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Within the context of a national or multilateral body of law, an invention is patentable if it meets the relevant legal conditions to be granted a patent. By extension, patentability also refers to the substantive conditions that must be met for a patent to be held valid.

Requirements

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The patent laws usually require that, for an invention to be patentable, it must be:

Usually the term "patentability" only refers to the four aforementioned "substantive" conditions, and does not refer to formal conditions such as the "sufficiency of disclosure", the "unity of invention" or the "best mode requirement".

Judging patentability is one aspect of the official examination of a patent application performed by a patent examiner and may be tested in post-grant patent litigation.

Prior to filing a patent application, inventors sometimes obtain a patentability opinion from a patent agent or patent attorney regarding whether an invention satisfies the substantive conditions of patentability.

Opposition and reexamination

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Many national and regional patent offices provide procedures for reconsidering whether or not a given patent is valid after grant. Under the European Patent Convention, any person can file an opposition provided they act promptly after the patent is granted. In the United States, members of the public can initiate reexamination proceedings. Japan provides similar options. In India, the Patent Act provides for a dual opposition system i.e. pre-grant opposition as well as post grant opposition. While a pre-grant opposition may be filed by any person, the post grant opposition may only be filed by a person interested in the field of invention.[2]

Members of the public can also initiate lawsuits in the courts of various nations to have patents declared invalid.

United Kingdom patents can be reviewed by way of a non-binding opinion issued by the Patent Office, or by formal applications for revocation before the Patent Office or the Court. If the patent survives a revocation action, this fact is noted for future reference by way of a Certificate of contested validity.

Infringement

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The fact that an invention is patentable or even patented does not necessarily mean that use of the invention would not also infringe another patent. The first patent in a given area might include a broad claim covering a general inventive concept if there is at that point no relevant prior art. Later, a specific implementation of that concept might be patentable if it is not disclosed in the earlier patent (or any intervening prior art), but nevertheless still falls within the scope of the earlier claim (covering the general concept). This means that the later inventor must obtain a license from the earlier inventor to be able to exploit their invention. At the same time, the earlier inventor might want to obtain a license from the later inventor, particularly if the later invention represents a significant improvement in the implementation of the original broad concept. In this case, the two enter into a cross license.

Thomas Edison's thin carbon filament light bulb was a patentable improvement over the earlier patented Woodward and Evans thick carbon filament light bulb. Thomas Edison bought the Woodward patent for $5,000 US before he began his development work so that Woodward would not be able to later sue him for patent infringement after Edison became commercially successful.

National laws

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United States

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Under United States patent law, inventorship is also regarded as a patentability criterion. It is a constitutional requirement, since the language of the US Constitution authorizes "the exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries" to Inventors only. The most significant implication of this requirement, which makes the US practice different from all other countries, is the fact that only actual people-inventors (and not their employer) can apply for a US patent. For this reason, patent applications filed via the Patent Cooperation Treaty often have two sets of applicants: the physical individuals for the US, and the legal entity (employer) for all other countries.[needs update]

The requirement to list actual human inventors was further confirmed by case law: "Inventorship is indeed relevant to patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f), and patents have in the past been held unenforceable for failure to correctly name inventors in cases where the named inventors acted in bad faith or with deceptive intent."[3][needs update]

Another difference between the practices of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and other patent offices is the requirements for non-obviousness and for inventive step. Although both requirements have the same purpose to prevent patent issuance for routine improvements/modifications (rather than for true inventions), the practical analyses of these criteria are based on different rules and sometimes result in different outcomes (see Inventive step and non-obviousness for more details).[vague]

Details on patentability in the U.S. can be found in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure or MPEP. This is published by the USPTO and is the reference manual used by both patent examiners and patent agents/attorneys. Chapter 2100, in particular, gives a comprehensive overview of the standards for patentability, a discussion of the related case law, and guidance on how to overcome an examiner's rejection of a given set of claims.

In the United States, the patent grant is presumptive, e.g. a patent shall issue unless the patent statutes preclude the grant. In other words, the burden is on the Patent Office to prove why a patent should not be granted.[4] Once a patent issues, it is presumed valid and a court may declare it invalid only on the basis of clear and convincing evidence.

Europe

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Terminology in Europe, within the member states of the European Patent Organisation,[5] is slightly different from U.S. terminology. While in the U.S. all patent applications are considered to cover inventions automatically, in Europe a patent application is first submitted to a test whether it covers an invention at all: the first out of four tests of Article 52(1) EPC (the other three being novelty, inventive step, and industrial applicability). So an "invention" in European legal terminology is similar to "patentable subject-matter" in the American system. Articles 52-57 of the European Patent Convention are concerned with patentability.[6]

India

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Under the Indian Patent Act (1970), "inventions" are defined as a new product or process involving an inventive step and capable of industrial application.[7] Thus the patentability criteria largely involves novelty, inventive step and industrial application or usability of the invention. In addition, section 3 of the Patent Act, 1970, also provides a list of non-patentable inventions for e.g. inventions that are frivolous or contrary to well established to natural laws.[8]

Quotes

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[The question whether there is a patentable invention] is as fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a phantom as exists in the whole paraphernalia of legal concepts. It involves, or it should involve, as complete a reconstruction of the art that preceded it as is possible. The test of invention is the originality of the discovery, and discovery depends upon the mental act of conceiving the new combination, for substantially every invention is only a combination. Nothing is more illusory, as nothing is more common, than to assume that this can be measured objectively by the magnitude of the physical readjustments required. Courts never tire, or at least in earlier times they never did, of expatiating upon the freshness of insight which observes a little, but fruitful, change which had theretofore escaped detection by those engaged in the field. When all is said, we are called upon imaginatively to project this act of discovery against a hypostatized average practitioner, acquainted with all that has been published and all that has been publicly sold. If there be an issue more troublesome, or more apt for litigation than this, we are not aware of it. (...)
- US Judge Learned Hand in Harries v. Air King Prod. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950).[9]

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Patentability

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from Grokipedia
Patentability encompasses the statutory and doctrinal criteria that an must satisfy to obtain legal as a patent, fundamentally requiring novelty (absence of disclosure), inventive step or non-obviousness (not an evident modification to skilled practitioners), industrial applicability or utility (practical usefulness in industry or commerce), and eligibility as (excluding abstract ideas, laws of nature, or mere discoveries). These requirements, codified in frameworks like the U.S. Patent Act (35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103), the (Art. 52-57), and harmonized under the (Arts. 27-29), ensure patents reward genuine technical advancements while preventing monopolization of preexisting knowledge or trivial improvements. Core to patent examination, novelty demands the invention not be identically anticipated in prior publications, uses, or sales, assessed globally under absolute novelty standards in most jurisdictions. Non-obviousness evaluates whether the invention would have been predictable from prior art combinations, often invoking the hypothetical "person of ordinary skill in the art" as a benchmark, with U.S. law applying the Graham factors for factual inquiries into scope of prior art, differences from it, and secondary considerations like commercial success. Utility requires concrete, specific, and substantial benefits, barring speculative or inoperable claims, while subject matter exclusions—such as mathematical algorithms or human genes in isolated form—have sparked litigation, notably U.S. Supreme Court rulings like Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics (2013) deeming naturally occurring DNA ineligible despite isolation. Debates over patentability persist in emerging fields, including software (challenged under Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank for abstract ideas lacking technological improvement) and , where overly permissive standards risk stifling through patent thickets, while stringent ones may deter ; empirical studies indicate mixed effects on R&D, with stronger of incentives in pharmaceuticals than . Jurisdictional variances, such as Europe's explicit bar on computer programs "as such" versus U.S. functional eligibility tests, underscore the tension between uniformity and adaptation to technological evolution.

