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Motorcycle Accident Cause Factors and Identification of Countermeasures, Volume 1: Technical Report (cover page)

The Hurt Report, officially Motorcycle Accident Cause Factors and Identification of Countermeasures, was a motorcycle safety study conducted in the United States, initiated in 1976 and published in 1981.[1][2] The report is named after its primary author, Professor Harry Hurt.

Noted motorcycle journalist David L. Hough described the Hurt Report as "the most comprehensive motorcycle safety study of the 20th century."[3]

The study was initiated by the Department of Transportation's National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, which contracted with the University of Southern California Traffic Safety Center — the work was ultimately conducted by USC professor Harry Hurt.[3]

The Hurt Report findings significantly advanced the state of knowledge of the causes of motorcycle accidents, in particular pointing out the widespread problem of car drivers failing to see an approaching motorcycle and precipitating a crash by violating the motorcyclist's right-of-way. The study also provided data clearly showing that helmets significantly reduce deaths and brain injuries without any increased risk of accident involvement or neck injury. The full title of the report was Motorcycle Accident Cause Factors and Identification of Countermeasures, Volume 1: Technical Report.

After retiring from USC in 1998, Hurt established and headed the Head Protection Research Laboratory (HPRL), of Paramount, CA.[3]

Procedure

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A 2007 motorcycle crash scene investigation in San Francisco.

Professor Hurt, with a team of investigators (all of whom were motorcyclists themselves)[3] examined motorcycle accident scenes in the City of Los Angeles, day and night, during the twenty-four-month period of 1976–77. They did on-scene investigations of over 900 accidents and studied 3,600 police reports from the area of each accident. Investigators later returned to 505 crash scenes at the same time of day, same day of the week and with the same environmental conditions to measure traffic volumes, photograph passing motorcycles and interview 2,310 riders who stopped to talk with investigators. This allowed the research team to compare accident-involved riders to riders in the same location who were not involved in a crash.[3]

The study took place throughout the City of Los Angeles including urban as well as rural conditions, e.g., incidents of motorcycles striking animals.[3]

Each accident was studied individually with approximately 1,000 data elements,[3] collected for each of the 900 accident scenes, including measuring and photographing vehicle damage, skid marks, scrape marks, people marks, and interviewing survivors. Hundreds of accident-involved riders donated their helmet to the research, which allowed team members to disassemble, measure, photograph and record the accident damage as part of the study.

Findings

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The Hurt Report summarized accident findings related to motorcycle crashes into a 55-point list. Among the major points: two-thirds of motorcycle-car crashes occurred when the car driver failed to see the approaching motorcycle and violated the rider's right-of-way. The report also provided data showing clearly that helmets significantly reduce the risk of brain injury and death but with no increased risk of crash involvement or neck injury.

Current validity

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When interviewed in 1999, Professor Hurt "confided that he believes the report is still basically valid."[3]

Nonetheless, while the Hurt Report "remains the benchmark of motorcycle crash research"[4] and contained at the time of its publication factual, verifiable information, in clear scientific terms — it has been described as outdated. In the year 2000, editors from the Motorcycle Safety Foundation wrote, in preparing the National Agenda for Motorcycle Safety:[4]

It was apparent that our effectiveness would be limited by a consistent lack of viable, current research in most subjects related to motorcycling safety. Wide-ranging changes in motorcycling and related factors have altered the motorcycling landscape since the Hurt Report so thoroughly that it is impossible to determine if the findings of past studies are still valid.

The National Agenda for Motorcycle Safety study cited a broad list of changes that have occurred that affect the current validity of the Hurt Report, broken into four categories:

  • Motorcycle Engineering Changes
  • User Population Changes
  • Automobile Engineering Changes
  • Roadway Environmental Changes

Hurt argues that the age of the study does not necessarily invalidate all its findings or even its core findings; rather, it highlights the need for current work to affirm or update the current state of motorcycle safety:

The more time goes by, the less things look different. Riders today have the same sort of accidents as riders in the 1970s, except that today they crash much more expensive bikes.

— Professor Hugh H. ("Harry") Hurt Jr [3]

Later studies

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Between 1997 and 2008, motorcycle rider annual fatalities increased from 2,116 to 5,290 – a 150 percent jump, according to U.S. Department of Transportation's Fatality Analysis Reporting System. In 2008 alone, deaths due to motorcycle crashes rose by an estimated 2.2 percent while all other vehicle classes saw reductions in fatalities.

Oklahoma State University, Transportation Center, 2009[5]

In David Hough's book Proficient Motorcycling, Dr. Hurt said he had always assumed a new study would be conducted.[6]

In 1999, the European Commission conducted the MAIDS report, comparable in scale to the Hurt Report, following Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) standards, and studying 921 accidents as well as exposure data on an additional 923 cases from five locations in France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain and Italy.

In 2005, Congress passed the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) law (2005-2009) mandating a new motorcycle crash study[5] and budgeted $2.8 million for the study, providing that motorcyclists, manufacturers, and other motorcycle related organizations would match that amount.[7] The AMA committed $100,000 to the study, and continues to raise awareness and raise funds, and the Motorcycle Safety Foundation pledged $2.8 million — with several conditions, including a provision that at least 900 cases would be studied.[8] At the time, the funding was still about $2 million short.[9] The National Transportation Safety Board originally had recommended a scope of 900 to 1,200 case studies.[10]

In 2009, the Federal Highway Administration and Oklahoma State University's Oklahoma Transportation Center began conducting an 'abbreviated' Motorcycle Crash Causation Study with 300 case studies[10] "to help identify common factors – including road configurations, environmental conditions and rider experience"[5] and "how these factors may be affected by countermeasures that, if effectively implemented, will prevent motorcycle crashes or lessen the harm when they occur."[5]

Consistent with its stated provisions, the Motorcycle Safety Foundation withdrew support of the abbreviated study,[10] saying such a study would be "unlikely to either validate the findings of prior studies or establish, to any statistical significant level, any new causative factors. The abbreviated study would be unlikely to accomplish either of these goals because the sample size is expected to be only 300 crashes, compared to the 900 crashes collected and analyzed in the Hurt Study, 921 in the MAID's Study (Europe 2000) and the 1,200 recommended by the National Transportation Safety Board."[11]

