the . The establishment of Tulkarm as a recognized village occurred during the late Ayyubid period, around 1230 CE, when Arab peasant farmers and herders migrated from southern Palestine to the area following the Muslim reconquest under in 1187 CE. These settlers capitalized on the fertile al-Sha'ir valley, engaging in cultivation and , which laid the foundation for the community's agrarian economy. During the subsequent era (1260–1516 CE), much of Tulkarm's surrounding farmland was designated as land under religious endowment, administered for charitable or pious purposes, which influenced local and elite structures persisting into later periods. Medieval Tulkarm remained a modest rural outpost at the crossroads of regional routes connecting the to inland highlands, with limited documentation in contemporary chronicles, reflecting its peripheral role amid larger conflicts between Ayyubids, Crusaders, and Mamluks. The system helped stabilize land use but also fostered conflicts among local elites over property rights, as seen in disputes involving migrant families who integrated into the village's social fabric. By the end of the medieval period, Tulkarm's population consisted primarily of Muslim fellahin, setting the stage for Ottoman administrative incorporation without evidence of significant non-Muslim communities or fortifications within the village proper.

Ottoman Era

Tulkarm entered Ottoman rule following the conquest of Palestine in 1516, functioning primarily as a rural village within the nahiya of Wadi al-Sha'ir, later incorporated into the Bani Sa'b nahiya under the Nablus Sanjak. Early Ottoman tax registers, known as Defterler-i Mufassal, documented it as a waqf village designated to support the al-Jawhariyya Madrasa attached to the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, with peasants paying one-third of their harvest in kind as qasm taxes, such as 7,000 kg of wheat and 14,000 kg of barley recorded in 1548. Population estimates from these registers indicate modest sizes: 95 households (approximately 522 persons, assuming 5.5 per household) in 1535, rising to 189 households (about 1,040 persons) by 1548, and 176 households (roughly 968 persons) in 1596, predominantly Sunni Muslim fallahin engaged in subsistence agriculture under communal musha' land tenure. The village's elite comprised local notable families managing administration and taxation, including the Fuqaha as overseers, amid occasional conflicts such as the mid-17th-century of the Kurdish Zaydan family due to excessive tax demands, which shifted influence to families like Badran. By the , reforms transformed land and administration; the 1858-1859 Ottoman Land Code enabled , allowing notables to accumulate holdings previously held communally or as state , with two-thirds of Tulkarm's lands originally waqf-designated but canceled by 1905 and reassigned to the Hijaz Railroad . The Hannun family, originating from Transjordanian Huwaytat Arabs and resettling in Tulkarm mid-century, exemplified this ascent as tax farmers (multazimun), amassing around 20,000 dunams by the early , including pioneering groves like Bayyarat Hannun established circa 1891, and securing administrative roles such as council seats in the Bani Sa'b nahiya from 1882. Administrative elevation occurred in the 1870s-1880s when Tulkarm became the center of a qada' (), reflecting its strategic position at junctions, followed by formal status in 1892 alongside construction of government buildings like a , , and . The economy centered on agriculture, with the musha' system persisting until reforms, though late Ottoman developments included the line and an agricultural by 1918; the population remained under 2,000 in the early 1900s, housed in about 88 buildings clustered around a and . During , Tulkarm served as an Ottoman military base in the , subjected to British aerial bombings, marking the era's turbulent close.

British Mandate Period

During the British Mandate for Palestine (1920–1948), Tulkarm functioned as the administrative center of the Tulkarm Subdistrict, an area characterized by agricultural productivity, particularly in citrus cultivation. Local notable families, such as the Hannuns, who had established citrus groves like Bayyarat Hannun spanning 600 dunams since the late Ottoman period, expanded operations under Mandate policies that facilitated land registration and export markets. The number of Arab-owned citrus plantations (bayyarat) in the coastal region rose from 31 in 1918 to over 250 by 1942, driven by investments in irrigation and wells funded partly by land transactions. This growth reflected broader Mandate-era improvements in health services and infrastructure, contributing to population increases, though precise subdistrict figures varied due to migration and economic shifts. Land sales by rural elites to Jewish purchasers marked a contentious aspect of Tulkarm's development, with prices escalating from approximately 1.5 Palestine pounds per in the 1920s to over 100 by the 1940s amid rising demand. The Hannun family, leveraging their holdings, sold 10,000 in 1932 for settlements including Even Yehuda and Kfar Tsur, followed by 4,500 in 1938 for sites like Beit Yehoshua and Tel Yitshaq, and additional parcels in 1947 for the Hadassim youth village. These transactions, while economically rational for sellers amid British encouragement of private land markets, fueled Arab nationalist opposition, viewing them as threats to communal and demographic balance; by 1938, owned 32.7% of land in the , far exceeding the national average of 6%. Such sales often led to intra-Arab conflicts, exemplified by the 1937 of Hasan Hannun and the 1939 killing of Dr. Rashad Hannun, attributed to disputes over property dealings. Tulkarm emerged as a focal point of resistance during the of 1936–1939, serving as a hub for nationalist activities against British rule and Jewish immigration. British efforts to curb agrarian crime in the succeeded in reducing incidents, but underlying tensions persisted, with pro-British rallies, such as one in October 1939 at Bayyarat Hannun attended by hundreds, highlighting divided loyalties among locals. Educationally, the establishment of an agricultural school in Tulkarm accommodated 55 students, aiming to modernize Arab farming practices, though its limited scale constrained broader impact on . By the late Mandate years, these dynamics—agricultural expansion juxtaposed with land disputes and political unrest—positioned Tulkarm amid escalating communal frictions leading into the 1947–1948 conflict.

1948 War and Jordanian Annexation

During the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, the Tulkarm Subdistrict of Mandatory Palestine saw significant territorial division along military front lines. Israeli forces captured western villages within the subdistrict, including Qaqun on June 4–5, 1948, by the Alexandroni Brigade, and al-Manshiyya around April 15, 1948, resulting in the expulsion or flight of their Palestinian inhabitants eastward. The city of Tulkarm itself remained under control of Jordanian Arab Legion and Iraqi troops, serving as a defensive position near the front but escaping major direct assaults. This conflict led to a substantial influx of Palestinian refugees into Tulkarm from adjacent areas seized by Israeli forces, markedly altering the city's demographics and straining its resources. The Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement, signed on April 3, 1949, as part of the , delineated the Green Line that positioned Tulkarm directly along the border, with Israel incorporating much of the 's fertile western lands previously used for by Tulkarm residents. Jordan thereby assumed control over Tulkarm and the eastern remnants of the subdistrict immediately following the war's end in early 1949, administering the area amid ongoing refugee settlement and economic disruption from lost territories. On April 24, 1950, formally annexed the , encompassing the districts of , , Tulkarm, , , and , thereby unifying them politically with the East Bank under the Hashemite Kingdom and extending Jordanian citizenship to West Bank Palestinians, including Tulkarm's population. This act, decided upon by King Abdullah I as early as December 1948, faced widespread international rejection as illegal, receiving formal recognition only from Britain and . Under Jordanian rule, Tulkarm functioned as a center, though its proximity to the line imposed restrictions on movement and development.

