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Operation Irini
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Operation Irini
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The European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operation Irini (abbr. EUNAVFOR MED IRINI) was launched on 31 March 2020 with the primary mission to enforce the United Nations arms embargo on Libya due to the Second Libyan Civil War. Operation Irini is a European Union military operation under the umbrella of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The operation is expected to use aerial, maritime and satellite assets.[2] The name Irini derives from the Greek word for peace.[3]

Key Information

In September 2020, the Irini operation stated that within six months, the operation sent 14 special reports to UN Panel of Experts concerning from both sides of the conflict in Libya, performed 12 visits on collaborative merchant vessels and monitored 10 ports and landing points, 25 airports and landing strips. In addition, it made 250 requests for satellite images to the EU Satellite Centre.[4]

Headquarters of the operation are in Rome, Italy. Italy and Greece alternate the force commander every six months (together with the rotation of the flagship).[5]

Mission

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The primary mission of the operation is to ensure the implementation of the UN arms embargo. Other missions include the training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Libyan Navy, the disruption of human trafficking and halt the illicit exports of Libyan oil.[6]

In March 2025, the Council expanded the operation’s mandate to include the monitoring, surveillance and information gathering of additional illicit activities beyond arms and oil trafficking. It was also tasked with collecting information relevant to the protection of critical maritime infrastructure and contributing to contingency planning.[7]

Duration

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The former Operation Sophia permanently ceased its activity at the same time of the launch of Irini. Operation Irini has been extended multiple times over the years[2][8] with the latest extension prolonging the mandate until 31 March 2027.[7]

Assets

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Premier-Maître L'Her in 2008
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 France: D'Estienne d'Orves-class aviso Premier-Maître L'Her[9]
 Greece: Elli-class frigate Aigaion[9] - flagship[10]
 Italy: Comandanti-class patrol vessel Comandante Borsini[9]

Air assets (active)

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 France: Atlantique 2[11]
 France: Falcon 50 from July 2020[5][12]
 Germany: P-3C Orion from May 2020[13][14]
 Greece: EMB-145H from July 2020[5][15]
 Italy: Predator B from July 2020[5][16]
 Luxembourg: Swearingen Merlin from 4 May 2020[5][17]
 Poland: An-28B1R Bryza from May 2020[18]

Previously deployed assets

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 France: Cassard-class frigate Jean Bart from 4 May 2020, left 1 June 2020[5][19]
 France: Georges Leygues-class frigate Latouche-Tréville from 7 October 2020[20]
 Germany: Sachsen-class frigate Hamburg from 18 August 2020[21][22] to 14 December 2020.[23]
 Germany: Type 212 submarine U-35 from 12 June 2021[24] to 14 December 2021.[25]
 Greece: Hydra-class frigate Spetsai from 4 June 2020, left 17 August 2020[26]
 Greece: Elli-class frigate Adrias[27]
 Greece: Elli-class frigate Limnos from 17 September 2020[28]
 Italy: San Giorgio-class amphibious transport dock San Giorgio - from 17 July 2020 to 7 September 2020[29]
 Italy: Bergamini-class frigate Carlo Margottini - from 7 September 2020[30]
 Italy: Comandanti-class patrol vessel Comandante Cigala Fulgosi[27]
 Portugal: Tridente-class submarine NRP Tridente - from 24 June 2021 to 20 August 2021[31][32]

Planned but never deployed

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 Greece: Hydra-class frigate Hydra expected May 2020, but not deployed[33]

Criticism

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Government of National Accord

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In April 2020, the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya objected to the operation on the ground that it would affect the supply of arms from Turkey.[34]

Malta

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In May 2020, Malta pulled out of Operation Irini and threatened to veto EU funds for the operation, in a move that could have impacted on the Turkish–Libyan agreement.[35][36] Malta complained to the European Commission that it does not give enough support to Malta on the issue of migration,[37] the EU responded that "The Irini operation was conceived to stop the fighting in Libya and political stabilisation is a precondition to stop the migrant wave. So to stop the migration push, we need to politically stabilise Libya, and this depends on [Irini],"[38] while Turkey has said that it will provide concrete and effective assistance to Malta.[39] In addition, Malta, Turkey and the GNA have issued a joint statement expressing reservations about the IRINI.[39]

Russia

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In early June 2020, Russia was the only Security Council member which raised concerns about renewing authorization for the operation, which was due to expire on 10 June.[40]

Turkey

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In June and July 2020, Turkey criticized the operation as being "not objective"[41] and claimed that the operation is supporting Khalifa Haftar.[42] In June of the same year, European diplomats and officials stated that Turkey was blocking EU attempts to secure NATO's help for the operation.[43] In addition, in August 2020, Turkey criticized Germany for its participation in the operation, after Germany decided to send a frigate in August.[41] In November 2020, the Turkey’s National Security Council said that Turkey will take necessary steps in every field against the Operation Irini, after a German frigate, participating in the operation, tried to search a Turkish-flagged freighter near Libya.[44] In addition, the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor's Office launched an investigation ex officio for the incident.[45] Furthermore, Turkey has denied the inspection of suspect Turkish vessels on many occasions (see the "Incidents" section below).

