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Eastern philosophy
Eastern philosophy
from Wikipedia

Eastern philosophy (also called Asian philosophy or Oriental philosophy) includes the various philosophies that originated in East and South Asia, including Chinese philosophy, Japanese philosophy, Korean philosophy, and Vietnamese philosophy, which are dominant in East Asia;[1] and Indian philosophy (including Hindu philosophy, Jain philosophy, Buddhist philosophy), which are dominant in South Asia, Southeast Asia, Tibet, Japan and Mongolia.[2][3]

Indian philosophy

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Valluvar, the Tamil philosopher of the post-Sangam era

Indian philosophy refers to ancient philosophical traditions (Sanskrit: dárśana; 'world views', 'teachings')[4] of the Indian subcontinent. Hinduism may have roots dating back to the times of the Indus Valley civilization.[5][6][7] The major orthodox schools arose sometime between the start of the Common Era and the Gupta Empire.[8] These Hindu schools developed what has been called the "Hindu synthesis" merging orthodox Brahmanical and unorthodox elements from Buddhism and Jainism.[9] Hindu thought also spread east to the Indonesian Srivijaya empire and the Cambodian Khmer Empire. These religio-philosophical traditions were later grouped under the label Hinduism. Hinduism is the dominant religion, or way of life,[note 1] in South Asia. It includes Shaivism, Vaishnavism, and Shaktism[11] among numerous other traditions, and a wide spectrum of laws and prescriptions of "daily morality" based on karma, dharma, and societal norms. Hinduism is a categorization of distinct intellectual or philosophical points of view, rather than a rigid, common set of beliefs.[12] Hinduism, with about one billion followers[13] is the world's third-largest religion, after Christianity and Islam. Hinduism has been called the "oldest religion" in the world and is traditionally called Sanātana Dharma, "the eternal law" or the "eternal way";[14][15][16] beyond human origins.[16] Western scholars regard Hinduism as a fusion[note 2] or synthesis[17][note 3][17] of various Indian cultures and traditions,[18][19][20] with diverse roots[21][note 4] and no single founder.[26]

Some of the earliest surviving philosophical texts are the Upanishads of the later Vedic period (1000–500 BCE)[citation needed]. Important Indian philosophical concepts include dharma, karma, samsara, moksha, and ahimsa. Indian philosophers developed a system of epistemological reasoning (pramana) and logic and investigated topics such as Ontology (metaphysics, Brahman-Atman, Sunyata-Anatta), reliable means of knowledge (epistemology, Pramanas), value system (axiology) and other topics.[27][28][29] Indian philosophy also covered topics such as political philosophy as seen in the Arthashastra c. 4th century BCE and the philosophy of love as seen in the Kama Sutra. The Kural literature of the post-Sangam period between c. 1st century BCE and 5th century CE, written by the Tamil poet-philosopher Valluvar, is believed by many scholars to be based on Jain[30][31][32] or Hindu philosophies.[33][34][35][36]

Later developments include the development of Tantra and Iranian-Islamic influences. Buddhism mostly disappeared from India after the Muslim conquest in the Indian subcontinent, surviving in the Himalayan regions and south India.[37] The early modern period saw the flourishing of Navya-Nyāya (the 'new reason') under philosophers such as Raghunatha Siromani (c. 1460–1540) who founded the tradition, Jayarama Pancanana, Mahadeva Punatamakara and Yashovijaya (who formulated a Jain response).[38]

Orthodox schools

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The principal Indian philosophical schools are classified as either orthodox or heterodox – āstika or nāstika – depending on one of three alternate criteria: whether it believes the Vedas are a valid source of knowledge; whether the school believes in the premises of Brahman and Atman; and whether the school believes in afterlife and Devas.[39][40]

There are six major schools of orthodox Indian Hindu philosophyNyaya, Vaisheshika, Samkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā and Vedanta, and five major heterodox schools—Jain, Buddhist, Ajivika, Ajñana, and Cārvāka. However, there are other methods of classification; Vidyaranya for instance identifies sixteen schools of Hindu Indian philosophy by including those that belong to the Śaiva and Raseśvara traditions.[41][42]

Each school of Hindu philosophy has extensive epistemological literature called Pramana-sastras.[43][44]

In Hindu history, the distinction of the six orthodox schools was current in the Gupta period "golden age" of Hinduism. With the disappearance of Vaisheshika and Mīmāṃsā, it became obsolete by the later Middle Ages, when the various sub-schools of Vedanta (Dvaita "dualism", Advaita Vedanta "non-dualism" and others) began to rise to prominence as the main divisions of religious philosophy. Nyaya survived into the 17th century as Navya Nyaya "Neo-Nyaya", while Samkhya gradually lost its status as an independent school, its tenets absorbed into Yoga and Vedanta.

Sāmkhya and Yoga

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Sāmkhya is a dualist philosophical tradition based on the Samkhyakarika (c. 320–540 CE),[45] while the Yoga school was a closely related tradition emphasizing meditation and liberation whose major text is the Yoga sutras (c. 400 CE).[46] Elements of proto-Samkhya ideas can, however, be traced back to the period of the early Upanishads.[47] One of the main differences between the two closely related schools was that Yoga allowed for the existence of a God, while most Sāmkhya thinkers criticized this idea.[48]

Sāmkhya epistemology accepts three of six pramanas (proofs) as the only reliable means of gaining knowledge; pratyakṣa (perception), anumāṇa (inference) and śabda (word/testimony of reliable sources).[49] The school developed a complex theoretical exposition of the evolution of consciousness and matter. Sāmkhya sources argue that the universe consists of two realities, puruṣa (consciousness) and prakṛti (matter).

As shown by the Sāṁkhyapravacana Sūtra (c. 14th century CE), Sāmkhya continued to develop throughout the medieval period.

Nyāya

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The Nyāya school of epistemology explores sources of knowledge (Pramāṇa) and is based on the Nyāya Sūtras (circa 6th century BCE and 2nd century CE).[50] Nyāya holds that human suffering arises out of ignorance and liberation arises through correct knowledge. Therefore, they sought to investigate the sources of correct knowledge or epistemology.

Nyāya traditionally accepts four Pramanas as reliable means of gaining knowledge – Pratyakṣa (perception), Anumāṇa (inference), Upamāṇa (comparison and analogy) and Śabda (word, testimony of past or present reliable experts).[49] Nyāya also traditionally defended a form of philosophical realism.[51]

The Nyāya Sūtras was a very influential text in Indian philosophy, laying the foundations for classical Indian epistemological debates between the different philosophical schools. It includes, for example, the classic Hindu rejoinders against Buddhist not-self (anatta) arguments.[52] The work also famously argues against a creator God (Ishvara),[53] a debate which became central to Hinduism in the medieval period.

Vaiśeṣika

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Vaiśeṣika is a naturalist school of atomism, which accepts only two sources of knowledge, perception, and inference.[54] This philosophy held that the universe was reducible to paramāṇu (atoms), which are indestructible (anitya), indivisible, and have a special kind of dimension, called "small" (aṇu). Whatever we experience is a composite of these atoms.[55]

Vaiśeṣika organized all objects of experience into what they called padārthas (literally: 'the meaning of a word') which included six categories; dravya (substance), guṇa (quality), karma (activity), sāmānya (generality), viśeṣa (particularity) and samavāya (inherence). Later Vaiśeṣikas (Śrīdhara and Udayana and Śivāditya) added one more category abhava (non-existence). The first three categories are defined as artha (which can be perceived) and they have real objective existence. The last three categories are defined as budhyapekṣam (product of intellectual discrimination) and they are logical categories.[56]

Mīmāṃsā

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Mīmāṃsā is a school of ritual orthopraxy and is known for its hermeneutical study and interpretation of the Vedas.[57] For this tradition, the study of dharma as ritual and social duty was paramount. They also held that the Vedas were "eternal, authorless, [and] infallible" and that Vedic injunctions and mantras in rituals are prescriptive actions of primary importance.[57] Because of their focus on textual study and interpretation, Mīmāṃsā also developed theories of philology and the philosophy of language which influenced other Indian schools.[58] They primarily held that the purpose of language was to correctly prescribe proper actions, rituals, and correct dharma (duty or virtue).[59] Mīmāṃsā is also mainly atheistic, holding that the evidence for the existence of God is insufficient and that the Gods named in the Vedas have no existence apart from the names, mantras and their power.[60]

A key text of the Mīmāṃsā school is the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra of Jaimini and major Mīmāṃsā scholars include Prabhākara (c. 7th century) and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (fl. roughly 700). The Mīmāṃsā school strongly influenced Vedānta, which was also known as Uttara-Mīmāṃsā; however, while Mīmāṃsā emphasized karmakāṇḍa, or the study of ritual actions, using the four early Vedas, the Vedānta schools emphasized jñanakāṇḍa, the study of knowledge, using the later parts of Vedas like the Upaniṣads.[57]

Vedānta

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Adi Shankara (8th century CE) the main exponent of Advaita Vedānta

Vedānta (meaning "end of the Vedas") or Uttara-Mīmāṃsā, are a group of traditions which focus on the philosophical issues found in the Prasthanatrayi (the three sources), which are the Principal Upanishads, the Brahma Sutras and the Bhagavad Gita.[61] Vedānta sees the Vedas, particularly the Upanishads, as a reliable source of knowledge.

The central concern for these schools is the nature of and the relationship between Brahman (ultimate reality, universal consciousness), Ātman (individual soul) and Prakriti (empirical world).

The sub-traditions of Vedānta include Advaita (non-dualism), Vishishtadvaita (qualified non-dualism), Dvaita (dualism), and Bhedabheda (difference and non-difference).[62] Due to the popularity of the bhakti movement, Vedānta came to be the dominant current of Hinduism in the post-medieval period.

Other

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While the classical enumeration of Indian philosophies lists six orthodox schools, there are other schools that are sometimes seen as orthodox. These include:[41]

Heterodox or Śramaṇic schools

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The nāstika or heterodox schools are associated with the non-Vedic Śramaṇic traditions that existed in India since before the 6th century BCE.[63] The Śramaṇa movement gave rise to a diverse range of non-Vedic ideas, ranging from accepting or denying the concepts of atman, atomism, materialism, atheism, agnosticism, fatalism to free will, extreme asceticism, strict ahimsa (non-violence) and vegetarianism.[64] Notable philosophies that arose from Śramaṇic movement were Jainism, early Buddhism, Cārvāka, Ajñana, and Ājīvika.[65]

Jain philosophy

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Jain philosophy deals extensively with the problems of metaphysics, reality, cosmology, ontology, epistemology, and divinity. Jainism is essentially a transtheistic religion of ancient India.[66]: 182  It continues the ancient Śramaṇa tradition, which co-existed with the Vedic tradition since ancient times.[67][68] The distinguishing features of Jain philosophy include a mind-body dualism, denial of a creative and omnipotent God, karma, an eternal and uncreated universe, non-violence, the theory of the multiple facets of truth, and morality based on liberation of the soul. Jain philosophy attempts to explain the rationale of being and existence, the nature of the Universe and its constituents, the nature of the bondage and the means to achieve liberation.[69] It has often been described as an ascetic movement for its strong emphasis on self-control, austerities, and renunciation.[70] It has also been called a model of philosophical liberalism for its insistence that truth is relative and multifaceted and for its willingness to accommodate all possible view-points of the rival philosophies.[71] Jainism strongly upholds the individualistic nature of the soul and personal responsibility for one's decisions, and that self-reliance and individual efforts alone are responsible for one's liberation.[72]

The contribution of the Jains in the development of Indian philosophy has been significant. Jain philosophical concepts like Ahimsa, Karma, Moksa, Samsara, and the like are common with other Indian religions like Hinduism and Buddhism in various forms.[73] While Jainism traces its philosophy from teachings of Mahavira and other Tirthankaras, various Jain philosophers from Kundakunda and Umasvati in ancient times to Yasovijaya and Shrimad Rajchandra in recent times have contributed to Indian philosophical discourse in uniquely Jain ways.

