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Guy Simonds

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Lieutenant-General Guy Granville Simonds, CC, CB, CBE, DSO, CD (April 23, 1903 – May 15, 1974) was a senior Canadian Army officer who served with distinction during World War II. Acknowledged by many military historians and senior commanders, among them Sir Max Hastings and Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, as one of the best Canadian generals of the war, Simonds, after serving the first few years of the Second World War mainly as a staff officer, commanded the 1st Canadian Infantry Division with distinction in Sicily and Italy from July 1943 until January 1944, and later II Canadian Corps during the Battle of Normandy from June−August 1944 and throughout the subsequent campaign in Western Europe from 1944, towards the end of which he temporarily commanded the First Canadian Army during the Battle of the Scheldt, until victory in Europe Day in May 1945. The historian J. L. Granatstein states about Simonds: "No Canadian commander rose higher and faster in the Second World War, and none did as well in action. Simonds owed his success wholly to his own abilities and efforts—and those of the men who served under him".[6]

After the end of the war, he went to the Imperial Defence College (IDC) in London, initially as a student and later as an instructor, before returning to Canada to command the National Defence College, Canada. In 1951, at the age of just 48, he was appointed Chief of the General Staff (CGS), the head of the Canadian Army, a post he held for four years, including during the Korean War, before retiring in 1955.

Family background

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Guy was born in Ixworth, near Bury St Edmunds, Suffolk, England on April 24, 1903.[7]

Simonds came from a military family: his great-grandfather had been in the army of the Honourable East India Company, his grandfather had been a major-general in the British Indian Army and his father an officer in the British Army's Royal Regiment of Artillery. The Simonds family was related to Ivor Maxse and Lord Milner. On his maternal side, his grandfather William Easton was a wealthy Virginian horse breeder, who had moved to England, renting Ixworth Abbey. Eleanor "Nellie" Easton, his mother, was one of five daughters, four of whom married army officers.[8]

His father Cecil, a major, resigned from the British Army in fall 1911 (when Guy was 8) and moved his family to British Columbia, working as a surveyor for a railway. Cecil's expectations of having his own survey company were frustrated by the requirement to pass local professional examinations. Re-joining the army at the start of World War I, Cecil was wounded in 1918, and demobilized in 1919 with the rank of colonel. The family spent the war in a rented house in Victoria. Guy's mother sold family possessions to make ends meet. Guy had to quit school for two years at age fourteen to help support the family. Graham speculates that the period of fatherlessness made him a "loner" and self-reliant.[9]

Simonds had three siblings, Cicely, Peter and Eric. Eric (anecdotally an excellent rifle shot, having won prizes at Bisley) became a test pilot, but died in an air accident off Felixstowe in July 1937 in a Miles Magister while serving with the A&AEE[10] in England. Cicely worked as a secretary in the Admiralty during the war. She and her daughter were killed by a V-1 (flying bomb) attack in June 1944, during World War II.[11]

Education and early military career

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Simonds attended Collegiate School in Victoria and then Ashbury College in Ottawa beginning in 1919.[9] The college's dining hall is named after him.

He studied at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, Ontario between 1921 and 1925,[12] cadet number 1596. Simonds' class was the last to be selected from nationwide exams (Simonds having been placed second) and the first after the recently ended First World War to enter a four-year course.[13] At graduation he was awarded the Sword of Honour, judged the best "all rounder", placed second academically, and was generally considered the best horseman in the class.[14]

He joined the Canadian Militia and was commissioned in 1925 as a second lieutenant into the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery,[15][16] serving first with B Battery of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery in Kingston, then C Battery in Winnipeg. In September 1932 (just weeks after his wedding) with the rank of brevet captain, he attended the Long Gunnery Staff Course in England.[12] He was accompanied to England by his wife, and his first child was born there. He returned to Kingston in 1934. In 1936 and 1937 he attended the Staff College, Camberley in England.[12] Major-General Lord Gort was the commandant at the time, although he was soon replaced by Major-General Sir Ronald Adam, while the instructors included Lieutenant Colonel William Slim.[17] Simonds worked extremely hard and thoroughly enjoyed his time there and he was deemed by his superiors to have one of the outstanding students on the two-year course. Furthermore, had he been a British officer, he would have been specially selected for an accelerated promotion in order that he may return to the college to serve as an instructor.[18]

This was not to be, however. Promoted to major, he returned to the Royal Military College of Canada as an associate professor of artillery and later as instructor in tactics. The college's commandant at the time was Brigadier Harry Crerar, a fellow gunner officer who was to play a significant part in Simonds's future military career, and with whom he had served under towards the end of the 1920s.[19] Historian J.L. Granatstein writes of the two men:

The two were not friends — a major and a brigadier could not be friends — but the older man developed some sense of Simonds's worth. That would be important in the war that began for Canada on 10 September 1939.[20]

During the pre-war years, Simonds and E. L. M. Burns, a future corps commander, debated concepts in the pages of Canadian Defence Quarterly.[21]

Second World War

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United Kingdom 1939−1943

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On September 10, 1939 Canada declared war on Nazi Germany and officially entered the Second World War. Almost immediately Simonds received orders to report to Ottawa where he was appointed to the newly raised 1st Canadian Infantry Division, as its General Staff Officer Grade 2 (GSO2). His first duties as GSO2 were to supervise the operations and training of the division, as well as for its organization and equipment.[22] Together with most of the rest of the division, Simonds went overseas to the United Kingdom in December 1939.

There his job was to consume him in the weeks and months ahead, so much so that he scarcely wrote to his wife, Kay. Colonel Ernest William Sansom, a fellow officer in the 1st Division, had heard about Kay's misgivings about never hearing from her husband, wrote to his wife, stating that he was not surprised, and claimed that Simonds, "is working very hard and doing an excellent job as GSO II."[22]

Simonds's job brought him into frequent contact with the 1st Division's General Officer Commanding (GOC), "Andy" McNaughton, a fellow gunner officer who had previously been Chief of the General Staff (CGS). Simonds was with the GOC on 16 May 1940, six days after the Battle of France began, when McNaughton was summoned to a conference by General Sir Edmund Ironside, the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), about the situation in France, which was not good and seemed to be deteriorating rapidly.[22] The briefing stated the situation as being critical but not completely hopeless, and urged commanders to teach bayonet fighting to instil in their men a fighting spirit. The briefing also urged that German paratroopers were not to be made prisoners of war.[22]

On July 20, 1940, after being promoted to lieutenant colonel,[23] he went on to be commanding officer of the 1st Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery, his first command since leaving C Battery.[24]

In November 1940 he was appointed commandant of the Canadian Junior War Staff Course (an intensive 14-week program that compressed one year of the Camberly course), intended to fill the shortage of trained staff officers.[12][25] He then became GSO I with the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division under Victor Odlum, a veteran of both the Second Boer War and the First World War in his sixties who was really too old to command in this newer conflict. Despite this, Odlum came to admire the younger man, informing McNaughton of Simonds's, "splendid work" and that he had, "never had an officer on my staff who gave better service."[26]

Shortly thereafter, on August 7, 1941 he was promoted again, now to brigadier,[23] and made acting Brigadier General Staff (BGS) of I Canadian Corps under McNaughton and later George Pearkes. Later he was confirmed as brigadier and stayed in the BGS role under Harry Crerar until mid-July 1942. Crerar, however, had opposed Simonds' appointment and considered his removal.[27] During his time as BGS, numerous exercises, including Bumper in September 1941 and Tiger in May 1942 were conducted, with Simonds catching British Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery's eye on both occasions.[28][27]