Incidents

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In May 2020, a French warship participating in the operation intercepted the Gabon-flagged oil tanker Jal Laxmi off the coast of Tobruk and stopped it from docking at the city. The vessel had not received authorization from the Tripoli-based Libyan National Oil Corporation. Following the event, Russia raised concerns regarding the operation's authorization.[46]

On 10 June 2020, the Greek frigate Spetsai under the command of the Irini operation attempted to inspect the Tanzanian-flagged cargo vessel Çirkin which was suspected of carrying arms to Libya, but was ordered to retreat after warnings from Turkish frigates accompanying the cargo vessel. According to sources, the Turkish commander's message was that "the Turkish ship is under the protection of the Turkish Republic."[47][48][49][50] EU confirmed that Turkey blocked the check on the ship.[51]

Later, on 17 June 2020, France also accused Turkish ships of harassing a French warship from the NATO Operation Sea Guardian as they tried to inspect Çirkin and that the Turkish Navy was using their NATO call signs while accompanying Turkish vessels suspected of breaking the UN arms embargo on Libya.[52] According to French officials, when the French ship tried to inspect the vessel, the Turkish vessel switched off its tracking system, masked its ID number and refused to say where she was going, while the Turkish frigates flashed their radar lights three times against the French warship, suggesting a missile strike was imminent.[53] On the other hand, Turkish officials, denied that the warship was harassed and claimed that the French warship did not establish communications with the Turkish vessel during the incident and provided fuel for the Turkish vessel.[54][55][56] At a request of France,[57] NATO stated on 18 June that it would investigate the incident.[58][59] NATO carried out three-week investigation into the incident, producing a 130-page report published on 1 July. The report did not include a "statement supporting the French claims that Turkish warships harassed the French warship by locking its radar on it".[60] The report of NATO's investigation was never released publicly.[57] Diplomats told Reuters that the investigation was too sensitive to discuss in public and does not apportion blame, adding that NATO wanted to keep Turkey onside and for this there was no willingness to point a finger.[61] On 21 September 2020, the EU sanctioned the Turkish maritime company Avrasya Shipping which operated the freighter Çirkin, because the vessel was found to have violated the arms embargo in Libya in May and June 2020.[62]

On 22 November 2020, the German frigate Hamburg, which participated in the operation, intercepted the Turkish 16,000-tonne freighter, Rosalina-A (or Rosaline-A), about 200 km (120 mi) north of the Libyan city of Benghazi. Soldiers from the frigate boarded the Turkish freighter in order to search it but had to abandon checks and withdraw after Turkey protested. According to the German spokesman, Hamburg had followed standard procedure by waiting four hours for approval from the flag country, and then boarding. Later, once the objection arrived, they withdrew. The German defense ministry spokesman said that "By the time the soldiers left the ship, they had not found anything suspicious." Turkey said that the search team had violated international law by not waiting for permission from Turkey, adding that the ship was carrying various materials such as food and paint.[63] Furthermore, Turkey summoned the envoys of the European Union, Germany and Italy to Ankara in order to protest against the operation.[64] Turkey condemned the incident, saying that Operation Irini is a biased mission that targets Turkey and the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya.

European Union in an official statement said that the Operation Irini gave five hours notice to Turkey (four hours in line with the international maritime practice plus a one hour extension at the request of the Turkish Embassy in Rome, where Operation Irini's headquarters are located). After the time elapsed and no answer has received from Turkey, the soldiers boarded the ship and started the inspection in accordance with internationally agreed procedures including NATO procedures. Later, when Turkey formally and with delay notified of its refusal to grant the permission for inspection, the search operation terminated and the soldiers left the ship. Until then, nothing suspicious has found on the ship. In addition, the statement reminded that the Irini operation is in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions 2292 (2016) and 2526 (2020) and that the UN Security Council resolution 2292 (2016) calls upon all flag states to cooperate with inspections. These resolutions are binding for all UN member states, including Turkey.[65] A secret EU report cited by the Deutsche Presse-Agentur, indicated that the Turkish vessel had long been watched on suspicion of making illegal arms shipments. In addition, Der Spiegel reported that Operation Irini's military analysts, in a report for United Nations, had previously spotted arms being unloaded in the Libyan port of Misrata in satellite images. Furthermore, EU report's authors said that suspicious cargo was again sighted in November while the ship was docked in the Turkish port of Ambarli.[66] Turkish prosecutors launched an investigation into the incident on 27 November 2020, which was not expected to lead to arrests or the extradition of officials involved in the search.[67]

In July 2021, Irini's forces intercepted a Zambian-flagged vessel called MV Gauja for being suspected of transporting illegal arms from Morocco to Libya. The Zambian government said that it does not own the vessel and that it is Russian operated.[68] In September 2021, an Irini report revealed that Turkey refused the inspection of Turkish ships heading to Libya six times.[69]

In May 2022, Turkey refused to accept the inspection of the Turkish-flagged vessel MV Kosovak which headed to the port of Misrata in Libya.[70][71]

In July 2022, Irini inspected the Equatorial Guinea-flagged vessel MV Victory Roro and found that it breached the UN arms embargo. The vessel was suspected, since it had been identified by UN Panel of Experts of transferring military equipment in Libya before under the name MV Luccello and the flag of the Comoros.[72] In addition, Irini commanders asked the permission from Turkey to inspect another ship called MV Parpali, but Turkey rejected it. Irini commanders wrote on a statement that all UN members are called by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to cooperate with inspections.[73]

In October 2022, the Irini commanders asked for the inspection of the Turkish-flagged vessel MV Matilde A, which was heading to Libya, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2292 on the arms embargo on Libya, but Turkey refused again.[74][75] Same month, Irini found and seized military vehicles in the merchant vessel MV MEERDIJK[76] coming from the United Arab Emirates and heading to Libya.[77] In the October 2022 report on Operation Irini, it was mentioned that Turkey has denied the inspection of suspect Turkish vessels on nine occasions since the launch of the operation.[78]

In March 2023, Turkey denied inspection to Turkish-flagged MV Kosovak as requested by Irini commanders. The UN Security Council called upon all UN members to cooperate with inspections.[79] Again, in October 2023 Turkey denied inspection to the MV Kosovak.[80]

