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Kayhan (Persian: کيهان, lit. 'The Cosmos') is a Persian-language newspaper published in Tehran, Iran. It is considered "the most conservative and hard-line Iranian newspaper."[1] Hossein Shariatmadari is the editor-in-chief of Kayhan. According to the report of the New York Times in 2007, his official position is representative of the Supreme Leader of Iran.[2]

Kayhan has about 1,000 employees worldwide.[2] There are conflicting reports about its circulation numbers: in 2006 the BBC gave it as 60,000–100,000 copies,[3] in 2007 the New York Times gave "about 70,000", and in 2008 a New York University School of Law journal article reported it as 350,000 copies.[4] Kayhan also publishes special foreign editions, which include the English-language Kayhan International.[1]

History and profile

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Kayhan was founded in February 1943[5] by owner Abdolrahman Faramarzi and Mostafa Mesbahzadeh as editor-in-chief. Later the roles of Faramarzi and Mesbahzadeh were reversed. The paper supported Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi during his reign.[6] Published in Iran as well as in London, the newspaper had a circulation greater than one million prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In 1974 Kayhan media group introduced itself as "the largest newspaper and magazine publishing house in the Middle East". Forugh Mesbahzadeh, the wife of Kayhan's major owner, officially appeared as the manager of the leading Iranian women's magazine, Zan-e Rooz.[7]

During the clashes between the Imperial forces and revolutionaries, Kayhan and Ettela'at were censored.[8] After the overthrow of the Shah all of Mesbahzadeh's assets were seized, including the publishing plant, which was the main headquarters of the daily. Following the revolution Kayhan became a state-sponsored publication together with Ettela'at and Jomhouri-e Eslami of which publishers are directly appointed by the Supreme Leader.[9]

In May 1980, Ayatollah Khomeini named Ebrahim Yazdi, then foreign minister, as head of the daily.[10] Under the guidance of Mesbahzadeh, the London office of Kayhan continued its work and publishes a monarchist weekly issue known as Kayhan London, which has a small circulation. In 2006, Mesbahzadeh died at the age of 98 in Los Angeles, California.[1]

The paper focuses on political, cultural, social and economic news.[11]

The last editor before the revolution

[edit]

The last editor of Kayhan newspaper was Amir Taheri until the beginning of the revolution. With the approach of the 1979 revolution, a new editorial council was formed within Kayhan, headed by Rahman Hatfi. From 1961 to 1966, Houshang Amiari was the director of the caricature department, overseeing themes of humorous paintings. Hossein Rezaei was the director of the news section of this newspaper from 1965 to 1979.[12]

Political orientation

[edit]

Kayhan supports the Iranian government and the policies of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Shariatmadari stated that the newspaper and its staff "defend the ideology of the Islamic Revolution."[13] Gareth Smyth, the former Iran correspondent of the Financial Times, contends that Kayhan articulates the political views of the "regime's fundamentalist camp."[14]

Shariatmadari rejects the labels "conservative" and "fundamentalist," which he had said "...make us sound like the Taliban." Instead, he calls himself and those with similar views "principlists". The Principlist faction comprises the majority of the Iranian Parliament.[2] This group is also referred to as the "neo-principlists" and includes such figures as Gholamali Haddad Adel and Saeed Jalili among the others.[15] In fact, the daily is the print media outlet of the group.[15]

Controversies

[edit]

The newspaper became controversial in 2010 for iterating an unequivocal condemnation of then-French First Lady Carla Bruni for her open letter about the death sentence against Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani for adultery and alleged murder. The newspaper called Bruni an "Italian prostitute" and "the singer and decadent actress who managed to break [up] the Sarkozy family" who "deserves to die" for her "perverted lifestyle," reiterating the striking similarities between Ashtiani and Bruni, and also condemned actress Isabelle Adjani as a prostitute. The French foreign ministry condemned the comments as "unacceptable" and summoned the Iranian ambassador to France. The Iranian foreign ministry sought to distance itself from Kayhan's comments, with spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast stating that "The media can properly criticize the wrong and hostile policies of other countries by refraining from using insulting words. This is not correct."[16][17]

In 2020, following the expulsion of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) from Iran, Kayhan's editor, Hossein Shariatmadari, described the MSF as an "American puppet"[18] because it is "based in France and all anti-Iranian groups have a base in France.[19] On 28 April 2022, the same day as Yom HaShoah, Kayhan published an opinion piece in the front page praising Adolf Hitler and promoting anti-semitic tropes.[20]

After a Lebanese-American suspect stabbed the Indian-born author Salman Rushdie on 12 August 2022, Kayhan responded by congratulating "a thousand bravos ... to the brave and dutiful person who attacked the apostate and evil Salman Rushdie in New York... The hand of the man who tore the neck of God's enemy must be kissed".[21]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
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Kayhan

