Recent from talks
Nothing was collected or created yet.
Centre Party (Germany)
View on Wikipedia
The Centre Party (German: Zentrum, Z), officially the German Centre Party (German: Deutsche Zentrumspartei, DZP) and also known in English as the Catholic Centre Party, is a Christian democratic political party in Germany. It was most influential in the German Empire and Weimar Republic. Formed in 1870, it successfully battled the Kulturkampf waged by Chancellor Otto von Bismarck against the Catholic Church. It soon won a quarter of the seats in the Reichstag, and its middle position on most issues allowed it to play a decisive role in the formation of majorities. The party name Zentrum (Centre) originally came from the fact that Catholic representatives would take up the middle section of seats in parliament between the social democrats and the conservatives.[6]
Key Information
For most of the Weimar Republic, the Centre Party was the third-largest party in the Reichstag and a bulwark of the Republic, participating in all governments until 1932. Following Adolf Hitler's rise to power in early 1933, the Centre Party was among the parties who voted for the Enabling Act, which granted legislative powers to Hitler's government. Nevertheless, the party was pressured into dissolving itself on 5 July, as the Nazi Party became the only legally permitted party in the country shortly thereafter.
After World War II, the party was reconstituted, but could not rise again to its former importance, as most of its members joined the new interdenominational Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and, in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union (CSU). The Centre Party continued on as a marginal party and concentrated its efforts on regional politics, mainly based in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia. The party was unrepresented on the German federal level from 1957 to 2022, when Federal representative Uwe Witt and European representative Jörg Meuthen defected from the AfD and joined the Centre Party. With the former no longer being a member of the party and the latter no longer holding office, the party is once again unrepresented in federal politics.
Before and during the German Empire
[edit]Origins
[edit]The Centre Party belongs to the political spectrum of "Political Catholicism" that, emerging in the early 19th century after the turmoil of the Napoleonic wars, had changed the political face of Germany. Many Catholics found themselves in Protestant dominated states.
The first major conflict between the Catholic Church and a Protestant state was the "Colonian Church conflict", when the Prussian government interfered in the question of mixed marriages and the religious affiliation of children resulting from these. This led to serious aggressions against the Catholic population of the Rhineland and Westphalia and culminated in the arrest of the Archbishop of Cologne. At that time, one of the founding fathers of Political Catholicism was journalist Joseph Görres, who called upon Catholics to "stand united" for their common goals, "religious liberty and political and civil equality of the denominations". The conflict relaxed after 1840, with Frederick William IV's accession to the throne.
The German revolutions of 1848–1849 brought new opportunities for German Catholics. In October, the bishops had their first meeting in 40 years in Würzburg and the local "Catholic Federations" assembled in Mainz to found the "Catholic Federation of Germany". In the National Assembly, which was convened to draw up a German constitution, a "Catholic club" was formed. This was not yet a comprehensive party, but a loose union aimed at protecting the Church's liberties in a future Germany, supported by many petitions from the "[Pope] Pius federations for religious liberty". The later demise of the National Assembly proved to be a major setback for Political Catholicism.
In the Kingdom of Prussia, the revised constitution of 1850 granted liberties, which in parts even exceeded those of the Frankfurt draft constitution, yet two years later the minister for culture, von Raumer, issued decrees directed mainly against the Jesuits. In reaction this led to a doubling of Catholic representatives in the subsequent elections and the formation of a Catholic club in the Landtag of Prussia. In 1858, when the "New Era" governments of Wilhelm I adopted more lenient policies, the club renamed itself "Fraction of the Centre" in order to open itself up to include non-Catholics. This name stemmed from the fact that in the Landtag the Catholic representatives were seated in the centre, between the Conservatives on the right and the Liberals on the left. Faced with military and constitutional issues, where there was no definite Church position, the group soon disintegrated and disappeared from parliament after 1867.
Soest programme and founding
[edit]


Growing anti-Catholic sentiment and policies, including plans for dissolving all monasteries in Prussia, made it clear that a reorganisation of the group was urgently needed in order to protect Catholic minority rights, enshrined in the 1850 constitution, and to bring them over to the emerging nation state.
In June 1870, Peter Reichensperger called on Catholics to unite and, in October, priests, representatives of Catholic federations and the Catholic gentry met at Soest and drew up an election programme. The main points were:
- Preservation of the Church's autonomy and rights, as accepted by the constitution. Defence against any attack on the independence of Church bodies, on the development of religious life and on the practice of Christian charity.
- Effectual implementation of parity for recognised denominations.
- Rejection of any attempt to de-Christianise marriage.
- Preservation or founding of denominational schools.
There were also more general demands such as for a more federal, decentralised state, a limitation of state expenditure, a just distribution of taxes, the financial strengthening of the middle classes and the legal "removal of such evil states, that threaten the worker with moral or bodily ruin". With such a manifesto, the number of Catholic representatives in the Prussian Diet rose considerably. In December 1870, they formed a new "Centre" faction, also called the "Constitution Party" to emphasise its adherence to constitutional liberties.
Three months later, early in 1871, the Catholic representatives to the new national parliament, the Reichstag, also formed a "Centre" faction. The party not only defended the Church's liberties, but also supported representative government and minority rights in general, in particular those of German Poles, Alsatians, and Hannoverians. The Centre's main leader was the Hannoverian advocate Ludwig Windthorst and other major figures included Karl Friedrich von Savigny, Hermann von Mallinckrodt, Burghard Freiherr von Schorlemer-Alst, the brothers August Reichensperger and Peter Reichensperger, Franz von Ballestrem and Georg Count Hertling. The party was named the Centre Party due to the fact that in Parliament the Catholics sat between the Liberals on the left and the Conservatives on the right as opposed to the party adhering to centrism in the modern context.
Also in other German states Catholic parties were formed, cooperating with the Prussian Centre Party in the Reichstag:
- in Bavaria, the "Bavarian Patriotic Party", with a particularistic-conservative bent, since 1887 called the "Bavarian Centre".
The Catholic People's Party was formed in the Grand Duchy of Baden in 1869, and merged into the Centre Party in 1888.[7]
Kulturkampf
[edit]In the age of nationalism, Protestant Germans, whether Conservative (like Otto von Bismarck) or Liberal, accused the Centre of Ultramontanism or having a greater loyalty towards the Pope than to the German nation. After the First Vatican Council, Bismarck launched the Kulturkampf ("cultural struggle") against the Catholic Church. Catholics fought back vigorously and with near-unanimity. The Centre party gained greater support from the Catholic population. Following Bismarck's 1879 turn from free trade to protectionism and from the National Liberal party to the Conservative parties, he also abandoned the unsuccessful Kulturkampf.[8][9] The Centre party remained a party of opposition to Bismarck, but after his resignation in 1890, it frequently supported the following administrations' policies in the Reichstag, particularly in the field of social security.
Attempts to broaden appeal beyond Catholics
[edit]

The Kulturkampf had reinforced the Catholic character of the Centre Party, but even during it Ludwig Windthorst had defended the party against Bismarck's accusation of being a "denominational party" in describing the Centre as "a political party with a comprehensive political programme and open to anyone, who accepts it". However, few Protestants took up this offer and the Centre remained, by the composition of its members, politicians and voters, an essentially Catholic party.
Loyal to the Pope in church matters, the Centre party steered a course independent of the Holy See on secular matters. This became apparent in the "septennat dispute" of 1886. Since the Centre Party rejected Bismarck's military budget, the Chancellor negotiated with the Holy See and promised to abolish some Kulturkampf-related laws and to support the Pope in the Roman question, if the Vatican persuaded the Centre Party to accept his bill. Despite this agreement, the Centre Party rejected the budget and Bismarck called new elections. He also published the letters with the Vatican, intending to drive a wedge between Catholic voters loyal to the Pope and the Centre Party with the slogan: "The Pope against the Centre!" Windhorst managed to avert this by reaffirming the Party's autonomy, which the Pope had accepted, and by interpreting the published letters as expressions of papal confidence in the party.
As the Kulturkampf declined, debates about the character of the party emerged culminating in the Centre dispute, in 1906, after Julius Bachem had published the article "We must get out of the tower!" He called upon Catholic politicians to fulfill Windthorst's word and get out of their perpetual minority position by an effort to increase Protestant numbers among their representatives in parliament. His proposal was met with passionate opposition by the greater part of Catholic public, especially since it also included the Christian trade unions and other Catholic organisations. No side could win the upper hand, when the outbreak of World War I ended the dispute.
After the war, there were many proposals on how the reform the party. Heinrich Brauns published the Cologne Program (Kölner Programm), which proposed the re-formation of the Zentrum under a new name (Christliche Volkspartei, CVP). This proposal was rejected, with only a few regions adopting it for the 1919 election; the party instead adopted the Berlin Guidelines (Berliner Leitsätze), which were more moderate but failed at making the Zentrum attractive for Protestant voters too.[10] Adam Stegerwald, leader of the Christian trade unions, made another attempt at transcending the party's exclusively Catholic character and uniting Germany's fragmented party spectrum. In 1920 he advocated the formation of a broad Christian middle-party, that would transcend denominations and social classes and which could push back the Social Democrats' influence.
The Polish minority in the German Empire formed one of the largest Catholic groups, but the Centre Party pursued an anti-Polish course causing enmity between it and Polish minority.[11]
In war and revolution
[edit]

With the German entry into World War I, the party also used the debates about war bonds to push for a repeal of the last remnants of anti-Jesuit laws. In 1916, the Reichstag adopted a resolution introduced by the Centre Party, calling on the government to follow the Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL)'s recommendation on the use of submarines. The OHL's policy of resuming unrestricted submarine warfare was supposed to break the deadlock of the war but instead led to the United States entry into the war.[12] As the war continued, many of the leaders of the Centre's left wing, particularly Matthias Erzberger, came to support a negotiated settlement, and Erzberger was key in the passage of the Reichstag Peace Resolution of 1917.
The same year, the Centre's Georg von Hertling, formerly Minister-President of Bavaria, was appointed Chancellor, but he could not overcome the dominance of the military leadership of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. When a parliamentary system of government was introduced in October 1918, the new chancellor Max von Baden appointed representatives from the Centre party, the Social Democrats and the left-liberals as ministers.
After the fall of the monarchy in the German Revolution of 1918–1919, conflict arose between the party and the new Social Democratic government. Adolf Hofmann, the Free State of Prussia minister for culture, attempted to decree a total separation of church and state, forcing religion out of schools. This stirred up a wave of protest among the Catholic population, and bishops, Catholic organisations and the Centre Party itself united to combat the "red danger". This conflict bridged internal tensions within the party and secured its continual existence despite the turmoil of the revolution. The party however was weakened by its Bavarian wing splitting off and forming the Bavarian People's Party (BVP), which emphasised autonomy of the states and also took a more conservative course.[13]
In the 1919 elections for the Weimar National Assembly, the Centre Party gained 91 representatives, being the second largest party after the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The Centre's Constantin Fehrenbach was elected president of the National Assembly. The party actively cooperated with Social Democrats and left-liberal German Democratic Party (DDP) in drawing up the Weimar Constitution, which guaranteed what the Centre had been fighting for since its founding: equality for Catholics and autonomy for Catholic Church throughout Germany. The party was less successful in the school question. Although religious education remained an ordinary subject in most schools, the comprehensive, inter-denominational schools became default.
Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany
[edit]In the Weimar Republic
[edit]
The Centre Party, whose pragmatic principles generally left it open to supporting either a monarchical or republican form of government, proved one of the mainstays of the Weimar Republic, continuing the cooperation with SPD and DDP in the Weimar Coalition. This combination, however, lost its majority in the 1920 elections. The formation of the new Christian People's Party in Rhineland (May 1920) caused considerable concern among the Centre leadership. Seeing the exodus of conservative Catholics caused by a sharp left turn of the Centre at the end of war, Adam Stegerwald proposed his "Essen program"[14] (September 1920) that promised Germany to become "Christian, democratic, German, and social" and a plan to form a broad-based Christian party.[15]
The party was an ideologically diverse coalition of Catholic politicians, comprising republicans like Matthias Erzberger and Joseph Wirth as well as right-wingers like Franz von Papen. As a result of the party's flexibility, it participated in every government between 1919 and 1932, both with parties to their left and to their right. The Centre mainly provided the ministers for finance and labour and, on four occasions, the Chancellor. However, this also damaged the party's prospects because it was increasingly associated with all of the conflicts, problems, and failures of the Republic. The Centre had a share of the odium attached to the so-called "Weimar Establishment" which was blamed, especially on the right, for the German defeat in World War I in the Stab-in-the-back myth, as well as for the humiliations of the Versailles Treaty and reparations. Erzberger himself, who had signed the armistice, was assassinated by right-wing extremists in 1921.


The parties of the Weimar Coalition (Social Democrats, Centre and the left-liberal German Democratic Party (DDP)) were the base of the Weimar Republic but lost their majority in the 1920 elections. After this, majority governments were rare as they required the support of the Weimar Coalition and the national liberal German People's Party (DVP). Social Democrats and DVP found it hard to agree on economic policy while Social Democrats disagreed with the Centre Party on issues like religious schools or a nationwide Concordat with the Holy See.
Following the 1920 elections, the Centre's Constantin Fehrenbach formed a minority government in a coalition with the DDP and the DVP. In May 1921 the Weimar Coalition once again joined forces with the Centre's Joseph Wirth as Chancellor, but this minority government collapsed again in November 1922. After this, the Centre participated in the non-affiliated Wilhelm Cuno's "government of the economy", together with both liberal parties and the Bavarian People's Party (BVP).
In August 1923, the DVP's Gustav Stresemann formed a Grand Coalition administration, comprising the Centre, both Liberal parties and the Social Democrats, which lasted until November, when the Social Democrats left the coalition and the Centre's Wilhelm Marx became chancellor of a cabinet of the remaining parties. In January 1925 the non-affiliated Hans Luther was appointed chancellor and formed a coalition between the Centre, both Liberal parties, the BVP and, for the first time, the right-wing German National People's Party (DNVP). The Centre, the BVP and the DNVP jointly supported legislation to expand religious schools.
In the same year, Wilhelm Marx was the Centre's candidate in the presidential elections. In the second round, combining the support of the Weimar coalition parties, he gained 45.3% of the vote and finished a close second to the victorious right-wing candidate Paul von Hindenburg with 48.3%. In May 1926 Chancellor Luther resigned and Marx again assumed the chancellorship. In June 1928, the general elections resulted in losses for the government parties and in gains for the Social Democrats and the Communists. The Grand Coalition of 1923 was revived, this time including the BVP and the Social Democrat Hermann Müller became chancellor.
During the years of the Weimar Republic, debates about the Catholic character of the party, as described above, persisted. The left-wing of the party, led by Erzberger and Wirth, had close ties to the Catholic workers' associations led by Joseph Joos.[16] Some politicians on the right wing of the party, including Heinrich Brauns and Franz von Papen, advocated a move towards the right and a closer cooperation with the national movements.[17] The middle-ground emphasised their loyalty to the Church and rejected both extremes. To mediate the tension between the wings and to strengthen their ties with the Bishops, the party in September 1928 did not elect the two favourites Joseph Joos and Adam Stegerwald, but rather the cleric Ludwig Kaas as chairman.
Brüning administration
[edit]
In 1930, the Grand Coalition fell apart. Heinrich Brüning, from the moderate-conservative wing of the party, was appointed as Chancellor with a cabinet that, apart from the missing Social Democrats, was virtually unchanged. Brüning was confronted with economic crises exacerbated by the Great Depression and had to tackle the difficult tasks of consolidating both budget and currency when faced with rising unemployment, and of also negotiating changes to the war reparations payments. His course of strict budget discipline, with severe cuts in public expenditure, and tax increases made him extremely unpopular among the lower and middle classes as well as among the Prussian Junkers.
In 1930, Brüning's failure to gain a majority for his policies in parliament prompted him to call early elections, in which the four parties of the former Grand coalition lost their majority. After this, Brüning based his administration entirely on the support of the presidential decrees ("Notverordnung") through article 48 of the Constitution. This allowed him to circumvent parliament, as long as the Social Democrats - who feared another election - tolerated this practice. For this way of government based on both the President and cooperation of parliament, Brüning coined the term "authoritarian democracy".
By this time, the party had become increasingly ambivalent toward democracy. Many elements of the party, including Kaas, had come to believe that only an authoritarian regime could protect the position of the Church.[18]
The Centre consistently supported Brüning's government and in 1932 vigorously campaigned for the re-election of Paul von Hindenburg, calling him a "venerate historical personality" and "the keeper of the constitution". Hindenburg was re-elected against Adolf Hitler, but shortly afterwards dismissed Brüning on 30 May 1932.
President Hindenburg, advised by General Kurt von Schleicher, appointed the Catholic nobleman Franz von Papen as Chancellor, a member of the Centre's right wing and former cavalry captain. The intention was to break the connection of the Centre with the other republican parties or to split the party and integrate it into a comprehensive conservative movement. However, the Centre refused to support Papen's government in any way and criticised him for "distorting and abusing good old ideals of the Centre, acting as the representative of reactionary circles". Papen forestalled being expelled by leaving the party.
Between coup d'état and authoritarian democracy
[edit]

Following Brüning's resignation, the Centre Party entered the opposition. Though they also opposed the Nazi Party, their energies were directed mainly against the renegade Papen. Some Centre politicians were soothed by Hitler's strategy of legality into downplaying the Nazi threat.[19]
In regard to the government, the Centre Party rejected a "temporal solution", such as Papen's presidial cabinets, and rather advocated a "total solution", i.e., a government according to the rules of the constitution. Since the Centre considered Papen's administration of being "in a dangerous way dependent on radical right-wing parties", chairman Ludwig Kaas advised the President to recognise this connection by basing the government on a coalition with the rising right-wing parties, the "logical result of current development". This would force the radicals to "take their share in responsibility" and "acquainting them with international politics". The Centre would then act as the party of opposition to this administration.[20]
As Papen was faced with almost uniform opposition by the parties, he had the Reichstag dissolved. In the subsequent elections, the Centre Party campaigned on two fronts, against both the Papen government and National Socialists and reaffirmed their stance as the "constitution party" opposed to "any measure contrary to constitution, justice and law" and "unwilling to yield to terror". The July 1932 elections brought further losses to the mainstream parties and gains to the extremist parties. The National Socialists supplanted the Social Democrats as the largest party in the Reichstag.
As Communists and National Socialists together had won the majority of seats, no government coalition could be formed without one of them. Papen tried to justify his authoritarian style of government by pointing out that parliament could no longer function properly. Countering this reasoning, the Centre and the BVP tried to re-establish a working parliament by cooperation with the National Socialists, since the three parties together had attained 53% of the seats. When Papen called upon the people to "reject the dictatorship of a single party", the Centre Party agreed "without reservation", but it also stated that "with the same resolution we reject the dictatorship of the nameless party, now in power … even if cloaked with the illusion of non-partisanship".
After Papen failed to get Hitler's support for his administration, the Centre began their own negotiations with the National Socialists. They started in the state of Prussia, where the Weimar Coalition had just lost its majority. An alternative majority could not be found and the Papen administration had seized this opportunity to assume control of Germany's largest state in the "Prussian coup" via presidential decree. Now, the National Socialists proposed to end this direct rule by forming a coalition with the Centre Party, promising an equal share in government. Since this went too far for the Centre's national leadership, the negotiations were transferred to the national level, where Heinrich Brüning conferred with Gregor Strasser. During that period the anti-Nazi polemics ceased in order not to disturb the negotiations. Since the NSDAP was the larger party, the Centre was willing to accept a Nazi as Chancellor, provided he could gain the trust of the President, which at that time seemed quite a difficult task.
The negotiations were bound for failure, since the aims of the two groups were largely incompatible. The Centre argued that the vote of July had "called Hitler not to dictatorship but to responsibility, to getting in line with law and constitution". They hoped to "build a strong government without touching the substance of the constitution", to create "clear responsibilities" and to "preclude anti-constitutional experiments". The Centre advocated a return to Brüning's "authoritarian democracy", which they considered up to the times and tested by experience, against Papen's "omnipotent state and independent leadership", while the Nazis would only accept a coalition that would serve their purpose of achieving total dominance. Not expecting a successful conclusion, Hitler used the Centre negotiations in order to put pressure on the Papen administration.
The negotiations were also met with criticism from within the Centre Party. Some rejected them as "currying favour with the National Socialists" and giving credence to Hitler's strategy of legality. Catholic journalists Fritz Gerlich and Ingbert Naab dismissed as "illusionary" the attempt to "uphold the constitution and the legal order" with a man such as Hitler with his "unconditional propensity to evil". Instead of "driving out the devil by Belzebub", the Centre should act as the parliament's conscience. The party leadership answered their critics by calling it a "duty of conscience" to try to achieve a constitutional government. Though Papen did not expect the negotiations to succeed, he was nonetheless concerned as a success would have led to a presidential crisis, as Hindenburg was unwilling to have a coalition parties dictate the administration. In September he ended all speculations by dissolving the Reichstag again, almost immediately after its first meeting.
Papen's act did not end the negotiations between the Centre and the NSDAP. In fact, it made further meetings possible, since the Centre Party's leadership blamed the failure not on the parties' incompatibility but on Papen calling for new elections. Since the NSDAP vote dropped again in the elections of November 1932, the Centre Party considered their strategy successful and resumed negotiations, this time under the slogan of forming a "Notgemeinschaft" ("community of need"), even though the Centre, BVP, and NSDAP together no longer formed a majority in parliament.
Kaas advised President Hindenburg not to continue Papen's "administration of conflict"; he advocated "national concentration including the National Socialists", but did not comment on an alternative Chancellor, since he considered that the "personal prerogative of the President". Hindenburg's negotiations with Hitler failed, but so did Kaas's attempt to form a coalition in parliament. By avoiding a clear statement, Hitler managed to pin the blame for this failure on the DNVP's Alfred Hugenberg, who had rejected Kaas's proposals.
Since the cabinet had refused to support Papen's planned coup d'état by a permanent dissolution of the Reichstag, in December Hindenburg appointed General Kurt von Schleicher as Chancellor. Schleicher tried to form a "Querfront" (an alliance involving willing members of both left-wing and right-wing parties), which failed. Schleicher then revived Papen's proposed coup d'état, which the Centre Party refused to condone, as did the other parties. Under these circumstances, Hindenburg refused to back the coup, and Schleicher accordingly resigned on 28 January 1933.[21]
Hitler government and new elections
[edit]Meanwhile, Papen had formed an intrigue to oust his successor. He conferred with Hugenberg and industrial magnates and bankers during a feverish night in which the outcome was unclear to all participants. On 30 January 1933 Hitler was appointed Chancellor with Papen as Vice-Chancellor and Hugenberg as minister for economics.
Though seeing their adversaries Papen and Hugenberg join forces with Hitler, the Centre Party still did not give up building a broad coalition government. Since the new administration was still lacking a majority in parliament, the Centre was ready to support it, either by toleration or by coalition. Hitler intended to minimise non-Nazi participation, but feigned a willingness to cooperate with the Centre and blamed Papen and Hugenberg for denying cabinet posts to the Centre. When Kaas requested a broad outline of his government's objectives, Hitler used the questionnaire presented by Kaas to declare the talks a failure and obtain the President's approval for calling for new elections for the third time in about half a year.