Overview and Principles

Definition and Core Purpose

Patentability refers to the legal eligibility of an to obtain a , which requires satisfaction of specific statutory criteria including novelty, inventive step (or non-obviousness), (or industrial applicability), and eligible subject matter. These criteria ensure that only advancements representing genuine technical contributions, rather than mere discoveries of natural phenomena or abstract ideas, qualify for protection. For instance, under the U.S. Act of 1952 (as amended), an must constitute a new and useful , , manufacture, or , excluding laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. The core purpose of patentability standards is to incentivize by granting inventors temporary exclusive —typically 20 years from filing—in exchange for full public disclosure of the , enabling societal access post-expiration. This quid pro quo mechanism addresses the public goods problem of inventions, where without protection, inventors might withhold knowledge to avoid free-riding by competitors, thereby recouping costs through commercialization. from historical analyses supports this, as patent systems correlate with increased inventive activity in sectors like pharmaceuticals and machinery, where high upfront costs deter innovation absent exclusivity. By filtering out trivial or obvious modifications, patentability criteria prevent over-monopolization of basic knowledge, fostering cumulative progress while aligning private incentives with broader technological advancement. International frameworks like the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Rights (TRIPS), effective since 1995, harmonize these essentials across member states to promote global innovation without unduly restricting access in developing economies.

Philosophical Foundations

The philosophical foundations of patentability derive primarily from two traditions: natural rights theory, rooted in the labor-based acquisition of property, and , which emphasizes incentives for societal progress. Natural rights proponents, drawing on John Locke's Second Treatise of Government (), argue that individuals acquire ownership over inventions through the application of their intellectual labor to unowned ideas or common knowledge, transforming them into proprietary expressions akin to . This view posits that denying such rights would violate the creator's inherent entitlement to the fruits of their effort, as Locke contended that labor adds value to resources from the common domain, justifying exclusive control provided it leaves "enough and as good" for others. However, extending Lockean theory to patents encounters challenges due to the non-rivalrous nature of ideas—unlike physical goods, knowledge can be used without depletion—necessitating statutory limits like fixed terms to reconcile individual rights with communal access. Utilitarian justifications, predominant in contemporary doctrine, frame as policy instruments to maximize net social welfare by addressing the public goods problem of underinvestment in . Absent exclusive , inventions would be freely copied post-disclosure, discouraging costly R&D since inventors could not recoup expenses, as articulated in economic analyses of market failures. By granting temporary monopolies in exchange for public disclosure, incentivize creation and dissemination of useful technologies, aligning private gain with broader utility, as evidenced in the U.S. Constitution's mandate to "promote the Progress of and useful " via such protections. Empirical support for this rests on historical correlations between strong regimes and accelerated technological advancement, though critics note potential overreach where monopolies stifle follow-on without commensurate inventive output. These foundations intersect in practice: natural rights provide a moral basis for rewarding ingenuity, while justifies regulatory constraints, such as expiration after 20 years under the (1994), to prevent perpetual exclusion. Debates persist over their relative weight, with some scholars advocating a hybrid where natural rights temper utilitarian calculus against excessive commercialization, ensuring patents serve human flourishing rather than mere economic extraction. This tension underscores patentability's aim to balance individual agency against collective benefit, informed by first-mover privileges in pre-modern guilds but formalized through Enlightenment rationales.

Historical Development

Early Origins and Evolution in

The Venetian Patent Statute of 1474, enacted by the Senate of the on March 19, marked the emergence of the first codified patent system in , granting inventors exclusive rights to practice their "new and ingenious devices" for a limited term of ten years in exchange for disclosing the to the and working it within the territory. This measure responded to the influx of technological innovations in glassmaking, , and textiles during Venice's commercial dominance, aiming to incentivize local while preventing secrecy and foreign export of techniques; over a thousand such grants were issued in the following decades. Preceding this, medieval European rulers sporadically awarded privileges resembling patents, often as monopolies to attract skilled artisans or import foreign arts, such as England's 1331 grant to John Kempe for wool weaving machinery or Florence's 1421 privilege to for a barge-lifting device on the River; these were royal dispensations tied to rather than systematic property rights. The Venetian system formalized novelty, exclusivity, and disclosure as core elements, influencing Italian city-states like and , and spreading northward through guilds and princely grants in the by the early 16th century. In , crown-issued evolved from Tudor-era monopolies on staples like salt and playing cards, which fueled public backlash over corruption and price gouging, culminating in the (21 Jac. I, c. 3) of ; this legislation invalidated general monopolies but preserved 14-year terms for "new manufactures" unknown before, establishing parliamentary limits on executive discretion and emphasizing invention over mere importation. Judicial interpretations, such as in Dollond v. Gray (1774), began requiring substantive ingenuity beyond mechanical skill, refining non-obviousness precursors amid the Industrial Revolution's demands for machinery patents. France's modern framework arose post-Revolution with the Law of July 25, , which enshrined inventors' rights as natural property, mandating detailed specifications, models, and fees scaled by scope (from 300 to 1,500 livres), while allowing secrecy petitions; this democratized access beyond royal favor but faced abolitionist critiques during free-trade debates, leading to refinements like the law shortening terms to 15 years and easing examinations. By the mid-19th century, these national systems converged on commonalities—fixed terms, registration, and enforcement via courts—facilitating cross-border flows, though divergences persisted in examination rigor and subject exclusions until international treaties.

Establishment in the United States

The establishment of patentability in the United States traces its constitutional foundation to Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1788 and effective from March 4, 1789, which empowers Congress "To promote the Progress of and useful , by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." This clause reflects an intent to incentivize innovation through temporary monopolies, drawing from English common law precedents like the of 1624 while adapting to republican principles of intervention in markets. The first federal implementation came with the Patent Act of 1790, enacted on April 10, 1790, and signed by President George Washington, marking the inaugural U.S. patent statute. This act authorized patents for "any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known or used," granting a 14-year term renewable for another seven years upon proof of utility and novelty, with administration vested in a board comprising the Secretary of State (Thomas Jefferson), Secretary of War, and Attorney General. Lacking a formal examination process, it operated as a registration system where applicants petitioned the board for approval based on demonstrated usefulness, resulting in only about 150 patents issued before its replacement; the first, numbered X00001, was granted to Samuel Hopkins on July 31, 1790, for a potash production method. Subsequent refinements addressed administrative inefficiencies and foreign access. The Patent Act of 1793, effective February 21, 1793, shifted oversight solely to the Secretary of State, eliminated the board, and adopted a pure registration model without substantive examination, confining eligibility to U.S. citizens while extending terms to 14 years without renewal. An 1800 amendment opened applications to resident aliens who invented in the U.S., reflecting growing economic pressures from industrialization. The modern U.S. patent framework solidified with the Patent Act of 1836, passed on July 4, 1836, which created the independent Patent Office under the Department of State and introduced a rigorous pre-issuance examination by appointed examiners to assess novelty, , and non-obviousness against . This act numbered patents sequentially from 1, permitted foreign inventors to apply if their invention was made in the U.S. or they were residents for specified periods, and raised fees to fund operations, issuing over 10,000 patents by 1860 amid rising inventive activity during the antebellum era. These changes shifted the system from mere registration to a gatekeeping mechanism, emphasizing empirical verification of inventive merit to prevent frivolous grants.