Israeli Control (1967–1990s)

Israeli forces completed the capture of Tulkarm on June 7, 1967, as part of operations on the front during the , securing control over the city and surrounding areas previously administered by . The occupation integrated Tulkarm into Israel's broader military administration of the , where a oversaw security, civil services, and resource allocation under the framework of belligerent occupation. This structure maintained Jordanian legal codes where applicable but subordinated them to Israeli military orders, facilitating direct oversight of local municipalities and infrastructure. In November 1981, Israel issued orders establishing the Civil Administration to manage non-military civilian functions across the , including , , and local , marking a shift from pure military rule; implementation in areas like Tulkarm followed in 1982, with Israeli officials coordinating alongside appointed Palestinian mayors and councils. Under this administration, Tulkarm experienced urban expansion and infrastructure improvements, such as road networks linking to , though subject to military permits and security restrictions. Economic ties deepened as residents gained access to Israeli labor markets, with many commuting daily for work in and , boosting household incomes and flows in the initial decades. Settlement activity emerged nearby, with outposts and industrial zones like those associated with Tulkarm factories established in the late and on expropriated lands, often justified for security or economic purposes, altering local land use patterns. Specific developments included the Avnei Hefetz settlement south of Tulkarm, founded in the early , which expanded amid government support for Jewish habitation in the region. These projects involved land seizures, reported by Palestinian sources to displace farming communities, though Israeli policy emphasized buffer zones near the Green Line. Tensions escalated with the outbreak of the in December 1987, as Tulkarm became a site of protests, stone-throwing clashes, and commercial strikes against the occupation, prompting Israeli responses including curfews, arrests, and troop deployments across the . By the early 1990s, sustained unrest and international pressure contributed to negotiations, culminating in the 1993 , which initiated phased withdrawals and transferred partial civil authority in Tulkarm to the emerging Palestinian Authority framework by 1995.

Palestinian Authority Era and Intifadas

Following the of 1993, Tulkarm was transferred to Palestinian Authority (PA) control in 1995 as part of Area A under the Interim Agreement, granting the PA responsibility for civil administration and internal security in the city and surrounding areas. This shift enabled initial economic stabilization and modest urban expansion, including infrastructure improvements, though constrained by ongoing Israeli security oversight and checkpoints. The PA established local governance structures, with Tulkarm serving as the capital of its namesake , but enforcement of law and order remained inconsistent due to factional rivalries and limited resources. The Second , which began in September 2000 amid the collapse of peace talks, saw Tulkarm emerge as a hub for militant activities orchestrated by groups such as and operatives within PA-controlled territories. Refugee camps like Tulkarm Camp and Nur Shams, densely populated with over 20,000 residents combined, harbored cells that facilitated smuggling of weapons and planning of attacks, including shootings and attempted infiltrations into . PA security forces, intended to coordinate with under , proved ineffective in curbing these networks, with some reports indicating tacit tolerance or direct involvement by elements linked to Fatah's militia. Israeli responses included in 2002 and subsequent raids, involving thousands of arrests and targeted operations to dismantle terror infrastructures, which severely disrupted camp life through curfews, home demolitions of militants' residences, and infrastructure damage. These actions followed a surge in attacks originating from the Tulkarm area, contributing to over 1,000 Israeli deaths nationwide during the , though specific attributions from Tulkarm vary by source. The period ended with Israel's 2005 disengagement from Gaza and partial West Bank barrier construction, which isolated Tulkarm further, reducing infiltrations but exacerbating local economic isolation under continued PA rule.

Geography

Location and Borders

Tulkarm lies in the northwestern , at approximately 32°19′N 35°02′E, serving as the administrative capital of the . The city occupies a strategic position near the Green Line, the 1949 Armistice Line demarcating the boundary with to the west. The western edge of Tulkarm directly adjoins Israeli-controlled territory, positioning it about 12 km from the and facilitating historical trade links across the border. To the east, it connects to other Palestinian localities within the , including villages such as Anabta and Deir al-Ghusun to the northeast. Northward, the area interfaces with the , while southward it approaches Governorate, enclosing a compact urban zone amid agricultural plains. The , encompassing the city, spans 268 square kilometers and borders Israeli districts including the Menashe Regional Council to the northwest and HaSharon to the southwest, underscoring its frontline status along the separation line. This proximity has shaped access dynamics, with checkpoints regulating movement across the Green Line since the .

and Environment

Tulkarm occupies a position in the northwestern at an average of approximately 120 meters above , with terrain varying from 50 to 150 meters in the immediate vicinity. The local consists of smooth to gently sloping plains, forming part of the transitional zone between the Samarian hills to the east and the coastal lowlands extending from the roughly 10 kilometers westward. This relatively flat landscape facilitates agricultural activity and urban expansion, though it is interspersed with low undulations and channels that drain toward the sea. The environment features fertile alluvial and soils derived from surrounding formations, which are well-suited for crop cultivation including olives, fruits, and . is predominantly Mediterranean scrub and agricultural fields, with limited natural woodland due to historical pressures. rely heavily on the shallow coastal , providing as the sole supply for domestic and needs, though extraction exceeds recharge rates, leading to declining water tables. Environmental stressors include salinization from over- and potential contamination of by nitrates from fertilizers, concentrated in areas of adjacent to urban zones.

Climate

Weather Patterns

Tulkarm exhibits a Mediterranean climate with distinct seasonal weather patterns, featuring prolonged hot and arid summers from May to September, followed by mild and wet winters from November to March, and transitional shoulder seasons. During summer, daytime highs typically range from 28°C to 32°C (82°F to 90°F), with low humidity and negligible precipitation, often less than 2 mm per month in July and August, fostering clear skies and minimal cloud cover. Nighttime lows hover around 18°C to 20°C (64°F to 68°F), contributing to muggy conditions due to occasional coastal influences despite the inland location. Winters bring cooler temperatures, with average highs of 15°C to 18°C (59°F to 64°F) and lows of 7°C to 9°C (45°F to 48°F) in January, accompanied by the bulk of annual rainfall, concentrated in short, intense events that can lead to localized flooding. The rainy season generally commences in October and extends through April, with over 80% of the approximately 500-600 mm annual precipitation occurring then, though variability is high, as evidenced by Tulkarm recording 866.7 mm in the 2023-2024 season, 144% above the long-term mean. Extreme weather events punctuate these patterns, including summer exceeding 35°C (95°F) and winter snaps dipping below 5°C (41°F), alongside occasional storms with or strong winds during peaks. Spring (March-May) and autumn (September-October) serve as mild transitions, with increasing or decreasing rainfall, respectively, and s bridging summer and winter norms. Historical data indicate low interannual variability in but significant fluctuations in , influenced by broader Mediterranean teleconnection patterns, which can amplify risks in dry years or excessive runoff in wet ones.
MonthAvg. High (°C)Avg. Low (°C)Avg. (mm)
January178130-150
February17-188-9100-120
March19-201070-90
April22-231230-40
May26-271510-15
June28-2917-18<5
July30192
August31-3220<1
September29185-10
October261525-30
November221260-80
December189120-140
Data compiled from long-term averages; annual totals approximate 500-600 mm.

Environmental Challenges

Tulkarm district experiences acute , with annual consumption historically around 22.2 million cubic meters in 1994, predominantly for (16.62 MCM), while supply from municipal wells remained limited at approximately 4 million cubic meters across Tulkarm and nearby Qalqiliya in 1995. Projections indicated demand could reach 91.14 MCM by 2020, straining shared aquifers amid restrictions on Palestinian extraction. Farmers increasingly depend on costly tankered , undermining agricultural viability in this fertile plain. Groundwater quality is compromised by nitrates and chlorides from fertilizers, pesticides, and infiltration, with electrical conductivity levels averaging 646 µS/cm in Tulkarm samples from 1995, signaling risks. Assessments confirm elevated concentrations in area wells, often exceeding safe thresholds due to overpumping and untreated domestic wastewater from cesspits used by 70% of households. Industrial effluents, including from stone-cutting (5,805 m³/year), are frequently discharged into wadis or cesspits, further contaminating aquifers. Sewage management failures exacerbate , as only 30% of structures connect to sewer networks, leading to untreated discharge into valleys that recharge . Solid generation reached 175 tons daily in the mid-1990s, with uncontrolled dumping at over 20 sites leaching contaminants into and despite 87% collection coverage. Nearby Israeli settlements contribute nitrates and fecal matter via overflows, as documented in municipal and university analyses, compounding health risks like respiratory diseases and infections. Soil degradation arises from wastewater irrigation, pesticide overuse (58.8 tons in 1993/94), and urban expansion on rendzina soils, reducing fertility in agricultural lands vital to economy. These challenges persist amid broader patterns of raw sewage infiltration, hindering sustainable resource use.