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Kayhan (Persian: کیهان, meaning "") is a daily newspaper published in , , established on 27 May 1942 by Mostafa Mesbahzadeh and Abd al-Rahman Faramarzi with initial financial support from the Pahlavi monarchy. Originally a pro-monarchy outlet that evolved into a major nationalist publication with significant circulation and journalistic influence during the Pahlavi era, it was nationalized following the 1979 Islamic Revolution and placed under the patronage of 's Supreme Leader. Published by the Kayhan Institute, an entity affiliated with the ruling clerical establishment, the newspaper maintains a staunchly conservative and hardline ideological position reflective of the regime's core principles, often amplifying anti-Western rhetoric and opposing internal reformist tendencies. Its editor-in-chief, Hossein Shariatmadari, has been appointed directly by Supreme Leader since 1991, positioning Kayhan as a mouthpiece for the highest echelons of Iran's theocratic leadership. The publication's defining characteristics include unwavering advocacy for revolutionary Islamist policies, criticism of perceived Western influences, and a history of shaping public discourse on and foreign relations from a regime-aligned perspective. While pre-revolution Kayhan trained generations of journalists and competed with rivals like , its post-revolution role has centered on ideological enforcement rather than independent reporting, contributing to its reputation as one of Iran's most influential yet polarizing media outlets. Controversies surrounding Kayhan often stem from its editorials promoting confrontational stances toward adversaries and domestic opponents, including calls for severe measures against critics, which have drawn accusations of exacerbating political divisions.

Founding and Pre-Revolutionary Era

Establishment and Initial Growth

Kayhan was founded on 27 May 1942 in by Mostafa Mesbahzadeh, who assumed the roles of director and editor-in-chief, and Abd-al-Rahman Faramarzi as publisher and general editor, a position Faramarzi held until 1972. The newspaper debuted as an evening daily featuring four six-column pages in a 32 by 48 cm format, with initial funding of 500,000 rials provided by and Mohammad Reza Shah, later augmented by an additional 1,500,000 rials in 1944. In its early months, Kayhan encountered regulatory hurdles, including a four-week suspension from December 1942 to January 1943 imposed after coverage of a prompted public unrest; operations resumed on 13 January 1943. Initial editorial content exhibited a leftist orientation but pivoted by 1946 toward populist , particularly in opposing Soviet influence, while emphasizing comprehensive reporting on domestic and international affairs to appeal to a diverse readership. Kayhan's journalistic rigor and broad scope, encompassing news, cultural commentary, and later expansions into social issues, arts, and sports coverage via supplements, fueled its rapid ascent. By 1961, circulation reached approximately 120,000 copies daily, supported by an extensive provincial network, positioning the publication as a leading independent voice advocating moderate reforms aligned with the Pahlavi framework's emphasis on modernization and national unity.

Editorial Independence and Influence Under the Pahlavi Regime

During the Pahlavi era, Kayhan operated as a privately owned newspaper under the direction of Mostafa Mesbahzadeh from its founding on May 27, 1942, until 1979, which afforded it greater editorial autonomy than state-run media outlets subject to direct government control. While receiving initial financial backing from Mohammad Reza Shah—500,000 rials at launch and an additional 1,500,000 rials in 1944—the publication maintained operational independence, evidenced by periods of divergence from official positions, such as in 1958–1961 when it pursued a populist-nationalist line not fully aligned with regime directives. This relative freedom allowed Kayhan to publish bold editorials appealing to middle-class readers, fostering public discourse on national issues within the constraints of censorship, though it avoided direct criticism of the royal family. Mesbahzadeh, alongside editor-in-chief Abd-al-Rahman Faramarzi (who served until 1972), shaped Kayhan's evolving stance from an initial leftist orientation (1942–1946) to a supportive yet occasionally assertive populist-nationalist tone that praised Reza Shah's modernization efforts while critiquing broader societal challenges indirectly. The newspaper's content emphasized monarchy loyalty but demonstrated journalistic spine through competitive rivalry with peers like , contributing to a more vibrant press environment compared to fully propagandistic . Kayhan's influence extended to intellectuals and policymakers, bolstered by its circulation exceeding one million copies by the late , a peak that underscored its role as a leading voice in pre-revolutionary Iranian . This reach amplified its contributions to national discourse, including coverage of post-1953 stabilization efforts, though investigative depth on economic mismanagement or social excesses remained limited by prevailing laws.