20th-Century International Harmonization

The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, initially signed in 1883, underwent several revisions in the to refine international standards for patent priority rights, national treatment, and procedural formalities, though substantive criteria for patentability such as novelty and inventive step remained largely national. Revisions occurred at in 1900, extending the convention's scope; Washington in 1911, clarifying independence of patents; in 1925, introducing service marks; in 1934, addressing dependency of patents; in 1958, enhancing protection for industrial designs; and in 1967, incorporating administrative updates under the nascent (WIPO). These acts progressively aligned filing requirements and reciprocity obligations among member states, which numbered over 70 by mid-century, but did not impose uniform definitions of . Post-World War II efforts shifted toward procedural efficiencies, culminating in the (PCT) signed on June 19, 1970, and entering into force on January 24, 1978, administered by WIPO. The PCT enabled inventors to file a single international application designating multiple countries, deferring national examinations and providing an international search report to assess novelty, thereby reducing duplication in preliminary reviews without altering core patentability thresholds. By 2000, over 100 states had joined, streamlining global filings but preserving divergences in , such as the ' retention of a first-to-invent system versus 's first-to-file approach. Complementing this, the (EPC), signed October 5, 1973, and effective from 1977, established a supranational framework for centralized grant of patents valid in contracting states, harmonizing criteria like novelty (absolute, with a six-month for certain disclosures) and inventive step across . The century's most significant substantive harmonization emerged with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), concluded on April 15, 1994, as part of the under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and administered by the nascent (WTO) from 1995. TRIPS mandated minimum standards requiring patents for any inventions—products or processes—in all technology fields, provided they meet criteria of novelty, inventive step (or non-obviousness), and industrial applicability, with a uniform 20-year term from filing and non-discrimination between nationals and foreigners. It compelled over 150 members, including many developing nations previously exempting sectors like pharmaceuticals, to enact compliant laws by 2000 (or 2005 for least-developed countries), marking the first global baseline for patentability despite ongoing variances in implementation, such as grace periods or exceptions for compulsory licensing. This framework addressed empirical needs for incentivizing innovation amid globalization, though enforcement disputes highlighted tensions between developed exporters and importing economies.

Essential Criteria for Patentability

Novelty Requirements

Novelty in patent law requires that an must not have been disclosed to the public in any form prior to its effective filing date, ensuring that patents reward genuine innovation rather than known subject matter. This criterion, codified in statutes such as 35 U.S.C. § 102 in the United States, bars patentability if the claimed was patented, described in a printed publication, in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the application. Similarly, under Article 54 of the (EPC), an lacks novelty if it forms part of the "state of the art," defined as everything made available to the public by written or oral description, use, or any other means before the filing date. Prior art, which serves as the benchmark for assessing novelty, encompasses any evidence of public disclosure worldwide, including patents, scientific publications, product sales, public demonstrations, or even oral presentations, provided the disclosure enables a skilled to reproduce the . For novelty to be destroyed—often termed ""—a single reference must disclose all elements of the claimed explicitly or inherently, arranged as in the claim, without requiring undue experimentation. Jurisdictions apply this strictly on a claim-by-claim basis during examination, where patent offices search databases like those maintained by the USPTO or EPO to identify disqualifying references. A key distinction exists between absolute novelty, required in most countries under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Rights (TRIPS), and systems with a . Absolute novelty demands no prior public disclosure anywhere, with no exceptions for the inventor's own acts; for instance, the EPO adheres to this standard, though it provides limited exceptions for disclosures due to evident abuse or under specific EPC provisions like Article 55 for non-prejudicial disclosures within six months of filing. In contrast, the offers a one-year under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), excluding from any disclosure made one year or less before the effective filing date if it was made by the inventor, someone who obtained the subject matter from the inventor, or derived from the inventor's work. This U.S. provision, retained post-America Invents Act (AIA) effective March 16, 2013, aims to protect inventors from premature disclosures but risks forfeiting rights abroad, as over 170 countries enforce absolute novelty without equivalent s. National variations influence strategic filing: in absolute novelty regimes like or , even the inventor's trade show demonstration can bar patentability if predating the filing, underscoring the need for pre-filing . Examination for novelty involves comprehensive searches, often supplemented by applicant submissions, with rejections issued if is found; appeals may hinge on interpreting disclosure sufficiency, as courts require the prior art to "inevitably" lead to the claimed features for inherent anticipation. Failure to meet novelty halts patent grants, preserving the from monopolies on pre-existing knowledge.

Inventive Step and Non-Obviousness

The , known as in , constitutes a core criterion for patentability, requiring that an represent more than a predictable variation or combination of existing knowledge as viewed from the perspective of a having ordinary skill in the relevant art (PHOSITA) at the time of filing. This threshold ensures patents incentivize genuine innovation rather than routine advancements, thereby preserving the from undue extension of exclusivity over trivial modifications. Failure to meet this standard invalidates claims, as seen in jurisdictions where examiners or courts routinely reject applications involving mere aggregation of known elements without synergistic effects or unexpected results. In the United States, non-obviousness is codified under 35 U.S.C. § 103, which prohibits patenting if the differences between the claimed invention and render the subject matter obvious to the PHOSITA before the effective filing date, considering the invention as a whole. The in Graham v. John Deere Co. (383 U.S. 1, 1966) established a factual inquiry framework, including: (1) the scope and content of the ; (2) the differences between the and the claims at issue; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and (4) secondary considerations such as commercial success, long-felt but unresolved needs, and failure of others. This multi-factor test demands evidence-based analysis, with objective indicia serving as safeguards against . Subsequent clarification in KSR Int'l Co. v. Inc. (550 U.S. 398, 2007) rejected rigid requirements like explicit "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" to combine references, emphasizing a flexible, common-sense approach that accounts for predictable improvements and market pressures. For instance, combining familiar elements according to known methods yielding predictable results typically lacks non-obviousness, as affirmed in KSR, where the Court invalidated a patent on an adjustable pedal assembly due to obvious adaptations from existing designs. Under the European Patent Convention (EPC), Article 56 defines inventive step negatively: an invention involves it unless obvious to the skilled person in light of the state of the art. The European Patent Office (EPO) employs the problem-solution approach to structure assessments objectively, comprising three steps: (1) identifying the closest prior art (typically the most relevant single document solving a similar problem); (2) formulating the objective technical problem as the difference between that prior art and the invention; and (3) determining whether a skilled person, starting from the closest prior art and faced with that problem, would find the claimed solution obvious via routine experimentation or known alternatives. This methodology, refined through EPO case law since the 1970s, prioritizes technical effects over subjective invention stories, rejecting claims where solutions emerge from obvious trade-offs, such as substituting equivalent components without demonstrated advantages. Unlike the U.S. emphasis on secondary evidence, EPO practice focuses on technical contributions, though both systems converge on excluding hindsight-driven evaluations. Internationally, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Rights (TRIPS) under the mandates non-obviousness equivalents as minimum standards, fostering harmonization while permitting jurisdictional nuances, such as Japan's focus on "inventive step" via effect-based analysis or China's alignment with EPO-like reasoning. Empirical studies indicate stricter application post-KSR has reduced U.S. patent grants for incremental innovations by approximately 10-15% in affected fields like pharmaceuticals, underscoring the criterion's role in balancing innovation incentives against monopoly costs. In practice, applicants bolster claims with data on unexpected properties or commercial viability, yet examiners prioritize combinations, with appeal boards upholding rejections in over 60% of inventive step disputes at the EPO as of 2023.