Demographics

The population of Tulkarm city grew modestly during the British Mandate era, from 3,349 inhabitants in the 1922 census to 4,827 in 1931 and 8,090 in 1945, reflecting agricultural expansion and rural-to-urban migration. This early growth occurred amid a predominantly Muslim population with small Christian and other minorities, supported by the region's orange export economy. Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and Jordanian administration, the influx of contributed to further increases, with the city reaching approximately 9,000-10,000 by according to Israeli estimates. Under Israeli control from to the , natural increase dominated trends, with high fertility rates (averaging 6-7 children per woman in the during this period) driving expansion despite limited opportunities. By the late , (PCBS) data indicated a population of around 39,000-43,000, incorporating urban development and adjacency.
YearPopulation (Tulkarm City)Source
1997~39,058PCBS via urban study
200751,300PCBS census
201764,532PCBS census
202371,161PCBS estimates
Recent decades show an average annual growth rate of about 2.3-2.4% for the city, from 60,647 in to 71,161 in 2023, fueled by persistent high birth rates (around 3.5 children per woman in the ) offset partially by economic emigration to or abroad. The adjacent Tulkarm , with 27,631 registered residents as of 2023, adds density but is tracked separately by , contributing to overall urban pressures without direct inclusion in city figures. Projections from PCBS anticipate continued moderate growth to 2026, tempered by barriers to labor mobility and constraints in the , which reached 195,341 mid-year estimate in 2020.

Ethnic and Religious Composition

The of Tulkarm is ethnically homogeneous, consisting almost exclusively of Palestinian Arabs, reflecting the broader of cities under Palestinian Authority control where non-Arab minorities are absent due to historical displacements and lack of settlement. Religiously, residents are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslims, with represented by a negligible remnant community that has dwindled through emigration amid socioeconomic pressures and regional conflicts. The 2017 Palestinian census recorded just 46 Christians in the entire Tulkarm Governorate (encompassing the city and surrounding areas), out of a total of 183,001, indicating a Christian proportion of approximately 0.025%. This marks a sharp decline from earlier decades; prior to the 1967 , small Christian enclaves existed in Tulkarm, but subsequent outflows—driven by factors including economic hardship, security instability, and perceived discrimination under Palestinian governance—have reduced their presence to insignificance. A of Saint George remains as a historical artifact, though active congregants are few. No other religious groups, such as or , maintain a resident community in the city, consistent with the post-1948 demographic shifts in the region.

Refugee Camps and Displacement

Nur Shams refugee camp, established in 1952 by the , houses primarily displaced during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War from areas in what is now . Located approximately 3 kilometers east of Tulkarm city in the northwestern [West Bank](/page/West Bank), the camp spans 0.21 square kilometers and had an estimated population of 13,739 registered refugees as of 2023, yielding a density of about 65,424 persons per square kilometer. Tulkarm refugee camp, a smaller adjacent facility established around the same period, covers 0.18 square kilometers north of the city center and historically accommodated several thousand residents, many also 1948 refugees or their descendants. These camps have long served as densely populated urban enclaves with limited , where residents face chronic , , and restricted access to services due to their status under international definitions maintained by . provides essential services including education for around 4,793 school-aged children in Nur Shams alone, health clinics, and psychosocial support, though funding constraints and operational restrictions have periodically hampered delivery. Prior to 2025 escalations, the camps' populations reflected multi-generational displacement, with limited economic opportunities tied to nearby agricultural labor in Tulkarm's fertile plains. Beginning in January 2025, Israeli military operations in the northern , including "Operation Iron Wall," resulted in widespread destruction and from Tulkarm and Nur Shams camps, affecting over 40,000 Palestinians across the region by early February. Assessments documented the demolition or severe damage of hundreds of structures in Nur Shams, including 89 fully destroyed homes and over 280 affected buildings by mid-2025, rendering the camps largely uninhabitable and displacing more than 90% of residents—equating to over 20,000 individuals from Tulkarm and Nur Shams combined. Military posts were established within the camps, with reports of bulldozing, arson, and barriers preventing returns, marking the largest such displacement in the since 1967. Displaced families have sought shelter in nearby areas or with relatives, exacerbating humanitarian needs amid restricted and school closures.

Economy

Agricultural Base

Agriculture forms the cornerstone of Tulkarm's economy, relying on the district's fertile alluvial soils along the northwestern plain for intensive cultivation. Fruit trees, predominantly olives and , dominate , covering 134,264 dunums of the 156,293 dunums under cultivation as of the 2004/2005 agricultural year, reflecting their role as perennial cash crops suited to the . Vegetables, including cucumbers, tomatoes, squash, and eggplants—key export-oriented produce—account for 10,302 dunums, while field crops like and occupy 11,727 dunums, supporting both local consumption and limited surplus. The sector's economic output reached approximately $52.4 million in 2004/2005, with fruit trees contributing $27.7 million, $22 million, and field crops $2.8 million, underscoring agriculture's outsized role in sustaining rural livelihoods. It provided 82.5% of income for 97.5% of farmers, employing 25.3% of the local workforce as of 2003 data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Olives, in particular, remain a staple, with Tulkarm's production contributing to the governorate's output of over 6,000 tonnes of in peak harvest years. Persistent constraints, including the Israeli separation barrier's isolation of farmland—resulting in an average 30% land access reduction and 68.8% income drop for affected farmers—have eroded by limiting labor mobility, equipment transport, and to Israeli buyers who absorb much of the vegetable surplus. shortages exacerbate these issues, as restricted permits for and access compel farmers to purchase expensive tankered water, hindering for high-value crops like cherry tomatoes and bell peppers. Despite such barriers, initiatives to shift toward export-focused persist, though output remains vulnerable to seasonal border closures and security-related disruptions.

Labor Market and Trade Barriers

The labor market in Tulkarm is predominantly agricultural, with a significant portion of the engaged in , , and vegetable cultivation, supplemented by remittances from cross-border employment in . Prior to October 2023, thousands of Tulkarm residents held Israeli-issued work permits for low-wage jobs in , , and services, facilitated by the city's proximity to the Green Line and crossings like Tayibeh and Eliyahu. These opportunities were critical, as local industry remains underdeveloped, and the unemployment rate in was recorded at 20.5% in 2022 amid broader challenges. Following the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, suspended or revoked permits for approximately 120,000 Palestinian workers from the , including many from northern areas like Tulkarm, leading to a sharp contraction in labor mobility and household incomes. This policy, justified by Israeli authorities on security grounds amid rising militant activity in Tulkarm, contributed to West Bank-wide surging to 32% by mid-2024, with Tulkarm's rate likely elevated due to its dependence on Israel-bound labor flows. data, while official, reflects systemic constraints but may understate informal sector vulnerabilities exacerbated by permit revocations. Trade barriers in Tulkarm arise primarily from Israeli-controlled borders, checkpoints, and the , which impose delays, inspections, and costs on agricultural exports central to the local . Goods must undergo back-to-back transfers at crossings, where Israeli customs enforce standards, tariffs, and quotas under the Oslo-era Paris Protocol's framework, often resulting in spoilage for perishable items like fruits and vegetables. These restrictions, linked to security protocols amid documented terrorist threats from the area, have historically reduced Palestinian export volumes by increasing logistics expenses and limiting beyond . Access to farmland isolated by the barrier further hampers production, with farmers facing permit requirements and risks of or interference.

