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Patent
Patent
from Wikipedia
A patent issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office

A patent is a type of intellectual property that gives its owner the legal right to exclude others from making, using, or selling an invention for a limited period of time in exchange for publishing an enabling disclosure of the invention.[1] In most countries, patent rights fall under private law and the patent holder must sue someone infringing the patent in order to enforce their rights.[2]

The procedure for granting patents, requirements placed on the patentee, and the extent of the exclusive rights vary widely between countries according to national laws and international agreements. Typically, however, a patent application must include one or more claims that define the scope of protection that is being sought. A patent may include many claims, each of which defines a specific property right.

Under the World Trade Organization's (WTO) TRIPS Agreement, patents should be available in WTO member states for any invention, in all fields of technology, provided they are new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial application.[3] Nevertheless, there are variations on what is patentable subject matter from country to country, also among WTO member states. TRIPS also provides that the term of protection available should be a minimum of twenty years.[4] Some countries have other patent-like forms of intellectual property, such as utility models, which have a shorter monopoly period.

Definition

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The word patent originates from the Latin patere, which means "to lay open" (i.e., to make available for public inspection). It is a shortened version of the term letters patent, which was an open document or instrument issued by a monarch or government granting exclusive rights to a person, predating the modern patent system. Similar grants included land patents, which were land grants by early state governments in the US, and printing patents, a precursor of modern copyright.

In modern usage, the term patent usually refers to the right granted to anyone who invents something new, useful and non-obvious. A patent is often referred to as a form of intellectual property right,[5][6] an expression which is also used to refer to trademarks and copyrights,[6] and which has proponents and detractors (see also Intellectual property § The term "intellectual property").

Some other types of intellectual property rights are also called patents in some jurisdictions: industrial design rights are called design patents in the US,[7] plant breeders' rights are sometimes called plant patents,[8] and utility models and Gebrauchsmuster are sometimes called petty patents or innovation patents. The additional qualification utility patent is sometimes used (primarily in the US) to distinguish the primary meaning from these other types of patents.

Particular types of patents for inventions include biological patents, business method patents, chemical patents and software patents.

History

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The Venetian Patent Statute, issued by the Senate of Venice in 1474, one of the earliest statutory patent systems in the world

Although there is evidence that some form of patent rights was recognized in Ancient Greece in the city of Sybaris,[9][10] the first statutory patent system is generally regarded to be the Venetian Patent Statute of 1474. However, recent historical research has suggested that the 1474 Statute was inspired by laws in the Kingdom of Jerusalem that granted monopolies to developers of novel silk-making techniques.[11] Patents were systematically granted in Venice as of 1474, where they issued a decree by which new and inventive devices had to be communicated to the Republic in order to obtain legal protection against potential infringers. The period of protection was 10 years.[12] As Venetians emigrated, they sought similar patent protection in their new homes. This led to the diffusion of patent systems to other countries.[13]

The English patent system evolved from its early medieval origins into the first modern patent system that recognised intellectual property in order to stimulate invention; this was the crucial legal foundation upon which the Industrial Revolution could emerge and flourish.[14] By the 16th century, the English Crown would habitually abuse the granting of letters patent for monopolies.[15] After public outcry, King James I of England (VI of Scotland) was forced to revoke all existing monopolies and declare that they were only to be used for "projects of new invention". This was incorporated into the Statute of Monopolies (1624) in which Parliament restricted the Crown's power explicitly so that the King could only issue letters patent to the inventors or introducers of original inventions for a fixed number of years. The Statute became the foundation for later developments in patent law in England and elsewhere.

James Puckle's 1718 early autocannon was one of the first inventions required to provide a specification for a patent.

Important developments in patent law emerged during the 18th century through a slow process of judicial interpretation of the law. During the reign of Queen Anne, patent applications were required to supply a complete specification of the principles of operation of the invention for public access.[16] Legal battles around the 1796 patent taken out by James Watt for his steam engine, established the principles that patents could be issued for improvements of an already existing machine and that ideas or principles without specific practical application could also legally be patented.[17]

The English legal system became the foundation for patent law in countries with a common law heritage, including the United States, New Zealand and Australia. In the Thirteen Colonies, inventors could obtain patents through petition to a given colony's legislature. In 1641, Samuel Winslow was granted the first patent in North America by the Massachusetts General Court for a new process for making salt.[18]

The modern French patent system was created during the Revolution in 1791.[19] Patents were granted without examination since inventor's right was considered as a natural one. Patent costs were very high (from 500 to 1,500 francs). Importation patents protected new devices coming from foreign countries. The patent law was revised in 1844 – patent cost was lowered and importation patents were abolished.[20]

The first Patent Act of the U.S. Congress was passed on April 10, 1790, titled "An Act to promote the progress of useful Arts".[21] The first patent under the Act was granted on July 31, 1790, to Samuel Hopkins of Vermont for a method of producing potash (potassium carbonate).[22] A revised patent law was passed in 1793, and in 1836 a major revision was passed. The 1836 law instituted a significantly more rigorous application process, including the establishment of an examination system. Between 1790 and 1836 about ten thousand patents were granted. By the American Civil War about 80,000 patents had been granted.[23]

Gender gap in patents

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Share of women amongst listed inventors in PCT applications from 2009 till 2023. In 2023, 17.7% of inventors were women.[24]

The first patent in England known to be granted to a woman was to Mrs. Amye Everard Ball in 1637 for a tincture of saffron.[25][26]

In the US, married women were historically precluded from obtaining patents. While section 1 of the Patent Act of 1790 did refer to "she",[27] married women were unable to own property in their own name and were also prohibited from rights to their own income, including income from anything they invented.[28] This historical gender gap has lessened over the course of the 20th and 21st centuries, however, disparity is still prevalent.[29] In the UK, for example, only 8% of inventors were female as of 2015.[30] This can partly be attributed to historical barriers for women to obtain patents,[28] as well as to the fact that women are underrepresented in traditionally "patent-intensive" sectors, particularly STEM sectors.[29] Marcowitz-Bitton et al. argue that the gender gap in patents is also a result of internal bias within the patent system.[29]

Innovation decline

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The number of patent applications filed each year has been growing for most countries although not smoothly, and jumps in activity are often observed due to changes in local laws. The high number of patent families for Spain in the 1800s is related to the superior preservation and cataloguing of the data by Spanish Patent and Trademark Office compared to other countries (see 1836 U.S. Patent Office fire). The US was the World's leader in terms of patent families filed between 1900 and 1966, when Japan took over. Since 2007 PR China leads.

Number of patent families published by different authorities vs. earliest priority date

However, in most technologically advanced countries (see, for example, France,[31] Italy, Japan,[32] Spain, Sweden, the UK[33][34] in the figure on the right, as well as in Poland[35]), the total (i.e. regardless of the priority/inventors' country) number of patent families filed there have been declining in absolute numbers since c. 1970s–1980s. The decline is even more pronounced when the number of patent applications is normalized by the country's population each year, or when the country of origin rather than country of filing is used.[36] For the US, the population-normalized peak in patenting occurred in 1915,[37] and the number of subsequent patents induced per patent has been mostly declining since 1926.[38] A study of 4,512 patents obtained by Stanford University between 1970 and 2020 showed that the university's patenting activity plateaued in the 2010s.[39] Incidentally, only 20% of Stanford patents in that dataset produced a positive net income for the university, while the rest was a net loss.

Similar declines have been noted not only for the number of patents, but also for other measures of innovation output.[40][37]

Several hypotheses have been proposed as explanations for the observed decline:

  1. increasing cost of doing research, as "lower-hanging fruits have been picked up";[41][42][43]
  2. decrease in productivity per researcher;[44][45][43] This occurred because factor (1) (higher hanging fruits) overwhelms increased efficiency in computation, automation, big data analysis and communication.
  3. human civilization is reaching the limits of the human brain rather than technological limits. "For the first time in history people are bombarded with far more information than they can process."[37]
  4. It has also been suggested[46] that the rate of innovation is proportional to the rate of population growth (rather than to the total population), and that the observed decline in research productivity is related to the resource-limited Malthusian growth model.
  5. increasing fragmentation of patent encumbrance[47][48] and increasing number and cost of patent litigations;[49]
  6. decreasing value of patents in post-industrial economies, as businesses prefer less risky and more profitable investments in software rather than in hardware,[50][48] which can be protected more effectively and at a lower cost by using copyrights, trade secrets, first mover advantage, download limitations (see digital economy).[51] A related decline of manufacturing share in the GDP of post-industrial countries has been reported in some studies.[52]
  7. a slow-down in patent applications in the US has been attributed to court decisions in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.(2012), Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. (2013) and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International (2014) limiting the eligibility of business method and biological patents.[53] Similar restrictions on software patents have been enacted in other countries.[54]
  8. the number of patent applications from PR China is expected to go down after 2025, when government subsidies for patent filing are to expire.[55]
  9. patents that are registered but not commercialized, as is the case in around 50% of them, function as a barrier to the registration of similar ideas, effectively creating a growing zone of non-patentability.[56]

Law

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Effects

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A patent does not give a right to make or use or sell an invention.[1] Rather, a patent provides, from a legal standpoint, the right to exclude others[1] from making, using, selling, offering for sale, or importing the patented invention for the term of the patent, which is usually 20 years from the filing date[4] subject to the payment of maintenance fees. From an economic and practical standpoint however, a patent is better and perhaps more precisely regarded as conferring upon its proprietor "a right to try to exclude by asserting the patent in court", for many granted patents turn out to be invalid once their proprietors attempt to assert them in court.[57] A patent is a limited property right the government gives inventors in exchange for their agreement to share details of their inventions with the public. Like any other property right, it may be sold, licensed, mortgaged, assigned or transferred, given away, or simply abandoned.

A patent, being an exclusionary right, does not necessarily give the patent owner the right to exploit the invention subject to the patent. For example, many inventions are improvements of prior inventions that may still be covered by someone else's patent.[1] If an inventor obtains a patent on improvements to an existing invention which is still under patent, they can only legally use the improved invention if the patent holder of the original invention gives permission, which they may refuse.

Some countries have "working provisions" that require the invention be exploited in the jurisdiction it covers. Consequences of not working an invention vary from one country to another, ranging from revocation of the patent rights to the awarding of a compulsory license awarded by the courts to a party wishing to exploit a patented invention. The patentee has the opportunity to challenge the revocation or license, but is usually required to provide evidence that the reasonable requirements of the public have been met by the working of invention.

