Hubbry Logo
High-level wasteHigh-level wasteMain
Open search
High-level waste
Community hub
High-level waste
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
High-level waste
High-level waste
High-level waste
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia
The Hanford site represents 7-9 percent of America's high-level radioactive waste by volume. Nuclear reactors line the riverbank at the Hanford Site along the Columbia River in January 1960.

High-level waste (HLW) is a type of nuclear waste created by the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.[1] It exists in two main forms:

Liquid high-level waste is typically held temporarily in underground tanks pending vitrification. Most of the high-level waste created by the Manhattan Project and the weapons programs of the Cold War exists in this form because funding for further processing was typically not part of the original weapons programs. Both spent nuclear fuel and vitrified waste are considered [2] as suitable forms for long term disposal, after a period of temporary storage in the case of spent nuclear fuel.

HLW contains many of the fission products and transuranic elements generated in the reactor core and is the type of nuclear waste with the highest activity. HLW accounts for over 95% of the total radioactivity produced in the nuclear power process. In other words, while most nuclear waste is low-level and intermediate-level waste, such as protective clothing and equipment that have been contaminated with radiation, the majority of the radioactivity produced from the nuclear power generation process comes from high-level waste.

Some countries, particularly France, reprocess commercial spent fuel.

High-level waste is very radioactive and, therefore, requires special shielding during handling and transport. Initially it also needs cooling, because it generates a great deal of heat. Most of the heat, at least after short-lived nuclides have decayed, is from the medium-lived fission products caesium-137 and strontium-90, which have half-lives on the order of 30 years.

A typical large 1000 MWe nuclear reactor produces 25–30 tons of spent fuel per year.[3]

It is generally accepted that the final waste will be disposed of in a deep geological repository, and many countries have developed plans for such a site, including Finland, France, Japan, United States and Sweden.

Definitions

[edit]
Long-lived fission products
Nuclide t1⁄2 Yield Q[a 1] βγ
(Ma) (%)[a 2] (keV)
99Tc 0.211 6.1385 294 β
126Sn 0.23  0.1084 4050[a 3] βγ
79Se 0.33  0.0447 151 β
135Cs 1.33  6.9110[a 4] 269 β
93Zr 1.61  5.4575 91 βγ
107Pd 6.5   1.2499 33 β
129I 16.1  0.8410 194 βγ
  1. ^ Decay energy is split among β, neutrino, and γ if any.
  2. ^ Per 65 thermal neutron fissions of 235U and 35 of 239Pu.
  3. ^ Has decay energy 380 keV, but its decay product 126Sb has decay energy 3.67 MeV.
  4. ^ Lower in thermal reactors because 135Xe, its predecessor, readily absorbs neutrons.
Medium-lived fission products
Nuclide t1⁄2 Yield Q[a 1] βγ
(a) (%)[a 2] (keV)
155Eu  4.74   0.0803[a 3] 252 βγ
85Kr 10.73   0.2180[a 4] 687 βγ
113mCd 13.9    0.0008[a 3] 316 β
90Sr 28.91 4.505     2826[a 5] β
137Cs 30.04 6.337     1176 βγ
121mSn 43.9  0.00005   390 βγ
151Sm 94.6  0.5314[a 3] 77 β
  1. ^ Decay energy is split among β, neutrino, and γ if any.
  2. ^ Per 65 thermal neutron fissions of 235U and 35 of 239Pu.
  3. ^ a b c Neutron poison; in thermal reactors, most is destroyed by further neutron capture.
  4. ^ Less than 1/4 of mass-85 fission products as most bypass ground state: Br-85 → Kr-85m → Rb-85.
  5. ^ Has decay energy 546 keV; its decay product Y-90 has decay energy 2.28 MeV with weak gamma branching.

High-level waste is the highly radioactive waste material resulting from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, including liquid waste produced directly in reprocessing and any solid material derived from such liquid waste that contains fission products in sufficient concentrations; and other highly radioactive material that is determined, consistent with existing law, to require permanent isolation.[4]

Spent (used) reactor fuel.

Waste materials from reprocessing.






Storage

[edit]
Main article: High-level radioactive waste management
Spent fuel pool

High-level radioactive waste is stored for 10 or 20 years in spent fuel pools, and then can be put in dry cask storage facilities.

In 1997, in the 20 countries which account for most of the world's nuclear power generation, spent fuel storage capacity at the reactors was 148,000 tonnes, with 59% of this utilized. Away-from-reactor storage capacity was 78,000 tonnes, with 44% utilized.[5]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

High-level waste

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
High-level (HLW) consists of highly radioactive materials generated as byproducts of reactions in reactors, primarily assemblies and the residues from reprocessing such fuel, which emit intense and requiring robust shielding, cooling, and eventual permanent isolation to prevent human or environmental exposure. Unlike lower-level wastes, HLW contains long-lived isotopes such as ( 24,100 years) and cesium-137 ( 30 years), necessitating geological disposal timescales spanning millennia. Commercial HLW arises mainly from irradiated uranium fuel used in power generation, while defense-related HLW stems from weapons material production and includes vitrified liquids from reprocessing at sites like Hanford. Global inventories remain compact—equivalent to a few Olympic-sized swimming pools in volume for spent fuel—yet demand interim storage in water pools for initial cooling or dry casks thereafter, with no recorded major releases from containment failures in civilian facilities over decades of operation. Permanent management strategies emphasize deep geological repositories, such as those operational in Finland (Onkalo) or planned elsewhere, where engineered barriers and host rock isolate waste from the biosphere. Challenges include political delays in siting, as seen in the U.S. Yucca Mountain project's halt despite technical viability, underscoring tensions between empirical safety data and public risk perceptions.

Definition and Characteristics

Classification and Criteria

High-level radioactive waste (HLW) is classified within broader schemes for radioactive waste management, which categorize materials based on content, activity concentration, heat generation potential, and long-term disposal safety requirements. Internationally, the (IAEA) outlines six waste classes: exempt waste (EW), very short-lived waste (VSLW), very low-level waste (VLLW), (LLW), intermediate-level waste (ILW), and HLW, with classification primarily driven by considerations for disposal facility design and post-closure safety. These classes account for half-lives of , distinguishing short-lived (decaying within years) from long-lived (persisting millennia) isotopes that influence isolation needs. HLW specifically comprises waste with activity concentrations sufficient to produce significant heat via —typically exceeding 2 kW/m³—or containing substantial quantities of long-lived radionuclides, such as transuranics, that demand specialized engineering in disposal systems. This heat output necessitates active cooling for centuries in many cases, alongside robust shielding to mitigate intense fields capable of delivering lethal doses (e.g., over 10,000 rem/hour at short decay times post-removal from reactors). Activity levels for HLW often range from 10⁴ to 10⁶ TBq/m³, far surpassing thresholds for lower classes, and it accounts for about 95% of total despite comprising only 3% of waste volume by mass. Disposal criteria emphasize deep geological repositories, typically hundreds of meters underground, to ensure containment over geological timescales due to hazards from fission products like cesium-137 and (half-lives ~30 years) and actinides like (half-life 24,000 years). In the United States, the (NRC) defines HLW under the Atomic Energy Act as irradiated reactor fuel or wastes from reprocessing spent fuel, including liquids converted to solids, distinguished from low- and intermediate-level wastes by their thermal and radiological intensity requiring permanent isolation rather than near-surface disposal. National variations exist, as some countries classify certain reprocessing residues differently based on treatment feasibility, but IAEA criteria provide a harmonized framework prioritizing empirical safety assessments over rigid numerical thresholds. ultimately hinges on potential individual doses post-disposal and economic practicality of radionuclide removal, ensuring HLW management addresses causal risks from and migration.

