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Operation Simoom
Operation Simoom
Operation Simoom
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Operation Simoom
DateMid-1990
Location
Iraq
Result Polish operatives successfully liberated American spies
Belligerents
Poland Poland
United States		 Iraq Iraq
Commanders and leaders
Poland Gromosław Czempiński [pl] Iraq Saddam Hussein
Strength
  • Unknown Polish spies
  • 6 American spies (mix CIA and DIA)
  • Unknown Republican Guards
    • Casualties and losses
    None, successfully escaped without raising any suspicion None

    Operation Simoom[1] (Polish: Operacja Samum) was a top secret Polish intelligence operation conducted in Iraq in 1990.

    In 1990 the CIA asked European intelligence agencies to assist in the withdrawal of six American operatives (a mix of CIA and DIA officers) investigating Iraqi troops movements in Iraq before the Gulf War.[2] Several countries, such as the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France refused to help in such a dangerous operation; only Poland agreed to help.[2]

    Poland had connections in Iraq due to Polish engineering firms' construction work throughout the country[2] and sent a few operatives to start working on the operation. Gromosław Czempiński [pl][3] became the commander of this operation, assigned to it by Polish Minister of Internal Affairs and first chief of Urząd Ochrony Państwa, Krzysztof Kozłowski.[2] Czempiński had previously been a spy in the United States and either took part or led many operations against the Western intelligence services.[2] The main plan was to reestablish contact with the hiding American spies and give them Polish passports so they could escape from Iraq in a bus, alongside Polish and Russian workers.

    The six agents were hiding in Kuwait and Baghdad for several weeks before the escape was carried out.[2] The operation was very difficult because the Iraqis started to suspect some kind of American-Polish intrigue.[2]

    The agents were given refuge at a Polish construction camp, and then provided with passports and put on a refugee bus. An Iraqi officer at checkpoint on the border had studied in Poland and spoke Polish well enough to communicate. When the bus arrived at the border, he asked one of the American spies a question in Polish. Since the spy did not know Polish at all, he pretended to be heavily drunk (another version states that the operative in question fainted). Nevertheless, the bus managed to cross the border with all occupants.[2] Poles moved the agents out of Iraq and into the safety of Turkey.[2] Operatives from both sides returned to their countries. Polish forces rescued not only the agents but also secret maps—detailed maps of various military installations and of crucial points in the capital of Baghdad itself—apparently crucial for Operation Desert Storm.[2][3]

    As a reward for Poland's help, the US government promised to urge other governments to cancel half, or $16.5 billion, of Poland's foreign debt.[4]

    In at least two other operations, the Poles later aided another 15 foreigners to escape, mostly Britons, held hostage by the Iraqis as part of Saddam Hussein's "human shield" campaign to deter an allied invasion.[2]

    Information about this operation was first revealed in 1995 by The Washington Post.[3][4] In 1999, Polish director Władysław Pasikowski made a movie, Operacja Samum about this operation; it was the first Polish production co-financed by Warner Bros. and third by HBO.[3]

    Notes

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    Operation Simoom

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    from Grokipedia

    Operation Simoom (Polish: Operacja Samum) was a clandestine Polish operation conducted in October 1990 to six stranded CIA operatives from following the on August 2, 1990. The American agents, tasked with monitoring Iraqi troop movements, sought refuge after their cover was compromised in the escalating crisis leading to the . Polish , recently transitioned from communist-era structures, exploited the presence of Polish construction workers in to shelter the operatives at a remote camp, furnish them with forged passports, and transport them overland to the Turkish border, evading Iraqi patrols through diversions including alcohol and cultural feints. The high-risk extraction, deemed successful without alerting Iraqi authorities, marked an early post-Cold War collaboration between and the , yielding diplomatic dividends such as President George H. W. Bush's subsequent push for forgiveness of 's $16.5 billion debt to Western creditors. This operation underscored the practical value of Polish expertise in Middle Eastern operations, honed during the communist period, in forging nascent NATO-era alliances.

