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Edwin O. Reischauer
Edwin O. Reischauer
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Edwin Oldfather Reischauer (/ˈrʃ.ər/ RYSHE-ow-ər; October 15, 1910 – September 1, 1990) was an American diplomat, educator, and professor at Harvard University. Born in Tokyo to American educational missionaries, he became a leading scholar of the history and culture of Japan and East Asia. Together with George M. McCune, a scholar of Korea and several Korean linguists, in 1939 he developed the McCune–Reischauer romanization of the Korean language.

Key Information

Reischauer became involved in helping create US policy toward East Asia during and after World War II. President John F. Kennedy appointed Reischauer as the United States Ambassador to Japan, where he served from 1961 to 1966. Reischauer founded the Japan Institute at Harvard University in 1973 and was its founding director. It was later named in honor of him.

Early life and education

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Reischauer was born in Tokyo, Japan, the son of Helen Sidwell (Oldfather) and August Karl Reischauer, Presbyterian educational missionaries. His father helped found the Tokyo Woman's Christian University along with Nitobe Inazō and Yasui Tetsu. His mother founded the Japan Deaf Oral School, the first of its kind in Japan. He and his younger brother Robert attended the American School in Japan before going to the United States for college. Both did graduate work in Asian studies. Edwin graduated with a AB from Oberlin in 1931.[1] On his 75th birthday, Reischauer recalled publicly that his aim in life after graduating in 1931 was to draw American attention to Asia.[2]

Reischauer earned his PhD from Harvard University in 1939. He was a student of the Russian-French Japanologist Serge Elisséeff, who had been the first Western graduate of the University of Tokyo.[3] His doctoral dissertation was "Nittō guhō junrei gyōki: Ennin's Diary of His Travels in T'ang China, 838–847," a study and translation of the Japanese monk Ennin's travelogues on his journeys in China during the Tang dynasty.[4] Ennin's work, Record of a Pilgrimage to China in Search of the Law (入唐求法巡礼行記; Middle Chinese: Nyip-Dang gjuw-pjop zwin-léi hæng-kì), is written in Classical Chinese. Reischauer's work shows the high level of Sinological scholarship that a graduate student was expected to demonstrate.[3][5]

Wartime service

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By October 1940, Reischauer had become aware of the possibility of war with Japan. He wrote a memorandum for the U.S. Navy pointing out that very few Americans knew the kind of written Japanese that was used in military situations and hardly any could read Japanese that had been handwritten in a hurry. His solution was to create a Japanese language school to train linguists in advance. Reischauer's warning did not go unheeded. It landed on the desk of Lieutenant (later Commander) Albert Hindmarsh of the U.S. Navy, and he agreed that there were indeed few competent Japanese-speaking officers available. The result was the creation of the U.S. Navy Japanese Language School, which spent most of the war at Boulder, Colorado. In the summer of 1942, at the request of the U.S. Army Signal Corps, Reischauer started running a top-secret course at Arlington Hall in Virginia. Arlington Hall had been a women's college, but it was taken over by the US Army Signal Intelligence Service in June 1942 and functioned like Bletchley Park in England as a secret cryptanalysis centre.[6]

Teaching career

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Reischauer had a 40-year teaching career at Harvard. He and John King Fairbank developed a popular undergraduate survey of East Asian history and culture. The course, which was known as "Rice Paddies", was the basis for their widely influential textbooks, East Asia: The Great Tradition (1958) and East Asia: The Modern Transformation (1965). Reischauer wrote both for fellow scholars and for the general public, including Japan: Story of a Nation, which was published in several editions.

He served as director of the Harvard–Yenching Institute and chairman of the Department of Far Eastern Languages. For his farewell lecture at the Yenching Institute in 1981, students had to compete for seats with faculty colleagues, university officials, and a television crew from Japan.

In that crowded scene, he said, "As I remember, there were only two graduate students interested in East Asian studies when I first came here: myself and my brother."[7]

Ambassador to Japan

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Reischauer was appointed US Ambassador to Japan by President John F. Kennedy in the spring of 1961, at a time when US-Japan relations were at a low point following the massive 1960 protests in Japan against the US-Japan Security Treaty.[8] In the immediate aftermath of the protests, Reischauer had traveled to Japan and spoken with various Japanese friends and associates to get a Japanese point of view on the protests.[9] After returning to the United States, Reischauer attracted the attention of Kennedy's transition team when he wrote an article about the protests in the prominent policy journal Foreign Affairs called "The Broken Dialogue with Japan." In this article Reischauer rejected the notion, put forth by the Eisenhower administration, that the protests had been a communist plot. Instead, he argued that the protests reflected real grievances on the part of the Japanese in relation to US, and were exacerbated by a failure by American leaders to reach out to Japanese opinion leaders and try to understand Japanese concerns. Reischauer argued forcefully that only skillful and nuanced diplomacy could repair this "broken dialogue."[9]

On the advice of his advisors, Kennedy decided that Reischauer himself would be the best candidate for the job, and nominated Reischauer to be his first (and only) ambassador to Japan. This was a break with precedent, because previous ambassadors to Japan had been career State Department officials who had no special connection with Japan.[8] In fact, State Department officials viewed strong connections with an ambassador's host country with suspicion and opposed Reischauer's nomination on these grounds.[8] However, Kennedy prevailed and Reischauer became the first US ambassador to Japan who actually knew the local language.