Key Physical and Radiological Properties

High-level waste (HLW) typically originates as highly acidic liquid effluents from reprocessing, primarily solutions containing dissolved fission products, actinides, and products, which are corrosive and stored in double-walled, leak-resistant tanks engineered for long-term containment. These liquids exhibit densities around 1.4–1.6 g/cm³ due to dissolved salts and require to manage initial heat loads exceeding 10 kW/m³ from short-lived radionuclides. Prior to disposal, the liquid is immobilized via , incorporating it into a matrix that forms durable, homogeneous canisters with densities of 2.5–3.0 g/cm³, low coefficients (typically 8–10 × 10⁻⁶/°C), and compressive strengths exceeding 400 MPa, ensuring structural integrity under repository conditions. Vitrified HLW demonstrates exceptional chemical durability, with normalized leach rates for key elements below 10⁻³ g/m²·day in standard tests, minimizing release. Radiologically, HLW is defined by the (IAEA) as waste with activity concentrations sufficient to generate greater than 2 kW/m³, alongside requirements for radiological shielding due to intense gamma and beta emissions. Initial specific activities can reach 5 × 10⁵ TBq/m³, dominated by fission products such as cesium-137 ( 30.17 years, principal gamma emitter at 662 keV) and ( 28.8 years, beta emitter yielding daughter), which account for over 80% of early . Actinides like ( 432.6 years, alpha and gamma emitter) and isotopes contribute to long-term alpha and residual , with output decaying to 0.6–1.6 kW per canister after 10–50 years of interim storage. This generation necessitates thermal management, as unmitigated temperatures in vitrified forms can exceed 200–400°C internally shortly after processing, potentially altering glass microstructure if not controlled. Surface dose rates for fresh canisters often surpass 10 Sv/h, requiring remote handling and thick lead or shielding.
PropertyTypical Value for Vitrified HLWNotes
Decay Heat>2 kW/m³ initially; 2–20 kW/m³ after ~10 yearsIAEA classification threshold; decreases with time due to short-lived isotopes
Key RadionuclidesCs-137, Sr-90 (short-term); Pu-239, Am-241 (long-term)Fission products ~90% initial activity; actinides dominate after 300 years
Radiation TypesGamma (Cs-137), beta (Sr-90), alpha (actinides)Requires shielding; alpha low penetration but high biological impact

Generation and Sources

Commercial Nuclear Power Production

In commercial production, high-level waste (HLW) arises primarily from the discharge of (SNF) after irradiation in reactor cores, where fission generates energy alongside radioactive fission products such as cesium-137 and , as well as transuranic elements like and . This SNF, typically uranium dioxide pellets encased in alloy cladding within fuel assemblies, constitutes the bulk of HLW by radioactivity, accounting for over 95% of the total radiotoxicity from the in non-reprocessing scenarios. Light-water reactors, which comprise the majority of the world's approximately 440 operational commercial units as of 2023, operate on fuel that reaches burnups of 40-60 gigawatt-days per metric ton of heavy metal before discharge, typically after 3-6 years in the core. The generation process involves loading fresh fuel assemblies into the reactor, where neutron-induced fission sustains the chain reaction; as depletes and neutron-absorbing fission products accumulate, assemblies lose efficiency and are shuffled or removed during refueling outages, which occur every 12-24 months. In countries without commercial reprocessing, such as the , intact SNF is classified and managed as HLW due to its intense and , with no significant additional HLW generated from routine plant operations, which produce mostly like contaminated tools or resins. Globally, commercial reactors discharge around 11,300 metric tons of heavy metal (tHM) in SNF annually, contributing to a cumulative inventory exceeding 400,000 tHM as of 2024, of which approximately 70% remains unreprocessed and stored at reactor sites or centralized facilities. In nations practicing reprocessing, such as and , SNF is chemically dissolved to recover and for recycle, yielding a smaller volume of liquid HLW that is then vitrified into logs for stabilization; this process reduces SNF mass by about 96% but concentrates the long-lived radionuclides into HLW canisters. Only about 30% of discharged SNF has undergone reprocessing worldwide, limiting the prevalence of this HLW form in commercial contexts. Per unit of generated, the HLW volume from commercial nuclear is minimal—roughly 1 gram of SNF per —contrasting sharply with the ash and emissions from , though its management demands isolation due to decay times spanning millennia for key isotopes. In the U.S., annual SNF arisings add about 2,000 metric tons to the stockpile, which stood at over 80,000 metric tons as of 2017, predominantly from pressurized and boiling water reactors. Emerging reactor designs, including small modular reactors, may alter HLW profiles by potentially increasing waste volume per energy output due to higher retention, though operational data remains limited as of 2022.

Nuclear Weapons and Defense Activities

High-level waste from nuclear weapons and defense activities arises primarily from the reprocessing of irradiated to extract and highly for production. In the United States, this waste was generated at facilities like the , operational from 1944 to 1987 for production, and the , active from 1953 onward for both and . Reprocessing involves dissolving fuel in , chemically separating target isotopes, and concentrating fission products—such as cesium-137, , and transuranic elements like and —into highly radioactive liquid streams. These liquids, with exceeding 2 kW/m³ and long-lived radionuclides requiring isolation for thousands of years, qualify as high-level waste under regulatory definitions due to their potential for significant . The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) oversees approximately 90 million gallons (340,000 m³) of such legacy defense high-level waste, stored in 177 underground tanks at Hanford and 51 at , many of which exhibit leaks and corrosion risks from the 1940s through the 1990s. Hanford's tank farm holds about 56 million gallons (210,000 m³) total, with roughly 5%—or 2.8 million gallons—designated as high-level waste based on cesium-137 concentration exceeding 1,100 curies per million gallons. contains 36 million gallons (136,000 m³), with similar high-radionuclide fractions derived from PUREX-process reprocessing campaigns. These volumes represent the bulk of U.S. defense HLW, distinct from commercial spent fuel, and pose challenges due to settling, supernate separation, and evolving DOE interpretations of waste classification for disposal. Treatment efforts focus on immobilization to reduce mobility and volume. At , the Defense Waste Processing Facility, operational since March 1996, has vitrified over 4,000 canisters of high-level waste into by 2023, encapsulating fission products while separating low-activity waste for grout solidification. Hanford's planned Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant aims to process high-level fractions via similar , targeting completion in the , though delays stem from technical issues with melter performance and cesium removal. Globally, nuclear-armed states like ( facility, with tank spills documented in 1957 and ongoing reprocessing waste) and the (, managing Magnox-derived HLW from defense extraction) generate comparable wastes, but public volume data remains opaque, estimated in tens of thousands of cubic meters without standardized reporting.

Global Volumes and Projections

As of the end of 2018, the global inventory of stood at approximately 371,000 tonnes of heavy metal (tHM), primarily arising from commercial discharges, while high-level waste (HLW)—typically vitrified residues from reprocessing—totaled about 22,000 cubic meters (m³). By the end of 2022, cumulative discharges of spent fuel had reached around 430,000 tHM, with approximately 301,000 tHM stored as unreprocessed assemblies, reflecting ongoing reprocessing in countries such as and that converts a portion into compacted HLW. These figures exclude defense-related HLW, which adds smaller but significant volumes in nations like the and , though comprehensive global tallies for military sources remain limited due to classification. Annual global generation of spent fuel, the primary precursor to HLW, averages about 10,000 tHM, driven mainly by the operation of roughly commercial reactors worldwide. Without fuel , this rate would accumulate additional unreprocessed spent fuel equivalent to HLW volumes; reprocessing reduces spent fuel mass but concentrates long-lived radionuclides into HLW canisters, with global reprocessing handling roughly one-third of discharges to date. Projections for future HLW and spent fuel volumes hinge on nuclear energy deployment scenarios. Under baseline assumptions of stable capacity around 400 gigawatt-electric (GWe), inventories could grow by another 250,000–300,000 tHM of spent fuel by 2050 through routine discharges and decommissioning of existing reactors. However, analyses aligned with net-zero emissions goals, such as those from the , anticipate a potential tripling of installed nuclear capacity to over 1,000 GWe by 2050, which would proportionally increase annual waste generation to around 30,000 tHM, necessitating expanded storage and disposal infrastructure. Such expansions remain contingent on policy, technological advances in , and deployment of advanced reactors that may reduce waste per energy output.

Processing and Treatment

Conditioning Methods like

Conditioning of high-level waste (HLW) involves transforming liquid or semi-liquid radioactive effluents, typically from fuel reprocessing, into a stable, solid matrix that minimizes release and facilitates safe handling, storage, and eventual disposal. , the predominant method, incorporates HLW into a matrix by evaporating water from the waste, calcining to decompose volatile components such as nitrates at around 400–600°C, and then melting the mixture with glass-forming additives like silica and at temperatures exceeding 1000°C, often 1150°C in joule-heated melters. The molten glass is poured into canisters, cooling to form durable logs that encapsulate fission products and actinides with leach rates below 10^{-5} g/cm²/day under standard testing conditions. This process has been operational since the 1970s, with France's Atelier Vitrification Marcoule (AVM) facility at Marcoule starting in 1978 and processing over 2000 metric tons of HLW equivalent by 2020 using liquid-fed ceramic melters achieving throughputs of 20–30 liters per hour. In the United States, the West Valley Demonstration Project vitrified approximately 600 cubic meters of commercial HLW from 1996 to 2002 in a pilot-scale facility, demonstrating scalability, while the ongoing Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant aims to vitrify 56 million gallons of legacy defense HLW by the 2030s using larger melters with capacities up to 3000 gallons per day. The United Kingdom's Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) at Sellafield employs a similar in-can vitrification system, having conditioned reprocessing wastes since 1990. Vitrification offers superior chemical durability compared to alternatives, with glass matrices resisting dissolution in groundwater for millennia under repository conditions, as validated by accelerated leach tests and natural analogs like ancient volcanic glasses. It accommodates a wide range of waste compositions through adjustable frit formulations, achieving volume reductions of up to 80% via prior evaporation and calcination. However, challenges include high capital and operational costs—estimated at $1–2 billion for large plants—along with corrosion of melter components by aggressive waste chemistries, necessitating frequent replacements and specialized expertise. Off-gas treatment systems are required to capture volatiles like cesium and ruthenium, adding complexity. While dominates HLW conditioning due to its proven performance, alternatives such as ceramic immobilization (e.g., Synroc, a titanate-based matrix) have been researched for wastes with high content, offering potentially lower leach rates but higher fabrication costs and less industrial deployment. Plasma arc , which uses thermal plasma torches for rapid melting, provides volume reduction for heterogeneous wastes but remains at lower technology readiness levels (TRL 7–9) for HLW and is more suited to smaller volumes or mixed wastes due to electrode erosion issues. Cementation, effective for low- and intermediate-level wastes, is unsuitable for HLW owing to inadequate thermal and radiological stability. International standards from bodies like the IAEA endorse as the baseline, with ongoing R&D focusing on advanced glasses for broader waste acceptance.