In November 2023, Turkey declined a request from IRINI to board and inspect the MV MATILDE A, a vessel suspected of breaching the UN arms embargo.[81]

In September 2024, Turkey once again denied Operation IRINI permission to inspect the MV MATILDE A. It was the twelfth time that Turkey denied the inspection of suspect Turkish vessels.[82][83]

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Operation Irini

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Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI, known as Operation Irini, is a military operation launched on 31 March 2020 to enforce the on amid the ongoing . Its core mandate involves using aerial, satellite, and maritime assets to monitor and inspect vessels suspected of violating the embargo by transporting arms or related materiel to or from . Headquartered in , , the operation draws contributions from multiple EU member states and operates under a non-executive framework that permits boardings only with or consent. The mandate, initially set for one year, has been repeatedly extended, most recently until 31 March 2027, reflecting sustained commitment to supporting UN efforts for stability in . Secondary tasks include monitoring illicit exports of Libyan , disrupting human networks, providing training to Libyan coastguard and , and enhancing regional maritime awareness. Since achieving full operational capability in September 2020, Irini has conducted over 30 boardings of suspect vessels, resulting in three cargo seizures determined to breach the embargo, alongside thousands of vessel hailings and intelligence contributions to UN panels of experts. Despite these activities, Operation Irini has faced for its limited effectiveness in curbing arms flows, which predominantly occur via overland and aerial routes beyond its maritime focus, and for failing to uncover major supply channels despite extensive monitoring. Reports indicate persistent violations, including state-sponsored shipments, underscoring challenges in due to political divisions within the and reluctance to confront key actors, thus highlighting the operation's constraints in achieving comprehensive embargo compliance.

Background and Establishment

Context of the Libyan Civil War

The Libyan Civil War began as part of the Arab Spring with protests erupting on February 15, 2011, in against the regime of , rapidly escalating into armed conflict as government forces cracked down on demonstrators. In response, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1970 on February 26, 2011, imposing a comprehensive on to prevent the supply of arms and related materiel, alongside travel bans, asset freezes, and a referral of the situation to the . Resolution 1973 followed on March 17, 2011, authorizing member states to enforce a and take measures to protect civilians, which enabled a NATO-led intervention involving airstrikes by , the , and the starting March 19, 2011. Gaddafi was captured and killed on October 20, 2011, ending his 42-year rule, but the power vacuum led to the proliferation of militias and rival factions vying for control amid widespread instability. Following the 2011 revolution, Libya experienced fragmented governance, with the General National Congress (GNC) elected in July 2012 but unable to consolidate authority as armed groups, including Islamists and tribal militias, expanded influence over territories and oil facilities. The conflict intensified in May 2014 when General launched Operation Dignity from against Islamist militants, prompting the formation of the opposing Libya Dawn coalition and splitting the country between the internationally recognized (HoR) based in , aligned with Haftar's (LNA), and the Tripoli-based GNC. This second phase of the civil war, lasting until 2020, featured battles over key cities like —briefly held by the in 2016 before its defeat—and control of oil resources, exacerbating economic collapse and humanitarian crises with over 1 million people displaced by 2020. In December 2015, the UN-brokered Libyan Political Agreement established the (GNA) in Tripoli as the internationally recognized executive, though the HoR rejected it, deepening the divide. Haftar's LNA mounted a major offensive toward Tripoli on April 3, 2019, prompting the GNA to seek external aid, which transformed the war into a proxy conflict with widespread violations of the 2011 UN . The GNA received drones, military advisors, and Syrian mercenaries from starting in 2019, enabling a counteroffensive that recaptured territory by mid-2020, while Haftar's forces benefited from UAE-supplied arms and airstrikes, Russian contractors (estimated at 1,000-2,000 fighters by 2020), Egyptian logistical support, and limited French intelligence. These interventions, often routed through sea lanes, undermined the embargo's effectiveness, fueling escalation until a fragile in October 2020.

Preceding EU Operations

EUNAVFOR MED was launched on 22 June 2015 as the European Union's primary military response to the escalating in the Central Mediterranean, with a core mandate to disrupt human smuggling and trafficking networks through intelligence gathering, boarding operations, and asset disposal in phases. The operation initially focused on the southern Central Mediterranean, employing aerial and naval assets from multiple member states to monitor and interdict vessels used by smugglers, while adhering to international maritime law for obligations. By October 2016, following UN Security Council Resolution 2292, Sophia's mandate expanded to include implementation of the UN arms embargo on , alongside training for the and to enhance their capacity for . Operation Sophia underwent several mandate extensions amid political debates within the EU, particularly over migrant disembarkation procedures and resource allocation, with the mandate prolonged until 31 March 2020 despite suspensions of naval deployments from September 2019 due to unresolved disputes on migrant handling. During its tenure, the operation conducted over 200 boardings, rescued more than 50,000 migrants, and trained over 1,000 Libyan personnel, though its effectiveness in enforcing the arms embargo was limited by asset constraints and the prioritization of migration tasks. The operation's evolution reflected shifting EU priorities from broad migration management to targeted embargo enforcement amid the Libyan civil war, setting the stage for its successor. Prior to Sophia, EU efforts in the Mediterranean included non-military operations like Frontex's , initiated in November 2014, which emphasized surveillance and search-and-rescue coordination but lacked the military interdiction capabilities later provided by Sophia. These preceding initiatives highlighted the EU's incremental approach to maritime security challenges, influenced by models such as the earlier EUNAVFOR Atalanta anti-piracy operation off since 2008, but Sophia marked the first dedicated military deployment in the Libyan vicinity.