Challenges

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In most jurisdictions, there are ways for third parties to challenge the validity of an allowed or issued patent at the national patent office; these are called opposition proceedings. It is also possible to challenge the validity of a patent in court. In either case, the challenging party tries to prove that the patent should never have been granted. There are several grounds for challenges: the claimed subject matter is not patentable subject matter at all; the claimed subject matter was actually not new, or was obvious to the person skilled in the art, at the time the application was filed; or that some kind of fraud was committed during prosecution with regard to listing of inventors, representations about when discoveries were made, etc. Patents can be found to be invalid in whole or in part for any of these reasons.[58][59]

Infringement

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Patent infringement occurs when a third party, without authorization from the patentee, makes, uses, or sells a patented invention. Patents, however, are enforced on a national basis. The making of an item in China, for example, that would infringe a US patent, would not constitute infringement under US patent law unless the item were imported into the US.[60]

Infringement includes literal infringement of a patent, meaning they are performing a prohibited act that is protected against by the patent. There is also the Doctrine of Equivalents. This doctrine protects from someone creating a product that is basically, by all rights, the same product that is protected with just a few modifications.[61] In some countries, like the United States, there is liability for another two forms of infringement. One is contributory infringement, which is participating in another's infringement. This could be a company helping another company to create a patented product or selling the patented product which is created by another company.[62] There is also inducement to infringement, which is when a party induces or assists another party in violating a patent. An example of this would be a company paying another party to create a patented product in order to reduce their competitor's market share.[63] This is important when it comes to gray market goods, which is when a patent owner sells a product in country A, wherein they have the product patented, then another party buys and sells it, without the owner's permission, in country B, wherein the owner also has a patent for the product. With either national or regional exhaustion being the law the in country B, the owner may still be able to enforce their patent rights; however, if country B has a policy of international exhaustion, then the patent owner will have no legal grounds for enforcing the patent in country B as it was already sold in a different country.[64]

Enforcement

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Patents can generally only be enforced through civil lawsuits (for example, for a US patent, by an action for patent infringement in a United States federal district court), although some countries (such as France and Austria) have criminal penalties for wanton infringement.[65] Typically, the patent owner seeks monetary compensation (damages) for past infringement, and seeks an injunction that prohibits the defendant from engaging in future acts of infringement, or seeks either damages or injunction. To prove infringement, the patent owner must establish that the accused infringer practises all the requirements of at least one of the claims of the patent. (In many jurisdictions the scope of the patent may not be limited to what is literally stated in the claims, for example due to the doctrine of equivalents.)

An accused infringer has the right to challenge the validity of the patent allegedly being infringed in a counterclaim. A patent can be found invalid on grounds described in the relevant patent laws, which vary between countries. Often, the grounds are a subset of requirements for patentability in the relevant country. Although an infringer is generally free to rely on any available ground of invalidity (such as a prior publication, for example), some countries have sanctions to prevent the same validity questions being relitigated. An example is the UK Certificate of contested validity.

Patent licensing agreements are contracts in which the patent owner (the licensor) agrees to grant the licensee the right to make, use, sell, or import the claimed invention, usually in return for a royalty or other compensation.[66][67] It is common for companies engaged in complex technical fields to enter into multiple license agreements associated with the production of a single product. Moreover, it is equally common for competitors in such fields to license patents to each other under cross-licensing agreements in order to share the benefits of using each other's patented inventions. Freedom Licenses like the Apache 2.0 License are a hybrid of copyright/trademark/patent license/contract due to the bundling nature of the three intellectual properties in one central license. This can make it difficult to enforce because patent licenses cannot be granted this way under copyright and would have to be considered a contract.[68]

Ownership

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In most countries, both natural persons and corporate entities may apply for a patent. In the United States, however, only the inventor(s) may apply for a patent, although it may be assigned to a corporate entity subsequently[69] and inventors may be required to assign inventions to their employers under an employment contract. In most European countries, ownership of an invention may pass from the inventor to their employer by rule of law if the invention was made in the course of the inventor's normal or specifically assigned employment duties, where an invention might reasonably be expected to result from carrying out those duties, or if the inventor had a special obligation to further the interests of the employer's company.[70] Applications by artificial intelligence systems, such as DABUS, have been rejected in the US, the UK, and at the European Patent Office on the grounds they are not natural persons.[71]

The plate of the Martin ejector seat of a military aircraft, stating that the product is covered by multiple patents in the UK, South Africa, Canada and pending in "other" jurisdictions. Dübendorf Museum of Military Aviation.

The inventors, their successors or their assignees become the proprietors of the patent when and if it is granted. If a patent is granted to more than one proprietor, the laws of the country in question and any agreement between the proprietors may affect the extent to which each proprietor can exploit the patent. For example, in some countries, each proprietor may freely license or assign their rights in the patent to another person while the law in other countries prohibits such actions without the permission of the other proprietor(s).

The ability to assign ownership rights increases the liquidity of a patent as property. Inventors can obtain patents and then sell them to third parties.[72] The third parties then own the patents and have the same rights to prevent others from exploiting the claimed inventions, as if they had originally made the inventions themselves.

Governing laws

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The grant and enforcement of patents are governed by national laws, and also by international treaties, where those treaties have been given effect in national laws. Patents are granted by national or regional patent offices,[73] i.e. national or regional administrative authorities. A given patent is therefore only useful for protecting an invention in the country in which that patent is granted. In other words, patent law is territorial in nature. When a patent application is published, the invention disclosed in the application becomes prior art and enters the public domain (if not protected by other patents) in countries where a patent applicant does not seek protection, the application thus generally becoming prior art against anyone (including the applicant) who might seek patent protection for the invention in those countries.

Commonly, a nation or a group of nations forms a patent office with responsibility for operating that nation's patent system, within the relevant patent laws. The patent office generally has responsibility for the grant of patents, with infringement being the remit of national courts.

The authority for patent statutes in different countries varies. In the UK, substantive patent law is contained in the Patents Act 1977 as amended.[74] In the United States, the Constitution empowers Congress to make laws to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts ...". The laws Congress passed are codified in Title 35 of the United States Code and created the United States Patent and Trademark Office.

There is a trend towards global harmonization of patent laws, with the World Trade Organization (WTO) being particularly active in this area.[75][non-primary source needed] The TRIPS Agreement has been largely successful in providing a forum for nations to agree on an aligned set of patent laws. Conformity with the TRIPS agreement is a requirement of admission to the WTO and so compliance is seen by many nations as important. This has also led to many developing nations, which may historically have developed different laws to aid their development, enforcing patents laws in line with global practice.

Internationally, there are international treaty procedures, such as the procedures under the European Patent Convention (EPC) [constituting the European Patent Organisation (EPOrg)], that centralize some portion of the filing and examination procedure. Similar arrangements exist among the member states of ARIPO and OAPI, the analogous treaties among African countries, and the nine CIS member states that have formed the Eurasian Patent Organization. A key international convention relating to patents is the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, initially signed in 1883. The Paris Convention sets out a range of basic rules relating to patents, and although the convention does not have direct legal effect in all national jurisdictions, the principles of the convention are incorporated into all notable current patent systems. The Paris Convention set a minimum patent protection of 20 years, but the most significant aspect of the convention is the provision of the right to claim priority: filing an application in any one member state of the Paris Convention preserves the right for one year to file in any other member state, and receive the benefit of the original filing date. Another key treaty is the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and covering more than 150 countries. The Patent Cooperation Treaty provides a unified procedure for filing patent applications to protect inventions in each of its contracting states along with giving owners a 30-month priority for applications as opposed to the standard 12 the Paris Convention granted. A patent application filed under the PCT is called an international application, or PCT application. The steps for PCT applications are as follows:

1. Filing the PCT patent application

2. Examination during the international phase

3. Examination during the national phase.[76]

Alongside these international agreements for patents there was the Patent Law Treaty (PLT). This treaty standardized the filing date requirements, standardized the application and forms, allows for electronic communication and filing, and avoids unintentional loss of rights, and simplifies patent office procedures.[77]

Sometimes, nations grant others, other than the patent owner, permissions to create a patented product based on different situations that align with public policy or public interest. These may include compulsory licenses, scientific research, and in transit in country.[78]

Anti-biopiracy dispositions

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After two decades of drafting,[79] the WIPO's Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore[80] moved to a Diplomatic Conference in May 2024[81] and adopted the WIPO Treaty on Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge (GRATK Treaty)[82] mandating patent disclosure requirements for patents based on genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge from being granted.[83] The Treaty contemplates revocation for patents incorrectly filed.[84]

The treaty, and in particular its planned extension,[81] is seen as complementing the Nagoya Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity and its system of Access and Benefit-Sharing.[85] Representatives of Indigenous peoples view the GRATK Treaty as a "first step towards guaranteeing just and transparent access to these resources."[86][87]

Application and prosecution

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Before filing for an application, which must be paid for whether a patent is granted or not, a person will want to ensure that their material is patentable. Patentable material must be synthetic, meaning that anything natural cannot be patented. For example, minerals, materials, genes, facts, organisms, and biological processes cannot be patented, but if someone were to apply an inventive, non-obvious, step to them to synthesize something new, the result could be patentable. That includes genetically engineered strains of bacteria, as was decided in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.[88] Patentability also depends on public policy and ethical standards.[89] Additionally, patentable materials must be novel, useful, and a non-obvious inventive step.[90]

Patent applications filed at the world's major patent offices from 1980 to 2021

A patent is requested by filing a written application at the relevant patent office. The person or company filing the application is referred to as "the applicant". The applicant may be the inventor or its assignee. The application contains a description of how to make and use the invention that must provide sufficient detail for a person skilled in the art (i.e., the relevant area of technology) to make and use the invention. In some countries there are requirements for providing specific information such as the usefulness of the invention, the best mode of performing the invention known to the inventor, or the technical problem or problems solved by the invention. Drawings illustrating the invention may also be provided.

The application also includes one or more claims that define what a patent covers or the "scope of protection".

After filing, an application is often referred to as "patent pending". While this term does not confer legal protection, and a patent cannot be enforced until granted, it serves to provide warning to potential infringers that if the patent is issued, they may be liable for damages.[91][92][93]

Once filed, a patent application is "prosecuted". A patent examiner reviews the patent application to determine if it meets the patentability requirements of that country. If the application does not comply, objections are communicated to the applicant or their patent agent or attorney through an Office action, to which the applicant may respond. The number of Office actions and responses that may occur vary from country to country, but eventually a final rejection is sent by the patent office, or the patent application is granted, which after the payment of additional fees, leads to an issued, enforceable patent. In some jurisdictions, there are opportunities for third parties to bring an opposition proceeding between grant and issuance, or post-issuance.

Once granted the patent is subject in most countries to renewal fees to keep the patent in force. These fees are generally payable on a yearly basis. Some countries or regional patent offices (e.g. the European Patent Office) also require annual renewal fees to be paid for a patent application before it is granted. In the US, patent maintenance fees are due on 3.5, 7.5 and 11.5 anniversaries of the patent issuance.[94] Only ca. 50% of issued US patents are maintained full term. Large corporations tend to pay maintenance fees through the full term, while small companies are more likely to abandon their patents earlier, even though the due fees are ca. 5 times lower for small businesses (microentities).[95]

Costs

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The costs of preparing and filing a patent application, prosecuting it until grant and maintaining the patent vary from one jurisdiction to another, and may also be dependent upon the type and complexity of the invention, and on the type of patent.

The European Patent Office estimated in 2005 that the average cost of obtaining a European patent (via a Euro-direct application, i.e. not based on a PCT application) and maintaining the patent for a 10-year term was around €32,000.[96] Since the London Agreement entered into force on May 1, 2008, this estimation is however no longer up-to-date, since fewer translations are required.