Reprocessing and Fuel Recycling

Reprocessing of extracts and for reuse, separating them from fission products that constitute high-level waste. This hydrometallurgical process reduces the volume of material requiring long-term geological disposal by concentrating radioactive fission products into a smaller stream, while recovering over 95% of the actinides for fabrication into new fuel assemblies. The predominant commercial method is the process, developed in the 1940s and refined since, which employs aqueous dissolution of fuel followed by organic solvent extraction using to isolate and . In this solvent extraction, is selectively reduced to its trivalent state for separation, while remains extractable; the remaining , laden with fission products like cesium-137 and , forms the high-level liquid waste that is subsequently vitrified into glass logs for stabilization. Advanced variants, such as those incorporating partitioning for minor actinides, aim to further mitigate long-term radiotoxicity by isolating elements like and for transmutation in fast reactors. Recycled materials enable closed fuel cycles, where is blended with to produce mixed oxide (, which powers light-water reactors and extracts additional energy value—up to 30 times more than once-through cycles—from the original resource. In France's facility, operational since 1966, reprocessing has handled over 40,000 metric tons of spent fuel as of 2025, 96% of its content and limiting annual high-level waste production to approximately 200 cubic meters. Similar facilities operate in (), the (, though scaling down), (Rokkasho, intermittently), , and , with these nations collectively reprocessing thousands of tons annually to support and waste minimization. Reprocessing yields waste volume reductions by a factor of five and long-term radiotoxicity reductions by a factor of ten compared to direct disposal of spent fuel, as reusable actinides are removed and fission products decay over shorter timescales. Multiple passes in fast-spectrum reactors could theoretically reduce the load and volume of ultimate by up to 90%, easing repository demands. However, proliferation concerns arise from separated , which can be weapon-usable, prompting safeguards under IAEA protocols; economic viability remains challenged by high capital costs—exceeding $1 billion for large plants—and operational expenses often surpassing the value of recovered materials in open-market conditions. The ceased commercial reprocessing after a 1977 policy halt over proliferation risks, though defense-related activities at sites like persist; recent demonstrations, such as those by and in 2025, signal renewed interest in advanced to leverage domestic fuel stocks amid supply chain vulnerabilities. Globally, reprocessing aligns with resource conservation, as recycled uranium substitutes for 10-15% of fresh in some cycles, but adoption lags in nations favoring direct disposal due to these security and cost trade-offs.

Storage Methods

Pool-Based Interim Storage

Pool-based interim storage involves submerging assemblies in deep water-filled pools located at sites or centralized facilities, where the water serves dual purposes as a to remove and as a shield to protect workers and the environment. The pools typically contain borated water to absorb neutrons and prevent unintended criticality events, with racks designed to maintain subcritical spacing. This method is the initial stage for managing high-level waste equivalents like spent , allowing for several years of cooling—often 5 to 10 years—before potential transfer to dry storage systems once diminishes sufficiently. These storage pools are engineered with robust structures, thick walls, and floors providing structural integrity against seismic events, impacts, and natural phenomena, while the depth—usually around 40 feet (12 meters)—ensures adequate shielding and cooling even if some or minor leakage occurs. Cooling systems rely on redundant pumps and exchangers to circulate , preventing that could expose ; in the event of power loss, via pool and atmospheric dissipation can sustain integrity for extended periods under normal conditions. Approximately one-fourth to one-third of a reactor's load is discharged every 12 to 18 months and placed into these pools, which in the United States currently hold a significant portion of the roughly 90,000 metric tons of commercial spent fuel generated to date. Advantages of pool storage include effective heat management during the high-decay-heat phase post-discharge, ease of visual inspection and monitoring of fuel integrity, and the ability to handle fuel manipulations like canning or canning for transport if needed. However, limitations arise from finite pool capacity, leading to reracking denser configurations or offloading to dry casks, as many U.S. pools reached original limits by the 1990s due to the lack of a federal repository. Potential vulnerabilities include reliance on active cooling systems, which could fail in severe accidents like prolonged station blackout, though historical data shows no significant radiological releases from U.S. pools despite events like earthquakes. Overcrowding beyond design bases has raised concerns in some analyses about increased fire risks from zirconium cladding ignition if water levels drop, prompting transitions to dry storage for longer-term interim needs. As of 2025, pool storage remains the predominant interim method globally for newly discharged , with ongoing of aging components like neutron-absorbing materials in racks to ensure long-term safety. Regulatory efforts, such as U.S. considerations for unattended water makeup, reflect adaptations to extended storage timelines absent permanent disposal, though recent discontinuations indicate reliance on existing designs' proven robustness. Internationally, similar pool systems support reprocessing pathways in countries like , where is stored wet prior to , underscoring pool storage's role in bridging operational and deferred final disposition.

Dry Storage Systems

Dry storage systems employ sealed, robust containers, typically casks constructed from steel, concrete, or composite materials, to hold assemblies or vitrified high-level waste canisters above ground without liquid cooling. The waste, cooled initially in spent fuel pools for several years, is loaded into multi-purpose canisters within the casks, which are then backfilled with an such as to facilitate internal and prevent . External cooling relies on passive natural and from the cask surface, eliminating the need for pumps or electrical power. These systems were developed to address pool capacity limitations at nuclear facilities, with the first U.S. (NRC) license issued in 1986 for installation at the in . By 2022, dry casks had stored over 3,000 metric tons of spent fuel across more than 70 U.S. sites, with designs accommodating 17 to 37 assemblies per cask depending on the model. Internationally, over 25 cask types have been deployed, including vertical pads, horizontal storage modules, and silo configurations, with more than 5,000 casks in use globally as of 2020. Safety features include multilayer shielding to limit to below regulatory limits, structural integrity against seismic events, winds up to 230 mph, and temperatures exceeding 1,000°F, as verified through NRC testing protocols. No radiological releases have occurred from dry storage systems since their , attributed to passive design that avoids single-point failures inherent in wet storage, such as pool leaks or boiling crises. For vitrified high-level waste from fuel reprocessing, air-cooled dry vaults provide extended containment, maintaining canister integrity for over 50 years pending geological disposal. Examples include decentralized on-site storage at U.S. reactors like those operated by and , as well as centralized facilities such as Switzerland's Zwilag interim storage for spent fuel and Germany's Ahaus site for high-level waste casks. Some dual-purpose casks enable direct to disposal sites, reducing handling risks, though extended storage beyond initial certifications—now routinely renewed up to 60 years—requires programs to monitor concrete degradation and canister corrosion.

Disposal Approaches

Deep Geological Repositories

Deep geological repositories (DGRs) entail the permanent isolation of high-level radioactive waste (HLW) and in engineered facilities excavated deep within stable geological formations, typically at depths of 200 to 1,000 meters, to prevent release into the over millennia. The approach relies on multiple barriers: the waste form itself (e.g., vitrified HLW or encased fuel assemblies), corrosion-resistant metal canisters, backfill materials like clay to seal voids and buffer , and the host rock's low permeability and tectonic stability to minimize ingress and migration pathways. This multi-barrier system is designed to ensure containment even if human oversight ceases, with safety assessments modeling scenarios over hundreds of thousands of years, projecting doses far below natural levels. Host rock types vary by site suitability: salt formations self-seal via creep, clays like Opalinus shale provide low , and crystalline rocks such as offer mechanical strength in low-seismic areas. The (IAEA) endorses DGRs as the internationally preferred method for HLW disposal, citing empirical evidence from natural analogs—like the intact 2-billion-year-old Oklo reactor in , where fission products remained confined—and laboratory tests demonstrating canister integrity for over 10,000 years under repository conditions. Probabilistic risk assessments indicate failure probabilities below 10^{-5} per year for critical components, with contact as the primary long-term concern mitigated by site-specific . As of 2025, no DGR for HLW or spent fuel is fully operational, though Finland's Onkalo repository in granitic at Olkiluoto is advancing toward commissioning by the late , following regulatory approval in 2015 and ongoing encapsulation facility construction. Sweden's Forsmark project in crystalline rock targets operations in the 2030s, with voluntary local host consent after decades of site characterization. France's Cigéo in Callovo-Oxfordian clay aims for HLW disposal starting in 2035, emphasizing retrievability during an initial monitoring phase. In contrast, the U.S. project, selected in 1987 for volcanic tuff, accumulated over $15 billion in development costs but stalled in 2010 due to political opposition despite favorable technical reviews by the . The (WIPP) in , operational since 1999 for transuranic defense waste in salt beds, demonstrates DGR feasibility but excludes HLW, with incidents like the 2014 hydrogen release highlighting operational risks from microbial gas generation. Challenges persist in scaling laboratory data to field conditions, including canister from microbial activity or radiolysis-induced oxidants, though models predict negligible impacts with proper like or Alloy 22. Social and regulatory hurdles dominate delays, with siting often thwarted by local opposition despite on safety, as evidenced by and Sweden's success through transparent, consent-based processes. Critics, including some environmental groups, argue uncertainties in ultra-long-term predictions justify indefinite storage, but IAEA analyses refute this, affirming DGRs' superiority over surface alternatives given HLW's concentrated hazard and predictable decay. Global projections indicate over a dozen DGR programs in planning stages, underscoring gradual implementation amid political variability.