Revolutionary Transition and Post-1979 Reorientation

Nationalization and Ideological Shift

Following the triumph of the Islamic Revolution on February 11, 1979, Kayhan was seized by revolutionary forces and nationalized as part of the new regime's consolidation of media assets previously associated with the Pahlavi monarchy. The provisional government, under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's overarching authority, targeted major dailies like Kayhan and Ettela'at for their perceived role as "pillars of the former regime," effecting the takeover through direct intervention by Islamist loyalists. By September 9, 1979, the nationalization was formalized, stripping private ownership—held by Mostafa Mesbahzadeh prior to the upheaval—and placing the publication under state oversight. This shift marked Kayhan's transformation from a commercially driven outlet into an instrument of ideological propagation aligned with the Islamic Republic's emerging theocratic framework. The ideological reorientation under Khomeini's guidance emphasized the doctrine of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist), positioning the supreme leader as the ultimate arbiter of governance and policy, a concept central to the 1979 constitutional order. Pre-revolutionary editorial staff deemed incompatible with revolutionary principles were systematically replaced, ensuring content fidelity to anti-imperialist narratives that vilified Western influence, particularly American "arrogance," as existential threats to Islamic sovereignty. Archival reviews of post-revolution editions reveal rapid alignment, with Kayhan's rhetoric pivoting to endorse revolutionary purges and export of the Islamic model abroad. Kayhan's content swiftly supported key post-revolutionary initiatives, including the November 4, 1979, seizure of the U.S. Embassy in , which it portrayed as a justified response to foreign meddling and a symbol of resistance against imperialism. The newspaper also championed the decreed by Khomeini in June 1980, advocating the closure of universities for ideological cleansing, dismissal of thousands of faculty suspected of secular or leftist leanings, and infusion of Islamic into education to safeguard velayat-e faqih from internal subversion. This alignment, evident in consistent front-page endorsements and opinion pieces, underscored Kayhan's role as a mouthpiece for the regime's causal prioritization of doctrinal purity over pluralistic discourse.

The Final Pre-Revolutionary Editor and Immediate Aftermath

served as executive editor-in-chief of Kayhan from 1972 until the triumph of the on February 11, . During the intensifying protests and strikes of 1978–1979, Taheri oversaw decisions amid competing pressures from Pahlavi authorities seeking to suppress and sympathizers infiltrating the , which included both pro-regime and anti- elements. While Kayhan maintained a degree of autonomy under the —occasionally critiquing government policies—Taheri faced increasing , labor disruptions at the printing presses, and threats, balancing regime expectations with efforts to report on the growing unrest without fully endorsing narratives. Following the Shah's departure and the collapse of the interim government, revolutionary committees seized Kayhan's headquarters and printing facilities in Tehran in mid-February 1979, marking the end of private ownership. The newspaper's founder and primary owner, Mostafa Mesbahzadeh, fled into exile in Europe, where he later relaunched a version in London; Iranian authorities confiscated his assets, including the publishing infrastructure, as part of broader nationalizations targeting perceived regime affiliates. Pre-revolutionary staff, including Taheri and many journalists, were ousted or departed amid purges enforcing ideological alignment with Ayatollah Khomeini's vision, with revolutionary tribunals targeting those seen as insufficiently committed to the Islamic Republic's principles. Publication halted briefly due to these takeovers and internal chaos but resumed under provisional revolutionary oversight by late February 1979, transitioning fully to state control under the Islamic Republic's by early 1980. This shift eliminated Kayhan's prior , repurposing it as an official organ to propagate the new regime's directives and suppress opposition voices, with content rigidly aligned to clerical authority.

Organizational Profile and Leadership

Ownership and Governance Structure

Kayhan is published by the Kayhan Institute, an entity directly affiliated with Iran's ruling clerical establishment and supervised by the Office of the Supreme Leader. This oversight is executed through a designated representative of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who manages the institute's operations to maintain strict adherence to revolutionary principles and regime directives. The governance framework prioritizes ideological loyalty via appointed leadership roles, with the selected personally by the Supreme Leader, diverging sharply from the newspaper's pre-1979 status as a privately owned enterprise under individual proprietors. This appointed structure insulates decision-making from commercial influences, as Kayhan receives funding primarily from the Supreme Leader's office rather than relying on advertising revenue or market-driven subscriptions. As a non-commercial entity within this system, Kayhan functions as a key instrument in the regime's "Vindication Jihad," an ongoing campaign to counter internal and external critiques of the through consistent propagandistic defense. This role underscores the institute's mandate to prioritize political vindication over , with board-level appointments reinforcing alignment with the Supreme Leader's strategic priorities.