After a patent is issued, in most countries patent maintenance payments are required. In some countries (e.g. Russia) fees are due every year, and the amount due does not change much. In other countries (e.g. US) payments are due ca. every 4th year after the grant date, and the amount due increases every time. A 2023 study by Rochester Institute of Technology found the full term maintenance rate of issued US patents has been fairly constant (40-50%) since 1992. Full term patents have more issued claims and receive on average more citations than earlier expired patents.[97]

The European Patent Office charges annual fees for pending applications. Also, between 2012 and 2016 Ecuador increased its patent maintenance fees ten-fold, briefly becoming the most expensive country to maintain patents.[98]

In the United States, in 2000 the cost of obtaining a patent (patent prosecution) was estimated to be from $10,000 to $30,000 per patent.[99] When patent litigation is involved (which in year 1999 happened in about 1,600 cases compared to 153,000 patents issued in the same year[99]), costs increase significantly: although 95% of patent litigation cases are settled out of court,[100] those that reach the courts have legal costs on the order of a million dollars per case, not including associated business costs.[101]

Non-national treatment in the application procedure

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Non-national treatments in national patent offices had been prevalent among the Northern countries[citation needed] until they were prohibited after the negotiation of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. According to Articles 2 and 3 of this treaty, juristic and natural persons who are either national of or domiciled in a state party to the Convention shall, as regards the protection of industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the Union, the advantages that their respective laws grant to nationals.

In addition, the TRIPS Agreement explicitly prohibits any such discrimination. TRIPS Agreement Article 27.1 states that 'patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced'.

Alternatives

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A defensive publication is the act of publishing a detailed description of a new invention without patenting it, so as to establish prior art and public identification as the creator/originator of an invention, although a defensive publication can also be anonymous. A defensive publication prevents others from later being able to patent the invention.

A trade secret is information that is intentionally kept confidential and that provides a competitive advantage to its possessor. Trade secrets are protected by non-disclosure agreement and labour law, each of which prevents information leaks such as breaches of confidentiality and industrial espionage. Compared to patents, the advantages of trade secrets are that the value of a trade secret continues until it is made public,[102] whereas a patent is only in force for a specified time, after which others may freely copy the invention; does not require payment of fees to governmental agencies or filing paperwork;[102] has an immediate effect;[102] and does not require any disclosure of information to the public.[102] The key disadvantage of a trade secret is its vulnerability to reverse engineering.[103]

Benefits

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Primary incentives embodied in the patent system include incentives to invent in the first place; to disclose the invention once made; to invest the sums necessary to experiment, produce and market the invention; and to design around and improve upon earlier patents.[104]

Patents provide incentives for economically efficient research and development (R&D).[105] A study conducted annually by the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS) shows that the 2,000 largest global companies invested more than 430 billion euros in 2008[106] in their R&D departments. If the investments can be considered as inputs of R&D, real products and patents are the outputs. Based on these groups, a project named Corporate Invention Board, had measured and analyzed the patent portfolios to produce an original picture[107] of their technological profiles. Supporters of patents argue that without patent protection, R&D spending would be significantly less or eliminated altogether, limiting the possibility of technological advances or breakthroughs. Corporations would be much more conservative about the R&D investments they made, as third parties would be free to exploit any developments.[citation needed]

The logical consequence of more efficient R&D is a more efficient national economy: An increase in patenting has proven to be linked with an increase of national income. A 2009 study on patent effects in various countries around the world finds, for instance, that a 10% increase in patenting in 1910 was correlated on average to a 9 to 11% higher level of per capita GDP in 1960. The positive effects of patenting on national income were found to be particularly strong in the U.S., Switzerland and Sweden. However, patenting is not the only factor influencing GDP growth: among others, schooling also plays a big role.[108]

"The patent internalizes the externality by giving the [inventor] a property right over its invention."[109]

In accordance with the original definition of the term "patent", patents are intended to facilitate and encourage disclosure of innovations into the public domain for the common good. Thus patenting can be viewed as contributing to open hardware after an embargo period (usually of 20 years). If inventors did not have the legal protection of patents, in many cases, they might prefer or tend to keep their inventions secret (e.g. keep trade secrets).[110] Awarding patents generally makes the details of new technology publicly available, for exploitation by anyone after the patent expires, or for further improvement by other inventors. Furthermore, when a patent's term has expired, the public record ensures that the patentee's invention is not lost to humanity.[104][specify]

One effect of modern patent usage is that a small-time inventor, who can afford both the patenting process and the defense of the patent,[111] can use the exclusive right status to become a licensor. This allows the inventor to accumulate capital from licensing the invention and may allow innovation to occur because he or she may choose not to manage a manufacturing buildup for the invention. Thus the inventor's time and energy can be spent on pure innovation, allowing others to concentrate on manufacturability.[112]

Another effect of modern patent usage is the social benefit(s) of technology disclosure. Although patentees usually end up not reaping benefit from their patent monopoly,[citation needed] the society still benefits from patent disclosures. Also patents both enable and incentivize competitors to design around (or to "invent around" according to R S Praveen Raj) the patented invention.[113] This may promote healthy competition among manufacturers, resulting in gradual improvements of the technology base.[114]

Criticism

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Legal scholars, economists, activists, policymakers, industries, and trade organizations have held differing views on patents and engaged in contentious debates on the subject. Critical perspectives emerged in the nineteenth century that were especially based on the principles of free trade.[115]: 262–263  Contemporary criticisms have echoed those arguments, claiming that patents block innovation and waste resources (e.g. with patent-related overheads) that could otherwise be used productively to improve technology.[116][117][118] These and other research findings that patents decreased innovation because of the following mechanisms:

  • Low quality, already known or obvious patents hamper innovation and commercialization.[119][120][121]
  • Blocking the use of fundamental knowledge with patents creates a "tragedy of the anticommons, where future innovations can not take place outside of a single firm in an entire field".[122]
  • Patents weaken the public domain and innovation that comes from it.[123]
  • Patent thickets, or "an overlapping set of patent rights", in particular slow innovation.[124][125]
  • Broad patents prevent companies from commercializing products and hurt innovation.[126] In the worst case, such broad patents are held by non-practicing entities (patent trolls), which do not contribute to innovation.[127][128] Enforcement by patent trolls of poor quality patents[129] has led to criticism of the patent office as well as the system itself.[130] For example, in 2011, United States business entities incurred $29 billion in direct costs because of patent trolls.[131] Lawsuits brought by "patent assertion companies" made up 61% of all patent cases in 2012, according to the Santa Clara University School of Law.[132]
  • Patents apply a "one size fits all" model to industries with differing needs,[133] that is especially unproductive for the software industry.[134]
  • Rent-seeking by owners of pharmaceutical patents have also been a particular focus of criticism, as the high prices they enable puts life-saving drugs out of reach of many people.[135]
  • "With the partial exception of the pharmaceutical industry, we just do not have clear evidence to support the assumption that patents provide significant incentives to inventive activity".[136]

Boldrin and Levine conclude "Our preferred policy solution is to abolish patents entirely and to find other legislative instruments, less open to lobbying and rent seeking, to foster innovation when there is clear evidence that laissez-faire undersupplies it."[137][138] Abolishing patents may be politically challenging in some[which?] countries,[citation needed] however, as the primary economic theories supporting patent law hold that inventors and innovators need patents to recoup the costs associated with research, inventing, and commercializing;[105] this reasoning is weakened if the new technologies decrease these costs.[139] A 2016 paper argued for substantial weakening of patents because current technologies (e.g. 3D printing, cloud computing, synthetic biology, etc.) have reduced the cost of innovation.[139]

Debates over the usefulness of patents for their primary objective are part of a larger discourse on intellectual property protection, which also reflects differing perspectives on copyright.

Anti-patent initiatives

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  • Patents on expensive medications are often used as examples that can highlight the inadequacy of patent-based mechanisms. One workaround solution that has been applied by South Africa in the past is passing explained domestic law that gives the state the right to import inexpensive generic versions without permission and wait for international regulations and incentive-systems to get upgraded at a later point.[140][141][142]
  • In 2020, multiple initiatives, including by India and South Africa, called for a waiver of TRIPS vaccine patents for accelerated deployment of COVID-19 vaccines around the world.[143] However, no mechanisms of alternative medical research and development incentive-systems[144] or technical details of proposed "sharing" after certain amounts of profit[145] were reported and some argue that, instead of intellectual property rights, manufacturing know-how is the main barrier to expanding capacity.[144]
  • The Patent Busting Project is an Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) initiative challenging patents that the organization claims are illegitimate and suppress innovation or limit online expression. The initiative launched in 2004 and involves two phases: documenting the damage caused by these patents,[146] and submitting challenges to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).[147][148]
  • Patent critic, Joseph Stiglitz has proposed Prizes as an alternative to patents in order to further advance solutions to global problems such as AIDS.[149][150]
  • In 2012, Stack Exchange launched Ask Patents, a forum for crowdsourcing prior art to invalidate patents.[151]
  • Several authors have argued for developing defensive prior art to prevent patenting based on obviousness using lists[152] or algorithms.[153] For example, a professor of law at the University of North Carolina School of Law, has demonstrated a method to protect DNA research,[152] which could apply to other technology. Chin wrote an algorithm to generate 11 million "obvious" nucleotide sequences to count as prior art and his algorithmic approach has already[154] proven effective at anticipating prior art against oligonucleotide composition claims filed since his publication of the list and has been cited by the U.S. patent office a number of times.[155] More recently, Joshua Pearce developed an open-source algorithm for identifying prior art for 3D printing materials to make such materials obvious by patent standards.[153] As the 3-D printing community is already grappling with legal issues,[156] this development was hotly debated in the technical press.[157][158][159] Chin made the same algorithm-based obvious argument in DNA probes.[155]
  • Google and other technology companies founded the LOT Network in 2014 to combat patent assertion entities by cross-licensing patents, thereby preventing legal action by such entities.[160]

See also

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia

A patent is a form of consisting of an granted by a government authority to an inventor or assignee for a limited period, typically twenty years from filing, in exchange for public disclosure of the , allowing the owner to exclude others from making, using, selling, or importing it without permission. This system aims to incentivize by enabling inventors to recoup costs through temporary market exclusivity, as enshrined in frameworks like Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which empowers Congress to promote the progress of science and useful arts. The origins of codified patent law trace to the Venetian Statute of 1474, the earliest known systematic grant of exclusive rights to inventors for new devices or processes produced in the , requiring local manufacture to prevent export of technology. In the United States, the first patent statute was enacted in 1790, marking a shift toward inventor-centric rights rather than royal privileges, with the inaugural patent issued to Samuel Hopkins for a production method. While patents underpin advancements in sectors like pharmaceuticals, where they demonstrably support high-risk R&D, empirical analyses reveal mixed impacts on overall , with limited evidence of broad inducement effects in fields such as software and electronics, and criticisms centering on overbroad grants that may impede cumulative progress or enable non-practicing entities to extract rents without contributing to production. Key requirements for patentability include novelty, non-obviousness to a person skilled in the art, and industrial , enforced through examination processes by offices like the USPTO, which granted over 300,000 patents in fiscal year 2023.