Emerging Alternatives such as Deep Borehole Disposal

Deep borehole disposal (DBD) involves emplacing high-level radioactive waste or in sealed canisters within vertical or deviated s drilled to depths of 3 to 5 kilometers into stable crystalline formations, where low permeability and minimal are expected to isolate the waste over geological timescales. The upper sections of the serve for access and emplacement, while the waste is positioned in the lower 2 kilometers, surrounded by backfill materials such as clay or to prevent migration, followed by complete sealing of the . This approach leverages mature technologies from the oil and gas industry, enabling diameters of 0.3 to 0.5 meters and potentially allowing deployment of multiple canisters per in arrays spaced hundreds of meters apart. Proponents argue that DBD offers advantages over traditional mined deep geological repositories, including a reduced thermal footprint due to the dispersed emplacement of waste, which minimizes rock heating and potential fracturing; faster construction timelines, as drilling a single could take 1-2 years compared to decades for repository tunneling; and enhanced isolation from surface disturbances or human intrusion, given the extreme depth beyond most circulation. Additionally, the concept provides flexibility for smaller nations or inventories, as boreholes can be sited in diverse geologies without requiring vast underground excavations, and retrieval remains theoretically possible via drilling if needed before final sealing, though post-emplacement recovery poses significant technical challenges. Despite these potential benefits, DBD faces substantial technical, regulatory, and hurdles. Critics highlight uncertainties in long-term , such as the of undetected fractures or seismic events allowing upward migration of radionuclides through the backfill or host rock, with limited opportunities for post-closure monitoring compared to accessible mined repositories. U.S. Department of Energy field demonstration efforts were paused in amid concerns over site characterization, waste package design, and regulatory pathways, though conceptual studies continue to emphasize the need for site-specific hydraulic testing and modeling to verify isolation efficacy. Peer-reviewed assessments underscore that while DBD may suit compact, heat-generating wastes, its relies heavily on probabilistic models rather than direct empirical data from full-scale operations, contrasting with the more established in mined facilities. As of 2025, DBD remains in the research and feasibility phase globally, with no operational deployments. The International Atomic Energy Agency initiated a Coordinated Research Project in August 2023 to advance knowledge on DBD testing protocols, focusing on drilling demonstrations, canister integrity, and international standards for intermediate- and high-level wastes. Private entities like Deep Isolation have progressed feasibility studies, including a restarted assessment in September 2025 for Bulgaria's spent fuel inventory using deviated boreholes to target optimal host rocks. Norway's expert evaluations in April 2025 included DBD among options for its high-level wastes, prioritizing concepts adaptable to granitic or gneissic formations, though medium-depth repositories were favored for low- and intermediate-level wastes. Other emerging disposal alternatives, such as hybrid borehole-array systems or integration with advanced waste forms, are under exploration but lack the conceptual maturity of DBD, with most programs deferring to refined geological repository designs amid ongoing debates over scalability and public acceptance.

Safety Assessments

Radiation and Health Risk Evaluations

Evaluations of radiation and health s from high-level waste (HLW) primarily involve probabilistic modeling of radionuclide release scenarios, transport through environmental pathways such as or air, and subsequent human exposure via , , or external , with doses calculated for hypothetical critical groups like nearby residents or inadvertent intruders. These assessments adhere to standards set by bodies like the (ICRP), which recommend limiting public effective doses to below 1 millisievert (mSv) per year above background, though HLW repository designs target collective doses far lower, often projecting individual lifetime doses under 0.1 mSv for deep geological disposal. quantification typically employs the linear no-threshold (LNT) model, extrapolating cancer risks from high-dose atomic bomb survivor data, estimating stochastic effects like a 5% increased cancer mortality per , but applied conservatively to low-dose projections where empirical evidence shows no detectable health impacts below 100 mSv. Projected health risks from contained HLW are minimal due to multi-barrier systems in storage and disposal, with models for facilities like proposed deep geological repositories indicating peak public doses on the order of 0.01-0.1 microsieverts per year decades post-closure, orders of magnitude below natural of 2-3 mSv annually. For instance, assessments of disposal simulate migration over millennia, yielding cancer risk probabilities below 10^{-6} per person, comparable to or lower than risks from everyday activities like . Acute deterministic effects, such as , are precluded by integrity, while chronic exposures are mitigated by decay—HLW halves roughly every 30 years initially, dropping to near-background levels after 10,000 years for most isotopes. The LNT model's application to HLW risks has faced scientific scrutiny, as low-dose epidemiological data from occupational cohorts and natural high-background areas reveal no linear risk increase and potential adaptive responses, including reduced cancer rates at doses under 100 milligray, challenging extrapolations that overestimate hazards for regulatory conservatism. Empirical studies at HLW sites, such as Hanford, report no attributable excess cancers among workers or populations despite historical releases, with UNSCEAR analyses confirming that medical and natural exposures dominate global risks, not when properly executed. Overall, evaluations underscore that engineered safeguards render HLW risks negligible compared to unmitigated industrial alternatives, prioritizing verifiable containment over unsubstantiated fears.

Environmental Impact Analyses

Environmental impact analyses of high-level radioactive waste (HLW) primarily rely on performance assessments, environmental impact statements (EIS), and long-term modeling to evaluate potential releases of radionuclides into soil, , , and the . These assessments integrate site-specific , , and engineered barrier performance to predict contaminant migration over millennia, adhering to standards such as the U.S. Agency's (EPA) 40 CFR Part 197, which limits individual effective dose from disposal to 15 millirem per year for 10,000 years post-closure. Such models demonstrate that multi-barrier systems in deep geological repositories (DGRs)—including waste canisters, buffers, and host rock—effectively isolate HLW, resulting in projected environmental doses far below natural levels of approximately 300 millirem annually. Interim storage methods, including pool and dry cask systems, exhibit negligible environmental impacts under normal operations, with radiological releases limited to trace gaseous effluents well below regulatory thresholds. For instance, monitoring at U.S. sites like Hanford has detected no significant off-site attributable to stored HLW tanks beyond localized plumes managed through remediation, despite legacy leaks from early operations predating modern containment standards. Dry storage casks, designed for 60+ years of service, show corrosion rates yielding annual dose rates to the environment of less than 0.01 millirem at 100 meters, per (NRC) evaluations. These findings underscore causal mechanisms where robust encapsulation prevents leaching, contrasting with hypothetical failure scenarios that analyses deem improbable due to overdesign factors exceeding 10,000-year stability requirements. In DGR contexts, analyses project maximal release peaks after 10,000–100,000 years, but concentrations remain dilute, with ecological risks dominated by short-lived isotopes decaying before significant migration. Swedish and Finnish repository designs, informed by and clay host rocks, forecast no measurable impacts, supported by analog studies of deposits stable for millions of years. Potential enhancers of migration, such as microbial activity or thermal stresses altering permeability, are quantified in sensitivity analyses; for example, elevated temperatures up to 100°C may accelerate clay alteration, yet buffer systems retain capacities reducing cesium mobility by factors of 10^4–10^6. Empirical data from underground research laboratories, like France's Callovo-Oxfordian clay, confirm low (10^-21 m/s), minimizing advective transport. Comparative lifecycle assessments reveal HLW's environmental footprint as orders of magnitude lower than wastes in terms of persistent toxicity per energy unit produced, with no verified cases of widespread ecological disruption from commercial HLW management since the . Regulatory EIS for sites like Idaho's HLW disposition conclude that even conservative "what-if" scenarios—assuming partial barrier failure—yield doses below 1% of regulatory limits, prioritizing causal isolation over speculative models often critiqued for overemphasizing tail-end risks without probabilistic weighting. Ongoing monitoring integrates isotopic tracers and bioindicators, validating models where predicted versus observed releases align within 10–20% margins.