Utility and Industrial Applicability

The utility requirement mandates that a claimed provide a specific, substantial, and credible real-world benefit, ensuring it is not merely theoretical or speculative. , this stems from 35 U.S.C. § 101, which limits patents to "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or , or any new and useful improvement thereof." The and (USPTO) evaluates utility under guidelines requiring the to achieve a stated purpose with a well-defined and particular real-world application, supported by evidence such as experimental data or established scientific principles when the utility is not immediately apparent. For instance, inventions like machines are routinely rejected for lacking credible utility, as they contradict known physical laws. In contrast, the (EPC) employs the term "industrial applicability" under Article 57, defining it as the capacity of an to be made or used in any kind of industry, including . The (EPO) assesses this by confirming the invention's technical character and feasibility for industrial production or use, without necessitating proof of a specific end-benefit beyond reproducibility and functionality. This criterion excludes inventions that are purely abstract or lack technical implementation, such as certain mathematical methods absent practical application, but permits broader claims if they demonstrate manufacturability. Internationally, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Rights (TRIPS) harmonizes these concepts by requiring patents for inventions "capable of industrial application" across all technology fields, equating the term with usefulness while allowing members flexibility in implementation. This minimum standard influences national laws but does not impose the U.S.-style evidentiary burden for credibility. Jurisdictional differences arise notably in fields like and pharmaceuticals, where U.S. examiners demand demonstrated efficacy—such as in vivo or data for new compounds—to avoid speculative utilities, as established in precedents like In re Fisher (1965), which invalidated claims for chemical intermediates without end-use correlation. European practice, however, often suffices with plausibility from the specification if industrial scalability is evident, leading to rejections primarily for non-technical subject matter rather than unproven benefits. These variances reflect causal priorities: U.S. emphasis on verifiable outcomes to prevent over-patenting low-value inventions, versus Europe's focus on technical reproducibility to foster innovation breadth. Both systems reject "inoperable" inventions lacking any practical or applicability, ensuring patents incentivize tangible advancements rather than mere ideas.

Eligible Subject Matter

Statutory Categories of Inventions

In patent law, statutory categories delineate the classes of subject matter deemed eligible for patent protection, serving as a threshold before assessing novelty, inventive step, or . These categories vary by but generally encompass tangible technological advancements, reflecting legislative intent to promote in practical arts. Internationally, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Rights (TRIPS), administered by the , establishes a baseline in Article 27, mandating that patents be available for "any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of ," provided they meet standard criteria, subject to limited exceptions for public order or morality. In the United States, 35 U.S.C. § 101 explicitly limits eligible subject matter to four categories: , , manufactures, and , or improvements thereof, if new and useful. A refers to a series of acts or steps, such as a method of production or treatment; a denotes a concrete apparatus with interrelated performing a function; a manufacture includes articles produced from raw materials through human intervention, like engineered devices; and a covers chemical compounds or mixtures, including pharmaceuticals. This framework, originating from the Patent Act and refined over time, excludes non-statutory categories like abstract ideas unless integrated into these forms, as affirmed in precedents interpreting the statute. Under the (EPC), Article 52(1) broadly authorizes patents for "any s" across technological fields that are new, inventive, and industrially applicable, without enumerating rigid categories but implying products (e.g., devices or substances) or processes (e.g., methods of manufacture). This approach emphasizes a functional definition of "" tied to technical character, allowing flexibility for while distinguishing from mere discoveries or non-technical schemes. National implementations, such as in the UK or , align with this, often classifying inventions as apparatus, substances, or methods yielding technical effects. Other jurisdictions, including and , adopt similar product-or-process dichotomies influenced by TRIPS, with Japan's Patent Act Article 2 defining inventions as "the creation of technical ideas utilizing natural laws." These categories ensure patents incentivize human ingenuity in applied sciences, excluding naturally occurring phenomena absent transformative effort, though interpretations evolve through and administrative guidance.

Exclusions: Abstract Ideas, Laws of Nature, and Natural Phenomena

In , codified under 35 U.S.C. § 101, inventions must fall within statutory categories—processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter—to be eligible, but judicial exceptions exclude laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from patentability, even if fitting those categories. These exceptions stem from the principle that such concepts represent fundamental truths or building blocks of human ingenuity that should remain freely available to prevent undue preemption of scientific progress. The has long recognized these limits, tracing back to cases like Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. (1942), where naturally occurring bacteria mixtures were deemed ineligible as products of nature. Laws of nature encompass universal principles describing how the world operates, such as gravitational forces or biochemical correlations, which cannot be patented in their pure form. In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. (decided March 20, 2012), the Supreme Court invalidated claims for a method of administering a drug and determining optimal dosage by measuring metabolite levels, ruling that the underlying correlation between dosage and blood metabolite concentration constituted a law of nature, while the additional steps of administering the drug and adjusting based on levels were conventional and added no inventive concept. This decision emphasized that merely applying a natural law to known methods does not transform it into patent-eligible subject matter, as such claims risk monopolizing the law itself. Natural phenomena include observable occurrences or products existing independently in nature, such as minerals, electricity, or unmodified biological materials. The Supreme Court's ruling in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. (June 13, 2013) held that isolated human DNA sequences, even if extracted from the genome, are ineligible as they are direct products of nature lacking markedly different characteristics from their native form; however, complementary DNA (cDNA), synthetically created from messenger RNA, was deemed eligible due to its non-natural structure. This distinction underscores that mere isolation or purification does not confer eligibility if the essence remains a natural product. Abstract ideas cover mental processes, mathematical formulas, or organizational methods performed in the human mind or by generic computers without technological improvement. Building on Mayo, the Court in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International (June 19, 2014) established a two-step framework for eligibility: first, determine if the claim is directed to a judicial exception like an abstract idea; second, examine whether additional elements transform it into a patent-eligible application by providing an inventive concept beyond routine or conventional activity. There, claims for mitigating in financial transactions via a computer-implemented scheme were invalidated as directed to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement, with generic computer use adding nothing inventive. Post-Alice, this test has led to scrutiny of software and business method patents, requiring claims to integrate exceptions into practical, innovative applications rather than merely automating mental tasks. These exclusions apply across jurisdictions influenced by U.S. precedents, though international frameworks like the separately bar discoveries and mathematical methods as non-inventions.

Evolving Standards for Technological Arts

The concept of "technological arts" has emerged as a pivotal criterion in determining eligibility, particularly to delineate inventions that advance technical fields from those rooted in abstract ideas, business methods, or non-technical schemes. In jurisdictions without explicit statutory language, courts have increasingly invoked this standard to ensure patents incentivize genuine technological progress rather than monopolizing fundamental concepts. This evolution reflects a judicial response to the proliferation of patent applications in digital and software domains since the late , where early permissiveness gave way to stricter scrutiny to prevent over-patenting of routine implementations. In Canada, the Supreme Court formalized the technological arts requirement in Amazon.com, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) (2011 SCC 77), ruling that patentable subject matter under section 2 of the Patent Act must pertain to the technological arts, defined as fields involving applied natural sciences yielding concrete, technical solutions rather than mere schemes or rules. The Court rejected Amazon's "one-click" purchasing method as ineligible, emphasizing that it addressed a business challenge without resolving a technical problem or effecting a , thereby overturning prior Federal Court of Appeal leniency toward methods. This decision marked a shift from pre-2011 practices, where examiners applied a broader purposive construction without a strict technological filter, leading to heightened rejections for software-implemented innovations unless demonstrating specific technical contributions, such as algorithmic improvements to network efficiency. United States jurisprudence has implicitly adopted analogous standards post-Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International (573 U.S. 208, 2014), where the invalidated claims for an abstract intermediated settlement idea implemented generically on computers, prompting Federal Circuit judges like to characterize the ruling as enshrining a "technological arts test" under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The USPTO's subsequent guidance, updated through examples in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP § 2106), directs examiners to assess whether claims integrate abstract ideas into a practical application via technological improvements, such as enhancing computer functionality (e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 2016, upholding lip synchronization software for automating technical animation processes). This two-step framework has evolved through over 70 Federal Circuit decisions by 2023, favoring eligibility for inventions claiming specific tech advancements like optimizations over generic automation, though persistent uncertainty has spurred legislative proposals to codify eligibility limits to technological domains. At the (EPO), eligibility for computer-implemented inventions hinges on "technical character" under Article 52(2)(c) EPC, excluding programs "as such" but allowing patents for those producing a "further technical effect" beyond routine hardware interactions, as clarified in guidelines updated post-2000 to address software surges. Landmark decisions like Vicom/ (T 208/84, 1986) initially permitted image processing algorithms for technical purposes, evolving to require contributions to internal computer operations or external technical fields, such as control systems in IBM/Text processing (T 115/85, 1990). Recent EPO Board of Appeal rulings, including on AI simulations (e.g., G 1/19, 2021), affirm eligibility if models adapt to technical environments like manufacturing processes, reflecting adaptive standards amid Industry 4.0 advancements while rejecting pure mathematical methods absent technical implementation. This approach contrasts with U.S. vagueness by emphasizing inventive step alongside technicality, fostering consistency through Enlarged Board referrals.