Post-Conflict Economic Impacts

Israeli military operations in Tulkarm, particularly Operation Iron Wall launched on January 21, 2025, have inflicted substantial damage on local and livelihoods, exacerbating economic vulnerabilities in the . These campaigns, targeting groups in refugee camps such as Nur Shams and Tulkarm camp, resulted in the partial or complete destruction of approximately 2,000 homes and nearly 250 commercial establishments by May 2025. Over 691 businesses across Tulkarm were destroyed, damaged, or forced to shut down, contributing to widespread displacement of around 20,000 residents from the camps. Such destruction has led to daily economic losses estimated at 10-15 million shekels (approximately $2.7-4.1 million), with business revenues declining by 60-80% due to checkpoint closures and restricted access. Agriculture, a cornerstone of Tulkarm's economy reliant on olive, citrus, and vegetable production, has faced severe disruptions from bulldozing, land leveling, and access restrictions. Israeli forces issued orders to bulldoze around 200 dunums of farmland near Tulkarm in September 2025, while ongoing operations and 849 movement obstacles, including 288 road gates, have isolated markets and prevented farmers from reaching their lands. Northern West Bank operations, including in Tulkarm, have damaged irrigation systems and greenhouses, with broader estimates indicating thousands of dunams of farmland affected, leading to reduced harvests and export capabilities to Israel. Labor market conditions deteriorated further post-operations, with approximately 12,000 workers losing jobs since January 2025 amid the revocation of work permits to following October 2023 escalations. in Tulkarm surged from 15% pre-October 2023 to over 32% by early 2025, compounded by daily losses of 191,000 working hours due to movement curbs. Trade barriers intensified, severing commercial routes and contributing to broader economic contraction, though Tulkarm-specific GDP data remains limited amid ongoing instability. Reconstruction efforts have been hampered by persistent restrictions and limited funding, with the Palestinian Authority providing temporary housing but facing challenges in rebuilding 396 homes destroyed in Tulkarm camps alone. International aid from and others is constrained by Israeli oversight, delaying recovery of water, electricity, and road networks essential for economic resumption. These factors perpetuate a , with Tulkarm's proximity to the Green Line offering potential for cross-border trade but undermined by security measures.

Governance and Administration

Local Government Structure

The Tulkarm Municipality functions as the principal local government entity for the city, classified as a Category A municipality—the highest tier—serving a population exceeding 50,000 residents and encompassing responsibilities for urban services such as sanitation, infrastructure development, public lighting, and spatial planning. This structure aligns with the Palestinian Local Authorities Law No. 1 of 1997, which delineates 27 specific domains of municipal authority, including water distribution, waste collection, and market regulation, while subordinating operations to oversight by the Palestinian Ministry of Local Government. At its core, the municipality is directed by a municipal council composed of 13 to 21 members for Category A entities, determined by thresholds and elected through in local polls. The council formulates policies, approves budgets, and elects the from its ranks to execute decisions and represent the locality. Internal organization typically features specialized units for administration, , (covering and maintenance), , and social affairs, with directors appointed by the council to handle day-to-day implementation. Local elections, mandated every four years under the 1997 law, have not occurred comprehensively since partial 2012 and 2017 votes in the , with terms extended by presidential decree amid political divisions between and , leading to de facto continuity of existing councils and potential erosion of electoral accountability. Dr. Riad Awad currently serves as , managing municipal affairs including coordination for projects like electricity infrastructure amid regional constraints. The governorate-level administration, headed by a PA-appointed such as Major General Abdallah Kamel since January 2025, provides supplementary coordination but defers core urban governance to the municipality.

Palestinian Authority Oversight

The , encompassing the city of Tulkarm and surrounding areas classified primarily as Area A under the , falls under the administrative jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority (PA), which appoints a to manage civil affairs, public services, and local governance. The coordinates with PA ministries on issues such as education, health, and infrastructure, while navigating constraints from security coordination protocols with , which limit PA operational autonomy in practice. Major General Abdullah Kamil, born in 1967 in Qabatiya near , serves as the current , having been appointed in January 2025. In this role, Kamil has focused on sustaining essential services, including convening meetings with educational stakeholders on October 14, 2025, to emphasize school maintenance amid disruptions, and hosting the PA Minister of Awqaf and Religious Affairs on July 20, 2025, to address religious site administration. However, PA oversight remains challenged by the proliferation of armed factions, which have eroded central authority; Kamil has publicly asserted that PA forces were capable of neutralizing local militant groups but were restricted by Israeli prohibitions on such actions. Efforts to reassert control include PA security operations launched in December 2024 targeting terrorist networks in Tulkarm, part of a broader campaign in coordination with or despite Israeli presence, aimed at curbing violence from groups like those affiliated with or independent brigades. These initiatives reflect ongoing tensions, as militant entrenchment in refugee camps such as Nur Shams has fragmented governance, with reports indicating PA security breakdown risks extending beyond Tulkarm. Israeli military incursions, intensified since October 2023, further strain PA administration, displacing thousands and overwhelming local capacities; by July 2025, Kamil reported over 200 structures destroyed in Tulkarm camps, prompting PA appeals for shelter and aid, though critics note limited on-ground PA support for affected residents. On February 28, 2025, Kamil described these operations as a "crushing calamity," urging halts to aggression while highlighting the PA's role in mitigating humanitarian fallout through temporary housing and international coordination. Despite formal structures, effective oversight hinges on balancing internal dissent, external pressures, and constrained security mandates, resulting in a governance model more nominal than absolute in high-conflict zones like Tulkarm.

Coordination with Israel

The Palestinian Authority (PA) in Tulkarm participates in security coordination with , a framework established under the involving intelligence sharing, joint operations against militants targeting , and PA arrests of suspects to maintain stability in the . This coordination persisted into recent years despite political tensions, with PA forces occasionally confronting local armed groups to demonstrate cooperation. However, such efforts have eroded PA legitimacy among Palestinians, who view them as collaboration amid rising militant activity in Tulkarm's refugee camps. In Tulkarm specifically, coordination has faced significant challenges due to the resurgence of militias, with the PA struggling to assert control. Tulkarm Governor Maj. Gen. Abdallah Kmeil stated in March 2025 that PA forces were capable of containing armed groups but were prevented by , claiming Israeli officials informed him that even full PA arrests would not stop IDF entries. Kmeil accused of deliberately maintaining a weak PA, asserting that economic desperation drives into militias offering payments like 10,000 shekels for attacks. This reflects broader dynamics where conducts independent operations, such as Operation Iron Wall launched in January 2025, which displaced approximately 25,000 residents from Tulkarm's camps amid infrastructure destruction. Economic coordination centers on labor movement, with issuing work permits allowing Tulkarm residents to cross into via checkpoints like Taybeh, facilitating up to 15,000 daily commuters prior to escalations. Following the October 7, 2023, attack, suspended or revoked most permits, resulting in about 12,000 Tulkarm workers losing jobs by early 2025 due to intensified measures and military campaigns. These restrictions, managed unilaterally by with limited PA input, underscore the asymmetry in coordination, where Palestinian economic access depends on Israeli approvals amid ongoing controls.