Launch and Initial Mandate


Operation IRINI, officially designated as EUNAVFOR MED IRINI, was established by Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/472 on 31 March 2020 and launched on the same date. The operation replaced the preceding EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, which permanently ceased activities concurrently to refocus EU efforts amid political disagreements over Sophia's migrant rescue mandate. The initial mandate centered on implementing 1970 (2011) and subsequent resolutions enforcing the on , utilizing aerial, satellite, and maritime assets for surveillance and inspections. This included the authority to board and inspect vessels suspected of violating the embargo, with provisions for diverting or detaining non-compliant ships, while excluding search-and-rescue tasks to prioritize embargo enforcement. The operation's name, derived from the Greek word for "peace," underscored its alignment with broader EU support for the UN-facilitated political dialogue in , including contributions to the process. The mandate was set to run until 31 March 2021, subject to review by EU member states, reflecting a scaled-back scope compared to Sophia's multifaceted training and deterrence roles due to internal EU divisions over naval presence extensions. Initial assets included contributions from member states such as Italy, France, and Greece, operating under the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy framework headquartered in Rome.

Mandate and Objectives

The core task of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Irini is to enforce the against through the use of aerial, satellite, and maritime assets, including the inspection of vessels suspected of transporting prohibited military equipment. This encompasses real-time monitoring of maritime traffic, intelligence gathering on potential violations, and coordination with the UN Panel of Experts on to report embargo breaches. Operations focus on the central , targeting suspicious vessels flagged under various nationalities or operating without clear origin, with authority to conduct flag-state consent requests or, under UN authorization, divert and board ships for verification. The legal foundation derives from Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/472 of 17 April 2020, which established the operation under the European Union's (CSDP). This EU decision explicitly invokes the UN arms embargo regime outlined in Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011) and subsequent resolutions, including 2146 (2014), which authorize member states to inspect cargoes to and from for compliance. The UN Security Council has periodically renewed the legal framework for such inspections, with Resolution 2636 (2022) extended through June 2023, confirming Irini's mandate for offshore boardings of embargo-suspect vessels by a vote of 14-0 with one abstention (). Non-compliance with inspection requests may lead to vessel diversion to designated ports for further scrutiny, subject to international maritime law principles under the UN Convention on the .

Scope and Limitations

Operation Irini operates within the geographical scope of the , focusing on the maritime area off the Libyan coast extending to the high seas, where it monitors and enforces the arms embargo established under Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011) and subsequent resolutions. The operation's core mandate limits its activities to countering illicit to and from , including the inspection of vessels suspected of carrying prohibited materiel, while also supporting ancillary tasks such as gathering information on oil fuel and providing training to the and under specific UN authorizations. Key limitations stem from the operation's reliance on international legal frameworks, which restrict vessel inspections to the high seas and require either the flag state's consent or reasonable grounds under UN Security Council Resolutions 2292 (2016) and 2214 (2015) for boarding without such consent; forcible inspections are prohibited absent explicit UN approval, rendering enforcement dependent on cooperative states and often ineffective against non-compliant actors like those flagged by . This has resulted in only selective interceptions, with over 2,271 hailings and 38 friendly approaches conducted by April 2025, but merely two embargo-related inspections in that period, highlighting operational constraints. Resource limitations further constrain effectiveness, as Irini deploys a modest force of aerial, naval, and satellite assets contributed voluntarily by member states, often insufficient for persistent surface presence and leading to reliance on air patrols that cannot conduct physical boardings. Unlike its predecessor , Irini excludes mandatory search-and-rescue obligations or migration-related interdictions, focusing narrowly on embargo enforcement to avoid political divisions among states, though incidental humanitarian assistance may occur if encountered during patrols. Political and diplomatic hurdles, including refusals from third countries to permit inspections, exacerbate these gaps, with critics noting the operation's mandate lacks the robustness to comprehensively stem arms flows amid Libya's ongoing civil conflict.

Evolution of Tasks

Operation Irini was launched on 31 March 2020 with its core task defined as implementing the United Nations arms embargo on Libya, authorizing the European Union Naval Force to conduct inspections of vessels suspected of violating the embargo, monitor flights into Libya, and seize prohibited cargoes where legally permissible. Supporting tasks from inception included collecting information to counter illicit exports of refined petroleum products, as well as gathering intelligence on human smuggling and trafficking networks through aerial and surface patrols to disrupt their operational models without direct migrant interdiction. These elements marked a shift from the predecessor Operation Sophia, emphasizing embargo enforcement over broader maritime security or training components, in response to criticisms of mission creep and political divisions within the EU. Mandate renewals have incrementally broadened the scope while preserving the as the primary focus, aligned with periodic UN Security Council resolutions renewing inspection authorizations. For example, extensions in 2021 and 2023 reinforced monitoring of oil smuggling and intelligence, enabling over 20,000 vessel boardings by October 2025 to verify compliance and report violations. The most recent extension on 11 March 2025, prolonging operations until 31 March 2027, introduced explicit expansions to of additional illicit activities—such as broader maritime threats—and a dedicated Maritime Situational Awareness task to enhance information sharing on southern Mediterranean security dynamics. This progression reflects efforts to adapt to persistent Libyan , including fluctuating embargo evasion tactics and regional patterns, without altering the operation's non-executive, intelligence-driven nature. All modifications require consensus among contributing member states, limiting rapid shifts and prioritizing verifiable UN-backed enforcement over unilateral expansions.