As Ambassador, Reischauer worked to repair the recent rift in US-Japan relations. Reischauer made "equal partnership" the watchword of his time as ambassador, and constantly pushed for more equal treatment of Japan.[10] He advocated and helped arrange a summit meeting between Kennedy and new Japanese prime minister Hayato Ikeda in Washington, D.C. in the summer of 1961. Historian Nick Kapur has argued that this summit was a success, and led to a substantial realignment of the US-Japan alliance in the direction of greater mutuality.[11] Reischauer hoped to return the favor by having Kennedy become the first sitting US president to visit Japan. Kennedy was agreeable, and initial preparations were made, but Kennedy was assassinated before he could make the visit and Secretary of State Dean Rusk went in his place in early 1964.[12] Reischauer also embarked on a nationwide listening tour in Japan; although he did not reach his goal of visiting all 47 prefectures by the end of his time in office, he did manage to visit 39 of them.[13] Reischauer's great efforts to charm the Japanese people were jocularly nicknamed the "Reischauer Offensive" (Raishawā rosen) by the Japanese press (sometimes alternatively, the "Kennedy-Reischauer Offensive").[13]

Reischauer's time as ambassador was seen as a success, and he stayed in the role until 1966, continuing on under the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson. However, his time as ambassador ended on two notes of tragedy. Toward the end of his ambassadorship, Reischauer increasingly had to defend the US war in Vietnam, and increasingly felt uncomfortable doing so, ultimately leading to his resignation.[14] In addition, Reischauer was hospitalized in March 1964 after being stabbed by Shiotani Norikazu, a Japanese youth, in an apparent assassination attempt. Shiotani had a history of mental illness and had Ménière's disease, a disorder of the inner ear. He felt that he had not been properly treated by the American occupation and wished to draw attention to this cause by assassinating Reischauer. The attacker apparently acted alone and had no connection to any group. In the aftermath of the violence, Japan's Minister of Public Safety was compelled to resign.[15] Reischauer received a blood transfusion and recovered from his wound, but the transfusion he received in the hospital was tainted with hepatitis C virus, which would lead to a variety of ailments for Reischauer in future years, and ultimately contribute to his death 26 years later.[16][17]

Personal life

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Reischauer married (Elinor) Adrienne Danton in Tokyo on July 5, 1935. They had three children together. She died in 1955 of a heart ailment.[18] Author James A. Michener introduced the widower to Haru Matsukata at the Foreign Correspondents Club in Tokyo in 1955.[19] They married on January 16, 1956.[20] They learned that, as teenagers, they had attended the same Tokyo high school. Haru confessed to having had a secret crush on him. Together they became a formidable team.[21] They jointly designed their house in Belmont, Massachusetts. It is operated and used today as the Edwin O. Reischauer Memorial House.

Later life

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In 1973, Reischauer was the founding Director of the Japan Institute at Harvard University. It was renamed the Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies in his honor when he turned 75, in 1985.[22]

Reischauer was also honored in 1985 by the opening of the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), part of Johns Hopkins University. Speaking at the dedication ceremonies in Baltimore, Senator Jay Rockefeller, one of Reischauer's former students, described Reischauer as being "what a teacher is meant to be, one who can change the life of his students." At the same event, Japan's ambassador, Nabuo Matsunaga, read a personal message from Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone: "I know of no other man who has so thoroughly understood Japan."[2]

Illness and death

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For the last decade of his life, Reischauer was afflicted by a variety of ailments and illnesses related to the hepatitis infection he had contracted from tainted blood following the attempt on his life while serving as US Ambassador to Japan. As a result of these ailments, Reischauer had to withdraw from active teaching and lecturing. Finally, in 1990, Reischauer succumbed to complications of hepatitis C.[23]

Impact on US foreign policy

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Reischauer promoted US foreign policy both in public and in government on Japan and the rest of Asia after World War II and during the Vietnam War.

World War II and afterward

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On September 14, 1942, three years before the end of World War II, Reischauer, then an instructor in Far Eastern languages at Harvard University, wrote the "Memorandum on Policy towards Japan." It laid out a plan on how the US could attain its postwar objective of "winning the peace" in Asia.[24][25]

According to late 20th-century Japanese historian Takashi Fujitani, the memo revealed a "condescension toward Japanese people" and a "purely instrumentalist and manipulative stance."[26] In the abstract to his article, "The Reischauer Memo: Mr. Moto, Hirohito, and Japanese American Soldiers," Fujitani wrote:

Already at this early date in the war, Reischauer proposed retention of the Japanese emperor as head of a postwar “puppet regime” that would serve U.S. interests in East Asia. He also argued that Japanese Americans had until then been a “sheer liability” and that the United States could turn them into an “asset” by enlisting them in the U.S. military. He reasoned that Japanese American soldiers would be useful for propaganda purposes – that is, to demonstrate to the world and particularly the “yellow and brown peoples” that the United States was not a racist nation.[27]

Myth of saving Kyoto

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During the war, Reischauer served as a Japan expert for the US Army Intelligence Service. A myth developed after the war that he had prevented the US from a nuclear bombing of Kyoto.[28] Robert Jungk, in his memoir about the war and atomic scientists, claimed that Reischauer convinced his boss to persuade Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson not to bomb Kyoto, and to have it crossed off the black list of potential sites.[29]

Reischauer specifically denied that popular myth:

I probably would have done this if I had ever had the opportunity, but there is not a word of truth to it. As has been amply proved by my friend Otis Cary of Doshisha in Kyoto, the only person deserving credit for saving Kyoto from destruction is Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War at the time, who had known and admired Kyoto ever since his honeymoon there several decades earlier.[30]

US bases in Okinawa

[edit]