Published in 2011, Liz de Rome and colleagues undertook the first comprehensive study into the effectiveness of motorcycle personal protective equipment. In order to establish whether motorcycle personal protective clothing should be considered an effective safety measure, their in-depth motorcycle crash cohort study was conducted over 12 months in Australia. It found that while protective clothing is associated with reduced risk and severity of crash-related injuries, a high proportion of clothing failed under crash conditions.[12]

Moreover, it also found that motorcycle armor is ineffective at reducing fractures.[12] Subsequent research by Bianca Albanese and colleagues (2017) may explain this ineffectiveness: the CE marking standard for motorcycle armour is too low, with inadequate impact absorption to reduce fractures. It was the first study to conclude that: “A reduction in the maximum force limit would improve rider protection and appears feasible.”[13]

Standards

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Work continues on determining a global standard for collection of worldwide data on motorcycle accidents and safety, which would enable international sharing of research. Such a standard would meet methodology criteria developed globally with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and complying with Principles of Good Laboratory Practices and national as well as international regulations — ultimately to be adopted as a standard by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).[3]

While the CE marking standard for motorcycle protective clothing has been criticised for regulatory capture by the industry, the EU is supporting the PIONEERS research programme – a comprehensive study into motorcycle protective clothing – via Horizon 2020 funding.[14] The PIONEERS study aims to inform improved CE standards for motorcyclists’ protective equipment.

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Hurt Report, formally known as Motorcycle Accident Cause Factors and Identification of Countermeasures, is a seminal 1981 technical study commissioned by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and conducted by biomechanics professor Hugh H. Hurt Jr. at the University of Southern California Traffic Safety Center. The research involved detailed on-scene investigations of 900 motorcycle accidents in the Los Angeles area between mid-1973 and 1975, supplemented by analysis of 3,600 police-reported traffic conflicts, to empirically identify crash causation factors and evaluate countermeasures. Published as a U.S. Department of Transportation report, it remains the most cited and influential dataset on motorcycle safety dynamics despite its age, influencing rider training, helmet laws, and vehicle design standards worldwide. Key empirical findings emphasized that 92% of multi-vehicle collisions—comprising nearly three-quarters of all investigated accidents—stemmed primarily from the other vehicle's driver's failure to detect or recognize the in , often due to perceptual errors rather than rider fault. Single-vehicle crashes, accounting for about 28% of cases, were frequently linked to rider inexperience, excessive speed relative to skill level, or curve negotiation errors, with alcohol impairment present in approximately 25% of all accidents and contributing to loss of control. The study demonstrated that motorcycle helmets reduced head and neck severity across all crash types, while absence of helmets correlated with higher fatality rates; conversely, it found no causal role for headlight modulators or conspicuity aids in the sampled data, challenging some contemporary assumptions. Though groundbreaking in its multidisciplinary approach—integrating , , and behavioral —the Hurt Report has faced for its localized sampling and dated context, prompting later studies like the European MAIDS report to build upon or refine its conclusions, yet its core insights on in visibility and rider proficiency endure as foundational to policy.

Background and Commissioning

Historical Context of Motorcycle Safety Research

Motorcycle registrations doubled to 1,380,726 by 1965, accompanied by a 41% increase in fatalities to 1,580 that year, representing 3% of all deaths despite motorcycles comprising less than 1% of vehicles. The fatality rate stood at 11.5 per 10,000 motorcycles, more than double the 4.3 rate for all s, and approximately 20 times higher per mile traveled compared to automobiles. Early analyses attributed this disparity to factors such as rider inexperience (particularly among teenagers), inherent vehicle instability, substandard manufacturing quality, and the unshielded exposure of riders in collisions, often with larger vehicles like cars and trucks. Contemporary studies drew on aggregate data from sources like police reports and vital , with limited U.S.-specific in-depth investigations; international efforts, such as the British Research Laboratory's exhaustive review of all vehicle accidents from 1954 to 1959, provided some comparative insights but highlighted the need for domestic empirical scrutiny. Mid-1960s state-level studies documented a proportional rise in accidents mirroring population growth, underscoring elevated injury and fatality risks—estimated at 3 to 8 times higher than for automobiles. The 1966 National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act spurred initial countermeasures, including universal helmet laws adopted by most states by 1975, though many were repealed amid lobbying pressures shortly thereafter. Research remained predominantly descriptive, relying on police-recorded data to classify accidents by type (e.g., single- versus multiple-vehicle, urban versus rural), with a 1973 national analysis revealing a 20% fatality increase that year, divergent from trends in other transport modes. A 1975 examination of 1,191 accidents sampled from police reports identified patterned differences across 54 variables, such as younger riders and involvement in multi-vehicle crashes versus speed and environmental factors in single-vehicle incidents, demonstrating typology's utility for hypothesis testing but constrained by retrospective reporting biases. The 1970s saw accelerated motorcycle adoption, fueled by affordable small-displacement models and cultural influences like the film , driving registrations and fatalities upward to a peak of 5,144 deaths in 1980. Safety initiatives shifted toward rider education, with the Motorcycle Safety Foundation (MSF) established in 1973 by the Motorcycle Industry Council to develop curricula; its initial Beginning Rider Course launched in 1974, followed by a 20-hour Motorcycle Rider Course in 1976 based on task analyses identifying over 3,000 operator maneuvers. The (NHTSA), formed under the 1970 Highway Safety Act, supported feasibility studies by 1978 affirming training's potential efficacy despite administrative hurdles, yet comprehensive causation research lagged, emphasizing accident avoidance over detailed causal mechanisms due to data limitations from non-standardized, post-event collections. These efforts, while advancing helmets and basic training, revealed gaps in understanding primary crash factors, setting the stage for more rigorous, on-scene investigations.

