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The Lima Group (GL; Spanish and Portuguese: Grupo de Lima, French: Groupe de Lima) is a multilateral body that was established following the Lima Declaration on 8 August 2017 in the Peruvian capital of Lima, where representatives of 12 countries met in order to establish a peaceful exit to the ongoing crisis in Venezuela.[1]

Key Information

Among other issues, the group demands the release of political prisoners, the end of human rights violations, calls for free elections, offers humanitarian aid and criticizes the breakdown of democratic order in Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro.

Since its founding, multiple member states have left the organization.[2]

Background

[edit]
Main article: Crisis in Venezuela (2012–present)

Following the death of President Hugo Chávez, Venezuela faced a severe socioeconomic crisis during the presidency of his successor Nicolás Maduro, as a result of corrupt elections, economic mismanagement, and subsequent crackdown on public protests.[3][4][5][6][7] Due to the state's high levels of urban violence, inflation, and chronic shortages of basic goods attributed to economic policies such as strict price controls,[8][9] civil insurrection in Venezuela culminated in the 2014–17 protests.[10][11] Protests occurred over the years, with demonstrations occurring in various intensities depending on the crises Venezuelans were facing at the time and the perceived threat of being repressed by authorities.[12][13][14][15]

The discontent with the United Socialist Party of Venezuela saw the opposition being elected to hold the majority in the National Assembly for the first time since 1999 following the 2015 Parliamentary Election.[16] As a result of that election, the lame duck National Assembly consisting of United Socialist officials filled the Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal (TSJ) with allies.[16][17] Into early 2016, the Supreme Court alleged that voting irregularities occurred in the 2015 Parliamentary Elections and stripped four Assembly members of their seats, preventing an opposition supermajority in the National Assembly which would be able to challenge President Maduro.[16] The Assembly nevertheless swore in 3 of the members in question, in response to which the Supreme Court ruled that the Assembly was in contempt of court and in violation of the constitutional order.[18] The TSJ court then began to approve multiple actions performed by Maduro and granted him more powers.[16]

After facing years of crisis, the Venezuelan opposition pursued a recall referendum against President Maduro, presenting a petition to the National Electoral Council (CNE) on 2 May 2016.[19] By August 2016, the momentum to recall President Maduro appeared to be progressing, with the Council setting a date for the second phase of collecting signatures, though it made the schedule strenuous, stretching the process into 2017 which made it impossible for the opposition to activate new Presidential Elections.[20] On 21 October 2016, the Council suspended the referendum only days before preliminary signature-gatherings were to be held.[21] The Council blamed alleged voter fraud as the reason for the cancellation of the referendum.[21] International observers criticized the move, stating that CNE's decision made Maduro look as if he were seeking to rule as a dictator.[22][23][24][25]

Days after the recall movement was cancelled, 1.2 million Venezuelans protested throughout the country against the move, demanding President Maduro to leave office, with Caracas protests remaining calm while protests in other federal states resulted in clashes between demonstrators and authorities, leaving one policeman dead, 120 injured and 147 arrested.[26] That day the opposition gave President Maduro a deadline of 3 November 2016 to hold elections, with opposition leader, Miranda Governor Henrique Capriles stating, "Today we are giving a deadline to the Government. I tell the coward who is in Miraflores ... that on 3 November the Venezuelan people are coming to Caracas because we are going to Miraflores".[26]

Days later on 1 November 2016, then National Assembly President and opposition leader Henry Ramos Allup announced the cancellation of 3 November march to the Miraflores presidential palace, with Vatican-led dialogue between the opposition and the government beginning.[27] By 7 December 2016, dialogue halted between the two[28] and two months later on 13 January 2017 after talks stalled, the Vatican officially pulled out of the dialogue.[29] Further protests were much smaller due to the fear of repression, with the opposition organizing surprise protests instead of organized mass marches.[30]

Other actions by President Maduro and his Bolivarian officials included a 7 February 2017 meeting which announced the creation of the Great Socialist Justice Mission which had the goal of establishing "a great alliance between the three powers, the judiciary, the citizen and the executive", with Maduro stating that "we have been fortunate to see how the judicial power has been growing and perfecting, carrying a doctrine so complete with the constitution of 1999" while stating that the opposition-led National Assembly "took power not for the majority not for the people but for themselves".[31]

History

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The Lima Declaration

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The Lima Declaration established outlines and goals of the Lima Group in their attempt to mediate the crisis in Venezuela.[32]

Introduction

Establishes member states and outlines the democratic and noninterventional ambitions of the group to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in Venezuela.