Operational Structure

Duration and Mandate Extensions

Operation Irini, formally known as EUNAVFOR MED IRINI, commenced on 31 March 2020 with an initial mandate lasting until 31 March 2021, as established by Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/412. This one-year period focused on implementing the arms embargo on through maritime surveillance and interdiction capabilities. In March 2021, the extended the mandate by two years to 31 March 2023, reflecting assessments of ongoing embargo violations and the need for continued enforcement amid the Libyan conflict. This extension maintained the operation's core tasks without introducing components, prioritizing arms monitoring over migrant-related activities. Further prolongation occurred on 20 March 2023, when the extended the mandate until 31 March 2025 via Decision (CFSP) 2023/653, following a strategic review that affirmed the operation's role in countering illicit arms flows despite challenges in full . The decision allocated resources for sustained aerial, surface, and procedural monitoring, with a mid-term review planned to evaluate effectiveness. Most recently, on 11 2025, the prolonged the mandate for an additional two years to 31 2027 under Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/XXX, setting a of €16.35 million for common costs from 1 2025 onward. This extension underscores persistent concerns over Libya's instability and arms smuggling, while expanding competencies to include enhanced monitoring of oil smuggling and dual-use goods, though the primary focus remains embargo enforcement.

Command and Participating Entities

Operation Irini is commanded from its operational headquarters in , , under the overall political control of the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC). The EU Operation Commander holds responsibility for the planning and conduct of the mission, with the current incumbent, as of September 2025, being Marco Casapieri of the , who assumed the role following a ceremony. The Force Commander directs tactical operations at sea, with the position rotating among contributing states; a occurred on 3 October 2025 at Taranto Naval Base, transitioning from (Italian Navy) to a successor. Participation involves contributions from 24 Member States, which provide staffing, maritime assets, aerial platforms, and satellite support to enforce the mandate. serves as the framework nation, hosting the headquarters, offering port facilities, and contributing significant personnel and vessels. Key initial and ongoing contributors include (ships and aircraft), (maritime patrol), (often Force Commander personnel and frigates), (staff officers), (logistics), and (air assets), with broader involvement from other states ensuring rotational deployments. The operation draws on voluntary national contributions coordinated through mechanisms, without a standing EU naval force.

Assets Deployed

Operation EUNAVFOR MED Irini deploys a combination of maritime, aerial, and satellite assets contributed on a rotational basis by member states to monitor and enforce the UN on . Maritime assets primarily consist of frigates and offshore patrol vessels capable of conducting vessel inspections and maintaining presence in the central Mediterranean, while aerial assets focus on , including and unmanned aerial vehicles for over-the-horizon monitoring. supplements these efforts for wide-area detection of suspect vessels. Personnel numbers have stabilized around 600, drawn from operational headquarters in and forward-deployed units. Upon reaching full operational capability in September 2020, the operation fielded , 5 aircraft, and approximately 600 personnel from 21 EU member states. By October 2022, deployments included , 4 aircraft, and nearly 600 personnel, with additional supporting naval and air units. As of October 2023, typical assets comprised 2 naval units, 6 aircraft, and over 600 personnel, reflecting periodic rotations amid varying contributions from 23 participating EU states. Maritime Assets
Frigates form the core of surface deployments for and tasks. Examples include:
  • Greek Navy HS Spetsai, a Hydra-class ( 200HN) equipped for and helicopter operations, deployed in June 2020.
  • FS Jean Bart, a Cassard-class air-defense , and FS Aconit, a La Fayette-class stealth , both active in initial phases starting May 2020.
  • Italian Navy ITS Foscari, a Maestrale-class used for patrols.
  • LÉ William Butler Yeats, a Samuel Beckett-class offshore patrol vessel, deployed in 2023 for tasks.
    Smaller units, such as Greek HS Aegean (possibly a 200 variant), have also supported operations. Deployments typically range from 1 to 4 vessels at any time, prioritizing multi-role with teams.
Aerial Assets
Aircraft enable persistent across the operational area. Key examples include: Contributions rotate among nations including , , , , , , and , ensuring operational continuity without fixed national quotas. Assets are tasked under a unified command structure led by a force commander, typically a , aboard a .

Activities and Enforcement

Vessel Inspections and Interdictions

Operation Irini primarily enforces the UN arms embargo on through maritime monitoring, vessel hails, friendly approaches, and selective onboard inspections of suspect vessels. Under UN Security Council Resolution 2292 (2016) and subsequent resolutions, the operation may inspect vessels bound to or from if there are reasonable grounds to suspect embargo violations, subject to consent or, in cases where contact cannot be made, the master's agreement. Inspections involve boarding teams from participating member states' assets, such as frigates and , to verify manifests, , and physical contents for prohibited . As of October 2025, Operation Irini has conducted 20,383 vessel stops via hails and monitoring, 764 friendly approaches for closer visual or communicative checks, and 33 onboard inspections. In three instances, inspections confirmed embargo breaches, leading to cargo seizures and diversion of vessels to ports for judicial handling by authorities. These interdictions targeted vehicles modified for military use, including approximately 100 armoured vehicles in one case. Notable inspections include the 22 2020 boarding of the Turkish-flagged MV Roseline A, en route to , , where German forces under Irini conducted a search approximately 160 nautical miles north of after initial suspicions of undeclared military cargo; no violations were found, but protested the action as unauthorized, claiming it proceeded without explicit consent despite prior denial requests. In July 2022, the Equatorial Guinea-flagged MV Victory Roro was inspected off 's coast and diverted to , , after discovery of vehicles deemed to breach the embargo. A 2022 seized dozens of military-modified vehicles from another vessel, confirmed as illicit by subsequent UN Panel of Experts review. These actions highlight enforcement challenges, including flag state non-cooperation—such as 's repeated refusals—and the operation's reliance on consensual boardings, which limit proactive s amid high denial rates.