Editorial Leadership Evolution

Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the subsequent nationalization of Kayhan, the newspaper's editorial leadership shifted toward direct oversight by the Supreme Leader's office, with the position appointed by decree to enforce ideological conformity. This mechanism, instituted under Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, replaced earlier patterns of internal selection with appointments vetted for loyalty to revolutionary principles, consolidating control over the outlet's hardline voice. Mehdi Nasiri, an early post-revolutionary figure, was appointed around 1988–1991 by Khamenei's representatives, serving through the early to mid-1990s before departing to found the Sobh publication in 1995. Initially aligned with the regime, Nasiri's tenure exemplified the transition from revolutionary fervor to structured oversight, though his later criticisms of leadership decisions—such as alignments—led to his on February 2, 2025, at Ferdowsi's tomb in , followed by release two days later amid charges tied to regime dissent. In 1993, Khamenei appointed Hossein Shariatmadari as managing editor, a role he has retained uninterrupted for over three decades as of 2025, marking a pivot to long-term incumbents who embody unwavering . Shariatmadari's extended , characterized by consistent for confrontational policies, underscores the post-revolutionary emphasis on personal loyalty over rotational or merit-driven changes, distinguishing it from the Pahlavi-era's relatively autonomous editorial processes. This pattern of decree-based succession has ensured Kayhan's alignment with Khamenei's strategic priorities, minimizing deviations observed in figures like Nasiri.

Circulation, Formats, and International Editions

Kayhan's daily print circulation in Tehran is reported at approximately 36,000 copies as of 2015, reflecting a modest operational scale compared to larger commercial outlets in Iran. This figure underscores the newspaper's reliance on ideological authority rather than mass market appeal, with no publicly verified updates available in subsequent years despite its state-backed status. The publication appears in standard print format, supplemented by a digital online edition at kayhan.ir, which archives issues and delivers content in Persian, English, and . Special publications and newsletters are also offered through the site, enabling broader accessibility beyond physical distribution. The digital section, accessible at kayhan.ir/ar, mirrors the print content for non-Persian readers. Kayhan Al-Arabi serves as the official -language print edition, published daily from under the same institutional oversight as the Persian version, functioning as a arm for outreach to Arab audiences in the . This edition aligns closely with the headquarters' editorial line, emphasizing regional geopolitical narratives. In contrast, Kayhan operates as an independent weekly print and online publication established in by the family of the pre-revolutionary founder, targeting the with content critical of the Islamic Republic and supportive of monarchist restoration. This expatriate variant represents a fork, unaffiliated with 's governance structure.

Ideological Stance and Content Characteristics

Core Political Orientation

Kayhan embodies a principlist orientation characterized by unwavering adherence to the doctrine of velayat-e faqih, positioning it as a staunch defender of Iran's theocratic system against any dilution through reformist or secular influences. This stance manifests in its role as an unofficial mouthpiece for Supreme Leader , synchronizing editorial content with his directives to prioritize the preservation of revolutionary ideology over pragmatic adjustments. The newspaper's hardline conservatism rejects Western liberal models as fundamentally corrosive to Islamic , advocating instead for a causal framework where external influences are viewed as existential threats requiring resolute opposition rather than accommodation. A key empirical illustration of this orientation is Kayhan's vehement rejection of compromises in nuclear negotiations, such as the 2015 (JCPOA), which it portrayed as a capitulation undermining Iran's and revolutionary principles. Editorials consistently argued that such deals represented U.S.-orchestrated plots disguised as moderation, insisting on full adherence to and deterrence without concessions that could erode the regime's foundational authority. This position stems from a first-principles commitment to theocratic supremacy, where empirical threats are assessed through the lens of safeguarding velayat-e faqih against incremental erosion via international entanglements. In contrast to reformist outlets, which often favor dialogue and incremental policy shifts for domestic stability, Kayhan privileges uncompromised revolutionary purity, framing as a gateway to Western subversion. It routinely critiques reformist media for prioritizing expediency over ideological fidelity, thereby reinforcing a binary worldview that elevates regime consolidation through hardline vigilance. This differentiation underscores Kayhan's function as a bulwark, ensuring public discourse remains anchored in the causal realities of perpetual ideological defense rather than concessions that risk systemic unraveling.

