Hubbry Logo
PredeterminismPredeterminismMain
Open search
Predeterminism
Community hub
Predeterminism
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Contribute something
Predeterminism
Predeterminism
Predeterminism
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia
Part of a series on
Philosophy
Philosophies
By period
By region
By religion
Branches
Philosophers

Predeterminism is the philosophy that all events of history, past, present and future, have been already decided or are already known (by God, fate, or some other force), including human actions.

Predeterminism is closely related to determinism.[1] The concept of predeterminism is often argued by invoking causal determinism, implying that there is an unbroken chain of prior occurrences stretching back to infinity. In the case of predeterminism, this chain of events has been pre-established, and human actions cannot interfere with the outcomes of this pre-established chain. Predeterminism can be used to mean such pre-established causal determinism, in which case it is categorised as a specific type of determinism.[2][3] It can also be used interchangeably with causal determinism—in the context of its capacity to determine future events.[2][4] Despite this, predeterminism is often considered as independent of causal determinism.[5][6] The term predeterminism is also frequently used in the context of biology and heredity, in which case it represents a form of biological determinism.[7]

Definitional difficulties

[edit]

Predeterminism is difficult to discuss because its simple definition can logically lead to a variety of similar, complex (and, perhaps, better defined) concepts in metaphysics, theology, and the philosophy of free will. The term predeterminism suggests not just a determining of all events, but the prior and deliberately conscious determining of all events (therefore done, presumably, by a conscious being). Due to this, predeterminism and the similar term determinism are easily and often confused or associated with ideas ranging, for instance, from the physicalist (and often scientific) notion of causal determinism to even the theological (and often religious) notion of predestination.

A secular example to try to illustrate predeterminism is that a fetus's future physical, emotional, and other personal characteristics as a matured human being may be considered "predetermined" by heredity, i.e. derived from a chain of events going back long before their eventual birth. However, one of the difficulties with defining predeterminism using this example is that the word predetermine necessarily implies a conscious being "doing" the determining ahead of time. With regards to predetermined heredity, a conscious being (perhaps a genetic scientist) is presumed to be the one speculating on what the fetus's personal characteristics will turn out to be, for example, based on looking at the genomes of the fetus and its ancestors. If there were not this conscious entity, the scientist, then one could say merely that the fetus's characteristics are determined by heredity, rather than predetermined. Predeterminism necessarily implies, at the very least, a passive but all-knowing observer, if not an active planner, designer, or manipulator (of the fetus's personal characteristics). This basic scientific idea of hereditary determination, though, already fulfills the definition of causal determinism, a metaphysical concept.

While determinism usually refers to a naturalistically explainable causality of events, predeterminism seems by definition to suggest a person or a "someone" who is controlling or planning the causality of events before they occur and who then perhaps resides beyond the natural, causal universe. This creates a definitional conflict because predeterminism, by this understanding, logically leads to a belief in the existence of a conscious being who must determine all actions and events in advance and who, possessing such seeming omnipotence, almost certainly operates outside of the laws of nature. This conscious entity is probably, then, a being who is omnipotent as well as presumably supernatural and omniscient. The definitional confusion here is that there is already a name for this very concept: predestination. Predestination asserts that a supremely powerful being has, in advance, fixed all events and outcomes in the universe; it is a famous doctrine of the Calvinists in Christian theology.

Likewise, the doctrine of fatalism already explicitly attributes all events and outcomes to the will of a (vaguer) higher power such as fate or destiny. Furthermore, in philosophic debates about the compatibility of free will and determinism, some argue that predeterminism back to the origin of the universe is simply what philosophers mean by the more common term "determinism." Others have suggested that the term "self-determination" be used to describe actions as merely "determined" by an agent's reasons, motives, and desires.

When various interpretation of the word predeterminism can be defined even better by other terms, such as the aforementioned determinism, predestination, or fatalism, then the definition of predeterminism itself appears awkward, unclear, and perhaps even worthless in terms of practical or philosophic discussion.