Cārvāka

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Cārvāka or Lokāyata was an atheistic philosophy of scepticism and materialism, who rejected the Vedas and all associated supernatural doctrines.[74] Cārvāka philosophers like Brihaspati were extremely critical of other schools of philosophy of the time. Cārvāka deemed the Vedas to be tainted by the three faults of untruth, self-contradiction, and tautology.[75] They declared the Vedas to be incoherent rhapsodies invented by humans whose only usefulness was to provide a livelihood to priests.[76]

Likewise, they faulted Buddhists and Jains, mocking the concept of liberation, reincarnation, and accumulation of merit or demerit through karma.[77] They believed the viewpoint of relinquishing pleasure to avoid pain was the "reasoning of fools".[75] Cārvāka epistemology holds perception as the primary source of knowledge while rejecting inference which can be invalid.[78] The primary texts of Cārvāka, like the Barhaspatya sutras (c. 600 BCE) have been lost.[79]

Ājīvika

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Ājīvika was founded by Makkhali Gosala, it was a Śramaṇa movement and a major rival of early Buddhism and Jainism.[80]

Original scriptures of the Ājīvika school of philosophy may once have existed, but these are currently unavailable and probably lost. Their theories are extracted from mentions of Ajivikas in the secondary sources of ancient Hindu Indian literature, particularly those of Jainism and Buddhism which polemically criticized the Ajivikas.[81] The Ājīvika school is known for its Niyati doctrine of absolute determinism (fate), the premise that there is no free will, that everything that has happened, is happening and will happen is entirely preordained and a function of cosmic principles.[81][82] Ājīvika considered the karma doctrine as a fallacy.[83] Ājīvikas were atheists[84] and rejected the authority of the Vedas, but they believed that in every living being is an ātman – a central premise of Hinduism and Jainism.[85][86]

Ajñana

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Ajñana was a Śramaṇa school of radical Indian skepticism and a rival of early Buddhism and Jainism. They held that it was impossible to obtain knowledge of metaphysical nature or ascertain the truth value of philosophical propositions;[87] and even if knowledge was possible, it was useless and disadvantageous for final salvation. They were seen as sophists who specialized in refutation without propagating any positive doctrine of their own. Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa (fl. c. 800), the author of the skeptical work entitled Tattvopaplavasiṃha ("The Lion that Devours All Categories"/"The Upsetting of All Principles"), has been seen as an important Ajñana philosopher.[88]

Buddhist philosophies

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The Buddhist Nalanda university and monastery was a major center of learning in India from the 5th century CE to c. 1200.
Monks debating at Sera monastery, Tibet, 2013

Buddhist philosophy begins with the thought of Gautama Buddha (fl. between sixth and fourth centuries BCE) and is preserved in the early Buddhist texts. It generally refers to the philosophical investigations that developed among various Buddhist schools in India and later spread throughout Asia through the Silk Road. Buddhist thought is trans-regional and trans-cultural. It is the dominant philosophical tradition in Tibet and Southeast Asian countries like Sri Lanka and Burma.

Buddhism's main concern is soteriological, defined as freedom from dukkha (unease).[89] Because ignorance of the true nature of things is considered one of the roots of suffering, Buddhist thinkers concerned themselves with philosophical questions related to epistemology and the use of reason.[90] Key Buddhist concepts include the Four Noble Truths, Anatta (not-self) a critique of a fixed personal identity, the transience of all things (Anicca), and a certain skepticism about metaphysical questions. Buddhist thinkers in India and subsequently in East Asia have covered topics as varied as phenomenology, ethics, ontology, epistemology, logic, and philosophy of time.

Later Buddhist philosophical traditions developed complex phenomenological psychologies termed 'Abhidharma'. Mahayana philosophers such as Nagarjuna and Vasubandhu developed the theories of Shunyata (emptiness of all phenomena) and Vijnapti-matra (appearance only), a form of phenomenology or transcendental idealism.[91] The Dignāga (c. 480–540) school of Pramāṇa promoted a complex form of epistemology and Buddhist logic. This tradition contributed to what has been called an "epistemological turn" in Indian philosophy.[92] Through the work of Dharmakirti, this tradition of Buddhist logic has become the major epistemological system used in Tibetan Buddhist philosophy and debate.[93]

After the disappearance of Buddhism from India, these philosophical traditions continued to develop in the Tibetan Buddhist, East Asian Buddhist, and Theravada Buddhist traditions. In Tibet, the Indian tradition continued to be developed under the work of thinkers like Sakya Pandita, Tsongkhapa, and Ju Mipham. In East Asian Buddhism, new developments were led by East Asian Yogacara thinkers such as Paramartha, Xuanzang, and Wŏnhyo and East Asian Madhyamaka thinkers like Jizang. New sinitic schools also arose, like Tiantai, founded by Zhiyi, Huayan, defended by figures like Fazang, and Zen, which included philosophers like Guifeng Zongmi.

Buddhist modernism

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Hu Shih and DT Suzuki during his visit to China in 1934

The modern period saw the rise of Buddhist modernism and Humanistic Buddhism under Western influences and the development of Western Buddhism with influences from modern psychology and Western philosophy. Important exponents of Buddhist modernism include Anagarika Dharmapala (1864–1933) and the American convert Henry Steel Olcott, the Chinese modernists Taixu (1890–1947) and Yin Shun (1906–2005), Zen scholar D.T. Suzuki, and the Tibetan Gendün Chöphel (1903–1951). Buddhist modernism refers to "forms of Buddhism that have emerged out of engagement with the dominant cultural and intellectual forces of modernity."[94] Forces which influenced modernists like Dhammapala and Yin Shun included Enlightenment values and Western science. A Neo-Buddhist movement was founded by the influential Indian Dalit leader B. R. Ambedkar in the 1950s who emphasized social and political reform.[95]

Buddhist modernism includes various movements like Humanistic Buddhism, Secular Buddhism, the Vipassana movement, and Engaged Buddhism. Chinese humanistic Buddhism or "Buddhism for Human Life" (Chinese: 人生佛教; pinyin: rénshēng fójiào) which was to be free of supernatural beliefs has also been an influential form of modern Buddhism in Asia.[96]

Sikh philosophy

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Sikhism is an Indian religion developed by Guru Nanak (1469–1539) in the Punjab region during the Mughal Era.[citation needed] Their main sacred text is the Guru Granth Sahib. The fundamental beliefs include constant spiritual meditation of God's name, being guided by the Guru instead of yielding to capriciousness, living a householder's life instead of monasticism, truthful action to dharma (righteousness, moral duty), equality of all human beings, and believing in God's grace.[97][98] Key concepts include Simran, Seva, the Three Pillars of Sikhism, and the Five Thieves.

Modern Indian philosophy

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From left to right: Virchand Gandhi, Anagarika Dharmapala, Swami Vivekananda, G. Bonet Maury. Parliament of World Religions, 1893

In response to colonialism and their contact with Western philosophy, 19th-century Indians developed new ways of thinking now termed Neo-Vedanta and Hindu modernism. Their ideas focused on the universality of Indian philosophy (particularly Vedanta) and the unity of different religions. It was during this period that Hindu modernists presented a single idealized and united "Hinduism." exemplified by the philosophy of Advaita Vedanta.[99] They were also influenced by Western ideas.[100] The first of these movements was that of the Brahmo Samaj of Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833).[101] Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902) was very influential in developing the Hindu reform movements and in bringing the worldview to the West.[102] Through the work of Indians like Vivekananda as well as westerners such as the proponents of the Theosophical society, modern Hindu thought also influenced western culture.[103]

The political thought of Hindu nationalism is also another important current in modern Indian thought. The work of Mahatma Gandhi, Deendayal Upadhyaya, Rabindranath Tagore, Aurobindo, Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya, and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan has had a large impact on modern Indian philosophy.[104]

Jainism also had its modern interpreters and defenders, such as Virchand Gandhi, Champat Rai Jain, and Shrimad Rajchandra (well known as a spiritual guide of Mahatma Gandhi).

East Asian philosophies

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One of the main halls of the Guozijian (Imperial College) in downtown Beijing, the highest institution of higher learning in pre-modern China

Chinese

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East Asian philosophical thought began in Ancient China, and Chinese philosophy begins during the Western Zhou dynasty and the following periods after its fall when the "Hundred Schools of Thought" flourished (6th century to 221 BCE).[105][106] This period was characterized by significant intellectual and cultural developments and saw the rise of the major Chinese philosophical schools (Confucianism, Legalism, and Daoism) as well as numerous less influential schools (Mohism, School of Names, School of Yin Yang). These philosophical traditions developed metaphysical, political, and ethical theories which, along with Chinese Buddhism, had a direct influence on the rest of the East Asian cultural sphere. Buddhism began arriving in China during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), through a gradual Silk road transmission and gradually developed distinct Chinese forms (such as Chan/Zen).

Confucianism

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Confucianism (孔教, Kǒngjiào — "Confucius' doctrine"), also known as "Ruism" (Rújiào — "doctrine of the scholars"), is a Chinese philosophical system with ritual, moral, and religious applications.[107] The tradition developed around the teachings of Confucius (Kǒng Fūzǐ, 孔夫子, "Master Kong", 551–479 BCE) who saw himself as transmitting the values and theology of the ancestors before him.[108] Other influential classical Confucian philosophers include Mencius and Xun Kuang who famously disagreed on the innate moral nature of humans.

Confucius

Confucianism focuses on humanistic values like familial and social harmony, filial piety (孝, xiào), Rén (仁, "benevolence" or "humaneness") and (禮/礼) which is a system of ritual norms that determines how a person should act to be in harmony with the law of Heaven. Confucianism traditionally holds that these values are based on the transcendent principle known as Heaven (Tiān 天), and also includes the belief in spirits or gods (shén).[109]

Confucianism was a major ideology of the imperial state during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) and was revived as Neo-Confucianism during the Tang dynasty (618–907). During later Chinese dynasties like Song dynasty (960–1297) and the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) as well as in the Korean Joseon dynasty (1392–1897) a resurgent Neo-Confucianism led by thinkers such as Zhu Xi (1130–1200) and Wang Yangming (1472–1529) became the dominant school of thought and was promoted by the imperial state. Beginning in the Song dynasty, Confucian classics were the basis of the imperial exams and became the core philosophy of the scholar-official class. Confucianism suffered setbacks during the 20th century, but is recently undergoing a revival, which is termed New Confucianism.[110]

Traditionally, East Asian cultures and countries in the cultural sphere are strongly influenced by Confucianism, including Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam as well as various overseas territories settled predominantly by Overseas Chinese, such as Singapore.

Legalism

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Legalism (法家,pinyin: Fǎjiā; school of "methods" or "standards")[111] was a philosophical tradition which focused on laws, realpolitik, and bureaucratic management.[112] Largely ignoring morality or idealized views of how society should be, they focused on the pragmatic government through the power of the autocrat and state. Their goal was to achieve increased order, security, and stability.[113] They were initially influenced by Mohist ideas.[114] A key figure of this school was administrator and political philosopher Shen Buhai (c. 400–337 BCE).[115] Another central figure, Shang Yang (390–338 BCE), was a leading statesman and reformer who transformed the Qin state into the dominant power that conquered the rest of China in 221 BCE.[116] Shen's successor Han Fei (c. 280–233 BCE) synthesized the thought of the other Legalists in his eponymous text, the Han Feizi, one of the most influential Legalist texts which was used by successive Chinese statesmen and rulers as a guide for statesmanship and bureaucratic organization of the imperial state.[117][118]

Mohism

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Mohism (墨家,Mòjiā; "School of Mo"), was founded by Mozi (c. 470–391 BCE) and his students. It was a major school of thought and rival of Confucianism and Taoism during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods (c. 770–221 BCE). The main text of the school is the Mozi (book). The administrative thought of Mohism was later absorbed by Legalism, their ethics absorbed into Confucianism and its books were also merged into the Taoist canon, as Mohism all but disappeared as an independent school after the Qin dynasty era.

Mohism is best known for the idea of "impartial care" (Chinese: 兼愛; pinyin: jiān ài; literally: "inclusive love/care").[119] According to Master Mo, persons should care equally for all other individuals, regardless of their actual relationship to them. Mo also advocated impartial meritocracy in government which should be based on talent, not blood relations. Mozi was against Confucian ritualism, instead emphasizing pragmatic survival through farming, fortification, and statecraft. Tradition is inconsistent, and human beings need an extra-traditional guide to identify which traditions are acceptable. The moral guide must then promote and encourage social behaviors that maximize the general benefit. As motivation for his theory, Mozi brought in the Will of Heaven, but rather than being religious his philosophy parallels utilitarianism.