Declaration of Lima

Joint Declaration 007 - 17

The Foreign Ministers and Representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and Peru, meeting in the city of Lima, on 8 August 2017, to address the critical situation in Venezuela and explore ways to contribute to the restoration of democracy in that country through a peaceful and negotiated solution;

Encouraged by the spirit of solidarity that characterizes the region and the conviction that negotiation, with full respect for the norms of international law and the principle of nonintervention, does not violate human rights and democracy, and is the only tool that ensures a lasting solution to the differences;

Declarations

Highlights the positions and goals of the Lima Group regarding the crisis in Bolivarian Venezuela.

They declare:
  1. Their condemnation of the breakdown of democratic order in Venezuela.
  2. Their decision not to recognize the National Constituent Assembly, nor the acts emanating from it, due to its illegitimate nature.
  3. Their full support and solidarity with the National Assembly, democratically elected.
  4. Legal acts that according to the Constitution require authorization from the National Assembly, will only be recognized when said Assembly has approved them.
  5. Their energetic rejection of violence and any option that involves the use of force.
  6. Their support and solidarity with the Attorney General and the members of the Public Ministry of Venezuela and demand the application of the precautionary measures issued by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
  7. Their condemnation of the systematic violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, of violence, repression and political persecution, the existence of political prisoners and the lack of free elections under independent international observation.
  8. That Venezuela does not comply with the requirements or obligations of the members of the Human Rights Council of the United Nations.
  9. Their serious concern about the humanitarian crisis facing the country and his condemnation of the government for not allowing the entry of food and medicine in support of the Venezuelan people.
  10. Their decision to continue the application of the Inter-American Democratic Charter to Venezuela.
  11. Their support for the decision of MERCOSUR to suspend Venezuela in application of the Ushuaia Protocol on Democratic Commitment.
  12. Their decision not to support any Venezuelan candidacy in regional and international mechanisms and organizations.
  13. Their call to stop the transfer of arms to Venezuela in light of articles 6 and 7 of the Arms Trade Treaty.
  14. That, taking into account the current conditions, they will request the Pro Tempore Presidency of CELAC and the European Union, the postponement of the CELAC-EU Summit scheduled for October 2017.
  15. Their commitment to keep track of the situation in Venezuela, at the level of Foreign Ministers, until the full restoration of democracy in that country, and to meet no later than the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, an opportunity in which may be added other countries.
  16. Their willingness to urgently support, within the framework of respect for Venezuelan sovereignty, any effort of credible negotiation and good faith, which has the consensus of the parties and is aimed at peacefully achieving the restoration of democracy in the country.

2018 Venezuelan presidential election

[edit]
Main article: 2018 Venezuelan presidential election

The Lima Group has overtly condemned the presidential elections called for by the Bolivarian government, describing them as unobserved, unjust and undemocratic.[33] Days before the planned election date, the Lima Group – alongside the United States and the European Union – called for the cancellation of the election and prepared for responses should the election be held.[34] Following the election which strengthened President Maduro's position, the fourteen member nations of the Lima Group recalled their ambassadors from Venezuela.[35][36]

2019 Venezuelan presidential crisis

[edit]
Main article: Venezuelan presidential crisis

During the presidential crisis, the Representative of Peru in the United Nations Security Council condemned what was described as an "illegitimate socialist regime," stating "We have received 700,000 Venezuelan refugees and migrants due to the crisis that is the responsibility of Maduro."[37] During the 2019 Venezuela uprising, group members Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay and Peru supported Guaidó's actions and condemned the actions of "the illegitimate and dictatorial regime of Nicolás Maduro."[38]

On 4 February 2019, in a meeting in Canada, it was agreed to include Juan Guaidó's interim government as a member of the Lima Group.[39] Previously, Guaidó has designated Julio Borges as ambassador of the Lima Group.[40] On the day of Maduro's second inauguration as president of Venezuela (10 January), Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland, one of the leading voices in the Lima Group, issued a statement that summarizes the Canadian government's position on Venezuela: "Today, Nicolás Maduro's regime loses any remaining appearance of legitimacy. Having seized power through fraudulent and anti-democratic elections held on 20 May 2018, the Maduro regime is now fully entrenched as a dictatorship. The suffering of Venezuelans will only worsen should he continue to illegitimately cling to power. Together with other likeminded countries in the Lima Group, Canada rejects the legitimacy of the new presidential term of Nicolás Maduro. We call on him to immediately cede power to the democratically-elected National Assembly until new elections are held, which must include the participation of all political actors and follow the release of all political prisoners in Venezuela."[41]

Membership

[edit]
Foreign ministers representing member states in the Lima Group meeting together on 13 February 2018 in Lima, Peru.