R. E. Hobart

[edit]

R. E. Hobart is the pseudonym of Dickinson S. Miller, a student of William James who was later one of James' closest personal friends and for some years a colleague in the Harvard philosophy department. Hobart (Miller) criticized the core idea of James' The Will to Believe, namely that it was acceptable to hold religious faith in the absence of evidence for or against that faith. James referred to Miller as "my most penetrating critic and intimate enemy."

Nearly 25 years after James' death, R. E. Hobart published a short article in Mind in 1934 that is considered one of the definitive statements of determinism and compatibilism. It was entitled Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable Without It.[8]

Hobart's compatibilism was similar to earlier landmark positions by Thomas Hobbes and David Hume, as refined in the 19th-century compatibilist views of John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick, and F. H. Bradley. But unlike them Hobart explicitly did not endorse strict logical or physical determinism, and he explicitly did endorse the existence of alternative possibilities, which can depend on absolute chance.

He was writing just a few years after the discovery of quantum mechanics and indeterminacy, and also makes passing mention of the ancient "swerve" of the atoms espoused by Epicurus:

'I am not maintaining that determinism is true...it is not here affirmed that there are no small exceptions, no slight undetermined swervings, no ingredient of absolute chance.'[8]: 2 

'"We say," I can will this or I can will that, whichever I choose". Two courses of action present themselves to my mind. I think of their consequences, I look on this picture and on that, one of them commends itself more than the other, and I will an act that brings it about. I knew that I could choose either. That means that I had the power to choose either.'[8]: 8 

Hobart supports the existence of alternative possibilities for action and the capability to do otherwise.[9]

And he clearly prefers "determination" to "determinism." Hobart's article is frequently misquoted as "Free Will as Involving Determinism."[10]

Philippa Foot

[edit]

Philippa Foot is one who misquoted Hobart's title, but who had the same misgivings about determinism.

In 1957 she wrote an article in The Philosophical Review entitled "Free Will As Involving Determinism."

Nevertheless, she criticized arguments that free will requires indeterminism, and in particular the idea that one could not be held responsible for "chance" actions chosen for no particular reason.

Her article begins with the observation that determinism has become widely accepted as compatible with free will.

"The idea that free will can be reconciled with the strictest determinism is now very widely accepted. To say that a man acted freely is, it is often suggested, to say that he was not constrained, or that he could have done otherwise if he had chosen, or something else of that kind; and since these things could be true even if his action was determined it seems that there could be room for free will even within a universe completely subject to causal laws."[11]: 439 

Foot doubted that the ordinary language meaning of saying our actions are "determined" by motives has the same meaning as strict physical determinism, which assumes a causal law that determines every event in the future of the universe.

She notes that our normal use of "determined" does not imply universal determinism.

"For instance, an action said to be determined by the desires of the man who does it is not necessarily an action for which there is supposed to be a sufficient condition. In saying that it is determined by his desires we may mean merely that he is doing something that he wants to do, or that he is doing it for the sake of something else that he wants. There is nothing in this to suggest determinism in Russell's sense."[11]: 441 

Foot cited Bertrand Russell's view of causal determinism:

"The law of universal causation . . . may be enunciated as follows:...given the state of the whole universe,...every previous and subsequent event can theoretically be determined."