Security and Conflicts

Emergence of Militant Activity

Militant activity in Tulkarm emerged prominently during the Second Intifada (2000–2005), when the city's refugee camps, particularly Tulkarm Camp and Nur Shams Camp, served as organizational hubs for Palestinian factions including Fatah's , , and (PIJ). These camps, established in 1950 to house refugees displaced during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, experienced severe impacts from Israeli military incursions aimed at disrupting attack planning, including raids, arrests, and curfews that targeted militants launching shootings and bombings into nearby Israeli communities in the Sharon region. The dense population and socioeconomic challenges in these camps, with at over 153,000 refugees per square kilometer in Tulkarm Camp, facilitated and operations, contributing to Tulkarm's role in cross-border violence during this period. Following the Second Intifada, Israeli operations such as those in 2002 temporarily reduced militant infrastructure in Tulkarm, leading to a relative decline in activity until around 2007. A resurgence began in the early 2020s, driven by Gaza-based groups like and PIJ extending influence through funding, training, and ideological incitement, which encouraged local cells to form. By 2023, the Tulkarm Brigade emerged as a coalition of fighters from multiple factions, announcing "swift response" units in response to Israeli actions and conducting attacks such as shootings and ambushes against IDF forces and civilians. This recent escalation, particularly post-October 7, 2023, saw Tulkarm's camps renew recruitment, with Iranian-backed networks providing resources to sustain operations amid weak Palestinian Authority enforcement. Specific incidents included the June 2024 murder of Israeli civilian Amnon Mukhtar by Nur Shams-based terrorists, highlighting the camps' role in targeting border areas. Factors enabling emergence include chronic , youth via martyrdom glorification, and the camps' strategic proximity to , approximately 15 kilometers from major population centers, allowing rapid attacks.

Terrorist Incidents and Threats to Israel

Tulkarm has served as a base for Palestinian militant groups, including Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas, which have planned and executed attacks targeting Israeli civilians and security forces. During the Second Intifada (2000–2005), the area was a frequent origin point for suicide bombers and other assailants infiltrating Israel, with Israeli security forces arresting multiple individuals en route to such operations, including a female bomber in Tulkarm on April 11, 2002. These activities contributed to heightened Israeli military presence and operations in the region to disrupt terror networks. In recent years, Tulkarm's Nur Shams refugee camp and surrounding areas have become hotspots for Iran-backed militant recruitment and plotting, with PIJ establishing a local focused on anti-Israel operations. On , 2024, Israeli forces eliminated operative Islam Odeh in Tulkarm, who was preparing a major bombing attack timed for the anniversary, with bomb-making materials discovered at his hideout. Similarly, on December 19, 2024, the IDF conducted a drone strike killing a PIJ network leader in Tulkarm who had recruited dozens of operatives, armed and funded by and affiliates, to carry out attacks against . Explosive attacks against Israeli targets have persisted, exemplified by a September 11, 2025, roadside bomb in the Tulkarm area that wounded two IDF soldiers; PIJ claimed responsibility for the ambush on an armored vehicle. maintains a Tulkarm , which has been linked to planning civilian-targeted operations, though it publicly distanced itself from specific bus bombings in central in February 2025. These incidents underscore Tulkarm's role in cross-border threats, including attempted infiltrations and shootings, prompting ongoing Israeli counterterrorism measures to neutralize imminent dangers.

Israeli Counterterrorism Operations

Israeli counterterrorism operations in Tulkarm target militant networks of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which have used the city and its refugee camps as bases for attacks on Israeli civilians and security forces, including shootings and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). These efforts, conducted by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in coordination with Israel's security agency (Shin Bet) and special units like Yamam, intensified after the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led assault on Israel, which heightened West Bank militancy. Operations typically involve overnight raids for arrests, targeted eliminations based on real-time intelligence, and occasional airstrikes to neutralize armed threats, aiming to disrupt attack planning and weapons smuggling via tunnels toward Israel. A notable early operation occurred on November 14, 2023, when IDF forces engaged in a 15-hour raid in Tulkarm, killing several armed terrorists and seizing weapons during clashes in the city center. In August 2024, broader IDF campaigns extended to Tulkarm's refugee camps, focusing on dismantling Iranian-backed PIJ and infrastructures responsible for recent shootings; on August 29, troops eliminated PIJ commander Muhammed Jabber, who coordinated attacks from the area. Airstrikes have been employed against fortified positions: on October 5, 2024, an strike in Tulkarm killed 12 terrorists, including Hamas commander Zahi Yaser Abd al-Razeq Oufi, who led the local network and directed assaults on IDF troops. Three weeks later, on October 26, 2024, joint IDF-Shin Bet-Yamam forces eliminated operative Islam Oda in Tulkarm, thwarting his plot for a large-scale attack on . These actions reflect a pattern of preemptive measures against operatives with prior involvement in violence, such as Oufi's role in coordinating PIJ-Hamas joint cells. By September 2025, operations continued amid persistent threats; following an IED attack near Tulkarm on that lightly wounded two IDF soldiers—claimed by and PIJ—troops arrested dozens of suspects in raids across the city, uncovering explosive materials and militant hideouts. Such interventions have degraded local terrorist capabilities, with IDF reports indicating hundreds of arrests and dozens of eliminations in Tulkarm since 2023, though militants frequently regroup using civilian areas for cover. In December 2025, the IDF conducted a counterterrorism raid in Tulkarm city, uncovering three crude rockets in various stages of production, including one fitted with an explosive warhead. This discovery followed interrogations of two arrested suspects, Ahmad Abu Samara and Khalil Kharisheh, linked to prior attacks on IDF vehicles and explosive device preparations. This operation is part of broader IDF efforts to disrupt rocket production capabilities in the West Bank.

Clashes with Palestinian Forces

In the context of Israeli counterterrorism efforts, clashes in Tulkarm have primarily involved exchanges of fire between Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) troops and Palestinian militant groups, such as the Tulkarm Battalion of and local formations like the Katibat Tulkarm Brigades, during raids targeting weapon caches, explosive devices, and operatives planning attacks on . These engagements intensified after October 7, 2023, with militants often responding to IDF incursions by detonating improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or firing small arms and anti-tank weapons, leading to casualties on both sides. A notable early clash occurred on January 17, 2024, when IDF forces entered Tulkarm to arrest suspects linked to prior attacks, prompting militants to detonate several IEDs and engage in gunfire, resulting in the death of one Palestinian militant and injuries to Israeli soldiers. The operation disrupted militant networks but highlighted Tulkarm's role as a launch point for rocket fire toward . Similar dynamics played out on October 5, 2023, in Tulkarm , where IDF troops faced armed resistance during an incursion, killing one militant amid ongoing exchanges. By August 2024, clashes escalated during broader IDF operations in northern cities including Tulkarm, where troops reported "exchanges of fire" with militants hiding in civilian areas, such as a , leading to the elimination of five PIJ-affiliated fighters, including Tulkarm Battalion commander Mohamed Jaber. Militants from groups like and PIJ claimed these actions as resistance to occupation, while IDF statements emphasized targeting individuals involved in shootings and bombings against Israeli communities. Drone strikes supplemented ground clashes, as seen on , 2024, when an Israeli on Tulkarm camp—following militant gunfire—killed at least 18, mostly described by Palestinian health officials as civilians but by IDF as including operatives. Into 2025, clashes persisted amid sustained IDF presence, with a airstrike killing two fighters in Tulkarm after they fired on troops, and December 25, 2024, raids involving gunfire that resulted in eight Palestinian deaths, including militants using the area for IED production. These incidents reflect a pattern where Palestinian armed factions, often loosely tied to larger groups, initiate or escalate violence during IDF operations, contributing to over 170 Palestinian deaths in Tulkarm alone by late 2024, per UN data, though verification of militant versus civilian status varies by source. IDF operations have seized hundreds of weapons and neutralized explosive threats, reducing attack capabilities from the area.