Twelve countries initially signed the declaration: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru. Guyana, Saint Lucia, Belize, Bolivia and Haiti joined later.[42][43]

Observers and support

[edit]

The organization is supported by Barbados, the United States, Ecuador, Grenada, Jamaica and Uruguay, who attended the initial meeting, as well as organizations such as the Organization of American States and the European Union. In addition, the Venezuelan opposition has given their support.[44]

The Lima Group supported the sanctions Panama placed against high-level Venezuelan officials, whom the Panamanian government accused of money laundering, supporting terrorism and the funding of weapons of mass destruction, and defended Panama after the Bolivarian government retaliated.[45][better source needed]

Departures

[edit]

Argentina left the Lima Group in March 2021 on the Day of Remembrance for Truth and Justice, criticizing the participation of Juan Guaidó in the bloc.[46][47] Mexico left the group by May 2021.[48][non-primary source needed] On 9 August Saint Lucia announced preparing to exit the group,[49] a decision confirmed the following day.[50]

The same year, President Pedro Castillo of host Peru re-established relations with the Maduro government in Venezuela and promised to "deactivate" the group.[51][52][53] His government announced Peru would leave the Lima Group in August;[54][55] however, after the resignation of foreign affairs minister Héctor Béjar and the appointment of Óscar Maúrtua, who has expressed support for the group, political analysts have expected a backtrack of the withdrawal decision,[56] and Peru has not officially withdrawn from the group.[57] After left wing parties took power in Mexico and Bolivia, both countries began to distance themselves from the group, and former Bolivian president Evo Morales said that Bolivia had left the group too.[58]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Lima Group

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from Grokipedia
The Lima Group was a multilateral diplomatic alliance comprising twelve nations from the —, , , , , , , , , , , and —formed on 8 August 2017 via the Lima Declaration to address Venezuela's escalating political, economic, and by advocating for the restoration of democratic order. The declaration condemned the rupture of democratic institutions, including the illegitimacy of Venezuela's National Constituent Assembly, and reaffirmed support for the democratically elected as the country's legitimate legislative body. It highlighted concerns over violations, political persecution, and the worsening humanitarian situation under President Nicolás Maduro's government, committing members to apply the Inter-American Democratic Charter, suspend Venezuela from regional bodies like , and oppose Venezuelan candidacies in international organizations. The group's defining actions included issuing successive declarations to isolate Maduro diplomatically, such as refusing to recognize his January 2019 inauguration following disputed elections and endorsing National Assembly President Juan Guaidó as Venezuela's interim leader in line with constitutional provisions. Members coordinated measures like denying entry to Venezuelan officials tied to repression and urging multilateral forums to address the crisis, aiming for a peaceful negotiated transition to free elections. Despite achieving broad international alignment against Maduro's authoritarian consolidation—evidenced by over 50 countries recognizing Guaidó—the Lima Group faced criticism from Maduro-aligned states and entities for perceived interference, though its efforts were grounded in regional democratic norms and responses to empirical indicators of institutional breakdown, including mass emigration exceeding 5 million and acute shortages. By 2021, the alliance effectively dissolved amid political shifts in key members, including Peru's new administration under withdrawing support and Argentina's exit, reducing its cohesion as left-leaning governments prioritized over confrontation with Maduro. The Lima Group's tenure underscored the challenges of multilateral pressure against entrenched in the region, ultimately yielding to alternative forums like the Mexico-led while highlighting the causal link between domestic policy failures and regional instability.