Purpose and Funding

The Hurt Report, formally titled Motorcycle Accident Cause Factors and Identification of Countermeasures, aimed to identify the primary causal factors in motorcycle accidents through empirical analysis of real-world crashes, with a focus on developing practical countermeasures to mitigate risks to riders. The study's objectives included examining human, vehicular, environmental, and roadway contributions to accidents; evaluating the of protective equipment like helmets; and recommending , educational, and regulatory interventions to reduce crash frequency and injury severity. This was driven by rising motorcycle fatalities in the United States during the , amid increasing popularity of the vehicles following the . The project was funded and commissioned by the (NHTSA), a U.S. agency responsible for vehicle safety standards and traffic injury prevention programs. Conducted by the Traffic Safety Center at the under NHTSA contract DOT HS-5-01160, the research spanned data collection from 1976 to 1978, culminating in the final report published in January 1981. While exact contract values are not specified in available documentation, the scope—encompassing in-depth investigations of 900 on-scene accidents, reviews of 3,600 police reports, and interviews with over 2,300 riders—reflected substantial federal investment in addressing gaps identified in prior, less comprehensive studies.

Methodology

Data Collection Process

The Hurt Report's data collection centered on in-depth, on-scene investigations of 900 motorcycle accidents in Los Angeles County, primarily conducted between 1976 and 1977 as part of a broader study timeline from July 1975 to September 1980. Accidents were selected based on timely notifications, targeting reported incidents—both single- and multiple-vehicle crashes—requiring ambulance dispatch for injuries, though the process captured approximately 20% of all recorded motorcycle accidents due to notification constraints. Of these, 54 cases were fatal, involving 900 riders and 152 passengers. Investigations occurred rapidly, with 68.6% initiated immediately at the scene and the remaining 31.4% within 24 hours, enabling detailed reconstruction through photography, diagrams, measurements, tire striation analysis, function checks, and assessment of control positions. Interviews were conducted with riders, other drivers, witnesses, and physicians either on-site, in hospitals, or via follow-up mailed questionnaires, with responses cross-verified for consistency; a supplementary survey targeted 68 drivers involved in other-vehicle collisions. Physical evidence collection encompassed environmental conditions (e.g., , , line-of-sight), vehicle defects, equipment compliance with , and injury mechanisms, yielding approximately 1,000 data elements per case covering rider demographics, experience, alcohol/drug involvement, usage, pre-crash speeds, collision dynamics, and post-crash . To contextualize accident data, the study incorporated analysis of 3,600 police traffic accident reports (TARs) for comparative patterns and exposure data from 505 revisited accident sites, matching original day-of-week, time-of-day, and conditions, which involved observing and interviewing 2,310 non-crash riders. Additional sources included records on registrations and licenses from 1976 to 1979, autopsy reports, and physician consultations on injuries. The study area lacked mandatory laws, facilitating examination of voluntary usage rates around 50% among the population at risk. This multi-source approach, funded by the , prioritized empirical on-site evidence over aggregated administrative data to derive causation factors.

Sample Characteristics and Scope

The Hurt Report analyzed 900 motorcycle accidents investigated on-scene by trained researchers, drawn from police-reported incidents in . These accidents occurred primarily in an urban environment, with 75% involving collisions with other vehicles—most commonly passenger cars—and 25% classified as single-vehicle events; intersections accounted for the majority of crash locations. Data collection emphasized detailed reconstruction of pre-crash scenarios, injury patterns, and contributing factors, supplemented by exposure surveys of non-crash-involved riders to contextualize accident risks. Rider demographics revealed a predominantly young male cohort: 96% of involved riders were male, though females were overrepresented relative to their proportion in the riding population. Riders aged 16-24 were overrepresented, while those aged 30-50 were underrepresented; occupational profiles showed overrepresentation among craftsmen, laborers, and students, with professionals and sales workers underrepresented. Experience levels were notably low, with over 50% of riders having fewer than five months on the specific accident , and 92% reporting self-taught skills or learning from family and friends rather than formal training. Vehicle characteristics indicated underrepresentation of large-displacement motorcycles and overrepresentation of modified types such as semi-choppers and cafe racers. The study's scope was limited to this localized sample, focusing on causation factors and countermeasures identifiable through in-depth investigations, but it excluded unreported accidents and rural or highway crashes, potentially limiting generalizability beyond urban settings during the mid-1970s. Complementary exposure data from traffic sites provided a control baseline, though exact sample sizes for non-accident riders were not detailed in primary summaries.

Analytical Approach and Limitations

The analytical approach employed descriptive and categorical statistical methods to categorize accident causation factors, injury mechanisms, and countermeasures. Data from 900 in-depth investigations were analyzed using the with Fortran IV for processing, focusing on frequency distributions, cross-tabulations, and chi-square tests to identify associations, such as between helmet use and injury absence (χ² = 54.3 for cases with no squared severity score greater than zero). Accident reconstruction integrated like skid marks and vehicle damage to determine pre-crash dynamics, speeds, and collision sequences, while injury analysis applied the (AIS) to score severities by body region and mechanism, aggregating multiple injuries via a Severity Sum of squared AIS values. Exposure surveys of 2,310 riders at 505 sites provided comparative baselines, enabling assessments, such as headlamp usage (30% in accidents versus 60% in exposure). This emphasized empirical reconstruction over probabilistic modeling, prioritizing causal sequences from multidisciplinary synthesis rather than regression-based . Medians and percentages quantified variables like rider age (24.8 years) and hazard approach angles (43.4% from 11 o'clock position), with adjustments for (e.g., 20.4% absent line-of-sight observations). Key limitations stemmed from the descriptive nature of the analysis, which relied on univariate and bivariate summaries without controlling for via multivariate techniques, potentially confounding correlated factors like alcohol impairment and speed. The sample captured only approximately 20% of County accidents due to a notification system limited to about 25% of cases, biasing toward severe incidents via chases and underrepresenting minor crashes or non-hospitalized riders. Exposure data collection, delayed by roughly two years (1978–1979 versus 1976–1977 accidents), introduced temporal mismatches from evolving motorcycle fleets and rider demographics, diminishing comparability. Self-reports introduced , evidenced by discrepancies like overestimated front brake usage, while small subsamples (e.g., for passengers or specific defects) constrained inferential power, and traffic reports' inaccuracies in speeds and contacts further eroded precision for non-on-scene variables. Overall, the urban-specific scope and absence of a non-accident control group precluded broader generalizability or quantification of baseline rider behaviors.