Mohism was also associated with and influenced by a separate philosophical school known as the School of Names (Míngjiā; also known as 'Logicians'), that focused on the philosophy of language, definition, and logic.[120][121]

Taoism

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The Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove, embroidery, 1860–1880

Taoism (or Daoism) is a term for various philosophies and religious systems that emphasize harmony with the Tao (Chinese: 道; pinyin: Dào; literally: "the Way") which is seen as the principle which is the source, pattern, and substance of everything that exists.[122] Taoism tends to emphasize virtues such as wu wei (effortless action), ziran (naturalness), pu (simplicity), and spontaneity while placing less emphasis on norms and ritual (as opposed to Confucianism). The attainment of immortality through external alchemy (waidan) and internal alchemy (neidan) was an important goal for many Taoists historically.[123]

Early forms of Taoism developed in the 4th century BCE, influenced by the cosmological theories of the School of Naturalists and the I Ching. The School of Naturalists or Yin-yang was another philosophical school that synthesized the concepts of yin-yang and the Five Elements; Zou Yan is considered the founder.[124]

The Dao De Jing (Tao-Te-Ching, c. 4th century BCE), traditionally attributed to Laozi, and the Nan Hua Jing (Zhuang Zi) are considered the key texts of the tradition.[125] The first organized form of Taoism, the Tianshi (Celestial Masters') school arose in the 2nd century CE. Xuanxue ("deep learning", also "Neo-Taoism") was a major philosophical movement influenced by Confucian scholarship, which focused on the interpretation of the Yijing, Daodejing, and Zhuangzi and which flourished during the third to sixth centuries CE.[126] The most important philosophers of this movement were He Yan, Wang Bi, the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove, Ge Hong, and Guo Xiang.[127] Thinkers like He Yan and Wang Bi focused on the deep nature of Tao, which they saw as being best exemplified by the term "Wu" (nothingness, non-being, negativity).[128]

Other schools rose to prominence throughout Chinese history, such as the Shangqing school during the Tang dynasty (618–907), the Lingbao school during the Song dynasty (960–1279) and the Quanzhen School which develop during the 13th–14th centuries and during the Yuan dynasty.[129] The later Taoist traditions were also influenced by Chinese Buddhism.[130]

Modern East Asian philosophy

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Chinese

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Xiong Shili circa 1960

Modern Chinese thought is generally seen as being rooted in Classical Confucianism (Jingxue), Neo-Confucianism (Lixue), Buddhism, Daoism, and Xixue ("Western Learning" which arose during the late Ming dynasty).[131]

The Opium war of 1839–42 saw the beginning of Western and Japanese invasions and exploitation of China which was humiliating to Chinese thinkers. The late 19th and early 20th century saw Chinese thinkers such as Zhang Zhidong looking to Western practical knowledge as a way to preserve traditional Chinese culture, a doctrine that he defined as "Chinese Learning as Substance and Western Learning as Function" (Zhongti Xiyong).[132]

The traditionalists meanwhile sought to revive and fortify traditional Chinese philosophical schools. Chinese Buddhist thought was promoted by thinkers like Yang Rensan and Ou-Yang Jingwu[133] while another influential movement is New Confucianism (Chinese: 新儒家; pinyin: xīn rú jiā). New Confucianism is a traditionalist revival of Confucian thought in China beginning in the 20th-century Republican China which is also associated with New Conservatism. Key New Confucians of the first generation are Xiong Shili and Fung Youlan.[134] The second generation (1950–1979) include individuals like Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, and Xu Fuguan, all three students of Xiong Shili. Together with Zhang Junmai, the second generation published the New Confucian Manifesto in 1958.

Japanese

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Fukuzawa Yukichi (1862) a key civil rights activist and liberal thinker

Modern Japanese thought is strongly influenced by Western science and philosophy. Japan's rapid modernization was partly aided by the early study of western science (known as Rangaku) during the Edo period (1603–1868). Another intellectual movement during the Edo period was Kokugaku (national study), which sought to focus on the study of ancient Japanese thought, classic texts, and culture over and against foreign Chinese and Buddhist cultures.[135] A key figure of this movement is Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801), who argued that the essence of classic Japanese literature and culture was a sense called mono no aware ("sorrow at evanescence").[136]

In the Meiji period (1868–1912), the modernist Meirokusha (Meiji 6, formed in 1874) intellectual society promoted European enlightenment thought. Meirokusha philosophers like Mori Arinori, Nishi Amane, and Fukuzawa Yukichi sought ways to combine Western ideas with Japanese culture and values. The Shōwa period (1926–1989) saw the rise of State Shinto and Japanese nationalism.

Japanese Buddhist philosophy was influenced by the work of the Kyoto School which drew from western philosophers (especially German philosophy) and Buddhist thought and included Kitaro Nishida, Keiji Nishitani, Hajime Tanabe, and Masao Abe. The most important trend in Japanese Buddhist thought after the formation of the Kyoto school is Critical Buddhism, which argues against several Mahayana concepts such as Buddha-nature and original enlightenment.[96]

North Korean

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Juche, usually translated as "self-reliance", is the official political ideology of North Korea, described by the regime as Kim Il-Sung's "original, brilliant and revolutionary contribution to national and international thought".[137] The idea states that an individual is "the master of his destiny"[138] and that the North Korean masses are to act as the "masters of the revolution and construction".[138]

Syntheses of Eastern and Western philosophy

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In the modern era, there have been many attempts to integrate Western and Eastern philosophical traditions.

Arthur Schopenhauer developed a philosophy that was essentially a synthesis of Hinduism with Western thought. He anticipated that the Upanishads (primary Hindu scriptures) would have a much greater influence in the West than they have had. However, Schopenhauer was working with heavily flawed early translations (and sometimes second-degree translations), and many feel that he may not necessarily have accurately grasped the Eastern philosophies which interested him.[139]

Recent attempts to incorporate Western philosophy into Eastern thought include the Kyoto School of philosophers, who combined the phenomenology of Husserl with the insights of Zen Buddhism. Watsuji Tetsurô, a 20th-century Japanese philosopher attempted to combine the works of Søren Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger with Eastern philosophies. Some have claimed that there is also a definite eastern element within Heidegger's philosophy.[140] For the most part, this is not made explicit within Heidegger's philosophy, apart from in the dialogue between a Japanese and inquirer. Heidegger did spend time attempting to translate the Tao Te Ching into German, working with his Chinese student Paul Hsaio. It has also been claimed that much of Heidegger's later philosophy, particularly the sacredness of Being, bears a distinct similarity to Taoist ideas. There are clear parallels between Heidegger and the work of Kyoto School, and ultimately, it may be read that Heidegger's philosophy is an attempt to 'turn eastwards' in response to the crisis in Western civilization. However, this is only an interpretation.

The 20th-century Hindu guru Sri Aurobindo was influenced by German Idealism and his integral yoga is regarded as a synthesis of Eastern and Western thought. The German phenomenologist Jean Gebser's writings on the history of consciousness referred to a new planetary consciousness that would bridge this gap. Followers of these two authors are often grouped together under the term Integral thought.

Following the Xinhai Revolution in 1911 and the end of the Qing dynasty, the May Fourth Movement sought to completely abolish the old imperial institutions and practices of China (such as the old civil service system). There were two major philosophical trends during this period. One was anti-traditional and promoted Western learning and ideas. A key figure of this anti-traditional current was Yan Fu (1853–1921) who translated various Western philosophical works including Smith's The Wealth of Nations and Mill's On Liberty.[141] There were also attempts to incorporate Western ideas of democracy, and republicanism into Chinese political philosophy, notably by Sun Yat-Sen (1866–1925) at the beginning of the 20th century. Another influential modern Chinese philosopher was Hu Shih, who was a student of John Dewey at Columbia University and who promoted a form of pragmatism.

The influence of Marxism on modern Chinese political thought is vast, especially through the work of Mao Zedong, the most famous thinker of Chinese Marxist Philosophy. Maoism is a Chinese Marxist philosophy based on the teachings of the 20th-century Chinese Communist Party revolutionary leader Mao Zedong. It is based partially on earlier theories by Marx and Lenin, but rejects the urban proletariat and Leninist emphasis on heavy industrialization in favor of a revolution supported by the peasantry, and a decentralized agrarian economy based on many collectively worked farms. The current government of the People's Republic of China continues to espouse a pragmatic form of socialism as its official party ideology which it calls Socialism with Chinese characteristics. When the Chinese Communist Party took over the reign, previous schools of thought such as Taoism and Confucianism (except Legalism) were denounced as backward, and later purged during the violence of the Cultural Revolution which saw many Taoist and Buddhist temples and institutions destroyed.

Swiss psychologist Carl Jung was deeply influenced by the I Ching (Book of Changes), an ancient Chinese text that dates back to the Bronze Age Shang dynasty (c. 1700–1050 BCE). It uses a system of Yin and Yang, which it places into hexagrams for the purposes of divination. Carl Jung's idea of synchronicity moves towards an Oriental view of causality, as he states in the foreword to Richard Wilhelm's translation of the I Ching.[142] He explains that this Chinese view of the world is based not on science as the West knows it, but on chance.

Criticism

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According to the British philosopher Victoria S. Harrison, the category of "Eastern philosophy", and similarly "Asian philosophy" and "Oriental philosophy" is a product of 19th-century Western scholarship and did not exist in East Asia or India. This is because in Asia there is no single unified philosophical tradition with a single root, but various autonomous traditions that have come into contact with each other over time.[143]

Some Eurocentric thinkers claim that philosophy as such is only characteristic of Western cultures. The German philosopher Martin Heidegger is reported to have said that only Greek and German languages are suitable for philosophizing.[144] It is still commonplace in Western universities to teach only Western philosophy and to ignore Asian philosophy altogether, or consider only newer Western-influenced Asian thought proper "philosophy". Carine Defoort, herself a specialist in Chinese thought, has offered support for such a "family" view of philosophy,[145] while Rein Raud has presented an argument[146] against it and offered a more flexible definition of philosophy that would include both Western and Asian thought on equal terms. In response, Ouyang Min argues that philosophy proper is a Western cultural practice and essentially different from zhexue, which is what the Chinese have,[147] even though zhexue (originally tetsugaku) is actually a neologism coined in 1873 by Nishi Amane for describing Western philosophy as opposed to traditional Asian thought.[148]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Sources

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Eastern philosophy refers to the body of philosophical thought originating in the ancient civilizations of and , encompassing traditions such as , , , and Daoism, which address , , and human flourishing through foundational concepts like karma, , the , and nirvana. These systems arose primarily in from the onward and in during the , with key developments during the around the 6th to 5th centuries BCE, featuring thinkers like Siddhartha Gautama (the Buddha) and who articulated paths to and social harmony via , moral cultivation, and alignment with cosmic principles. Distinctive characteristics include an emphasis on experiential verification through practices like and wu-wei (effortless action), often intertwining philosophical inquiry with religious rituals and empirical observation of natural processes, rather than solely abstract argumentation. Major achievements encompass the formulation of enduring ethical frameworks influencing billions, such as the Confucian for and Buddhist analysis of suffering's cessation, alongside controversies over doctrinal interpretations, including debates on the self's eternity in versus impermanence in . These traditions have demonstrated resilience, adapting across cultures while maintaining core causal insights into and reality's interdependence.

Definition and Scope

Historical Origins and Core Principles

The earliest roots of Eastern philosophical traditions lie in ancient , where speculative thought emerged within the Vedic corpus, composed orally between approximately 1500 and 500 BCE. The , the oldest Vedic text dated to around 1500–1200 BCE, includes hymns addressing cosmology, ritual efficacy, and the nature of reality, laying groundwork for later metaphysical inquiries. These evolved in the (c. 800–200 BCE), which shifted toward introspective analysis of ultimate reality (), the self (Atman), and liberation from cyclic existence (samsara), influencing subsequent schools like . In China, philosophical origins crystallized during the Spring and Autumn (771–476 BCE) and Warring States (475–221 BCE) periods amid social upheaval, fostering the "Hundred Schools of Thought." Confucius (551–479 BCE) articulated principles of ethical governance and human cultivation in the Analects, emphasizing benevolence (ren) and propriety (li) to restore social harmony. Concurrently, Daoist texts like the Daodejing (compiled c. 4th–3rd centuries BCE, attributed to Laozi) proposed alignment with the natural way (Dao), critiquing artificial conventions in favor of spontaneity (wu wei) and balance of opposites (yin-yang). Core principles across these traditions prioritize practical , cosmic interconnectedness, and ethical harmony over abstract theorizing, though diversity precludes uniformity. Indian systems often invoke causal mechanisms like karma (action-consequence) and (cosmic order) to explain moral continuity across rebirths, grounded in empirical observation of patterns in nature and society. Chinese thought stresses relational dynamics, as in Confucian role ethics or Daoist flux, viewing reality as processual rather than static entities. Both contrast with certain Western emphases on isolated and linear by integrating human agency within holistic, often cyclical frameworks, as evidenced in early texts' focus on transcending ego for societal or existential equilibrium.