Monitoring of Embargo Violations

Operation Irini employs a combination of maritime, aerial, and intelligence-based surveillance to detect potential violations of the United Nations arms embargo on Libya, focusing on the central Mediterranean Sea region. Naval assets, including frigates and patrol vessels from contributing EU member states, conduct continuous monitoring of vessel traffic, utilizing radar, satellite imagery, and open-source intelligence to identify suspicious activities such as irregular routing or undeclared cargoes. Aircraft detachments provide overhead reconnaissance, enabling real-time tracking and confirmation of targets for potential interdiction. This multi-domain approach allows for the hailing of merchant vessels via radio to request compliance declarations, followed by friendly approaches or boardings where authorization is granted under UN Security Council resolutions. Upon detection of indicators suggesting embargo breaches—such as discrepancies in cargo manifests or vessels linked to known proliferators—Irini teams perform on-board inspections to verify contents against UN prohibitions on arms transfers to or from . Confirmed violations trigger seizure of illicit materials and diversion of the vessel to a designated member state port for judicial proceedings, with evidence shared immediately with the UN Panel of Experts on . For instance, on July 18, 2022, an inspection off 's coast uncovered cargo assessed as breaching the embargo, leading to its impoundment. Similarly, in November 2022, Irini seized a vessel transporting modified for military purposes, suspected of violating the embargo. By October 2025, the operation had executed 20,383 vessel stops, 764 friendly approaches, and 33 on-board inspections, with at least three diversions to ports due to verified breaches. Beyond maritime enforcement, Irini extends monitoring to aerial and overland routes by analyzing flight , observations, and ground , reporting potential violations—such as unauthorized arms flights or convoys—to the UN Panel and relevant authorities. This includes 14 special reports submitted by September 2020, with ongoing contributions documented in UN assessments as of April 2025, covering breaches in both directions across Libya's borders. The operation's information-sharing protocol enhances transparency, though detections remain constrained by the embargo's broad scope and the challenges of verifying non-maritime transfers. The Panel of Experts on , established under Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) and renewed periodically, serves as a primary complementary mechanism for monitoring compliance with the imposed by Resolution 1970 (2011). Comprising experts in arms, counter-terrorism, and sanctions implementation, the Panel investigates reported violations through on-site inspections, analysis of shipping data, and coordination with member states and operations like Irini. It has documented extensive circumvention tactics, including vessel misdeclarations and air deliveries, submitting detailed reports to the Security Council that inform enforcement actions. For instance, the Panel's findings have prompted Irini to conduct targeted boardings based on shared . Preceding Irini, (EUNAVFOR MED Sophia), launched in 2015, initially focused on disrupting migrant smuggling but expanded in 2016 to include enforcement via maritime interdictions off Libya's coast. Although Sophia's mandate emphasized training Libyan coastguards and ended in March 2020, its cumulative data on smuggling routes and vessel patterns contributed to Irini's operational framework, with overlapping asset contributions from states. The transition reflected a narrowed focus on embargo monitoring amid criticisms of Sophia's broader scope diluting enforcement efficacy. National and bilateral efforts by participating states, such as satellite surveillance by and or aerial patrols by , augment Irini's monitoring but operate under national mandates aligned with UN resolutions. These efforts have identified embargo breaches, like undeclared cargoes destined for Libyan factions, though coordination challenges persist due to varying intelligence-sharing protocols. The UN Security Council has repeatedly urged among such entities to address gaps, as evidenced by resolutions renewing inspection authorizations on the high seas.

Incidents and Confrontations

Key Operational Incidents

On 10 June 2020, a Greek frigate operating under Operation Irini attempted to hail and inspect the Tanzanian-flagged merchant vessel MV Cirkin on suspicion of violating the UN , but three Turkish frigates escorting the vessel intervened, preventing the boarding; the Cirkin subsequently entered Tripoli harbor without inspection. The incident highlighted enforcement challenges against escorted shipments, with supporting Libya's and viewing Irini as biased toward rival factions. On 22 November 2020, the German frigate , commanding Irini's , boarded the Turkish-flagged MV Roseline A in following a UN authorization; no prohibited cargo was found, but protested the action as unauthorized and forceful, summoning and German diplomats while launching a domestic probe into the German personnel involved. Irini reported the event to the UN Panel of Experts, emphasizing compliance with , though Turkish officials contested the legality of the high-seas boarding without prior flag-state consent in this context. In July 2022, Irini inspected the MV Victory Roro off Libya's coast, identifying vehicles transported in breach of the embargo; the cargo was seized, and the vessel diverted to an EU port for further verification by authorities. Similar seizures occurred in October 2022 (approximately 100 armored military vehicles) and November 2022 (additional illicit vehicles), marking the operation's three documented cargo diversions to EU ports since its inception, with inspections confirming embargo violations originating from ports including those in the United Arab Emirates. These actions represented rare successful enforcements amid over 3,000 vessel hailings, though UN panels later noted limitations in uncovering broader smuggling networks.