Origins and Context

Venezuelan Crisis Preconditions

The Venezuelan crisis originated in the economic and political policies implemented following Hugo Chávez's election as president on December 6, 1998, which initiated the "Bolivarian Revolution" characterized by extensive state intervention, nationalizations, and redistribution efforts heavily reliant on oil revenues. Venezuela's economy, with oil comprising over 90% of exports by the early 2000s, experienced initial growth from 1999 to 2008 due to surging global oil prices, but underlying structural weaknesses emerged from currency controls, price caps on essentials, and expropriation of private industries, fostering shortages and inefficiency. Real GDP per capita stagnated or declined after peaking around 2008, as non-oil sectors atrophied under reduced investment and regulatory burdens. Oil production, critical to fiscal stability, began a sustained decline after the 2002-2003 opposition strike against , the state oil company, which led to mass firings of 19,000 skilled workers and their replacement with political loyalists, prioritizing ideological control over technical expertise. Output peaked at 3.4 million barrels per day (bpd) in 1998 but fell to approximately 2.5 million bpd by 2013, hampered by chronic underinvestment, corruption, and aging infrastructure, despite exceeding 300 billion barrels. These trends intensified under , who assumed the presidency following Chávez's death on March 5, 2013, and a on April 14, 2013, where Maduro won by 1.5 percentage points amid allegations of irregularities. By 2014, fiscal deficits exceeding 10% of GDP prompted excessive money printing by the , igniting that officially surpassed 50% annually in 2014 and escalated to over 1,000% by 2017, eroding and exacerbating shortages of food and due to distorted signals and dependencies. Politically, Maduro's government undermined democratic institutions, including the opposition's victory in the December 6, 2015, elections, through interventions in 2016 that stripped legislative powers and the creation of a parallel National on July 30, 2017, boycotted by opposition parties and viewed internationally as a mechanism to consolidate executive . These preconditions—marked by policy-induced economic contraction, with GDP shrinking 3.8% in 2014 and accelerating thereafter, alongside rising repression of protests—culminated in widespread humanitarian distress, setting the stage for regional diplomatic responses.
Indicator1998 (Pre-Chávez Peak)2013 (Chávez Era End)Key Driver
Oil Production (million bpd)3.4~2.5Nationalizations and underinvestment
GDP Per Capita (constant USD)~10,000 (est.)~9,500 (decline post-2008 boom)Oil dependency and fiscal mismanagement
Inflation Rate~30%~40% (pre-hyperinflation surge)Currency controls and deficits

Establishment and Lima Declaration

The Lima Group was established on 8 August 2017 during a meeting of foreign ministers in , , convened to address the deepening political and humanitarian crisis in . The initiating document, the Lima Declaration, was signed by representatives from , , , , , , , , , , , and . This gathering responded to the Venezuelan government's installation of the National Constituent Assembly on 4 August 2017, following a boycotted by major opposition parties amid widespread allegations of fraud and suppression of dissent. The group's formation marked a coordinated diplomatic effort by mostly nations to isolate the administration internationally, emphasizing multilateral pressure over unilateral actions. The Lima Declaration outlined profound concern over the "rupture of the democratic order" in , rejecting the legitimacy of the and its decisions while upholding the elected in 2015 as the sole legitimate legislative body. It condemned systematic violations, including arbitrary detentions of opposition figures and protesters, extrajudicial killings, and torture, as documented by international observers, and decried the regime's refusal to allow amid shortages of food and medicine affecting millions. Signatories called for the immediate release of all political prisoners, restoration of separated powers, and scheduling of free, fair elections in line with constitutional timelines, while supporting the application of the Inter-American Democratic Charter by the (OAS). Subsequent to the declaration, and joined the initial 12 members, expanding the Lima Group to 14 countries committed to monitoring Venezuela's situation and backing good-faith negotiations for a peaceful , with explicit rejection of military intervention. The framework prioritized respect for Venezuelan sovereignty and non-intervention principles under , aiming to facilitate dialogue while applying diplomatic and economic measures against regime officials implicated in corruption and repression. This establishment reflected a consensus among signatories—predominantly center-right governments at the time—on the of democratic , including manipulated judicial processes and electoral manipulations, as verified by bodies like the OAS electoral observation missions.