Humanitarian and Civilian Effects

Israeli operations in Tulkarm, particularly targeting in the Nur Shams and Tulkarm s, have resulted in significant civilian displacement. In the initial phase of escalated operations in early 2025, over 40,000 were displaced from their homes across the northern , with Tulkarm experiencing the largest-scale evacuations since the 1967 occupation, including the forced departure of nearly 20 families near Tulkarm Camp in September 2025. Ongoing demolitions in the camps, resumed on 30 June 2025 in Tulkarm , have exacerbated , with structures razed to eliminate terror hideouts but impacting adjacent civilian residences. Civilian casualties have mounted amid these clashes, with OCHA documenting multiple Palestinian deaths and injuries in during raids, including children killed in crossfire or confrontations at camp entrances. Between October 2023 and September 2025, operations contributed to broader fatalities totaling nearly 1,000 , many in areas like Tulkarm where militants embed in densely populated civilian zones, complicating efforts to avoid collateral harm. destruction, such as 8.4 kilometers of and networks damaged in Tulkarm and Nur Shams camps by February 2025, has led to crises and health risks for residents, hindering recovery even after temporary pauses in fighting. Access to essential services remains disrupted, with schools adjacent to the camps closed indefinitely as of September 2025, forcing children into online learning hampered by lack of devices and connectivity. Under operations like 'Iron Wall,' thousands in Tulkarm camps have been barred from returning home, relying on limited aid amid restricted movement, though Palestinian militant use of civilian areas as bases has prolonged insecurity and delayed normalization. These effects stem from the interplay of entrenched terror networks and necessities, with UN reports highlighting acute vulnerabilities but often underemphasizing militant tactics that shield fighters among non-combatants.

Society and Culture

Education System

The education system in Tulkarm Governorate operates under the oversight of the Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher Education, following a that emphasizes basic, secondary, and vocational training. As of the 2024/2025 scholastic year, the governorate hosts 160 schools, comprising 142 government-run institutions, 6 facilities primarily serving the , and 12 private schools. Secondary schools number 67, with 65 under government supervision and 2 private, reflecting a focus on extending education to grades 10–12. Enrollment in (grades 1–9) stood at approximately 36,876 students in recent years, with consistent figures hovering around 39,000 prior to disruptions. Tulkarm maintains among the highest secondary completion rates in , exceeding national averages and correlating with low dropout rates under 1% in early basic stages. Literacy rates align with Palestine's overall low illiteracy of 2.8% among those aged 15 and above as of 2018, supported by compulsory . UNRWA schools in the Tulkarm camp enroll about 1,341 students across four facilities, though overcrowding poses ongoing challenges. Security operations by Israeli forces frequently disrupt schooling, leading to closures, remote learning shifts, and delays. In early 2025, 32 government s in Tulkarm adopted remote instruction amid military activities, with in-person classes resuming by April except in four affected sites. High school examinations in 2025 faced exceptional obstacles, including access restrictions, yet proceeded under Ministry coordination. By September 2025, all government s near Tulkarm and Nur Shams camps had reopened, though vulnerability to incursions persists. These interruptions exacerbate dropout risks in later grades and strain infrastructure, despite resilience in enrollment recovery.

Cultural Traditions

Tulkarm's cultural traditions are rooted in rural Palestinian practices, emphasizing agricultural rhythms, family rituals, and communal expressions adapted to the region's northern context. Women's traditional thobes (long dresses) in Tulkarm historically featured plain, dark fabrics with limited embroidery, reflecting practical attitudes toward time and resources in agrarian communities, unlike the more elaborate tatreez () patterns prevalent in southern areas like . This restraint in adornment extended to wedding attire, where customs prioritized familial continuity and village-specific motifs passed down through both maternal and paternal lines, fostering local identity amid Ottoman-era social structures. Culinary heritage highlights , a dish of roasted chicken layered with caramelized sumac onions and pine nuts served over taboon bread, which traces its origins to Tulkarm and nearby as a harvest-season staple utilizing local grains and poultry. Communal celebrations, including weddings and Eid observances, incorporate , the energetic accompanied by wind instruments and chants, symbolizing unity and resilience in Palestinian social life. These practices persist despite modern disruptions, maintaining ties to the area's fellah (peasant) ethos of soil-tied and oral histories.

Sports and Community Life

Markaz Shabab Tulkarem, a professional football club based in Tulkarm, competes in the West Bank Premier League, with recent standings reflecting participation in national competitions as of 2025. Thaqafi Tulkarem, another local club, fields teams in the Palestinian football leagues, focusing on regional matches and youth development. Football remains the dominant , supported by community clubs like the Tulkarm Sport Cultural Club, which organizes local events and training. Youth sports programs emphasize skill-building and international exposure, as seen in June 2025 when 14 under-14 players from Tulkarm embarked on a 46-day European tour, competing in tournaments across three countries while representing resilience amid local challenges like camp demolitions. Organizations such as Sports For Life deliver free training for ages 8-16 at community centers in Tulkarm, integrating sports with and social development goals. Facilities include the Tulkarm Sports Center, featuring a , Olympic-sized , fitness hall, and outdoor playgrounds, though youth centers' halls have been converted to shelters for displaced residents during escalations in 2025. Community life centers on these sports initiatives and volunteer efforts, with groups like the Palestine Red Crescent Society's Tulkarm branch providing emergency response and health services that intersect with local gatherings since its establishment in 1989. Economic and social activities, including support programs, foster resilience but are constrained by ongoing security issues, limiting broader cultural events.

Notable Individuals

Political and Military Figures

Abdallah Kamil, a Major General in the Palestinian National Security Forces, was appointed governor of Tulkarm in January 2025. Born in 1967 in Qabatiya near Jenin, Kamil has publicly asserted his ability to address local armed groups but claimed Israeli restrictions prevented effective action, including during the IDF's Operation Iron Wall in early 2025. His predecessor, , served as Tulkarm governor from March 2024 until his transfer to in January 2025. Al-Dirawi, also holding the rank of , oversaw the governorate amid heightened militant activity and Israeli operations targeting in Tulkarm refugee camps. On the militant side, Ashraf Nafeh, a in Hamas's Tulkarm , was eliminated in an Israeli drone strike on July 23, 2024, alongside an operative; Nafeh was wanted for involvement in attacks against Israeli targets. Mohammed Jaber, known as "Abu Shujaa," led (PIJ) operations in Nur Shams refugee camp within and was described as the West Bank's most wanted militant for orchestrating shootings and explosive attacks on IDF forces; he was killed in an Israeli operation on August 29, 2024. In October 2024, conducted an airstrike in Tulkarm eliminating the commander overseeing the city's operations, part of a strike that killed at least 12 militants from and PIJ.