In July and August 1942 Simonds was involved in planning for an abortive Churchill-inspired attack on Norway, codenamed "Jupiter", thereby avoiding the Dieppe Raid debacle.[29] Simonds's plan for "Jupiter" required so many ground troops, together with significant air and naval forces in support, that Churchill was forced to abandon the idea.[27] Although the operation was aborted, Simonds received praise for his help in writing the appreciation, with the British Chiefs of Staff Committee informing McNaughton that "This was one of the clearest and most ably worked out appreciations that they had ever had before them."[27]

In September 1942, he was made commander of the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade, part of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, now commanded by Major-General H. L. N. Salmon.[27] The brigade was sent to Inverary in Scotland in December 1942, where it took part in training for combined operations.[28][30]

In January 1943 Simonds became chief of staff of the First Canadian Army, again serving under McNaughton, with Brigadier Howard Graham assuming command of the 1st Brigade.[28] The Army performed poorly in Exercise Spartan (March 1943). Simonds suggested that McNaughton separate his "political" functions (CMHQ) from "fighting" headquarters (First Canadian Army).[31] McNaughton grew angry, and within 48 hours Simonds was on attachment to the British Eighth Army, under Montgomery, then fighting in Tunisia.[32][33][34]

Sicily 1943

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On April 20, 1943 (three days before his fortieth birthday) Simonds was promoted to major-general[23] and appointed General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division,[35] having risen from major to major-general in three-and-a-half years–faster than any other officer in the Canadian Army.[36] A senior officer had described Simonds to Colonel James Ralston, the Defence Minister, as, "a most outstanding officer but not a leader of the type that will secure the devotion of his followers", although he, "has undoubted ability and will fight his Division and make few mistakes."[36] Simonds's new division had sustained extremely heavy casualties the year before at Dieppe under its previous commander, Major-General John Hamilton Roberts, and was still recovering from its losses.[37]

Major-General Simonds, GOC of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, coming ashore on Sicily, July 1943

Just nine days later, however, he was suddenly transferred to the 1st Canadian Infantry Division as its GOC, replacing Major-General Salmon, who had been killed in a plane crash earlier that day over Devon while planning for Operation Husky, codename for the Allied invasion of Sicily.[35][36] British Rear Admiral Philip Mack, Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Finlay and several other members of Salmon's staff were among the casualties.[37]

In this last post he led the 1st Canadian Division through the invasion of Sicily, which started on July 10, 1943.[12] The division was placed under the command of British XXX Corps, serving alongside the veteran 51st (Highland) Infantry Division, commanded by Lieutenant-General Oliver Leese. XXX Corps was part of the British Eighth Army, under the command of General Sir Bernard Montgomery. Aged just 40, he was the youngest Canadian officer to lead a division in action at that time.[36] He came under fire for the first time on July 16, 1943, after nearly 17 years of service in the Canadian Army.[38]

Always a supporter of Simonds, Montgomery was impressed with the way the younger man had commanded 1st Division throughout the brief but bitter campaign in Sicily, marking him out as a man destined for higher command.[39] Morton noted that Simonds had proven himself to Montgomery in Sicily as "...an able field commander. No other Canadian would ever quite meet Monty's standards." At Agira and Regalbuto, Simonds won "costly, difficult battles" over the Wehrmacht who used the mountainous terrain of Sicily to their advantage.[40] The victories were not cheap, as the 1st Division had suffered 2,310 casualties in Sicily, losing 562 men killed in action or dying of their wounds, with the rest being wounded or taken prisoner.[41]

Major-General Simonds, pictured in Italy, 1943

Italy 1943−1944

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The campaign in Sicily was over by mid-August and, after a brief rest, on September 3, 1943, Simonds and the 1st Canadian Division, now serving alongside the British 5th Infantry Division as part of British XIII Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General Miles Dempsey (whom Simonds was to form a high opinion of), landed on the mainland of Italy in Operation Baytown, part of the Allied invasion of Italy. Meeting light resistance, the division suffered only nine casualties on the first day.[42] Falling ill on September 22, he was replaced as commander of the 1st Canadian Division by Brigadier Christopher Vokes, the former commander of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade.[43]

Subsequently, he replaced Major-General Charles Stein as GOC of the recently arrived 5th Canadian (Armoured) Division when it arrived on the Italian Front in November 1943. Simonds viewed this, along with the arrival of Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar and I Canadian Corps, as something of a comedown, although this was not the intent of CMHQ.[36] Montgomery had wanted Simonds to command an armoured division to give him experience with commanding tanks, though the mountainous terrain of Italy was hardly the best place.[44]

Simonds was furious when he learned that, to save shipping, his new division would have to take old equipment from the veteran British 7th Armoured Division (famous in the Western Desert as the "Desert Rats"). Crerar rejected an idea to use 3,350 brand-new I Corps headquarters vehicles to equip the 5th Canadian Armoured Division.[45] The division would not be fully equipped until the end of January 1944.

His initial meeting with Crerar went poorly (possibly strained by Simonds' illness), and relations further deteriorated when Simonds ejected an officer sent by Crerar to measure his headquarters caravan. Crerar was fascinated by Simonds's caravan, and sent an officer to take its measurements without informing Simonds, who expelled the officer when he discovered him in his caravan.[46] Crerar had become jealous of Simonds, who had enjoyed more battlefield success and media attention as the general officer commanding (GOC) of 1st Infantry Division and then as 5th Armored Division in Italy than he had.[46]

Crerar attempted to sack Simonds because of this incident, writing to Simonds that he felt his "nerves were over-stretched" and complained about the "personal discourtesy" in expelling the captain from his caravan.[47] Crerar took the matter to General Montgomery, the Eighth Army commander, but found little support. On December 11, 1943 Crerar sent a memo to Montgomery declaring he had "serious cause to doubt...the suitability of Simonds for higher command", going on to write that he believed that Simonds was mentally ill, saying that Simonds had "always been high strung...with a tendency to be introspective rather than objective, when faced with acute problems". Montgomery wrote back that he had the "highest opinion of Simonds" and rejected Crerar's claims that he was mentally ill.[48] However, Crerar discussed the event with army psychiatrists, the temporary commander of the Canadian First Army in England, Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart, and post-war pushed for Charles Foulkes to be selected as Chief of the General Staff (CGS) over Simonds.[49]

Simonds's only battle in command of 5th Division was the so-called "Arielli Show", an offensive launched on January 17, 1944 against the German 1st Parachute Division's strong-points southeast of the Arielli River in central Italy.[44] After being defeated by the 1st Canadian Division in the Battle of Ortona in December 1943, the 1st Parachute Division had retreated back to the Riccio River north of Ortona. The Canadians brought down heavy artillery fire first on the left flank of the Germans to allow the Perth Regiment to advance and then on the right flank to allow the Cape Breton Highlanders to advance. As the 1st Parachute Division was well dug in, the heavy Canadian artillery fire did not have the desired results and the assaults by the Perth Regiment and the Cape Breton Highlanders reached about 200 yards of their objectives before being stopped.[50]

Northwest Europe 1944−1945

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General Montgomery (eighth from left) talking with Lieutenant-General Simonds (ninth from left) and other senior officers of II Canadian Corps at Corps Headquarters in the Normandy bridgehead, France, July 20, 1944

In January 1944 he was recalled to the United Kingdom and, after being promoted to lieutenant-general on January 6,[23] was made General Officer Commanding II Canadian Corps,[12] which went on to take part in the Battle of Normandy and the subsequent advance through France. At the age of just forty, Simonds was purported to be the youngest corps commander in the British Empire.[51] Simonds made numerous personnel changes: The Chief Engineer, Chief Medical Officer and the Commander Corps Royal Artillery (CCRA) were sacked, and F. F. Worthington was replaced as commander of the 4th Canadian (Armoured) Division.[51] Talented officers such as George Kitching, Bruce Matthews and Geoffrey Walsh were brought by Simonds from Italy to II Corps.[52] In his instructions to his officers in February 1944, Simonds noted that the Wehrmacht always fought its defensive battles the same way; namely a thinly manned series of outposts, behind which were a series of strongly held dug-in positions that could bring down interlocking machine gun and mortar fire.[53] Simonds further noted the Wehrmacht would always launch aggressive counter-attacks in face of an Allied attack, stating:

...success of the offensive battle hinges on the defeat of the German counter-attacks, with sufficient of our own reserves in hand to launch a new phase as soon as the enemy strength has spent itself. The defeat of these counter-attacks must form part of the original plan of attack which must include arrangements for artillery support and forward moves of infantry-supporting weapons—including tanks—on the objective.[53]

As Simonds had been trained as a "gunner", as artillerymen were known in the Canadian Army, artillery played a significant role in his planning for offensives with the divisions attacking along narrow points as divisional artillery was only capable of supporting one brigade at a time.[53]

General Sir Bernard Montgomery shows Prime Minister Winston Churchill the battle situation on a map held by the commander of II Canadian Corps, Lieutenant-General Simonds, during Churchill's visit to Normandy, July 22, 1944. Lieutenant-General Miles Dempsey, the commander of the British Second Army, looks on.