Distinctions from Western Philosophy

Eastern philosophy, encompassing traditions from , , and other Asian regions, diverges from in its methodological emphasis on holistic integration and practical rather than fragmented analysis and abstract theorizing. , traceable to thinkers like Thales in the BCE, prioritizes systematic argumentation, empirical observation, and dialectical reasoning to dissect into discrete categories, such as substance versus accident or mind versus matter. In contrast, Eastern approaches, such as those in classical Chinese thought, employ correlative models that map relational patterns across phenomena without rigid ontological commitments, viewing the world as a dynamic process of change rather than static entities. Indian schools like developed formal logic comparable to Aristotle's syllogisms around the 2nd century BCE, yet subordinated it to soteriological ends—achieving liberation (mokṣa) from cyclic existence—rather than pure theoretical pursuit. Ontologically, Eastern traditions often reject sharp dualisms in favor of monistic or interdependent frameworks, challenging Western assumptions of independent substances. For instance, Advaita Vedānta, articulated by Śaṅkara in the 8th century CE, posits a singular non-dual reality () where apparent distinctions like and world are illusory superimpositions, contrasting with Platonic forms or Cartesian substance dualism introduced in the 17th century, which separate res cogitans (thinking substance) from res extensa (extended substance). Chinese philosophies like Daoism, originating with circa 6th century BCE, emphasize an undifferentiated as the source of all, rendering being and non-being interdependent, unlike the Western focus on being as primary and hierarchical, from ' 5th-century BCE monism to Heidegger's 20th-century ontological difference between Being and beings. These Eastern views align with a holistic that prioritizes contextual relations over isolated essences, influencing perceptions of as karmic interdependence rather than linear chains of efficient causes. In epistemology and ethics, Eastern philosophy integrates introspective practices like with and , aiming at transformative over propositional . Buddhist epistemology, formalized in Dignāga's 5th-century CE pramāṇa , validates yogic insight alongside sensory data for realizing no-self (anātman), differing from Western empiricism's post-Locke () reliance on unaided senses or rationalism's innate ideas, which seek objective truth detached from personal . Ethically, Eastern systems stress relational harmony and duty within cosmic cycles—evident in Confucian ren (humaneness) from the 5th century BCE or Jain (non-violence)—prioritizing communal balance and transcendence of ego, whereas Western ethics, from Aristotle's (flourishing) in the 4th century BCE to Kantian in the 18th century, centers individual and universal rational principles. Such distinctions, while broad, reflect divergent cultural priorities: Eastern causal realism embedded in experiential paths to alleviate suffering, versus Western analytical dissection for mastery over nature.

Empirical and Rationalist Elements

The school in ancient established a foundational framework for rational inquiry through its of pramāṇas (valid means of knowledge), prioritizing (pratyakṣa) as the primary empirical source alongside (anumāna), (upamāna), and testimony (śabda). This system rejected by insisting on verifiable cognition, where doubt prompts systematic examination rather than paralysis, as articulated in the attributed to Akṣapāda Gautama around the 2nd century BCE. Nyāya logicians formalized deductive arguments resembling syllogisms, such as the hetvābhāsa (fallacy of the reason) in propositions like "sound is eternal because it is audible," critiqued via empirical counterexamples like echoes dissipating over distance. Allied with Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika school advanced pluralistic realism and , categorizing reality into substances, qualities, and actions observable through sense data, with ultimate particles (paramāṇus) inferred as eternal, indivisible units explaining composite phenomena like molecular combinations in fire or water. Kaṇāda's Vaiśeṣika Sūtra (circa 6th–2nd century BCE) grounded these in causal analysis, positing motion and conjunction as mechanisms testable against natural processes, though lacking experimental replication akin to . This realism contrasted Vedic by demanding coherence with perceptible evidence, influencing later debates on void and substance. The Cārvāka (Lokāyata) tradition epitomized and , confining knowledge to direct sensory experience and dismissing as unreliable due to unobserved links, as in rejecting " implies fire" without perceiving the connection universally. Emerging around the 6th century BCE, Cārvākas critiqued Vedic rituals and claims as unperceived, advocating a hedonistic derived from bodily pleasures alone, with fragments preserved in opponents' texts like the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha. Their skepticism extended to conditional inferences only when perceptionally corroborated, prefiguring positivist constraints on unverifiable metaphysics. In , (circa 5th–3rd century BCE) emphasized empirical adjudication via "three standards" (san biao): consistency with ancient sage-kings' precedents, sensory verification, and utilitarian outcomes benefiting the state. Mozi's followers compiled the Mohist Canon, applying logical disjunctions and analogies to practical problems like defensive engineering and optical illusions, testing claims against observable utility rather than ritual authority. This proto-scientific method critiqued Confucian analogs through empirical counterevidence, such as demonstrating mirror reflections refute soul immortality, prioritizing causal efficacy over intuition. These elements underscore causal mechanisms—perception yielding data for inference—over dogmatic revelation, though often subordinated to soteriological goals in broader Eastern systems. Institutional centers like Taxila and Nalanda (5th century CE onward) fostered debates enforcing logical rigor, with records of disputations resolving via evidential defeat.

South Asian Philosophical Traditions

Orthodox (Āstika) Schools

The Orthodox (Āstika) schools of Indian philosophy, numbering six primary darśanas, are distinguished by their acceptance of the as authoritative scripture, contrasting with the heterodox (Nāstika) traditions that reject Vedic infallibility. These systems—, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, , Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta—emerged between approximately the 2nd century BCE and the 8th century CE, systematizing inquiries into , metaphysics, , and through aphoristic sūtras and commentaries. Their development reflects a pluralistic yet interconnected framework, often pairing complementary schools (e.g., with Vaiśeṣika for logic and ; Sāṃkhya with for dualism and practice), aimed at achieving liberation (mokṣa) via rational analysis and disciplined praxis. Nyāya, founded on the Nyāya Sūtras attributed to Akṣapāda Gautama (c. CE), emphasizes pramāṇa (valid means of knowledge), including , , , and , to refute error and attain truth. It posits a realist with categories like substance, , and action, integrating theistic elements such as an eternal creator (Īśvara) to explain cosmic order. Vaiśeṣika, linked to Kaṇāda's Vaiśeṣika Sūtra (c. 2nd–1st century BCE), complements Nyāya by classifying reality into six padārthas (categories)—substance, , action, generality, particularity, and —and advances an atomic theory wherein indivisible, eternal atoms (paramāṇu) combine to form composite matter under divine supervision, rejecting continuous creation in favor of periodic dissolution and reformation. Sāṃkhya, traced to sage (pre-500 BCE, though systematized later in Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's Sāṃkhya Kārikā, c. 4th century CE), propounds a dualistic metaphysics distinguishing puruṣa (pure consciousness, passive and plural) from (primordial matter, active and evolving through three guṇas: , , tamas), with suffering arising from misidentification of self with evolving ; liberation occurs via discriminative knowledge (), without reliance on a . , building on Sāṃkhya's , is articulated in Patañjali's Sūtras (c. 2nd–4th century CE), outlining an eightfold path (aṣṭāṅga yoga)—including ethical restraints (), postures (āsana), breath control (prāṇāyāma), and meditation (samādhi)—to still mental fluctuations (citta-vṛtti) and isolate puruṣa, incorporating theistic devotion (īśvara-praṇidhāna) as an aid. Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, founded by in the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras (c. 3rd–1st century BCE), focuses on Vedic to ensure precise ritual execution (karma-kāṇḍa), asserting the eternal, authorless as self-validating sources of ; it defends polytheistic ritualism against skeptical critiques, positing that actions yield intrinsic fruits without need for posthumous realms, though later integrations with introduced theistic modifications. Vedānta, or Uttara Mīmāṃsā, interprets the Upanishads' speculative portions (jñāna-kāṇḍa), with sub-schools like Advaita (non-dualism) of Śaṅkara (c. 788–820 CE) advocating as the sole reality, where apparent diversity (māyā) veils non-differentiated consciousness, achieved via knowledge () negating ignorance (avidyā); other variants, such as Viśiṣṭādvaita, introduce qualified non-dualism. These schools influenced each other extensively, with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika providing logical tools and Sāṃkhya-Yoga metaphysical foundations, collectively countering Buddhist and Jain challenges through debate and synthesis.

Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and Dualism

Sāṃkhya, one of the six orthodox (āstika) schools of , posits a metaphysical dualism between puruṣa—eternal, passive, plural principles of pure consciousness—and prakṛti, the uncaused, dynamic primordial substance comprising matter, mind, and the three guṇas (, , tamas). This framework, traceable to Vedic speculations around the 8th century BCE but systematized in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṃkhya Kārikā circa 350–450 CE, enumerates 25 tattvas (principles of reality): prakṛti evolves into 23 derived categories including intellect (), ego (ahaṃkāra), mind (manas), five sense organs, five motor organs, five subtle elements (tanmātras), and five gross elements (mahābhūtas), with puruṣa standing apart as non-evolutionary. The system's atheistic cosmology explains suffering (duḥkha) as arising from puruṣa's misidentification with prakṛti's fluctuations, resolved through discriminative knowledge (viveka-khyāti) that isolates puruṣa, achieving (liberation). Yoga philosophy, articulated in Patañjali's Yoga Sūtras (composed between 200 BCE and 400 CE), adopts Sāṃkhya's dualistic ontology while introducing practical methodologies for realization. Unlike classical Sāṃkhya's emphasis on theoretical enumeration, Yoga prescribes an eightfold path (aṣṭāṅga yoga)—ethical restraints (yama), observances (niyama), postures (āsana), breath control (prāṇāyāma), sensory withdrawal (pratyāhāra), concentration (dhāraṇā), meditation (dhyāna), and absorption (samādhi)—to attenuate mental modifications (citta-vṛtti) and attain citta-vṛtti-nirodha (cessation of mind fluctuations). Patañjali incorporates a theistic element by defining īśvara as a special, affliction-free puruṣa aiding devotion (īśvara-praṇidhāna), distinguishing Yoga as mildly theistic against Sāṃkhya's strict atheism, yet both affirm the irreducible separation of consciousness from matter as causal basis for bondage and release. This dualism underscores a causal realism in which prakṛti's automatic , driven by guṇas' disequilibrium, manifests the empirical world without requiring a , privileging analytical over or devotion found in other schools. Empirical validation occurs through introspection of psychophysical processes, aligning with Sāṃkhya-Yoga's proto-scientific taxonomy that influenced later Indian thought, including ’s tri-doṣa theory derived from the guṇas. While Sāṃkhya texts predate Patañjali, their interdependence is evident: supplies praxis for Sāṃkhya's jñāna (), forming a symbiotic emphasizing via ontological discrimination rather than monistic dissolution.

Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika: Logic and Atomism

The school, attributed to the sage Akṣapāda Gautama, systematizes and as pathways to valid and ultimate liberation from suffering through discriminative understanding of reality. Its foundational text, the , composed between the 2nd century BCE and 2nd century CE, outlines sixteen categories of analysis, including the means of knowledge (pramāṇas), techniques, and , emphasizing realism in cognition where objects exist independently of . identifies four primary pramāṇas: direct (pratyakṣa) for sensory immediacy, (anumāna) involving a five-step (e.g., , reason, example, application, conclusion) to establish unseen causes from observed effects, analogy (upamāna) for identifying similarities, and reliable testimony (śabda) from authoritative sources like Vedic texts. This framework prioritizes empirical validation and causal , rejecting skepticism by arguing that errors arise from misapplication rather than inherent flaws in these means. Complementing Nyāya's epistemological rigor, the Vaiśeṣika school, founded by the sage Kaṇāda, develops a metaphysical atomism grounded in categorical analysis of existent entities (padārthas). The Vaiśeṣika Sūtras, dated to around the 2nd century BCE to 4th century CE, classify reality into six fundamental categories: substances (dravyas, including eternal atoms of earth, water, fire, and air, alongside all-pervading ether, space, time, souls, and minds), qualities (guṇas, such as color, taste, and motion inhering in substances), actions (karmas, transient motions), universals (sāmānyas, shared properties like cow-ness), particulars (viśeṣas, unique differentiators of atoms), and inherence (samavāya, the eternal relation binding parts to wholes). Atoms (paramāṇus) are indivisible, partless units that combine through unseen forces to form composite bodies, explaining macroscopic phenomena via microscopic causal aggregation without invoking illusion or monism. This pluralistic realism posits a theistic causality, with God as an efficient arranger of pre-existing atoms, aligning motion and combination to manifest order. Historically, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika emerged as distinct yet allied orthodox (āstika) traditions, with Nyāya providing tools for validating Vaiśeṣika's ontology through logical scrutiny. By the 10th century CE, thinkers like Udayana synthesized them into a unified system (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika), integrating atomistic metaphysics with inferential epistemology to defend realism against Buddhist idealism and Jain relativism. This merger emphasizes causal realism, where liberation (mokṣa) results from eradicating false cognitions via precise analysis of substances and their relations, fostering a scientific-like method of inquiry into nature's building blocks and cognitive processes.