    Background

    Geopolitical Context

    Iraq's of on August 2, 1990, under marked a pivotal escalation in Middle Eastern tensions, driven by longstanding border disputes, Iraq's war debts from the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq conflict, and claims over Kuwaiti oil fields. Iraqi forces swiftly overran , annexing the emirate as Iraq's 19th province, which prompted immediate international condemnation via United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 demanding withdrawal. This act disrupted global oil markets, with prices surging over 30% initially, and galvanized a U.S.-led coalition of 35 nations under Operation Desert Shield to enforce and prepare for potential military action, culminating in Operation Desert Storm on January 17, 1991. Western intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA and , had cultivated networks of operatives inside to track regime activities, weapons programs, and military movements amid fears of Iraqi aggression post-Iran war. Hussein's Ba'athist government, notorious for internal purges and executions of suspected spies—as seen in prior crackdowns on dissidents—posed acute risks to these assets as coalition forces amassed in . With mobilizing over 500,000 troops along the Kuwaiti border and issuing threats against and other neighbors, embedded Western agents faced isolation without extraction routes, as diplomatic channels closed and borders tightened under . Poland's intermediary role stemmed from its post-communist transition following the Solidarity-led elections and the dissolution of structures, which left remnants of Cold War-era ties intact. Throughout the and , Polish state firms like Polservice executed major infrastructure projects in , including power plants, hospitals, and refineries, embedding thousands of engineers and technicians who developed local contacts and operational familiarity. This legacy provided Polish —evolving from Soviet-aligned units—with credible cover as civilian contractors, enabling discreet infiltration amid Iraq's suspicion of Western powers while aligning Warsaw's nascent pro-Western with U.S. interests in demonstrating reliability for future integration.

    Stranded Western Intelligence Personnel

    Six American intelligence officers, primarily affiliated with the (CIA), were operating in to monitor Iraqi troop movements in the lead-up to potential conflict. These personnel included a mix of CIA and (DIA) officers, as later declassified accounts confirmed, though primary reporting emphasized CIA involvement. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, abruptly stranded the operatives by closing borders, triggering international isolation of , and intensifying internal security measures under Saddam Hussein's regime. Unable to exfiltrate via standard channels amid the escalating crisis, the officers went on the run, evading Iraqi units and intelligence services for several weeks across Kuwaiti and Iraqi territory, including . The stranded agents faced acute risks of capture, , or execution, as Iraq's routinely targeted suspected foreign spies during wartime mobilizations; historical precedents included the swift detention of Western diplomats and journalists post-invasion. Their covert status precluded diplomatic intervention, leaving them reliant on improvised evasion tactics without reliable communication to U.S. handlers, who urgently sought third-party extraction options from European allies. This isolation underscored vulnerabilities in pre-war intelligence deployments, where rapid geopolitical shifts outpaced contingency planning for deep-cover operations in hostile states.

    Planning and Preparation

    Polish Intelligence Transition

    The transition of Polish intelligence services in the late 1980s and early 1990s followed the systemic political changes initiated by the Round Table Agreement in February 1989 and the formation of Poland's first non-communist government under Prime Minister in August 1989. The communist-era Służba Bezpieczeństwa (SB), which had functioned as the primary domestic and foreign security apparatus since 1956 with around 24,000 personnel, faced immediate scrutiny and restructuring due to its deep ties to the and Soviet oversight. Reforms accelerated in early 1990, culminating in the SB's effective dismantlement by May 1990, as part of broader efforts to depoliticize and democratize the security sector amid public demands for of former regime collaborators. On April 6, 1990, the passed legislation establishing the Urząd Ochrony Państwa (UOP) as the successor agency for internal security, , and limited foreign operations, absorbing vetted SB assets to preserve expertise while excluding overtly political elements. Of approximately 14,034 SB officers screened for ideological reliability and competence, 10,451 were retained in the UOP, ensuring continuity in operational capabilities, particularly in regions like the where Poland maintained historical contacts from communist-era arms exports and trade deals with . This hybrid structure—blending reformed personnel with new oversight mechanisms—reflected the challenges of rapid post-communist reconfiguration, where full institutional overhaul risked capability gaps, yet allowed for pragmatic adaptation to Western alliances. The UOP's formation positioned to respond to CIA requests for assistance in October 1990, leveraging inherited SB networks in for Operation Simoom without fully severing ties to pre-1989 operational legacies. Under UOP deputy head Gromosław Czempiński, the agency coordinated the extraction, marking an early test of Poland's pivot from subordination to NATO-aligned cooperation. These reforms, though incomplete and later criticized for insufficient , facilitated the operation's success by combining experienced field agents with the political will of the post-Solidarity government.