Simonds, by his own admission, was bad-tempered, unable to tolerate those he regarded as fools, and had a headstrong streak, which he attempted to check by maintaining a cold "glacial" composure.[47] Simonds always spoke with a strong English accent, and his personality never inspired any affection from the men under his command who regarded him as a "cold Englishman".[47] One Canadian brigadier wrote that Simonds "was not a man one could love. In my heart I knew, however, that I would rather serve under his type than under a kindly, but less driving commander; the former is much more likely to win battles."[53] Simonds had a long-standing feud with his fellow British immigrant Charles Foulkes, going back to their days as students at the Staff College where Simonds had received greater recognition than Foulkes. Both Foulkes and Simonds were ambitious men with strong ruthless streaks, and together with Lieutenant General Harry Crerar, who had "a nasty streak of his own", the three officers were the ones most responsible for the command decisions of the Canadians in the Normandy campaign.[47] Relations between Simonds and Crerar, were very poor as Crerar had attempted to sack Simonds as commander of the 5th Canadian Division in December 1943.[54] However, Simonds was a favorite of Montgomery, who viewed Simonds as the most talented Canadian general in the entire war, and Montgomery blocked Crerar's attempts to send Simonds back to Canada.[55]

Once II Corps was activated, Simonds would direct four major attacks during the Battle of Normandy in five weeks: Operations Atlantic (the Canadian part of Operation Goodwood), Spring, Totalize and Tractable. After Operation Spring, Simonds tried to sack Foulkes as commander of 2nd Canadian Division, writing that Foulkes "did not [show] the right qualities to command 2nd Division", but was blocked by Crerar, who kept Foulkes on to nettle Simonds.[56] Simonds has often been criticized for his reliance on heavy bombers to "blast" open a way for Operation Totalize, but the Canadian historian Jody Perrun argued that the marked inferiority of the Sherman tanks to the Panther and Tiger tanks of the Germans meant that Simonds had no other choice, but to use air power to even the odds given that both the Panthers and Tigers had more powerful guns and heavier armor than the Shermans.[57] Perrun has charged too many historians have taken at face value the disparaging remarks about Simonds's command by SS-Brigadeführer Kurt "Panzer" Meyer, the commander of the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, who spoke as if the Sherman tanks were the equal of the Tiger and Panther tanks, and charged that the Canadians were insufficiently aggressive in armored operations and too reliant upon air support.[58] A principal problem for Simonds was that his tank crews were loath to face the Panthers and Tigers on open ground given their guns could not knock either type of tank except at very close range while the guns of the Panthers and Tigers could knock a Sherman at long range.[59] Perrun argued that Meyer's claims that Simonds lacked aggression failed to take into account the weaknesses of the Sherman tanks, and Simonds designed his operations with the aim of counter-acting the flaws of the Shermans by providing for air and artillery support to even the odds.[60]

Brigadier J. A. W. Bennett is made a Commander of the British Empire by King George VI at the headquarters of the First Canadian Army in Belgium, October 1944. Lieutenant-General Simonds, wearing a black beret and having just been made a Companion of the Order of the Bath, stands a short distance away, and behind him is Field Marshal Montgomery.

For Totalize (beginning August 7, 1944), which involved a night attack, numerous navigation aids were devised, along with heavy bomber support. Having learned from Operation Spring, Simonds devised the "Kangaroo", an early armoured personnel carrier converted from non-operational armoured vehicles "defrocked Priests".[12][61] Granatstein characterizes the plan as "brilliant if too complicated",[62] in that it did not account for the inexperience of the troops. The two commanders of the armored divisions tasked with leading the assault, George Kitching and Stanisław Maczek both objected to Simonds's plans for a "mailed fist" assault on narrow fronts as allowing the Germans to concentrate their forces for counter-attack, but Simonds argued the planned heavy bombing attack by American bombers would disorganize the Germans enough to allow a breakthrough.[63] As Maczek's English was very poor and Simonds spoke no Polish, the two generals spoke in French, in which Maczek was fluent.[64] Simonds insisted that his French was not that good and so Kitching translated for him.[64] Kitching later accused Simonds of being better at French than what he pretended as the interval for translations gave him more room to develop arguments to dismiss Maczek's concerns.[64]

From left to right: Christopher Vokes, Harry Crerar, Sir Bernard Montgomery, Brian Horrocks (both British Army), Guy Simonds, Daniel Spry and Bruce Mathews, all pictured here in February 1945 during Operation Veritable.

During Operation Totalize, the American bombers who were supposed to hit the German lines instead carpet-bombed the II Canadian Corps's artillery and assembling areas, badly disorganizing the offensive.[65] While the offensive was derailed by the American "friendly fire", the aggressive Meyer took advantage of the pause to stop the advances of both the 1st Polish Armored Division at St. Aignan and the 4th Canadian Armored Division at Langannerie.[66] Simonds's plan for Totalize had called for Canadian heavy and medium artillery to support the Canadian and Polish tanks as they advanced, but the accidental American bombing of the Canadian artillery had robbed the Allied armor of the expected fire support. Simonds, knowing of the weakness of the Sherman tanks, which were both under-armored and under-gunned, had planned for his artillery to knock out Meyer's Tigers and Panthers, and expected the Germans to counter-attack at once with their armor.[67] The next day, Simonds sent the Worthington Force, comprising a battlegroup of the British Columbia regiment and the Algonquin regiment, which however took a wrong turn, and was annihilated by Meyer who sent his Tiger and Panther tanks against the Shermans.[68]

Tractable, on August 14, used a smoke screen in an attempt to shield armour from German anti-tank weaponry. The Canadian historian Desmond Morton wrote that Operation Tractable should have been a disaster as the Wehrmacht had captured a copy of the Canadian operations plan the night before, but despite this, the assault by the II corps under the cover of smoke ended with the Canadians taking Falaise on 16 August 1944.[69] Afterwards, Simonds had the task of closing the "Falaise Gap" with the 1st Polish Armored Division under Major General Stanisław Maczek leading the way and engaging in desperate fighting at the Maczuga (Mace) as the Poles called Hill 262 as the German Army Group B sought to escape from Normandy.[69] Though the 1st Polish Division was nearly destroyed several times as the Germans pushed their way out of Normandy, the Poles at the Maczuga and the Canadians at St. Lambert finally closed the "Falaise Gap" on August 21, 1944.[69] Despite its name, the II Canadian Corps had Polish and British divisions operating under Simonds's command.

Field Marshal Montgomery with his staff, army, corps and division commanders at Walbeck, Germany, March 22, 1945. Standing in the third row, seventh from the left, is Lieutenant General Simonds.