Domestic Policy Positions

Kayhan consistently endorses policies promoting economic amid , framing them as imperatives for national resilience rather than sources of undue hardship. The newspaper has praised former President Ebrahim Raisi's administration (2021–2024) for initiatives like phasing out artificial foreign currency rates, which it described as liberating Iran's economy from externally imposed distortions and fostering internal production. This stance aligns with the "resistance economy" doctrine, emphasizing domestic capacities to neutralize sanctions without reliance on foreign negotiations. In critiquing reformist approaches, Kayhan rebuked President Masoud Pezeshkian's September 2024 suggestion to pursue (FATF) compliance, asserting that such steps would compromise and that final authority resides with Supreme Leader . Hardline outlets like Kayhan portray FATF integration as a security risk, prioritizing ideological independence over potential economic relief through global financial norms. On social and cultural fronts, Kayhan advocates rigorous enforcement of Islamic norms to safeguard against perceived Western cultural encroachment, including mandatory adherence as a bulwark of chastity and . In December 2024, it demanded judicial scrutiny of law critics, viewing their dissent as threats to revolutionary principles. The publication promotes a "cultural " to elevate over Western , which it condemns as fostering ignorance and moral erosion; a September 2025 editorial explicitly contrasted Islam's superiority with imported modern ideologies. This includes resistance to and secular educational influences seen as diluting Islamic identity, positioning such efforts as defenses against moderate dilutions of strict Sharia-based governance.

Foreign Affairs and Anti-Western Rhetoric

Kayhan's foreign affairs coverage consistently frames the and as primary existential threats to Iran and the broader Islamic world, attributing regional instability to American interventions such as the and subsequent support for regime changes, which it argues created power vacuums exploited by Western interests rather than Iranian expansionism. This perspective positions Iranian and proxy responses not as unprovoked aggression but as necessary deterrence against empirically documented threats, including over 200 documented U.S. drone strikes and assassinations targeting Iranian officials and scientists since 2010. In editorials, Kayhan portrays actions by Iranian-aligned groups as strategic victories that counter perceived Western aggressions, such as depicting Hezbollah's border operations and Hamas's resistance as effective pressure tactics that forced a fragile Gaza ceasefire in late 2025, despite mainstream Western narratives emphasizing Iranian instigation. A September 11, 2025, exemplified this by contrasting Islam's enduring principles with Western "modern ignorance," arguing that jihadist defenses preserve against cultural and military encroachment, thereby justifying proxy engagements as defensive rather than offensive . The newspaper advocates unwavering support for the "axis of resistance," a network including , , and other Iran-backed militias, highlighting their coordinated readiness as a bulwark against Israeli expansionism; for instance, a 2023 Kayhan report detailed discussions between leader and 's on joint operations, framing this alliance—active since 's 1982 founding with ian aid—as a causal counter to U.S.-Israeli dominance in the region. This stance rejects portrayals of as the aggressor by tracing conflicts to root causes like U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal in 2018, which Kayhan claims escalated proxy tensions through renewed sanctions and to exceeding $3.8 billion annually.

Sociopolitical Influence and Role

Agenda-Setting in Iranian Politics

Kayhan functions as a primary agenda-setter in Iranian elite politics by disseminating positions closely aligned with Supreme Leader Khamenei's directives, thereby framing the boundaries of official discourse and policy priorities among hardline factions. Appointed directly by Khamenei, the newspaper's editor ensures its editorials preempt and reinforce red lines, influencing how state institutions and conservative lawmakers interpret and enact policies on domestic stability and external threats. This role extends to silencing intra-elite dissent, as deviations from Kayhan's prescribed narratives risk accusations of disloyalty, compelling policymakers to align with its tones to preserve access to power. Empirical evidence of this influence persists despite Kayhan's modest circulation, reported at approximately 70,000 copies as of 2006, far below pre-revolutionary peaks exceeding one million. Its outsized impact derives from frequent citations and emulation in state-controlled outlets, applying —where media salience dictates elite priorities—in Iran's hierarchical system, elevating issues like ideological vigilance over pragmatic reforms. During the 2024 presidential election, triggered by President Ebrahim Raisi's death on May 19, Kayhan aggressively countered reformist momentum by denouncing candidates advocating moderated foreign engagement, such as Masoud Pezeshkian, who advanced to the runoff. Following Pezeshkian's victory on July 6, the newspaper rebuked his overtures on rejoining international financial frameworks like FATF, asserting they contradicted Khamenei's non-concessionist stance and reminding elites of the Supreme Leader's veto power over policy shifts. This intervention helped calibrate post-election discourse, constraining reformist initiatives and upholding principlist (hardline) parameters amid below 50 percent. In broader crises, such as nuclear talks, Kayhan's editorials have delineated negotiation limits, as seen in 2015 when it echoed Khamenei's conditions for any deal, shaping official to prioritize resistance narratives over . Such agenda-setting has empirically bolstered dominance by synchronizing elite responses, evident in the marginalization of moderate voices during parliamentary sessions and vetting processes.