    CIA Request and Operational Agreement

    Following Iraq's invasion of on August 2, 1990, six CIA officers tasked with monitoring Iraqi military movements became stranded in , as borders closed and internal security tightened under Saddam Hussein's regime. The CIA, lacking viable extraction routes, identified Poland's foreign intelligence service—restructured after the 1989 fall of communism—as uniquely positioned to assist, owing to its deep-rooted networks in cultivated during the era when Polish agents operated extensively in the under Warsaw Pact alignments. CIA officials, with endorsement, formally approached Polish counterparts in the late summer or early fall of 1990, requesting their intervention to smuggle the officers out undetected. Poland's Solidarity-led government, seeking to build ties with the West amid its post-communist transition, consented to the covert request, forging an operational agreement centered on Polish-led infiltration and exfiltration. This entailed deploying a small team of Polish operatives who leveraged longstanding Iraqi contacts, forged documents including Polish passports, and secure transport routes to rendezvous with the CIA personnel in 1990. Coordination occurred through back-channel communications between the CIA and Poland's Urzęd Wbezpieczeństwa agency, emphasizing minimal U.S. involvement to preserve deniability and exploit Poland's neutral facade in Iraqi eyes. The agreement stipulated no monetary compensation upfront, prioritizing operational secrecy over formal treaties, though CIA Director later conveyed U.S. gratitude via a presidential letter advocating for as implicit reciprocity post-success. This collaboration marked an early test of post-Cold War intelligence sharing, bridging erstwhile adversaries through pragmatic mutual interest in countering Iraqi aggression ahead of Operation Desert Storm.

    Execution

    Infiltration into Iraq

    Polish intelligence operatives entered Iraq in October 1990, leveraging the country's established Polish commercial presence from engineering and construction projects dating back to the Cold War era. A key operative, a Polish lieutenant using the alias "Jan," infiltrated Baghdad on October 13, 1990, via a false passport identifying him as a newly assigned attaché to the Polish Embassy. This diplomatic cover facilitated discreet movement within the capital, where Iraqi security scrutiny was intensifying amid escalating tensions prior to the Gulf War. The infiltration relied on Poland's unique access, as Polish firms had maintained ongoing contracts for infrastructure work across , providing and logistical support for the agents' insertion. Small teams, numbering a few operatives trained in Pact-era , crossed borders or arrived via commercial flights under business visas tied to these firms, avoiding direct confrontation with Iraqi intelligence. Upon arrival, they established safe houses and communication networks, preparing for contact with the six stranded U.S. personnel—comprising CIA, , and officers—who had been cut off since Iraq's invasion of on August 2, 1990. This phase minimized exposure by exploiting Iraq's tolerance for Polish nationals, who were viewed neutrally due to historical ties, in contrast to overt Western presence. Operatives carried essential tools, including blank passports and forged documents, sourced through Polish foreign channels, to enable rapid adaptation to extraction needs. No arrests or compromises occurred during entry, underscoring the effectiveness of the low-profile approach amid Iraq's border closures and internal purges.