In September 1944, Simonds temporarily took charge of the First Canadian Army from Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar, who was recovering from a bout of dysentery, and led the liberation of the mouth of the Scheldt River.[12] "By most accounts, Simonds’ assumption of command reinvigorated the army HQ; where Crerar managed, Simonds commanded."[70] When Crerar resumed command with the First Army, Simonds resumed his command of II Canadian Corps for the liberation of North-Western Europe.[12]

Post-war Army

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Senior commanders of the First Canadian Army, May 1945. Seated from the left: Stanisław Maczek (Polish Army), Guy Simonds, Harry Crerar, Charles Foulkes, Bert Hoffmeister. Standing from the left: Ralph Keefler, Bruce Matthews, Harry Foster, Robert Moncel (standing in for Chris Vokes), Stuart Rawlins (British Army).

Simonds was "undoubtedly deeply hurt" when he was passed over for Charles Foulkes as Chief of the General Staff (CGS) in August 1945.[71] In 1946 he went to London where he attended the Imperial Defence College (IDC).[72] He "found that work at the IDC engaged his alert intelligence. He met and talked to leading politicians, industrialists, and servicemen of the Western Alliance."[73] From 1946 to 1949 he was Chief Instructor there, "a signal honour for a Canadian".[74] He returned to Canada in 1949 to take a role as Commandant of the Canadian Army Command and Staff College and the National Defence College, Canada. In 1951 he was appointed Chief of the General Staff.[12] In 1950, it was widely believed that the North Korean invasion of South Korea was meant to be a distraction to get American forces bogged down in Korea as the prelude to a Soviet invasion of West Germany.[75] When China entered the Korean War in October 1950, it was believed the world was on the brink of World War III, and on January 16, 1951, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, visited Ottawa to ask Canada for help.[75] The Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent agreed to send two Canadian divisions to West Germany.[76] Simonds wrote at the time that, since the shipping was not available to move two divisions to Europe, the Canadians best be there before World War III started.[77]

Lieutenant General Simonds inspecting II Canadian Corps in Meppen, Germany, May 31, 1945

Simonds clashed with Foulkes, the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee about where to station the Canadians in West Germany. The continentalist Foulkes, who wanted to move Canada closer to the United States, wanted the Canadians to serve with the U.S. Army forces in southern West Germany. Simonds by contrast argued that for historical reasons the Canadians should serve with the British forces in northern West Germany, arguing that the Canadians would fight better with them if the Red Army should invade West Germany. Simonds stated that the Canadians had fought alongside the British successively in the Boer War, the First World War, the Second World War, and the Korean War, and moreover the Canadian Army was closely modelled after the British Army right down to having British-style uniforms and ranks and the same regimental structure; for all these reasons, Simonds felt that placing the Canadians with the British in northern West Germany would be a better fit. As the Canadian decision-makers had been "shocked by the American performance in Korea" while the British forces fighting in Korea had fought well, Simonds won the debate and it was agreed that the Canadians would serve as part of the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), though Foulkes was able to ensure the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) units would serve with the U.S Air Force (USAF) instead of the Royal Air Force (RAF).[77]

The commander of the First Canadian Army in the Netherlands, General Harry Crerar, arrives at Prince Bernhard's headquarters in Apeldoorn to receive the Grand Cross of the Order of Orange-Nassau with Swords, July 20, 1945. Lieutenant-General Simonds can be seen in the background, with beret, along with Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes, wearing peaked cap.

At the same time, Simonds had to oversee the build-up of the Canadian military for the new commitments in West Germany and for the Korean War; the defence budget had risen to $1,907 million by 1953, ten times what it had been in 1947.[78] From 1950 to 1953, the military went from having 47,000 service personnel to 104,000.[78] Simonds spoke of bringing in conscription to meet NATO commitments, but was silenced by the defence minister, Brooke Claxton, who warned him with the polls showing 83% of the Quebecois opposed to conscription that the subject was too politically toxic for the government to contemplate.[78] In 1952, the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean was opened to provide training in French for French-Canadian officer candidates; previously all officer candidates were trained in English at the Royal Military College in Kingston.[79] Besides the Royal 22e Régiment and the 8th Canadian Hussars, the Canadian Army in the 1950s made little acknowledgement of the "French fact", but the Army was more open to French-Canadians than either the Royal Canadian Air Force or the Royal Canadian Navy, where the language of command was English.[79]

Simonds believed that esprit de corps was the key to maintaining morale, and felt that regimental pride in the history and traditions was what motivated soldiers to fight.[78] For this reason, as part of the army's expansion, Simonds had militia regiments like the Black Watch of Montreal, the Fort Garry Horse of Winnipeg, and the Queen's Own Rifles of Toronto taken on as regular regiments instead of creating new ones, arguing the histories and traditions of these regiments would provide greater regimental pride for the men serving in them than a new regiment would.[78] Simonds also created a Regiment of Canadian Guards which closely resembled the Brigade of Guards in London, right down to having scarlet uniforms and bearskin hats.[78] Morton wrote that a "more practical aid to morale, opposed by Simonds, was a decision to allow families to join Canadian service personnel in Europe".[78]

Retirement and later years

[edit]
Simonds' grave at Mount Pleasant Cemetery

After retiring from the Canadian Army, he worked for Halifax Insurance Company, and Toronto Brick and Associates. He was active with Royal Life Saving Society of Canada, the Gurkha Appeal, the Canadian Corps of Commissionaires and was chairman of the National Ballet of Canada.[80]

He criticized the government for seeking closer ties with the United States,[74] and opposed the reliance on nuclear weapons, advocating strong conventional forces. Simonds proposed the use of aerial supply to reduce the vulnerability of army divisional supply chains. Skeptical of air-power advocates, he foresaw the increasing use of missiles. He believed in the "integration" of defence headquarters, but opposed the Hellyer "unification" of the armed forces.[81][82] Simonds wrote at the time that each service required a distinctive leadership style for officers; stating that for a pilot alone in his jet decided by himself to fight or flee when faced with an enemy; for a naval officer holding the equivalent rank as the pilot, the decision to fight or flee was made by the captain of his ship; and for an army officer holding the equivalent ranks as the air force and naval officers had to decide for himself to fight or flee and motivate the men under his command to do the same.[83] Simonds concluded that the plans of the Defence Minister Paul Hellyer to unify the services would never work as it was based on the assumption there was really no difference between war on land, at sea and in the air and a common service could handle all three.[83] At the same time, Simonds also opposed Hellyer's plans to "Canadianize" the military by scrapping the traditional British style uniforms and ranks of all three services and impose an American style uniform and ranks on the unified Canadian Forces, warning this attack on the traditions on the Canadian military would hurt morale.[83]

A street is named after him in Antwerp ("Generaal Simondslaan").[84][85] Simonds was honorary colonel of the Royal Regiment of Canada at the time of the regiment's 100th anniversary in October 1962.[86] He was offered an honorary degree from RMC which he declined, as he had opposed the degree program, fearing the long tenure of civilian instructors would unduly influence the curriculum.[87] On October 29, 1971, he was made a Companion of the Order of Canada.[88]

Diagnosed with lung cancer, he died in Toronto on May 15, 1974. He was buried in Toronto's Mount Pleasant Cemetery after a service at Grace Church-on-the-Hill.

Married life

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On August 17, 1932, he married Katherine "K" Lockhart Taylor, the daughter of a Winnipeg businessman. K was a spirited young woman, having taken flying lessons, a motor mechanics course, and eventually teaching Guy how to drive. As a subaltern, Simonds had to ask special permission to marry. They had a daughter, Ruth, born in England in June 1933, and a son, Charles, born in Kingston in 1934.[89]

While overseas in World War II, Simonds had an affair, which K subsequently discovered while in England in 1946.[90] They separated shortly thereafter.