Comparative Context

Volume and Hazard Relative to Fossil Fuel Wastes

High-level radioactive waste (HLW) from , primarily , occupies a vastly smaller volume than the solid wastes generated by combustion for equivalent production. A typical produces approximately 25-30 metric tons of spent fuel annually per gigawatt of electric capacity at full load, equating to roughly 3 metric tons per terawatt-hour (TWh) of output when accounting for capacity factors around 90%. By contrast, -fired plants generate about 89 kilograms of per megawatt-hour, resulting in over 89,000 metric tons per TWh—orders of magnitude greater due to the low of relative to fuel. combustion yields less solid waste but still produces significant volumes of sludge and gypsum from , though these are dwarfed by accumulations exceeding 1 billion metric tons globally as of 2020. In terms of specific hazard, HLW exhibits high initial radioactivity from fission products and actinides, necessitating engineered containment to prevent releases, with its radiotoxicity declining exponentially over millennia as isotopes decay. wastes, however, present a different profile: ash concentrates naturally occurring radionuclides like , , and radium-226 during combustion, achieving levels up to 10 times those in input and, in some cases, surpassing concentrations in HLW for certain alpha-emitters. Yet the sheer scale amplifies total hazard; annual global ash production carries about 5,000 metric tons of equivalent, dispersed via landfilling and spills, contributing to elevated environmental doses compared to contained nuclear wastes. ash also leaches toxic heavy metals such as , , and mercury, causing documented groundwater contamination at over 200 U.S. sites, with chemical persisting indefinitely unlike the time-bound radiological risks of HLW. Empirical assessments underscore that, per unit energy, fossil fuel wastes impose broader dispersal risks: coal plants release radionuclides via fly ash and stack emissions at rates 10-100 times higher than nuclear facilities, based on routine operational data, while mining overburden for coal adds 600,000-1,200,000 metric tons per gigawatt-equivalent capacity in waste rock alone. HLW's compact volume facilitates secure geological isolation, mitigating long-term exposure, whereas fossil wastes' diffuse has led to measurable health impacts, including increased cancer risks near ash ponds from radium decay products. This contrast highlights nuclear HLW's manageability through concentration and isolation versus the persistent, voluminous environmental footprint of alternatives.

Lifecycle Risks Versus Other Energy Sources

High-level nuclear waste management risks, when assessed across the full lifecycle of nuclear energy production—from fuel extraction to disposal—yield significantly lower societal impacts than those associated with dominant alternatives like and . Empirical analyses of mortality rates, incorporating accidents, occupational hazards, and chronic health effects from , place nuclear energy at approximately 0.03 deaths per terawatt-hour (TWh) of generated, far below 's 24.6 deaths/TWh and oil's 18.4 deaths/TWh. These figures derive from comprehensive datasets spanning 1965–2021, including major incidents like Chernobyl (433 direct deaths) and Fukushima (2,314 estimated total), yet nuclear's overall rate remains comparable to or lower than (0.04 deaths/TWh) and solar (0.02–0.44 deaths/TWh, varying by installation type). In contrast, deaths predominantly stem from particulate matter and emissions causing respiratory diseases, with alone contributing thousands of annual fatalities globally due to collapses, explosions, and .
Energy SourceDeaths per TWh (Full Lifecycle)
24.6
18.4
2.8
Nuclear0.03
0.04
Solar0.02
Data aggregated from global historical records, 1965–2021. Focusing on waste-specific hazards, high-level nuclear waste—primarily spent fuel assemblies stored in robust casks or pools—presents contained radiological risks with no recorded public fatalities from management since commercial began in the . Globally, annual generation equates to roughly 12,000 metric tonnes of spent fuel, compact enough to fit on a few football fields at shallow depths, engineered for millennia-scale isolation in geological repositories. By comparison, yields about 280 million tonnes of annually worldwide, often disposed in unlined impoundments prone to spills and leaching of (e.g., , mercury) and naturally occurring radionuclides like and decay chains. exhibits higher radioactivity per unit mass than nuclear spent fuel in some metrics, with fly ash concentrations up to 10 times those in original , releasing via atmospheric dispersion or —evidenced by incidents like the 2008 Kingston, spill, which mobilized 4 million cubic yards of toxic slurry into rivers, prompting EPA designation without equivalent nuclear waste breaches. Environmental and health risks from nuclear waste lifecycle stages, including and interim storage, are mitigated by multi-barrier systems yielding dose rates below natural background levels for nearby populations; for instance, IAEA-monitored shipments since report zero radiation-induced injuries. wastes, however, disperse radionuclides continuously: coal plants emit 10–100 times more airborne radioactivity than nuclear facilities per equivalent output, per unit analyses, contributing to elevated cancer risks in ash-handling communities without the protocols applied to high-level waste. Lifecycle assessments thus underscore nuclear waste's lower causal impact on human health and ecosystems, attributable to its minimal volume, engineered confinement, and absence of routine emissions, versus the diffuse, unmanaged toxics from fossil combustion residues.

Historical Evolution

Initial Handling Post-WWII

Following the conclusion of in 1945, high-level radioactive waste (HLW)—primarily liquid effluents from the chemical reprocessing of irradiated fuel to extract for nuclear weapons—was handled through temporary underground storage at U.S. Department of Energy predecessor sites, prioritizing production speed over long-term disposal amid demands. At the in Washington, where operations had begun in 1944 under the , HLW was concentrated via evaporation and stored in large carbon-steel single-shell tanks buried approximately 10 meters underground to shield and manage heat generation from decay. These tanks, with capacities ranging from 190,000 to 3.8 million liters, were the first such facilities globally designed for HLW containment, reflecting an approach where waste solidification or permanent isolation was deferred in favor of interim containment. Construction of Hanford's 149 single-shell tanks occurred between 1943 and 1964, with post-war expansions accelerating as output surged; by 1947, the site's T and B Plants using the bismuth-phosphate process generated about 30 cubic meters of HLW per metric ton of processed, much of it piped directly into early tanks like those in the 200-West Area. Similar practices emerged at the in , operational from 1951, where HLW from canyon reprocessing was likewise stored in single-shell tanks, accumulating millions of gallons by the mid-1950s. These methods relied on natural cooling and periodic monitoring, but tank designs assumed only 20-30 years of service life, leading to issues from the acidic, high-nitrate wastes as early as the 1950s. While low- and intermediate-level wastes were often discharged to soil cribs, trenches, or evaporation ponds at Hanford to avoid interference with operations, HLW isolation in tanks aimed to prevent immediate environmental release, though leaks from at least 67 tanks have since been confirmed due to inadequate initial liners and overfilling. No federal policy mandated permanent disposal until later decades; instead, 1940s-1950s practices emphasized waste volume reduction through settling and evaporation rather than immobilization, with exploratory fixation tests (e.g., using lime or phosphates) abandoned for scalability reasons. This storage-centric strategy, while enabling rapid weapons buildup—Hanford alone produced two-thirds of U.S. by 1989—accumulated approximately 200 million liters of HLW nationwide by 1960, underscoring causal trade-offs between imperatives and environmental safeguards.

Major Policy Milestones

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 established the first comprehensive federal framework in the United States for the management and disposal of high-level and , mandating the Department of Energy to develop geologic repositories and creating a Nuclear Waste Fund financed by fees from nuclear utilities. The Act required site characterization at multiple locations and emphasized permanent isolation to protect , reflecting growing recognition of the need for centralized, long-term solutions amid accumulating from commercial reactors and defense programs. Amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1987 designated in as the sole candidate site for the initial repository, terminating further site investigations elsewhere and directing focused characterization efforts there, though this decision later contributed to protracted legal and political disputes. President Reagan signed the original Act into law on January 7, 1983, formalizing federal responsibility for waste acceptance by 1998—a deadline repeatedly missed due to subsequent regulatory and congressional actions. Internationally, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, adopted under the on September 5, 1997, marked the first legally binding global instrument to promote high safety standards for spent fuel and , including high-level waste, with obligations for national programs, reporting, and ; it entered into force on June 18, 2001, after ratification by 25 states. In , Sweden's 1977 Act on Nuclear Activities stipulated that reactor operators must present feasible plans for safe waste disposal prior to license extensions, influencing a consensus-based siting process that led to approval of a deep geologic repository at Forsmark in 2009. 's Parliament approved the Olkiluoto repository site in 2001 under the Nuclear Energy Act, which requires on-site management of nuclear waste, enabling construction to commence in 2004 and operational licensing in 2015—contrasting with delays in other nations by prioritizing technical viability over indefinite interim storage. The Directive 2011/70/, adopted on July 19, 2011, set binding requirements for member states to establish national programs for management, including high-level waste, with timelines for disposal strategies and emphasis on geologic disposal, addressing variations in progress across countries like and . These milestones highlight a shift toward institutionalized, science-driven policies, though implementation has varied due to local opposition and funding mechanisms, with successful cases demonstrating feasibility where political will aligns with empirical site assessments.