Impact on Public Opinion and Regime Stability

Kayhan's consistent framing of domestic unrest as orchestrated by foreign adversaries has served to delegitimize opposition movements and reinforce regime narratives of external encirclement, thereby aiding in the preservation of internal cohesion among loyalists. During the 2018 protests triggered by economic grievances, the newspaper explicitly attributed the rallies to incitement by foreign sources disguised as legitimate dissent. This approach echoes patterns observed since the 1979 Revolution, where Kayhan has depicted challenges to authority—ranging from the 2009 Green Movement to recent demonstrations—as plots by Western intelligence or hostile states, redirecting public focus from systemic issues to geopolitical threats. Such rhetoric has arguably mitigated the spread of disillusionment by fostering a siege mentality that prioritizes national defense over reform demands. Among Iran's conservative and religious demographics, particularly in rural areas, Kayhan functions as a bulwark against perceived Western cultural penetration, promoting an Islamic-centric worldview that counters global media influences. Its editorials emphasize and deterrence, portraying sanctions not as existential threats but as opportunities to demonstrate resolve, as evidenced in analyses downplaying the severity of potential UN snapback measures. This has correlated with sustained elite and base support for uncompromising policies, enabling the regime to endure prolonged isolation without capitulation, despite economic strains documented in GDP contractions exceeding 6% annually in sanction-heavy periods from onward. While broader surveys, such as those by GAMAAN, indicate widespread skepticism toward overall, Kayhan's targeted appeal to traditionalist segments has helped insulate the regime's ideological core from erosion. The newspaper's influence on regime stability manifests in its capacity to polarize in favor of hardliners, pressuring moderates and sustaining revolutionary fervor amid crises. For instance, post-ceasefire commentaries in framed regional conflicts as validations of Iran's strategic posture, warning against concessions that could undermine deterrence. Critics from reformist factions have accused it of exacerbating societal divisions, yet this very polarization has prevented consensus on , allowing the Supreme Leader's vision to prevail in key policy arenas like nuclear negotiations and regional alliances. Empirical persistence of these stances—evident in Iran's continued proxy engagements and rejection of FATF compliance despite internal debates—underscores Kayhan's role in anchoring public and elite opinion to confrontational realism.

Achievements in Defending Revolutionary Principles

Kayhan has positioned itself at the forefront of the "Vindication Jihad," a campaign initiated by Supreme Leader in February 2022 to counter ideological attacks on the through hybrid measures including media exposition and cultural resistance. The newspaper has claimed a leading role in this effort by consistently publishing editorials and analyses that refute reformist narratives and Western propaganda, thereby reinforcing revolutionary orthodoxy amid domestic challenges. This sustained ideological push has been credited by regime supporters with bolstering public adherence to core principles like velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist) and , contributing to the regime's resilience against erosion from within. In electoral contexts, Kayhan's exposés of perceived moderate betrayals—such as its August 2025 editorial branding reformist manifestos as tantamount to —have aligned with hardliner gains, including the conservative dominance in the parliamentary elections where principlists secured over 70% of seats despite reformist boycotts and disillusionment. By highlighting inconsistencies in figures like former President Hassan Rouhani's nuclear deal pursuits, which it argued diluted revolutionary self-sufficiency, the paper aided in mobilizing base voters toward candidates upholding strict adherence to 1979 Revolution tenets, as evidenced by the 2017 disqualification of reformist allies and subsequent hardliner parliamentary majorities. These efforts empirically correlated with reduced reformist influence, sustaining the ideological framework that has underpinned regime stability for over four decades. Kayhan has advanced (esteghlal) as a imperative, countering dependency narratives through advocacy for indigenous development amid sanctions; for instance, its coverage of the auto sector's pivot to post-2018 U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA emphasized reduced vulnerability to external shocks, aligning with Khamenei's "resistance economy" doctrine that achieved measurable gains like a 20% rise in non-oil exports from 2020 to 2023. Editorials promoting military deterrence, such as those framing advancements as "," have reinforced causal links between ideological defiance and national , enabling to maintain operational in defense and sectors despite isolation. This promotion has arguably extended regime longevity by fostering a of triumphant over capitulation, substantiated by sustained GDP growth in sanctioned periods through internal .

Controversies and Criticisms

Notable Editorial Incidents and Backlash

In April 2025, Kayhan published a column in its "Goft-o-Shenoud" section that suggested potential attacks on the U.S. embassy in , prompting warnings from Iran's Press Supervisory Board for violating press laws and raising national security concerns. The remarks, which included provocative language interpreted as threats against U.S. interests, drew domestic debate on media responsibilities and international commentary from outlets like highlighting risks to U.S.- relations. Following a in Iran-related conflicts in June 2025, Kayhan demanded the execution of Director General , accusing him of espionage and collaboration with adversaries amid escalated rhetoric. This , published around June 28-29, contributed to broader post-ceasefire in Iranian outlets, with critics including regime opponents noting it as amid a surge in executions. experts subsequently urged Iran to curb such and crackdowns, though official responses minimized the content as principled defense.