    Contact and Extraction Process

    Polish intelligence established initial contact with the American agents hiding in through direct meetings in . On October 15, 1990, General Gromosław Czempiński, a key figure in the operation, met one U.S. officer on a Baghdad street roughly 300 meters from headquarters, amid heightened Iraqi surveillance following the August 1990 invasion of . The agents, who included personnel from the CIA, NSA, and DIA monitoring Iraqi forces, had evaded capture for weeks, partly by relying on Iraqi collaborators to facilitate movement to the capital. By October 24, 1990, the six agents convened at a prearranged rendezvous in and were discreetly transported in two vehicles to a secure Polish camp, where they had previously found shelter arranged via CIA-White House coordination. At the camp, Polish operatives equipped them with forged Polish passports bearing authentic-looking visas procured through a contact embedded in Iraq's , enabling disguise as Polish workers amid Poland's ongoing repatriation efforts from . Extraction commenced on October 25, 1990, with the group driven northward over 500 kilometers to the border in vehicles operated by Polish personnel familiar with local routes and checkpoints. En route, at a critical Iraqi checkpoint, a Polish technician neutralized scrutiny by embracing and kissing the guard in an exaggerated Slavic greeting, diverting attention and bypassing passport verification. This maneuver ensured safe passage into without detection, marking the successful conclusion of the agents' evasion from Iraqi custody.

    Outcome

    Successful Evacuation

    The evacuation succeeded on October 25, 1990, with Polish intelligence agents extracting six U.S. operatives who had been stranded in Iraq monitoring military movements following the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The Americans had taken refuge in a Polish construction camp, arranged through clandestine CIA-Polish coordination, where they remained hidden amid broader Polish citizen evacuations. Polish officers provided the group with forged passports and drove them northward in vehicles toward the border. At the Iraqi checkpoint, the Poles executed a diversion by embracing and kissing the guards in an effusive display, drawing attention away from the passengers and enabling unimpeded passage. The convoy crossed into without detection or incident, ensuring the operatives' safe extraction from hostile territory. This outcome preserved the lives of all six U.S. personnel and maintained operational secrecy, as Iraqi authorities never discovered the escape or the Polish-U.S. collaboration. The success demonstrated the effectiveness of leveraging Poland's diplomatic cover and intelligence networks in , built during prior communist-era ties.

    Operational Challenges Overcome

    The operation faced significant hurdles due to Iraq's pervasive intelligence apparatus under , which imposed strict border controls, frequent checkpoints, and surveillance on foreigners amid escalating tensions following the , 1990, invasion of . Polish operatives, leveraging their established presence through construction contracts that allowed freer movement than other Westerners, infiltrated to establish contact with the stranded CIA and DIA personnel sheltering in and a Polish construction camp. This required smuggling additional Polish intelligence officers into the country covertly, navigating constantly shifting Iraqi restrictions that complicated logistics and timelines in the lead-up to Operation Desert Storm. A primary challenge was devising credible non-official covers for the Americans, who were issued fake Slavic passports but lacked proficiency in pronouncing the associated names, risking exposure during interrogations. To mitigate this, the group posed as inebriated Eastern European workers, using bottles of Scotch whiskey to feign intoxication and discourage from Iraqi authorities during transit. The extraction route involved a perilous overland journey through northern to the Turkish border in autumn 1990, where detection by Hussein's forces could have resulted in execution as spies. At a critical checkpoint near the , an Iraqi security officer fluent in Polish nearly compromised the by demanding , heightening the risk of passport verification. This was overcome through rapid improvisation by a Polish , who distracted the officer with a culturally resonant Slavic greeting—a followed by three kisses—creating a momentary diversion that allowed the vehicles to pass without checks. Such ad-hoc tactics, combined with the Poles' on-the-ground familiarity from prior Warsaw Pact-era training and commercial ties, enabled the successful evasion of Iraqi detection networks despite the operation's high-stakes, low-margin environment.