These elections in March 1933 were already marred by the SA's terror, after the Reichstag fire and civil rights had been suspended by President Hindenburg through the Reichstag Fire Decree. Still the Centre Party campaigned hard against the Hitler administration and managed to preserve their former vote of roughly 11 per cent. The government parties NSDAP and DNVP however jointly won 52 per cent of the vote. This result shattered the Centre Party's hopes of being indispensable for obtaining a majority in parliament. The party was now faced with two alternatives – either to persist in protesting and risk reprisals like Communists and Social Democrats, or to declare their loyal cooperation, in order to protect their members. As shown by subsequent events, though deeply uncomfortable with the new government, the party opted for the latter alternative.[22][page needed]
Enabling Act of 1933
[edit]
The government confronted the newly elected Reichstag with the Enabling Act of 1933 that would have vested the government with legislative powers for a period of four years. As the bill required a two-thirds majority in order to pass and the coalition parties only controlled 340 of the 647 seats (52.5 percent), the government needed the support of other parties.[22]
The Centre Party, whose vote was going to be decisive, was split on the issue of the Enabling Act. Chairman Kaas advocated supporting the bill in parliament in return for government guarantees. These mainly included respecting the President's Office retaining veto power, religious liberty, its involvement in culture, schools and education, the concordats signed by German states and the existence of the Centre Party. Via Papen, Hitler responded positively and personally addressed the issues in his Reichstag speech but he repeatedly put off signing a written letter of agreement.
Kaas was aware of the doubtful nature of such guarantees but when the Centre Party assembled on 23 March to decide on their vote, Kaas advised his fellow party members to support the bill, given the "precarious state of the party". He described his reasons as follows: "On the one hand we must preserve our soul, but on the other hand a rejection of the Enabling Act would result in unpleasant consequences for fraction and party. What is left is only to guard us against the worst. Were a two-thirds majority not obtained, the government's plans would be carried through by other means. The President has acquiesced in the Enabling Act. From the DNVP no attempt of relieving the situation is to be expected."[23]
According to English historian Richard J. Evans, the main reason why the Centre Party voted for the Enabling Act despite questioning the sincerity of Hitler's guarantees was because of the intimidation that it was subjected to. The party was further pressured by the fact that on 26 June 1933, all of the Reichstag and Landtag deputies of the Bavarian People's Party were placed in custody by Heinrich Himmler. This was also followed by the Nazi troops forcefully disbanding the Catholic trade unions, and Catholic civil servants being threatened with dismissals. In light of the increasing oppression, most members of the Centre Party believed that they were powerless to prevent the NSDAP from gaining power.[24] Evan wrote:
Yet the party wanted a Concordat not least because of the massive intimidation to which it had been subjected since the end of February 1933. This included violent attacks on Centre Party meetings during campaigning for the elections of 5 March 1933, during one of which the Centre Party politician and former government minister Adam Stegerwald was severely beaten by Nazi stormtroopers (on 22 February). One after another in the spring and early summer of 1933, Catholic lay organisations were being forcibly closed down or merged with their Nazi counterparts, Catholic journalists and newspaper editors were arrested, especially if they had attacked the Nazi-led coalition government in print, and leading Catholics were brutally mistreated by the SA. (...) Not surprisingly, it was fear of the complete destruction of its lay organisations and the reversal of all the progress that Catholic laymen had made towards gaining equality of status with Protestants that provided the major impetus behind the agreement of the Centre to dissolve itself in return for a Concordat in which the new regime would commit itself – with how little sincerity would soon become apparent – to preserving the integrity of the Catholic community and its institutions.
— Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich in History and Memory, (2015), pp. 87-88
A considerable number of parliamentarians opposed the chairman's course, among these former Chancellors Heinrich Brüning, Joseph Wirth and former minister Adam Stegerwald. Brüning called the Act the "most monstrous resolution ever demanded of a parliament" and was sceptical about Kaas's efforts: "The party has difficult years ahead, no matter how it would decide. Sureties for the government fulfilling its promises have not been given. Without a doubt, the future of the Centre Party is in danger and once it is destroyed it cannot be revived again."
The opponents also argued that Catholic social teaching ruled out participating in acts of revolution. The proponents argued that a "national revolution" had already occurred with Hitler's appointment and the presidential decree suspending civil rights. The Enabling Act would contain the revolutionary forces and move the government back to a legal order. Both groupings were not unaffected by Hitler's self-portrayal as a moderate seeking cooperation as opposed to the more revolutionary SA led by Ernst Röhm. Even Brüning thought it would be "decisive which groups of the NSDAP will be in power in the future. Will Hitler's power increase or will he fail, that is the question."
In the end the majority of Centre parliamentarians supported Kaas's proposal. Brüning and his followers agreed to respect party discipline by also voting in favour of the bill. The Reichstag assembled under turbulent circumstances. SA men served as guards and crowded outside the building to intimidate any opposition while the Communist and some Social Democratic members of the Reichstag had been imprisoned and were thus prevented from voting. In the end, the Centre voted as planned in favour of the Enabling Act, as did all the other parties apart from the SPD. The act was passed on 23 March 1933.
End of the party
[edit]The passing of the Enabling Act did not, as Kaas had suggested, prevent the Centre Party's demise. As promised during the negotiations, a working committee chaired by Hitler and Kaas was supposed to inform about further legislative measures. However, it met only three times (31 March, 2 and 7 April) without any major impact. At that time, the Centre Party was weakened by massive defections by party members. Loyal party members, in particular civil servants, and other Catholic organisations were subject to increasing reprisals, despite Hitler's previous guarantees. The party was also hurt by a declaration of the German bishops that, while maintaining their opposition to Nazi ideology, modified the ban on cooperation with the new authorities.[25][26]
The issue of the concordat prolonged Kaas's stay in Rome, leaving the party without an effective chairman: On 5 May Kaas finally resigned from his post and the party now elected Brüning as his successor. The party adopted a tempered version of the leadership principle; pro-Centre papers now declared that the party's members, or "retinue", would fully submit itself to Brüning. It was not enough, however, to relieve the growing pressure that it and other parties faced in the wake of the process of Gleichschaltung. Prominent members were frequently arrested and beaten, and pro-Centre civil servants were fired. As the summer of 1933 wore on, several government officials — including Papen — demanded that the Centre either dissolve or be closed down by the government.
By July, the Centre was the only non-Nazi party that still even nominally existed; the SPD and KPD had been banned outright, while the others had been browbeaten into dissolving themselves. On 1 July, Papen and Kaas agreed that as part of the concordat, German priests would stay out of politics. As it turned out, the party dissolved on 5 July — much to the dismay of Cardinal Pacelli, who felt the party should at least have waited until after the conclusion of negotiations. The day after, the government issued a law outlawing the formation of new political parties, thereby making the NSDAP the only legally permitted party in Germany.
Refounding and post-war history
[edit]

After the war, the party was refounded, but it was confronted with the emergence of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), a new party formed as a Christian party comprising both Catholics and Protestants. As many former Centre party politicians, such as Konrad Adenauer, were founding members or joined the CDU, and Cardinal Josef Frings of Cologne endorsed the new party, the party lost its position as the party of the Catholic population. For some time, however, the party managed to hold on to regional strongholds in North Rhine-Westphalia. In 1945, its Rudolf Amelunxen had been the new state's first Minister-President, and it participated in the state government until 1958, when it left the state parliament. Until 1959, the Centre was also represented in the state parliament of Lower Saxony.
On the national level, in the elections of 1949, it won ten seats in the first Bundestag. However, in 1953, the party (with the aid from the regional CDU) only retained three seats. In 1957, largely due to the massive CDU landslide that year, the party dropped out of the Bundestag completely and it did not return until 2022.
This demise is at least partly because of Helene Wessel. In 1949, she was one of the Centre's representatives in the Bundestag and also was elected chairwoman of the party, the first woman ever to lead a German party. In 1951, she vocally opposed Adenauer's policy of West German rearmament and joined forces with the CDU's Gustav Heinemann, the former Minister of the Interior. The two formed the Notgemeinschaft zur Rettung des Friedens in Europa ("Emergency Community to Save the Peace in Europe"), an initiative intended to prevent rearmament. Wessel resigned from her post and in November 1952 left the party. Immediately afterwards, Wessel and Heinemann turned the Notgemeinschaft into a political party, the All-German People's Party (Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei, GVP), that failed badly in the elections of 1953. In 1957, the GVP dissolved, and most members joined the SPD.
Meanwhile, the survivors of the Centre Party tried to forge an alliance of small parties of Christian persuasion, to offer an alternative to disappointed CDU/CSU voters, but they gained only the support of the Bavaria Party. The two parties joined forces under the name Federal Union, first in parliament since 1951 and in the 1957 the general elections, but the results were disappointing.
In 1988, the right wing of the party split off and formed the "Christian Centre Party". In 2003 the evangelical "Christian Party of Germany" (CPD) joined the Centre Party.
Since its demise on the national level, the party focuses on local politics, while maintaining the same positions as in the post-war period. The party is represented in some city councils in North Rhine-Westphalia and Saxony-Anhalt. Despite its marginal numbers, the party emphasises continuity to its history by sometimes referring to itself as the "oldest political party of Germany". According to its statutes the official name of the party is Deutsche Zentrumspartei – Älteste Partei Deutschlands gegründet 1870 (German Centre Party – Oldest Party in Germany founded in 1870).[27]
Small revival
[edit]The current chairman of the party is Klaus Brall. The party is affiliated with the European Christian Political Party.