Accusations of Propaganda and Incitement

Kayhan has been widely accused by Western organizations and Iranian reformist critics of functioning as a state outlet, with its reporting exhibiting a marked lack of balance by systematically omitting perspectives critical of the Islamic Republic's leadership and policies. Observers, including media analysts, have documented patterns of selective news arrangement, rumor dissemination, and false attributions in its coverage, particularly on foreign conflicts like the Israel-Palestine war, where content aligns uncritically with regime narratives of and resistance. This approach prioritizes causal advocacy for the Supreme Leader's directives over empirical verification or multiperspective , resulting in editorials that frame domestic dissent as treasonous conspiracies without evidentiary counterbalance. Accusations of incitement center on inflammatory rhetoric targeting religious minorities and perceived internal threats, with the Baha'i community frequently cited as a victim of orchestrated hate campaigns. Under editor Hossein Shariatmadari since 2005, Kayhan has published articles portraying Baha'is as Zionist spies or sources of societal corruption, contributing to broader efforts that demonize the group through fabricated allegations of and moral deviance. The Baha'i International Community has highlighted over 200 instances since 1979 where Kayhan and affiliated outlets amplified such tropes, correlating with spikes in discriminatory actions like business closures and arrests, though direct causation remains debated among analysts. Similar patterns appear in critiques of Pahlavi-era intellectuals, where editorials invoke historical grievances to incite public disdain, often blending factual events with unsubstantiated claims of collaboration with "enemies of ." Western sources, including the U.S. State Department, have labeled Kayhan's output as pervasive in fostering antisemitic incitement, with articles recycling tropes and depicting as perpetual aggressors in line with regime ideology. Iranian diaspora monarchists, drawing from the paper's pre-1979 history as a relatively independent voice, contend that its post-revolutionary transformation into a clerical mouthpiece hijacked its original journalistic , turning it into an instrument for suppressing alternative historical narratives about the . These claims underscore empirical observations of Kayhan's adherence to regime loyalty metrics—such as alignment with Supreme Leader edicts—over standards of neutral reporting, as evidenced by content audits showing near-total exclusion of opposition viewpoints in political discourse.

Defenses and Counterarguments from Supporters

Supporters of Kayhan, particularly regime hardliners and editor Hossein Shariatmadari, portray the newspaper as an essential bulwark against disinformation engineered by Western intelligence and media outlets intent on undermining Iran's . They assert that Kayhan's embodies unflinching causal realism—prioritizing deterrence through strength amid encirclement by adversaries—rather than gratuitous provocation, as evidenced by its advocacy for advancements that, in 2024, enabled Iran's direct strikes on , which supporters credit with restoring regional deterrence balances previously eroded under moderate administrations. This position rebuts accusations of excess by linking Kayhan's output to empirical security gains, such as the sophistication of hypersonic missiles that evaded Israeli defenses, outcomes dismissed in Western analyses as escalatory but defended internally as proportionate responses to . Critics' portrayals of Kayhan as mere are countered by arguments that such labels stem from a systemic aversion in moderate Iranian and Western sources to acknowledging threats like covert operations attributed to and the U.S., which Kayhan exposes without dilution. Shariatmadari has dismissed reformist objections to hardline editorials as concessions to enemy narratives, insisting that Kayhan's independence from governmental funding—deriving from endowments tied to institutions—enables unvarnished adherence to the Supreme Leader's vision, unlike state-influenced outlets prone to softening stances for diplomatic expediency. Supporters highlight the newspaper's role in debunking moderate media's optimism during the 2015 JCPOA era, where predicted economic boons failed to materialize amid reimposed sanctions, vindicating Kayhan's warnings of entrapment. The endurance of Kayhan's influence, with Shariatmadari's appointment directly by Khamenei since 1999 and its shaping of parliamentary bills like the July 2025 measure to bolster armed forces backed by 120 lawmakers, empirically affirms alignment with conservative public and elite sentiments prioritizing ideological purity over compromise. This resonance is contrasted with the diminished traction of reformist publications, whose advocacy for yielded no verifiable lifts in sanctions relief, as U.S. extensions in 2016 and snapbacks in 2025 demonstrated. Proponents argue that Kayhan's "necessary realism" has sustained regime cohesion by rallying support for , evidenced by non-oil export growth to approximately $50 billion in the 2023-2024 Iranian year despite isolation, framing resilience as proof against narratives of hardliner-induced collapse.