Mīmāṃsā and Ritualism

, also termed Pūrva Mīmāṃsā or Karma Mīmāṃsā, constitutes one of the six orthodox (āstika) schools of , specializing in the of the Vedic saṃhitās and brāhmaṇas to elucidate through ritual action. The school's foundational text, the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra, was composed by the sage circa 300–200 BCE, systematizing rules for interpreting Vedic injunctions (vidhi) and prohibitions to ensure precise ritual execution. This framework posits that —defined as obligatory duties yielding worldly and posthumous fruits—is cognized exclusively via Vedic verbal testimony (śabda pramāṇa), rendering rituals the causal mechanism for accruing merit and averting demerit. Central to Mīmāṃsā ritualism is the doctrine of apūrva, an imperceptible potency engendered by yajñas (sacrifices) and other karmas, which bridges the temporal gap between action and its delayed results, such as ascent to (heavenly realms) or progressive purification toward mokṣa (liberation from rebirth). Unlike knowledge-oriented paths, Mīmāṃsā asserts that eternal performance of Vedic rites sustains cosmic order () and individual welfare, dismissing ascetic withdrawal or theistic devotion as superfluous or even contrary to scriptural mandate. The themselves are deemed apauruṣeya—eternal, self-validating, and devoid of human authorship—thus immune to skeptical challenges from nāstika traditions like Cārvāka or . Epistemologically, the school endorses six pramāṇas (means of valid knowledge): perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna), postulation (arthāpatti), non-perception (anupalabdhi), and inclusion (sambhava), with Vedic śabda holding supremacy for supersensible dharma due to its intrinsic reliability. Metaphysically realist, Mīmāṃsā upholds the soul (ātman) as eternal and conscious, the world as composed of eternal substances undergoing transformation via inherent potencies, and rejects a personal creator deity, attributing ritual efficacy to impersonal causal laws rather than divine intervention. Śabara's bhāṣya (commentary) on Jaimini's sūtras, dated around the 2nd century CE, expanded these tenets, spawning Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara subschools that diverged on issues like the intrinsic-extrinsic validity of knowledge and the role of speaker intention in Vedic exegesis. Mīmāṃsā's ritual-centric worldview influenced texts and polemics against heterodox schools, defending Vedic as nominal (devas as ritual foci, not ultimate realities) and prioritizing over . By the medieval period, its ritualism waned under Vedāntic dominance, yet its hermeneutic tools persisted in legal and linguistic traditions.

Vedānta and Monism

![Raja Ravi Varma's depiction of Adi Shankara][float-right] Vedānta constitutes one of the six orthodox (āstika) schools of , deriving its doctrines primarily from the , the speculative portions concluding the . The Brahma Sūtras, attributed to Bādarāyaṇa (also identified as Vyāsa), serve as its foundational exegetical text, comprising 555 aphoristic verses that reconcile Upanishadic teachings on the nature of reality, the self, and liberation. Composed likely between 200 BCE and 400 CE, these sūtras address inquiries into as the ultimate cause and essence of existence. Within Vedānta, monism finds its most rigorous expression in Advaita Vedānta, systematized by Ādi Śaṅkara in the early 8th century CE through his commentaries on the —the , Brahma Sūtras, and Bhagavad Gītā. Advaita asserts the non-dual (advaita) nature of reality, identifying as the sole, unchanging, infinite substratum of all phenomena, devoid of attributes, parts, or limitations. The individual self (Ātman) is not distinct but consubstantial with , encapsulated in the Upanishadic formula tat tvam asi ("thou art that"). This monistic denies ultimate reality to multiplicity, positing empirical distinctions as products of (avidyā). Central to Advaita's is the concept of māyā, the indefinable power of that accounts for the apparent manifestation of the world as diverse and dualistic, akin to a superimposed on a mistaken for a snake. Māyā operates under the of Īśvara (personalized Brahman), enabling cosmic functions while remaining inexplicable as either real or unreal. Liberation (mokṣa) arises not through or devotion alone but via discriminative knowledge () attained through śravaṇa (hearing scriptures), manana (reflection), and nididhyāsana (), dissolving the misapprehension of separateness. for this is drawn from introspective realization and scriptural authority, where perceptual errors underscore the provisionality of sensory data. Advaita monism contrasts with other Vedānta interpretations, such as Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita (11th century CE), which upholds qualified non-dualism wherein subsumes differentiated souls and matter as inseparable attributes, preserving real distinctions within . Similarly, Madhva's Dvaita (13th century CE) rejects outright, affirming eternal duality between God, souls, and world. These divergences stem from varying hermeneutics of the Brahma Sūtras, with Advaita privileging non-dualistic Upanishadic passages while critiquing pluralistic views as accommodating conventional experience without ultimate truth. Śaṅkara's framework, however, integrates causality through vivarta (apparent transformation), where remains the unchanging cause without undergoing real modification, aligning with first-principles analysis of efficient and material origins.

Heterodox (Nāstika) Schools

The Nāstika schools of Indian philosophy, emerging during the Śramaṇa movements of the 6th to 5th centuries BCE, reject the as authoritative and often challenge doctrines like the eternal efficacy of rituals, an unchanging (ātman), and Vedic cosmology. These traditions prioritize empirical validation, ethical praxis independent of , or epistemological restraint, contrasting with Āstika acceptance of Vedic . While forms a major Nāstika branch, the core non-Buddhist schools—Cārvāka, , Ājīvika, and Ajñāna—emphasize , non-violence, , or doubt, respectively, influencing debates on , , and human agency without reliance on supernatural sanction.

Cārvāka: Materialism and Skepticism

Cārvāka, or Lokāyata, posits that consciousness arises from the combination of material elements (earth, water, fire, air), denying any immaterial soul or afterlife, as no evidence beyond perception supports such claims. Perception alone qualifies as a valid pramāṇa (source of knowledge), with inference rejected for its reliance on unobserved universals, such as assuming fire causes smoke without direct verification of the causal link in all instances. This empiricism extends to ethical hedonism, advocating pursuit of sensory pleasure as life's aim, critiquing Vedic rituals as priestly exploitation: material reality alone is knowable, rendering supernatural rewards illusory. Original texts like the Bṛhaspati Sūtra are lost, surviving chiefly through orthodox critiques, indicating Cārvāka's influence persisted into the medieval period despite marginalization.

Jain Philosophy: Non-Violence and Pluralism

Jain philosophy, systematized by Vardhamāna Mahāvīra (c. 599–527 BCE), centers on (non-violence) as the cardinal virtue, extending to all life forms through vows minimizing harm via thought, word, and deed, grounded in the belief that souls (jīva) pervade living entities and accumulate karma as subtle matter binding them to saṃsāra. Anekāntavāda, the doctrine of manifold aspects, asserts reality's complexity defies singular viewpoints, as truths are conditional and multifaceted, exemplified by the of blind men describing an differently yet partially correctly. Syādvāda operationalizes this via seven relativistic predicates (e.g., "in some respect, it is"), fostering tolerance by acknowledging partial knowledge and rejecting dogmatism, which underpins ethical pluralism and supports by discouraging absolutist judgments leading to violence. Liberation (mokṣa) requires ascetic purification to shed karma, achieved through right faith, knowledge, and conduct, independent of Vedic gods or rites.

Ājīvika and Ajñana: Determinism and Agnosticism

Ājīvika, founded by Makkhali Gośāla (fl. c. 5th century BCE, contemporary of ), adheres to niyati (strict ), positing all events—from cosmic cycles to individual actions—as predestined by fate, with no room for , karma's efficacy, or , as souls transmigrate inexorably through 8,400,000 mahākalpas. Adherents practiced extreme , including nudity and breath control, viewing ethical effort as futile illusion, which contrasted sharply with Jain and Buddhist emphasis on volitional karma. The school declined by the 14th century CE, evidenced by inscriptions like Aśoka's edicts protecting Ājīvikas, but its influenced debates on . Ajñāna, a skeptical tradition linked to figures like Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta (6th–5th centuries BCE), maintains metaphysical propositions—such as the soul's permanence, the world's origin, or ethical universals—are unknowable due to perceptual limits and contradictory inferences, suspending judgment via ekaṃśavāda (one-sided assertions lead to error). This critiques both theist and materialist absolutes, arguing claims beyond direct experience (e.g., or impermanence) devolve into regress or circularity, prioritizing epistemological humility over dogmatic resolution. Though not systematized into a lasting , Ajñāna's doubt permeated early debates, challenging opponents like Buddhists to refine arguments against infinite regresses in .

Cārvāka: Materialism and Skepticism

The Cārvāka school, also known as Lokāyata, represents an ancient heterodox (nāstika) tradition in Indian philosophy that emerged around the 6th century BCE, characterized by strict materialism and epistemological skepticism. It rejected Vedic authority, supernatural entities, and metaphysical absolutes, positing that reality consists solely of observable matter composed of the four elements—earth, water, fire, and air—without any enduring soul or afterlife. Primary texts of the school are lost, with doctrines preserved mainly through critiques by orthodox philosophers, such as in the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha attributed to Mādhava (14th century CE), which compiles summaries from earlier sources. In epistemology, Cārvāka upheld pratyakṣa (direct via the senses) as the sole valid means of (pramāṇa), dismissing (anumāna), verbal (śabda), and other sources unless grounded in immediate sensory . This stance fostered toward unobservable claims, such as the of gods, karma, or rebirth, arguing that (symbolizing rituals and Vedic sacrifices) cannot produce (material ) without empirical verification, and that no one returns from death to confirm an . Critics like the school accused Cārvāka of undermining reliable , but proponents countered that generalizations from suffice for practical affairs, like inferring signals only when repeatedly observed. Metaphysically, Cārvāka denied any transcendent reality, asserting consciousness arises from the combination of material elements akin to intoxication from fermented ingredients, ceasing with bodily death. It critiqued orthodox notions of ātman (self) and brahman (ultimate reality) as inferred constructs lacking perceptual basis, prioritizing causal explanations rooted in observable natural processes over ritualistic or theistic ones. This materialist framework extended to ethics, advocating hedonism where pleasure (kāma) is the only intrinsic good, urging enjoyment of sensory life—"while life remains, let one live happily; let one feed on ghee even if debt-bound"—while rejecting asceticism or dharma as veils for priestly exploitation. Cārvāka's influence persisted in debates across Indian thought, challenging dominant and prompting defenses of in schools like , though it faced marginalization for its perceived vulgarity and rejection of social hierarchies tied to Vedic norms. Its emphasis on empirical validation prefigures modern , yet remained a minority view amid pervasive religious paradigms.

Jain Philosophy: Non-Violence and Pluralism

Jainism, as a nāstika school, rejects the infallibility of Vedic scriptures while developing an independent metaphysical framework centered on the soul's (jīva) bondage by karma and its potential for liberation through ethical and ascetic practices. This philosophy gained prominence under Mahāvīra, the 24th tīrthaṅkara, active in the 6th century BCE, who systematized doctrines emphasizing self-discipline over ritual sacrifice. At its core lies ahiṃsā, the imperative of non-violence, which extends to abstaining from harm toward any sentient being, including microscopic life forms, through actions, speech, or thought. Mahāvīra proclaimed ahiṃsā paramo dharmaḥ—non-violence as the highest duty—positing that all injury generates karmic influx (āsrava), obscuring the soul's innate purity and perpetuating saṃsāra. Practical observance of ahiṃsā manifests in rigorous lifestyles: monastics (sādhus) wear mouth coverings to prevent inhaling insects, sweep paths ahead, and handle possessions minimally to avoid unintended harm, while laity adhere to excluding root vegetables to minimize soil disruption and microbial death. This principle causally links ethical conduct to spiritual progress, as —rooted in passions like anger or greed—coarsens the soul, whereas restraint refines it toward omniscience (kevala jñāna). Empirical adherence has shaped , correlating with occupational patterns favoring non-harmful trades like over farming or warfare, though critiques note interpretive shifts in modern contexts where absolute non-violence yields to contextual necessities. Jain pluralism, embodied in anekāntavāda (many-sidedness), counters dogmatic absolutism by asserting that reality (dravya) possesses infinite attributes, graspable only partially from any standpoint. Developed as a response to rival schools' rigid ontologies, it holds that substances like or exhibit qualities that are simultaneously existent and non-existent relative to viewpoints, promoting over conflict. Syādvāda, its epistemological extension, qualifies assertions with syāt ("in a certain sense"), yielding predicates like "it is, it is not, it is indescribable" to reflect conditional truths, as in the classic of the elephant apprehended differently by blind men touching distinct parts. These doctrines interlink: anekāntavāda undergirds ahiṃsā by discouraging violence born of partial, ego-bound perspectives, fostering tolerance toward divergent beliefs as approximations of multifaceted truth. Codified in the Tattvārtha Sūtra by Umāsvāti (ca. 2nd–5th century CE), which synthesizes and canons into 357 aphorisms on , , and liberation, this framework prioritizes empirical self-observation over speculation. Umāsvāti's text equates right , , and conduct—rooted in non-violence and pluralism—as the "three jewels" (ratnatraya) essential for mokṣa, influencing later commentaries that refine these against absolutist critiques from or Buddhist logicians.