Diplomatic and Military Tensions

Operation Irini has generated significant diplomatic friction with , primarily due to Ankara's perception that the mission selectively targets shipments supportive of the UN-recognized () in , while allegedly overlooking arms flows to the rival (). Turkish officials, including Foreign Minister , have accused the operation of lacking neutrality and serving as a political tool against Turkey's interests in the Mediterranean, particularly amid broader disputes over maritime boundaries and energy exploration. A notable escalation occurred on , 2020, when Irini forces, including an Italian , attempted to inspect the Turkish-flagged merchant vessel Cihem (also reported as Rosmarin) in off Libya's coast, suspecting it of carrying undeclared military cargo in violation of the UN embargo. condemned the action as unauthorized, stating that the had not obtained prior consent from as the , and protested the boarding as a breach of ; the vessel was released after a brief found no prohibited items, but the incident prompted formal diplomatic complaints from to the . Similar standoffs persisted, such as in October 2022, when Irini requested to inspect another Turkish vessel, Necdet Alp, but rejected the move, leading to mutual accusations: the claimed Turkey refused cooperation, while Turkish authorities denied the request was properly conveyed and questioned Irini's legitimacy for not consulting Libya's recognized government or allies beforehand. These episodes heightened military posturing, with Turkish warships occasionally shadowing vessels to deter inspections, though no direct armed clashes have been reported. Broader tensions extended to NATO-EU coordination, where Turkey blocked assurances of non-duplication between Irini and NATO's Sea Guardian mission, citing concerns over the operation's impartiality and its hindrance to allied support for the ; this impasse delayed potential NATO logistical aid to Irini until resolved in June 2020. Additionally, the EU's September 2020 sanctions on Turkish firm Avrasya Shipping for alleged embargo breaches via vessel transfers further strained relations, with Turkey viewing them as punitive amid ongoing disputes.

Effectiveness and Assessments

Measured Achievements

Operation EUNAVFOR MED Irini has conducted extensive monitoring of maritime traffic in the central Mediterranean since its launch on 1 March 2020, investigating over 20,000 merchant vessels through radio hailings to verify compliance with the UN arms embargo on . By May 2025, cumulative hailings reached 19,135 vessels, with additional friendly approaches—non-boarding visual or close-range inspections—to 764 ships for further assessment. These efforts have generated intelligence shared with the UN Panel of Experts, including 16 special reports in the operation's initial months detailing potential violations from both Libyan factions. Onboard inspections, the most direct enforcement measure, totaled 33 by October 2025, targeting suspect vessels flagged for possible embargo breaches. Of these, three resulted in seizures confirmed as violations: in May 2020, a vessel carrying 3,000 tonnes of uniforms and light destined for Tripoli; in 2021, another with similar undeclared ; and in November 2022, the Evi transporting 18 BATT UMG armoured to , which were diverted and offloaded in under UN oversight. These interdictions prevented an estimated dozens of and related equipment from reaching conflict zones, contributing to partial stabilization of arms flows by sea. Aerial and supplementary monitoring has complemented sea-based activities, with over 2,000 suspicious flights tracked by October 2025, including 20 physical inspections in January 2024 alone. Operation Irini has also supported land-border awareness through intelligence sharing, though quantifiable impacts remain tied primarily to maritime metrics. Overall, these operations have documented and reported patterns of evasion, such as vessel denials of inspection—nine instances involving Turkish-flagged ships by October 2022—enhancing UN embargo enforcement data despite challenges in comprehensive .
MetricCumulative Total (as of May/October 2025)Source
Radio Hailings19,135–20,383 vessels
Friendly Approaches764 vessels
Onboard Inspections32–33 vessels
Cargo Seizures/Diversions3 cases
Suspicious Flights Monitored>2,000

Empirical Failures and Limitations

Despite conducting over 20,000 radio investigations of merchant vessels and approximately 30-33 boardings by late 2024 to mid-2025, Operation Irini has resulted in only three confirmed seizures of embargo-violating cargos. This low interdiction rate—less than 0.01% of monitored vessels leading to seizures—highlights operational constraints, including dependence on consents for boardings and the challenges of verifying concealed cargos at sea. The mission's maritime-centric mandate fails to address the predominant smuggling routes, with UN Panel of Experts reports documenting that the majority of arms violations occur via air cargo flights rather than sea shipments. Irini monitors suspect flights (e.g., 44 out of 2,078 in August 2025) and airports but lacks authority for aerial interdictions, allowing bulk transfers of weapons, , and military vehicles to evade enforcement. Empirical assessments by the UN confirm the arms embargo's overall ineffectiveness, with weapons flows persisting unabated as evidenced by continued factional fighting and documented violations exceeding detected sea-based incidents. The Panel of Experts has noted Irini's inability to uncover significant supply channels, attributing this to gaps in aerial and land monitoring, while Libya's instability—marked by over 100 reported arms transfers in recent years—demonstrates negligible causal impact on reducing militarization. Resource limitations, including a small fleet and budget under €12 million annually, further constrain comprehensive coverage of the vast Mediterranean approaches.

Evaluations by UN and Other Bodies

The Panel of Experts on has acknowledged Operation Irini's contributions to monitoring the , receiving classified reports from the operation on potential violations, including details of vessel inspections and suspicious activities observed by Irini's assets. As of October 2025, Irini had submitted 4,465 special reports to the Panel, facilitating investigations into embargo-related incidents. However, the Panel's periodic assessments, such as in report S/2024/914, continue to highlight persistent and large-scale violations of the embargo, predominantly through overland and aerial routes that fall outside Irini's maritime mandate, underscoring the operation's limited scope in addressing comprehensive networks. In proceedings, evaluations of Irini have been mixed. During informal interactive dialogues, such as the May 2025 session under resolution 2292 (2016), some member states, including , have contended that the operation has failed to identify significant arms supply channels and accused it of selective enforcement favoring certain Libyan factions. Conversely, the UN Special Representative for , in an October 2025 briefing, described Irini as the sole international mission explicitly mandated to enforce the maritime aspects of the embargo, emphasizing its role in information-sharing with the Panel despite ongoing challenges. Other bodies, including Security Council supplements to the Repertoire of Practice, have reflected delegate criticisms portraying Irini as ineffective overall, citing Libya's continued proliferation of weapons as evidenced by Panel findings, which indicate that maritime interdictions alone have not stemmed the influx supporting conflict parties. These assessments align with empirical patterns in Panel reports documenting repeated refusals of inspections by flagged vessels, often linked to state actors, suggesting enforcement gaps despite Irini's reported 20,000 vessel inspections by late 2025.