Shortly before retirement, Simonds met Dorothy "Do" Sinclair (the widow of George Graham "Gus" Sinclair) whom he married on January 16, 1960.[91]

Assessment

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Randall Wakelam says, "Canadian biographies and memoirs carry two themes: innovative and hard driving commander; cold and uninspiring leader."[70] Terry Copp suggests, "overwhelming self-confidence and a degree of arrogance which did not encourage expressions of dissent. Simonds did not attempt to lead; he sought only to command."[70] The American General of the Army Omar Bradley called Simonds the "best of the Canadian generals" while the British Lieutenant-General Sir Brian Horrocks described Simonds as "a first class commander with a most original brain and full of initiative."[92] Simonds's friend and superior for much of the last two years of the war, General Sir Miles Dempsey, believed Simonds in Normandy to be "the best of my Corps Commanders."[93]

In his book, The Normandy Campaign, Victor Brooks lists Simonds as the most effective corps-level commander of the Allied Forces in Normandy. He wrote:

The corps commander among the units that comprised the 21st Army Group who most likely had the largest personal impact on the Normandy campaign was Lieutenant General Guy Simonds. This senior officer of the II Canadian Corps created one of the most effective tank-infantry teams in the Allied forces through a high degree of improvisation during the drive from Caen to Falaise. This general was versatile and imaginative but was not able to generate the momentum that would have more fully closed off the Falaise gap at an earlier date. Despite this drawback, Simonds deserves credit for his effective command.[94]

Sir Max Hastings states: "one of the outstanding Allied corps commanders in Europe, a dour, direct officer who brought unusual imagination to bear on every operational plan for which he was responsible."[95]

References

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Bibliography

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Further reading

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from Grokipedia
Lieutenant-General Guy Granville Simonds CC CB CBE DSO CD (23 April 1903 – 15 May 1974) was a senior Canadian Army officer renowned for his command of the II Canadian Corps during key operations in Italy and Northwest Europe in the Second World War, including the invasions of Sicily and Normandy, and for temporarily leading the First Canadian Army in the Battle of the Scheldt.[1][2] A graduate of the Royal Military College of Canada, Simonds commissioned into the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery in 1925 and advanced rapidly through the ranks due to his tactical acumen and aggressive leadership style.[1][2] Simonds' wartime achievements included directing the 1st Canadian Division's advances in Sicily against fortified Axis positions in 1943, such as the battles for Nissoria and Agira, and later commanding the 5th Canadian Armoured Division in Italy before taking over II Canadian Corps for the Normandy campaign.[1] In operations like Totalize and Tractable near Caen, he pioneered the use of repurposed self-propelled guns as "Kangaroo" armoured personnel carriers to transport infantry under fire, enabling breakthroughs that contributed to closing the Falaise Gap and encircling German forces.[1] His temporary command of the First Canadian Army from September 1944 facilitated the grueling amphibious and land assault on Walcheren Island and the Scheldt estuary, securing vital supply routes to Antwerp despite heavy casualties from flooded terrain and entrenched defenders.[1][2] Post-war, Simonds served as Chief of the General Staff from 1951 to 1955, overseeing the Canadian Army's reorganization amid the Korean War and NATO commitments, and later as commandant of staff colleges, emphasizing rigorous training.[1] Allied commanders like Field Marshal Montgomery praised him as the sole Canadian general suited for corps-level command, and historians have deemed him the most effective Canadian field officer of the conflict, valuing his emphasis on combined arms tactics and operational tempo over cautious approaches.[1]

Early Life and Background

Family Origins and Childhood

Guy Granville Simonds was born on 23 April 1903 in Bury St Edmunds, Suffolk, England.[3] His father, Cecil Barrow Simonds (born 1867), served as a major in the British Army before resigning in 1911 to pursue opportunities abroad.[4][5] His mother, Eleanor "Nellie" Easton, came from a family with strong military ties, as four of her five sisters married army officers; her father, William Easton, was a prosperous Virginian horse breeder.[5] The Simonds lineage featured a pronounced military heritage, spanning multiple generations; Guy represented the third in direct succession of career officers, with familial connections to British figures such as General Ivor Maxse and colonial administrator Lord Milner.[6][5] This environment instilled early exposure to martial values and discipline, though specific childhood anecdotes remain sparsely documented beyond the family's peripatetic lifestyle. In 1912, at age nine, Simonds emigrated with his parents and siblings to Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, marking a pivotal shift from English roots to North American settlement.[6] The family subsequently relocated within the province to Victoria, where Cecil Simonds engaged in civilian pursuits, including real estate and mining ventures, amid the economic opportunities of the pre-First World War era.[7] This formative period in British Columbia exposed young Simonds to the rugged Canadian frontier, contrasting with his initial English upbringing and reinforcing self-reliance amid a backdrop of familial military ethos.[8]

Education and Formative Influences

Simonds was born on 23 April 1903 in Burwash, Sussex, England, to a family of British military heritage; his father had served as an officer in the British Army.[9] In 1912, the family immigrated to Canada, settling in Victoria, British Columbia, where Simonds attended the local Collegiate School amid financial hardships that prompted his mother to sell family possessions and required him to leave school temporarily at age 14 to contribute to the household.[5] These early experiences of self-reliance and economic challenge likely fostered a resilient character, though Simonds later resumed studies, transferring to Ottawa's private Ashbury College in 1919 for preparatory education.[9] In August 1921, at age 18, Simonds entered the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) in Kingston, Ontario, as cadet number 1596, embarking on a rigorous four-year program that emphasized military discipline, engineering, and leadership training.[7] He graduated in 1925 with honours, earning the Sword of Honour as the top cadet and the prize for the best all-round cadet, along with awards for proficiency in riding and equitation, reflecting his aptitude for both academic and practical military skills.[10] [1] The RMC curriculum, rooted in British military traditions adapted for Canadian needs, profoundly shaped Simonds' formative influences by instilling a doctrinal focus on artillery and combined arms tactics, which he would later apply innovatively in command roles; his early immersion in this environment, combined with familial military precedents, oriented him toward a permanent army career upon commissioning into the Royal Canadian Artillery in 1926.[11]

Pre-War Military Career

Officer Training and Early Assignments

Simonds entered the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) in Kingston, Ontario, in 1921 as cadet number 1596 and underwent rigorous officer training there, focusing on military science, engineering, and leadership fundamentals.[6] He graduated in June 1925 and was commissioned as a lieutenant in the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (RCHA), a field artillery unit within the Permanent Active Militia.[6][1] Following his commission, Simonds undertook regimental duties as a junior officer in the RCHA, serving initially with B Battery in Kingston and later with other batteries in Petawawa, Ontario—a key artillery training ground—and Winnipeg, Manitoba.[1] This period, spanning approximately seven years from 1925 to 1932, involved practical experience in artillery operations, including gunnery drills, unit administration, and field exercises amid the interwar military's limited resources and emphasis on horsedrawn equipment.[6] In 1932, Simonds transitioned to an instructional role as an instructor in gunnery at the Royal Canadian School of Artillery (Mobile) upon returning to specialized duties in Canada, where he trained artillery officers in technical and tactical skills.[6] Selected for advanced professional development, he attended the British Army Staff College at Camberley from 1936 to 1938, completing the junior officers' course alongside future British generals such as Brian Horrocks and Richard Hull; this program emphasized staff procedures, operational planning, and combined arms tactics.[1]