A secret memorandum, declassified in 1996, detailed a conversation among top US military and civilian officials on July 16, 1965, in Tokyo. Reischauer, then serving as the US Ambassador to Japan, proposed a plan to enable the US both to keep its military bases and to introduce nuclear weapons in Okinawa after the reversion of the US-occupied islands to Japanese sovereignty. Reischauer based his strategy on the symbolic political importance of reversion for Japan's conservative ruling party, but argued that the US did not have to "give Japan any real say in the use of our bases."[31]

He said that "if Japan would accept nuclear weapons on Japanese soil, including Okinawa, and if it would provide us with assurances guaranteeing our military commanders effective control of the islands in time of military crisis, then we would be able to keep our bases on the islands, even though 'full sovereignty' reverted to Japan."[31]

These "became key elements [of] the 1969 U.S.-Japan Okinawa Reversion Agreement," effectively making "U.S. military presence more or less permanent and maintaining the option to introduce nuclear weapons."[26] In a 1981 article, Time reported: "Former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer revealed that ...U.S. naval vessels carrying nuclear weapons have routinely visited Japanese ports—with Tokyo's tacit approval."[32]

The secret memo also revealed Reischauer's proposed countermeasures to quell "nationalistic reaction" to continuing US military presence in Okinawa. In his 2010 article, "'Secret' 1965 Memo Reveals Plans to Keep U.S. bases and Nuclear Weapons Options in Okinawa After Reversion," Steve Rabson, author and lecturer on Okinawan literature, history, and culture, wrote:

To reduce the risk of “disturbances” in Okinawa, Reischauer proposed an increase in U.S. aid, revision of the Price Act to increase compensation for owners of land the U.S. had seized for base construction, and a loosening of the ban on flying the Japanese flag. It is difficult to measure precisely his influence at the time, but all three of these recommendations became U.S. policy.[26]

Romanization of Korean

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With George M. McCune, Reischauer in 1939 published the McCune–Reischauer system for romanization of the Korean language, which became the most-widely used system for many years.[33]

Reischauer called Hangul, the Korean alphabet, "perhaps the most scientific system of writing in general use in any language."[34]

Honors

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Notable students

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Selected bibliography

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See also

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Citations

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  1. ^ "Edwin O. Reischauer". Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, Harvard University. Archived from the original on 2014-07-04. Retrieved July 17, 2014.
  2. ^ a b "Reischauer is Feted in Capital". The New York Times. October 16, 1985.
  3. ^ a b Zurndorfer, Harriet Thelma. (1995). China Bibliography: A Research Guide to Reference Works About China Past and Present, p. 31 n85.
  4. ^ Schulman, Frank Joseph. (1970). Japan and Korea: An Annotated Bibliography of Doctoral Dissertations in Western Languages, 1877–1969, p. 909. (Reischauer 1610)
  5. ^ Edwin O. Reischauer (1939). Nittō Guhō Junrei Gyōki: Ennin's Diary of His Travels in T'ang China (838–847) (PhD). OCLC 76996908.
  6. ^ Peter Kornicki, Eavesdropping on the Emperor: Interrogators and Codebreakers in Britain's War with Japan (London: Hurst & Co., 2021), pp. 181, 184-5, 191.
  7. ^ Johnston, Laurie and Robert Thomas. "Notes on People; Reischauer, at Harvard, Gives Farewell Lecture", The New York Times. April 23, 1981.
  8. ^ a b c Kapur, Nick (2018). Japan at the Crossroads: Conflict and Compromise after Anpo. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. p. 51. ISBN 9780674988484.
  9. ^ a b Kapur, Nick (2018). Japan at the Crossroads: Conflict and Compromise after Anpo. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. p. 46. ISBN 9780674988484.
  10. ^ Kapur, Nick (2018). Japan at the Crossroads: Conflict and Compromise after Anpo. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. pp. 53–4. ISBN 9780674988484.
  11. ^ Kapur, Nick (2018). Japan at the Crossroads: Conflict and Compromise after Anpo. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. pp. 54–74. ISBN 9780674988484.
  12. ^ Kapur, Nick (2018). Japan at the Crossroads: Conflict and Compromise after Anpo. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. p. 50. ISBN 9780674988484.
  13. ^ a b Kapur, Nick (2018). Japan at the Crossroads: Conflict and Compromise after Anpo. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. p. 53. ISBN 9780674988484.
  14. ^ Packard, George (2010). Edwin O. Reischauer and the American Discovery of Japan. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 213–35. ISBN 9780231512770.
  15. ^ Ford, Franklin L. (1987). Political Murder: From Tyrannicide to Terrorism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. p. 310. ISBN 978-0-674-68636-6. Retrieved 24 August 2012.
  16. ^ Packard, George (2010). Edwin O. Reischauer and the American Discovery of Japan. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 203–213. ISBN 9780231512770.
  17. ^ McCurry J (2008). "Japan compensates some of its hepatitis C victims". Lancet. 371 (9618): 1061–1062. doi:10.1016/s0140-6736(08)60469-9. PMID 18380033.
  18. ^ Edwin O. Reischauer, My Life between Japan and America, John Weatherhill, Inc., pp. 57 and 137
  19. ^ Reischauer, My Life, p.140
  20. ^ Reischauer, My Life, p. 142
  21. ^ "Haru M. Reischauer, 83; Eased Tensions With Japan", The New York Times. October 5, 1998.
  22. ^ Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies (RIJS), Director, 1974–1981
  23. ^ "Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Expert, Dies", The Harvard Crimson. September 10, 1990.
  24. ^ Rabson, Steve. "'Secret' 1965 Memo Reveals Plans to Keep US bases and Nuclear Weapons Options in Okinawa After Reversion", The Asia-Pacific Journal, 5-1-10, February 1, 2010
  25. ^ Fujitani, T (2001). "The Reischauer Memo: Mr. Moto, and Japanese American Soldiers". Critical Asian Studies. 33 (3): 379–402. doi:10.1080/14672710122556. S2CID 143350660.
  26. ^ a b c Rabson 2010
  27. ^ Fujitani, T. (2001). "THE REISCHAUER MEMO: Mr. Moto, Hirohito, and Japanese American Soldiers". Critical Asian Studies. 33 (3): 379–402. doi:10.1080/14672710122556. S2CID 143350660.
  28. ^ Kelly, Jason M. (2012). "Why Did Henry Stimson Spare Kyoto from the Bomb? Confusion in Postwar Historiography". Journal of American-East Asian Relations. 19 (2): 183–203. doi:10.1163/18765610-01902004.
  29. ^ Jungk, Robert. (1959). Brighter Than a Thousand Suns: A Personal History of the Atomic Scientists, p. 178.
  30. ^ Reischauer, Edwin. (1986). My Life Between Japan And America, p. 101.
  31. ^ a b "Memorandum of Conversation: U.S. Policy in the Ryukyu Islands". July 16, 1965. Record Number 79651
  32. ^ "Japan: Time to Confess, Nuclear 'Lie' Strains U.S. Ties", Time, June 8, 1981
  33. ^ G. M. A. McCune, E. O. Reischauer, Royal Asiatic Society. Korea Branch, The Romanization of the Korean Language: Based Upon Its Phonetic Structure (Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1939).
  34. ^ Hyun, Peter. "A Trove of Unfamiliar Art from Korea", The New York Times. January 4, 1981.
  35. ^ "Edwin Oldfather Reischauer". American Academy of Arts & Sciences. Retrieved 2022-08-11.
  36. ^ "APS Member History". search.amphilsoc.org. Retrieved 2022-08-11.
  37. ^ Japan Foundation Archived 2008-03-11 at the Wayback Machine
  38. ^ Nitze School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies Archived 2010-11-28 at the Wayback Machine
  39. ^ RIJS Archived 2010-10-12 at the Wayback Machine named in his honor when he turned 75 in 1985.
  40. ^ WorldCat Identities Archived December 30, 2010, at the Wayback Machine: Reischauer, Edwin O. (Edwin Oldfather) 1910–1990
  41. ^ "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2018-08-07. Retrieved 2018-08-06.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  42. ^ "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2016-08-29. Retrieved 2018-08-06.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)