Examination and Validation Processes

Pre-Grant Examination Procedures

Pre-grant examination procedures involve the administrative and technical review of a by a national or regional to determine compliance with statutory requirements for patentability, such as novelty, inventive step, and industrial applicability, prior to issuance of a . This phase typically commences after filing a complete application and payment of requisite fees, encompassing formalities checks, searches, and iterative exchanges between the examiner and applicant to refine claims or address deficiencies. In the United States, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) initiates pre-examination processing upon receipt of a non-provisional utility patent application, verifying completeness, including presence of claims, specification, drawings if necessary, and fees. Formal examination ensures adherence to formatting rules under 37 C.F.R. § 1.52, after which the application advances to substantive examination assigned to an examiner in the relevant technology center. The examiner conducts a prior art search using databases like USPTO's internal systems, PATFT, and external resources, then evaluates the invention against 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and 112 for eligibility, novelty, non-obviousness, and enablement, respectively. An initial office action, typically issued within 14-24 months of filing, communicates allowability or rejections with cited prior art, prompting the applicant to respond within six months via amendments or arguments; failure to respond results in abandonment. Multiple rounds of office actions may occur, with examiner interviews permitted to resolve issues, culminating in a notice of allowance if deficiencies are overcome, followed by issuance 3-4 months later upon fee payment. Under the European Patent Convention (EPC), the European Patent Office (EPO) separates search from examination: post-filing, a formalities examination confirms eligibility for search, leading to publication of a search report and written opinion on patentability within nine months. To trigger substantive examination, applicants must file a request within six months of search report publication and pay the examination fee, as per Article 94 EPC. An examining division, comprising three technical experts, reviews the application against EPC Articles 52-57, issuing a first communication on objections, to which applicants respond with amended claims or counterarguments within four months; the division may summon parties for oral proceedings if needed. Third-party observations on patentability can be submitted anonymously before grant under Rule 114 EPC, influencing but not binding the examination. Approval leads to an intention to grant notice, requiring fee payment and translations for validation in designated states. Many jurisdictions incorporate pre-grant publication to disclose applications, typically 18 months post-filing priority date, balancing applicant rights with public access to ; in the , this occurs under 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) unless non-publication requested for non-PCT applications without foreign filing. Expedited options exist to accelerate examination, such as USPTO's Track One prioritized examination for applications with limited claims (up to four independent, 30 total), targeting final disposition within 12 months, or EPO's accelerated procedures upon request for urgent needs like . These procedures aim to filter invalid applications early, with global averages for first office actions around 16-20 months, though backlogs persist in high-volume offices.

Post-Grant Opposition and Reexamination

Post-grant opposition procedures enable third parties to contest the validity of a granted before the issuing authority, typically within a fixed period after issuance, on grounds such as lack of novelty or inventive step. These mechanisms aim to refine patent quality by permitting administrative review based on evidence available at or after grant, often avoiding the higher costs and delays of litigation. In systems employing opposition, such as under the , any natural or legal person may initiate proceedings irrespective of direct interest in the patent. The (EPO) opposition procedure exemplifies a centralized post-grant challenge, requiring filing within nine months of the grant's mention in the European Patent Bulletin, accompanied by payment of a fee. Grounds for opposition include absence of , lack of novelty or inventive step relative to , insufficient disclosure for enablement, or claims extending beyond the original application as filed. The EPO's Opposition Division, comprising three technically qualified examiners, examines the patent's validity de novo, potentially summoning parties for oral proceedings; outcomes range from full , maintenance in amended form, or upholding as granted, with appeals available to the EPO Boards of . In 2023, the EPO received 5,255 oppositions against 47,089 granted European patents, indicating a challenge rate of approximately 11%. In contrast, reexamination provides a mechanism for reassessing issued primarily on grounds, initiated by any interested party or the patent owner. reexamination, effective since July 1, 1981, under 35 U.S.C. §§ 302-307, may be requested at any time during the patent's enforceability if substantial new questions of patentability arise from patents or printed publications, prompting the Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to issue an order for reexamination if warranted. The examiner conducts a full reexamination akin to initial prosecution, allowing the patent owner to amend claims but excluding third-party participation after initiation; certificates issue confirming, amending, or partially canceling claims, with statistics showing about 1,200 requests filed from 1981 to 2012 before related inter partes options expanded. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), enacted September 16, 2011, introduced adversarial post-grant reviews to supplant the prior inter partes reexamination system, which ceased acceptance after September 16, 2012. Post-grant review (PGR) permits petitions within nine months of grant or reissue, challenging claims on any ground under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, , 103, or 112 except best mode, before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB); institution requires a showing that it is more likely than not that at least one claim is unpatentable. Inter partes review (IPR), available thereafter (or post-PGR), limits grounds to novelty and non-obviousness over patents or publications under §§ and 103, with trials featuring discovery, expert testimony, and oral hearings; PTAB decisions, appealable to the Federal Circuit, have invalidated claims in roughly 70-80% of instituted cases annually since inception. These AIA proceedings emphasize efficiency, targeting completion within 12-18 months, and have handled over 15,000 petitions by 2023, significantly impacting patent enforcement dynamics. Other jurisdictions, such as , maintain post-grant opposition systems allowing third-party requests for invalidation trials on similar substantive grounds, while systems like India's permit pre- and post-grant oppositions with broader participation to balance innovation incentives against monopoly risks. These procedures vary in timelines, evidentiary standards, and paths, reflecting national priorities in harmonizing under frameworks like the , which mandates expeditious invalidity challenges without prescribing specific post-grant forms.

International Frameworks and National Variations

TRIPS Agreement and Global Minimum Standards

The , concluded on 15 April 1994 as Annex 1C to the establishing the and entering into force on 1 January 1995, obliges WTO members to adhere to minimum standards for protection, including patents, to promote while respecting national sovereignty. These standards apply to all fields of technology without discrimination based on the place of or whether the product is imported or locally produced, incorporating principles of national treatment and most-favored-nation status under Articles 3 and 4. Article 27.1 mandates that patents be available for any inventions—products or processes—in all technological fields, contingent on meeting three core criteria: novelty (newness), inventive step (non-obviousness to a person skilled in the art), and capability of industrial application (usefulness in industry, including ). A footnote to Article 27 clarifies that "inventive step" and "capable of industrial application" equate to "non-obviousness" and "industrial applicability," "usefulness," or equivalents in domestic laws, allowing flexibility in implementation without diluting the substantive requirements. Applicants must also disclose the invention sufficiently to enable skilled replication, as per Article 29.1, ensuring public access to technical knowledge upon grant. Permissible exclusions from patentability under Article 27.2 include inventions whose prevention of commercial exploitation is necessary to safeguard ordre public or —encompassing risks to , , or life, , or the environment—and under Article 27.3(a), diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods for treating or . Article 27.3(b) further permits exclusion of and (excluding microorganisms), though microbiological processes and non-biological processes for producing them must remain patentable; members are required to protect plant varieties via patents, a system, or both. These provisions balance broad technological coverage with targeted safeguards, though implementation varies, with some members opting for narrower exclusions to maximize incentives. The minimum term of protection, per Article 33, extends to at least 20 years from the filing date, adjustable for delays in grant but not extendable beyond this floor absent specific flexibilities like compulsory licensing under Article 31. Article 28 delineates exclusive rights conferred, enabling owners to prohibit third parties from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing the patented product, or using the process or its direct products, with additional rights to assign or license the patent. Limited exceptions under Article 30 are allowable if they do not unreasonably conflict with normal exploitation or prejudice rights holders, such as for experimental use or regulatory review. These standards establish a global baseline, enforced through WTO dispute settlement, though developing countries received transition periods until 2000 (or 2013 for pharmaceuticals in some cases) to comply.