Criticisms and Controversies

Views from Libyan Factions

The (GNA), the UN-recognized executive authority based in Tripoli, formally rejected Operation Irini upon its launch on March 31, 2020, with Prime Minister describing it as biased toward eastern commander Khalifa Haftar's forces and accusing the EU of ignoring arms inflows via land borders from and elsewhere that bolstered the (LNA). The GNA argued that the operation's maritime focus selectively targeted shipments to western forces while overlooking aerial and overland smuggling routes predominantly used to supply Haftar's LNA, thereby exacerbating the imbalance in the civil conflict. This stance aligned with allied views, such as Turkey's, which labeled Irini as lacking legal basis without GNA consent and intended to favor Haftar by inspecting vessels bound for Tripoli. In contrast, the eastern-based () in and the affiliated LNA under Haftar issued no formal rejection of the operation and maintained relative silence on its mandate, with indicating that Irini's intercepts—such as the May 2020 diversion of a vessel carrying potential arms to Tripoli—disproportionately affected GNA-aligned supplies, indirectly aiding LNA positions by constraining western reinforcements amid ongoing hostilities. Incidents like the November 2020 of a Turkish-flagged ship (Oruc Reis) en route to , which GNA supporters decried as harassment, further fueled Tripoli's narrative of partiality toward the east, though spokespersons focused criticisms on broader embargo evasions rather than Irini itself. Following the 2021 formation of the as a transitional body incorporating elements from both factions, criticisms from Tripoli persisted in moderated form, with GNU officials questioning Irini's efficacy against land-based networks that continued to equip eastern militias, though public rejections softened amid diplomatic engagement with the . Eastern representatives, including LNA-aligned voices, occasionally invoked Irini to highlight intercepted GNA-bound cargoes as evidence of balanced enforcement, yet emphasized the operation's limitations in addressing foreign backing for Tripoli via airlifts, reflecting factional incentives to portray it as insufficiently aggressive against adversaries.

International Criticisms

has accused Operation Irini of exhibiting bias by disproportionately targeting shipments destined for the UN-recognized (GNA) in Tripoli, while overlooking violations supporting Haftar's (LNA) via predominantly air and land routes. In December 2020, Turkish Foreign Minister described the operation as an instrument wielded against , citing a November 22, 2020, attempt to board the Turkish-flagged commercial vessel Roseline A en route to Libya's port, which deemed a violation of . Ankara has consistently refused Irini inspection requests, denying access on 11 occasions between 2020 and November 2023, arguing that the mission undermines Turkey's legitimate support for the and ignores parallel violations by LNA backers such as the and . This stance reflects broader Turkish assertions that Irini's maritime focus enables selective enforcement favoring Haftar, as Turkish aid to the relies more heavily on sea transport compared to LNA supplies. The echoed elements of these criticisms in July 2020, when a senior diplomat remarked that Irini fails to sufficiently curb arms flows and aligns with Turkish assessments of its , particularly in neglecting to interdict deliveries from , the UAE, and to Haftar's forces. has similarly contested the operation's neutrality, contending that it bolsters Libyan factions adverse to Moscow's interests, including through inadequate monitoring of non-maritime violation pathways. These international objections underscore debates over Irini's mandate limitations, which exclude dedicated air or land enforcement capabilities despite UN Panel of Experts documentation of pervasive embargo breaches across multiple vectors.

Debates on Bias and Enforcement

Turkey has repeatedly accused Operation Irini of bias, claiming the mission selectively targets shipments to the UN-recognized () while overlooking aerial deliveries to Haftar's () from supporters like the , , and . Turkish officials argue that the operation's naval and aerial focus in the central Mediterranean favors monitoring routes used by to supply the , reflecting geopolitical tensions with EU members like and , who view Turkish intervention in Libya as expansionist. This perception is amplified by Irini's limited interceptions—only three cargo seizures by August 2025, mostly from non-Turkish vessels—contrasting with documented UN-verified violations via air to LNA-held areas, which evade naval patrols. Enforcement debates center on Irini's mandate constraints under UN Security Council resolutions, which prohibit a full and require flag-state consent for inspections, leading to repeated Turkish refusals—11 denials by November 2023 alone. Critics, including , contend this framework enables selective application, as Irini issued 14 reports to the UN Panel of Experts in its first six months covering violations by both GNA and LNA backers, yet prioritized high-profile stops of Turkish-flagged ships like the aborted November 2020 inspection of the Cirkin, escalating diplomatic friction without confirmed arms finds. EU defenders, via the , maintain neutrality, noting operations rely on intelligence-driven suspicions and have diverted vessels to EU ports for scrutiny regardless of origin, though UN Panel reports highlight persistent embargo breaches by multiple states, underscoring Irini's under-resourced scope against land and air routes. Broader assessments question causal effectiveness, with think tanks like the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik arguing Irini's air-naval assets yield lower violation detections compared to potential multinational efforts, fostering bias narratives where enforcement appears politically calibrated to intra-EU rivalries over energy disputes rather than impartial embargo upholding. Libyan factions echo this: allies decry over-scrutiny of their supply lines, while LNA supporters praise perceived leniency toward their overland arms flows, per UN expert findings of Egyptian and Emirati transfers evading detection. Despite these, Irini proponents cite its disruption of networks and training for Libyan as non-partisan contributions, though empirical data from UN reports indicate the embargo's overall persists, with over 1,000 violations logged since 2011.

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