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Predeterminism

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Predeterminism is a and theological asserting that all events in —past, present, and future—are fixed and determined in advance by a divine or power through a deliberate or plan, rendering the course of the inevitable from its inception. This view emphasizes foreordination over mere causal chains, positing that outcomes are not merely the result of prior physical causes but are pre-established by an omnipotent agent, often , who sets the entire sequence of . Unlike standard causal , which focuses on natural laws unfolding from initial conditions, predeterminism incorporates a teleological or intentional element, where the future is not just predictable but purposefully ordained. Historically rooted in religious thought, predeterminism aligns closely with , particularly in Christian traditions where God's sovereignty decrees every creaturely event to fulfill divine purposes. Key proponents include early like , who integrated it with discussions of grace and sin, and Reformation theologian , whose doctrine of in works such as Institutes of the Christian Religion (1536) described God as eternally ordaining all things, including human salvation and damnation, for the manifestation of divine glory. This perspective appears in confessional documents like the (1646), which states that God "freely and unchangeably ordain[ed] whatsoever comes to pass," yet maintains that secondary causes, including human actions, operate according to their natures. Predeterminism profoundly impacts debates on and moral responsibility, often leading to compatibilist resolutions where human choices are voluntary yet divinely determined, as agents act in accordance with their God-given dispositions without alternative possibilities. It also engages the , as the divine authoring of all events, including moral wrongs, challenges attributions of goodness to God; defenders invoke theodicies such as the greater good of displaying divine justice or the compatibility of sin originating from creaturely wills under sovereign oversight. In contemporary philosophy, the concept continues to influence discussions in metaphysics and , with critiques highlighting tensions between omniscience, , and human agency.

Core Concepts

Definition

Predeterminism is a doctrine asserting that all events in the universe, including human actions and decisions, are predetermined or foreknown in advance by an external agent such as a divine being, fate, or immutable universal laws, within a framework of causal chains rather than purely emergent processes. Note that the term is sometimes synonymous with and its usage varies across and theological traditions. This view posits that the entire course of history—, present, and —is fixed prior to its occurrence, emphasizing a preordained structure over emergent processes. The term "predeterminism" derives from the prefix "pre-" meaning "before" combined with "determinism," which refers to the idea that events are necessitated by prior conditions; it entered philosophical discourse as a descriptor for doctrines where outcomes are set at the outset, such as by divine or initial cosmic setup. A key attribute of predeterminism is the pre-establishment of all outcomes either at the universe's or by a conscious , ensuring that no genuine novelty or contingency arises within the temporal flow. For instance, under this perspective, the Big Bang's initial conditions would encode every subsequent event, from galactic formations to individual choices, leaving no room for deviation. In relation to , predeterminism conceptualizes the as fundamentally information-conserving, wherein the complete state of all future possibilities is fully specified and preserved from the initial conditions without loss or addition. This implies that the present configuration of the contains all necessary data to reconstruct or predict the entire timeline, distinguishing predeterminism from forms of that may allow for interpretive flexibility in complex systems, though it aligns closely with strict causal necessity from initial states. Predeterminism shares similarities with causal , as both involve events necessitated by initial conditions and natural laws unfolding continuously, but predeterminism emphasizes intentional foreordination, often by a agent, overseeing the causal sequence. In contrast, causal is purely naturalistic, focusing on mechanistic without pre-established intentional endpoints. Unlike , which is a theological centered on divine foreordination of human and eternal fate through 's continuous intervention, predeterminism applies more broadly to the determination of all events in a causal sequence and can exist in non-theistic frameworks. often permits the appearance of human choice foreknown by , whereas predeterminism typically precludes any genuine alternatives. Predeterminism contrasts with by grounding fixed outcomes in a structured causal or foreordained sequence, rather than an acausal inevitability that disregards human efforts and implies arbitrary doom without explanatory mechanisms. While views events as unalterably set regardless of actions, often evoking , predeterminism maintains a framework that may superficially accommodate effort within the pre-set path. Hard determinism, as a strict form of causal , denies based on the necessity of events from prior causes, differing from predeterminism's emphasis on outcomes intentionally pre-determined at the universe's origin within a causal framework, rather than solely through perpetual naturalistic chains. Both reject agency, but predeterminism's initial-state fixation allows conceptual room for macro-level unpredictability in complex systems, unlike hard determinism's uniform necessity.
ConceptMechanismAgencyTheological Implications
PredeterminismIntentionally fixed from initial conditions in a causal sequence, often by an agentDenies ; actions follow pre-set pathOften involves foreordination, but can be non-theistic
Causal DeterminismEvents necessitated by initial conditions and ongoing cause-effect chains via natural lawsDenies ; behavior necessitated by priorsNone; purely naturalistic
PredestinationDivine decree and continuous creationMay allow foreknown choices; limited agencyCentral: God's will determines
FatalismAcausal fixed events, independent of causesDenies agency; efforts irrelevant to doomPossible fate, but not necessarily divine
Hard DeterminismStrict causal necessity from past eventsDenies entirelyNone; scientific and materialist