United States Patent System

The patent system, administered by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), grants inventors exclusive rights to make, use, and sell inventions for limited periods to promote innovation, as authorized by Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution. The system primarily operates under Title 35 of the , with core principles codified in the Act of 1952 and amended by statutes such as the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) of 2011, which shifted priority determination from a first-to-invent to a first-inventor-to-file basis for applications filed on or after March 16, 2013, thereby harmonizing with global standards under the while retaining U.S.-specific derivations for true inventors disadvantaged by derivation from others. This change reduced interference proceedings—costly adjudications of invention priority—and expedited grant decisions, though it disadvantages individual inventors who delay filing relative to well-resourced entities filing promptly. Patentable subject matter in the U.S. is limited to processes, machines, manufactures, compositions of matter, or improvements thereof that are , non-obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art, , and sufficiently described to enable replication without undue experimentation, per 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 and 112. Utility patents, comprising over 90% of grants, protect functional inventions for 20 years from the earliest non-provisional filing date, subject to maintenance fees at 3.5, 7.5, and 11.5 years post-issuance; patents safeguard ornamental appearances for 15 years from grant; and plant patents cover distinct, asexually reproduced varieties for 20 years from filing. Applications undergo rigorous substantive examination by USPTO examiners, who search and issue office actions for amendments or arguments, with applicants able to appeal rejections to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB); approval rates hover around 50–60% after prosecution, emphasizing of inventive step over mere novelty. In contrast to centralized pre-grant oppositions under the , the U.S. system features limited pre-grant third-party submissions but robust post-grant proceedings established by the AIA, including inter partes review (IPR) for challenges, post-grant review (PGR) for broader validity issues within nine months of issuance, and supplemental examination for new . These mechanisms have invalidated claims in approximately 80% of instituted IPRs for challenged patents, providing a cost-effective alternative to district court litigation while addressing concerns over low-quality grants. Enforcement occurs primarily through federal courts, where patentees can seek injunctions and damages up to treble for willful infringement, contributing to the U.S.'s position as a global leader in protection, though critics note higher litigation rates compared to opposition-heavy systems abroad. The system's emphasis on private rights and judicial remedies fosters rapid commercialization but has prompted reforms to curb non-practicing entity abuse, with empirical studies linking strong U.S. patents to trillions in annual economic output from incentives.

European Patent Convention and Unitary Patent

The (EPC), signed on October 5, 1973, and entered into force on October 7, 1977, establishes a unified procedure for granting patents effective in multiple contracting states through the (EPO). As of 2025, the EPC has 39 contracting states, including all EU member states plus non-EU countries such as , , , and (which joined the EU but remains an EPC state). Under the EPC, patentability requires that an invention be new (Article 54), involve an inventive step (Article 56), and be susceptible of industrial application (Article 57). Article 52(1) EPC defines patentable inventions as those in all fields of technology meeting the above criteria, emphasizing a broad technological scope without categorical exclusions beyond specified limits. Exclusions under Article 52(2) cover discoveries, scientific theories, mathematical methods, aesthetic creations, schemes or rules for mental acts, games or business activities, computer programs, and presentations of information, but Article 52(3) limits these to subject matter "as such," permitting patentability when claims involve a technical contribution or effect beyond the excluded category. For instance, computer-implemented inventions qualify if they solve a technical problem using technical means, as assessed by EPO guidelines interpreting these provisions. The EPO examines applications centrally, granting a European patent that becomes a bundle of national patents upon validation in designated states, with patentability decisions binding across the system. The system, operational since June 1, 2023, extends the EPC by allowing a granted European to acquire unitary effect across participating member states via a single post-grant request to the EPO. Patentability criteria remain identical to those under the EPC, with the EPO applying Articles 52-57 without alteration; the innovation lies in streamlined validation and uniform enforcement rather than redefined eligibility. As of September 1, 2024, unitary effect covers 18 states, including initial ratifiers like , , , and later joiners such as . Non-participating EPC states, such as non- members or opt-outs like and , require traditional national validations, preserving the EPC's flexibility while the reduces administrative costs for broader coverage—estimated at up to 90% of EPO grants potentially qualifying. Disputes for fall under the (), centralizing infringement and validity challenges, though opt-out options exist for traditional European . This framework maintains EPC patentability standards but enhances efficiency, with over 26,000 unitary effect requests filed in the first year of operation.

Emerging Economies: China and India

China's patent system, governed by the Patent Law of the People's Republic of China as amended in 2020, aligns with TRIPS Agreement minimum standards by requiring novelty, inventive step, and industrial applicability for inventions, alongside protections for utility models and designs. The China National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA) has seen explosive growth in filings, with 1.68 million patent applications received in 2023, representing a 3.6% increase from 2022 and positioning China as the global leader. In 2024, CNIPA granted 1.045 million invention patents, a 13.5% year-on-year rise, including 92,000 to foreign applicants from January to October. Amendments effective January 2024 to the Implementing Regulations introduced patent term adjustments for delays in examination exceeding three years from filing or four years from request, aiming to bolster enforcement amid criticisms of prior delays. Recent guidelines emphasize rejecting applications lacking genuine invention-creation activities, addressing concerns over low-quality filings incentivized by subsidies. India's Patents Act, 1970, as amended to comply with TRIPS in 2005, imposes stricter patentability thresholds, particularly under Section 3(d), which bars patents for new forms of known substances—such as salts, esters, or polymorphs—unless they demonstrate enhanced therapeutic efficacy over the original. This provision targets "" in pharmaceuticals, prioritizing access in a generics-dominant market, and has rejected claims for incremental modifications without proven benefits, as upheld in cases involving novel intermediates requiring efficacy data. grants surged to approximately 100,000 in 2024, up from 6,000 annually a decade prior, with a 149.4% increase in 2023 alone, reflecting growth exceeding 1.25 million entities by March 2024. India's first-to-file system contrasts with China's in its foreign filing license requirements and compulsory licensing flexibilities, enabling government intervention for public needs, though examination pendency remains a challenge despite reductions to 15 months on average. Both nations leverage TRIPS flexibilities differently: China's post-1993 product patent regime for pharmaceuticals adopted stringent protections, fostering domestic R&D but raising enforcement issues, while India's delayed product patents until 2005 emphasize utility over novelty alone to curb monopolies. In emerging contexts, China's volume-driven approach—exceeding 4 million valid domestic invention patents by 2024—supports state-led innovation in sectors like AI and biotech, yet invites scrutiny for substantive review rigor. India's efficacy-focused criteria sustain its position as a global generics hub, with IP filings up 44% from 2020–21 to 2024–25, balancing innovation incentives against affordability.