References

  1. https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/kayhan-newspaper/
  2. https://statemediamonitor.com/2025/07/kayhan/
  3. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/showdown/interviews/shariatmadari.html
  4. https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sanctioned-person/shariatmadari-hossein
  5. https://cpd.gov.ua/en/international-threats-en/irans-propaganda-kayhan-state-media/
  6. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202409083740
  7. https://niacouncil.org/controversial-comments-by-kayhan-newspaper-spark-backlash-and-security-concerns/
  8. https://www.iranchamber.com/media/articles/kayhan_newspaper.php
  9. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4310346
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  12. https://www.amazon.com/stores/author/B001HPTN2S
  13. https://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/uncategorized/politics-and-the-press-in-iran-the-revolution-and-after/2537/
  14. https://old.iranintl.com/en/kayhan-daily
  15. https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/node/37962
  16. https://www.mei.edu/publications/kayhan-editor-us-and-allies-trying-weaken-irans-regime-empowering-moderates
  17. https://amwaj.media/article/inside-story-former-hardliners-turn-into-formidable-critics-of-iranian-state
  18. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202502027183
  19. https://iranwire.com/en/news/138753-ex-keyhan-editor-and-outspoken-critic-of-irans-leadership-released-from-detention/
  20. https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj37570/
  21. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202202081089
  22. http://allmedialink.com/iran-media-list/iran-newspaper/kayhan/
  23. https://kayhan.ir/en
  24. https://kayhan.ir/ar
  25. https://kayhan.london/
  26. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/media-landscape-iran
  27. https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/changing-of-the-guards/
  28. https://www.uskowioniran.com/2015/08/kayhan-supreme-leader-opposes-jcpoa.html
  29. https://www.iranintl.com/en/20211120616382
  30. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/iran-press-report-where-does-rouhani-lie-on-the-political-spectrum/
  31. https://amwaj.media/en/media-monitor/in-iran-reformist-call-for-broad-policy-u-turn-sparks-fierce-backlash
  32. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202410281677
  33. https://kayhan.ir/en/news/102517/explainer-president-raisi%25E2%2580%2599s-bold-economic-reform
  34. https://kayhan.ir/en/news/145000/iran-focuses-on-domestic-capacities-to-overcome-sanctions
  35. https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/kayhan-newspaper-reminds-pezeshkian-who-holds-the-final-say-on-fatf-in-iran/
  36. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202410083671
  37. https://abdimedia.net/en/politics/kayhans-dossier-critics-hijab-law
  38. https://www.memri.org/reports/iranian-regime-mouthpiece-kayhan-editorial-september-11-2025-promotes-islam-over-modern
  39. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/2400
  40. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/irans-foreign-policy-towards-iraq-and-syria
  41. https://mei.edu/publications/high-price-irans-anti-israel-policies
  42. https://www.inss.org.il/strategic_assessment/evolution-of-irans-perception-of-israel/
  43. https://kayhan.ir/files/en/publication/pages/1404/7/30/3253_25975.pdf
  44. https://kayhan.ir/files/en/publication/pages/1403/4/2/2869_22904.pdf
  45. https://kayhan.ir/en/news/113867/hezbollah-hamas-discuss-readiness-of-axis-of-resistance
  46. https://www.nytimes.com/article/axis-resistance-iran-militia.html
  47. https://www.middleeasteye.net/big-story/middle-east-axis-resistance-shaping-how
  48. https://manaramagazine.org/2024/01/the-axis-of-resistance-strategy-in-the-israel-hamas-war/
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  50. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/270619717_Macro_and_micro_legitimation_in_discourse_on_Iran%27s_nuclear_programme_The_case_of_Iranian_national_newspaper_Kayhan_Discourse_Society_26_1_52-73
  51. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran/closing-circles-irans-exclusionary-2024
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  53. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13216597.2014.948034
  54. https://kayhan.ir/en/news/56006/foreign-parties-instigating-unrest-official
  55. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202510018302
  56. https://gamaan.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/GAMAAN-Iran-Media-Survey-2021-English-Final.pdf
  57. https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-state-media-turns-aggressive-post-ceasefire-with-kayhan-demanding-grossis-execution/
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  59. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202508204613
  60. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/reformist-hardline-rivalries-dull-irans-parliament-elections
  61. https://kayhan.ir/en/news/144770/sanctions-push-iran%25E2%2580%2599s-auto-sector-to-rev-up-self-reliance
  62. https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/519602/Iranian-missiles-send-message-of-peace-through-strength
  63. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-self-limiting-success-of-iran-sanctions/
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  78. https://kayhan.ir/en/news/141378/lawmakers-move-to-strengthen-armed-forces
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