Definition and Scope

Core Principles

Patents grant inventors exclusive rights to exploit their inventions commercially for a limited period, typically 20 years from the filing date, in exchange for full public disclosure of the invention to promote technological progress. This quid pro quo forms the foundational rationale: the temporary monopoly incentivizes innovation by allowing recoupment of research costs, while disclosure enriches the public domain for future advancements. Under international standards established by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of 1994, patents must be available for any invention—whether product or process—in all fields of technology, provided they meet specific criteria, without discrimination as to the place of invention or the nationality of the inventor. The primary patentability requirements are novelty, inventive step, and industrial applicability. Novelty demands that the invention must not have been anticipated by , meaning it cannot be identical to any publicly disclosed or available worldwide before the filing date or priority date. Inventive step, known as non-obviousness in jurisdictions like the , requires that the invention not be obvious to a person skilled in the relevant art at the time of filing, considering the state of ; this prevents patenting mere incremental tweaks without genuine technical advancement. Industrial applicability, or , mandates that the invention be capable of practical use in industry or , excluding abstract ideas, natural phenomena, or mere discoveries without technical effect. Beyond these thresholds, patents necessitate sufficient disclosure in the application: a detailed description enabling a skilled practitioner to reproduce the without undue experimentation, often supplemented by claims defining the scope of and, where necessary, drawings or sequences. conferred are negative—excluding others from making, using, selling, or importing the within the granting — but are territorial, requiring separate filings for in different countries, though systems like the streamline international applications without guaranteeing grants. Maintenance involves periodic fees to prevent lapse, ensuring the patent does not burden the public indefinitely.

Types and Classifications

Utility patents, also known as patents, protect the functional aspects of a new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or , including improvements thereof, provided they meet novelty, non-obviousness, and requirements under 35 U.S.C. § 101. These patents cover how an invention works, its , or method of operation, granting the owner exclusive to make, use, sell, or the invention for a term of 20 years from the filing date of the earliest non-provisional application. In 2023, utility patents accounted for the vast majority of U.S. patent grants, with over 300,000 issued annually, predominantly in fields like software, , and mechanical devices. In the United States, applicants may pursue a utility patent by directly filing a non-provisional application or by first filing a provisional application to secure an early priority date, followed by filing a non-provisional application claiming its benefit within 12 months. Design patents safeguard the ornamental or aesthetic appearance of an article of manufacture, distinct from its functional features, as defined in 35 U.S.C. § 171. Protection extends to novel, non-obvious, non-functional designs, such as the shape or surface ornamentation of a product, with a term of 15 years from the date of grant for applications filed on or after May 13, 2015, and no maintenance fees required. Unlike patents, design patents do not require disclosure of or enablement of function, focusing instead on visual distinctiveness to prevent . They are commonly applied to products, with approximately 20,000 granted in the U.S. each year as of 2023. Plant patents cover new and distinct varieties of plants that are asexually reproduced, such as by or , excluding tuber-propagated plants like potatoes, per 35 U.S.C. § 161. Introduced by the Plant Patent Act of 1930, these patents require the plant to be novel, non-obvious, and distinctly characterized, with protection lasting 20 years from filing, similar to utility patents, but demanding detailed botanical descriptions and specimens where feasible. They apply primarily to cultivated varieties like roses or fruit trees, with fewer than 1,000 issued annually in recent years, reflecting their niche role in . Beyond these statutory types, patents are classified by technical subject matter to enable systematic searching and examination, independent of the protection category. The International Patent Classification (IPC), administered by the under the Strasbourg Agreement of 1971, organizes inventions into a hierarchical structure of approximately 70,000 symbols across eight sections (A through H), subdivided into classes, subclasses, groups, and subgroups based on technical fields. For instance, Section A covers human necessities like (A01) and medical preparations (A61), while Section H addresses , including semiconductors (H01L). Updated periodically, with the 2024.01 version incorporating over 250,000 amendments since inception, the IPC facilitates global patent retrieval in over 100 countries. The Cooperative Patent Classification (CPC), a joint effort by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and (EPO) since 2013, builds on the IPC with finer granularity, featuring about 250,000 symbols and aligning closely with IPC sections for . Used by the USPTO to replace the legacy (USPC) by 2015, CPC enhances search precision for examiners and applicants, with mandatory assignment during prosecution. Classifications are determined by patent examiners based on claims and specifications, aiding searches and often multiple codes per patent to reflect cross-domain inventions. In jurisdictions without s—shorter-term protections for minor inventions—full patents dominate, though some countries like and offer utility model registration as a distinct, non-examined category.

Historical Development

Ancient and Medieval Precursors

The earliest known precursor to patent-like protections dates to ancient , a Greek colony in , around 500 BCE, where the law granted a one-year monopoly to the creator of any new refinement in luxury or , allowing exclusive exploitation before public instruction in the method. This practice, described by the ancient author , represented an embryonic form of exclusive rights tied to innovation disclosure, though evidence is anecdotal and limited to literary references rather than codified statutes. Similar informal recognitions may have existed in other ancient societies, but no systematic mechanisms for granting or enforcing such privileges have been documented prior to the medieval period. In medieval Europe, invention privileges emerged as ad hoc grants by rulers or city authorities, often motivated by mercantilist goals to import or develop technologies beneficial to the realm, in exchange for the inventor's commitment to local production and knowledge transfer. These differed from modern patents by lacking formal novelty examinations or public registries, relying instead on sovereign prerogative, and frequently extending to foreign artisans introducing known arts rather than purely novel inventions. Such privileges typically lasted 10 to 20 years and aimed to stimulate economic activity, though enforcement depended on the grantor's power and could be revoked if the invention failed to deliver promised benefits. A prominent early example occurred in 1421 in , where the granted architect a three-year exclusive privilege for his innovative design, Il Badalone, intended for ox-free transport of marble to the construction site via the River. Brunelleschi's petition explicitly invoked the need to protect his intellectual labor from imitation, arguing that secrecy would hinder public benefit while open copying would undermine his ; the grant prohibited others from building similar vessels and was conditioned on his willingness to share the method if unexploited. This case marked one of the first recorded instances where an inventor sought protection for a domestically conceived mechanical innovation, foreshadowing later statutory approaches. In , King issued the first known English invention privilege on May 1, 1449, to Flemish glassmaker John of Utynam, awarding a 20-year monopoly for manufacturing colored glass windows using a novel Flemish process previously unknown in . The , an open royal decree, required Utynam to train English apprentices and supply , reflecting a pattern where privileges served state interests in and self-sufficiency. These medieval grants, while sporadic and discretionary, laid groundwork for formalized systems by establishing the principle of time-limited exclusivity to incentivize disclosure over perpetual secrecy, amid growing recognition of inventions as public goods warranting temporary private control.

Emergence in the Early Modern Period

The emergence of formalized patent systems in Europe began in the Republic of Venice on March 19, 1474, when the Senate enacted the world's first statutory patent law. This decree granted exclusive privileges to individuals who constructed "any new and ingenious device" not previously made within Venetian territories, allowing them to prevent others from producing, using, or selling the invention for a term of ten years. The law required inventors to register their devices and aimed to incentivize the introduction of innovations to Venice, particularly in key industries such as glassmaking, textiles, and mechanics, where the city sought to maintain technological leadership. Enforcement was handled through local magistrates, with penalties including fines and destruction of infringing goods, marking an early shift from guild secrecy to state-backed exclusivity. This Venetian model spread across Italian city-states and influenced patent-like privileges in other European regions during the 16th century, including Florence, Genoa, and Milan, as well as the Netherlands and France, where rulers granted temporary monopolies to attract skilled artisans and novel technologies. In the Dutch Republic, privileges were issued for both new inventions and introductions of foreign ones, often tied to economic policies promoting trade and manufacturing. These grants typically lasted 6 to 25 years, reflecting a pragmatic balance between encouraging disclosure and rewarding ingenuity amid rising mercantilist competition. In , the practice evolved from royal , frequently abused as broad monopolies under and James I, sparking parliamentary opposition due to their economic distortions and favoritism. The , passed by Parliament on May 29, 1624 (21 Jac. 1 c. 3), curtailed these abuses by declaring most monopolies void while preserving limited exceptions for "the sole working or making of any manner of new manufactures" granted to their "true and first inventor" for 14 years. This provision established criteria emphasizing novelty and invention, laying the groundwork for statutory patent examination and serving as a cornerstone of Anglo-American patent , distinct from continental discretionary grants.

Expansion During Industrialization

The , commencing in Britain around the 1760s and spreading to and the by the early , coincided with a marked expansion in patent activity, as mechanized production and engineering innovations proliferated in sectors such as textiles, steam power, and ironworking. Patent grants in Britain, governed by the (1624) which restricted monopolies to novel inventions, averaged fewer than 10 annually in the early 1700s but accelerated after 1750, reaching over 100 per year by the 1830s, driven by inventions like James Watt's improvements (patented 1769 and extended 1775). This uptick reflected not only inventive output but also evolving legal recognition of patents as incentives for commercialization, though enforcement remained inconsistent until judicial shifts in the 1780s affirmed their validity against infringement. In the United States, the Patent Act of 1790 established a federal system modeled on British precedents, initially granting privileges through a review by the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and Secretary of War; by 1836, reforms created a dedicated Patent Office with examination procedures, spurring annual grants from dozens in the 1790s to thousands by mid-century. Cumulative U.S. patents reached approximately 60,000 by 1860, then surged to nearly 450,000 more by 1890 amid railroad expansion and manufacturing booms, totaling over 500,000 by century's end—a tenfold increase tied to immigration of skilled artisans and domestic R&D in machinery. France's 1791 patent law, enacted amid the Revolution, introduced a deposit-based system without prior examination, granting privileges for fixed terms; filings grew steadily post-Napoleonic era, supporting innovations in chemicals and metallurgy, though the system's emphasis on secrecy deposits limited diffusion until 1844 reforms added optional publication. Empirical analyses indicate that this patent expansion correlated with output growth in high-inventiveness industries like cotton spinning and steam engines, where patents facilitated capital investment by securing exclusive rights; however, econometric suggests patenting surges were largely consequences of underlying sectoral gains rather than primary drivers of industrialization, as weak and high costs deterred many inventors until procedural simplifications in the 1830s–1850s. In Britain, the 1852 Patent Law Amendment Act slashed fees from £100–£120 to £50 and streamlined processes, boosting applications fivefold within a decade and extending patent norms continent-wide. These developments underscored patents' role in commodifying amid factory-scale production, though critics noted their potential to hinder cumulative by restricting access to .