Key Controversies

Software, Business Methods, and Algorithmic Inventions

In the , the patent eligibility of software, business methods, and algorithmic inventions has been contentious since the late , with courts grappling over whether such claims constitute under 35 U.S.C. § 101 or merely abstract ideas preempting basic tools of commerce and mathematics. The Federal Circuit's 1998 decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group opened the door to business method patents by upholding claims to a system for portfolio management, rejecting prior categorical exclusions. However, the Supreme Court's 2010 ruling in Bilski v. Kappos clarified that the Patent Act excludes abstract ideas, including certain business methods, while discarding the rigid "machine-or-transformation" test as the sole criterion for eligibility, allowing for case-by-case . This culminated in the 2014 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International decision, establishing a two-step framework: claims directed to an abstract idea (e.g., mitigating financial via software) are ineligible unless they include an inventive concept transforming the idea into a patent-eligible application, such as improving computer functionality beyond generic implementation. Post-Alice, federal courts have invalidated thousands of software and business method patents, with empirical showing a 50-60% invalidation rate in § 101 challenges by , prompting debates over whether this rigor eliminates low-quality patents or unduly hampers technological progress. Recent USPTO guidance on algorithmic inventions, particularly those involving artificial intelligence, reinforces Alice scrutiny while offering pathways for eligibility when claims demonstrate technical improvements, such as enhanced machine learning model training efficiency or specific hardware integrations that solve concrete technological problems. For instance, the USPTO's July 2024 update to subject matter eligibility examples emphasizes that AI claims reciting mathematical models alone remain abstract, but those integrating practical applications—like optimizing network routing via novel algorithms—may qualify if they provide "significantly more" than the underlying idea. Critics argue this framework perpetuates uncertainty, as evidenced by a surge in § 101 rejections for software-related applications, rising from 40% pre-Alice to over 60% by 2023, potentially deterring investment in algorithmic R&D. Proponents counter that it weeds out vague claims, with one study finding that Alice correlated with a 10-15% increase in patent value for surviving software inventions due to higher perceived quality. In , under Article 52(2)(c) of the , computer programs, mathematical methods, and business methods are excluded from patentability "as such," but claims producing a non-obvious technical effect beyond mere —such as improving accuracy in a —remain eligible. The has granted over 50,000 software-related patents annually by 2023, focusing on "technical character" per guidelines updated in 2023, yet this has sparked over inconsistent application, with appeals boards overturning exclusions in cases like T 0641/00 (Vicom) where image processing algorithms yielded technical contributions. Empirical assessments indicate that Europe's stricter stance correlates with slower software patent growth compared to the U.S. pre-Alice era, but higher grant quality, as measured by forward citations per patent. The core controversy centers on causal impacts: detractors, often citing litigation data, claim software and business method patents enable "patent trolls" to extract rents without , with U.S. business method litigation peaking at 30% of patent suits in 2010 before Alice reductions. However, rigorous studies refute blanket assertions of harm, finding no that business method patents systematically reduce overall rates; instead, they facilitate via licensing, contributing to sector-specific R&D spillovers in and . A 2024 analysis post- observed stimulated firm , with patent-intensive software firms showing 8-12% higher gains, suggesting eligibility thresholds enhance rather than erode inventive activity when calibrated to exclude pure abstractions. These debates underscore tensions between incentivizing technical solutions and avoiding over-patenting routine implementations, with ongoing reforms like the USPTO's 2024 AI guidance aiming to balance disclosure incentives against preemption risks.

Biotechnology, Gene Sequences, and Living Organisms

The patentability of , particularly and living organisms, has sparked significant debate over whether such subject matter qualifies as eligible inventions under patent law, balancing innovation incentives against ethical and practical concerns about monopolizing fundamental biological building blocks. In the United States, the in Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980) ruled 5-4 that a genetically engineered bacterium capable of degrading crude oil components constituted patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as it was a human-made product distinct from naturally occurring phenomena, thereby extending patent eligibility to non-naturally occurring microorganisms. This decision facilitated the growth of the sector by clarifying that "anything under the sun that is made by man" could be patentable, leading to increased investment and over 3,000 biotech patents issued by the alone in subsequent years under similar principles. Subsequent U.S. rulings refined boundaries for gene sequences. In Association for Molecular Pathology v. , Inc. (2013), the unanimously held that isolated naturally occurring DNA sequences, such as the and genes linked to breast and risk, are ineligible for patenting as they remain products of nature despite isolation, though (cDNA) created via laboratory synthesis qualifies due to its non-natural structure. This distinction aimed to prevent overreach in claiming genomic information inherent to human biology while permitting protection for inventive processes that alter genetic material. Post-ruling empirical data indicated expanded access to , with BRCA testing volumes increasing and prices declining by over 90% within a decade, suggesting that barring patents on native sequences reduced barriers to downstream research and diagnostics without evident diminishment in biotech innovation. In , the Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions (98/44/EC, adopted 1998) harmonized standards, permitting patents on isolated biological material—including gene sequences and microorganisms—provided they demonstrate a specific industrial application and disclosed function, while excluding inventions contrary to ordre public or morality, such as processes for human beings. The implements this via Rules 26-29, allowing claims to sequences encoding proteins with technical effects but prohibiting patents on plant or animal varieties per se or essentially biological processes for their production. Internationally, the (Article 27.3(b)) mandates patent protection for microorganisms and microbiological processes but permits exclusions for plants and animals, requiring instead sui generis protection for plant varieties, a flexibility exploited by countries like to safeguard against expansive biotech claims. Controversies center on ethical objections to "patenting life," with critics arguing that such grants commodify natural resources, potentially stifling cumulative innovation by imposing licensing fees on foundational genetic elements, as seen in pre-Myriad litigation where Myriad enforced BRCA patents to limit competing tests. Proponents counter that empirical evidence from the post-Chakrabarty era shows patents spurred advancements, including technologies that generated a multi-billion-dollar industry, without causal proof of net research suppression. For higher organisms, patents on transgenic animals like the Harvard Oncomouse (1988) raised moral qualms about and species integrity, yet courts upheld them where human intervention conferred novelty, though exclusions persist for conventional breeding to avoid over-patenting incremental agricultural gains. Overall, while academic sources often amplify anti-patent critiques rooted in egalitarian impulses, causal analyses indicate that targeted eligibility—excluding mere discoveries—better aligns with first-principles incentives for inventive risk-taking in biotech.

Artificial Intelligence and Inventorship Challenges

The core challenge in AI and inventorship arises from traditional patent statutes requiring inventors to be natural persons capable of legal rights and obligations, while AI systems autonomously generate outputs that may qualify as inventive concepts. In 2018, Stephen Thaler developed DABUS, a device for the autonomous bootstrapping of unified sentience, and filed patent applications listing it as the sole inventor for creations such as a fractal food container and a neural flame emergency light beacon. These filings tested whether machines could satisfy statutory inventor definitions, prompting rejections across multiple jurisdictions on grounds that AI lacks personhood, intent, and capacity to conceive inventions independently of human oversight. In the United States, the USPTO has consistently held that inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 101 requires a , as the statute refers to "whoever invents or discovers" implying agency. Thaler's applications were denied in 2019, a decision upheld by the Federal Circuit in 2022, which emphasized that conception—the formation of a definite and permanent idea of the —must involve intellectual labor, not mere AI execution of prompts. On February 13, , the USPTO issued guidance clarifying that AI-assisted inventions remain patentable if a significantly contributes to conception, such as by formulating problems, directing AI parameters, or recognizing and refining AI outputs into patentable claims; however, purely AI-generated inventions without such input fail inventorship. This approach prioritizes incentivizing ingenuity while accommodating AI tools, though it raises disputes over quantifying "significant contribution," potentially leading to evidentiary burdens in examination or litigation. European jurisdictions align closely, with the European Patent Office (EPO) ruling in December 2021 that the European Patent Convention's inventor designation applies only to natural persons, as machines cannot hold rights or fulfill duties like oath requirements. The EPO reaffirmed this in a December 2024 decision rejecting Thaler's appeal in the DABUS case, stating that even autonomous AI outputs derive from human-designed systems and data. Germany's Federal Court of Justice echoed this on June 11, 2024, declaring AI ineligible as inventor under national law, reinforcing that patent systems presuppose human creativity for conception. A Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property ruling on July 15, 2025, further clarified that AI lacks the autonomy for intellectual creation, necessitating human intervention for valid inventorship, though it signaled flexibility for human-AI collaborations by not disqualifying applications with AI assistance. In the , the unanimously ruled on December 20, 2023, that the Patents Act 1977 limits inventors to humans, rejecting Thaler's argument that qualified under a purposive interpretation; the noted AI's inability to own patents or transfer , underscoring statutory intent to reward human contributors. Internationally, variations persist but trend toward human-centric standards: Japan's IP upheld rejections in 2025, while South Africa's 2021 grant to lacked substantive review and remains an outlier without precedential weight. These rulings highlight causal dependencies—AI inventions trace to human-provided training data, algorithms, and prompts—challenging claims of pure machine and prompting calls for legislative updates to clarify ownership chains, such as vesting in AI developers or users based on verifiable contributions. Persistent challenges include ownership attribution, as AI cannot legally assign patents, risking disputes between programmers, data providers, and deployers; empirical analyses suggest this could deter investment in AI R&D without reforms, though no as of October 2025 recognizes AI inventorship outright. Policy debates center on balancing incentives: excluding AI-generated works might stifle progress, yet diluting inventorship requirements could undermine the patent system's rationale of rewarding mental effort, as evidenced by consistent judicial emphasis on conception as a human mental act.