Historical Development

Ancient and Medieval Origins

The roots of predeterminism in ancient thought can be traced to Greek philosophers grappling with fate, necessity, and human agency. (341–270 BCE) introduced the concept of the atomic swerve, or , as a spontaneous deviation in the motion of atoms to counter the deterministic implications of Democritean atomism, which posited that all events follow rigidly from prior causes, thereby preserving the possibility of free volition. In contrast, the Stoics, particularly (c. 279–206 BCE), embraced heimarmenē (fate) as an unbreakable chain of causation woven by the divine , viewing the universe as a pre-ordained cosmic order where all events, including human actions, are eternally determined yet compatible with rational assent. This Stoic framework equated fate with providence and the active principle of nature, emphasizing a teleological that integrated individual choices into a universal rational plan. Aristotle (384–322 BCE) offered an early philosophical resistance to strict predeterminism through his deliberation argument in (Chapter 9). He contended that statements about future contingents, such as whether a sea battle will occur tomorrow, cannot be definitively true or false in the present, as this would render future events necessary and eliminate human deliberation and choice. By rejecting the principle of bivalence for such propositions, Aristotle preserved contingency in the future, implying that predetermination of all events would undermine practical reasoning and . In medieval theology, these ancient ideas evolved within Christian, Islamic, and Jewish frameworks, often reconciling divine omniscience with human will. (354–430 CE), in City of God (c. 426 CE), addressed divine foreknowledge as an eternal present that predetermines human actions through grace, arguing that God's prescience does not coerce the will but enables its alignment with divine purpose, thus integrating predeterminination with freedom via . This perspective influenced the Second Council of Orange (529 CE), which affirmed elements of by declaring that and originate solely from God's grace, rejecting any human initiative independent of divine election while condemning double predestination to evil. Parallel developments occurred in with (Ibn Sina, 980–1037 CE), who posited a of necessary emanation from as the Necessary Existent, where the and all events unfold deterministically from divine essence through a chain of intellects, rendering creation and occurrences eternally predestined without compromising God's transcendence. In Jewish thought, (1138–1204 CE) articulated as an active oversight that predetermines events according to rational laws, extending to human affairs through intellectual perfection, where God's knowledge encompasses all particulars eternally, pre-setting outcomes while allowing for apparent contingency in moral choices. These medieval syntheses laid foundational theological groundwork for predeterminism, bridging ancient with monotheistic doctrines of divine sovereignty.