Core Principles and Objectives

Stated Goals and Mechanisms

The Lima Group articulated its primary goals in the Lima Declaration adopted on August 8, 2017, by foreign ministers of 12 nations meeting in , . The declaration condemned the "rupture of democratic order" in following the Maduro government's establishment of a , which the signatories viewed as undermining the democratically elected . Key objectives included refusing recognition of the constituent assembly's legitimacy, supporting the as the sole democratic institution, demanding the release of political prisoners, and committing to diplomatic isolation of Venezuelan officials responsible for democratic erosion. The group pledged ongoing monitoring of Venezuela's situation at the ministerial level until full democratic restoration, emphasizing peaceful, negotiated solutions aligned with international democratic norms. Subsequent communiqués reinforced these aims, such as the September 2017 reaffirmation of efforts for a "peaceful and negotiated" resolution while rejecting Maduro's legitimacy. The group sought to coordinate actions like denying entry to high-ranking Venezuelan officials implicated in abuses or , contingent on member states' domestic laws, as outlined in a January 2019 resolution. Broader mechanisms involved joint diplomatic pressure to facilitate opposition-led transitions, including support for electoral processes free of regime interference. Operationally, the Lima Group functioned as an multilateral forum without a permanent secretariat, relying on periodic foreign ministers' meetings to issue unified statements and coordinate positions. These gatherings, held in various member capitals, enabled consensus-building on responses to Venezuelan developments, such as the January 2019 declaration rejecting Maduro's presidential term as illegitimate. The group collaborated with bodies like the (OAS) and , amplifying calls for access and sanctions against regime figures, though it avoided direct military or economic enforcement, focusing instead on normative diplomatic leverage. This structure allowed flexibility but limited sustained institutional pressure, with actions centered on public declarations and bilateral alignments rather than binding treaties.

Alignment with International Norms

The Lima Group's principles, as outlined in the August 8, 2017, Lima Declaration, emphasized the restoration of democracy, , and through diplomatic means, aligning with regional commitments under the (OAS) framework. The declaration condemned the Venezuelan government's rupture of democratic order, including the irregular formation of the 2017 National Constituent Assembly, and supported the OAS's invocation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC), a instrument that authorizes collective hemispheric responses to threats against democracy, such as electoral irregularities and institutional breakdowns. This alignment reflected the IADC's provisions for monitoring and addressing democratic erosion without endorsing military intervention, focusing instead on electoral verification, prisoner releases, and humanitarian access. Subsequent Lima Group communiqués, such as the January 4, 2019, statement, reiterated adherence to OAS instruments by urging reaffirmation of the OAS Charter and IADC to facilitate free elections and institutional legitimacy in . These efforts complemented OAS resolutions applying the IADC, including demands for transparent voting processes and , consistent with the charter's emphasis on and citizen participation. The group's rejection of violence and commitment to peaceful political solutions mirrored Article 4 of the IADC, which prioritizes and multilateral cooperation over unilateral actions. Regarding broader international norms, the Lima Group expressed concerns over Venezuela's non-compliance with obligations, including systematic violations documented in UN reports, but framed responses within diplomatic pressure and sanctions rather than direct intervention. This approach respected the UN Charter's principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs (Article 2(7)) by avoiding forcible measures and instead promoting through democratic restoration, an evolution in Latin American practice where non-intervention coexists with proactive defense of democratic norms via instruments like the IADC. Critics, including Venezuelan officials, alleged interference, but the group's actions—limited to recognition of opposition figures like as interim president in January 2019 and coordinated —remained non-coercive and multilateral, aligning with causal precedents of regional bodies addressing legitimacy crises without breaching sovereignty.

Historical Actions and Responses

Pre-2019 Engagements

The Lima Group convened its third ministerial meeting on , , where members demanded the immediate release of all political prisoners in , an end to arbitrary disqualifications of opposition leaders, and the restoration of democratic institutions including . The statement also called for the government to cease repression against protesters and , and urged international support for a negotiated political transition aligned with the Inter-American Democratic Charter. In its fourth meeting on January 23, 2018, in Santiago, Chile, the group reaffirmed the illegitimacy of Venezuela's National Constituent Assembly, condemning its actions to usurp powers from the democratically elected and . Members expressed alarm over escalating repression, including over 200 political prisoners and widespread violations documented by international observers, and committed to coordinating diplomatic efforts to isolate the Maduro administration economically and politically without direct sanctions at that stage. Throughout , the Lima Group issued further declarations responding to key events, including a May 21 statement rejecting Venezuela's as lacking democratic legitimacy due to opposition disqualifications, lack of electoral guarantees, and failure to meet international standards for free and fair voting. At a September gathering, members explicitly ruled out military intervention, emphasizing peaceful diplomatic pressure and support for OAS resolutions to address the , which by mid- had displaced over 2.3 million Venezuelans according to estimates cited in group communications. These engagements focused on unified messaging to international forums, urging Maduro to convene genuine negotiations with opposition representatives under neutral mediation.