20th Century Globalization and Reforms

The Patent Act of represented a major domestic reform, codifying the non-obviousness requirement for alongside novelty and , thereby clarifying criteria for inventions and aiming to reduce judicial uncertainty in patent examinations. This act also introduced provisions for patents and clarified the role of patent specifications in defining claim scope. In 1970, the (PCT) was signed under the auspices of the (WIPO), entering into force in 1978, which streamlined the process for filing a single international designating multiple countries, thereby reducing administrative burdens and facilitating of patent protection. By allowing deferred national phase entries, the PCT enabled applicants to delay costs and gather searches, contributing to a surge in international filings; for instance, PCT applications grew from initial low numbers to over 100,000 annually by the . The (EPC) of 1973, effective from 1977, established the (EPO) to provide a centralized examination and grant procedure for patents valid in contracting states, promoting regional harmonization and efficiency in Europe amid post-war . This reform addressed fragmented national systems, with EPO grants rising from 12,000 in 1980 to over 50,000 by 2000, reflecting increased cross-border innovation. The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 in the United States permitted universities, nonprofits, and small businesses to retain ownership of patents arising from federally funded research, reversing prior government retention policies and incentivizing commercialization; this led to a marked increase in university patenting, from fewer than 300 annually pre-1980 to over 2,000 by the mid-1990s. Culminating late-century globalization, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1994, administered by the , mandated minimum patent standards across member states, including 20-year terms from filing and coverage of all technological fields, enforcing compliance through trade sanctions and accelerating worldwide adoption of robust IP regimes. TRIPS integrated patents into global trade, with non-compliance risks prompting reforms in developing nations, though critics argue it prioritized corporate interests over access in pharmaceuticals. Global patent applications expanded from about 500,000 in 1980 to over 1 million by 2000, driven by these harmonization efforts.

Patentability Requirements

The core requirements for patentability, as established by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), mandate that patents be granted for inventions that are new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial application, applicable to both products and processes across all fields of technology, subject to limited exclusions such as certain biological processes or methods of treatment. These criteria ensure that patents reward genuine innovation rather than mere replication or trivial modifications, promoting technological progress through exclusive rights granted for a limited term. Novelty requires that the invention must not have been disclosed to the public anywhere in the world prior to the filing date of the , encompassing publications, uses, or sales that make the invention part of the . In practice, absolute novelty is assessed against the global , with grace periods in some jurisdictions (e.g., one year in the United States under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)) allowing inventors to disclose their own without forfeiting , though such provisions vary and can complicate international filings. Failure to meet novelty bars patents on inventions that, even if refined, replicate existing knowledge, as determined through prior art searches by patent offices. Inventive step, equivalent to non-obviousness in U.S. law (35 U.S.C. § 103), demands that the invention not be an obvious modification to a person skilled in the relevant art, considering the at the filing date. This criterion, rooted in preventing , evaluates whether the differences between the claimed invention and yield unexpected results or solve long-felt needs, often using frameworks like the Graham factors in the U.S. or the problem-solution approach at the (EPO). Empirical analyses indicate that stricter inventive step scrutiny correlates with higher-quality patents, reducing grants for incremental changes that do not advance the art substantially. Industrial applicability or utility requires the invention to be capable of practical use in industry or , excluding abstract ideas or theoretical constructs without real-world function. In the U.S., this is codified under 35 U.S.C. § 101 alongside subject matter eligibility, demanding specific, substantial, and credible utility beyond mere operability. Jurisdictions like the EPO emphasize that the invention must produce a technical effect solvable by technical means, barring pure software or business methods unless tied to hardware improvements. Subject matter eligibility further delineates patentable inventions to processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, excluding laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas, as per U.S. precedents like Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank (2014), whose holding significantly narrowed the scope of patent-eligible software-related inventions by clarifying that claims directed to an abstract idea, without additional inventive features beyond implementation on a generic computer, are not patent eligible, and which invalidated software patents lacking transformative integration into practical applications. The EPO similarly limits protection under Article 52(2) EPC to exclude discoveries, mathematical methods, and aesthetic creations unless they exhibit technical character. These exclusions prevent monopolization of fundamental knowledge, though debates persist on their application to emerging fields like , where USPTO guidance as of July 2024 clarifies that AI cannot be an inventor but inventions using AI may qualify if meeting other criteria. Variations across jurisdictions, such as broader exclusions for software in versus post-Alice U.S. scrutiny, underscore the need for tailored applications under harmonized yet flexible TRIPS minima.

Application and Prosecution Process

The patent application process commences with the preparation of a formal document detailing the invention, typically including a specification that describes the invention's structure, function, and enablement for one skilled in the art; one or more claims defining the scope of protection sought; an abstract summarizing the invention; and any necessary drawings. In jurisdictions like the United States, applicants may first file a provisional application, which establishes a priority date but requires no formal claims or examination, is not examined for patentability, and does not mature into an issued patent on its own, providing 12 months to file a non-provisional utility application that claims priority to it. Although formal claims are not required in a provisional application, the disclosure must nevertheless describe the invention in sufficient detail to support later-filed claims. In practice, a provisional application only establishes priority for subject matter that is actually disclosed in the provisional specification as filed. If key features, steps, components, or embodiments are omitted, those aspects may not be entitled to the provisional filing date. As a result, when a non-provisional application is later examined, applicants may lose the benefit of the provisional filing date for unsupported claims, even if the nonprovisional application itself contains a more complete disclosure. In practice, disputes over provisional priority most commonly arise in two contexts. First, they may occur during substantive examination—often after claim amendments—when the examiner determines that the original or amended claims are not adequately supported by the disclosure of the underlying provisional application. Second, such disputes frequently arise in patent litigation, where defendants challenge entitlement to an earlier provisional filing date on the ground that the asserted claims lack written description or enablement support in the provisional disclosure. In many cases, deficiencies in provisional priority do not become apparent until years after the provisional filing date. In both contexts, loss of priority can have significant consequences, including exposure of the claims to intervening prior art. Filing fees vary by entity size and type; for example, as of 2023, small entities pay $800 for a non-provisional utility filing, while large entities pay $1,600, excluding additional search and examination surcharges. Upon filing with a patent office such as the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the application receives a filing date and , followed by a preliminary review for completeness and compliance with formal requirements, including inventor oaths or declarations under 37 CFR 1.63. If deficient, restrictions or corrections are requested; otherwise, it advances to substantive examination. , the interactive phase between applicant and examiner, involves the examiner conducting a prior art search using databases like USPTO's EAST system and assessing patentability under criteria such as novelty (35 U.S.C. § 102), non-obviousness (35 U.S.C. § 103), and utility (35 U.S.C. § 101). The examiner issues an Office Action, typically within 14-24 months of filing, outlining allowability, rejections (e.g., for anticipation or obviousness), or objections to the specification. Applicants must respond within three months (extendable to six for fees) via amendments narrowing claims, arguments rebutting rejections, or evidence like declarations. Multiple rounds may occur; a Final Office Action rejecting claims prompts options including a Request for Continued Examination (RCE) to reopen prosecution, appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), or abandonment. If prosecution succeeds, a Notice of Allowance issues, requiring issue fees within three months; the patent grants upon payment, typically 1-3 years post-filing depending on technology center backlog and applicant actions. Average pendency for USPTO utility patents was 23.9 months as of 2023, influenced by examiner workload and applicant responsiveness. Internationally, the (PCT) allows a single filing for deferral of national examinations up to 30-31 months from priority, streamlining but not substituting national prosecution. Prosecution demands precision to avoid estoppel from amendments, where narrowing claims during response limits later enforcement scope under prosecution history . Over 60% of USPTO applications encounter at least one rejection, underscoring the adversarial nature of examination as a mechanism rather than a mere formality.

Rights, Duration, and Ownership

A patent confers upon its owner the to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing the patented within the of grant, thereby enabling the owner to prevent unauthorized commercial exploitation. These rights are territorial, applying only in the country or where the patent is issued, and do not grant affirmative permission to practice the invention if it infringes other patents. The duration of patent protection is typically 20 years from the filing date of the application, as established by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Rights (TRIPS) under the , which sets this as the minimum term for WTO members. In the United States, patents expire 20 years from the earliest non-provisional filing date, subject to maintenance fees paid at 3.5, 7.5, and 11.5 years after issuance to avoid lapse. Extensions may apply for regulatory delays, such as in pharmaceuticals, but the base term aligns with international standards to balance incentives for against public access. Ownership of a patent vests initially in the inventor or joint inventors, who are the individuals who conceived the inventive concept and contributed to its reduction to practice. However, ownership can be transferred via assignment, often to employers in cases of employee inventions developed within the scope of employment, pursuant to explicit agreements or implied shop that grant non-exclusive licenses. In the U.S., federal presumes the original applicant as owner unless assignment records prove otherwise, while international practices vary but commonly require inventors to assign to assignees for prosecution.

Enforcement Mechanisms

Infringement Detection and Litigation

Patent holders detect infringement primarily through systematic monitoring of commercial products and services that may incorporate claimed inventions. This involves accused products to compare their technical features against patent claims, often using claim charting techniques that map specific elements of the independent and dependent claims to corresponding product components. Market surveillance, including analysis of competitor advertisements, sales data, and supply chains, further aids identification, supplemented by tips from industry informants or automated alerts from patent watch services. Advanced detection increasingly relies on software tools for patent-product mapping, which extract key features from patent specifications and align them with product documentation or teardowns. enhances efficiency by processing vast datasets via and to flag potential matches in real-time across global filings and product databases, reducing manual review time compared to traditional searches. Upon , a formal infringement analysis assesses literal infringement, , and induced or contributory liability under statutes like 35 U.S.C. § 271. Litigation commences after pre-suit investigation, typically with a cease-and-desist letter demanding cessation or licensing, followed by filing a in a U.S. District Court alleging , indirect, or willful infringement. The process includes pleadings, initial disclosures under , and a Markman hearing for claim construction, which interprets disputed patent terms to define infringement scope. Discovery follows, involving extensive document production, depositions, and expert reports on validity, infringement, and damages; motions may resolve issues pre-trial. Trials, often before juries in patent "" venues like the Eastern District of Texas or Western District of Texas, determine liability and award remedies such as injunctions, lost profits, or reasonable royalties, with willful infringement enabling enhanced damages up to treble. Appeals proceed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, potentially reaching the . In 2023, U.S. district courts saw 3,111 new patent infringement suits, a decade-low reflecting post-America Invents Act trends and venue reforms. Average litigation costs range from $2.3 million to $4 million per case through trial, escalating with stakes over $25 million to medians exceeding $5 million per the American Intellectual Property Law Association. The International Trade Commission handles import-related cases, issuing exclusion orders after investigations averaging 16 months.