Core Findings

Primary Accident Causation Factors

The Hurt Report identified human factors as the dominant contributors to accidents, with rider error and other drivers' failures to perceive s predominating over vehicle defects or environmental conditions. In multiple-vehicle collisions, which accounted for 60% of the investigated cases, the primary causation factor was the automobile driver's failure to detect and recognize the in traffic, leading to right-of-way violations in over 50% of such incidents. This perceptual error occurred most frequently at intersections, where 75% of accidents involved the proceeding straight while the other vehicle executed a left turn into its path. In single-vehicle accidents, comprising the remaining 40% of cases, motorcycle rider error served as the precipitating factor in approximately two-thirds of instances, typically manifesting as loss of control during maneuvers such as cornering too fast, between lanes, or overbraking. Contributing rider behaviors included inattention to the task, excessive speed relative to conditions, and lack of , with overall rider error classified as the principal cause in 40% of all accidents across both single- and multiple-vehicle types. Alcohol impairment exacerbated these human errors, appearing as a factor in 12% of all but rising to nearly 50% in fatal crashes, often compounding issues like poor judgment and delayed reaction times. In contrast, mechanical failures of the were rare, implicated in only 3% of cases, while roadway defects such as potholes or surface irregularities contributed to just 2%. These findings underscored that accident causation stemmed primarily from behavioral and perceptual shortcomings rather than inherent vehicle or infrastructural flaws.

Rider and Environmental Contributors

The Hurt Report identified rider inexperience as a predominant factor in accidents, with 57.4% of involved riders possessing less than six months of experience on the specific model in the crash. Median riding experience on the accident-involved was approximately five months, despite a median overall street riding history of about three years. Riders aged 16 to 24 were overrepresented relative to their exposure in the riding population, while those aged 30 to 50 experienced fewer accidents proportional to their numbers. Lack of formal training exacerbated risks, as 92% of accident-involved riders were self-taught or learned informally from friends or family, with formally trained riders (e.g., via Motorcycle Safety Foundation courses) underrepresented in accidents by a factor of two. Rider errors, including failure to perceive hazards and inadequate collision avoidance maneuvers, were primary causes in 40.8% of all investigated cases and 64.3% of single-vehicle collisions. Specific deficiencies included no evasive action in 31.9% of cases and improper braking techniques, such as rear-wheel-only application leading to skids in 18.5%. Inattentiveness or contributed in 40.9% of accidents, with riders often failing to maintain focus on traffic dynamics. Alcohol impairment was documented in 11.5% of riders overall, escalating to 40.9% in accidents, with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.125% among impaired cases; involvement reached 43.1% in fatalities. These factors compounded in single-vehicle spills, where rider control loss due to speed, curves, or obstacles predominated without external vehicle involvement. Environmental conditions rarely served as primary causes, with most accidents occurring under favorable circumstances that underscored human factors over externalities. Approximately 93% took place in good weather with clear visibility, on dry pavement, and during daylight hours, minimizing the role of adverse elements like or darkness. Roadway contributed marginally, as 62.3% of crashes happened at intersections and on straight sections, but surface irregularities or wetness increased skid risks in a subset, amplifying rider error effects such as overbraking. Urban settings predominated (70%), where density heightened perceptual failures, yet environmental hazards like poor or were incidental rather than causal in the majority.

Vehicle and Countermeasure Insights

The Hurt Report identified vehicle defects as a rare precipitating factor in accidents, accounting for less than 3% of the 900 investigated cases, with most instances linked to punctures or mechanical failures attributable to poor rather than inherent design flaws. -related issues, such as punctures or flats, contributed to 2.8% of accidents, predominantly affecting tube-type tires and leading to sudden loss of control; front tires showed 95.4% with no issues, while rear tires had 1.3% puncture rates. Fuel system vulnerabilities were prevalent, with spills or leaks occurring in 61.9% of crashes—17.1% high-flow and 44.7% low-flow—often from tank caps or carburetors, and contributing to 1.2% of cases involving crash or post-crash fires. Conspicuity emerged as a dominant vehicle-related factor in multi-vehicle collisions, where motorist failure to detect motorcycles was implicated in approximately 66% of cases, particularly during daylight hours when only 30% of accident-involved motorcycles had headlights on compared to 60% in the exposure population. Fairings and windshields were underrepresented in accidents (8.7% vs. 12.0% in exposure data), suggesting they enhance without compromising handling. Stability concerns included cornering clearance problems in 1.0% of cases, with three fatalities tied to unretracted sidestands, and modified styles like semi-choppers or cafe racers overrepresented due to altered maneuverability. Braking performance data revealed frequent rear-wheel overbraking (18.5% rear-only use) leading to skids, with median pre-crash speeds of 29.8 mph dropping to 21.5 mph at impact, though few systemic brake defects were noted under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 122. Injury mechanisms highlighted vehicle components as contact points, with handlebars causing 17.2% of rider somatic injuries, fuel tanks 6.3%, and engine cases 5.1%, often to lower extremities; crash bars on 18.1% of motorcycles provided no net injury reduction and inflicted 22 injuries in 18 cases. injuries, at 13% of pelvic cases, were frequently linked to fuel tank impacts, with severity increasing with (81.8% moderate/serious for 501-750 cc engines). Recommended countermeasures emphasized design enhancements for and . Tubeless tires were advocated to mitigate puncture-induced losses of control, while improved fuel system integrity—such as self-sealing tank caps, reinforced carburetors, and lines—was proposed to reduce spills and fire risks, citing the as an exemplar. Mandatory headlamp operation was urged to boost conspicuity, alongside research into interconnected or antilock braking s to address overbraking tendencies without relying solely on rider skill. Modifications altering stability, such as extended forks on choppers, were discouraged, with standards prioritizing stock configurations for safety. No evidence supported crash bars for injury mitigation.
Vehicle FactorKey StatisticCountermeasure Recommendation
Conspicuity (Headlamps)30% on in accidents vs. 60% exposureMandatory daytime operation
Tires2.8% failure rateAdopt tubeless designs
Fuel System61.9% spills/leaksEnhanced crashworthy components (e.g., self-sealing caps)
BrakingRear-only use in 18.5%Develop antilock/interconnected systems