Support for 2019 Presidential Transition

On January 23, 2019, President invoked Article 233 of the Venezuelan Constitution to assume the role of interim president, citing the vacancy created by Nicolás Maduro's refusal to relinquish power following the disputed May 2018 elections, which the Lima Group had previously deemed fraudulent and lacking legitimacy. Eleven member states of the Lima Group—, , , , , , , , , , and —issued statements recognizing Guaidó's claim within hours, emphasizing the 's constitutional authority to lead a transitional government toward free elections. abstained from this initial recognition, prioritizing non-intervention, while aligned with the majority. The Lima Group collectively reinforced this stance in subsequent declarations, framing the transition as a Venezuelan-led process to restore democratic order without external military intervention. On February 4, 2019, the group issued a communiqué reiterating recognition of Guaidó as interim president, urging the Venezuelan forces to uphold constitutional duties by supporting the transition, and rejecting Maduro's as derived from an illegitimate . This built on their January 4, 2019, rejection of Maduro's impending term, which had called for a negotiated exit and access, signaling the group's causal view that Maduro's tenure perpetuated institutional breakdown and economic collapse. Further statements in 2019 amplified diplomatic pressure, including a declaration advancing recognition of Guaidó's diplomatic representatives in international bodies and condemning Maduro's power consolidation tactics, such as blocking aid convoys. By April 30, amid Guaidó's attempted "Operation Freedom" to prompt military , the group reaffirmed support for his leadership and the , rejecting fraudulent elections and endorsing sanctions coordination to isolate Maduro's regime economically. These actions aligned with the group's core objective of enforcing democratic norms, though effectiveness was limited by non-unanimous membership and Maduro's retention of military loyalty, as evidenced by minimal defections despite appeals.

Post-2019 Statements and Initiatives

In February 2020, members of the Lima Group convened a ministerial meeting in , , where they reaffirmed their commitment to restoring democracy in through a peaceful political transition led by interim president and the . The declaration emphasized unity among participants, including , , , and , while condemning the Maduro regime's suppression of democratic institutions and calling for of its representatives. On August 14, 2020, several Lima Group members, alongside participants from the International Contact Group and the , issued a joint declaration endorsing democratic change in , rejecting the legitimacy of the December 2020 parliamentary elections organized by the Maduro government, and urging coordinated diplomatic efforts to facilitate free and fair elections. This initiative highlighted convergence among anti-Maduro coalitions, prioritizing delivery and accountability for regime abuses without endorsing military options. A December 7, 2020, joint declaration by Lima Group adherents and other nations addressed Venezuela's multidimensional , reiterating non-recognition of Maduro's and support for Guaidó's transitional while advocating for multilateral mechanisms to enforce sanctions and promote negotiations. In January 2021, the group explicitly rejected the Maduro-controlled installed on January 5, deeming it illegitimate and calling on international actors to withhold recognition and bolster the democratic opposition. These statements marked a shift toward procedural condemnations amid member attrition, with core participants like and sustaining pressure through forums such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Subsequent initiatives waned as governmental changes in key members—such as Peru's June 2021 administration reviewing participation—reduced coordinated actions, though residual statements from 2021 onward focused on upholding prior principles without novel mechanisms.

Membership Dynamics

Founding and Core Members


The Lima Group was founded on August 8, 2017, when foreign ministers from twelve countries convened in Lima, Peru, to sign the Lima Declaration addressing the political crisis in Venezuela. The declaration explicitly condemned the rupture of democratic order in the country, rejected the legitimacy of the National Constituent Assembly convened by President Nicolás Maduro, and called for the restoration of democratic institutions through free elections.
The core founding members comprised Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru. These nations formed an ad hoc multilateral mechanism without a formal charter or permanent secretariat, relying instead on periodic declarations and meetings to coordinate responses to the Venezuelan situation. Peru, as host of the inaugural meeting, played a leading role in initiating the group amid growing regional concerns over authoritarianism and human rights violations in Venezuela.
This initial coalition represented a majority of Latin American governments opposed to Maduro's policies, excluding allies such as Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela itself, and marked Canada's first significant involvement in a Latin American-led initiative on the crisis. Subsequent expansions added observers like Guyana and Saint Lucia, but the original twelve remained the group's foundational base until membership attrition in later years.