    Revelation and Legacy

    Declassification in 1995

    The details of Operation Simoom remained classified for over four years following its completion in late , with Polish and American agencies maintaining strict secrecy to protect sources, methods, and ongoing diplomatic relations in the post-Cold War era. In January 1995, the operation was publicly disclosed for the first time through investigative reporting, marking a deliberate effort by Polish authorities amid leadership changes in their services. Gromosław Czempiński, the Polish officer who led the mission, had been appointed head of the Urząd Ochrony Państwa (UOP, Poland's domestic ) in December 1994, a position that facilitated the controlled release of information to underscore Poland's post-communist alignment with Western allies. On January 17, 1995, published an article revealing that Polish agents, drawing on expertise from their Warsaw Pact-era , had infiltrated and extracted six stranded U.S. intelligence officers just before the January 1991 coalition air campaign, using smugglers and forged documents to evade Iraqi forces. The report, based on interviews with declassified Polish officials and U.S. sources, emphasized the operation's success in rescuing not only the Americans but also approximately 15 other Westerners held as human shields by Saddam Hussein's regime, highlighting the financial incentives Poland received—reportedly $11 million in U.S. aid for debt forgiveness and intelligence upgrades. This disclosure was corroborated the next day by , which detailed the joint CIA-Polish planning and the extraction's reliance on Polish networks embedded in since the 1980s Iran- War era. The 1995 declassification served strategic purposes beyond historical record, signaling Poland's reliability to amid its 1999 accession aspirations and fostering bilateral intelligence ties, though it drew internal Polish scrutiny over the opsec risks of publicizing sensitive like border-crossing via Jordanian deserts. No formal U.S. declassification documents were released concurrently, with CIA records on Simoom remaining partially redacted in later FOIA responses, indicating asymmetric transparency where Poland bore the brunt of disclosure to build goodwill. The revelations prompted no immediate reprisals from , as Hussein's regime was weakened post-Gulf War, but they underscored vulnerabilities in during , informing future joint operations.

    Implications for International Intelligence Cooperation

    Operation Simoom exemplified the potential for rapid, effective bilateral intelligence cooperation in the immediate post-Cold War era, as Polish services, leveraging networks established during the communist period for economic and military ties with , successfully extracted six U.S. operatives whom the CIA had been unable to retrieve independently. This operation, initiated following a direct CIA request to Polish counterparts in late , demonstrated how former intelligence assets could be pragmatically repurposed to support Western objectives, bridging ideological divides through shared operational imperatives amid the . The collaboration underscored the advantages of cost-effective partnerships, with Polish agents providing on-the-ground infiltration and exfiltration capabilities that minimized U.S. exposure while utilizing Poland's unique access—derived from prior contracts for Iraqi chemical facilities and military equipment dating back to the 1970s and 1980s. Such cooperation highlighted the risks and rewards of relying on liaison relationships with transitioning states, where historical baggage (e.g., training) enabled unconventional solutions but required swift trust-building to overcome mutual suspicions. The operation's success, declassified in January , affirmed that intelligence sharing could yield tangible results without formal alliances, fostering a model for alliances in high-stakes environments. Long-term, Simoom initiated a sustained U.S.-Polish partnership that extended beyond the Gulf crisis, influencing subsequent joint operations and contributing to Poland's alignment with structures; this rapport persisted into the , with Polish services aiding CIA efforts in diverse global theaters. It illustrated the causal of demonstrable operational reciprocity in building enduring liaison ties, as Poland's willingness to risk assets under Saddam Hussein's regime—despite potential Iraqi retaliation—earned reciprocal U.S. support for Polish reforms and integration into Western frameworks. Analysts note that such episodes reveal the underappreciated value of bilateral over multilateral for sensitive extractions, where deniability and specialized outweigh bureaucratic hurdles.