Ājīvika and Ajñana: Determinism and Agnosticism

The Ājīvika school emerged in ancient India around the 6th century BCE, founded by Makkhali Gosāla, a contemporary of the Buddha and Mahāvīra. This heterodox (nāstika) tradition emphasized absolute determinism, or niyati-vāda, positing that all events, including moral actions and rebirths, unfold according to an inexorable fate without scope for human agency or free will. Descriptions in early Buddhist texts, such as the Sāmaññaphala-sutta, attribute to Gosāla the view that beings experience fixed sequences of pleasure and suffering, governed by destiny (niyati), predetermined concurrence of conditions (saṅgati), and intrinsic nature (svabhāva), culminating in purification only after exhaustive cycles of existence spanning 8,400,000 great kalpas. Ājīvikas rejected the orthodox notion of karma as modifiable through effort, instead seeing past accumulations as unalterably dictating present and future states, though they practiced severe asceticism, including nudity and endurance of hardships, as outward conformity to this cosmic order. Ājīvika cosmology featured eternal atoms and souls undergoing transformation without creator intervention, with existence progressing through inevitable stages of aggregation and disaggregation. The school gained patronage under the Maurya emperor Bindusāra (r. c. 297–273 BCE) and persisted into the 14th century CE in southern India, though no primary texts survive, and surviving accounts derive from rival Buddhist and Jain sources, which portray Ājīvikas as fatalistic extremists. Scholarly analysis cautions that these depictions may exaggerate or distort doctrines for polemical purposes, yet the core commitment to determinism distinguishes Ājīvikas from probabilistic karmic systems in Buddhism and Jainism. The school, active from roughly the 5th century BCE, embodied and , declining to affirm or refute key metaphysical claims such as the reality of karma, rebirth, or ultimate liberation. Led by figures like Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta, who instructed future Buddhist disciples Sāriputta and Moggallāna, Ajñānists employed dialectical evasion—termed "eel-wriggling" (āmaṇḍala-vyākaraṇa) in sources—to suspend judgment, responding to propositions with indeterminate modes like "perhaps" or "it may be thus," arguing that empirical verification of transcendent truths exceeds human capacity. This approach critiqued dogmatic assertions across śramaṇa traditions without advancing a constructive or , prioritizing epistemological humility over resolution. Knowledge of Ajñana derives exclusively from adversarial Buddhist and Jain canons, such as the Bṛhatkalpa-bhāṣya and Sāmaññaphala-sutta, which classify its proponents among the six heterodox teachers and dismiss their methods as sophistic avoidance rather than genuine . Unlike Cārvāka , Ajñana avoided materialist reductions, instead maintaining an agnostic stance on the soul's existence or perishability, potentially influencing later skeptical strains in Indian thought but fading by the early centuries CE due to lack of institutional support.

Buddhist Philosophical Traditions

Early and Theravāda Buddhism

Early Buddhism encompasses the philosophical teachings attributed to Siddhartha Gautama, known as , who flourished in northern India during the 5th century BCE, with scholarly estimates for his lifespan ranging from approximately 480 to 400 BCE based on alignments with contemporary kings like and . These teachings, preserved in the earliest strata of , center on empirical observation of human experience rather than metaphysical speculation, diagnosing existence as characterized by suffering (dukkha) arising from attachment to impermanent phenomena. The foundational framework is the : the reality of suffering, its causation through craving and ignorance, the possibility of its cessation via detachment, and the method of the —right view, intention, speech, action, livelihood, effort, mindfulness, and concentration—as practical disciplines for ethical conduct, mental training, and wisdom. Core to this philosophy are the three marks of conditioned existence (tilakkhana): impermanence (anicca), where all aggregates of form, sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness are in constant flux; (dukkha), as clinging to the unstable leads to dissatisfaction; and no- (anatta), rejecting any permanent, independent or essence in phenomena, which undermines dualistic notions of and other prevalent in contemporary Indian thought. This analysis promotes causal understanding of dependent origination (paticcasamuppada), a chain of twelve links from to aging and death, breakable through (vipassana) into of inherent being, aiming at nirvana—unbinding from samsara without positing an eternal . Early texts, such as the , emphasize verification through personal practice over blind faith, with critiquing both Vedic ritualism and ascetic extremes. Theravāda Buddhism, translating to "doctrine of the elders," represents the surviving lineage tracing to the Sthavira nikaya, one of the earliest post-Buddha schismatic branches around the 4th-3rd centuries BCE, formalized through councils like the Third Buddhist Council under Emperor circa 250 BCE, which dispatched missions including to where the tradition took root. It maintains continuity with Early Buddhism by prioritizing the (Tipitaka)—comprising the Pitaka for monastic rules, Sutta Pitaka for discourses, and Abhidhamma Pitaka for doctrinal analysis—first orally transmitted and committed to writing on palm leaves around 100-50 BCE in to preserve against decline. Theravāda philosophy upholds the arhat ideal of personal enlightenment through rigorous adherence to the Eightfold Path and insight into anatta, dukkha, and anicca, viewing the Buddha as a human teacher who discovered universal laws rather than a divine figure. While doctrinally aligned, it incorporates later Abhidhamma systematizations and commentarial traditions (e.g., by , 5th century CE) that elaborate psychological categories, which some analyses identify as divergences from the sutta-based pragmatism of Early Buddhism, such as heightened emphasis on jhana absorption states over direct nibbana insight. Predominant in , , , , and , Theravāda stresses discipline and lay-monastic symbiosis for societal stability, with empirical efficacy in fostering evidenced in practices yielding reported reductions in reactivity per textual accounts and modern studies.

Mahāyāna Developments

Mahāyāna Buddhism represents a major philosophical expansion within Indian Buddhism, developing from the 1st century BCE onward through texts like the sūtras, which emphasize the perfection of wisdom () as the realization that all dharmas are empty of inherent existence (svabhāva). These sūtras, emerging roughly 400 years after the Buddha's death, critique substantialist interpretations in earlier schools and promote insight into śūnyatā (emptiness) as interdependent arising without self-nature. Unlike the ideal of early Buddhism, which prioritizes personal extinguishment of suffering via insight into the three marks (impermanence, suffering, non-self), Mahāyāna elevates the path, wherein practitioners cultivate boundless compassion to achieve and liberate all beings, viewing as provisional or lesser. This shift underscores a universalist , positing that is attainable by all through the six or ten perfections (pāramitās), including generosity, ethics, and meditative absorption. The school, founded by Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE), systematized as the , avoiding extremes of eternalism and through arguments in his . Nāgārjuna demonstrated that phenomena dependently originate (), lacking independent essence, thus rendering concepts like causation, self, and nirvana empty in the ultimate sense while conventionally functional via the : saṃvṛti-satya (conventional reality) and paramārtha-satya (ultimate ). This non-affirmative stance critiques essentialism and realism, asserting that reification of dharmas perpetuates , with liberation arising from deconstructive prajñā untainted by views. Later thinkers like Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka refined these dialectics, emphasizing non-dual awareness beyond subject-object dichotomy. Parallel to Madhyamaka, the Yogācāra (or Cittamātra) school, articulated by Asaṅga (c. 4th century CE) and his half-brother Vasubandhu (c. 4th–5th century CE), advanced a phenomenological idealism positing that perceived objects are mere representations of consciousness (vijñaptimātra), without external referents. Drawing from meditative insights, Asaṅga's Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra outlines eight consciousnesses, including the foundational ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness) that subliminally retains karmic seeds (bīja) shaping experience, transforming afflictive habits into pure buddha-nature via practice. Vasubandhu, initially a Sarvāstivādin, converted to Mahāyāna under Asaṅga's influence and authored seminal texts like the Triṃśikā-vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (Thirty Verses), defending mind-only against realist objections by arguing that intersubjective agreement arises from shared karmic imprints rather than independent reality. Yogācāra integrates Madhyamaka's emptiness by positing three natures (trisvabhāva): imagined (parikalpita, illusory projections), dependent (paratantra, causal processes), and perfected (pariniṣpanna, non-dual gnosis), aiming at consciousness purification to realize the imaginal basis of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. These schools interwove to form Mahāyāna's core dialectic: Madhyamaka's deconstructive negation of extremes complemented 's constructive analysis of mind, influencing subsequent Indian debates and the transmission of Buddhism to and by the 7th century CE. Empirical evidence from and Nalanda inscriptions corroborates their doctrinal dominance in monastic curricula from the Gupta period (c. 4th–6th centuries CE). While debates persist on whether affirms a subtle mind-continuum or fully aligns with —Sautrāntika critiques notwithstanding—their shared rejection of svabhāva grounded Mahāyāna's causal realism in praxis-oriented , prioritizing verificatory insight over speculative metaphysics.

Vajrayāna and Esoteric Traditions

Vajrayāna, also known as the Diamond Vehicle or Tantric Buddhism, developed in between the 5th and 7th centuries CE as an extension of Mahāyāna traditions, incorporating esoteric tantric texts and practices aimed at achieving enlightenment within a single lifetime. It emerged amid the late Mahāyāna synthesis of ontology—positing the emptiness () of inherent existence in all phenomena—and , which analyzes as mind-only (cittamātra), though Vajrayāna innovates by emphasizing non-dual through ritualized yogic methods rather than solely analytical . This vehicle privileges "skillful means" (upāya) to transform ordinary perception into enlightened vision, viewing tantric techniques as expedited paths grounded in the same causal framework of dependent origination () as earlier Buddhism, but accelerated via direct engagement with subtle psycho-physical energies. Philosophically, Vajrayāna maintains Mahāyāna's —conventional reality as interdependent appearances and ultimate reality as empty luminosity—but integrates an esoteric ontology of innate (tathāgatagarbha) as primordially pure awareness, accessible through tantric deconstruction of dualistic clinging. Key texts, such as the (composed circa CE) and Hevajra Tantra (late CE), articulate this via symbolic mandalas and mantras that encode the inseparability of (prajñā) and (karuṇā), positing that samsaric delusions arise from ignorance of the body's subtle channels (nāḍī), (prāṇa), and drops (bindu), which tantric yoga manipulates to reveal non-conceptual (jñāna). Unlike Mahāyāna's gradualist approach relying on sutra-based and , Vajrayāna's validates "yogic direct perception" (yogipratyakṣa) as a valid pramāṇa (means of ), derived from guru-initiated visualization of deities as projections of one's own mind, thereby collapsing subject-object in real-time practice. Esoteric traditions in Vajrayāna demand strict vows and (abhiṣeka) rituals, restricting teachings to qualified initiates to prevent misapplication, as unchecked tantric methods could reinforce egoic attachments rather than dissolve them. This secrecy underscores a causal realism: profound realizations depend on precise lineages tracing to Indian mahāsiddhas like (988–1069 CE) and Nāropa (1016–1100 CE), whose oral instructions emphasize as the root of authentication, avoiding the pitfalls of intellectual speculation alone. In Tibetan contexts, where Vajrayāna predominates post-8th century importation by figures like (8th century), four major schools— (emphasizing ancient or dzogchen as primordial purity), Kagyu ( realizing mind's nature), Sakya (lamdre path uniting samsara and nirvana), and (integrating logic with )—diversify applications while upholding shared doctrines of and . Japanese Shingon, founded by (774–835 CE), parallels this by adapting Indian for esoteric realization of the (truth body) through mudrās and fire rituals. Empirical assessments of tantric efficacy remain anecdotal within traditions, with modern studies noting potential cognitive benefits from meditative components but lacking controlled evidence for supramundane claims.