In 2022, former Alternative for Germany member Uwe Witt joined the party while still holding his seat in the Bundestag. It is the first time since 1957 that the party has held a seat in the Bundestag.[28] Witt subsequently left in August of the same year.[29]
The party also got its first representation in the European Parliament on 10 June 2022, when the former AfD co-chairman Jörg Meuthen joined the party.[30] However, Meuthen left the party in September 2023.[31]
Ideology and beliefs
[edit]| Part of a series on |
| Christian democracy |
|---|
Although the party's ideology has shifted throughout its existence, it has consistently presented itself through a Christian democratic and politically Catholic profile. It was seen to occupy the political centre,[32] although the party is considered to have shifted towards the right of centre in early 1930s under the leadership of Ludwig Kaas.[33] The Oxford Handbook of the Weimar Republic argues that while "Until recently, historians considered Kaas to have been an... ominous indication of the Centre’s shift to the right", the party's position was "more nuanced", as it continued to accept the legitimacy of the Weimar Republic and its constitution, and Kaas strove to reconcile both the left-leaning and right-leaning wings of the party.[34]
The party adopted a new program in 2008 in which it stated rejection for the traditional left and right divide of politics and called for a "value-oriented" platform guided by the principles of Christianity and Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. The party supports the traditional family unit and is generally opposed to abortion. It has given support to right to life movements in Germany.[35][36]
During the Weimar era, the Centre Party was socially and economically heterogenous and included groups of various political views and interests, including republicans and monarchists.[37] It represented the entire "political microcosm of Weimar Catholic society". It included industrial workers and smallholders, broad middle class (including both the agrarian and urban middle classes), as well as entrepreneurs, civil servants and clerics, and lastly a small but influential group of Catholic aristocracy. The uniting element of the factions of the Centre Party was commitment to Political Catholicism.[38] The party also urged union with Austria.[39] The party had a left wing, represented by politicians such as Constantin Fehrenbach,[40] Matthias Erzberger, Joseph Wirth, as well as Catholic workers' associations and trade unions, led by the Centre's laborist politicians such as Adam Stegerwald.[41]
Left-wing factions of the Centre Party were committed to republicanism and pressured the Zentrum to officially identify itself as a pro-republican party; however, the party instead adopted a vague label of being a "constitutional party", which was "ready to collaborate with any legal government".[37] The leftists of the Centre Party also promoted cooperation with the SPD and advised Weimar Catholics to join the Reichsbanner; some left-wing Centre factions were also supportive of cooperation with right-wing nationalist trade unions on pragmatic basis.[41] Along with "republican-democratic" wings of the party, the Centre Party also had socialist factions. Catholic socialism was promoted by politicians such as Heinrich Mertens and Vitus Heller, as well as the Catholic priest Wilhelm Hohoff, who argued that Marx's criticism of capitalism is consistent with Catholic social teaching, and believed that the atheism of socialism "was not an essential ingredient but only a transient phase". The Catholic socialists of the Centre Party presented various positions, such as promoting a "third way" between capitalism and communism based on the papal encyclical Quadragesimo anno, or advocating economical socialism with a strongly religious and socially conservative character, but rejecting the secular currents of socialism and social democracy.[42]
In stark contrast to pro-parliamentary and pro-republican factions of the Centre, there were also anti-republican and anti-democratic factions, which argued that Weimar democracy promoted anti-Catholic values such as secularism, individualism and materialism. The party's right wing was represented by figures such as the cardinal Michael von Faulhaber or Hermann Port, who sought cooperation with conservative parties. Because of the extreme ideological heterogeneity of the party, it simultaneously participated in pro- and anti-republican coalitions on the local level.[43] In attempt to solve internal dissent, the party would increasingly appoint Catholic priests and clerics to leading positions, as opposed to non-clerical politicians associated with certain interest groups witin the party. This practice led to the appointment of figures such as Ludwig Kaas in 1928.[44] The party then became subject to the broader shift to the right of the Weimar society in late 1920s caused by the Great Depression and dissatisfaction with the Weimar political system, which also included the Catholic groups.[45]
In an updated policy platform in 2022, the Centre Party declares its objective is to protect the "Christian-Jewish roots of Europe and defend the free-democratic basic order of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany." The party supports a social market economy, keeping national debt low and strong social security systems. The party supports the integration of immigrants residing legally in Germany while protecting German national identity and ensuring compulsory laws for immigrants to learn German, understand German culture and undergo a values test before acquiring citizenship. It also calls for strong law and order and national security policies to combat violent crime and terrorism and supports German membership of NATO.[46]
Election results
[edit]German Reichstag/Bundestag
[edit]| Election year | Constituency | Party list | Seats won | +/– | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Votes | % | Votes | % | |||
| 1867–1868 | 315,777 | 9.6 | 36 / 382
|
|||
| 1871 | 724,000 | 18.6 | 63 / 382
|
|||
| 1874 | 1,446,000 | 27.9 | 91 / 397
|
|||
| 1877 | 1,341,300 | 24.8 | 93 / 397
|
|||
| 1878 | 1,328,100 | 23.1 | 94 / 397
|
|||
| 1881 | 1,182,900 | 23.2 | 100 / 397
|
|||
| 1884 | 1,282,000 | 22.6 | 99 / 397
|
|||
| 1887 | 1,516,200 | 20.1 | 98 / 397
|
|||
| 1890 | 1,342,100 | 18.6 | 106 / 397
|
|||
| 1893 | 1,468,500 | 19.1 | 96 / 397
|
|||
| 1898 | 1,455,100 | 18.8 | 102 / 397
|
|||
| 1903 | 1,875,300 | 19.8 | 100 / 397
|
|||
| 1907 | 2,179,800 | 19.4 | 105 / 397
|
|||
| 1912 | 1,996,800 | 16.4 | 91 / 397
|
|||
| 1919 | 5,980,216 | 19.67 | 91 / 423
|
|||
| 1920 | 3,845,001 | 13.6 | 64 / 459
|
|||
| May 1924 | 3,914,379 | 13.4 | 65 / 472
|
|||
| December 1924 | 4,118,849 | 13.6 | 69 / 493
|
|||
| 1928 | 3,712,152 | 12.1 | 61 / 491
|
|||
| 1930 | 4,127,000 | 11.81 | 68 / 577
|
|||
| July 1932 | 4,589,430 | 12.44 | 75 / 608
|
|||
| November 1932 | 4,230,545 | 11.93 | 70 / 584
|
|||
| March 1933 | 4,424,905 | 11.25 | 73 / 647
|
|||
| November 1933 | Banned. National Socialist German Workers Party sole legal party. | |||||
| 1936 | ||||||
| 1938 | ||||||
| 1949 | 727,505 | 3.1 | 10 / 402
|
|||
| 1953 | 55,835 | 0.2 | 217,078 | 0.8 | 3 / 509
|
|
| 1957[a] | 295,533 | 1.0 | 254,322 | 0.9 | 0 / 519
|
|
| 1961 | did not participate | |||||
| 1965[b] | 11,978 | 0.0 | 19,832 | 0.1 | 0 / 518
|
|
| 1969 | — | — | 15,933 | 0.0 | 0 / 518
|
|
| 1972 | did not participate | |||||
| 1976 | ||||||
| 1980 | ||||||
| 1983 | ||||||
| 1987 | 4,020 | 0.0 | 19,035 | 0.1 | 0 / 519
|
|
| 1990 | did not participate | |||||
| 1994 | 1,489 | 0.0 | 3,757 | 0.0 | 0 / 672
|
|
| 1998 | 2,076 | 0.0 | — | — | 0 / 669
|
|
| 2002 | 1,823 | 0.0 | 3,127 | 0.0 | 0 / 603
|
|
| 2005 | 1,297 | 0.0 | 4,010 | 0.0 | 0 / 614
|
|
| 2009 | 369 | 0.0 | 6,087 | 0.0 | 0 / 622
|
|
| 2013 | did not participate | |||||
| 2017 | ||||||
| 2021 | ||||||
| 2025 | ||||||
Volkstag of Danzig
[edit]| Election year | Votes | % | Seats won | +/– |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1920 | 21,262 | 13.88 | 17 / 120
|
|
| 1923 | 21,114 | 12.81 | 15 / 120
|
|
| 1927 | 26,096 | 14.27 | 18 / 120
|
|
| 1930 | 30,230 | 15.28 | 11 / 72
|
|
| 1933 | 31,336 | 14.63 | 10 / 72
|
|
| 1935 | 31,522 | 13.41 | 10 / 72
|
Landesrat of the Territory of the Saar Basin
[edit]| Election year | Votes | % | Seats won | +/– |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1922 | 92,252 | 47.7 | 16 / 30
|
– |
| 1924 | 3,246,511[47] | 42.8 | 14 / 30
|
|
| 1928 | 129,162 | 46.4 | 14 / 30
|
|
| 1932 | 156,615 | 43.2 | 14 / 30
|
See also
[edit]Notes
[edit]- ^ As member of the Federal Union
- ^ As member of the Christian People's Party (CVP)
References
[edit]- ^ Fogarty, Michael P. (1957). Christian Democracy in Western Europe: 1820–1953. Routledge Revivals. ISBN 978-1-351-38672-2.
{{cite book}}: ISBN / Date incompatibility (help) - ^ Spenkuch, Jorg L.; Tillmann, Philipp (2017). "Elite Influence? Religion and the Electoral Success of the Nazis". American Journal of Political Science. 62 (1). Midwest Political Science Association: 3. doi:10.1111/ajps.12328.
Promoting the political and cultural ideals of Germany's Catholic minority, the Zentrum had been the spearhead of Political Catholicism ever since its founding in the second half of the nineteenth century.
- ^ Rossol, Nadine; Ziemann, Benjamin; Baranowski, Shelley (2022). The Oxford Handbook of the Weimar Republic (1st ed.). Oxford University Press. p. 459. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198845775.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-884577-5.
In addition, the Centre remained a republican party opposed to the anticonstitutional right. Nowhere was this clearer than in the overwhelming support that Catholics lent to Hindenburg's re-election as President in 1932 in order to block the candidacies of Adolf Hitler and the Stahlhelm leader, Theodor Duesterberg.
- ^ Rossol, Nadine; Ziemann, Benjamin; Stibbe, Matthew (2022). The Oxford Handbook of the Weimar Republic (1st ed.). Oxford University Press. pp. 119–122. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198845775.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-884577-5.
However, having agreed the wording of the proposed law, the SPD and KPD failed to persuade centrist 'bourgeois' parties like the DDP or the Zentrum officially to join them, giving the referendum campaign a distinctly sectarian aura from the outset. [...] The republican paramilitary organization the Reichsbanner, which leaned strongly towards the SPD but also had supporters from the centrist DDP and Zentrum in its ranks and was therefore officially obliged to stay neutral in the referendum, also found itself in a deeply uncomfortable position in 1926, with some left-wing and even moderate branches coming out in defiance for a 'yes' vote.
- ^ Spenkuch, Jörg L.; Tillmann, Philipp (2018). "Elite Influence? Religion and the Electoral Success of the Nazis". American Journal of Political Science. 62 (1): 21. doi:10.1111/ajps.12328. JSTOR 26598748.
"As a consequence, the Zentrum's right-of-center position both aided and hindered the Church hierarchy's efforts to counter extremist movements.
- ^ Blackbourn, David (December 1975). "The Political Alignment of the Centre Party in Wilhelmine Germany: A Study of the Party's Emergence in Nineteenth-Century Württemberg". Historical Journal. 18 (4): 821–850. doi:10.1017/S0018246X00008906. JSTOR 2638516.
- ^ Schmidgall 2012, p. 28.
- ^ Christopher Clark, Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947 (2006) pp 568-576
- ^ Ronald J. Ross, The failure of Bismarck's Kulturkampf: Catholicism and state power in imperial Germany, 1871-1887 (Washington, D.C., 1998)
- ^ Morsey, Rudolf (1966). Die deutsche Zentrumspartei, 1917-1923. Droste. OCLC 963771636.
- ^ Helmut Walser Smith, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict: Culture, Ideology, Politics, 1870-1914 (2014), p. 197-198.
- ^ Robson, Stuart (2007). The First World War (1 ed.). Harrow, England: Pearson Longman. pp. 61–62. ISBN 978-1-4058-2471-2 – via Archive Foundation.
- ^ "Bayerische Volkspartei (BVP)". Deutsches Historisches Museum (in German). 17 September 2014. Retrieved 19 January 2023.
- ^ Jones, L.E. (2020). The German Right, 1918–1930: Political Parties, Organized Interests, and Patriotic Associations in the Struggle against Weimar Democracy. Cambridge University Press. p. 140. ISBN 978-1-108-49407-6. Retrieved 25 March 2024.
- ^ Dill 1954, p. 101.
- ^ Haffert, Claus (1994). Die katholischen Arbeitervereine Westdeutschlands in der Weimarer Republik (1. Aufl ed.). Essen: Klartext. ISBN 388474187X. OCLC 32830554.
- ^ Ruppert, Karsten (1992). Im Dienst am Staat von Weimar: das Zentrum als regierende Partei in der Weimarer Demokratie: 1923-1930. Droste. ISBN 3770051661. OCLC 797422863.
- ^ Evans, Richard J. (2003). The Coming of the Third Reich. New York City: Penguin Press. ISBN 978-0141009759.
- ^ Patch, William L. Jr. Heinrich Bruning and the Dissolution of the Weimar Republic. Cambridge University Press, 2006. pp 278–288.
- ^ Lutz, Ralph Haswell. "The Collapse of German Democracy under the Brüning Government March 30, 1930-May 30, 1932." Pacific Historical Review (1941): 1-14.
- ^ Patch, pp 278–291.
- ^ a b Evans, The German Center Party, 1870-1933
- ^ Martin R. Menke, "Misunderstood Civic Duty: The Center Party and the Enabling Act." Journal of Church and State 51.2 (2009): 236-264.
- ^ Evans, Richard J. (2015). The Third Reich in History and Memory. Little, Brown Book Group. pp. 87–88. ISBN 978-1-4087-0643-5.