Observers, Supporters, and Expansions

The Lima Group experienced limited expansions following its establishment, with three additional countries joining the original 12 founding members to affirm commitment to the Lima Declaration's emphasis on restoring democracy in . Guyana and acceded in September 2017, shortly after the group's inaugural meeting, bringing the total to 14 members by early 2018. followed in January 2018, motivated by its opposition to Venezuelan influence via programs like , which had been suspended. These additions reflected regional alignment against the Maduro regime but did not significantly alter the group's core Latin American and Canadian composition, as no further full memberships were pursued amid growing domestic political shifts in member states. Formal was not a structured feature of the Lima Group, which operated as an diplomatic forum rather than a treaty-based organization. However, the attended select meetings in an observer capacity, notably the February 2019 Ottawa session, where it endorsed a joint statement alongside core members calling for a in through free elections. This participation underscored U.S. coordination with the group without seeking membership, aligning with broader American efforts to isolate the Maduro government via sanctions and diplomatic pressure. External supporters bolstered the Lima Group's initiatives, with the providing consistent rhetorical and policy alignment, including synchronized sanctions against Venezuelan officials and recognition of opposition leader in 2019. The and its member states similarly expressed support, issuing parallel statements rejecting Maduro's legitimacy and advocating for electoral processes, though EU actions emphasized multilateral channels like the International Contact Group over direct Lima Group integration. These endorsements amplified the group's pressure on but highlighted its reliance on extraregional powers, as regional cohesion waned due to leadership changes in countries like and .

Departures, Attrition, and Effective Dissolution

The Lima Group experienced significant attrition beginning in 2019, as several founding members distanced themselves or formally withdrew amid shifting domestic politics and a perceived lack of progress in addressing the Venezuelan crisis. Mexico, a founding member, ceased active participation after President Andrés Manuel López Obrador assumed office in December 2018, abstaining from key declarations such as the January 2019 statement denying entry to Venezuelan officials loyal to Nicolás Maduro and prioritizing bilateral dialogue over multilateral isolation efforts. This early divergence reflected Mexico's foreign policy emphasis on non-intervention and sovereignty, contrasting with the group's confrontational stance. Formal withdrawals accelerated in 2020–2021, coinciding with electoral turnovers toward administrations more amenable to engaging Maduro's government. Bolivia, which had joined under the interim government of Jeanine Áñez in 2019, withdrew in December 2020 following the return of the Movement for Socialism under Luis Arce, signaling a pivot back to ideological alignment with Venezuela. Argentina formally exited on March 24, 2021, under President Alberto Fernández, with Foreign Minister Felipe Solá stating that the group's policies of non-recognition and sanctions had "led to nothing" and failed to foster democratic transition. Peru, the group's namesake host, announced its departure on August 10, 2021, under President Pedro Castillo, advocating for renewed dialogue and criticizing the mechanism's ineffectiveness amid domestic migration pressures and the COVID-19 pandemic. Saint Lucia followed suit the same day, citing similar regional realignments. These exits, driven by left-leaning governments' preference for negotiation over sustained pressure—often viewing the group's approach as overly influenced by U.S. priorities—eroded the Lima Group's cohesion and operational capacity. The bloc issued its final joint communiqué in early 2021, rejecting Maduro's legitimacy but without subsequent coordinated actions or meetings. By mid-2021, with the loss of Peru as convener and core Latin American participants, the group effectively dissolved, supplanted by forums like the Mexico-based dialogue process initiated in 2021 and broader CELAC engagements that included Maduro representatives. Remaining members, such as and , shifted focus to individual or OAS-led initiatives, underscoring the Lima Group's dependence on transient anti-Maduro consensus among right-of-center regional leaders. No formal dissolution declaration occurred, but inactivity persisted through subsequent Venezuelan electoral cycles, including the presidential vote where erstwhile aligned states adopted more varied responses.

Impact and Assessments

Achievements in Raising Awareness and Pressure

The Lima Group, formed on August 8, 2017, through the Lima Declaration, issued joint statements that highlighted the erosion of democratic institutions in , including the non-recognition of the 2017 National Constituent Assembly and calls for the restoration of . These early declarations amplified awareness of and , drawing regional attention to the affecting millions, with over 4 million Venezuelans fleeing by . In January 2019, the group refused to recognize Nicolás Maduro's second term, citing the illegitimacy of the May 2018 marred by opposition boycotts and irregularities, thereby pressuring for democratic elections. On January 23, 2019, members recognized President as interim president under Venezuela's constitutional provisions, a stance reiterated on February 4, 2019, urging the Venezuelan military to support him and facilitating his recognition by over 50 countries, including the and much of the . This coordinated diplomatic move isolated Maduro internationally and spotlighted the regime's refusal to relinquish power despite constitutional mandates. The group advocated for targeted sanctions against Maduro regime officials, with members implementing measures such as suspending military cooperation and restricting credit lines to by early 2019, contributing to economic pressure amid exceeding 1 million percent in 2018. Declarations in April and July 2019 urged action and global calls for new elections, while emphasizing access, which raised visibility of the crisis's severity, including widespread and disease outbreaks. These efforts, aligned with resolutions, fostered a unified regional front that documented abuses, such as arbitrary detentions of over 1,000 opposition figures, prompting increased scrutiny from bodies like .