Helmet Effectiveness Analysis

Observed Protective Effects

The Hurt Report observed that helmets substantially mitigated severity in crashes involving head-to-surface contact, with damaged helmets consistently absorbing impact energy and preventing penetration or critical trauma to the or . In the 900 in-depth investigations, no helmeted rider suffered a fatal despite documented head impacts, whereas all fatal head injuries occurred among unhelmeted riders. Helmeted fatalities, numbering seven among the 33 total rider deaths, resulted exclusively from non-head trauma such as thoracic or abdominal injuries. Unhelmeted riders exhibited markedly higher frequencies of head and injuries compared to helmeted riders across both single-vehicle and multi-vehicle collisions, with head impacts representing the primary mechanism for serious and fatal outcomes. The study identified as the leading in accidents, occurring in over 60% of unhelmeted cases involving roadway collisions. Helmets demonstrated effectiveness in reducing both the incidence and severity of such injuries without of compensatory risks, such as increased neck strain from helmet weight or restricted sensory input. Only four instances of minor injury—primarily superficial abrasions incurred during removal—were directly linked to helmet use, and in each case, the device averted what would likely have been severe or lethal head trauma based on impact dynamics. These observations affirm helmets as the single most effective for head protection observed in the dataset, derived from on-scene reconstructions, medical records, and helmet inspections conducted between 1976 and 1977.

Limitations and Non-Protected Risks

The Hurt Report concluded that motorcycle helmets, when compliant with standards such as FMVSS 218, significantly mitigate but offer no protection against trauma to other body regions, including the chest, , and extremities. Chest injuries emerged as a primary cause of fatality among riders in the study's 900 analyzed crashes, often resulting from direct impact with vehicles, pavement, or other obstacles, independent of head protection. Similarly, injuries occurred in 13% of cases, predominantly during high-speed frontal collisions where lower body exposure to impact forces was unavoidable. While the report documented fewer injuries among helmeted riders compared to unhelmeted ones, with no of helmets increasing cervical risk, trauma remained possible in severe crashes due to inertial loading or direct forces transmitted beyond the 's scope. Only four minor injuries were directly attributable to use across the sample, each involving scenarios where the helmet shell or retention system contributed to superficial harm but averted potentially fatal head impacts. Additional limitations included vulnerabilities from improper helmet fit or usage: approximately 6% of riders in crashes had unfastened retention systems, increasing the likelihood of dislodgement during impact, while loose-fitting helmets risked and reduced . Helmets also failed to address systemic crash dynamics, such as rider ejection or multiple sequential impacts exceeding tolerances, which could overwhelm protective materials even for cranial strikes.

Statistical Outcomes from the Study

In the analyzed sample of 900 on-scene accidents, approximately 40% of riders were helmeted at the time of impact. Among cases involving head or injuries (861 total), helmeted riders accounted for 22.8% (195 cases), while unhelmeted riders comprised 77.2% (663 cases). Conversely, the absence of head or injuries was more common among helmeted riders at 54.3%, compared to 46.1% for unhelmeted riders. Severity metrics further underscored helmet benefits: severe head or neck injuries (scoring ≥10 on the Severity Scale 2) occurred in 5% of helmeted cases versus 11.8% of unhelmeted cases. In fatal accidents (59 cases examined), helmeted riders represented only 20% (12 cases), despite constituting 50% of the at-risk population and 40% of the overall accident-involved riders. This disparity indicates helmets substantially mitigated fatal outcomes, with the report concluding that qualified safety helmets achieved a "spectacular reduction" in head injury frequency and severity. Neck injuries showed no helmet-induced increase; helmeted riders experienced fewer such injuries (27 cases) than unhelmeted riders (60 cases), with neck-only injuries at 32.4% for helmeted versus 67.6% for unhelmeted in relevant subsets. Helmets meeting Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 218 demonstrated high efficacy without impairing vision, hearing, or contributing to accidents, though only 4 minor injuries (AIS=1) were directly linked to helmet components, offset by protection against more severe trauma. Full-coverage and full-facial helmets provided equivalent head protection, with facial variants additionally reducing force transmission from facial impacts.
CategoryHelmeted (%)Unhelmeted (%)Notes
Head/ Injuries (of 861 cases)22.877.2Lower incidence for helmeted
No Head/ Injuries54.346.1Higher avoidance for helmeted
Severe Injuries (SS2 ≥10)511.8Reduced severity with helmets
Fatal Cases (of 59)2080Disproportionate protection
These outcomes derive from in-depth examinations, including donated helmets (73.4% of accident-involved), revealing most impacts within design tolerances. The data affirm helmets as the primary effective countermeasure against head trauma, though limitations persisted in extreme impacts or unprotected regions.

Criticisms of the Report

Methodological and Sampling Critiques

The Hurt Report's sampling was confined to 900 motorcycle accidents occurring in , between 1976 and 1979, primarily in urban and suburban business-shopping zones representing high-density environments. This geographic and temporal scope has raised concerns about limited generalizability, as the prevalence of multi-vehicle crashes at intersections—comprising about 60% of cases—may reflect local patterns rather than nationwide conditions, potentially underrepresenting rural single-vehicle incidents or varying types elsewhere. Only approximately 25% of police-reported motorcycle accidents in the study area were captured for in-depth investigation, due to constraints in notification systems, team availability, and prioritization of injury-involved cases via ambulance dispatches. This opportunistic sampling introduced potential selection bias toward more severe or officially documented events, while excluding unreported minor crashes, which could skew causation analyses by overemphasizing factors like other drivers' failure to detect motorcycles. Exposure data from 2,310 non-crash-involved riders, collected at 505 accident sites roughly two years later under matched conditions, further risked misalignment with contemporaneous rider demographics or behaviors due to evolving motorcycle trends and voluntary participation rates. A key methodological issue arose from the mix of investigation timings: 68.6% of cases received immediate on-scene analysis, while 31.4% involved follow-up probes conducted 3–24 hours post-crash. These "warm" follow-up cases disproportionately included severe outcomes, with higher rates of hospitalization (28.3% versus 22.9% in on-scene cases), fatalities (13.4% versus 2.6%), injuries (24.7% versus 10.4%), and alcohol involvement (17.8% versus 9.1% in nighttime crashes), as access to hospitalized riders and impounded vehicles favored such incidents over minor ones. This timing-based bias likely inflated estimates of injury severity and certain risk factors, as follow-up investigations also yielded less complete data due to degradation and participant unavailability. Data collection relied heavily on rider and witness interviews, police reports, and inspections, but incomplete records—such as missing usage in 59.6–65.9% of cases—compromised subgroup analyses, while potential recall inaccuracies in post-crash accounts could introduce subjectivity in attributing causation. Although the interdisciplinary team's training mitigated some observer biases, the absence of randomized sampling or comprehensive controls for unreported events underscores inherent limitations in representing the full spectrum of risks.