- ^ Zeender, (1984), pp. 428-441.
- ^ Evans, (1981).
- ^ "Parteisatzung". Archived from the original on 15 January 2008. Retrieved 6 January 2008.
- ^ Zentrumspartei (18 January 2022). "Beitritt von Uwe Witt: Deutsche Zentrumspartei wieder im Bundestag vertreten". zentrumspartei. Retrieved 18 January 2022.
- ^ Zentrumspartei (23 August 2022). "Mitteilung zum Parteiaustritt von Uwe Witt, MdB". ZENTRUM - Deutsche Zentrumspartei. Retrieved 11 September 2022.
- ^ "Ex-AfD-Chef Meuthen wechselt in neue Partei". 10 June 2022. Retrieved 10 June 2022.
- ^ Streib, Daniel (8 September 2023). "Ex-AfD-Chef Jörg Meuthen verlässt Zentrum und räumt Scheitern ein". Badische Neueste Nachrichten (in German).
- ^ Blackbourn, David (1975). "The Political Alignment of the Centre Party in Wilhelmine Germany: A Study of the Party's Emergence in Nineteenth-Century Württemberg". The Historical Journal. 18 (4): 821–850. doi:10.1017/S0018246X00008906. ISSN 0018-246X. JSTOR 2638516. S2CID 39447688.
- ^ Spenkuch, Jörg L.; Tillmann, Philipp (2018). "Elite Influence? Religion and the Electoral Success of the Nazis". American Journal of Political Science. 62 (1): 19–36. doi:10.1111/ajps.12328. JSTOR 26598748.
- ^ Rossol, Nadine; Ziemann, Benjamin; Stibbe, Matthew (2022). The Oxford Handbook of the Weimar Republic (1st ed.). Oxford University Press. p. 457. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198845775.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-884577-5.
- ^ "Grundsatzprogramm". Zentrumspartei.de. Retrieved 11 June 2022.
- ^ "Rechtliche Schritte vorbehalten". domradio.de. 27 June 2018. Retrieved 29 June 2018.
Über einem Foto einer Abtreibungsklinik ist der Schriftzug „Abtreiben macht frei" zu lesen – in Anlehnung an die Aufschrift „Arbeit macht frei" über dem Tor des Vernichtungslagers Auschwitz-Birkenau.
- ^ a b Dorpalen, Andreas [in German] (2016). Hindenberg and the Weimar Republic. Princeton Legacy Library. p. 118. ISBN 9780691651378.
- ^ Kaiser, Wolfram; Wohnout, Helmut (2004). Political Catholicism in Europe 1918-45. Vol. 1. Routledge. p. 42. ISBN 0-203-65539-7.
- ^ Mallory, Walter H. (1 January 1930). Political Handbook of the World 1930. New York: Yale University Press New Haven for Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. (published 1930). p. 72.
- ^ Jones, Larry Eugene (1988). German Liberalism and the Dissolution of the Weimar Party System, 1918-1933. 979-8-8908-7883-0. p. 85.
- ^ a b Knapp, Thomas A. (1969). "The German Center Party and the Reichsbanner: A Case Study in Political and Social Consensus in the Weimar Republic". International Review of Social History. 14 (2): 159–179. doi:10.1017/S0020859000003564.
- ^ Knapp, Thomas (1975). "The Red and the Black: Catholic Socialists in the Weimar Republic". The Catholic Historical Review. 61 (3). Catholic University of America Press: 386–408.
- ^ Greenberg, Udi (2014). The Weimar Century: German Emigres and the Ideological Foundations of the Cold War. Princeton University Press. p. 123. ISBN 978-0-691-15933-1.
- ^ Kaiser, Wolfram; Wohnout, Helmut (2004). Political Catholicism in Europe 1918-45. Vol. 1. Routledge. p. 43. ISBN 0-203-65539-7.
- ^ Greenberg, Udi (2014). The Weimar Century: German Emigres and the Ideological Foundations of the Cold War. Princeton University Press. p. 130. ISBN 978-0-691-15933-1.
- ^ "policy". Retrieved 16 June 2022.
- ^ every voter had 30 votes
Works cited
[edit]- Dill, Marshall (1954). "The Christian Trade Unions During the Last Years of Imperial Germany and the First Months of the Weimar Republic". Review of Social Economy. 12 (2). Taylor & Francis, Ltd.: 89–109. doi:10.1080/00346765400000024. ISSN 0034-6764. JSTOR 29767502. Retrieved 25 March 2024.
- Grünthal, Günther (1968). Reichsschulgesetz und Zentrumspartei in der Weimarer Republik. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien (in German). Droste. ISBN 978-3-7700-5056-7. Retrieved 27 November 2024.
- Grünthal, Günther (1979). ""Zusammenschluß" oder "Evangelisches Zentrum"? Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Deutschen Zentrumspartei in der Weimarer Republik". In Pöls, Werner (ed.). Staat und Gesellschaft im politischen Wandel. Beiträge zur Geschichte der modernen Welt (in German). Stuttgart: Klett Cotta. pp. 301–330. ISBN 9783129119006.
- Mitchell, Maria (2012). "Confessional Conflict in German History". The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany. Social History, Popular Culture, And Politics In Germany. University of Michigan Press. ISBN 978-0-472-02854-2. Retrieved 27 November 2024.
- Schmidgall, Markus (2012). Die Revolution 1918/19 in Baden. Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. ISBN 9783866447271.
Further reading
[edit]- Anderson, Margaret Lavinia. Windthorst: A Political Biography (Oxford University Press, 1981).
- Anderson, Margaret Lavinia. Practicing Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany (2000) excerpt and text search
- Anderson, Margaret Lavinia, and Kenneth Barkin. "The myth of the Puttkamer purge and the reality of the Kulturkampf: Some reflections on the historiography of Imperial Germany." Journal of Modern History 54.4 (1982): 647-686. online
- Bennette, Rebecca Ayako. Fighting for the Soul of Germany: The Catholic Struggle for Inclusion After Unification (Harvard University Press; 2012)
- Blackbourn, David. "The Political Alignment of the Centre Party in Wilhelmine Germany: A Study of the Party's Emergence in Nineteenth-Century Württemberg," Historical Journal Vol. 18, No. 4 (Dec. 1975), pp. 821–850 in JSTOR
- Bredohl, Thomas Matthias. Class and Religious Identity: The Rhenish Center Party in Wilhelmine Germany (Marquette University Press, 2000).
- Cary, Noel D. Path to Christian Democracy: German Catholics and the Party System from Windthorst to Adenauer (1996)
- Elvert, Jürgen (2004). Kaiser, Wolfram; Wohnout, Helmut (eds.). A Microcosm of Society or the Key to a Majority in the Reichstag? The Centre Party in Germany. Political Catholicism in Europe 1918-45. Routledge. pp. 38–52. ISBN 0-7146-5650-X.
- Evans, Ellen Lovell. The German Center Party 1870-1933: A Study in Political Catholicism (1981)
- Jones, Larry Eugene. "Catholic conservatives in the Weimar Republic: the politics of the Rhenish-Westphalian aristocracy, 1918–1933." German History 18.1 (2000): 60-85.
- Kohler, Eric D. "The Successful German Center-Left: Joseph Hess and the Prussian Center Party, 1908–32." Central European History 23.4 (1990): 313-348.
- Lutz, Ralph Haswell. "The Collapse of German Democracy under the Brüning Government March 30, 1930–May 30, 1932." Pacific Historical Review (1941) 10#1: 1-14. online
- Ross, Ronald J. "Critic of the Bismarckian Constitution: Ludwig Windthorst and the Relationship Between Church and State in Imperial Germany," Journal of Church & State (1979) 21#3 pp 483–506. online
- Ross, Ronald J. Beleaguered Tower: The Dilemma of Political Catholicism in Wilhelmine Germany (1976),
- Zeender, John. "Ludwig Windthorst, 1812-1891," History (1992) 77#290 pp 237–54 online
- Zeender, John K. "The German Center Party, 1890-1906." Transactions of the American Philosophical Society (1976) 66#1 pp 1–125.
Historiography
[edit]- Anderson, Margaret Lavinia. "Confessions of a Fellow Traveler," Catholic Historical Review (2013) 99#4 pp 623–648.
- Drury, Marjule Anne. "Anti-Catholicism in Germany, Britain, and the United States: A review and critique of recent scholarship." Church History 70.1 (2001): 98-131 online
- Zeender, John K. "Recent Literature on the German Center Party," Catholic Historical Review (1984) 70#3 pp 428–441. in JSTOR
External links
[edit]Centre Party (Germany)
View on GrokipediaFoundations in the German Empire (1870-1918)
Catholic Origins and Pre-Party Movements
The roots of the Centre Party trace to the resurgence of Catholic political organization in German states during the mid-19th century, amid fears of Protestant Prussian dominance following the Napoleonic secularizations and the 1848 revolutions. German Catholics, particularly in the Rhineland and southern regions, formed associations and parliamentary fractions to defend ecclesiastical interests against liberal and Protestant influences. These efforts crystallized in response to Otto von Bismarck's unification policies, which heightened Catholic apprehensions about marginalization in a Protestant-led empire.[8] In the Prussian Landtag, Catholic deputies coalesced into informal groups as early as the 1840s, evolving into the Katholische Fraktion by 1852 under the leadership of brothers Peter and August Reichensperger. Peter Reichensperger, a prominent advocate for Gothic Revival architecture and ultramontane Catholicism, emphasized the need for Catholics to assert their rights within a unified Germany. This fraction opposed measures eroding church autonomy, such as civil marriage proposals, laying groundwork for broader coordination.[9][10] Anticipating the first Reichstag elections after the 1870-71 unification, Reichensperger issued a public call on June 11, 1870, in the Kölner Volkszeitung urging Catholics to unite politically beyond regional lines. This prompted a national conference in October 1870, attended by priests, Catholic federation representatives, and nobility, which coordinated candidate slates and programmatic unity. Ludwig Windthorst, initially active in Hanoverian politics, emerged as a key ally, bridging northern Protestant-Catholic tensions despite his convert background. These pre-party movements reflected a pragmatic alliance of clergy, laity, and conservatives aimed at safeguarding confessional parity rather than separatism.[8][11] Catholic clubs and Volksvereine proliferated in the 1860s, fostering grassroots mobilization; by 1870, these networks provided the organizational backbone for what would become the Centre. Figures like Joseph Görres had earlier championed Catholic journalism and petitions, influencing the shift from passive defense to active parliamentary engagement. This foundation ensured the party's rapid cohesion upon formal founding, drawing from empirical Catholic demographic strength—approximately one-third of the population—in key industrial and agricultural areas.[12]The Soest Programme and Formal Founding (1871)
The Soest Programme, formulated during a Catholic conference in Soest on 28 October 1870, outlined core principles for political representation of Catholic interests amid German unification. It demanded the preservation of the Church's constitutionally recognized independence and rights, repulsion of any interference in the constitutional prerogatives of individual federal states, maintenance of parity between denominations in mixed areas, safeguarding of civil liberties including freedom of the press and association, and opposition to centralizing tendencies that undermined federalism.[11][13] The programme's motto, "Für Wahrheit, Recht und Freiheit!" (For Truth, Justice, and Freedom!), underscored its commitment to constitutionalism and ecclesiastical autonomy as bulwarks against perceived Protestant dominance in Prussian-led unification.[13] On 13 December 1870, shortly before the opening of the Prussian Diet, over 50 Catholic deputies formally constituted the "Zentrum" (Centre) faction within the Prussian House of Deputies, explicitly adopting the Soest Programme as their guiding platform. This step transformed the programme from a declarative statement into an operational basis for parliamentary action, positioning the faction as a defender of Catholic and federal interests against centralist policies. Key figures such as Peter Reichensperger, a prominent Catholic publicist and deputy, drove the initiative, emphasizing the need for unified resistance to encroachments on religious freedoms.[11][14] The formal national founding occurred following the German Empire's proclamation on 18 January 1871 and the convening of the first Reichstag elections on 3 March 1871, in which Catholic candidates secured 63 seats, representing approximately 18.6% of the vote. On 21 March 1871, these Reichstag deputies established the Centre Party caucus, extending the Soest Programme's tenets to imperial politics. The caucus's late March programme reiterated demands for upholding the Reich's federative character, protecting religious communities' autonomy, ensuring civic and confessional freedoms, and prioritizing justice as the foundation of governance, while allowing members voting flexibility on non-core issues.[15][11] This structure enabled the party to function as a cohesive bloc despite internal regional and ideological variances, laying the groundwork for its role in subsequent Reichstag deliberations.[15]Kulturkampf: Bismarck's Assault and Party Resilience