Modern Philosophical Evolution

The Reformation marked a pivotal advancement in predeterminism within , emphasizing God's sovereign decree over all events. (1483–1546), in works like The Bondage of the Will (1525), argued that human will is bound by sin and that salvation is entirely predetermined by , rejecting in spiritual matters while affirming God's foreordination of all outcomes. (1509–1564) systematized this in (1536), describing double predestination where God eternally elects some to salvation and others to , ordaining every event to glorify His justice and mercy. These doctrines influenced Protestant confessions and debates on divine sovereignty. During the Enlightenment, predeterminism's theological concepts paralleled emerging compatibilist frameworks in philosophy that integrated deterministic natural laws with agency, often influencing theological discussions. , in his (1651), posited a mechanistic where all events, including actions, are causally determined by prior conditions, yet individuals act freely when unhindered by external forces, providing a philosophical analogue to predeterminist ideas of inevitability under divine oversight. Similarly, , in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), reconciled and necessity by arguing that actions are determined by internal motives and character, which operate according to uniform natural laws, rendering outcomes predictable within causal chains while preserving voluntary action, concepts that resonated with theological compatibilism. In the , these ideas advanced amid utilitarian and idealist thought, paralleling theological predeterminism by emphasizing amid determination. , in A System of Logic (1843), defended by asserting that consists in actions arising from one's own character and deliberations, even if those are fully determined by antecedent causes, allowing for moral within a predetermined framework akin to divine ordination. , in The Methods of Ethics (1874), contended that the debate over holds limited practical significance for , as does not undermine moral reasoning or the justification of actions based on foreseeable consequences, thus accommodating in a determined world. Complementing this, F. H. Bradley's in (1893) portrayed reality as a timeless, coherent whole—the Absolute—where individual events and temporal sequences are illusions subsumed in a pre-set holistic structure, implying a predeterministic unity that echoed theological views of eternal divine decree. Early 20th-century philosophy introduced shifts toward critiquing strict determinism, highlighting predeterminism's tensions with human experience and divine foreknowledge. , in (1907), challenged deterministic views by emphasizing their practical implications, arguing that a fully predeterministic universe fosters pessimism and undermines moral effort, thereby advocating as more conducive to vigorous living and ethical progress. The advent of further influenced interpretations of predeterministic concepts. Albert Einstein's Relativity: The Special and the General Theory (1916) described as a four-dimensional continuum, inspiring the "block universe" interpretation where past, present, and future events coexist eternally in a static structure, representing a scientific analogue to theological predeterminism through the and the illusory flow of time. , in his lecture "Why I Am Not a Christian" (1927), critiqued religious doctrines of divine foreknowledge, such as Christ's predictions of an imminent , as flawed and unfulfilled, underscoring issues with notions of preordained cosmic events.

Key Arguments and Proponents

R. E. Hobart's Compatibilist Defense

R. E. Hobart, the of the American philosopher Dickinson S. Miller, published his seminal article "Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable Without It" in the January 1934 issue of Mind, using the alias to anonymously contribute to the ongoing debate on and . As a student and close associate of , Miller drew on pragmatist influences but developed a robust compatibilist position, arguing that —understood as the complete fixation of future events by initial conditions—need not undermine human agency when properly analyzed, and such arguments have been extended to theological predeterminism where divine foreordination plays the determinative role. Hobart's core argument posits that is not only compatible with but actually requires , rendering it inconceivable in the absence of causal necessity. He contends that an agent's voluntary actions are free precisely because they are determined by the agent's own character, motives, and deliberations, rather than by external compulsion or random chance. In this view, preserves freedom by ensuring that choices arise from the agent's internal constitution, allowing for since undetermined actions would evade attribution to the self. Hobart famously summarizes this by stating, " is itself, expressed in the ," emphasizing that causal chains originating from the agent affirm rather than negate . Central to Hobart's defense are the concepts of alternative possibilities and the rejection of fatalistic interpretations of determinism. He maintains that the sense of "I could have done otherwise" refers to the agent's power to act according to varying preferences or motives, which determinism enables through reliable causal connections, rather than eliminating via an inexorable chain from the past. Hobart critiques overly mechanistic views of determinism, akin to those implying a Laplacean superintelligence that renders all outcomes inevitable without room for present effort, as misunderstanding how determination operates through ongoing personal struggles rather than pre-ordained fatalism. To illustrate, he employs the analogy of ligaments, which constrain yet enable bodily movement, showing how determination provides the structure for free action; similarly, he likens the self to a horse harnessed within a locomotive, where the mechanism amplifies rather than overrides the rider's will. Another key quote underscores his point: "Just so far as the volition is undetermined, the self can neither be praised nor blamed for it, since it is not the act of the self." Hobart's compatibilist framework influenced subsequent defenses against by demonstrating that allows for genuine alternatives within a determined order, where the agent's nature weights possible outcomes toward responsible choices. This approach counters incompatibilist objections by reframing not as a to but as its necessary condition, paving the way for later compatibilists to explore agency in predetermined systems, including those with theological dimensions.