Regulatory Frameworks

International Standards and IAEA Guidelines

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) establishes and promotes safety standards for the management of radioactive waste, including high-level waste (HLW), through its Safety Standards Series, which reflects international consensus on protecting human health and the environment from ionizing radiation. These standards emphasize a graded approach based on waste hazard levels, with HLW requiring stringent controls due to its high radioactivity and long-lived radionuclides, such as plutonium-239 with a half-life of 24,110 years. The IAEA's framework prioritizes passive safety features, multi-barrier systems, and defense-in-depth to ensure containment and isolation over geological timescales, typically millions of years for HLW. For HLW disposal, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-5 (Disposal of , 2011) mandates deep geological repositories, sited in stable formations at depths of several hundred meters or more to minimize release pathways. This approach relies on natural barriers like low-permeability rock and engineered barriers including vitrified waste forms, corrosion-resistant canisters, and backfill materials to achieve isolation for at least 10,000 years, with assessments extending to longer periods based on site-specific data. Predisposal management, covered in GSR Part 5 (Predisposal Management of , 2009), requires interim storage in robust facilities to allow decay—often 50 years for HLW—prior to disposal, with limits on not exceeding 1 mSv per year for workers and 0.3 mSv for the public. The IAEA also administers the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Management (entered into force in 2001), which obligates contracting parties to implement these standards, conduct periodic safety assessments, and report progress, fostering global harmonization. Compliance involves site characterization for seismic stability, groundwater isolation, and retrievability during operational phases, with post-closure monitoring to verify performance against predicted risks below 10^{-5} per year for individual exposure. These guidelines, updated periodically through expert consultations, underscore that HLW disposal technologies are mature and demonstrably safe when implemented, countering of by prioritizing empirical site data over speculative scenarios.

National Policies and Examples

National policies for high-level radioactive waste (HLW) management typically emphasize long-term isolation through deep geological disposal, with variations in implementation driven by national legislation, funding mechanisms, and processes. In countries with established nuclear programs, utilities often fund via dedicated fees, while governments oversee and siting. As of 2025, and exemplify progress toward operational repositories, advances reprocessing-integrated disposal, and the faces ongoing delays despite legislative frameworks. In the United States, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 designates the Department of Energy (DOE) to develop a deep geological repository for spent nuclear fuel and HLW, with utilities contributing 0.1 cents per kilowatt-hour generated since 1983, amassing over $40 billion in the Nuclear Waste Fund by 2023. Yucca Mountain in Nevada was selected in 1987 as the primary site, featuring 300-meter-deep tunnels in volcanic tuff, with a planned capacity of 70,000 metric tons of heavy metal. The DOE submitted a license application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2008, but construction halted in 2010 due to funding withdrawal under the Obama administration; as of October 2025, no permanent repository operates, leaving approximately 90,000 metric tons of commercial spent fuel in interim dry cask storage at reactor sites and DOE facilities like Hanford. Finland's policy, managed by Posiva Oy (a of nuclear utilities), adopts the method of encapsulating spent fuel in copper canisters emplaced in 400-meter-deep crystalline bedrock tunnels at the Onkalo facility near Olkiluoto. Construction was licensed in 2015, with an operating license application submitted in 2021; a key trial encapsulation run using a non-radioactive dummy assembly completed successfully in March 2025, positioning operations to begin by late 2025 or 2026, making it the world's first such repository. The project, funded by utilities and approved with Eurajoki municipality consent, demonstrates effective and technical feasibility for isolating waste for over 100,000 years. Sweden pursues a parallel approach through the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB), selecting Forsmark for a 500-meter-deep repository using the KBS-3V vertical emplacement variant, with construction licensed in 2022 and initial tunneling commencing in January 2025 following an environmental permit in October 2025. Planned for operations around 2030-2032, the facility will handle spent from Swedish reactors, supported by a utility fee system and municipality approval processes that prioritize geological stability in granitic rock. France's strategy, overseen by the National Radioactive Waste Management Agency (Andra), integrates reprocessing at to vitrify HLW, reducing volume by about 95% compared to direct disposal of spent fuel, before emplacement in the Cigéo repository in Callovo-Oxfordian clay at Bure, at 500 meters depth with capacity for approximately 10,000 cubic meters of vitrified HLW. A declaration was issued in July 2022, construction license application submitted in January 2023, and pilot industrial phases for disposal modes advanced through 2025 safety reviews, targeting commissioning in 2035. This policy reflects empirical volume minimization via , informed by decades of operational reprocessing data.

Controversies and Debates

Siting and Political Blockages

The siting of high-level repositories has encountered persistent political opposition, primarily driven by local resistance and national policy inertia, despite technical assessments confirming the viability of deep geological disposal. , the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 mandated the Department of Energy to identify and develop a permanent repository for and high-level waste, targeting operation by 1998, but no such facility has been completed as of 2025 due to repeated delays from political interventions. Yucca Mountain in Nevada, designated as the primary site under the 1987 Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act, exemplifies these blockages after over three decades of contention. President approved the site in 2002 following favorable scientific reviews by the Department of Energy, but Nevada Governor vetoed the decision, leading to override it; subsequent legal challenges and state opposition persisted. In 2010, the Obama administration withdrew the license application from the at the behest of Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, a Nevada Democrat who conditioned federal funding on defunding the project, effectively halting progress amid claims of inadequate safety data despite prior peer-reviewed validations of the site's hydrological isolation. The Trump administration in 2017 initiated a revival by resuming licensing reviews, but the Biden administration opposed resumption in 2021, citing ongoing litigation and preferring consent-based alternatives, leaving approximately 90,000 metric tons of commercial spent fuel stored at reactor sites without a federal solution. These delays stem from "not-in-my-backyard" (NIMBY) dynamics amplified by political incentives, where elected officials leverage opposition for electoral gain, as seen in bipartisan Nevada resistance from senators like Dean Heller and Catherine Cortez Masto. Indigenous groups, including the Western Shoshone Nation, have cited cultural and treaty rights violations, contributing to lawsuits that extended timelines, though empirical transport risk models indicate negligible public health impacts from shipments. Top-down federal siting processes have eroded trust, contrasting with the 2012 Blue Ribbon Commission's recommendation for voluntary, consent-based approaches involving states, tribes, and locals, which have succeeded elsewhere but faced implementation hurdles in the U.S. due to statutory restrictions barring interim storage without permanent site commitment. Internationally, similar blockages have occurred, such as Germany's 2010 Ethics Commission decision to phase out nuclear power partly over repository uncertainties, abandoning deep geological plans despite geological suitability, influenced by post-Fukushima public sentiment. In contrast, Finland's Onkalo repository advanced since 1999 through community voluntarism in Eurajoki, where local benefits and transparent risk communication secured approval for operations starting in the 2020s, highlighting how political consensus via bottom-up engagement can overcome aversion when technical safety—evidenced by stable granite host rocks—is decoupled from politicized narratives. These cases underscore that while geological criteria like low seismic activity and groundwater isolation are met in vetted sites, political blockages often prioritize perceived risks over probabilistic assessments showing containment probabilities exceeding 99.9% over 10,000 years.

Media Narratives Versus Empirical Data

Media outlets have recurrently framed high-level nuclear waste (HLW), primarily , as an existential peril demanding indefinite isolation due to its purportedly immutable toxicity spanning millennia, often invoking imagery of inevitable catastrophe from failure or proliferation risks. Such portrayals, amplified post-accidents like Fukushima in 2011, emphasize unproven long-term geological uncertainties and equate managed storage with reckless endangerment, sidelining quantitative risk assessments. In contrast, empirical inventories reveal HLW volumes remain compact: the has accumulated approximately 90,000 metric tons of commercial spent fuel as of recent audits, with annual generation at about 2,000 metric tons—equivalent to a space roughly the size of a football field piled 10 yards high if aggregated. systems, deployed since the , encase this material in robust, corrosion-resistant and overpacks, subjected to rigorous testing simulating extreme conditions; no releases have occurred from these facilities over decades of operation. Quantitative comparisons underscore disparities: coal-fired power plants annually disperse via fly radionuclides like , , and radium-226 at levels exceeding those in nuclear waste by orders of magnitude in total activity released to the environment, with U.S. coal production surpassing 100 million tons yearly—vastly outstripping HLW by volume and lacking equivalent . This dispersed radioactivity from fossil fuels correlates with measurable population exposures, whereas HLW's confinement yields negligible off-site doses, often below natural . Historical incident data further diverges from alarmist depictions: commercial HLW storage has recorded zero fatalities or significant breaches attributable to design flaws, unlike legacy defense wastes at sites like Hanford, where tank leaks stemmed from wartime-era rather than inherent waste properties—issues mitigated in modern processes. Coverage biases, with media disproportionately highlighting antinuclear perspectives over probabilistic analyses from bodies like the IAEA, contribute to perceptual distortions, as expert consensus deems HLW risks low relative to energy production benefits when contextualized against alternatives.