Criticisms and Perceived Failures

The Lima Group encountered substantial criticism for its inability to catalyze a in , despite its formation in August 2017 with goals of improving , alleviating humanitarian conditions, and restoring democratic order. By 2022, five years after inception, the group had failed to dislodge from power, even after recognizing as interim president in January 2019; Maduro's regime endured amid waning international support for the opposition. This outcome was attributed to insufficient sustained regional unity, as political shifts across —occurring in every country except since 2017—eroded consensus, with several members eventually abstaining from or reversing recognition of Guaidó. Member departures underscored perceptions of ineffectiveness, exemplified by Argentina's withdrawal on March 24, 2021, where the foreign ministry declared the group's efforts "led to nothing" and had not facilitated resolution of , particularly criticizing the acceptance of Guaidó and the use of sanctions that intensified Venezuelan suffering during the . Analogous disillusionment prompted other nations to abandon the initiative, contributing to its effective dissolution by mid-2021, as the absence of tangible progress diminished its diplomatic leverage. The Maduro government, which has faced international condemnation for electoral irregularities and suppression of opposition, routinely denounced the Lima Group as orchestrating unlawful interventionism and a covert regime-change agenda in violation of Venezuelan , framing its statements and recognitions as illegitimate foreign meddling. Supporters of this view, often aligned with Maduro's United Socialist Party, argued the group's actions bypassed multilateral bodies like the or , prioritizing unilateral pressures over inclusive dialogue. Further critiques highlighted internal divisions that hampered cohesion, such as Canada's advocacy for firmer stances potentially implying intervention—contrasting with the majority's explicit rejection of options in statements like the September 2018 declaration—leading to unsigned communiqués and diluted resolve. Detractors, including pragmatic voices within member states, contended the strategy overemphasized isolation via diplomatic non-recognition and , which inflicted disproportionate harm on civilians without compelling Maduro's -backed apparatus to defect or negotiate substantively.

Controversies Surrounding Legitimacy and Interventions

The Lima Group's legitimacy has been contested by the Venezuelan government under and its allies, who characterized it as an ad hoc coalition lacking formal international status or broader multilateral endorsement, such as from the or the (OAS). Critics, including Venezuelan officials, argued that the group's formation in August 2017 by 14 nations—primarily right-leaning governments in plus —served solely to orchestrate opposition to Maduro rather than address regional democratic norms impartially. This view was echoed in statements from pro-Maduro outlets, which dismissed the Lima Group as a "pretense to be an international body" without legal basis for issuing declarations on Venezuela's internal affairs. Accusations of improper intervention intensified following the group's repeated calls for Maduro to relinquish power and its endorsement of opposition leader as interim president on January 23, 2019, after he invoked constitutional provisions amid disputed elections. Maduro's administration and supporters, including and , portrayed these actions as violations of the principle of non-intervention enshrined in the UN Charter and the Rio Treaty, labeling the Lima Group a vehicle for external aligned with U.S. interests. For instance, in April 2018, the group rejected Venezuela's presidential elections as illegitimate, prompting claims of overreach into sovereign electoral processes. Such criticisms often originated from outlets sympathetic to the Bolivarian , which faced independent documentation of electoral irregularities and humanitarian crises driving over 7 million Venezuelan migrants by 2023. Despite the Lima Group's explicit rejection of military options in statements like its September 2018 declaration, detractors accused it of tacitly encouraging destabilization through diplomatic isolation and economic pressure, including support for sanctions against Maduro officials. In , domestic opposition figures, such as NDP MP Matthew Green in 2020, criticized participation as alignment with "pseudo-imperialist" efforts, urging withdrawal amid perceptions of undue influence from Washington. These interventions were further questioned for bypassing established forums like the OAS, where consensus on proved elusive due to divisions among member states. Proponents of the criticisms, including Venezuelan , contended that the group's composition—dominated by governments ideologically opposed to —undermined its claims to regional consensus, especially as membership eroded post- with shifts like Mexico's non-participation and Argentina's withdrawal under Peronist in 2020. However, empirical assessments of Venezuela's governance, including reports from the UN Council on arbitrary detentions and extrajudicial killings, provided context for the group's focus on democratic restoration, though this did not mitigate charges of selective legitimacy application.

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