Cultural and Economic Contributors

Abd al-Karim al-Karmi, known by his pen name Abu Salma (1909–1980), was a leading Palestinian poet born in Tulkarm, whose works chronicled the Palestinian experience under Ottoman, British Mandate, and post-1948 conditions. His poetry, including collections like Sakhur Qura al-Wadi (Sparrows of the Valley, 1937) and Ughniyat al-Hijra wa-l-Watan (Songs of Migration and Homeland, 1956), emphasized themes of exile, resistance, and , earning him recognition as the "Poet of " and chairmanship of the Union of Palestinian Writers and Journalists. Al-Karmi practiced law in until 1948, later broadcasting for Arab stations before emigrating to the , where he continued writing until his death. Akram Al-Ashqar (born 1982), a filmmaker and educator from Tulkarm, has contributed to Palestinian cinema through documentaries addressing refugee life and identity. His debut short First Picture (2007) follows a child born in an Israeli prison to Palestinian parents from Tulkarm , exploring themes of displacement and separation amid checkpoints and conflict. Al-Ashqar, who has taught film and media at Palestine Technical University-Kadoorie for over a decade, blends personal narratives with visual storytelling to document realities, with screenings across Europe highlighting restricted mobility's impact on Palestinian creators. Prominent economic contributors from Tulkarm remain less documented in compared to cultural figures, with the city's historically tied to and trade families rather than standout individual entrepreneurs on a national scale. Local chambers note resilient traders and farmers adapting to barriers and market shifts, but no singular business leaders from Tulkarm have achieved widespread recognition for economic or large-scale enterprise.