Interpretive Disputes

The Hurt Report's analysis of helmet performance has sparked interpretive disagreements regarding its implications for . The study documented that helmets mitigated head and facial injuries in approximately two-thirds of relevant crash cases, primarily those involving lower-speed impacts or glancing blows, but failed to protect in the remaining third, often due to rider ejection, high-velocity collisions exceeding helmet tolerances, or strikes to the and areas not covered by standard designs. Proponents of mandatory helmet laws interpret these results as compelling for universal requirements, emphasizing the substantial reduction in severe head trauma and associated fatalities— with unhelmeted riders comprising 75% of those sustaining fatal . Critics, including advocates for rider autonomy, counter that the limitations in high-severity scenarios undermine claims of comprehensive efficacy, arguing the data reveal helmets as a partial insufficient to justify overriding personal choice, especially since and multi-system injuries dominate non-head fatalities. Interpretations of causation factors also diverge, particularly on the balance between rider actions and external variables. The report attributed 60-65% of multi-vehicle collisions to other drivers' failure to detect or yield to motorcycles, often at intersections, positioning perceptual errors by motorists as the dominant precipitant. Safety researchers favoring enhanced rider education interpret this as underscoring the need for improved defensive riding skills and of driver lapses, viewing —present in about 30% of such cases—as modifiable through . Conversely, some analysts and interpret the emphasis on detection failures as evidence that accident risks are largely exogenous to rider control, prioritizing countermeasures like vehicle conspicuity aids (e.g., headlights, reflective gear) over behavioral mandates, and questioning the feasibility of riders preempting all perceptual oversights in complex traffic. A further point of contention involves the report's findings on rider and . While formal training courses were underrepresented among crash-involved riders (92% self-taught or informally instructed), the data showed no statistically significant reduction in accident rates for those completing structured programs compared to equivalently experienced self-taught riders, though cumulative riding mileage correlated inversely with involvement. Detractors of expansive training requirements interpret this as indicating limited preventive value for standardized curricula, especially given the era's rudimentary programs, and advocate focusing resources on or licensing rigor instead. Supporters, citing the overall deficiency in professional instruction among casualties, interpret the results as a call for mandatory, high-quality to instill foundational skills, arguing that modern evidence-based curricula address the gaps evident in the data and that the report's experience effect supports ongoing skill development. Alcohol's role presents another interpretive lens, with the report identifying measurable impairment (BAC ≥0.10%) in 12.5% of riders and nearly half of cases, yet noting underreporting due to inconsistent testing. advocates interpret these figures as conservative underestimates, akin to broader traffic patterns, justifying stricter enforcement and education on impairment risks. Skeptics among rider communities interpret the relatively low prevalence in non-fatal accidents as evidence that alcohol is not a primary causal driver compared to or factors, attributing higher associations to variables like riskier night riding rather than direct causation, and cautioning against overgeneralizing from a subset prone to post-crash scrutiny.

Controversies and Policy Debates

Helmet Mandate Arguments For and Against

Arguments in Favor
Proponents of helmet mandates cite the Hurt Report's empirical observation that helmeted riders experienced significantly lower rates of head and neck injuries across all injury types and severity levels compared to unhelmeted riders, attributing this to helmets' ability to mitigate impact forces in crashes involving ground contact. Subsequent analyses building on such data, including National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) evaluations, estimate helmets reduce fatal injuries by 37% for operators and 41% for passengers, while decreasing head injury risk by 69%, justifying mandates to enforce compliance where voluntary use lags—as evidenced by the Report's finding that only 40% of accident-involved riders wore helmets despite 50% general usage. Universal helmet laws have demonstrably increased usage rates and correlated with reduced nonlethal head injuries by 29% or more in states enacting them, alongside lower overall mortality, supporting arguments that mandates yield net public safety benefits by countering underuse driven by behavioral factors.
Arguments Against
Critics contend that the Hurt Report underscores helmets' limitations as a , noting they neither prevent rider ejection—occurring in 60% of multi-vehicle crashes—nor address primary accident causes like alcohol impairment (involved in 50% of cases) or poor , rendering mandates an incomplete solution that diverts focus from more causal interventions such as rider training and licensing reforms recommended in the study. Empirical reviews of law repeals, such as in , reveal surges in unhelmeted fatalities without proportional increases in total crashes, suggesting mandates may induce where riders perceive added protection and adopt riskier behaviors, potentially offsetting gains. Opponents further argue mandates infringe on individual autonomy, prioritizing personal over coerced compliance, especially given evidence that targeted elevates voluntary usage without broad regulatory overreach, and that externalized costs like healthcare burdens are mitigated by mechanisms rather than paternalistic . While acknowledging reduced head trauma, detractors highlight the Report's data on neck injury risks in certain impacts and helmets' inefficacy at high speeds, questioning the proportionality of universal enforcement when non-head injuries predominate in severe .

Influence on Libertarian vs. Regulatory Perspectives

The Hurt Report's empirical demonstration that helmets reduced head and brain injuries by approximately 85% and 75%, respectively, in analyzed crashes provided key data for regulatory advocates pushing universal helmet mandates, as it underscored measurable reductions in fatalities without evidence of increased neck injuries or . This finding influenced federal incentives in the 1990s, where the referenced similar helmet efficacy data to tie funding to state adoption of laws, resulting in 26 states reinstating or strengthening mandates by 2000. Libertarian perspectives, however, leveraged the report's broader —which identified rider error in 92.5% of cases, alcohol impairment in 50% of fatal accidents, and inexperience as primary factors—to argue that helmet mandates address symptoms rather than root causes, failing to prevent crashes where single-vehicle incidents predominated. Organizations like the cited such data to oppose mandates, emphasizing adult autonomy and voluntary compliance through education and licensing reforms, as helmets mitigate only post-crash outcomes and infringe on personal without tackling behavioral risks. The debate highlighted tensions between cost savings—estimated at $3 billion annually from mandates via reduced medical expenditures—and libertarian critiques of , where the report's non-helmet countermeasures (e.g., improved training reducing novice errors by up to 30%) were seen as more causally effective for without coercive . Regulatory sources often prioritized the report's reduction metrics for societal benefit arguments, while libertarian analyses noted potential overreliance on mandates amid voluntary helmet use rates exceeding 60% in non-mandate states pre-2000, questioning enforcement's marginal gains against costs.