Interwar Developments and Preparations

Following his commissioning into the Royal Canadian Artillery upon graduation from the Royal Military College of Canada in 1925, Simonds joined the Canadian Permanent Force in 1926 and served with the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, initially at Petawawa, Ontario, and later in Winnipeg, Manitoba.[1] During this period, he also served as an instructor in gunnery at the Royal Canadian School of Artillery (Mobile), where he developed expertise in artillery tactics and training within the constraints of Canada's modest interwar military establishment, which prioritized militia instruction over expansion.[6] In 1936, Simonds was selected as one of the first post-World War I Royal Canadian Artillery officers to attend the British Army Staff College at Camberley, England, completing the two-year course from 1936 to 1937 under Commandant Major-General Lord Gort.[7] This rigorous program emphasized operational planning, staff procedures, and combined arms coordination, equipping him with advanced doctrinal knowledge that contrasted with the limited mechanization and funding in the Canadian forces during the 1930s.[1] Promoted to major upon his return to Canada in 1938, Simonds took up roles at the Royal Military College as Associate Professor of Artillery and subsequently as Instructor in Tactics, where he influenced the next generation of officers through practical exercises and theoretical instruction.[7] These positions allowed him to integrate British staff college insights into Canadian training, fostering a focus on mobility and firepower that anticipated armored warfare, though the army's overall preparations remained hampered by budget cuts and reliance on horse-drawn artillery until the late 1930s.[6] By 1939, as war loomed, Simonds' accumulated experience positioned him for rapid advancement in mobilization efforts.[7]

Second World War Service

Deployment to the United Kingdom (1939-1943)

Following Canada's declaration of war on 10 September 1939, Major Guy Simonds deployed overseas as General Staff Officer Grade 2 (GSO2) with the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, which arrived in the United Kingdom in December 1939 under the command of General Andrew McNaughton.[1][12] In July 1940, after the Dunkirk evacuation, Simonds was posted to the 1st Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery, where he commanded the unit for approximately three months.[6][1] In November 1940, McNaughton directed Simonds to establish the Canadian Junior War Staff Course in England, an intensive program aimed at enhancing the tactical and operational skills of Canadian officers amid the demands of modern warfare.[1] Simonds organized and led the inaugural course, which trained dozens of officers and set a precedent for subsequent iterations.[6] Promoted to colonel on 18 May 1941, Simonds was appointed GSO1 (operations) of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division on 7 August 1941, following his elevation to brigadier.[13] In September 1942, he took command of the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade, overseeing its training and readiness exercises in southern England.[1][7] That August, Simonds visited Tunisia to observe General Bernard Montgomery's Eighth Army in action, gaining insights into desert warfare and armoured tactics that informed his future commands.[13] Throughout 1942, as a senior staff officer, Simonds consulted with Montgomery on requirements for Canadian officer training, contributing to improved instructional methods and forging a professional acquaintance.[6] In early 1943, promoted to major-general on 13 April, he briefly commanded the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division before transferring to lead the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, focusing on intensive preparations including amphibious and combined arms exercises for impending overseas operations.[1][6] His tenure emphasized practical field training, staff efficiency, and adaptation to British doctrinal influences, enhancing the Canadian Corps' combat effectiveness despite limited active combat opportunities in the UK.[1][6]

Sicilian Campaign (1943)

In April 1943, Guy Simonds was promoted to major-general and initially assigned command of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, but he soon transferred to lead the 1st Canadian Infantry Division following the death of its previous commander in an air crash.[13] This division, comprising approximately 26,000 personnel, participated in Operation Husky as part of the British 8th Army under General Bernard Montgomery.[14] Simonds' first combat command occurred during the Allied invasion of Sicily on July 10, 1943, when the division landed at beaches near Pachino in the southeast, encountering minimal initial resistance and securing its objectives by midday with 75 casualties and over 700 prisoners captured.[14][13] The 1st Division then advanced northwest through rugged, mountainous terrain toward key objectives like Catania, facing increasing opposition from German and Italian forces.[14] Simonds emphasized rapid movement and coordinated combined arms tactics, including effective use of artillery, tanks, and infantry.[1] Notable engagements included the capture of Valguarnera on July 17-18, where the division incurred 145 casualties amid determined German resistance; the innovative night assault on Assoro heights from July 20-22, which surprised defenders and forced their withdrawal; and house-to-house fighting at Leonforte.[14] Further north, Simonds directed operations at Nissoria, Agira, and Regalbuto, with the Battle of Agira proving particularly grueling; he ordered a massive artillery barrage involving five field regiments and two medium regiments, supported by air strikes, to soften defenses before infantry assaults that secured the town after five days of combat.[14][1] Over the campaign, the division advanced approximately 200 kilometers, suffering 2,310 casualties including 562 killed, before halting operations near Lentini by early August as the broader campaign concluded on August 17.[14] Simonds' aggressive leadership and tactical acumen earned praise from Montgomery, marking a successful baptism of fire for both him and the untested Canadian formation.[13][1]

Italian Campaign (1943-1944)

Following the conclusion of operations in Sicily, Major-General Guy Simonds commanded the 1st Canadian Infantry Division during the Allied invasion of mainland Italy as part of Operation Baytown. On 3 September 1943, the division landed near Reggio di Calabria in the "toe" of Italy, as the lead element of British XIII Corps within the British Eighth Army, encountering virtually no opposition from Italian forces after the announcement of the Armistice of Cassibile.[15][13] The landing succeeded in drawing German attention southward, indirectly supporting the subsequent Allied landings at Salerno.[16] The 1st Canadian Infantry Division, supported by the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade, advanced northward through mountainous terrain against German rearguard positions. By mid-September, elements of the division had pushed approximately 125 miles inland to threaten German lines behind Salerno, capturing the town of Potenza on 20 September 1943 after overcoming light defensive actions.[16][17] This rapid progress, hampered by poor roads and weather, positioned the Canadians to contribute to the broader Eighth Army effort to breach the Volturno Line by early October.[16] On 1 November 1943, Simonds relinquished command of the 1st Infantry Division to Major-General E.L.M. Burns and assumed leadership of the newly deployed 5th Canadian Armoured Division in Italy, a move intended to broaden his experience with armoured formations.[13] The division, arriving piecemeal from late November, underwent acclimatization and initial training before entering combat on the Adriatic sector in December 1943, supporting I Canadian Corps operations amid the winter stalemate.[18] Simonds commanded the 5th Armoured Division until 29 January 1944, when he was promoted to lieutenant-general and recalled to the United Kingdom to take command of II Canadian Corps for the impending Normandy invasion.[7]

Normandy Invasion and Northwest Europe (1944-1945)