Remedies and Defenses

In the United States, a patentee may seek remedies for infringement through a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 281, which entitles the patent holder to enforce exclusive rights against unauthorized making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing of the patented . Primary remedies include to prevent ongoing or future infringement, as provided by 35 U.S.C. § 283, and monetary damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 to compensate for the harm suffered. Courts may also award prejudgment interest, costs, and in exceptional cases, reasonable attorney fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285. Damages are calculated to provide adequate compensation, typically the greater of the patentee's lost profits or a reasonable royalty that would have been agreed upon in a hypothetical negotiation between the parties at the time infringement began. Lost profits require proof that the patentee would have made the sales but for the infringement, often using the panduit factors: demand for the product, absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes, manufacturing capability, and amount of profit. For willful infringement, where the infringer acted despite an objective risk of violating the patent, courts may enhance damages up to three times the compensatory amount. Injunctive relief, once presumptively granted, now requires the patentee to demonstrate irreparable harm, inadequacy of legal remedies, balance of hardships favoring the patentee, and public interest, following the Supreme Court's decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. (547 U.S. 388, 2006). Defenses to infringement claims are outlined in 35 U.S.C. § 282, which presumes patent validity but permits challenges on grounds such as invalidity due to lack of novelty (anticipation by ), obviousness to a person of ordinary skill, or failure to meet other statutory requirements like or enablement. Non-infringement asserts that the accused product or process does not fall within the scope of the patent claims, often resolved through claim construction under Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (517 U.S. 370, ), where courts interpret claim terms as a matter of law. Additional defenses include unenforceability from inequitable conduct during prosecution, such as withholding material with intent to deceive the USPTO, or equitable doctrines like laches (unreasonable delay in suing causing prejudice) and (prior representations or litigation conduct barring claims). Patent misuse, if proven by showing improper extension of the patent monopoly beyond its statutory scope, can also render the patent unenforceable until remedied. In government-related infringements, 28 U.S.C. § 1498 limits remedies to compensation against the in the Court of Federal Claims, barring injunctive relief and providing only reasonable royalty damages without liability for willfulness. For induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), a good-faith in patent invalidity does not negate liability, as affirmed by the in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. (563 U.S. 754, ), requiring knowledge of the patent and intent to induce acts known to infringe. These mechanisms balance enforcement incentives with protections against overreach, though empirical analyses indicate that remedies like enhanced damages deter willful behavior but can escalate litigation costs.

International Harmonization Efforts

International efforts to harmonize patent laws have primarily focused on procedural standardization and minimum substantive standards, driven by the need to reduce filing costs, streamline examinations, and facilitate cross-border protection for inventors amid growing global trade. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, signed on March 20, 1883, established foundational principles including national treatment—requiring member states to treat foreign applicants as favorably as nationals—and the right of priority, allowing applicants to claim an earlier filing date within 12 months in other member countries. By 2025, it has 179 member states and serves as the bedrock for subsequent treaties, though it does not impose uniform substantive criteria for . Procedural harmonization advanced significantly with the (PCT), administered by the (WIPO) and entering into force on January 1, 1978, which enables a single international application to seek protection in up to 158 contracting states as of 2025. The PCT defers national-phase examinations, providing an international search report and optional preliminary examination to assess novelty and inventive step, thereby reducing redundancy but not resolving divergent national grant standards. Complementing this, the Patent Law Treaty (PLT), adopted on June 1, 2000, and effective from April 28, 2005, standardizes formal requirements such as filing dates, priority claims, and restoration of rights across 41 contracting parties by 2025, aiming to minimize administrative burdens without altering substantive patentability rules. Substantive alignment received impetus from the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of (TRIPS), part of the framework and effective January 1, 1995, which mandates minimum protections including a patent term of 20 years from filing, coverage for all fields of without , and to prevent unauthorized making, using, or selling of patented inventions. TRIPS compelled many developing countries to strengthen domestic laws, harmonizing baseline criteria like novelty and inventive step, though flexibilities such as compulsory licensing for persist, reflecting compromises over uniform enforcement. Compliance disputes, enforced via WTO dispute settlement, have driven adjustments, with over 150 members adhering by 2025. Deeper substantive remains elusive, as evidenced by stalled negotiations for a Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) under WIPO's Standing Committee on the of Patents since the early . The SPLT seeks convergence on issues like for prior disclosures—where the U.S. allows one year versus absolute novelty elsewhere—and definitions of inventive step, but progress halted in 2011 due to disagreements over , treatment, and opposition procedures. Informal "Group B+" discussions among major offices (e.g., USPTO, EPO, JPO, KIPO, CNIPA) since 2011 have advanced technical alignments, such as claim format and exceptions, but no binding has emerged by 2025, underscoring persistent national divergences in priorities and stages. These efforts, while reducing procedural friction—evidenced by over 3.5 million PCT filings cumulatively by 2023—have not eliminated substantive barriers, as countries retain sovereignty over grant decisions to balance domestic incentives against global access.

Economic and Innovative Incentives

Role in Stimulating R&D Investment

Patents incentivize (R&D) investment by granting inventors temporary exclusive rights to commercially exploit their innovations, thereby enabling recovery of the high fixed costs associated with uncertain R&D endeavors, which often exceed millions or billions per project in sectors like pharmaceuticals. This mechanism addresses the inherent in innovation, where without protection, imitators could appropriate discoveries without bearing development expenses, deterring initial investments. Empirical analyses indicate that enhancements in patent protection positively influence R&D expenditures, particularly among firms with greater reliance on . A 2024 study utilizing Spanish circuit-level patent reforms from 1986–1991 found that firms in regions experiencing larger increases in patent enforcement invested more in R&D and grew larger in sales, employment, and output. Similarly, a recent examination of U.S. firms exposed to stronger patent protections post-reform showed rises in R&D spending alongside quality-adjusted patent counts. In high-stakes industries such as pharmaceuticals, where average R&D costs per new reached approximately $2.6 billion as of 2014 estimates updated in subsequent analyses, patent extensions have demonstrably boosted domestic . on Canada's 1993–1997 patent term with the U.S. revealed significant increases in pharmaceutical R&D spending attributable to prolonged exclusivity periods. These findings underscore patents' role in sustaining long-term R&D pipelines, though effects are more pronounced in capital-intensive fields than in low-barrier sectors like software.

Disclosure and Knowledge Spillovers

Patents mandate detailed public disclosure of inventions to satisfy enablement and written description requirements, ensuring that a skilled in the can replicate the invention without undue experimentation. This disclosure, published typically 18 months after filing in jurisdictions like the , forms a cumulative body of technical intended to facilitate cumulative by revealing and enabling incremental advances. In exchange for this openness, inventors receive exclusive rights, theoretically balancing private incentives with societal knowledge dissemination. Knowledge spillovers arise when disclosed patent information diffuses beyond the patent holder, informing competitors, researchers, and subsequent inventors. Forward patent citations serve as a primary empirical proxy for such spillovers, with studies indicating that cited patents contribute to technological recombination and gains across firms. For instance, analysis of U.S. patent data shows localized spillovers, where geographic proximity to interference-resolved patents—publicly revealing detailed claims—increases citation rates and output in nearby firms by up to 10-15%. High-quality disclosures, characterized by precise technical specifications rather than minimal compliance, amplify these effects, generating 20-30% more forward citations and follow-on patents compared to vague ones. The American Inventors Protection Act of 2000 accelerated U.S. publications from issuance to 18 months post-filing, providing quasi-experimental on mandatory disclosure's impacts. This reform boosted rivals' by enhancing access to early technical details, increasing their patenting rates through spillovers, but simultaneously reduced the disclosing firm's own incentives due to heightened imitation risks and proprietary costs. Net effects vary by sector: in complex technologies like semiconductors, spillovers dominate as disclosures aid ; in discrete innovations like pharmaceuticals, costs often outweigh benefits due to easier replication. Absent patents, trade secrecy would suppress spillovers entirely, as by historical pre-patent eras where inventions remained proprietary, underscoring disclosure's causal role in baseline knowledge diffusion. Critics note that strategic behaviors undermine spillovers, such as "salami slicing" inventions into multiple minimally disclosed patents or obscuring key details within enablement thresholds. Empirical assessments confirm that while aggregate spillovers exist—e.g., patent documents cited in 40-50% of new applications in knowledge-intensive fields—disclosure quality correlates inversely with firm secrecy preferences, limiting full societal gains. Overall, mandatory disclosure enforces a : it generates verifiable externalities via citations and recombination, but firm-level costs temper the pace of , with evidence favoring net positive effects in empirical models controlling for endogeneity.

Empirical Evidence from Key Sectors

In the pharmaceutical sector, empirical analyses indicate that patents play a significant role in incentivizing (R&D) investments, where development costs for new s average $1-2 billion per approved therapy as of 2018 estimates. Surveys of U.S. and European firms consistently rank patents as one of the most effective mechanisms for appropriating returns on in this field, outperforming alternatives like or advantages, with inter-industry comparisons showing pharmaceuticals exhibiting stronger patent effectiveness than sectors like or machinery. For instance, a 2018 NBER review of multiple (CMU) and other firm-level surveys found that 60-70% of pharmaceutical innovators cited patents as crucial for securing profits sufficient to justify R&D outlays, correlating with sustained rates despite high failure probabilities in drug trials. However, strategic patenting practices, such as through secondary patents on formulations or delivery methods, have been documented to extend effective monopolies beyond core inventions, potentially inflating prices without proportional gains, as evidenced by analyses of U.S. approval data showing that only 10-20% of follow-on patents represent novel therapeutic advances. Biotechnology exhibits similar patterns, with patents enabling early-stage firms to attract and license technologies critical for scaling discoveries like gene therapies or monoclonal antibodies. A 2018 empirical survey synthesis highlighted that patents rank as the primary appropriation mechanism for startups, distinct from mature chemical firms where suffices, with patent filings correlating positively with subsequent rounds and product approvals in datasets from the U.S. Patent and (USPTO). Studies of human gene patenting post-1980s decision reveal no substantial evidence of innovation suppression; instead, patented genes showed pre-patenting indicators of higher value (e.g., citation rates), and follow-on citations increased for patented sequences compared to non-patented ones, suggesting patents facilitate cumulative rather than block it in this sector. Nonetheless, patent thickets—clusters of overlapping claims on foundational biotech tools like —have raised concerns, though longitudinal USPTO data through 2006 found little aggregate hindrance to downstream invention rates. In contrast, the software and sector shows weaker empirical links between patents and stimulation, with firms often prioritizing trade secrecy, first-mover advantages, or copyrights for protection. Post-1990s legal shifts enabling broader software patentability (e.g., State Street Bank v. Signature Financial) led to a surge in filings—comprising 15% of U.S. patents by 2002—but econometric analyses of firm-level data indicate minimal boosts to R&D investment or productivity, and potential negative effects on cumulative due to licensing frictions. For example, a analysis of patent citations in high-tech industries found software patents less predictive of forward citations (a proxy for technological impact) than in pharmaceuticals, with surveys revealing only 20-30% of software firms viewing patents as key to , versus over 50% relying on rapid iteration and network effects. Empirical work on startup patenting in tech further suggests patents enhance exit valuations (e.g., 10-20% premium in acquisitions) but do not consistently drive initial funding or invention rates, as non-patenting firms like early innovated effectively via secrecy. Cross-sector comparisons underscore these variances: OECD analyses of firm surveys across and services confirm patents' positive but heterogeneous effects, strongest in discrete-product industries like pharmaceuticals (where patents secure 40-60% of innovation rents) and weakest in complex, cumulative fields like software (under 20%). In chemicals—a bridge sector—patents correlate with higher R&D intensity, mirroring pharma outcomes, but data show substitution toward non-patent strategies amid rising litigation costs. These patterns hold in panel regressions controlling for firm size and , though causal identification remains challenged by endogeneity, with natural experiments like patent reforms yielding mixed results on aggregate metrics such as . A small number of exceptionally prolific inventors have been granted thousands of patents, showcasing sustained innovation; see .