Buddhist Modernism and Secular Adaptations

Buddhist modernism arose in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as Asian Buddhist leaders reinterpreted traditional doctrines to resonate with Western rationalism, , and , often de-emphasizing , cosmology, and monastic in favor of personal experience and ethical . This responded to colonial challenges and Protestant influences, portraying as a compatible with rather than . A pivotal event occurred at the 1893 World's Parliament of Religions in Chicago, where Sri Lankan reformer (1864–1933) presented Theravāda Buddhism as tolerant and rational, emphasizing ideals of gentleness and compassion over dogma. Dharmapala's address highlighted Buddhism's alignment with universal ethics, drawing applause from audiences unfamiliar with its teachings and sparking Western interest. Japanese scholar (1870–1966) further advanced this trend through over 100 books and lectures, interpreting as an intuitive, non-theistic practice beyond intellectualism, influencing figures in psychology and the arts while promoting experiential over scriptural literalism. Secular adaptations extend modernism by extracting meditative and ethical elements for non-religious contexts, prioritizing empirical benefits over metaphysical claims like rebirth or karma. developed (MBSR) in 1979 at the Medical Center, adapting into an eight-week program for and , stripped of Buddhist terminology to appeal to clinical settings. Over 700 MBSR programs worldwide by 2022 demonstrate its integration into healthcare, with randomized trials showing reductions in anxiety and improved , though critics argue it dilutes causal insights into by omitting traditional frameworks. Stephen Batchelor, a former turned secular advocate, articulates this shift in works like Secular : Imagining the in an Uncertain World (2017), rejecting unprovable doctrines while retaining , agnostic inquiry, and ground-level ethics as responses to life's contingency. Batchelor's approach, informed by 10 years in Tibetan and monasteries, posits as a practical testable against experience, influencing communities that view traditional elements as culturally contingent rather than essential. Empirical data from interventions supports stress relief—e.g., meta-analyses indicate moderate effect sizes for depression (Hedges' g ≈ 0.5)—but longitudinal studies question sustained doctrinal independence, as participants often re-engage Buddhist sources for depth.

East Asian Philosophical Traditions

Chinese Core Schools

The core schools of Chinese philosophy emerged during the , a period of intellectual flourishing in ancient from approximately the 6th to 3rd centuries BCE, amid the political instability of the dynasty's Spring and Autumn (771–476 BCE) and Warring States (475–221 BCE) eras. This fragmentation of feudal authority into warring states fostered diverse philosophical responses aimed at restoring order, with thinkers traveling as itinerant scholars to advise rulers on governance, ethics, and cosmology. Key among these schools—, Daoism, , and Legalism—offered competing visions grounded in empirical observations of human behavior and statecraft, influencing subsequent imperial policies and enduring cultural norms. Confucianism, originating with Kong Fuzi (, 551–479 BCE), prioritized moral self-cultivation through virtues like ren (humaneness) and li (ritual norms) to foster harmonious social hierarchies, viewing ethical leadership by rulers as causal to societal stability rather than coercive force. Daoism, attributed to (circa 6th century BCE) and developed by Zhuangzi (circa 369–286 BCE), countered with a naturalistic ontology centered on the Dao—an ineffable principle of spontaneity—advocating (effortless action) to align with cosmic processes, critiquing artificial social constructs as disruptive to natural equilibrium. Mohism, founded by (circa 470–391 BCE), promoted utilitarian through jian ai (impartial caring) and standardized assessments of benefit versus harm, emphasizing defensive and to achieve universal welfare. Legalism, systematized by figures like (died 338 BCE) and (circa 280–233 BCE), rejected moral idealism for pragmatic , asserting that is self-interested and thus requires rigorous laws (fa), administrative techniques (shu), and autocratic power (shi) to enforce compliance and consolidate state strength, directly enabling the Qin dynasty's unification of in 221 BCE. These schools' emphasis on causal mechanisms—whether through , , , or —reflected first-principles analyses of power dynamics, though and Daoism later syncretized as complementary state ideologies, while Mohism waned and Legalism persisted covertly in bureaucratic practice. Empirical historical outcomes, such as the Han dynasty's adoption of Confucian classics for exams from 136 BCE, underscore their practical impact over abstract theorizing.

Confucianism: Ethics and Hierarchy

Confucianism emphasizes ethical cultivation as the foundation for personal and societal harmony, with core virtues including ren (benevolence or humaneness), yi (righteousness), li (proprietary rites), zhi (wisdom), and xin (sincerity). These virtues, articulated in the Analects compiled by Confucius's disciples after his death in 479 BCE, guide individuals toward moral self-improvement through reflection and adherence to ritual norms. For instance, ren is defined in Analects 12.1 as subduing selfish desires to conform to li, enabling one to extend benevolence outward from family to state. Ethical practice begins with filial piety (xiao), extending deference from parents to rulers, as ren manifests in hierarchical duties rather than abstract equality. Social hierarchy in Confucianism is structured around the five cardinal relationships (wulun): ruler and subject, father and son, husband and wife, elder brother and younger brother, and friend and friend. Each pair entails reciprocal obligations, such as the subject's loyalty to the in exchange for the 's benevolence and just governance, as stated in Analects 12.11: "Let the be a , the minister a minister... then the state will be upright." This framework prioritizes role fulfillment over individual autonomy, positing that harmony arises from superiors modeling virtue (de) to inspire inferiors, with li prescribing rituals to reinforce these positions. Unlike egalitarian systems, Confucian hierarchy values merit-based ascent through scholarly virtue, as the (exemplary person) rises via ethical excellence rather than birth alone. Ethics and hierarchy interlink causally: moral order (li) sustains political stability by aligning personal virtue with social roles, as disordered hierarchies lead to chaos, per Confucius's critique of the Warring States era (475–221 BCE). Adopted as state ideology during the Han dynasty around 130 BCE, this system influenced imperial bureaucracy, mandating Confucian classics for civil service exams from 605 CE onward, fostering administrative continuity across dynasties. Empirically, it contributed to social cohesion in pre-modern China, evident in enduring family-centric structures and deference to authority, though rigid application sometimes stifled innovation. In Analects 13.3, Confucius prioritizes rectifying names and roles as the first step in governance, underscoring that ethical lapses in superiors corrupt the hierarchy downward.

Daoism: Naturalism and Spontaneity

Daoism emerged in ancient China during the Warring States period (circa 475–221 BCE), with foundational texts attributing its origins to Laozi's Dao De Jing (compiled around the 4th century BCE) and Zhuangzi's eponymous work (circa 4th–3rd century BCE). Central to Daoist naturalism is the dao (道), conceived as the immanent principle governing the cosmos's self-organizing processes, observable in phenomena like seasonal cycles and ecological balances, rather than a transcendent deity or imposed moral code. This perspective rejects anthropocentric artifice, positing that genuine efficacy stems from conformity to observable natural patterns, as evidenced in Dao De Jing chapter 25: "Humans follow earth, earth follows heaven, heaven follows the dao, the dao follows ziran (naturalness)." Ziran, denoting "self-soing" or spontaneity, underscores Daoism's naturalistic ontology, where entities manifest their inherent potentials without external compulsion, akin to water flowing downhill or plants growing unbidden. In Zhuangzi, this is exemplified through parables of skilled artisans—such as the butcher dismembering an ox intuitively, following its natural joints—illustrating how attuned perception yields effortless mastery, bypassing deliberate calculation. Empirical alignment with ziran fosters resilience, as rigid interventions disrupt adaptive equilibria, a corroborated by Daoist observations of fluid, non-linear natural dynamics over static human constructs. Wu wei (無為), or "effortless action," operationalizes spontaneity in practice, advocating interventions that harmonize with rather than coerce natural flows, distinct from inaction or passivity. applies this to governance in Dao De Jing chapter 57, stating rulers achieve order by minimizing interference, allowing societal self-regulation mirroring ecological . Zhuangzi extends it to personal cultivation, promoting transformative techniques like "fasting of the mind" to dissolve ego-driven distinctions, enabling spontaneous responsiveness to environmental cues. This naturalism influenced later Chinese thought, including , by prioritizing causal interdependence over dominion, with modern interpretations linking it to sustainable practices grounded in observed and resource cycles.

Mohism, Legalism, and Utilitarian Alternatives

, founded by (circa 430 BCE), emerged during the (479–221 BCE) as a rival to , advocating for impartial, universal concern (jian ai) to maximize societal benefit over familial partiality. 's followers formed organized communities that emphasized merit-based , , and opposition to offensive warfare, arguing that such policies would reduce and promote order through empirical assessment of outcomes rather than propriety. Core texts like the Mozi outline ten doctrines, including "elevating the worthy" for leadership selection and standardization of measures to enhance efficiency, reflecting a consequentialist ethic where actions are judged by their promotion of collective welfare. Legalism, synthesized by thinkers such as (died 338 BCE) and (died 233 BCE), prioritized state power through rigorous laws (fa), administrative techniques (shu), and authoritative position (shi) to unify fragmented realms. 's reforms in Qin from the mid-4th century BCE enforced agricultural productivity, military , and harsh penalties for disloyalty, transforming Qin into a centralized power that conquered rivals by 221 BCE under the first emperor. critiqued moralistic governance, asserting human nature's self-interest necessitated impersonal rules and rewards-punishments systems to align individual behavior with state goals, dismissing Confucian benevolence as ineffective for control. Both schools offered utilitarian frameworks distinct from Confucianism's and Daoism's naturalism: pursued ethical impartiality to benefit "all under Heaven" via cost-benefit analysis, while Legalism applied utility to bolster autocratic rule, viewing human motivation as driven by tangible incentives over innate goodness. Though declined post-Qin due to its anti-war stance amid unification, Legalist principles influenced imperial administration, highlighting a pragmatic focus on verifiable results over metaphysical or relational ideals.

Korean and Japanese Extensions

Neo-Confucianism, originating in , was transmitted to Korea in the late by scholar An Hyang (1243–1306), who introduced the works of (1130–1200) and established it as a metaphysical and ethical framework emphasizing (li) and material force (). In the dynasty (1392–1910), it became the dominant state ideology, supplanting and shaping governance, education, and social hierarchy through academies like the Seonggyungwan. Korean thinkers synthesized Chinese with local concerns, producing rigorous debates on human nature and cosmology that deepened metaphysical inquiries beyond Zhu Xi's formulations.

Neo-Confucianism and Synthesis

In Japan, gained prominence during the (1603–1868) under the , serving as an official philosophy to legitimize feudal order and merit-based bureaucracy. Scholar Hayashi Razan (1583–1657) adapted Zhu Xi's Shushigaku (Cheng-Zhu school) to Japanese contexts, integrating it with elements and promoting Confucian virtues like and loyalty to reinforce dominance and social stability. This synthesis contrasted with China's imperial focus by emphasizing practical ethics for a decentralized warrior class, influencing legal codes and education while critiquing excessive commerce as disruptive to . Later thinkers like Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728) shifted toward ancient Confucianism (kogakuha), prioritizing textual literalism over metaphysical abstraction to address perceived moral decay. Korean Neo-Confucians extended synthesis through emphasis on moral cultivation via self-examination, viewing the sage as achievable through rigorous study of and ritual practice, which informed Joseon's examinations and elite structure from 1392 onward.

Zen Buddhism and Samurai Ethics

, the Japanese adaptation of Chinese , was introduced by Myōan Eisai (1141–1215), who established the in 1191 after studying in , advocating kōan practice for sudden enlightenment amid Kamakura-era (1185–1333) social upheaval. Eihei (1200–1253) founded the school in 1227, emphasizing shikantaza ("just sitting") meditation as the direct realization of , rejecting reliance on scriptures or rituals in favor of embodied practice to transcend dualistic thinking. 's (1231–1253) articulated non-dual ontology, where practice and enlightenment are identical, influencing aesthetics like and tea ceremony. Samurai ethics, codified loosely as bushidō ("warrior way") by the 17th century, drew from Zen's emphasis on and fearlessness—cultivated through to face death equanimously—and Confucianism's hierarchy, loyalty, and benevolence, as seen in texts like Yamamoto Tsunetomo's (1716). These influences promoted virtues such as gi (righteousness) and chū (loyalty to lord), aligning warrior discipline with cosmic order, though bushidō as a unified code was retroactively emphasized in Meiji-era (1868–1912) rather than strictly pre-modern practice.

Korean Innovations in Mind and Principle

Korean Neo-Confucianism innovated through the "Four-Seven Debate" (1559–1573), initiated by Yi Hwang (T'oegye, 1501–1570), who distinguished the four moral beginnings (benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom) as rooted in principle (i, Korean for li) from the seven emotions (joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, dislike, desire) arising from material force (gi, for qi), preserving moral primacy amid potential chaos. Yi I (Yulgok, 1536–1584) countered with a unity thesis, arguing both emerge simultaneously from the mind's original substance, integrating Zhu Xi's metaphysics with a dynamic view of human nature that influenced later Korean thought on self-cultivation. This debate, spanning correspondence between T'oegye and Ki Daesung (Kobong, 1527–1572), exemplifies Korea's analytical depth, prioritizing empirical introspection over Chinese orthodoxy and shaping Joseon's intellectual factions into the 19th century. Innovations like Yulgok's "four virtues and seven feelings" framework advanced causal explanations of ethical agency, grounding moral realism in innate mind-principle unity.