Recent Developments

Advances in Waste Minimization

Fuel reprocessing separates reusable fissile materials like and from , thereby reducing the volume of high-level waste (HLW) destined for disposal by a factor of approximately 5 and long-term radiotoxicity by a factor of 10 compared to direct disposal without . This , commercially implemented in since the 1970s at facilities like La Hague, recovers over 96% of the original and for fabrication into new assemblies, leaving behind a concentrated HLW stream primarily consisting of fission products and minor s that undergoes for stabilization. Advances in reprocessing technologies, such as improved aqueous methods like the variants, have enhanced actinide recovery efficiency to above 99%, further minimizing residual HLW mass while addressing proliferation risks through co-processing or safeguards. Partitioning and transmutation (P&T) represents a more advanced strategy, involving chemical separation (partitioning) of long-lived s from HLW followed by irradiation (transmutation) in fast-spectrum reactors or accelerator-driven systems to convert them into shorter-lived isotopes or stable elements, potentially reducing radiotoxicity by factors of 100 to 1,000 over geological timescales. International assessments, including those by the IAEA, indicate that multi-recycling in fast reactors could decrease the heat load and required repository volume by up to 90% for certain s like and curium-244. Pilot demonstrations, such as those planned under the European project (initiated in 2010), aim to validate P&T feasibility by 2030, though full-scale deployment faces technical challenges in minor handling and economic viability. Generation IV reactor designs, including sodium-cooled fast reactors and molten salt reactors, inherently minimize HLW generation through higher fuel burn-up rates—up to 20% or more of heavy metal atoms fissioned versus 4-5% in current light-water reactors—and closed fuel cycles that enable multi-pass recycling of actinides. These systems reduce the long-term radiotoxicity of waste to background levels in centuries rather than millennia, with projected HLW volumes per unit energy output decreased by 50-100 times relative to Generation II reactors. U.S. Department of Energy-funded initiatives, such as ARPA-E's ONWARDS program launched in 2021, support pyroprocessing innovations that integrate with fast reactors to achieve proliferation-resistant recycling, minimizing waste while utilizing existing stockpiles. Ongoing R&D, including OECD-NEA efforts since 2021, focuses on integrating P&T with Gen IV for sustainable waste management, though regulatory approval for advanced fuels remains a barrier as of 2025.

Implications of Advanced Reactors

Advanced nuclear reactors, encompassing Generation IV designs and certain small modular reactors (SMRs), present varied implications for high-level (HLW), which primarily consists of and its processing residues. Generation IV reactors aim to minimize waste generation through higher and the potential for closed fuel cycles, where spent fuel is reprocessed to extract usable materials, thereby reducing the volume and long-term radiotoxicity of HLW. For instance, sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFRs) enable high of actinides, converting long-lived isotopes into shorter-lived fission products and potentially decreasing the heat load and radiological hazard duration of waste by orders of magnitude compared to once-through cycles in light-water reactors. In closed fuel cycles facilitated by fast spectrum reactors, such as those involving , one of HLW can be reused multiple times to fully utilize resources, transforming waste from a liability into a fuel source and substantially curtailing the need for new . reactors and other Gen IV concepts further support transmutation, burning minor actinides like and that dominate long-term repository risks, with studies indicating up to a 100-fold reduction in radiotoxicity over millennia. However, these benefits hinge on technological maturity and economic viability; while prototypes like the demonstrated feasibility in the 1990s, widespread deployment remains limited by reprocessing infrastructure costs and proliferation concerns. SMRs, often proposed as near-term advanced options, exhibit mixed HLW implications depending on design. Light-water-based SMRs may generate comparable or higher waste volumes per unit of electricity than large reactors due to lower fuel economy and higher surface-area-to-volume ratios leading to more frequent refueling, exacerbating disposal needs. In contrast, high-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs) among SMR variants produce less HLW per energy output, with tristructural-isotropic (TRISO) fuel exhibiting lower plutonium content and decay heat, easing interim storage and geological disposal. Overall, advanced reactor HLW streams pose minimal additional risk to repository performance if managed within established frameworks, though higher enrichment levels in some fuels introduce criticality and reactivity challenges during storage and disposal planning. Despite these potentials, empirical data underscore that nuclear HLW volumes remain small relative to other sources—equivalent to a few grams per person annually in electricity-generating nations—and advanced reactors do not fundamentally alter the need for secure, long-term isolation, as no design eliminates fission products requiring millennia-scale containment. Regulatory and policy advancements, such as the U.S. ADVANCE Act of 2024, encourage early integration of in advanced licensing to mitigate uncertainties, yet critics note that claims of "waste-solving" technologies often overlook persistent challenges in scaling without subsidies. Deployment of waste-minimizing designs could thus enhance but requires verification through operational data, as modeling alone cannot resolve debates over net environmental impacts.