Lieutenant-General Guy Granville Simonds assumed command of II Canadian Corps on 30 January 1944, tasked with preparing the formation—comprising the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, 4th Canadian Armoured Division, 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade, and supporting units—for the Allied invasion of Normandy.[10][1] The corps began landing in Normandy on 6 July 1944, operating under the British Second Army, with Simonds emphasizing rapid manoeuvre and combined arms tactics to overcome German defensive positions around Caen.[13][1] In mid-July, II Canadian Corps participated in Operation Atlantic (18–20 July 1944), the Canadian component of the broader British Operation Goodwood, aimed at capturing Verrières Ridge and the Colombelles steelworks south of Caen to enable further Allied advances.[13] Simonds directed the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade in assaults that faced intense German resistance from the 1st SS Panzer Division, resulting in approximately 1,500 Canadian casualties but securing limited high ground objectives.[13][1] This was followed by Operation Spring (25 July 1944), a further push on Verrières Ridge that incurred heavy losses—over 400 killed and 890 wounded—against entrenched panzer forces, highlighting the challenges of attritional fighting in bocage terrain.[13] Simonds devised Operation Totalize (7–13 August 1944), an innovative night assault employing armoured columns with infantry mounted in modified self-propelled guns (Kangaroo armoured personnel carriers) and artificial moonlight from searchlights to disrupt German defences south of Caen toward Falaise.[1][19] Initial advances penetrated up to 20 kilometres, but coordination issues, friendly fire incidents, and German counterattacks halted momentum short of Falaise, with II Corps suffering around 1,400 casualties.[19] Building on this, Operation Tractable (14–21 August 1944) enabled II Canadian Corps, alongside the 1st Polish Armoured Division, to link with American forces and close the Falaise Gap on 21 August, trapping and destroying much of the German Seventh Army and Fifth Panzer Army—estimated at 50,000 prisoners and significant materiel losses—facilitating the Allied breakout from Normandy.[13][1] Following the Normandy campaign, Simonds led II Canadian Corps in the pursuit across northern France and Belgium, clearing Channel ports such as Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk by early September 1944, though these yielded limited immediate logistical value due to German demolition.[13] With Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar sidelined by illness from 28 September to 9 November 1944, Simonds temporarily commanded First Canadian Army, directing the grueling Scheldt Campaign (2 October–8 November 1944) to secure the estuary approaches to Antwerp.[13][1] Employing combined amphibious, infantry, and armoured operations against flooded terrain and fortified islands like Walcheren, the effort cost II Corps over 6,000 casualties but opened the vital port by late November, enabling sustained Allied supply lines.[1][20] In early 1945, II Canadian Corps contributed to the Rhineland offensive, including Operations Veritable (8 February–10 March 1945) and Blockbuster (18 February–10 March 1945), clearing the Hochwald Forest and Reichswald against determined Wehrmacht defences, with Simonds coordinating artillery barrages and tank-infantry assaults that advanced 30 kilometres amid muddy conditions and high attrition.[13][1] The corps then pursued retreating forces into the Netherlands and Germany, reaching the IJssel River and participating in the final offensives until VE Day on 8 May 1945, after which Simonds inspected his troops in Meppen, Germany, on 31 May.[1] Throughout, Simonds' command emphasized aggressive exploitation and tactical flexibility, though operations often exacted heavy tolls reflective of the campaign's intensity.[13][10]

Tactical Innovations and Command Style

Doctrinal Contributions and Innovations

Simonds pioneered the development of the Kangaroo, an improvised armoured personnel carrier created by converting obsolete M7 Priest self-propelled guns through the removal of their 105 mm howitzers, enabling infantry to advance protected and at the pace of tanks during offensive operations.[9][1] This innovation, first deployed on 7 August 1944 during Operation Totalize in Normandy, addressed heavy infantry casualties from prior assaults by providing close armoured transport to the front lines, thereby enhancing combined arms mobility and reducing exposure to defensive fire.[9][1] In doctrinal terms, Simonds emphasized tight infantry-armour coordination, advocating the exchange of liaison officers equipped with radios—such as allocating 18 sets per brigade—to ensure infantry could articulate objectives while armoured commanders adapted tactics on the ground, fostering mutual understanding over rigid hierarchies.[21] He critiqued armoured units for inadequate infantry support, demanding greater integration to exploit enemy weaknesses through speed and bypassing strongpoints rather than direct confrontation.[21] This approach underpinned successes in Normandy operations like Totalize (7-9 August 1944) and Tractable (14-21 August 1944), where Kangaroos facilitated the closure of the Falaise Gap on 21 August, and extended to the Scheldt campaign (27 September-9 November 1944), incorporating amphibious elements and sustained combined arms pressure to clear fortified positions.[9] Simonds' doctrine prioritized overwhelming firepower, particularly artillery, for its psychological impact—estimating it at 95% of morale effects—while insisting troops advance immediately behind creeping barrages to maximize gains, even accepting risks of short-round casualties to prevent diminished effectiveness.[21] He promoted an offensive mindset against stiff resistance, favouring night armoured advances to evade anti-tank screens, simultaneous air and ground support as in Totalize's heavy bomber strikes, and rapid exploitation over prolonged attrition, reflecting a command philosophy suited to volunteer forces through analytical decision-making rather than inspirational leadership.[21][9] These principles marked a shift toward pragmatic, firepower-supported manoeuvre in Canadian operations, influencing post-Normandy adaptations in flooded terrains like the Scheldt.[9]

Leadership Approach and Personnel Management

Simonds employed a centralized command style that prioritized detailed operational planning and rigid execution, often limiting subordinate initiative to ensure alignment with his tactical vision. This approach was evident in operations such as Totalize and Tractable in Normandy during August 1944, where he imposed tight oversight on divisional commanders following earlier setbacks, favoring set-piece attacks supported by overwhelming artillery fire over decentralized maneuver.[22] He viewed artillery as the decisive arm, famously stating that it "conquers" while infantry "occupies," reflecting a formulaic emphasis on narrow-front advances and bite-and-hold tactics honed from his staff college training and wartime experience.[23] In personnel management, Simonds was hard-driving and intolerant of perceived shortcomings, frequently attributing operational failures to subordinate execution rather than flaws in his plans. He relieved several commanders during the Northwest Europe campaign, including Major-General George Kitching of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division on 21 August 1944, after the Falaise Pocket battles, citing deficiencies in leadership amid high casualties (48% officer losses) and exhaustion from 14 days of continuous combat.[22] Similarly, he replaced figures like Chris Vokes and Rod Keller when performance fell short, demonstrating a ruthless streak that prioritized results over personal rapport; contemporaries noted his cold, impersonal demeanor and rare displays of kindness, possibly rooted in his strict Regular Army upbringing.[23] This led to criticisms of micromanagement and strained command relationships, as in the case of Kitching, where Simonds stripped authority yet held him accountable, exacerbating fatigue and inexperience issues among troops.[22] Despite these tensions, Simonds invested in training to elevate personnel standards, establishing the Canadian Junior War Staff Course in November 1940 to accelerate officer development amid rapid expansion of the Canadian Army.[1] His reserved yet innovative style earned high praise from Allied leaders, including Field Marshal Montgomery, who deemed him the only Canadian fit for corps command, and Generals Bradley and Dempsey, who ranked him the finest Canadian general encountered.[1] This technical proficiency and discipline-focused management contributed to successes like the Scheldt estuary clearance in late 1944, though it came at the cost of interpersonal friction and high demands on exhausted units.[23]

Post-War Military Career

Key Commands and Reforms

Following demobilization in 1946, Simonds served as commandant of the National Defence College from 1949 until early 1951, where he emphasized strategic education drawing from wartime experiences.[9] He was appointed Chief of the General Staff (CGS) of the Canadian Army on 1 February 1951, succeeding General Charles Foulkes, and held the position until 8 June 1955.[9] In this role, the highest in the Canadian Army, Simonds directed the service's expansion and adaptation to Cold War demands, overseeing a significant increase in personnel and resources amid rising defense budgets.[1] Simonds prioritized modernization through organizational and infrastructural reforms, including the establishment of Camp Gagetown in New Brunswick as a central training facility capable of accommodating two full divisions simultaneously, which enhanced large-scale maneuver exercises and readiness.[9] He expanded the regular army by incorporating six additional infantry regiments, bolstering combat strength for international commitments.[9] To support sustained overseas deployments, Simonds introduced a rotational reinforcement system, enabling units from Canada to periodically replace and sustain active formations abroad, thereby maintaining operational tempo without permanent overextension.[7] Under his tenure, Simonds directed the formation and training of the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade for dispatch to the Korean War in 1951, marking Canada's first major post-war combat contribution.[7] [9] He also orchestrated the creation of the 27th Infantry Brigade and its permanent stationing in West Germany as part of NATO's forward defense strategy, restructuring the army to integrate with alliance requirements.[7] [1] These initiatives reflected Simonds' emphasis on mobile, brigade-sized forces suited to rapid response, informed by his Second World War advocacy for armored mobility and combined arms tactics.[9]