Otto von Bismarck launched the Kulturkampf in 1871 as a campaign to assert state control over the Catholic Church, prompted by concerns over papal influence following the First Vatican Council and loyalty issues among Catholic populations, particularly Poles in Prussia.[16] Initial measures included the abolition in July 1871 of the Catholic section within the Prussian Ministry of Public Worship and Education, followed by the Pulpit Law on December 10, 1871, which criminalized clerical statements perceived as endangering public peace, punishable by up to two years' imprisonment.[17] The Centre Party, representing Catholic interests in the Reichstag, immediately contested these encroachments, framing them as violations of religious liberty and framing its parliamentary opposition as a defense against secular overreach.[18] The escalation peaked with the May Laws of 1873, enacted under Prussian Culture Minister Adalbert Falk, which mandated state approval for priestly training, restricted ecclesiastical appointments, and enabled the expulsion of unauthorized religious orders, leading to the imprisonment or exile of numerous bishops and priests.[19] Centre Party leaders, including Hermann von Mallinckrodt until his death in 1874 and subsequently Ludwig Windthorst, orchestrated a strategy of legal challenges, public protests, and bloc voting to obstruct implementation, while Windthorst's tactical acumen in Reichstag debates earned him Bismarck's grudging respect as the chancellor's chief adversary.[20] Despite severe repression—over 1,800 priests faced penalties by 1876—the party's cohesion held, bolstered by grassroots Catholic solidarity and petitions amassing millions of signatures against the laws.[21] By 1878, Bismarck, confronting the emerging socialist threat and internal political shifts, pivoted toward reconciliation, negotiating with Pope Leo XIII and initiating the repeal of key Kulturkampf statutes, such as the May Laws in 1880 and 1887.[22] The Centre Party's steadfast resistance not only preserved Catholic institutional autonomy but also solidified its role as a pivotal force in German politics, emerging from the conflict with enhanced legitimacy among confessional voters, as evidenced by sustained electoral gains in Catholic strongholds through the 1870s.[23] This resilience underscored the limits of Bismarck's authoritarian tactics against organized religious opposition, preventing the full subjugation of the Church.[18]Efforts to Broaden Beyond Confessional Base
From the 1870s onward, Centre Party leaders, particularly Ludwig Windthorst after assuming party leadership in 1874, positioned the organization as a defender of federalism and regional autonomy against Prussian centralization, aiming to attract non-Catholic particularists such as the Protestant voters in former Hanover.[24] Windthorst cultivated alliances with the German-Hanoverian Party (Welfs), Protestant opponents of Bismarck's unification policies, culminating in collaborative Reichstag blocs that amplified opposition to centralizing reforms on 28 March 1889, when Windthorst met with Welf representatives to coordinate strategy. These partnerships emphasized shared interests in decentralism over confessional divides, with the Centre securing occasional support in Protestant-majority districts like those in Oldenburg and Hanover by highlighting anti-Prussian sentiments.[24] The party's foundational documents and public rhetoric reinforced its non-exclusive character; statutes permitted non-Catholic membership, and Windthorst repeatedly argued in Reichstag speeches that the Centre represented constitutional and minority protections applicable to all denominations, not merely Catholic interests.[25] Efforts extended to nominating Protestant candidates in Alsace-Lorraine and mixed areas, where the party garnered votes through advocacy for bilingualism and local governance, achieving minor breakthroughs such as the election of non-Catholic deputies by 1881.[24] Internally, figures like Julius Bachem pushed for programmatic diversification in the early 1900s, advocating reduced emphasis on confessional exclusivity to broaden appeal amid industrialization and social shifts, though this sparked debates unresolved until the Empire's end.[25] Despite these initiatives, electoral data revealed persistent confessional boundaries: the party held 90-100 seats from 1874 to 1912, predominantly from Catholic strongholds in the Rhine, Westphalia, and south, with Protestant inroads limited to under 10% of mandates.[15] The strategy reflected pragmatic adaptation post-Kulturkampf, prioritizing governmental coalitions—like support for Chancellor Leo von Caprivi in 1890-1894—in exchange for policy concessions, thereby demonstrating viability as a cross-confessional partner.[25]World War I Stance and the 1918 Revolution
The Centre Party supported the German Empire's war effort during the initial phases of World War I, aligning with the Burgfriedenspolitik truce that united parliamentary parties behind the government.[26] This stance reflected the party's nationalist leanings and commitment to confessional interests amid the national crisis, with members contributing to war financing and policy debates. However, as military setbacks mounted, internal divisions emerged, particularly by 1917, when the party's left wing, led by Matthias Erzberger, pushed for a negotiated end to the conflict.[26][24] On July 19, 1917, the Reichstag adopted the Peace Resolution, introduced by Centre deputy Erzberger on behalf of the Centre, Social Democrats, and Progressives, advocating a "peace of understanding" without forcible annexations, indemnities, or ongoing enmity, while upholding the right to self-determination.[27][28] The resolution passed 212 to 126, signaling a parliamentary shift away from expansionist war aims, though it faced opposition from conservatives and military leaders.[29] In November 1917, party leader Georg von Hertling became Reich Chancellor, serving until October 3, 1918, under the influence of the High Command, yet unable to reverse the war's trajectory.[30] As defeat became inevitable, Erzberger represented the new government in signing the Armistice of Compiègne on November 11, 1918, accepting Allied terms to halt hostilities.[31][32] The ensuing November Revolution, triggered by naval mutinies and the Kaiser's abdication on November 9, prompted the Centre Party to reluctantly embrace the republican order, reorganizing its leadership on November 14–15 amid chaos.[24] While conservative elements resisted the overthrow of the monarchy, fearing socialist dominance and anti-clerical measures, pragmatic leaders like Erzberger prioritized stability, demarcating against radical leftists and aligning with bourgeois forces to safeguard Catholic interests in the emerging Weimar system.[24][26] The party justified participation in the provisional government and subsequent coalitions as a patriotic duty, laying groundwork for its role in the National Assembly elections of January 19, 1919, where it secured 91 seats.[24]
Performance and Pivots in the Weimar Republic (1919-1933)
Adaptation to Parliamentary Democracy
The Centre Party, emerging from the monarchical German Empire, pragmatically accepted the Weimar Republic's parliamentary framework following the November Revolution of 1918, viewing the new democratic order as a fait accompli rather than an ideological commitment, which allowed it to balance internal monarchist and republican factions by positioning itself as a Verfassungspartei (party of the constitution).[33] This adaptation involved abandoning resistance to the republican system in favor of active participation, including joining the "Weimar Coalition" with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and German Democratic Party (DDP) to ratify the Weimar Constitution on August 11, 1919.[34] In the January 1919 National Assembly elections, the party secured 19.7% of the vote and 91 seats, establishing itself as a pivotal centrist force capable of bridging left and right in coalition governments.[5] Key leaders exemplified this shift: Matthias Erzberger, as armistice signatory and finance minister in 1919, endorsed the Treaty of Versailles and pursued Erfüllungspolitik to stabilize the republic amid reparations crises, while Constantin Fehrenbach served as Reichstag president in 1918 and chancellor from 1920 to 1921, leading minority governments reliant on Centre support.[5] The party supplied ministers to the initial Scheidemann and Bauer cabinets, contributing to the republic's formative legislative efforts despite internal debates over ditching confessional exclusivity for a broader Christian-national appeal, as proposed in the failed 1920 Essener Programm drafted by figures like Heinrich Brüning.[33] These efforts reflected a strategic pivot from Kulturkampf-era defensiveness to leveraging parliamentary majorities for Catholic interests, including church autonomy under the 1919 Weimar Constitution's parity provisions.[35] However, adaptation was not seamless; the party's broad ideological spectrum—from left-leaning advocates like Joseph Wirth, chancellor in 1921–1922, to conservatives open to restoring a constitutional monarchy during instability—meant support for parliamentary democracy remained contested, with no explicit programmatic endorsement of republicanism beyond pragmatic governance.[33][5] By the mid-1920s, under leaders like Wilhelm Marx (chancellor in three terms, 1923–1924 and 1926–1928), the Centre had solidified its role in stabilizing coalitions, such as the 1925–1928 Grand Coalition, while navigating economic turmoil and regional splits like the Bavarian People's Party's secession in 1920 over federalist disputes.[5] This participation underscored a causal realism in prioritizing institutional continuity and Catholic patronage over ideological purity, enabling the party to function as a "bulwark" in Weimar's fragmented system despite underlying ambivalence toward full democratization.[36]Heinrich Brüning's Chancellorship and Austerity Measures (1930-1932)
Heinrich Brüning, a prominent Centre Party politician and Reichstag deputy since 1924, was appointed Chancellor on March 30, 1930, by President Paul von Hindenburg following the collapse of the previous grand coalition government over failed budget negotiations amid the onset of the Great Depression.[37][38] Lacking a parliamentary majority, Brüning's minority cabinet—comprising Centre Party members and independents—relied on emergency decrees under Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution to govern, bypassing Reichstag opposition from Social Democrats and Communists.[39] The Centre Party, as the largest coalition partner, provided crucial initial backing for Brüning's administration, viewing his fiscal conservatism as aligned with its anti-socialist economic stance and Catholic social teachings.[40] Brüning's core strategy centered on deflationary austerity to balance the federal budget, reduce public debt, and pressure reparations revisions by demonstrating Germany's fiscal discipline. Between July 1930 and May 1932, he enacted five major emergency fiscal decrees that slashed civil service salaries by up to 20 percent, cut unemployment benefits and pensions, raised income and turnover taxes, and curtailed public works spending, aiming to lower nominal wages and prices to restore competitiveness without currency devaluation.[41] These measures, rooted in Brüning's aversion to inflation—shaped by the 1923 hyperinflation—prioritized short-term budget equilibrium over stimulus, with the expectation that economic pain would force international concessions like the 1931 Hoover Moratorium on reparations payments.[42] Centre Party leaders, including Brüning himself as a former party finance expert, endorsed this approach as necessary to avert fiscal collapse, though it strained the party's working-class base.[40] The austerity regime exacerbated Germany's economic downturn: real GDP contracted by an estimated additional 4.5 percent in 1932 alone due to the policies' contractionary impact, while unemployment doubled from approximately 3 million in 1930 to over 6 million by 1932, fostering widespread impoverishment and social unrest.[43][44] Political fallout included the dissolution of the Reichstag in September 1930 after Brüning's budget defeat, leading to elections where the Nazis surged from 12 to 107 seats, capitalizing on voter discontent with deflation-induced hardship.[45] Within the Centre Party, support for Brüning held amid intra-party debates, but mounting extremism eroded its centrist position; Brüning resigned on May 30, 1932, after Hindenburg, influenced by military and conservative advisors, withdrew confidence amid perceptions of policy rigidity.[39] Historians attribute the chancellorship's failure partly to Brüning's inflexible orthodoxy, which, while fiscally prudent in intent, amplified the Depression's deflationary spiral without achieving reparations relief or stability.[46]
Navigating Instability: Papen, Schleicher, and Coalition Shifts (1932)