References

  1. https://www.mindat.org/loc-341819.html
  2. https://latitude.to/map/ps/palestine/cities/tulkarm
  3. https://elevation.city/ps/619l
  4. https://www.anera.org/stories/tulkarem-palestine-overcoming-challenges-economic-development/
  5. https://www.anera.org/stories/giving-palestinian-economy-boost-tulkarem-west-bank/
  6. https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/west-bank/tulkarm-camp
  7. https://nakbamemorymuseum.org/en/tulkarm/
  8. https://gopalestine.org/palestine-2/where-in-palestine/ramallah/
  9. https://www.palpolice.ps/en/content/347385.html
  10. https://arabicpost.net/%25D8%25AB%25D9%2582%25D8%25A7%25D9%2581%25D8%25A9/2023/11/29/%25D9%2585%25D8%25AF%25D9%258A%25D9%2586%25D8%25A9-%25D8%25B7%25D9%2588%25D9%2584%25D9%2583%25D8%25B1%25D9%2585/
  11. https://www.palqura.com/ar/city/9/%25D8%25B7%25D9%2588%25D9%2584%25D9%2583%25D8%25B1%25D9%2585
  12. https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/2014/11/19/%25D8%25B7%25D9%2588%25D9%2584%25D9%2583%25D8%25B1%25D9%2585
  13. https://refrainplayingisrael.wordpress.com/2013/04/28/tulkarm-or-tulkarem/
  14. https://www.reddit.com/r/etymology/comments/13en1v2/part_ii_the_roots_of_the_names_of_some_of_the/
  15. https://www.travelpalestine.ps/en/Site/157/The-Museum-of-Tulkarem
  16. https://www.travelpalestine.ps/en/Site/182/Khirbet-Irtah
  17. https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/78442
  18. https://escholarship.org/content/qt71w4303s/qt71w4303s.pdf
  19. https://fada.birzeit.edu/bitstream/20.500.11889/2520/1/5.6-%20Salem%20Thawaba.pdf
  20. https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/10.3366/hlps.2024.0327
  21. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-203632/
  22. https://www.zochrot.org/writable/userfiles/files/DOSSETT%2520FINAL%2520THESIS.pdf
  23. https://www.palquest.org/en/place/17114/qaqun
  24. https://www.palquest.org/en/place/16842/al-manshiyya-tulkarm
  25. https://www.britannica.com/place/Tulkarm
  26. https://www.britannica.com/place/West-Bank
  27. https://www.palquest.org/en/highlight/6586/palestinians-jordan-1948-1967
  28. https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jordanian-annexation-of-the-west-bank-april-1950
  29. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/six-day-war-timeline-1/six-day-war-timeline/
  30. https://www.arij.org/atlas40/chapter2.2.html
  31. https://brill.com/downloadpdf/book/edcoll/9789004422933/BP000019.pdf
  32. https://fada.birzeit.edu/bitstream/20.500.11889/2520/1/5.6-%2520Salem%2520Thawaba.pdf
  33. https://monthlyreview.org/articles/class-economy-and-the-second-intifada/
  34. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-205221/
  35. https://poica.org/2016/10/avnei-hefetz-colonists-to-open-new-road-at-the-expense-of-tulkarm-lands/
  36. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2018/6/4/the-naksa-how-israel-occupied-the-whole-of-palestine-in-1967
  37. https://www.britannica.com/place/Palestine/The-first-intifada
  38. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/timeline-israeli-palestinian-peace-process-1993-oslo-accord/
  39. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235683038_Urban_Growth_of_a_City_Under_Siege_Tulkarm_Palestine_Over_the_Past_Century
  40. https://idsf.org.il/en/papers/tulkarm-terrorism-capital/
  41. https://www.gov.il/en/pages/iranian-activities-in-support-of-the-palestinian-intifada
  42. https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/tulkarm_refugee_camp.pdf
  43. https://mapcarta.com/Tulkarm
  44. https://www.palestineremembered.com/TulkarmTownsSnapshot.html
  45. https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/statisticsIndicatorsTables.aspx?lang=en&table_id=697
  46. https://profilesolar.com/locations/Palestine/Tulkarm/
  47. https://www.arij.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/1996-5_Environmantal_Profiles_for_the_West_Bank_Volume_8_Tulkarem_District.pdf
  48. https://www.scienpress.com/upload/geo/vol%25202_1_1.pdf
  49. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/276291411_Protecting_the_Groundwater_Environment_of_Tulkarem_City_of_Palestine_from_Industrial_and_Domestic_Pollution
  50. https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Press_En_WorldMeteorologicalDay2024E.pdf
  51. https://weatherspark.com/y/98930/Average-Weather-in-%25C5%25A2%25C5%25ABlkarm-Palestinian-Territories-Year-Round
  52. https://www.weather-atlas.com/en/west-bank/tulkarm-climate
  53. https://www.timeanddate.com/weather/palestine/tulkarm/climate
  54. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320881330_Groundwater_Pollution_Assessment_In_Tulkarem_Area_Palestine
  55. https://www.newarab.com/features/israeli-settlers-contaminate-west-bank-their-waste
  56. https://ejatlas.org/print/israeli-industries-polluting-palestinian-city-of-tulkarm
  57. https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4441/14/21/3417
  58. https://www.citypopulation.de/en/palestine/westbank/tulkarm/100645__tulkarm/
  59. https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/tulkarm_camp_profile_-_2023.pdf
  60. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/05173653
  61. https://database.ours.foundation/DP6MZQ5/
  62. https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Downloads/book2532.pdf
  63. https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/west-bank/nur-shams-camp
  64. https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/nur_shams_camp_profile_-2023.pdf
  65. https://www.972mag.com/nur-shams-tulkarem-army-destruction/
  66. https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/large-scale-forced-displacement-west-bank-impacts-40000-people
  67. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2025/10/15/israeli-arson-bulldozers-and-forced-labour-in-the-west-banks-tulkarem
  68. https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-308-west-bank
  69. https://www.newarab.com/news/israel-displaces-over-90-tulkarem-nur-shams-camp-residents
  70. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/northern-west-bank-humanitarian-response-update-21-january-30-april-2025/
  71. https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/largest-forced-displacement-west-bank-1967-oxfam
  72. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/06/israels-destructive-west-bank-military-operation-fuels-mass-forced-displacement-of-palestinians/
  73. https://library.palestineeconomy.ps/public/files/server/20142511171605-1.pdf
  74. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/14/infographic-palestines-olive-industry
  75. https://gisha.org/en/back-to-work/
  76. https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/82805
  77. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/middle-east-crisis/article/2025/10/24/the-tragedy-of-palestinian-construction-workers-banned-from-israel_6746729_368.html
  78. https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/post.aspx?lang=en&ItemID=5980
  79. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/gdsapp2014d1_en.pdf
  80. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/960071513228856631/pdf/ACS22471-REVISED-Palestine-Trade-Note-Web.pdf
  81. https://www.ochaopt.org/content/increased-restrictions-access-agricultural-land-behind-barrier
  82. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2025/05/01/west-bank-tulkarm-reels-israels-new-military-campaign
  83. https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/161320
  84. https://mas.ps/cached_uploads/download/2025/05/07/special-bulletin-18-eng-1746604832.pdf
  85. https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/municipalities/
  86. https://www.apla.ps/en
  87. https://www.sng-wofi.org/country_profiles/palestinian_authority.html
  88. https://ymerdigital.com/uploads/YMER220369.pdf
  89. https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/2024-09/local-councils-electoral-reform-in-palestine.pdf
  90. https://www.petl.ps/en/Category/39/The-Prime-Minister-inaugurates-the-Tulkarm-power-reduction-station-to-solve-the-electricity-crisis
  91. https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/abdallah_kamil/
  92. https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/israel-west-bank-and-gaza/west-bank-and-gaza
  93. https://yaffaps.com/en/page-52528.html
  94. https://yaffaps.com/en/page-34424.html
  95. https://www.timesofisrael.com/governor-of-tulkarem-i-could-have-tackled-the-armed-groups-here-israel-wouldnt-let-me/
  96. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/12/14/residents-must-live-in-peace-palestinian-authority-launches-counterterrorism-operation-in-west-bank/
  97. https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-811642
  98. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ghost-camp-israeli-operations-west-bank-push-wave-palestinians-their-homes-2025-07-09/
  99. https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/155116
  100. https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/154529
  101. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/12/13/the-palestinian-authority-s-conflicted-security-relationship-with-israel-in-the-west-bank_6337789_4.html
  102. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/israelpalestine/israels-west-bank-incursions
  103. https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2018/commuting-through-israeli-checkpoints/index.html
  104. https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-330-west-bank
  105. https://acleddata.com/report/resurgence-armed-groups-west-bank-and-their-connections-gaza
  106. https://www.newarab.com/news/tulkarm-brigade-will-join-lions-den-armed-resistance
  107. http://www.gov.il/en/pages/a-woman-terrorist-en-route-to-carry-out-a-suicide-attack-arrested-in-tulkarm-11-apr-2002
  108. https://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-forces-kill-hamas-operative-in-tulkarem-plotting-imminent-attack/
  109. https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-834216
  110. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/islamic-jihad-claims-responsibility-for-bomb-attack-on-armored-carrier-in-west-bank/
  111. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-09-11/ty-article/.premium/two-idf-soldiers-lightly-wounded-in-west-bank-explosion-hamas-islamic-jihad-take-credit/00000199-3924-d704-a9d9-fbafada00000
  112. https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-843230
  113. https://www.longwarjournal.org/westbankterrorgroups
  114. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/08/israeli-military-launches-extensive-operation-against-west-bank-terrorist-groups.php
  115. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/11/15/idf-battles-palestinian-terrorists-in-west-bank-city-of-tulkarm/
  116. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/08/29/israel-eliminates-palestinian-islamic-jihad-commander-in-tulkarem/
  117. https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-823138
  118. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-826173
  119. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/12/09/idf-locates-rockets-during-west-bank-raid-in-tulkarem/
  120. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/deadly-israeli-strike-west-bank-highlights-spread-war-2024-10-04/
  121. https://acleddata.com/brief/fact-sheet-israel-and-palestine-conflict-updated-31-october-2023
  122. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/18/israeli-west-bank-strikes-gaza-death-toll-palestine-war-hamas
  123. https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/154265
  124. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-205647/
  125. https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/aug/29/middle-east-crisis-live-israel-west-bank-gaza-tulkarm-mosqe-idf
  126. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/3/israeli-air-attack-on-west-banks-tulkarem-camp-kills-at-least-18-ministry
  127. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/27/israeli-air-strike-kills-two-hamas-fighters-in-the-occupied-west-bank
  128. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/25/israeli-forces-kill-at-least-8-in-occupied-west-bank-raids-drone-strikes
  129. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/ohchr-statement-04oct24/
  130. https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-322-west-bank
  131. https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/humanitarian-situation-update-301-west-bank-enhe
  132. https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-190-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem
  133. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/ocha-humanitarian-situation-update-266-west-bank/
  134. https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-189-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem
  135. https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20240910_ACAPS_Palestine_-_Humanitarian_impact_of_the_escalation_of_violence_01.pdf
  136. https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/Schools_en.html
  137. https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/Secondary_Schools_en.html
  138. https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/Basic_Students_en.html
  139. https://data.unicef.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/2022Palestine-Education-Fact-Sheet-2022FINAL.pdf
  140. https://pcbs.gov.ps/site/512/default.aspx?lang=en&ItemID=3543
  141. https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/northern-west-bank-humanitarian-response-update-21-january-30-april-2025
  142. https://una-oic.org/en/palestinians/2025/06/19/High-school-exams-in-Tulkarm-and-J/
  143. https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-333-west-bank
  144. https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/generation-risk-schooling-west-bank-under-threat
  145. https://www.bethlehem.edu/2020/02/27/know-your-palestinian-heritage-embriodery/
  146. https://palestineinadish.com/recipes/chicken-musakhan/
  147. https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/dabkeh-traditional-dance-in-palestine-01998
  148. https://www.palestineremembered.com/GeoPoints/Tulkarm_523/Article_2869.html
  149. https://www.flashscore.com/team/markaz-tulkarm/jaLMpEWt/standings/
  150. https://yellowpages.com.ps/en/companies/25950-tulkarm-sport-cultural-club
  151. https://www.thenationalnews.com/sport/football/2025/06/30/freedom-of-football-palestinian-teenagers-spread-their-wings-on-seven-week-european-tour/
  152. https://ps4l.org/community/1/en
  153. https://repository.najah.edu/items/124cd629-f1b8-4d15-bf6f-73ba21550d8a
  154. https://www.newarab.com/news/thousands-displaced-west-bank-turn-sports-halls-shelters
  155. https://www.palestinercs.org/en/Article/11248/Tulkarem-branch
  156. https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/mustafa-al-dirawi-governor-of-tulkarem/
  157. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_eds/2024/07/23/israeli-drone-strike-kills-wanted-west-bank-commanders/
  158. https://jamestown.org/brief/abu-shujaa-west-banks-most-wanted-militant-killed-in-israeli-operation/
  159. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1l4qy7q314o
  160. https://www.palquest.org/en/biography/9829/abd-al-karim-al-karmi-abu-salma
  161. https://www.all4palestine.org/ModelDetails.aspx?gid=7&mid=118956
  162. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1980/10/13/abdul-karim-karmi-73-dies-palestinian-poet-lived-in-md/5cf1dc08-ebc9-4e4e-82dc-b58278b87b06/
  163. https://www.gla.ac.uk/explore/sanctuary/events/biographies/
  164. https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1640126/
  165. https://www.thenational.scot/news/25101021.film-documenting-palestine-boy-born-israel-prison-tour-scotland/
  166. https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/109291
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.