General sources

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia

Edwin Oldfather Reischauer (October 15, 1910 – September 1, 1990) was an American scholar and diplomat who specialized in Japanese history, , and United States-Japan relations. Born in to Presbyterian missionary parents, Reischauer acquired fluency in Japanese during his childhood and survived the while attending school there. He earned a from in 1931 and a doctorate from in 1939, where he joined the faculty and contributed to establishing as a rigorous .
During , Reischauer worked in , analyzing Japanese communications for the Office of Strategic Services, and afterward advised on U.S. occupation policies in . Appointed by President , he served as U.S. Ambassador to from 1961 to 1966, navigating tensions over issues like the protests and the renewal of the U.S.-Japan security treaty amid anti-American demonstrations. As director of Harvard's East Asian Research Center (later renamed the Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies), he expanded interdisciplinary programs on Asia, authoring influential books such as The United States and Japan (1950) that promoted mutual understanding between the two nations. His efforts bridged scholarly analysis with policy, emphasizing 's post-war democratization and economic resurgence while critiquing isolationist tendencies in American foreign policy toward Asia.

Early Life and Education

Childhood and Family Background in

Edwin Oldfather Reischauer was born on October 15, 1910, in , , to August Karl Reischauer and Helen Sidwell Oldfather, American Presbyterian missionaries dedicated to educational work. His father, a scholar of Japanese history and , had arrived in in 1901 after studying at and Yale, while his mother supported the family's missionary efforts focused on . The couple founded Japan's first school for the deaf in in 1908, reflecting their emphasis on specialized Christian education amid Japan's Meiji-era modernization. Reischauer's family included an older brother, Robert Karl, born in 1907, and a younger sister, , who was deaf and benefited from the parents' institutional work. The Reischauers resided primarily in after the Kyoto school's establishment, where August Karl balanced missionary duties with academic pursuits, including translations of Japanese historical texts. This environment exposed young Edwin to and customs from infancy, fostering bilingualism, though the family's expatriate status limited deeper integration into local society beyond professional interactions. During his childhood, Reischauer attended the American School in , an institution serving missionary and diplomatic children with a blending Western education and exposure to Japanese culture. Between ages eight and twelve, he and his brother experienced periodic adjustments to boarding arrangements tied to their parents' travels, underscoring the transient nature of missionary family life in early 20th-century . This period until his mid-teens shaped his early affinity for , informed by direct observation of societal changes under Taishō-era reforms rather than abstract study.

Formal Academic Training

Reischauer commenced his formal higher education in the United States at age sixteen, enrolling at , where he earned a degree in 1931 and was elected to for academic excellence. He then pursued graduate studies at , obtaining a degree in 1932. Following his master's, Reischauer conducted postgraduate research in and to deepen his expertise in and , before returning to Harvard to complete his in 1939 under the supervision of Serge Elisséeff, a pioneering scholar in . His doctoral work focused on Japanese and philology, building on his early fluency in Japanese acquired during childhood in Tokyo, and positioned him to teach in Harvard's newly formed Department of Far Eastern Languages by the late 1930s. This training emphasized rigorous linguistic analysis and historical methodology, reflecting Elisséeff's influence in establishing Western academic standards for East Asian studies.