Following Heinrich Brüning's dismissal on May 30, 1932, President Paul von Hindenburg appointed Franz von Papen as Chancellor on June 1, 1932. Papen, a longtime member of the Centre Party's ultraright wing, faced immediate backlash from the party's executive committee, which demanded his resignation on May 31 due to his role in Brüning's ouster. To avoid formal expulsion, Papen preemptively quit the party on June 3, 1932, marking a definitive split.[47][48] The Centre Party, led by Ludwig Kaas, entered opposition to Papen's "cabinet of barons," rejecting its reliance on Article 48 emergency powers as an authoritarian deviation from parliamentary democracy. Kaas criticized Papen's moves, including the "Preußenschlag" on July 20, 1932, which ousted Prussia's Social Democratic government, as erosive of federalism and constitutional norms. On September 12, 1932, the Reichstag, convened after the July 31 elections, passed a no-confidence vote against Papen by 513 to 42, with the Centre Party joining the majority despite holding 75 seats from the election—up slightly from 68 in 1930 but insufficient for coalitions without the Nazis. The party advocated a "total solution" through stable parliamentary majorities rather than temporary presidial rule, resisting Papen's overtures for support amid economic distress and rising Nazi influence.[49] Papen's government persisted until November 17, 1932, after failing to secure a working majority following November 6 elections, where the Centre retained 70 seats. Kurt von Schleicher succeeded as Chancellor on December 3, 1932, promising a "cross-front" alliance transcending parties, including overtures to trade unions and moderate elements. However, the Centre Party maintained resistance, viewing Schleicher's maneuvers—such as delaying Reichstag sessions—as further threats to democratic processes. On October 17, 1932, Kaas had proposed a "German emergency and majority community" to rally institutions against dictatorship, underscoring the party's commitment to constitutional defense over expedient authoritarianism. No coalition materialized with Schleicher, as the party prioritized parliamentary revival amid fragmentation, with internal debates weighing anti-Nazi firmness against pragmatic accommodations.[49][50]Endorsement of Hitler, March 1933 Elections, and the Enabling Act
After Adolf Hitler's appointment as Chancellor on January 30, 1933, without initial support from the Centre Party, the Reichstag was dissolved amid political instability, leading to federal elections on March 5, 1933. These elections occurred under severe intimidation, including arrests of political opponents and violence by SA paramilitaries, following the Reichstag fire on February 27. The Nazi Party (NSDAP) won 43.9% of the vote, securing 288 seats, while the German National People's Party (DNVP) obtained 8%, with 52 seats; the Centre Party maintained a presence with 11.2% of the vote and 73 seats.[51][52] Lacking an absolute majority, Hitler pursued the Enabling Act (Ermächtigungsgesetz), introduced on March 23, 1933, to empower the cabinet to enact laws bypassing the Reichstag, including those altering the constitution, for four years. Requiring a two-thirds majority in the 647-seat Reichstag (reduced due to KPD exclusion), the bill garnered 444 votes in favor. The Centre Party's support proved decisive; its leadership, wary of socialist alternatives and seeking safeguards for Catholic interests, negotiated with Nazi officials.[53][54] On March 21 and 22, Centre Party chairman Ludwig Kaas met with Hitler, extracting assurances—later formalized in a July 1933 concordat—protecting denominational schools, youth organizations, and Church autonomy. In return, all 73 Centre deputies voted affirmatively, joining the NSDAP and DNVP blocs, despite Social Democrats' opposition and amid an atmosphere of coercion, including SA presence outside the Kroll Opera House venue. This pragmatic alignment, driven by anti-communism and institutional self-preservation rather than ideological endorsement of National Socialism, enabled Hitler's consolidation of dictatorial authority.[55][56][6] The Act's passage marked the Centre Party's effective contribution to dismantling Weimar democracy, though unfulfilled promises soon led to Nazi encroachments on Catholic rights and the party's voluntary dissolution on July 5, 1933. Historians note the decision reflected miscalculations about Nazi intentions, prioritizing short-term ecclesiastical security over long-term republican defense.[52][57]Nazi Suppression and Party Dissolution
Following the Centre Party's endorsement of the Enabling Act on 23 March 1933, the Nazi regime intensified its suppression of political opponents, including Catholic politicians perceived as obstacles to total coordination (Gleichschaltung). Despite verbal assurances from Hitler to party leader Ludwig Kaas regarding protections for the Church and confessional rights, Nazi authorities initiated arrests of prominent Centre figures, such as former chancellor Heinrich Brüning and other Reichstag members, on charges of alleged financial irregularities and opposition activities. These actions, coupled with SA intimidation of local party branches and the seizure of party assets, created an atmosphere of coercion that eroded the party's operational capacity by late spring.[58][59] In June 1933, as other bourgeois parties like the German People's Party and German State Party dissolved under similar pressures, the Centre Party faced ultimatums to disband or face outright bans and further persecutions. On 5 July 1933, the party's presidium, meeting without Kaas (who was in Rome negotiating the Reichskonkordat), issued a declaration of self-dissolution, framing it as an adaptation to the "new political reality" to safeguard Catholic interests amid the Nazi consolidation. This made the Centre the last non-Nazi party to vanish voluntarily, preempting a forced shutdown, though Nazi officials had already drafted legislation to declare the NSDAP the sole legal party, enacted on 14 July 1933. The announcement cited the "political upheaval" as necessitating the end of independent party activity, but internal documents and subsequent accounts reveal it stemmed from fears of mass arrests and the regime's refusal to honor prior guarantees.[60][57][58] The dissolution scattered the party's approximately 75 Reichstag deputies and thousands of local adherents: some integrated into Nazi organizations to avoid reprisals, while others, including Brüning, fled into exile; resisters faced imprisonment in early concentration camps like Dachau. Kaas, upon returning, protested the suppression in Vatican circles but ceased active opposition, prioritizing the Concordat's ratification over party revival. This episode underscored the Nazis' strategy of inducing "voluntary" capitulation to legitimize their monopoly, rendering the Centre's earlier Enabling Act support—intended as pragmatic bargaining—a fatal miscalculation that facilitated its own eradication without overt resistance.[59][61]Ideological Core and Policy Stances
Confessional Catholic Foundations and Anti-Secularism
The Centre Party emerged from Catholic political associations in Prussia, initially organized as the Catholic Party in 1852 and renamed the Party of the Centre in 1859, before reorganization on 13 December 1870 to counter escalating anti-Catholic policies.[11] On 21 March 1871, 63 newly elected Catholic deputies in the German Reichstag formally united to form the party's Reichstag caucus, primarily comprising members from Catholic regions in Prussia, Baden, and other southern states.[11] This confessional foundation positioned the party as a dedicated defender of Catholic interests, prioritizing the Church's institutional autonomy and the rights of Catholic minorities within a Protestant-dominated Prussian state.[11] The party's core ideology was ultramontane, emphasizing loyalty to the Pope and the Catholic Church over nationalistic secular authority, in direct response to Otto von Bismarck's Kulturkampf launched in 1871–1873.[20] Measures such as the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1872, the May Laws requiring state oversight of clerical education and appointments, and the dissolution of religious orders prompted the Centre's resolute opposition, framing these as assaults on religious liberty and ecclesiastical independence.[11] Leaders like Peter Reichensperger, a co-founder and advocate for confessional schools, and Ludwig Windthorst, who succeeded as parliamentary head after 1875, mobilized Catholic voters, growing the party's Reichstag representation to over 100 seats by the Kulturkampf's end around 1878.[20] Their strategy combined parliamentary obstruction with public advocacy, contributing to the partial repeal of Kulturkampf laws by 1887 under Bismarck's reconciliation efforts.[11] Anti-secularism permeated the party's program, articulated in its 1871 Reichstag caucus declaration, which championed religious liberties, federal state autonomy, and constitutional adherence against centralized secular impositions.[15] The Centre resisted state encroachments on denominational education, insisting on Catholic-controlled schools to preserve faith-based moral instruction over neutral or Protestant-influenced curricula.[20] It opposed civil marriage laws and pulpit paragraphs that subordinated canon law to state regulations, viewing secularism as eroding the Christian foundations of family, society, and governance.[11] This stance extended beyond immediate Kulturkampf defenses, embedding a commitment to confessional pluralism and Church influence in public life, even as the party navigated broader political coalitions.[15]Economic Views: Anti-Socialism and Corporatist Leanings
The Centre Party firmly opposed socialism, particularly its Marxist variants, as antithetical to Catholic teachings that upheld private property as a natural right essential to human dignity and family autonomy. Influenced by Rerum Novarum (1891), Pope Leo XIII's encyclical condemning socialism's denial of God, class warfare, and abolition of private ownership, the party rejected collectivist nationalization efforts, such as those proposed by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the post-1918 socialization committees. Instead, it advocated protective social reforms—like expanding Bismarck-era insurance systems—channeled through confessional trade unions and intermediary bodies, avoiding state monopoly over the economy. This stance manifested in electoral platforms and Reichstag votes against SPD-led bills for widespread industry socialization in the early Weimar years, prioritizing anti-Bolshevik stability amid revolutionary threats.[62] The party's economic thought leaned corporatist, drawing from Heinrich Pesch's solidarism, which envisioned an organic economy organized by vocational estates (Berufsstände) to harmonize interests beyond proletarian-capitalist antagonism. Pesch, a Jesuit whose multi-volume Lehrbuch der Nationalökonomie (1905–1926) synthesized Catholic doctrine into a framework rejecting both laissez-faire individualism and socialist centralism, influenced Centre intellectuals and policymakers seeking collaborative production councils over adversarial unions.[63] This aligned with Quadragesimo Anno (1931), Pope Pius XI's endorsement of corporative ordering where professional guilds regulated wages and conditions under subsidiarity, limiting state role to coordination rather than control—a model the party echoed in supporting agricultural cooperatives and industry cartels during the 1920s stabilization.[64] Practically, these views shaped responses to crises: under Chancellor Heinrich Brüning (1930–1932), a Centre leader, the party backed austerity via Article 48 decrees, slashing public spending by over 1 billion Reichsmarks (roughly 15% of the budget) and enforcing wage reductions averaging 10–20% to enforce balanced budgets and preserve the gold standard against inflationary socialist alternatives.[65] Such policies, while exacerbating short-term hardship, reflected a commitment to fiscal realism and corporatist self-regulation over deficit-financed welfare expansion, distinguishing the Centre from left-wing demands for public works programs.[66]Positions on Federalism, Monarchy, and Authoritarianism
The Centre Party upheld federal principles during the German Empire as a bulwark for Catholic particularism against Prussian centralization, emphasizing the autonomy of Länder to preserve regional confessional identities amid Bismarck's Kulturkampf and unification efforts. Party leader Ludwig Windthorst (1812–1891) epitomized this defense of states' rights, critiquing Reich encroachments on federal competencies and aligning with particularist sentiments to counter Protestant-dominated policies from Berlin, though the party's broader platform subordinated such views to pragmatic governance. This federalist orientation persisted into the Weimar era, where the party influenced constitutional debates to retain Länder powers in education and culture, despite accepting greater centralization for national cohesion post-1918.[67] On monarchy, the Centre Party pre-1918 reconciled its confessional agenda with loyalty to the constitutional Kaiserreich, supporting Wilhelm II's framework insofar as it accommodated federal safeguards and ended anti-Catholic hostilities after 1878, but prioritizing ecclesiastical protections over dynastic absolutism. The November Revolution prompted a tactical pivot: while conservative factions harbored restorationist leanings, leaders like Joseph Wirth endorsed the republican Stresemann-Erzberger coalition in 1918–1919, framing acceptance of the Weimar Constitution as a pragmatic defense of democratic legality and Catholic interests against socialist upheaval, with internal debates reflecting ambivalence rather than outright rejection.[33][60] Regarding authoritarianism, the party pragmatically embraced limited executive overreach under Heinrich Brüning's chancellorship (March 1930–May 1932), backing his invocation of Article 48 over 100 times for deflationary decrees amid Reichstag gridlock, positioning this "presidential government" as a constitutional expedient to avert economic collapse and extremist surges rather than a departure from rule-of-law traditions. Centre chairman Ludwig Kaas justified such measures as stabilizing "authoritarian democracy" tested against parliamentary paralysis, distinguishing them from the totalitarianism later embodied in the Enabling Act, which the party conditionally supported but framed as reversible amid fears of Nazi dominance. This stance reflected causal prioritization of order-preserving legality over pure parliamentarism, rooted in Catholic social doctrine's emphasis on subsidiarity and anti-revolutionary stability, though critics within and outside the party contested its erosion of democratic norms.[39][68]Post-1933 Trajectory and Marginal Revivals