Challenges and Institutional Impacts

Simonds encountered significant challenges during his tenure as Chief of the General Staff from February 1951 to 1955, primarily stemming from tensions between military requirements and political constraints. He advocated strongly for compulsory military service to address personnel shortages and fulfill Canada's commitments in the Korean War and NATO, informing Defence Minister Brooke Claxton in May 1951 that conscription was essential without which Canada could not meet its obligations.[24] [13] In June 1954, he addressed a private army gathering in Saint John, New Brunswick, urging two years of mandatory training for all youth, and reiterated this publicly in 1955 at the Canadian Club of Montreal, arguing it would benefit individuals, the army, and the nation.[24] These positions drew reprimands from Claxton in 1954 and 1955, exacerbating friction with the Liberal government wary of conscription's divisiveness following its use in the Second World War, and contributed to Simonds' retirement at age 52.[24] Additionally, Simonds' staunch preference for maintaining strong ties with Britain clashed with government efforts to deepen alliances with the United States amid shifting Cold War dynamics, leading him to criticize policies prioritizing American integration over traditional Commonwealth links.[13] He also opposed proposals for unifying the Canadian armed services, contending that the army, navy, and air force required distinct structures due to their differing operational demands, a view that positioned him against broader institutional reforms favored by some political leaders.[13] These stances reflected his earlier frustration in 1945 upon learning Charles Foulkes had been appointed CGS ahead of him, prompting consideration of resignation and underscoring persistent rivalries within senior military circles.[13] Institutionally, Simonds' leadership drove expansions that bolstered Canada's post-war military posture, including deploying a brigade to the Korean War, establishing a permanent brigade group in West Germany for NATO commitments, and adding six regular infantry regiments to enhance readiness.[13] He spearheaded the creation of Camp Gagetown in New Brunswick in 1950–1951, a vast training facility capable of accommodating two divisions simultaneously, which facilitated large-scale maneuvers and modernization efforts amid nuclear-era doctrinal shifts like the "Gold Rush" exercises focused on tactical atomic warfare.[13] However, his unsuccessful push for conscription limited force growth, constraining the army's ability to fully adapt to peacetime demobilization and fiscal austerity, while his resistance to unification delayed inter-service integration until later decades. These outcomes highlighted the Canadian Army's transition challenges from wartime expansion to a smaller, professional Cold War force, with Simonds' tenure marking a period of targeted strengthening overshadowed by policy divergences.[24][13]

Personal Life and Later Years

Marriage and Family

Simonds was born on April 23, 1903, in Bury St. Edmunds, England, to British Army Major Cecil Granville Simonds and Eleanor "Nellie" Easton, the daughter of a Sussex vicar; the family immigrated to Victoria, British Columbia, in 1911 when Guy was eight years old.[13] [25] He was one of four children, with his siblings including brothers who also pursued military careers.[13] On August 17, 1932, Simonds married Katherine "K" Lockhart Taylor, the daughter of a Winnipeg businessman, while stationed in England; the couple had a daughter later that year and a son the following year.[13] [3] The marriage ended in divorce after the Second World War, after which Simonds remarried.[25] He was survived by his son and daughter from the first marriage, as well as his second wife.[25]

Retirement, Health, and Death

Simonds retired from the Canadian Army in June 1955 at the conclusion of his appointment as Chief of the General Staff, a position he had held since February 1951.[9][26] In retirement, he pursued business interests, serving as president of the Toronto Brick Company and as vice-president and director of Commercial Life Assurance and Halifax Insurance companies.[25][6] He also contributed to charitable causes, including as national chairman of the Veterans' Service Committee for the Canadian Red Cross, a member of the Toronto Arts Foundation, and president of the National Ballet Guild.[6] Additionally, he held the honorary role of Colonel of the Royal Regiment of Canada from 1960 until his death.[7] Simonds developed lung cancer in his later years and died from the disease on 15 May 1974 in Toronto, Ontario, at the age of 71.[9] He was buried with full military honours at Mount Pleasant Cemetery.[9]

Legacy and Historical Assessment

Achievements and Positive Evaluations

Simonds earned widespread acclaim as Canada's most effective field commander during the Second World War, distinguished by his rapid battlefield adaptations and emphasis on combined arms operations.[13] Historians have praised his reserved yet demanding leadership style, which prioritized empirical tactical refinements over doctrinal rigidity, enabling 2nd Canadian Corps to achieve breakthroughs where others faltered.[13] His command of the corps from July 1944 onward oversaw key successes, including the clearance of the Scheldt estuary between October and November 1944, which neutralized German coastal batteries and secured Antwerp as a supply hub critical to sustaining Allied advances into Europe.[13] A hallmark achievement was Simonds's improvisation of the "Kangaroo" armoured personnel carrier in late 1944, converting obsolete Priest self-propelled guns—rendered useless after their 105 mm howitzers were removed—into protected infantry transports capable of matching tank speeds under fire.[13] This innovation addressed a persistent causal gap in Allied operations: infantry vulnerability to attrition when trailing armour, allowing protected dismounted assaults that minimized casualties and maximized momentum, as demonstrated in the Rhineland offensives of 1945.[25] Contemporary evaluations highlighted how these carriers preserved troop strength for subsequent engagements, with Simonds's foresight in repurposing surplus equipment exemplifying resource-driven problem-solving amid logistical constraints.[13] In Normandy, particularly during the July–August 1944 battles around Caen, Simonds garnered respect for pioneering armoured-infantry coordination and anti-tank deployments that exploited German defensive weaknesses, contributing to the eventual Falaise Pocket closure despite heavy opposition.[12] Post-war assessments, including those from military analysts, affirm his doctrinal influence on mechanized warfare, crediting him with elevating Canadian forces' operational effectiveness through hands-on refinements rather than untested theory.[13] His elevation to Chief of the General Staff in 1951, at age 48—the youngest in Canadian history—reflected institutional acknowledgment of these wartime feats, where he advocated for modernization amid Cold War transitions.[13]

Criticisms, Controversies, and Debates

Simonds' command decisions during the Normandy campaign, particularly in Operation Totalize from August 7-10, 1944, have drawn criticism for excessive reliance on heavy bombing to breach German defenses, which contributed to operational setbacks and unintended casualties. Approximately 65 Canadian soldiers were killed by "shorts" from Allied bombers on August 7, when navigation errors led to bombs striking forward positions, including the Black Watch Regiment, whose advance was widely doubted by subordinates as feasible given terrain and enemy resistance.[19][27] Critics, including assessments of the plan's execution, argue that Simonds' emphasis on rigid timings and air support, while innovative in incorporating Kangaroo armored personnel carriers, underestimated ground coordination challenges and German anti-tank capabilities, resulting in stalled advances and higher-than-necessary infantry losses amid bocage fighting.[28] The relief of Major-General George Kitching from command of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division on August 21, 1944, shortly after Operation Tractable, exemplifies debates over Simonds' personnel management and interpersonal dynamics. Historical analysis attributes the dismissal to deep-seated tensions in their command relationship, stemming from divergent operational styles and unresolved frictions during the Falaise Gap closure, where Kitching's division faced heavy attrition against superior German armor.[22] While Simonds viewed such actions as essential for maintaining corps effectiveness amid mounting pressures, contemporaries and later scholars question whether personal incompatibilities overshadowed performance evaluations, contributing to perceptions of Simonds as autocratic and prone to abrupt sackings of capable officers like Kitching, who had prior successes in Italy.[23] Post-war, Simonds engaged in public controversies over Canadian defense policy, notably in 1956 when he joined Major-General H. A. Macklin in charging the program with pervasive waste, inefficiency, and inadequate reserves, prompting calls for a parliamentary inquiry.[29] His advocacy for conscription to fulfill NATO commitments clashed with government reluctance, leading to interventions by Defence Minister Brooke Claxton, who suppressed Simonds' speeches amid unfavorable public polls on compulsory service.[24] These positions, rooted in Simonds' belief that volunteer forces insufficiently addressed Cold War threats, fueled debates on civil-military relations and highlighted institutional resistance to his critiques of over-reliance on air power and underinvestment in ground reserves.[30]

References

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