    Media Depictions and Public Perception

    The partial declassification of Operation Simoom in led to its initial public disclosure through media reports, notably a New York Times article on January 18, , which described the Polish intelligence service's role in smuggling six stranded American spies out of following the invasion of . This coverage emphasized the operation's success amid heightened tensions before the , framing it as a clandestine triumph of allied without delving into operational specifics due to ongoing sensitivities. In popular media, the operation inspired the 1999 Polish film Operacja Samum (Operation Simoom), directed by Władysław Pasikowski, which presents a dramatized narrative of Polish agents extracting CIA personnel from under Saddam Hussein's regime. The film, rated 5.3/10 on based on over 800 user reviews, blends factual elements like the pre-war urgency with fictional tropes, including personal stakes such as rescuing a spy's son from Iraqi captivity. It received domestic attention in but limited international distribution, positioning the operation within cinematic portrayals rather than as a standalone . Public perception of Operation Simoom has centered on its demonstration of Polish intelligence prowess during Poland's post-communist transition, with accounts portraying it as a pivotal early success in U.S.-Polish cooperation that rebuilt Western trust in Warsaw's capabilities after decades of Soviet influence. Analysts have noted its role in elevating the profile of units like JW GROM, which maintained until partly to protect such missions, contributing to a narrative of as a reliable partner in high-risk extractions. Later works, such as David E. Hoffman's 2021 book From Warsaw with Love, reinforce this view by highlighting the operation's extraction of CIA and DIA officers as a foundational alliance-building effort, though without evidence of widespread or in declassified records. Overall, it is remembered in intelligence circles for underscoring practical covert alliances over ideological divides, with minimal politicization in mainstream discourse.

    References

    1. https://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/18/world/during-gulf-war-polish-agents-saved-6-american-spies.html
    2. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/01/17/polish-agents-rescued-6-us-spies-from-iraq/e31165d3-e6e5-4cf1-babc-763a06e463a2/
    3. https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=57592
    4. https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/august-2/iraq-invades-kuwait
    5. https://tnsr.org/2023/06/the-origins-of-the-iraqi-invasion-of-kuwait-reconsidered/
    6. https://archive.seattletimes.com/archive/19950117/2099750/a-spy-drama-polish-intelligence-rescued-us-agents-from-iraq
    7. https://www.deseret.com/1995/1/17/19153912/poles-rescued-6-u-s-spies-stranded-in-iraq/
    8. http://connections-qj.org/article/transformation-state-security-and-intelligence-services-poland-job-still-unfinished
    9. https://securitas-imperii-journal.com/2021/05/16/the-last-days-of-the-security-service-transformation-of-the-state-security-services-in-poland-in-1989-1990/?lang=en
    10. https://irp.fas.org/world/poland/dastych.html
    11. https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/GSSR-5.2-June-2017.pdf
    12. https://sofrep.com/news/how-poland-rescued-cia-spies-from-iraq-in-1990/
    13. https://www.rp.pl/film/art5965951-operacja-samum-jak-bylo-naprawde
    14. https://scholar.lib.vt.edu/VA-news/ROA-Times/issues/1995/rt9501/950117/01170142.htm
    15. https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/historia-sluzb-specjalnych-po-89-r-6038698341585537g
    16. https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/foia/CIA-FOIALOG-2017.pdf
    17. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/beginning-beautiful-friendship-central-intelligence-agency-and-polish-security-service
    18. https://daviscenter.fas.harvard.edu/events/polish-foreign-intelligence-assistance-us-military-during-1991-gulf-war-switching-sides
    19. https://www.interlochenpublicradio.org/2021-11-26/the-untold-story-of-how-polish-spies-helped-the-cia-carry-out-secret-missions-around-the-world
    20. https://collider.com/gulf-war-movies-best-ranked/
    21. https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0213134/
    22. https://www.quora.com/Why-did-Polish-Special-Forces-JW-GROM-stay-secret-until-1994
    23. https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/56347311-from-warsaw-with-love
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