References

  1. https://www.nrc.gov/waste/high-level-waste
  2. https://www.epa.gov/radtown/radioactive-waste
  3. https://iwaste.epa.gov/guidance/radiological-nuclear/high-level-waste
  4. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-waste/radioactive-waste-management
  5. https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/radwaste
  6. https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2019/06/f63/DOE-New-Interpretation-of-High-Level-Waste.pdf
  7. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-waste/storage-and-disposal-of-radioactive-waste
  8. https://www.oecd-nea.org/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-07/7532-dgr-geological-disposal-radioactive-waste.pdf
  9. https://www.nrc.gov/waste/hlw-disposal/what-we-regulate
  10. https://www.gao.gov/nuclear-waste-disposal
  11. https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1419_web.pdf
  12. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/21404640216.pdf
  13. https://www.nwtrb.gov/docs/default-source/facts-sheets/vitrified_hlw.pdf?sfvrsn=18
  14. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2468605025000663
  15. https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/SupplementaryMaterials/P1799_CD_Annex.pdf
  16. https://cea.hal.science/cea-04815419v1/document
  17. https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/chemistry/high-level-radioactive-waste
  18. https://www.oecd-nea.org/brief/brief-03.html
  19. https://www.oecd-nea.org/upload/docs/application/pdf/2019-12/5990-advanced-nfc-rwm.pdf
  20. https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/5-fast-facts-about-spent-nuclear-fuel
  21. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-603.pdf
  22. https://www.stimson.org/2020/spent-nuclear-fuel-storage-and-disposal/
  23. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/fuel-recycling/processing-of-used-nuclear-fuel
  24. https://crownschool.uchicago.edu/student-life/advocates-forum/our-silent-zombie-commercial-nuclear-waste-storage-united-states
  25. https://sustainability.stanford.edu/news/small-modular-reactors-produce-high-levels-nuclear-waste
  26. https://www.epa.gov/radtown/nuclear-weapons-production-waste
  27. https://www.nwtrb.gov/docs/default-source/facts-sheets/overview_snf_hlw.pdf?sfvrsn=19
  28. https://www.gao.gov/assets/880/873065.pdf
  29. https://www.srs.gov/general/news/factsheets/srr_dwpf.pdf
  30. https://www.energy.gov/em/high-level-radioactive-waste-hlw-interpretation
  31. https://nap.nationalacademies.org/read/10119/chapter/6
  32. https://www.iaea.org/publications/11173/status-and-trends-in-spent-fuel-and-radioactive-waste-management
  33. https://euradschool.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/IAEA-On-going-activities-on-NFCO-and-SFM_EURAD-Webinar_June-2023.pdf
  34. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-waste/radioactive-wastes-myths-and-realities
  35. https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_105190/roadmaps-to-new-nuclear-2025
  36. https://www.oecd-nea.org/trw/
  37. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-waste/treatment-and-conditioning-of-nuclear-wastes
  38. https://mo-sci.com/vitrification-nuclear-waste-management/
  39. https://nap.nationalacademies.org/read/9743/chapter/6
  40. https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/24/019/24019780.pdf
  41. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1108/ML110800189.pdf
  42. https://www.hanfordvitplant.com/vitrification-101
  43. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13369-024-09292-z
  44. https://www.geoengineer.org/education/web-class-projects/cee-549-geoenvironmental-engineering-winter-2013/assignments/vitrification
  45. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590159119300469
  46. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0029549325006788
  47. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc788929/
  48. https://www.orano.group/en/unpacking-nuclear/all-about-used-fuel-processing-and-recycling
  49. https://inldigitallibrary.inl.gov/sites/sti/sti/4460757.pdf
  50. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc52inf-3-att4_en.pdf
  51. https://www.theearthandi.org/post/let-s-not-waste-nuclear-waste-some-nations-say
  52. https://pubs.aip.org/physicstoday/article/77/2/22/3230671/US-takes-another-look-at-recycling-nuclear
  53. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/rethinking-nuclear-fuel-recycling/
  54. https://www.ans.org/news/2025-09-08/article-7348/us-nuclear-fuel-recycling-takes-two-steps-forward/
  55. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48364
  56. https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage
  57. https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/pools
  58. https://www.nei.org/resources/fact-sheets/safely-managing-used-nuclear-fuel
  59. https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/faqs
  60. https://wx1.ans.org/pi/ps/docs/ps76.pdf
  61. https://downloads.regulations.gov/FTA-2021-0012-0019/attachment_2.pdf
  62. https://www.epri.com/portfolio/programs/061149
  63. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/05/07/2025-07899/long-term-cooling-and-unattended-water-makeup-of-spent-fuel-pools
  64. https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/dry-cask-storage
  65. https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/dry-cask-storage
  66. https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/review-used-nuclear-fuel-storage-and-transportation-technical-gap-analyses
  67. https://www.nwtrb.gov/docs/default-source/meetings/2016/august/carter.pdf?sfvrsn=12
  68. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc50inf-3-att5_en.pdf
  69. https://wyoleg.gov/InterimCommittee/2025/09-2025052110-02NRCSpentNuclearFuelsStorage.pdf
  70. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265931X25001377
  71. https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1378_web.pdf
  72. https://oecd-nea.org/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-11/ne6319-safety.pdf
  73. http://www.iaea.org/topics/disposal
  74. https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1449_web.pdf
  75. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1762035
  76. https://www.ans.org/news/2025-07-25/article-7222/deep-geologic-repository-progress2025-update/
  77. https://www.stimson.org/2021/geological-disposal-and-spent-nuclear-fuel/
  78. https://thebulletin.org/2024/07/the-thorny-social-problem-of-permanent-nuclear-waste-storage/
  79. https://nap.nationalacademies.org/read/10119/chapter/8
  80. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/985495
  81. https://energy.mit.edu/research/deep-borehole-disposal-spent-nuclear-fuel/
  82. https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/nuclear-engineering/articles/10.3389/fnuen.2024.1470443/full
  83. https://www.ans.org/news/article-6010/retrieval-of-nuclear-waste-canisters-from-a-borehole/
  84. https://thebulletin.org/2020/03/nuclear-waste-disposal-why-the-case-for-deep-boreholes-is-full-of-holes/
  85. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ml1114/ml111470719.pdf
  86. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00295450.2023.2266609
  87. http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/new-crp-enhancing-global-knowledge-on-deep-borehole-disposal-for-nuclear-waste-t22003
  88. https://www.deepisolation.com/press/feasibility-study-for-deep-borehole-disposal-of-bulgarian-high-level-nuclear-waste-restarts-following-u-s-government-review/
  89. https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/67653e3287d0c12078edb518/6810adf4833ed974af1a9890_361-SB2-C004-REP-002-D_Long%2520list%2520of%2520DBD%2520options-VF2_accepted%2520%281%29.pdf
  90. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0029549376900789
  91. https://www.nwmo.ca/en/canadas-used-nuclear-fuel/radiation-risk-and-safety
  92. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/radiation-and-health/radiation-and-health-effects
  93. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1155/2024/6663859
  94. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6043938/
  95. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/15593258251367588
  96. https://www.unscear.org/unscear/en/publications/2024_1.html
  97. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0331/ML033160363.pdf
  98. https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_34631/the-environmental-and-ethical-basis-of-geological-disposal-of-long-lived-radioactive-wastes
  99. https://ecology.wa.gov/waste-toxics/nuclear-waste/hanford-cleanup/high-level-nuclear-waste-definition
  100. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10062484/
  101. https://www.oecd-nea.org/upload/docs/application/pdf/2019-12/6244-timing-waste-disposal.pdf
  102. https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/nepapub/nepa_documents/RedDont/EIS-0287-FEIS-01-2002.pdf
  103. https://www.sustainabilitybynumbers.com/p/renewables-waste
  104. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/magazines/bulletin/bull35-4/35404682733.pdf
  105. https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/1997/fs163-97/FS-163-97.html
  106. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/coal-ash-is-more-radioactive-than-nuclear-waste/
  107. https://www.sciencefocus.com/science/do-coal-fired-power-stations-produce-radioactive-waste
  108. https://www.epa.gov/radtown/radioactive-wastes-coal-fired-power-plants
  109. https://inis.iaea.org/records/58d77-ncj43/files/31026705.pdf?download=1
  110. https://ourworldindata.org/safest-sources-of-energy
  111. https://www.visualcapitalist.com/cp/charted-safest-and-deadliest-energy-sources/
  112. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/9594114/
  113. https://www.pnnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/pnnl-13605rev4.pdf
  114. https://content.ampp.org/corrosion/article-split/65/3/163/95/History-and-Operation-of-the-Hanford-High-Level
  115. https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan-project-history/Science/Radioactivity/rad-waste.html
  116. https://www.americanscientist.org/article/managing-the-environmental-legacy-of-u.s.-nuclear-weapons-production
  117. https://ecology.wa.gov/waste-toxics/nuclear-waste/hanford-cleanup/hanford-overview
  118. https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-nuclear-waste-policy-act
  119. https://www.energy.gov/articles/nuclear-waste-policy-act
  120. https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/yucca-license-review
  121. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2009/P7278.pdf
  122. https://www.iaea.org/topics/nuclear-safety-conventions/joint-convention-safety-spent-fuel-management-and-safety-radioactive-waste
  123. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc546.pdf
  124. https://www.oecd-nea.org/rwm/profiles/Finland.pdf
  125. https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/nuclear-energy/radioactive-waste-and-spent-fuel_en
  126. https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1576_web.pdf
  127. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0320/ML032050714.pdf
  128. https://www.nwtrb.gov/docs/default-source/reports/nwtrb-2022-survey-report.pdf
  129. https://www.posiva.fi/en/
  130. https://www.nucnet.org/news/finland-completes-key-trial-for-world-s-first-deep-geological-nuclear-waste-repository-3-2-2025
  131. https://www.skb.com/
  132. https://www.ans.org/news/2025-06-25/article-7135/swedens-skb-awards-early-contract-for-repository-construction/
  133. https://international.andra.fr/
  134. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-enduring-dilemma-of-managing-american-high-level-nuclear-waste/
  135. https://thebulletin.org/2024/07/why-us-nuclear-waste-policy-got-stalled-and-what-to-do-about-it/
  136. https://www.heritage.org/climate/commentary/what-the-candidates-need-know-about-yucca-mountain
  137. https://ag.nv.gov/hot_topics/issue/yucca/
  138. https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/indy-explains-fight-yucca-mountain
  139. https://www.utilitydive.com/news/yucca-mountain-high-stakes-and-high-hurdles/447573/
  140. https://titus.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=3192
  141. https://www.hcn.org/articles/nuclear-energy-nevadas-senators-fight-the-yucca-mountain-resurgence/
  142. https://sites.evergreen.edu/ccc/warnuclear/shoshone-tribe-opposes-yucca-mountain-nuclear-repository/
  143. https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/12/f34/Summary%2520of%2520Public%2520Input%2520Report%2520FINAL.pdf
  144. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-023-02139-2
  145. https://digitalcommons.morris.umn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2156&context=jmas
  146. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17524032.2019.1603018
  147. https://digitalcommons.providence.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=chemistry_students
  148. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00295450.2023.2229566
  149. https://nicholas.duke.edu/news/radioactive-contaminants-found-coal-ash
  150. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2772783122000085
  151. https://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs24ramana.pdf
  152. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4756348/
  153. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/new-iaea-report-presents-global-overview-of-radioactive-waste-and-spent-fuel-management
  154. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S014919702300272X
  155. https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/TRS435_web.pdf
  156. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0029549311002366
  157. https://www.epj-n.org/articles/epjn/full_html/2020/01/epjn190057/epjn190057.html
  158. https://www.gen-4.org/generation-iv-criteria-and-technologies
  159. http://www.iaea.org/bulletin/shrinking-nuclear-waste-and-increasing-efficiency-for-a-sustainable-energy-future
  160. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2211339822000880
  161. https://arpa-e.energy.gov/programs-and-initiatives/view-all-programs/onwards
  162. https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_53319/new-nea-task-force-on-partitioning-and-transmutation-kicks-off
  163. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45706
  164. http://www.iaea.org/bulletin/when-nuclear-waste-is-an-asset-not-a-burden
  165. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-power-reactors/generation-iv-nuclear-reactors
  166. https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2111833119
  167. https://news.stanford.edu/stories/2022/05/small-modular-reactors-produce-high-levels-nuclear-waste
  168. https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/p15790-PUB9062_web.pdf
  169. https://nuclearinnovationalliance.org/sites/default/files/2024-12/From%2520Reactors%2520to%2520Repositories%2520-%2520Disposal%2520Pathways%2520for%2520Advanced%2520Nuclear%2520Reactor%2520Waste.pdf
  170. https://www.oecd-nea.org/upload/docs/application/pdf/2025-03/2025_rwmc-57_brochure.pdf
  171. https://www.vnf.com/congress-passes-advance-act-to-accelerate-deployment-of-advanced-nuclear-reactors
  172. https://thebulletin.org/premium/2025-01/small-and-advanced-nuclear-reactors-closing-the-fuel-cycle/
  173. https://www.ans.org/news/2025-01-23/article-6701/ibulletini-article-argues-for-more-certainty-in-advanced-reactor-waste-management/
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.