Economic and Societal Impacts

Empirical Evidence on Innovation Incentives

Empirical studies surveying innovators consistently find that patents serve as a key incentive for in sectors characterized by high (R&D) costs and straightforward risks, such as pharmaceuticals and chemicals. For example, Mansfield's 1986 survey of U.S. firms indicated that patents were essential for 60% of pharmaceutical inventions and 38% of chemical innovations, without which development would not occur due to inadequate alternative appropriation mechanisms like or . Similarly, the Berkeley Technology Law Journal survey of biotech startups ranked patents as the most effective means of capturing value from innovations, underscoring their role in enabling costly s and regulatory approvals. In these fields, patent exclusivity allows firms to recoup investments averaging billions per new drug, with evidence from quasi-experiments showing that reductions in effective patent life—such as through extended durations—correlate with diminished R&D directed at high-mortality cancers. In contrast, evidence from other sectors reveals weaker or negligible incentive effects. Surveys like the Yale 1987 and Carnegie Mellon 2000 studies rank patents below alternatives such as process innovations or complementary sales in electronics, machinery, and software, where cumulative knowledge builds on and patents may instead impose blocking costs on follow-on inventors. Aggregate analyses, including Lerner’s 2009 examination of patent reforms across 60 countries from 1850 to 1999, find no positive association between strengthened protection and proxies like British patent filings, suggesting patents influence the direction rather than the overall volume of inventive activity. Historical data from 19th-century world fairs, analyzed by Moser, demonstrate that patent-free jurisdictions like and the sustained robust rates by shifting efforts toward non-patentable domains (e.g., user innovations in chemicals), implying that patents redirect resources without necessarily expanding total output. Patent policy changes provide causal tests with mixed outcomes. The 1988 Japanese reforms, which broadened claim scope and reduced examination stringency, yielded no statistically significant rise in firm-level R&D expenditures or domestic patenting rates, despite practitioners anticipating stronger incentives. Qian’s 2007 study of 26 countries adopting pharmaceutical product patents between 1978 and 2002 similarly detected no uptick in U.S.-filed, citation-weighted patents for affected drugs. Comprehensive reviews conclude that while patents complement other mechanisms in targeted industries, broader strengthening does not reliably elevate aggregate R&D or innovation, particularly for socially valuable but commercially marginal pursuits like treatments, where market failures persist. These findings highlight sector heterogeneity, with patents proving most efficacious where is challenging absent legal monopoly, but potentially counterproductive in knowledge-intensive fields prone to hold-up problems.

Criticisms: Litigation Abuse, Patent Trolls, and Monopoly Effects

Critics argue that the patent system facilitates excessive litigation, imposing substantial economic burdens on defendants through costly defenses and settlements, often regardless of merit. , patent lawsuits numbered over 6,000 annually in recent years, with defense costs averaging $1-4 million per case for small to medium enterprises. This litigation volume has surged since the , driven by low barriers to filing and high settlement incentives, as plaintiffs frequently leverage the threat of protracted trials to extract payments, even for weak claims. Non-practicing entities (NPEs), commonly termed patent trolls, exemplify this abuse by acquiring primarily for enforcement rather than commercialization, initiating suits against operating companies without producing or services themselves. NPEs accounted for approximately 67% of all U.S. patent lawsuits between 2005 and 2019, targeting sectors like where infringement detection is asymmetric. These entities impose direct out-of-pocket costs of $29 billion annually on defendants, alongside destroying over $60 billion in firm wealth through stock value declines and diverted resources. Empirical analyses indicate that NPE litigation reduces by chilling investment in R&D, with affected firms cutting patenting activity by up to 20% post-suit, as resources shift to legal defenses rather than development. Moreover, NPEs disproportionately target smaller firms, with over 52% of defendants from 2017-2022 having revenues under $25 million, exacerbating inequities as these entities lack the scale to counter aggressive assertions. Patents confer exclusive rights akin to monopolies, enabling holders to set supra-competitive prices and suppress rivals, which critics contend distorts markets and harms consumers. Economic theory posits that such exclusivity allows pricing above marginal cost for the patent term, typically 20 years, reducing output and allocative efficiency until expiry. Empirical evidence from consumer products shows prices drop significantly—often by 30-50%—upon patent expiration, confirming elevated monopoly pricing during protection, particularly in pharmaceuticals where extensions via secondary patents sustain high costs. This dynamic limits access, as seen in drug markets where patent-protected monopolies contribute to annual U.S. healthcare expenditures exceeding $500 billion in avoidable costs, while stifling follow-on innovation through blocking effects on cumulative technologies. Although proponents cite incentives for initial invention, causal studies reveal that monopoly rents often exceed necessary rewards, fostering rent-seeking over genuine progress and entrenching incumbents against entrants.

Net Assessment from Causal Analyses

Quasi-experimental analyses of U.S. Federal Circuit invalidations reveal that removing rights increases forward citations to the invalidated by approximately 50% on average, with effects reaching 178-320% in complex fields like computers, , and , evidencing that patents frequently block follow-on through hold-up and incomplete contracting. These blocking effects are amplified in scenarios involving large patentees and small entrants, where post-invalidation citations from smaller firms surge by up to 520%, highlighting frictions rather than enhanced disclosure as the dominant mechanism. In non-complex domains such as chemicals and mechanical technologies, no such citation boosts occur, suggesting patents' impeding role is context-specific to cumulative, fragmented landscapes. Patent law reforms provide further causal insights, with Japan's 1988 expansion of patent scope (allowing multi-claims) failing to elevate firm-level R&D spending or patent filings among sampled manufacturers, despite increased claim breadth. Cross-country strengthening of patent protections over 150 years, proxied by foreign filings in unaffected markets like Britain, similarly yields no detectable rise in domestic innovation proxies. In , eligibility extensions to human genes exhibit null or reductive impacts on subsequent research citations and product development, as natural experiments around grant variations show diminished follow-on activity in genome-related science. Sectoral variation tempers these findings: in pharmaceuticals, shorter effective patent terms due to regulatory causally reduce cancer R&D investments, affirming incentives for discrete, high-cost inventions with low spillovers. Yet, dynamic panel regressions spanning 70 countries from 1965-2009 detect no significant association between patent index scores and growth, irrespective of development status, implying proprietary rights contribute negligibly to broader economic dynamism compared to knowledge diffusion and absorptive capacities. Synthesizing these causal designs, patents yield marginal incentives in R&D-barrier-heavy sectors like drugs but predominantly generate deadweight losses via blocking in interconnected technologies, with law shocks and invalidations underscoring limited net stimulation of inventive output or growth; alternative institutions, such as lead-time advantages or collaborative norms, appear sufficient for much , rendering the system's overall causal efficacy neutral at best and counterproductive in diffusion-reliant domains.

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