Alcohol and Training Policy Implications

The Hurt Report documented alcohol involvement in approximately half of fatal accidents analyzed, with blood alcohol concentrations often exceeding legal limits and contributing to impaired judgment, reduced reaction times, and increased crash severity. These empirical observations highlighted alcohol as a causal factor amplifying risks inherent to operation, such as balance instability and limited crash protection, thereby supporting measures for targeted deterrence. Implications included strengthened for zero-tolerance BAC standards for riders, intensified roadside checkpoints focused on motorcyclists, and integration of alcohol impairment into licensing protocols, as evidenced by subsequent NHTSA guidelines emphasizing against impaired motorcycling to mitigate disproportionate fatality rates. In parallel, the report found that 92 percent of crash-involved riders had no formal , having learned through self-teaching or informal means from family or friends, which was associated with deficient skills in collision avoidance, braking, and hazard perception. This lack of structured correlated with elevated accident rates and injury outcomes, prompting recommendations for accessible rider programs to instill proficiency in vehicle control and risk recognition. Policy ramifications extended to the proliferation of mandatory basic rider courses in numerous U.S. states post-1981, often as prerequisites for licensing, alongside federal endorsements for standardized curricula that address real-world dynamics like intersection incursions and single-vehicle losses of control. While subsequent evaluations have yielded mixed evidence on 's net crash-reduction effects, the Hurt findings provided foundational for regulatory shifts prioritizing skill-building over permissive self-instruction.

Subsequent Research and Validation

Studies Affirming Key Conclusions

Subsequent research has corroborated the Hurt Report's conclusion that motorcycle helmets substantially reduce the risk of head and fatal injuries. A meta-analysis of 61 studies found helmets to be 42% effective in preventing fatalities and associated with lower rates of head, neck, and facial injuries. Similarly, an analysis of over 40,000 crashed motorcyclists showed helmet use linked to a relative risk of 0.40 for head injury (95% CI 0.31–0.52) and markedly lower fatal injury rates. These findings align with the Report's in-depth investigation of 900 accidents, where unhelmeted riders suffered fatal head trauma in cases preventable by helmets, and have been echoed in policy evaluations confirming helmets' role in mitigating crash severity across diverse datasets. The Report's emphasis on alcohol impairment as a primary factor in approximately half of rider-involved crashes has been validated by national fatality data and targeted analyses. In , 28% of motorcyclists in fatal crashes had blood alcohol concentrations (BAC) of 0.08 g/dL or higher, exceeding rates for passenger vehicle drivers and correlating with higher crash severity. on 372 alcohol-positive riders confirmed elevated BAC levels (e.g., above 0.10%) associated with impaired control, poor judgment, and single-vehicle loss-of-control incidents, mirroring the Hurt findings on causation and environmental factors like nighttime riding. Comparative studies of alcohol-related versus crashes further highlight riders' heightened vulnerability, with alcohol contributing to 23-49% of hospitalized cases in sampled populations. Regarding rider training, the Report's observation of no significant reduction in involvement for formally trained riders—despite potential benefits in mitigation—has been supported by longitudinal evaluations. A review of U.S. and international data indicated trained riders exhibited similar or elevated crash rates compared to untrained peers, attributed to and overconfidence post-training. Australian cohort studies found pre-license safety course participants overrepresented in crashes, suggesting limited preventive impact on incidence while affirming training's role in avoidance maneuvers during inevitable events. These results underscore the Report's causal focus on behavioral and perceptual errors over formal instruction alone. Broader crash causation patterns, including the prevalence of single-vehicle accidents due to rider error and multi-vehicle failures in , have persisted in modern investigations. The FHWA Motorcycle Crash Causation Study (), analyzing over 350 crashes, identified rider factors in 40% of cases and alcohol in 25%, with perceptual errors akin to the Hurt dataset's 65% multi-vehicle attribution to other drivers' failure to detect motorcycles. NTSB analyses similarly affirm non-collision risks like stability loss, validating the Report's emphasis on unprotected vulnerabilities over protected .

Updates and Contradictions in Modern Contexts

The Motorcycle Crash Causation Study (MCCS), conducted from 2009 to 2011 by the and published in 2018, serves as the most comprehensive update to the Hurt Report's , employing a similar on-scene, case-control approach to analyze 351 crashes and 665 control cases across five U.S. sites. Key findings largely affirm the Hurt Report's emphasis on human factors, with rider unsafe acts contributing to 44% of crashes, including failures (32%) and skills deficiencies (24%), echoing the original study's identification of rider error in approximately two-thirds of single-vehicle incidents. Other vehicle (OV) perception failures remained a leading cause in multiple-vehicle crashes (30%), consistent with the Hurt Report's documentation of drivers failing to detect or recognize motorcycles in 65% of such collisions. However, the MCCS reveals notable shifts in contributing factors. Alcohol involvement was documented in 13% of crashes, significantly lower than the Hurt Report's findings of positive blood alcohol concentrations in nearly 50% of single-vehicle crash riders and over 60% of those involved in accidents overall, potentially reflecting improved enforcement, awareness campaigns, or demographic changes since the 1970s data collection. Rider demographics also diverged, with older riders (over 40) overrepresented in the MCCS sample compared to the Hurt Report's predominance of younger, novice riders, aligning with broader NHTSA trends showing the average fatally injured motorcyclist age rising from 28 in the Hurt era to 42 by 2023. Helmet usage in the MCCS reached 99%, far exceeding the Hurt Report's 40-60% rates in non-mandate areas, correlating with reduced severity; full-face helmets were overrepresented and demonstrated effectiveness in mitigating impacts, though fatalities still occurred primarily from and extremity trauma. Recent NHTSA data through 2023 indicates persistent high fatality rates (31.39 per 100 million vehicle miles traveled), with single-vehicle crashes comprising 38% of deaths, underscoring enduring rider control issues despite technological advances like ABS braking, which were absent in Hurt-era analysis. Contradictions emerge in underrepresentation of certain risks, such as use being more prevalent in MCCS than national averages, and intersections remaining crash hotspots due to challenges, but with modern factors like rider from portable devices not systematically captured in the Hurt framework. These updates suggest that while perceptual errors by other drivers persist as immutable causal elements, reductions in alcohol-related incidents highlight the impact of policy and behavioral interventions, though overall crash patterns indicate no fundamental resolution to rider decision failures.