Philippa Foot's Critique of Strict Determinism

In her 1957 paper "Free Will Involving Determinism," published in The Philosophical Review, engaged with compatibilist debates on , responding to R. E. Hobart's earlier arguments while critiquing strict physical as incompatible with genuine agency. challenged the determinist thesis, advanced by thinkers like , that every human action is fully explained by sufficient antecedent conditions governed by universal causal laws, which would render choices mechanical and eliminate . She contended that such a view conflates physical causation with the practical determination of actions by an agent's motives, desires, and reasons, thereby undermining the intentional nature of . Foot argued that free actions are "determined" internally by the agent's character and motives, which describe and rationalize the rather than cause it in a blind, external sense. For example, a might decide to help a friend out of on one occasion, where the motive—rooted in their traits—guides the action without implying an inescapable causal chain from prior physical events. This internal determination allows for volition even if and environment pre-set an individual's dispositions, such as tendencies toward or , enabling moral within those boundaries rather than predestining every detail through strict laws. She rejected the indiscriminate application of the principle that "every event has a cause" to free actions, insisting that indeterminacy in outcomes does not make them random or unattributable to the agent, as long as they stem from deliberate reasons. Foot's critique highlights tensions in strict and emphasizes the role of motives in agency, which has implications for compatibilist resolutions in broader deterministic frameworks, including theological predeterminism, though her position questions the necessity of full determination for . Foot's emphasis on motives as integral to action foreshadowed her later , in which pre-determined virtues like or form the basis for ethical volition, allowing individuals to act well despite deterministic influences on their nature.

Implications and Debates

Compatibility with Free Will

In the context of predeterminism, posits that is compatible with the pre-determination of all events, defining not as contra-causal but as the capacity to act in accordance with one's desires and motivations, even if those are themselves pre-determined. This view maintains that pre-determination does not negate agency but rather structures it predictably, allowing individuals to exercise control over their actions relative to their internal states. Incompatibilists, particularly libertarians, counter that such pre-determination undermines genuine by eliminating alternative possibilities, rendering choices illusory. A key distinction arises between soft and hard predeterminism: soft predeterminism aligns with , affirming within a determined framework, while hard predeterminism rejects outright, viewing pre-determination as eliminating any meaningful choice. Regarding foreknowledge, Boethius's model in The Consolation of Philosophy reconciles divine pre-knowledge with human freedom by conceiving as timeless, perceiving all events simultaneously in an eternal present rather than sequentially, thus avoiding causal imposition on the future. In secular adaptations, this timeless perspective parallels eternalist views of , where past, present, and future coexist without temporal precedence dictating outcomes. Ethically, supports moral accountability by tying responsibility to the alignment of actions with an agent's character and reasons, even in a pre-decided world; for instance, everyday decisions like selecting a meal may feel volitional but stem from pre-set habits and preferences, yet still warrant praise or blame based on rational responsiveness. This preserves ethical frameworks without requiring . Historical examples, such as R. E. Hobart's defense of as essential to and Foot's critique of strict determinism's denial of agency, illustrate compatibilist support for responsibility under predetermination. Debates persist on whether quantum indeterminacy softens predeterminism, introducing genuine that could accommodate libertarian by allowing uncaused alternatives at the micro-level, though compatibilists argue such indeterminacy adds noise without enhancing rational control.