Scholarly and Wartime Contributions

Development of Korean Romanization System

During a research trip to Korea in the summer of , Edwin O. Reischauer collaborated with George M. McCune to develop a new for the , addressing limitations in prior methods such as the Japanese-imposed enforced during colonial rule. The McCune-Reischauer prioritized a balance between phonetic accuracy—approximating Korean pronunciation for non-speakers—and orthographic fidelity to structure, incorporating diacritical marks (e.g., macrons for long vowels and breves for tense consonants) while avoiding excessive complexity for use in the pre-digital era. The system was formally published in 1939 through the Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, marking its debut as a standardized tool for Western scholars studying Korean texts amid limited Hangul familiarity outside East Asia. Reischauer's contribution stemmed from his linguistic expertise gained through childhood immersion in Japanese and self-study of related East Asian scripts, enabling him to refine rules for consonant aspiration and vowel harmony that McCune, a Korea-focused historian, had initially outlined. This romanization gained traction in academic and library contexts, particularly in , where it became the for Korean studies until the late , influencing transliterations in publications and catalogs despite later national shifts like South Korea's adoption of Revised Romanization in 2000. Its enduring utility lay in facilitating precise scholarly access to Korean historical and literary sources without requiring native proficiency, though critics later noted ambiguities in handling certain diphthongs and regional dialects.

Intelligence Service During World War II

During , Edwin O. Reischauer contributed to U.S. efforts as a commissioned officer in the United States Army, leveraging his expertise in and culture following the on December 7, 1941. He served in the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) of the War Department General Staff, where he focused on training personnel for operations against . In spring 1942, Reischauer initiated an intensive Japanese language course at to address the urgent wartime demand for linguists capable of supporting . He soon relocated to Washington, D.C., to direct a specialized Japanese training school for the Army at a secret facility, instructing cryptanalysts in advanced language skills essential for decoding Japanese communications. This program operated at Station, the Army's primary site, where Reischauer served as one of the key instructors, emphasizing practical proficiency for intercepting and translating enemy messages. Reischauer's role extended to analyzing intercepted and serving as director of the Language Liaison Group within the MIS, facilitating coordination between linguists and codebreakers to enhance the effectiveness of U.S. in the Pacific theater. His efforts helped build a cadre of Japanese-speaking specialists, contributing to the Allied decryption of Japanese diplomatic and military codes, though specific operational impacts remained classified for decades post-war. As a expert, he also advised on broader assessments, countering misconceptions about Japanese society that could hinder .

Academic Career

Pre-Ambassadorial Teaching at Harvard

Reischauer returned to in 1946 after wartime service in U.S. intelligence, resuming his faculty role focused on and history amid the postwar expansion of . He initially held the position of professor of Far Eastern languages from 1946 to 1950, transitioning to professor of Japanese history from 1950 until his departure for in 1961. During this period, he collaborated with department chair Serge Elisséeff to transform Harvard's offerings from rudimentary classes into a structured, multi-year that emphasized practical proficiency and cultural context. A cornerstone of his teaching was the co-development, with historian John K. Fairbank, of the undergraduate survey course "East Asian Civilizations," affectionately nicknamed "Rice Paddies" by students for its vivid depictions of agrarian societies. First offered in the late and formalized postwar, the course—spanning Reischauer's first term on Japanese topics followed by Fairbank's on China—introduced thousands of undergraduates to the historical, cultural, and social dynamics of , integrating lectures with lantern slides for visual engagement. It became a flagship of Harvard's General Education program, enduring beyond Reischauer's tenure and influencing generations of scholars by prioritizing empirical historical analysis over ideological narratives. From 1956 to 1961, Reischauer directed the Harvard-Yenching Institute, an advanced research center for East Asian languages and civilizations funded by the , where he oversaw fellowships, publications, and interdisciplinary training for graduate students and faculty. Under his leadership, the institute supported dictionary projects, translation efforts, and fieldwork, fostering rigorous philological and historical scholarship while navigating Cold War-era demands for area expertise. His pre-ambassadorial classroom emphasis on Japan's premodern traditions, Meiji modernization, and imperial expansion equipped students with tools for understanding contemporary , drawing on his firsthand linguistic fluency and archival research rather than secondary interpretations.

Post-Ambassadorship Academic Roles

Upon returning to in the fall of 1966 following his resignation as U.S. Ambassador to , Edwin O. Reischauer resumed his faculty position as a University Professor, a senior rank reflecting his expertise in . In this role, he focused on undergraduate and graduate instruction, leveraging his diplomatic experience to emphasize practical insights into Japanese history, , and U.S.- relations. Reischauer continued teaching his longstanding course "Rice Paddies," formally titled , which was part of Harvard's General Education curriculum and drew large enrollments for its accessible overview of regional history and culture. He also offered specialized seminars, including Japanese Government and Politics in the Government Department and in the History Department, incorporating contemporary developments such as postwar Japanese society and bilateral security dynamics informed by his ambassadorship. These courses highlighted his shift toward modern , producing educational materials like videotaped lectures on Japanese history distributed for broader use. In addition to teaching, Reischauer contributed to curriculum development by co-authoring : Tradition and Transformation in 1973 with John K. Fairbank and Albert M. Craig, a widely used textbook that integrated historical analysis with modern transformations across the region. He retired from active teaching in 1981 after over four decades at Harvard but maintained influence through advisory roles in East Asian programs until the mid-1980s.