Criticisms and Systemic Costs

Monopoly Pricing and Access Barriers

Patents grant inventors exclusive rights to exclude others from making, using, or selling the for a limited period, typically 20 years from filing in most jurisdictions, enabling the holder to charge prices above marginal production costs during that time. This monopoly pricing recovers expenditures but restricts supply to those willing to pay the elevated rates, creating economic as some potential users forgo the product despite valuing it above production costs. Empirical analyses indicate that such pricing dynamics are most pronounced in sectors with high fixed costs and low marginal costs, like pharmaceuticals, where patent protection sustains prices far exceeding competitive levels. In the , monopolies contribute to substantial price premiums, with originator drug prices often declining by 30% to 80% across high-income countries in the eight years following expiration as generics enter the market. For instance, systematic reviews of multiple studies report average price reductions ranging from 34% to 93% within one to five years post-expiry, depending on market entry of competitors and regulatory factors. Physician-administered drugs show similar patterns, with average price drops of 38% to 48% after loss, though declines are more modest (around 25%) for self-administered medications due to slower generic penetration. These reductions highlight how exclusivity delays affordable access, exacerbating affordability barriers; for example, in the U.S., patients often face list prices hundreds of times higher than international generics during the monopoly period, contributing to by cost rather than medical need. Access barriers extend beyond pricing to include geographic and socioeconomic disparities, particularly in low- and middle-income countries where patent enforcement under agreements like TRIPS limits imports or local production of affordable versions until compulsory licensing or expiry. rules, including patents and data exclusivity, have been shown to delay market entry of lower-cost alternatives, reducing availability of and increasing out-of-pocket expenditures. While proponents argue that monopoly revenues fund —pharmaceutical R&D costs averaging $1-2 billion per approved drug—the resulting access restrictions generate welfare losses estimated in billions annually, as foregone consumption exceeds the marginal benefits of incentivized inventions in some models. Critics note that strategies like patent thickets, involving secondary patents on minor modifications, prolong these barriers, further inflating prices without commensurate innovative gains.

Litigation Burdens and Troll Exploitation

Patent litigation imposes significant economic burdens on both plaintiffs and s, primarily due to high legal fees, prolonged proceedings, and uncertain outcomes. In the United States, the median cost to litigate a case through the discovery phase, where disputed damages are under $1 million, reaches approximately $300,000 per patent, according to data from the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA). For higher-stakes cases alleging $10 million to $25 million in damages, costs average $1.5 million and costs $3 million per patent through discovery, with total expenses often exceeding $5 million if reaching . These figures, drawn from AIPLA's practitioner surveys, reflect not only attorney fees but also witnesses, document production, and potential appeals, which can extend cases for 2-3 years on average. Small and medium-sized firms face amplified risks, as the threat of protracted defense prompts settlements in 90-95% of cases, even when infringement claims lack merit, thereby eroding incentives for genuine . Non-practicing entities (NPEs), often termed patent trolls, exacerbate these burdens by acquiring broad or vague patents solely for aggressive enforcement rather than product development or commercialization. characterizes many NPEs as opportunistic actors that disproportionately target financially liquid companies, filing suits to leverage settlement demands over substantive . A Government Accountability Office (GAO) analysis of litigation trends from 2007 to 2011 attributed an 80% surge in patent cases—reaching over 5,000 annually—to NPE activity, with software-related patents comprising 89% of the increase due to their abstract nature and ease of assertion. Post-2011 reforms, including the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, reduced NPE dominance, yet they accounted for a notable share of the 2,594 patent filings in 2024, continuing to impose defensive costs estimated at $29 billion annually in earlier peak periods. The exploitative tactics of trolls yield measurable negative externalities, including suppressed R&D spending and broader deterrence. Studies document that NPE lawsuits trigger stock price declines of 1-2% for defendants and ripple effects reducing peer firms' investment by up to 10%, as uncertainty over patent validity chills technological adoption. Over 10,000 U.S. companies have been targeted by entities, with empirical surveys confirming that while some NPEs pursue legitimate licensing, the majority exhibit "trolling" behavior focused on low-effort, high-volume assertions of questionable patents. This dynamic distorts the patent system's intent, prioritizing over knowledge dissemination, though proponents argue NPEs fill enforcement gaps for individual inventors—a claim undermined by showing minimal from troll-held patents. Reforms targeting frivolous suits, such as fee-shifting provisions, have mitigated some abuse, but persistent district court forum-shopping sustains the issue.

Empirical Assessments of Net Innovation Effects

Empirical studies examining the net effects of patent systems on overall output yield mixed results, with positive associations in sectors requiring large upfront investments but of deterrence or redirection in areas prone to cumulative development. In pharmaceuticals, patents have been linked to heightened (R&D) expenditures, as the exclusivity allows recoupment of high fixed costs; for instance, analyses of pipelines show that patent protection correlates with faster rates in , where without it, firms might underinvest due to free-rider problems. Similarly, a 2024 study of India's post-2005 patent reforms, which aligned with TRIPS requirements for stronger protection, found that exposed firms increased patent filings by 13.5% over eight years, alongside rises in R&D spending and quality-adjusted patents (measured by renewals and international filings), suggesting a net boost to innovative activity without commensurate price hikes. In contrast, evidence from software and electronics indicates patents can hinder follow-on through hold-up effects and fragmented licensing; a study of human gene patents found they reduced subsequent scientific research and product development by increasing transaction costs for building on . Historical data from 19th-century world's fairs, covering nearly 15,000 innovations across exhibitions in 1851 and 1876, reveal that countries lacking patent systems—such as and the —exhibited rates comparable to or exceeding those with patents, particularly in complex technologies like chemicals and , where or lead-time advantages substituted effectively. Petra Moser's analysis of these datasets concludes that patent absence did not suppress total but shifted it away from discrete, easily patentable inventions toward fields less amenable to exclusive , implying patents may distort rather than expand the innovation frontier. Cross-country comparisons further underscore ambiguity: while stronger patent regimes correlate with higher patent propensity in high-tech sectors, economy-wide productivity gains are not uniformly evident, as endogeneity between institutional quality and causality. Sectoral variation persists, with mechanical and electrical fields showing reliance on patents for incentives, yet overall historical evidence suggests non-patent mechanisms—such as trade secrets and first-mover advantages—sustained robust in patent-free environments, challenging claims of universal net positivity. Methodological challenges, including difficulties in measuring unpatented innovations and isolating causal effects amid confounding factors like market size, limit definitive conclusions, though consensus holds that patents' net contribution depends heavily on quality and sectoral fit.

Major Controversies

Software and Business Method Patents

Software patents pertain to inventions implemented via computer programs, while business method patents cover novel ways of conducting commercial activities, often intertwined with software implementations. In the United States, eligibility for both has long hinged on 35 U.S.C. § 101, which excludes abstract ideas from patent protection unless transformed into something significantly more. The surge in such patents during the and sparked debates over whether they foster by safeguarding R&D investments or hinder it by enabling low-quality claims that create legal minefields. Critics argue that software's mathematical and logical nature renders many patents obvious or inevitable, leading to over-patenting without corresponding inventive steps, whereas proponents contend they incentivize disclosure of non-obvious algorithms. A pivotal shift occurred with State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group in 1998, where the Federal Circuit upheld a patent on a method for accounting, effectively discarding the prior "business method exception" to patentability and opening floodgates for financial software claims. This decision facilitated a boom in business method patents, with USPTO issuances in Class 705 ( for business methods) rising from negligible levels pre-1998 to over 11,000 annually by the mid-2000s. Subsequent cases refined boundaries: In re Bilski (2010) saw the reject a strict "machine-or-transformation" test for process patents but affirm that abstract business methods remain ineligible without more, while Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International (2014) established a two-step framework—determining if claims are directed to an abstract idea and, if so, whether they include an inventive concept—invalidating many software-implemented hedging methods. Post-Alice, Federal Circuit rulings have rejected over 70% of challenged software patents as abstract, reducing grants but not eliminating litigation over borderline cases. Empirical analyses reveal mixed but predominantly skeptical impacts on . Firm-level studies indicate software patents correlate with reduced R&D intensity, suggesting they serve as substitutes for genuine rather than complements. In the software sector, patent propensity rose sharply in the due to lowered prosecution costs, yet follow-on metrics show no clear acceleration attributable to such protections, with open-source contributions thriving amid narrower scopes. Business method patents, in particular, exhibit lower citation rates and higher invalidation frequencies, implying inferior quality and minimal knowledge spillovers. These patents have fueled non-practicing entity (NPE) or "patent troll" activity, where entities acquire vague claims to extract settlements without producing goods. Between 1990 and 2010, troll suits eroded $500 billion in defendant wealth, disproportionately targeting software and methods in tech and . By , NPEs filed 64% of U.S. patent lawsuits, many involving post-State Street business methods, with trolls leveraging ambiguous boundaries for 93% of software-related assertions against operating companies. Such practices impose defensive patenting burdens, diverting resources from development; startups report no evidence of patents attracting investment in software ventures. Reforms like the America Invents Act's fee-shifting provisions have curbed some abuse, but persistent controversies underscore tensions between monopoly incentives and cumulative innovation in rapidly evolving fields.

Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical Extensions

In biotechnology, a central controversy surrounds the of naturally occurring biological materials, exemplified by the 2013 U.S. decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., which held that isolated human DNA sequences, such as the and genes linked to and risk, are products of nature and thus ineligible for patent protection, though (cDNA) created via reverse transcription remains patentable. This ruling invalidated key claims in Myriad's patents, which had previously granted the company monopoly rights over , leading to higher costs and limited access for patients; critics argued such patents stifled follow-on research and innovation by deterring competitors from developing improved diagnostic methods, while proponents contended they were essential to recoup the $500 million-plus invested in gene discovery. Post-decision empirical analyses indicate a surge in BRCA testing providers and price reductions, from Myriad's $3,000+ per test to under $250 by 2015, suggesting that gene patent exclusivity had indeed created access barriers without proportionally spurring broader innovation in genetic diagnostics. Ongoing disputes over CRISPR-Cas9 gene-editing technology further illustrate biotechnology patent frictions, with interference proceedings pitting inventors and —2020 Nobel laureates—against and the Institute; the U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) initially awarded key eukaryotic application patents to Broad in 2017 and , but the Federal Circuit in May 2025 remanded the case for reconsideration on conception priority, amid claims that Broad's filings preempted foundational uses and slowed commercialization. These battles, spanning U.S., European, and other jurisdictions, have delayed licensing agreements and raised concerns that fragmented ownership— with over 20 CRISPR-related patent families contested—impedes collaborative research in therapeutics for genetic diseases like sickle cell anemia, though defenders assert such exclusivity incentivizes risky investments yielding tools now used in FDA-approved therapies such as Casgevy in 2023. Empirical reviews highlight that while biotech patents correlate with increased R&D in upstream tools, downstream innovation can suffer from "anticommons" effects where overlapping claims raise transaction costs for cumulative invention. Pharmaceutical patent extensions amplify debates over balancing incentives against market exclusivity, particularly through practices like "," where firms secure secondary patents on minor formulation tweaks, delivery devices, or new uses to extend monopoly periods beyond the standard 20 years from filing, often delaying generic entry by 5–10 years. For instance, AbbVie's Humira (), approved in 2002, amassed over 100 patents forming a "" that postponed U.S. competition until 2023, sustaining annual revenues exceeding $20 billion and contributing to list prices around $6,000 per month before discounts. Critics, including analyses of FDA Orange Book listings, contend this strategy exploits regulatory pathways like the Hatch-Waxman Act's 180-day generic exclusivity to maintain high prices—U.S. drug spending hit $576 billion in 2021—while empirical studies show accounts for 78% of new pharma patents protecting existing molecules rather than novel entities, potentially reducing net by diverting resources from true breakthroughs. Proponents, including industry analyses, counter that such extensions are lawful refinements reflecting genuine inventive activity amid 90%+ clinical rates, with cross-country evidence indicating stronger patent regimes correlate with 10–20% higher new molecular entity approvals, though access suffers in low-income nations where compulsory licensing under TRIPS has enabled generics for antiretrovirals, cutting treatment costs from $10,000 to $100 per patient-year by 2010. Overall assessments reveal patents' outsized role in pharma R&D—surveys rank them as the top appropriation mechanism versus secrecy or lead time—yet question their efficiency given public subsidies like NIH funding comprising 40% of upstream biotech inputs, suggesting reforms like prize systems could better align incentives with social value.