Contemporary Scientific and Theological Perspectives

In contemporary physics, the block universe interpretation, also known as eternalism, emerges from special relativity's framework, positing that all events in —past, present, and future—exist equally and fixedly, akin to points in space. This view, motivated by the where no universal "now" prevails across reference frames, implies a predeterministic structure where the entire timeline is predetermined, rendering future events as unalterable for observers in certain frames. Complementing this, the of , proposed by Hugh Everett in 1957, describes the universe's wavefunction as evolving deterministically via the without wavefunction collapse, leading to branching into parallel worlds for every quantum possibility. Each branch represents a pre-determined outcome within the overall deterministic evolution, though subjective experience perceives probabilistic choices. Neuroscience contributes through Benjamin Libet's 1983 experiments, which measured activity via readiness potentials (RP) preceding conscious of to act by approximately 350-400 milliseconds, with the (W) reported only 200 milliseconds before movement. These findings suggest unconscious neural processes initiate voluntary actions prior to conscious will, lending empirical support to predeterministic mechanisms in human decision-making. Stephen Hawking's 1988 analysis of time's arrow further underscores predeterminism by attributing the universe's unidirectional temporal flow to its low-entropy initial conditions at the , from which all subsequent states evolve deterministically according to physical laws, increasing over time. Recent advancements in include deterministic simulations modeling predestined outcomes, such as agent-based models and cellular automata that replicate Laplacean , where initial states fully dictate future trajectories without . Predeterminism also informs the , articulated by in 2003, which argues that advanced civilizations could simulate ancestor realities with high fidelity, rendering our world potentially pre-programmed and predeterministic if the simulation's code enforces fixed causal chains. In theology, , developed from Alfred North Whitehead's 1920s philosophy, envisions God as a co-creator who provides initial aims and lures for an evolving reality, persuading rather than coercing outcomes in a universe marked by creativity and contingency, thus adapting predeterministic elements to allow creaturely . Critiquing such views, rejects God's exhaustive foreknowledge of future free actions, arguing that undetermined contingent events are inherently unknowable, thereby opposing predeterminism to preserve genuine libertarian freedom and .

References

  1. https://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/determinism.html
  2. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/theological-determinism/introduction/2819EB9B1BBE03A6CDB86D6762FEA9D6
  3. https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/3090336/1/201049109_Sep2019.pdf
  4. https://sk.sagepub.com/ency/edvol/time/chpt/predeterminism
  5. https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/pre-determinism.html
  6. https://www.etymonline.com/word/predetermination
  7. https://www.informationphilosopher.com/quantum/determinism/
  8. https://www.eduqas.co.uk/media/4daazrmt/eduqas-gce-rs-religion-and-ethics-2018-booklet-with-oers.pdf
  9. https://www.naturalism.org/philosophy/free-will/fatalism/determinism-vs-fatalism
  10. https://www.academia.edu/4309985/Epicurus_refutation_of_determinism
  11. https://people.wku.edu/jan.garrett/stoa/seddon1.htm
  12. https://academic.oup.com/book/39974/chapter/340286142
  13. https://philarchive.org/archive/IZGFCBv1
  14. https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil100/Kane1.pdf
  15. http://www.crivoice.org/creedorange.html
  16. https://al-islam.org/necessity-causation-and-determinism-ibn-sina-and-his-critics-muhammad-legenhausen/necessity
  17. https://philosophy.ucsd.edu/_files/facultysites/watkins-conference/nadler.pdf
  18. https://lutheranreformation.org/theology/luther-and-calvin/
  19. https://iep.utm.edu/theological-determinism/
  20. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/46743/46743-h/46743-h.htm
  21. https://users.drew.edu/~jlenz/whynot.html
  22. https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/hobart/
  23. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2250169
  24. https://philarchive.org/archive/HOBFWA
  25. https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/iphi/files/free_will_2016_01.pdf
  26. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/thinking-about-free-will/how-to-think-about-the-problem-of-free-will/5A202830A9884D82D7DFE751B352D266
  27. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2182743
  28. https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/determination_fallacy.html
  29. https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/foot/
  30. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/
  31. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/
  32. https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/
  33. https://iep.utm.edu/eternalism/
  34. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/
  35. https://academic.oup.com/brain/article-abstract/106/3/623/271932
  36. https://www.fisica.net/relatividade/stephen_hawking_a_brief_history_of_time.pdf
  37. https://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.pdf
  38. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/process-theism/
  39. https://iep.utm.edu/o-theism/
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
Contribute something
User Avatar
No comments yet.