Diplomatic Career

Appointment and Tenure as U.S. Ambassador to Japan

President nominated Edwin O. Reischauer, a Harvard and Japan-born fluent in the , as to on March 29, 1961, marking an atypical selection of an academic specialist rather than a career . The confirmed the appointment, and Reischauer presented his credentials to Japanese authorities on April 27, 1961. His expertise in Japanese and culture positioned him to bridge bilateral understanding at a time of lingering tensions from the 1960 U.S.-Japan security treaty protests. Reischauer's five-year tenure emphasized fostering an "equal partnership" between the two nations, drawing on his personal ties to and scholarly insights to enhance diplomatic engagement. He worked to promote mutual respect and cooperation, contributing to Japan's increased outward orientation in international affairs, including hosting its first ministerial-level conference in April 1966. His approachable style and cultural affinity earned widespread popularity among Japanese officials and the public, helping to mitigate anti-American sentiments in media coverage of issues like the . A significant incident occurred on March 24, 1964, when Reischauer was stabbed in the abdomen by a deranged 23-year-old Japanese ultranationalist at the entrance to the U.S. Embassy in , necessitating the surgical removal of a and leading to chronic health issues. Despite recovering sufficiently to continue his duties, the attack underscored vulnerabilities in personal security amid volatile domestic politics. Reischauer submitted his resignation in April 1966, formally leaving the post on August 19, 1966, primarily to resume his academic at Harvard after deeming his diplomatic objectives achieved, with U.S.-Japan relations markedly strengthened. U.S. Senators and lauded his unique qualifications and contributions to bilateral ties upon his departure.

Handling of Key Crises and Security Treaty Revisions

During his ambassadorship from March 1961 to 1966, Edwin O. Reischauer focused on stabilizing U.S.-Japan relations strained by the 1960 revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which had sparked massive and contributed to the resignation of Prime Minister . The revised Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, signed on January 19, 1960, replaced the 1951 agreement with provisions for mutual defense obligations, prior consultation on U.S. force deployments, and indefinite duration subject to review after ten years, aiming for greater equality but fueling leftist opposition to perceived subordination and U.S. bases. Reischauer, leveraging his scholarly expertise and fluency in Japanese, prioritized to counter anti-American narratives, engaging intellectuals, media, and politicians to emphasize shared interests in economic and security stability amid tensions. A major challenge emerged with the escalation of the in 1964-1965, which intensified domestic protests in against U.S. policy and the security alliance's implications for base usage and potential Japanese entanglement. Japanese public opinion polls from the period showed widespread disapproval of U.S. bombing campaigns, with leftist groups exploiting the issue to rally against the treaty ahead of its 1970 review clause. Reischauer responded by publicly critiquing Japanese media for biased coverage that amplified anti-U.S. sentiment without balanced reporting on North Vietnamese actions, which he argued stemmed from insufficient understanding of the conflict's complexities; this intervention reportedly moderated press tone and curbed a surge in demonstrations. In a March 1964 memorandum to , he urged a proactive U.S. to integrate more actively into regional security without alienating nationalists, recommending increased aid to the (under U.S. administration, home to key bases affecting 900,000 ethnic Japanese) from $20 million to $50 million annually to mitigate grievances over reversion and basing rights. Reischauer also navigated internal crises tied to the treaty's basing provisions, including friction over U.S. nuclear-armed vessel visits—later acknowledged in declassified documents as occurring without explicit prior consultation, despite Japanese non-nuclear principles—and the persistent presence of approximately 50,000 U.S. troops. His approach emphasized "prior consultation" mechanisms introduced in the 1960 to inform of major actions, fostering trust while defending bases as essential for deterring Soviet and Chinese threats; he viewed Japanese aloofness in crises as a historical pattern but advocated evolving it toward cooperative burden-sharing. By , these efforts had diminished prospects for treaty abrogation in , as leftist momentum waned and bilateral dialogue strengthened, though challenges like Okinawa's status persisted until later reversion talks. A personal incident underscored the volatility: on March 24, 1964, Reischauer was stabbed by a right-wing assailant protesting ties to the U.S., severing his and requiring emergency surgery, yet he downplayed it as isolated rather than systemic failure.

Foreign Policy Views and Controversies

Advocacy for Realistic U.S.-Japan Partnership

Reischauer consistently argued that the United States and , as the two leading industrial powers on the , formed a natural partnership essential for regional stability and economic prosperity, emphasizing pragmatic cooperation over ideological alignment. In his 1950 book The and , he highlighted the need for Americans to grasp 's unique historical and cultural context to avoid missteps in bilateral relations, advocating for policies that recognized 's post-war vulnerabilities while leveraging shared democratic values for mutual benefit. This work, revised in 1957 and 1965, underscored realistic expectations by detailing the successes of the U.S. occupation—such as democratic reforms and economic recovery—while cautioning against over-idealizing 's rapid transformation without addressing lingering anti-American sentiments rooted in wartime experiences. In a 1960 Foreign Affairs article titled "The Broken Dialogue with Japan," Reischauer critiqued the superficial nature of U.S.-Japan exchanges, urging a deeper, fact-based to rebuild trust amid tensions over the 1960 security treaty revisions. He contended that realistic appraisals of Japan's pacifist constitution and economic priorities would strengthen the alliance, rather than forcing into uncomfortable military roles that could exacerbate domestic opposition. This perspective informed his ambassadorship (1961–1966), during which he navigated protests against U.S. bases by promoting the treaty as a practical deterrent to Soviet and Chinese threats, while privately advising Washington to respect Japanese to sustain long-term partnership. Upon retiring as on January 25, 1966, Reischauer reiterated in public statements that the U.S. and must prioritize their "essential partnership" through candid acknowledgment of differences, such as Japan's aversion to overt , to counterbalance communist expansion in without unrealistic demands for Japanese rearmament. He viewed equality in the relationship as key, rejecting paternalistic U.S. attitudes that treated Japan as a subordinate, and instead favored joint initiatives in trade and technology to align incentives. Later reflections, such as in 1978 lectures, affirmed Japan's democratic maturation as validating this approach, with broad Japanese consensus supporting close U.S. ties for security and growth. Reischauer's framework thus emphasized causal links between mutual understanding, , and geopolitical realism, influencing subsequent U.S. policy toward a balanced .