Failed Post-War Reconstitution Attempts (1945-1950s)
Following the dissolution of the Centre Party under Nazi rule in 1933, efforts to revive it emerged amid the Allied occupation of Germany after World War II. The party was officially reconstituted on October 14, 1945, in Soest, Westphalia, within the British occupation zone, by former members seeking to restore its confessional Catholic orientation.[69] ) This reconstitution occurred shortly after the formation of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in August 1945, which positioned itself as an interdenominational Christian alternative appealing to both Catholics and Protestants.[70] Initial prospects appeared viable in Catholic-stronghold regions like North Rhine-Westphalia, where the British military government appointed Rudolf Amelunxen, a Centre loyalist, as the state's first Minister President from 1945 to 1947.) The party briefly participated in coalition governments there and secured Landtag seats into the late 1950s.) However, these gains were undermined by the rapid rise of the CDU, which Catholic Church leaders, including bishops, actively promoted as a unified bulwark against socialism and communism, encouraging former Centre politicians and voters to integrate rather than fragment along confessional lines.[71] Priests played a key role in coordinating this shift, pressuring holdouts and framing the CDU as the pragmatic successor to the pre-war Centre tradition in a divided, post-war context prioritizing national reconstruction over denominational exclusivity.[71] [70] Nationally, the Centre Party's revival faltered at the 1949 federal election, where it garnered approximately 409,000 votes (0.9% of the total) and secured two direct mandates, partly because the CDU abstained from contesting certain Catholic-majority districts to avoid splitting the vote. By the 1953 election, it failed to retain any Bundestag seats, reflecting the absorption of its base into the CDU/CSU alliance, which achieved 45.2% of the vote as a broad Christian-conservative force.[70] The party's insistence on strict confessionalism clashed with the era's emphasis on interconfessional unity, fostered by occupation authorities and church hierarchies wary of reviving Weimar-era divisions that had contributed to political instability.[71] Regional strongholds eroded as CDU organizational efforts and voter mobilization outpaced the Centre's limited resources, rendering it marginal by the mid-1950s.)Dormancy and Sporadic Activations (1960s-2000s)
Following unsuccessful reconstitution efforts in the immediate post-war period, the Deutsche Zentrumspartei entered prolonged dormancy from the late 1950s onward, with organizational structures largely dissolving amid the rise of interconfessional parties like the CDU/CSU that absorbed much of its Catholic base.[72] No federal or state parliamentary representation was achieved after the 1953 Bundestag election, in which the party secured negligible support under 1% nationally, reflecting voter preference for broader Christian democratic alliances.[72] Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the party exhibited no recorded electoral candidacies or significant internal activities, as economic modernization and secularization trends further eroded confessional politics' appeal in West Germany. Sporadic discussions among conservative Catholic intellectuals occasionally invoked the Zentrum's legacy for potential revival, but these remained theoretical, lacking institutional follow-through or public traction.[73] In the 1980s and 1990s, minor activation attempts surfaced in localized contexts, such as informal groups in traditional Catholic strongholds like Rhineland or Bavaria advocating a return to the party's anti-secularist roots, yet these efforts failed to register candidates in substantive elections or build membership beyond handfuls of enthusiasts. The party's nominal existence persisted through archival or symbolic means, but without influence on policy or ballots, underscoring the enduring success of CDU/CSU in channeling similar ideological currents. By 2000, the Zentrum remained a historical relic, its traditions marginalized in Germany's consolidated party system.[73]Contemporary Micro-Existence and 2022 Parliamentary Footnote
The Deutsche Zentrumspartei maintains a marginal presence in contemporary German politics as a registered minor party espousing Christian-democratic principles with historical ties to political Catholicism, though its membership and voter base have diversified beyond strict confessional lines. Operating from an official website and structured with a federal executive board chaired by Christian Otte since at least 2022, the party emphasizes values such as family policy, subsidiarity, and opposition to secular excesses, while contesting sporadic local elections. For instance, it fielded candidates and a program for the 2025 municipal elections in Dormagen, North Rhine-Westphalia, highlighting issues like community welfare and fiscal conservatism. Despite these activities, the party holds no federal or state parliamentary seats as of October 2025 and garners negligible national support, rendering it effectively dormant at higher levels of governance.[74][75] A brief parliamentary interlude occurred during the 19th Bundestag (2021–2025) when Uwe Witt, a motorcycle enthusiast and erstwhile Alternative for Germany (AfD) deputy elected in 2021 for North Rhine-Westphalia's constituency 110, defected to the Zentrumspartei on January 18, 2022. This switch—motivated by Witt's reported disillusionment with AfD internal dynamics—restored the party's Bundestag representation for the first time since 1957, when its last mandate expired amid post-war decline. The single seat provided no substantive legislative influence, as Witt operated independently without forming a parliamentary group, and it concluded without renewal following the party's minimal vote share in the February 23, 2025, federal election, which yielded no mandates amid competition from 40 other parties.[76][77]Electoral Record
Imperial Reichstag and Early Contests (1871-1912)
![Ludwig Windthorst, leader of the Centre Party][float-right] The Centre Party coalesced in December 1870 at a congress in Soest, Westphalia, where Catholic notables drafted a program emphasizing the protection of denominational schools, ecclesiastical independence from state interference, and safeguards for minority rights within a federal structure resistant to Prussian centralism. This initiative, spearheaded by figures like Peter Reichensperger, a Rhineland lawyer and parliamentarian who had long advocated Catholic political organization, responded to anxieties over the new German Empire's Protestant Prussian dominance and Bismarck's early encroachments on Catholic institutions.[65] In the inaugural Reichstag election of March 3, 1871, the nascent party secured 63 seats, primarily from Catholic strongholds in the Rhineland, Westphalia, southern Germany, and Polish areas, establishing it as a cohesive bloc despite lacking a formal pre-election organization.[23] Otto von Bismarck's Kulturkampf, launched in 1871 with laws expelling Jesuits, mandating state oversight of clergy appointments, and imposing civil penalties on non-compliant bishops, galvanized Catholic resistance and boosted the party's electoral fortunes.[78] By the 1874 election, amid widespread Catholic mobilization against these measures—including over 1,800 priests imprisoned or fined and numerous sees vacant—the Centre doubled its representation to 91 seats, making it the second-largest faction in the Reichstag and forcing Bismarck to confront its parliamentary leverage.[23] [78] Hermann von Mallinckrodt served as initial parliamentary leader until his death in 1874, after which Ludwig Windthorst, a shrewd Hanoverian tactician and former Guelph partisan, assumed direction, honing the party's strategy of principled opposition blended with pragmatic alliances to defend confessional interests.[79] Throughout the 1880s and 1890s, the Centre maintained robust support in confessional regions, averaging 90-100 seats across elections in 1881 (94 seats), 1887 (99 seats), and 1890 (106 seats), reflecting its role as a bulwark against secularizing reforms and socialist inroads while navigating Bismarck's shifting coalitions, including a brief 1878-1887 entente after Kulturkampf partial repeal.[15] Windthorst's oratory and maneuvers, such as allying with conservatives against the 1878 anti-Socialist Law while rebuffing Bismarck's expulsion attempts, solidified the party's reputation for resilience, though internal tensions arose over economic policy and relations with the Vatican.[79] By the 1912 election, the party captured 91 seats with 25.7% of the vote in Catholic districts, underscoring its enduring appeal amid industrialization and urbanization that otherwise fragmented other groupings, yet it faced no outright dominance due to the fragmented multi-party system.[15] This period entrenched the Centre as a pivotal, cross-class force, leveraging Catholic solidarity to influence legislation on education, marriage law, and federal competences despite lacking a nationwide monopoly.[80]Weimar-Era Reichstag Elections (1919-1932)
The Centre Party participated in every Reichstag election during the Weimar Republic, securing a consistent share of the vote primarily from Catholic strongholds in the Rhineland, Westphalia, and southern states like Bavaria and Baden, where it often exceeded 20-30% locally. This confessional base provided electoral stability amid the republic's volatility, positioning the party as a centrist pivot in coalition governments despite national fluctuations driven by economic crises and extremist surges.[81][82]| Election Date | Vote Percentage | Seats Won |
|---|---|---|
| 19 January 1919 | 15.9% | 91 |
| 6 June 1920 | 13.6% | 64 |
| 7 May 1924 | 13.4% | 65 |
| 7 December 1924 | 13.6% | 69 |
| 20 May 1928 | 12.1% | 62 |
| 14 September 1930 | 11.8% | 68 |
| 31 July 1932 | 12.4% | 75 |
| 6 November 1932 | 11.9% | 70 |
Results in Peripheral Bodies: Danzig Volkstag and Saar Basin
In the Free City of Danzig, the local affiliate of the Centre Party, known as the Zentrumspartei der Freien Stadt Danzig, contested Volkstag elections from 1920 onward, representing the interests of the city's Catholic minority amid a predominantly Protestant and German-nationalist electorate. The party achieved modest but consistent representation in early contests, typically garnering 10-15% of the vote corresponding to the Catholic demographic share of approximately 12% in the 1920s. In the 16 November 1930 Volkstag election, the Zentrum secured 15.3% of the valid votes and 11 seats in the 72-member assembly.[83] This performance reflected its role as a confessional anchor against socialist and nationalist extremes, though it lacked the dominance seen in Catholic heartlands. The Nazi surge eroded its base; in the 28 May 1933 election, the National Socialists captured 50% of the vote and a majority, reducing non-Nazi parties including the Zentrum to marginal status, with the latter likely holding fewer than 5 seats based on the fragmented opposition vote.[84] By the 7 April 1935 election, Nazi consolidation yielded 59% and full control, effectively sidelining the Zentrum until its dissolution under authoritarian pressure in 1937-1938.[85] In the Saar Basin, detached from Germany under League of Nations administration from 1920 to 1935, the Centre Party operated as the Zentrumspartei des Saargebietes and dominated consultative Landesrat elections, leveraging the territory's Catholic-majority population exceeding 70%. This confessional stronghold enabled it to outpoll socialist, communist, and emerging Nazi competitors across multiple cycles, often forming coalition majorities while advocating for economic autonomy and eventual reintegration with Germany. The following table summarizes key results:| Election Date | Valid Votes (%) | Seats Won / Total | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 25 June 1922 | 47.7 | 16 / 30 | Largest party; voter turnout ~80%.[86] |
| 27 January 1924 | 42.8 | 14 / 30 (est.) | Retained plurality despite economic strains from French occupation influences.[87] |
| 25 March 1928 | 43.2 | 14 / 33 | Continued dominance amid rising KPD support (23%).[88] |
| 13 February 1932 | 43.0 | 14 / 33 | Held ground against NSDAP (9-10%) and KPD (23%); final pre-plebiscite vote.[88] |