Technological and Behavioral Changes

Advancements in antilock braking systems (ABS) have directly mitigated one of the Hurt Report's key findings on rider control failures during emergency braking, which contributed to instability in 43% of braked in the study's sample. Post-1981 research demonstrates that ABS reduces fatal crash rates by 22% to 37% per registered vehicle years, with a 2011 analysis reporting a 37% lower rate for ABS models compared to non-ABS counterparts across multiple brands and engine sizes. A 2014 international evaluation of over 6,000 scooter and motorcycle crashes in further confirmed 22-27% reductions in ABS-equipped vehicles over 250 cc, attributing gains to prevented wheel lockup and maintained steering control. Helmet technology has evolved beyond the standards prevalent during the Hurt Report's data collection period (1973-1976), incorporating improved absorption materials, multi-directional impact systems like MIPS, and enhanced coverage designs, leading to higher efficacy estimates. While the Hurt Report documented helmets reducing risk by approximately 29%, contemporary analyses, accounting for these material and construction upgrades, estimate 37% effectiveness in preventing rider fatalities and 69% in mitigating . Full-face helmets, now more common, provide superior facial and rotational impact mitigation compared to the partial-coverage types analyzed in the original study, with biomechanical testing showing reduced brain strain metrics under oblique loading. Behavioral shifts among motorcyclists have included greater emphasis on formal and awareness, partially addressing the Hurt Report's identification of inexperience and poor in 92% of single-vehicle crashes. The Motorcycle Safety Foundation's expanded rider education programs since the have increased trained rider prevalence, correlating with self-reported improvements in hazard perception, though empirical crash data indicate persistent as the primary factor in over 90% of incidents, akin to the original findings. Stricter licensing requirements and public campaigns have boosted helmet compliance rates to 60-70% in mandatory states by the , up from lower voluntary usage in the Hurt era, yet alcohol impairment remains a factor in roughly 25-40% of fatal crashes, underscoring limited progress in curbing substance-related errors.

Long-Term Impact

Effects on Legislation and Standards

The Hurt Report's findings on helmet efficacy, demonstrating that they significantly reduced fatal and trauma in 85% of cases without increasing , supplied critical data supporting universal mandates amid ongoing state-level debates in the . Proponents cited the study's analysis of 900 , where unhelmeted riders suffered 33% higher fatality rates and disproportionate severe injuries, to advocate for stricter laws; this contributed to legislative shifts, such as California's 1992 reinstatement of a comprehensive helmet requirement following earlier repeals influenced by freedom-of-choice arguments. Similar evidence informed policy in states like , where partial laws evolved amid references to the report as a foundational safety resource, though exemptions persisted for older riders. Beyond helmets, the report's identification of rider inexperience as a factor in 92% of single-vehicle crashes—often linked to poor control and judgment—underscored the need for formalized , prompting regulatory adoption of mandatory for riders. This directly bolstered programs like those from the Motorcycle Safety Foundation (MSF), with states increasingly tying licensing to completion of certified courses; by the mid-1980s, over 30 states had incorporated such requirements, reducing crash rates by emphasizing skills like curve negotiation and braking addressed in the study's countermeasures. The (NHTSA) integrated these insights into its frameworks, referencing the report in plans that shaped enforcement standards for rider proficiency. On equipment standards, the report's detailed injury biomechanics—revealing common impact sites on helmets and the ineffectiveness of substandard designs—advanced testing protocols under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 218, which Hurt's prior research helped refine for impact absorption and retention. Recommendations for enhanced conspicuity, such as mandatory headlight activation, influenced DOT regulations enacted in the early 1980s, mandating daytime running lights on motorcycles to mitigate the 65% of multi-vehicle crashes attributed to visibility failures by other drivers. These changes prioritized causal factors like alcohol impairment (present in 50% of single-vehicle cases) in policy, leading to targeted enforcement standards rather than blanket prohibitions.

Enduring Relevance in Safety Discussions

The Hurt Report's methodology, involving on-scene investigations of 900 motorcycle accidents in from 1976 to 1977, provided granular data on crash causation that continues to underpin analyses, as later studies like the National Transportation Safety Board's 2018 review of risk factors explicitly reference its identification of frequent collision types, such as vehicles violating the motorcyclist's right-of-way at intersections. This empirical foundation highlights enduring human factors, including rider inexperience and perceptual errors by other drivers, which persist despite technological advances like anti-lock braking systems. In contemporary rider education and policy formulation, the report's finding that 92 percent of accident-involved riders were self-taught or learned informally from family or friends informs ongoing emphases on formal training programs by organizations such as the Motorcycle Safety Foundation, which model investigations after Hurt's approach to prioritize causal realism over . Similarly, its documentation of alcohol's role in 65 percent of single-vehicle crashes sustains for checkpoints and licensing restrictions, aligning with causal patterns observed in modern datasets where impairment remains a leading contributor to fatalities. Debates on helmet mandates frequently invoke the report's evidence that helmets reduced severity in 85 percent of cases and were absent in 60 percent of fatal crashes involving head trauma, offering a benchmark for efficacy estimates that modern meta-analyses, such as those confirming a 37 percent reduction in death risk, build upon rather than supplant. While critics note potential obsolescence from evolved , the report's focus on verifiable mechanics and non-helmet factors like improper evasive maneuvers ensures its citation in regulatory discussions, countering narratives that overemphasize equipment over behavioral interventions.

References

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