Debunking Myths and Addressing Criticisms of Wartime Role

A persistent myth claims that Reischauer personally intervened to prevent the atomic bombing of , crediting him with single-handedly saving the city due to his expertise and affinity for Japanese culture. Reischauer explicitly denied this assertion, noting he had no direct involvement in atomic target selection. The decision to exclude originated with Secretary of War , who on July 25, 1945, directed its removal from the atomic target list—initially proposed for its industrial value—to preserve a cultural center that could aid in Japan's post-war rehabilitation and reduce resentment during occupation. Stimson's rationale emphasized strategic psychology over sentiment, arguing that destroying 's temples and shrines would harden Japanese resistance and complicate governance, a view informed by his own pre-war visits to the city rather than Reischauer's input. Reischauer's actual wartime duties focused on and linguistic support, not bombing policy. Commissioned as a in U.S. Service in 1943, he contributed to the top-secret project by analyzing decrypted Japanese diplomatic cables, which provided insights into Tokyo's negotiations and military intentions. He also instructed codebreakers and analysts in and nuances at Station, enhancing the U.S. capacity to process intercepts from operations like ULTRA and , which yielded over 10,000 daily translations by 1945. These efforts supported broader Allied strategy, including assessments of Japanese elite dynamics that informed occupation planning, but remained analytical rather than decisional. Criticisms portraying Reischauer as unduly pro-Japanese during the war often arise from his missionary upbringing in and linguistic fluency, implying bias that softened U.S. resolve. Such views overlook the empirical value of his counsel: he urged realistic evaluations of Japanese societal structures over blanket demonization, advice that aligned with causal necessities for intelligence accuracy and post-surrender stability, as evidenced by its partial adoption in State Department planning despite initial military skepticism. No declassified records indicate disloyalty or ; instead, his work expedited code exploitation, contributing to victories like Midway, where linguistic decoding proved pivotal. Post-war, these contributions transitioned seamlessly into his advisory roles, underscoring their alignment with U.S. objectives rather than personal favoritism. Claims of wartime leniency thus conflate expertise with advocacy, ignoring the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive .

Positions on Military Bases and Japanese Pacifism

Reischauer consistently advocated for the retention of U.S. military bases in as a cornerstone of the bilateral security alliance, emphasizing their role in deterring regional threats and ensuring mutual defense commitments under the 1960 U.S.- Security Treaty. In a classified drafted while serving as , he proposed post-reversion arrangements for Okinawa that would preserve U.S. command authority over bases during crises, predicting that Japan's Liberal Democratic Party would prioritize symbolic reversion over substantive reductions in American presence. He recommended measures such as increased economic aid to mitigate local anti-base protests, particularly amid escalations, while underscoring the bases' strategic necessity for stability in . Reischauer urged ongoing efforts to "minimize irritations" from bases through precautions like and , but rejected outright withdrawal, viewing it as detrimental to Japan's interests and the alliance's . Post-ambassadorship, he maintained that bases facilitated a pragmatic , countering domestic opposition by highlighting empirical data on reduced Soviet and Chinese threats due to forward-deployed U.S. forces. His positions drew from causal assessments of power balances, prioritizing deterrence over ideological objections. Regarding Japanese pacifism, Reischauer characterized it as a post-World War II reaction yielding "ostrich-like" tendencies that enabled simplistic avoidance of defense responsibilities, as noted in a 1964 embassy assessment attributing public complacency to two decades of demilitarization. He acknowledged the depth of pacifist sentiment—rooted in wartime devastation and Article 9 of the Constitution—but critiqued its excess as unrealistic in a volatile geopolitical context, arguing that Japan's economic prosperity depended on allied military umbrellas rather than unilateral renunciation of force. In 1981, after disclosing tacit U.S.-Japan understandings permitting nuclear-armed vessel visits despite official denials, Reischauer contended that rigid anti-nuclear principles ignored practical necessities, provoking parliamentary backlash but reinforcing his call for to align policy with security realities. Reischauer's views evolved toward encouraging to incrementally bolster its Self-Defense Forces contributions, debunking pure as unsustainable without risking dependency or vulnerability; he posited that empirical alliance dynamics, not moral absolutism, should guide revisions to accommodate emerging threats like North Korean aggression. This stance reflected his broader realism, informed by historical precedents of isolationist errors, and contrasted with leftist protests that he saw as amplifying biases against U.S. presence without viable alternatives.