AI-Generated Inventions and Eligibility

The eligibility of inventions generated by (AI) systems for patent protection hinges primarily on statutory requirements for inventorship, which in major jurisdictions mandate that inventors be natural persons capable of human conception. In cases where AI autonomously produces an invention without significant human input to its conception, patent offices and courts have consistently ruled such outputs ineligible, as AI lacks legal personality to hold inventorship rights. This position stems from interpretations of patent statutes, such as 35 U.S.C. § 101 and § 100(f) , which define inventors as individuals, and analogous provisions in the (EPC) Article 81 requiring designation of a human inventor. The landmark DABUS cases, initiated by Stephen Thaler in 2018–2019, tested these boundaries by seeking patents for inventions autonomously created by his AI system, Device for the Autonomous Bootstrapping of Unified Sentience (), such as a food container and emergency beacon optimized via . In the United States, the U.S. Patent and Office (USPTO) rejected the applications in 2020, a decision upheld by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of in 2021 and affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on August 5, 2022, which held that "only a can be an inventor" under the Patent Act, as AI cannot exercise the required "act of conception." Similarly, the (EPO) rejected Thaler's applications in decisions J 8/20 (2021) and reaffirmed in December 2024, ruling that the EPC precludes non-human inventors and that mere ownership or programming of AI does not confer inventorship to the human. In the , the rejected DABUS inventorship in 2021, a ruling upheld by the Court of Appeal in 2023 and the on January 8, 2024, which clarified that an inventor must be a "person" under the Patents Act 1977, excluding machines regardless of their autonomy. A subsequent attempt by in 2025 to amend a UK application by naming himself as inventor failed on September 5, 2025, when the determined he lacked the requisite inventive contribution, as —not —conceived the invention. stands as an outlier, granting a patent in 2021 without designating an inventor, treating it as a formal registration rather than substantive examination of AI eligibility. Distinguishing AI-generated from AI-assisted inventions, the USPTO issued guidance on , 2024, stating that purely AI-generated inventions remain ineligible due to absent human inventorship, but AI-assisted ones qualify if a human significantly contributes to conception—defined as forming a definite and permanent idea of the invention's complete and operative configuration. Examples in the guidance illustrate thresholds: a human directing AI prompts to refine parameters may qualify, whereas routine AI use without human ingenuity does not; the human must demonstrate contributions beyond mere recognition or reduction to practice. The EPO aligns similarly, assessing under Article 52 EPC for technical character while requiring human inventorship, as affirmed in its 2023 AI discussions. Internationally, the (WIPO) has noted in 2023 discussions and reports that while AI-related patent filings surged—reaching over 60,000 annually by 2019—no consensus exists for recognizing AI as inventors, with most systems prioritizing human contributions to preserve incentives for . Empirical on AI-generated inventions remains limited, as few applications disclose full AI autonomy, potentially undercounting due to strategic non-disclosure; however, rejections in DABUS-like cases underscore a causal barrier to protection absent human involvement, aiming to maintain patents' role in rewarding human intellectual labor over machine outputs.

Reforms and Future Directions

Legislative and Judicial Adjustments

The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), signed into law on September 16, 2011, represented a major legislative overhaul of U.S. patent law, transitioning the system from first-to-invent to first-inventor-to-file, which aligned U.S. practices more closely with international norms and aimed to reduce disputes over inventorship dates. The AIA also established post-grant review mechanisms, including (IPR), to enable faster and less costly challenges to patent validity at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), addressing concerns over low-quality patents and litigation abuse by non-practicing entities. Judicial adjustments have similarly refined patent standards, with the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. rejecting automatic injunctions for infringement, requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate irreparable harm, which curtailed leverage for patent trolls seeking settlements without market participation. In 2007, KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. expanded the obviousness inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 103, instructing courts to reject rigid tests like teaching-suggestion-motivation (TSM) in favor of a flexible approach considering market incentives and common sense, thereby invalidating more predictable combinations and raising the bar for non-novel inventions. Subsequent rulings tightened subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, with Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. (2012) and Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. (2013) excluding natural laws and phenomena from patentability, followed by Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International (2014), which invalidated abstract ideas implemented on generic computers absent inventive concepts, leading to widespread uncertainty and invalidation of software and business method patents. These decisions, while curbing overbroad claims, have been criticized for stifling innovation in diagnostics and tech sectors due to inconsistent application by lower courts. In response, bipartisan legislative efforts have intensified, exemplified by the reintroduction of the Patent Eligibility Restoration Act (PERA) on May 1, 2025, by Senators and , alongside Representatives Scott Peters and , seeking to codify eligibility tests that exclude mere ideas but protect practical applications in fields like AI, biotech, and software, thereby overriding judicial expansions of § 101 exclusions. Complementing this, the Restoring Lawful Inventorship Act (RALIA), introduced by Representative on October 24, 2025, proposes reverting elements of the inventorship system to pre-AIA standards to mitigate perceived distortions from first-to-file and precedents. These proposals reflect ongoing debates over balancing monopoly incentives against access, with empirical analyses post-AIA showing reduced patent grants but mixed outcomes.

Alternative IP Mechanisms

Trade secrets offer perpetual protection for innovations without the disclosure requirement of patents, provided the information remains confidential and derives economic value from secrecy. Unlike patents, which expire after typically 20 years and enable competitors to build upon disclosed inventions, trade secrets can endure indefinitely if safeguarded through nondisclosure agreements, employee restrictions, and internal security measures. For instance, the has remained a since , avoiding public replication despite extensive analysis. However, trade secrets provide no recourse against independent invention or , limiting their suitability for easily replicable products. Innovation inducement prizes represent a direct alternative, compensating creators for achieving predefined goals without granting exclusive rights, thereby avoiding monopoly distortions in downstream markets. Historical examples include the 1714 British , which awarded £20,000 (equivalent to millions today) for a method to determine at sea, spurring development by . Modern instances, such as the XPRIZE Foundation's $10 million in 2004 for private , demonstrate targeted incentives fostering breakthroughs in fields like space travel and clean energy. Empirical assessments indicate prizes can outperform patents in areas requiring cumulative innovation, as rewards scale with verifiable impact rather than market exclusion, though they demand precise goal-setting to avoid misdirected efforts. Government grants, contracts, and tax incentives provide "push" mechanisms to subsidize research costs upfront, decoupling funding from commercialization monopolies. In the United States, the National Institutes of Health allocated $47.7 billion in grants for biomedical R&D in fiscal year 2023, supporting innovations that enter the public domain immediately upon development. Tax credits, such as the U.S. Research and Experimentation Tax Credit (extended through 2025), allow firms to offset up to 20% of qualified R&D expenditures, incentivizing investment without exclusivity. These approaches mitigate patent-related access barriers but rely on taxpayer funding and bureaucratic allocation, potentially favoring established entities over disruptive startups. Defensive publication and open-source models serve as non-exclusive strategies to block patenting by others while enabling collaborative advancement. By publicly disclosing inventions without seeking patents, creators prevent rivals from claiming novelty; for example, IBM's Technical Disclosure Bulletins have preempted thousands of potential patents since the 1950s. Open-source licensing, as in software via the GNU General Public License, facilitates rapid iteration— development, initiated in 1991, powers 96.3% of top web servers as of 2023—by pooling contributions without secrecy or monopolies. Such mechanisms thrive in cumulative fields like software but falter where first-mover returns are insufficient without protection. Utility models, available in over 80 countries including and , offer shorter-term (6-15 years), faster-granting protection for incremental , bridging patents and trade secrets for small-scale inventions. In , utility model applications reached 12,000 in 2022, providing cost-effective safeguards for minor improvements without full substantive examination. These differ from patents by lower novelty thresholds but yield narrower , suiting markets with rapid . Overall, selecting alternatives depends on innovation type, with suggesting hybrids—combining , prizes, and public funding—optimize incentives in patent-weak domains like and software.

Emerging Global Challenges

Efforts toward international patent harmonization face persistent obstacles, including divergences in eligibility criteria, examination standards, and enforcement mechanisms across jurisdictions, resulting in elevated costs and delays for applicants seeking global protection. The facilitates streamlined international filings, yet substantive differences—such as varying interpretations of novelty and inventive step—necessitate separate national validations, exacerbating inefficiencies for multinational enterprises. In developing countries, weak institutional capacity and limited resources in patent offices hinder effective enforcement, fostering counterfeiting and piracy while impeding technology transfer essential for economic development. These gaps are compounded by debates over compulsory licensing under the , where provisions for public health emergencies, as invoked during the , highlight tensions between originator rights and access in low-income nations. Geopolitical frictions, particularly between the and , intensify challenges to the global patent regime, with accusations of theft and forced transfers fueling trade restrictions and reduced cross-border collaboration. In 2023, overtook the in total patent filings, recording over 70,000 applications compared to under 60,000 in the , though concerns persist regarding the quality and innovative impact of such filings amid state-driven incentives. entity list sanctions have demonstrably curtailed patenting output among targeted Chinese firms by disrupting joint ventures with American partners, potentially slowing global technological advancement in critical sectors like semiconductors. 's establishment of specialized IP courts has bolstered domestic enforcement, positioning it as a rising venue for standard-essential patent disputes, which challenges traditional Western dominance and prompts reevaluation of international licensing norms. Emerging technologies amplify these disparities, as seen in (AI) patent eligibility, where jurisdictions diverge on inventorship—rejecting AI as inventors—and technical effect requirements, complicating protection for generative models and algorithms. accounts for over 70% of global AI patent applications as of 2025, underscoring the need for harmonized standards to prevent and ensure equitable incentives. In climate change mitigation, rapid growth in clean technology patents since 2000 has outpaced other fields, yet barriers to diffusion in developing economies—exacerbated by stringent IP protections—undermine international cooperation goals under frameworks like the , prompting calls for patent pools and voluntary licensing to facilitate green technology adoption. These dynamics reveal a patent system strained by , where reconciling proprietary incentives with collective challenges demands pragmatic reforms beyond current multilateral efforts.

References

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