Later Life and Legacy

Establishment of the Reischauer Institute

The Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of at traces its origins to the Japan Institute, established in 1973 to support research on across disciplines and coordinate related academic activities university-wide. Edwin O. Reischauer, who had returned to Harvard in 1966 after serving as U.S. Ambassador to , played a central role as the prime mover in its founding, personally funding initial efforts and overseeing its development to advance , particularly Japan-focused scholarship. Reischauer assumed the position of founding director in 1974, guiding the institute's early operations until 1981, during which it fostered interdisciplinary programs, fellowships, and events to deepen understanding of Japanese history, culture, and U.S.-Japan relations. In 1985, coinciding with Reischauer's 75th birthday, the institute was renamed the Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of in his honor, reflecting his lifelong contributions to and his vision for a dedicated hub at Harvard. This renaming underscored the institute's mandate to promote rigorous, evidence-based research free from ideological constraints, aligning with Reischauer's emphasis on empirical historical analysis over politicized narratives.

Major Publications and Intellectual Influence

Reischauer's scholarly output included foundational texts on Japanese history and bilateral relations with the . His book The and , initially published in 1950 and revised in editions through 1965, examined the evolving dynamics between the , emphasizing historical patterns and the need for mutual comprehension to foster stable cooperation amid reconstruction. In Japan: The Story of a , released in 1970 and updated in 1981, he traced 's political, social, and from ancient times to the , drawing on primary sources to highlight continuity amid transformation. These works, alongside earlier contributions like Ennin's Diary: The Record of a Pilgrimage to in Search of the Buddhist Law (1955), which translated and analyzed a ninth-century Japanese monk's travels, established him as a meticulous philologist and focused on East Asian textual traditions. Reischauer co-authored the widely adopted textbook East Asia: Tradition and Transformation in 1973 with John K. Fairbank and Albert M. Craig, synthesizing historical narratives of , , and Korea to underscore shared cultural legacies and divergent modernization paths; the volume became a staple in university curricula for its empirical grounding and avoidance of ideological overlays. Later publications, such as The Japanese (1977), extended his analysis to contemporary society, portraying as a resilient, consensus-driven shaped by endogenous reforms rather than imposed changes. These texts prioritized verifiable historical data over speculative interpretations, reflecting Reischauer's commitment to dispelling Western misconceptions through direct engagement with Japanese sources. His intellectual influence extended beyond publications to institutionalizing in American academia. At Harvard, Reischauer trained numerous specialists, pioneering interdisciplinary approaches that integrated , , and , thereby elevating the field's rigor and accessibility. Regarded as the dean of U.S. Japanology, his efforts helped construct the modern framework for East Asian , influencing discourse by promoting realistic assessments of Japan's postwar and economic ascent over alarmist views. Through public-facing works, he countered caricatures of as inherently militaristic, advocating instead for recognition of its democratic institutions and cultural adaptability, which informed broader U.S. engagement strategies.

Honors, Students, and Enduring Impact

Reischauer received numerous honors recognizing his contributions to scholarship and diplomacy. In 1957, he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences as a , language scholar, educator, diplomat, and research institution administrator. In 1968, the Japanese government awarded him the Grand Cordon of the , First Class, presented by Emperor and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, for his service in strengthening bilateral ties. In 1988, the bestowed upon him its Award for Scholarly Distinction, alongside recipients such as Sylvia L. Thrupp and Joseph R. Strayer, honoring his lifetime achievements in historical research. As a longtime professor at , Reischauer mentored hundreds of graduate students and taught thousands of undergraduates, guiding the development of curricula and fostering expertise in Japanese , , and . His pedagogical influence extended through collaboration with figures like John K. Fairbank to build undergraduate programs that emphasized rigorous, language-based scholarship over superficial analysis. Reischauer's enduring impact lies in his role as a bridge between academia and policy, promoting pragmatic U.S.-Japan engagement grounded in historical understanding rather than stereotypes. His diplomatic tenure and writings helped stabilize the alliance amid post-war tensions, including protests over security treaties, laying foundations for a partnership that became central to U.S. strategy in . Initiatives bearing his name, such as the Reischauer Scholars Program established in 2003, continue to educate high school students on U.S.-Japan relations, echoing his emphasis on cultural empathy and informed realism to sustain bilateral cooperation.

Personal Life and Death

Marriages and Family

Reischauer married Elinor Adrienne Danton, an American scholar raised partly in and daughter of an Oberlin College professor, on July 5, 1935, in . The couple had three children: daughters Ann and Joan, and son Robert Danton Reischauer, born in January 1941. Adrienne Reischauer died of on January 17, 1955. In early 1956, following the death of his first wife, Reischauer married Haru Matsukata, a Japanese-American who served as Far Eastern representative for the Saturday Evening Post and secretary of the Foreign Correspondents' Club of . The pair had known each other since their school days in , and Haru was the granddaughter of former Japanese Prime Minister Nobuaki Matsukata. They had no children together, with Haru becoming to Reischauer's three children from his prior marriage. Robert Reischauer pursued public service, directing the U.S. from 1989 to 1995. At the time of Edwin Reischauer's death in , daughters Ann Heinemann and Joan Simon resided in and , respectively.

Health Decline and Passing

In March 1964, while serving as U.S. to , Reischauer was stabbed in the by a Japanese ultranationalist assailant, requiring multiple transfusions that later transmitted non-A, non-B (now identified as hepatitis C). This infection developed into chronic , which progressively impaired his liver function over the ensuing decades. For the final decade of his life, Reischauer endured a range of complications from the , including persistent , liver damage, and associated systemic ailments that limited his physical activities despite his continued scholarly engagements. He managed the condition through medical monitoring but experienced worsening symptoms in his later years, reflecting the era's limited treatments for chronic prior to antiviral therapies. Reischauer died on September 1, 1990, at age 79, from complications of the chronic at Green Hospital of Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation in , .

References

  1. https://www.[goodreads](/page/Goodreads).com/book/show/815869.Japan
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