Neo-Confucianism and Synthesis

Neo-Confucianism, originating in Song dynasty China as a rationalist revival of classical Confucianism infused with metaphysical inquiries into li (principle) and qi (vital energy), profoundly shaped Korean and Japanese intellectual landscapes from the 14th century onward. In Korea, it supplanted Buddhism as the dominant ideology during the Joseon dynasty (1392–1910), enforcing a bureaucratic meritocracy through civil service exams based on Confucian classics and Zhu Xi's commentaries. This shift, initiated by founder Yi Seong-gye, prioritized moral self-cultivation and hierarchical social order, with scholars like Jeong Do-jeon (1342–1398) adapting Zhu Xi's synthesis to justify the new regime's centralization of power. Korean Neo-Confucians advanced beyond Chinese formulations through rigorous ontological debates, most notably the Four-Seven Debate (1559–1574) between Yi Hwang (Toegye, 1501–1570) and Gi Dae-seung (Kobong, 1527–1572). This controversy examined whether the "four beginnings" (benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom—rooted in li) and "seven emotions" (joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hatred, desire—manifesting via qi) shared a common origin or differed fundamentally, probing the interplay of moral principle and material force in human nature. Toegye argued for a distinction to preserve ethical transcendence, influencing subsequent Korean thought toward a more dualistic li-qi framework, while fostering academy networks (seowon) that rivaled state institutions in scholarly influence by the 16th century. These developments represented a synthesis of Zhu Xi's orthodoxy with indigenous emphases on rigorous textual exegesis and practical governance, yielding a cosmology that critiqued Buddhist emptiness as escapist while affirming Confucian immanence in social roles. In , gained traction during the (1603–1868) as the Tokugawa shogunate's ideological bulwark, with Zhu Xi's school formalized by Hayashi Razan (1583–1657), who integrated it into domain schools (hankō) to inculcate loyalty and hierarchy among . By 1700, over 200 such academies existed, embedding Confucian ethics in the four-class system (, farmers, artisans, merchants) to stabilize feudal order post-Sengoku chaos. Synthesis occurred through pragmatic adaptations: early transmission via monasteries blended rational inquiry with meditative discipline, but later thinkers like Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728) rejected Zhu Xi's metaphysical abstractions, advocating kobunjigaku (ancient learning) focused on classical texts' linguistic and ritual authenticity over Song rationalism. Sorai's emphasis on shi (names/positions) for social efficacy critiqued Neo-Confucian cosmology as overly speculative, prioritizing empirical governance and poetry as tools for moral formation. This regional evolution highlighted Neo-Confucianism's adaptability: in Korea, it deepened metaphysical synthesis to reinforce yangban elite dominance and anti-Buddhist policies, suppressing monastic landholdings by 1500; in , it pragmatically fused with indigenous , influencing bushidō codes while spawning heterodox schools like Wang Yangming's intuitivism among military reformers. Such integrations sustained Confucian primacy until 19th-century Western pressures, underscoring its role in East Asian statecraft over pure metaphysics.

Zen Buddhism and Samurai Ethics

Zen Buddhism, transmitted from China as Chan, entered Japan during the (1185–1333), coinciding with the ascendancy of the class under the first shogunate established by in 1192. Rinzai Zen was introduced by in 1191, followed by Dōgen's establishment of Sōtō Zen in 1227, appealing to warriors seeking practical spiritual tools amid constant warfare. patronage funded Zen monasteries, which served as retreats for meditation () that cultivated mental clarity and resilience, essential for battlefield decision-making. The core Zen principle of mushin (no-mind), a state of spontaneous action free from hesitation or attachment, directly informed samurai combat ethics by enabling decisive strikes without emotional interference. Zazen practice emphasized direct insight over ritualistic devotion, fostering discipline and acceptance of impermanence (mujō), which mitigated fear of death—a frequent reality for samurai facing ritual suicide (seppuku) or battle. This contrasted with more devotional Pure Land Buddhism, making Zen suitable for a class valuing self-reliance; historical records show samurai like Hōjō Tokimune invoking Zen meditation before the 1274 Mongol invasion to steel resolve. Bushidō, the samurai ethical code emphasizing rectitude, courage, benevolence, respect, honesty, honor, and loyalty, incorporated 's detachment as a counterbalance to Confucian hierarchy and ancestral piety, though its formal codification emerged later in the (1603–1868). 's influence promoted ethical : a warrior's duty (giri) to lord and clan was pursued without ego-driven ambition, aligning with Zen teachings on emptiness (śūnyatā) to avoid vengeful cycles. Critics note that while Zen temples trained samurai in arts like and swordsmanship (), the linkage was pragmatic rather than doctrinal dominance, with many samurai blending multiple traditions. In the early 17th century, Rinzai Zen master Takuan Sōhō (1573–1645) exemplified this synthesis in Fudōchi Shinmyōroku (The Unfettered Mind, ca. 1632), advising swordsman Yagyū Munenori (1571–1646), head of the Shinkage-ryū school and Tokugawa shōgun's instructor. Takuan urged transcending dualistic thought—opponent versus self—to achieve fluid technique, warning that fixation (shibō) on outcomes breeds error, a principle drawn from Zen kōan study and applied to ethical conduct beyond combat. Munenori's Heihō Kadensho (1632) echoed this, integrating Zen's non-attachment into strategy, influencing later martial ethics where moral virtue stemmed from unclouded awareness rather than rote loyalty. Such texts underscore Zen's role in elevating samurai ethics from mere martial prowess to philosophical depth, though empirical accounts reveal variability, with not all samurai adhering strictly.

Korean Innovations in Mind and Principle

Korean Neo-Confucianism during the Joseon dynasty (1392–1910) advanced Chinese Zhu Xi's framework by conducting rigorous metaphysical analyses of principle (i or li), conceived as the universal, ideal organizing pattern underlying reality, and its embodiment in the human mind (sim or xin). Korean thinkers prioritized principle's ontological primacy over material force (ki or qi), viewing the mind as a microcosmic site where principle integrates with ki to enable moral self-cultivation and sagehood. This emphasis differed from Chinese Neo-Confucianism by employing systematic diagrams and introspective debates to dissect mind-principle dynamics, fostering a more granular causal model of moral agency. A pivotal innovation emerged in the Four-Seven Debate, initiated in 1559 between (T'oegye, 1501–1570) and Ki Taesŭng (Kobong, 1527–1572), which probed the origins of human . The debate contrasted the "four beginnings" (sadan)—benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, posited as issuing purely from —and the "seven feelings" (ch'il ch'ing)—pleasure, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hatred, and desire, linked to ki's fluctuations. maintained a distinction, arguing 's precedence ensures the four beginnings remain untainted by ki's potential obscurity, thus preserving the mind's innate moral clarity through vigilant mindfulness (kyŏng). Yi I (Yulgok, 1536–1584) extended this inquiry, critiquing Yi Hwang's separation as overly dualistic and proposing that ki actively realizes in both sets, unifying moral and emotional faculties under a dynamic, holistic mind. In works like Essentials of the Learning of the Sages (1575), Yi I advocated practical sagehood via integrated and action, influencing subsequent Korean thought toward reconciling metaphysical abstraction with ethical praxis. This synthesis refined causal realism in Neo-Confucian terms, positing mind as the locus where causally governs ki without rigid bifurcation, and originated uniquely in Korea by framing disparate classical sources into a cohesive thesis. These innovations, exemplified in Yi Hwang's Ten Diagrams on Sage Learning (1568), elevated Korean philosophy's focus on diagrams to visualize principle's permeation of mind, bolstering Joseon bureaucracy's moral hierarchy while probing deeper than Chinese counterparts into emotional . Later thinkers like Jeong Yak-yong (Dasan, 1762–1836) built on this by critiquing rigid principle-centric orthodoxy in favor of empirical , though core mind-principle debates remained foundational.

Modern Developments and Global Impact

19th-20th Century Revivals in South Asia

In 19th-century South Asia, particularly Bengal, colonial encounters with British rule and Christian missionary activities prompted intellectual and religious reform movements that revived core elements of Indian philosophical traditions, such as Vedanta's monotheism and ethical universalism, while critiquing ritual excesses and social practices like sati and caste rigidity. These efforts, often termed the Bengal Renaissance, emphasized rational inquiry and scriptural return to texts like the Upanishads to counter perceptions of Hinduism as superstitious, fostering a synthesis of ancient metaphysics with modern ethics. Raja Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833), a pioneer, founded the Brahmo Sabha in 1828, promoting a formless, singular deity drawn from Vedantic principles and opposing idol worship and polytheism, which he viewed as later corruptions. The , established by (1824–1883) on April 7, 1875, in Bombay, advanced a Vedic revivalist philosophy rejecting post-Vedic accretions, , and birth-based , insisting on the as infallible sources of knowledge encompassing , karma, and social equality through merit. Dayananda's (1875) articulated this critique, advocating education in and Vedic sciences to reclaim India's philosophical primacy amid colonial dominance. This movement expanded across , establishing schools like DAV institutions to propagate its principles, influencing nationalist thought by linking philosophical purity to cultural resurgence. Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902), disciple of Paramahamsa, catalyzed a broader revival in the late 19th and early 20th centuries through the (founded 1897), emphasizing practical —self- via and service—as a universal philosophy transcending ritualism and applicable to social reform. His address at the 1893 World Parliament of Religions in introduced to global audiences, portraying it as tolerant and scientific, which bolstered domestic confidence in Indian metaphysics against Western materialism. Vivekananda's works, like Raja Yoga (1896), integrated Patanjali's sutras with empirical self-inquiry, inspiring figures in India's independence movement and establishing centers that persist today.

East Asian Modernization and State Philosophies

In the late , several East Asian states achieved rapid industrialization and economic growth, often termed the "East Asian miracle," with average annual GDP growth rates exceeding 7% from the to the 1990s in countries like , , , and . This modernization drew selectively on Confucian principles such as , meritocratic , familial duty, and emphasis on to underpin state-directed development, contrasting with individualistic Western liberalism by prioritizing collective and long-term stability over immediate democratic pluralism. Scholars attribute part of this success to Confucian cultural legacies fostering high savings rates (often over 30% of GDP), disciplined work ethics, and respect for authority, which facilitated export-oriented policies and investment. However, these influences were pragmatic adaptations rather than dogmatic revivals, integrated with imported technologies and market mechanisms to evade colonial subjugation and achieve . Singapore exemplifies explicit incorporation of Confucian ethics into state philosophy under Prime Minister (1959–1990), who in 1982 instituted mandatory Confucian ethics classes in schools to instill values like , social responsibility, and anti-corruption norms amid perceived Western moral decay. Lee's "" discourse emphasized group loyalty over individual rights, crediting Confucian hierarchy for Singapore's transformation from a per capita GDP of $428 in 1960 to over $12,000 by 1990, through merit-based and strict governance that curbed . This approach yielded low rates and high economic efficiency but drew criticism for suppressing dissent, as evidenced by the Internal Security Act's use against opponents. In China, post-1978 reforms under pragmatically sidelined Maoist ideology, but since Xi Jinping's 2012 ascension, has been rehabilitated as a complement to "," promoting "" like harmony and rule by moral virtue to legitimize centralized authority. Xi has overseen over 500 new Confucian academies and the expansion of Confucius Institutes globally, framing traditional as aiding "peaceful modernization" with GDP growth averaging 6-7% annually in the , though state control echoes Legalist elements over pure Confucian benevolence. This synthesis addresses gaps in communist by reinforcing , yet risks reinforcing without empirical checks on power. South Korea and Taiwan's developmental states under leaders like Park Chung-hee (1963–1979) leveraged Confucian-influenced education systems—producing literacy rates over 90% by the 1970s—and family-centric savings to drive export booms, with 's GDP per capita rising from $100 in 1960 to $1,647 by 1980. Neo-Confucian emphasis on diligence and principal (li) over material (qi) supported conglomerates and land reforms, enabling Taiwan's "economic miracle" with equal income distribution alongside growth. Japan's (1868) laid earlier foundations by blending imperial loyalty—rooted in Shinto-kokutai—with Confucian bureaucratic to industrialize, achieving constitutional government and military parity with the West by 1895, though post-war philosophy shifted toward with residual cultural emphases on group consensus. Across these cases, state philosophies hybridized tradition for causal efficacy in development, yielding verifiable prosperity but prompting debates on absent broader accountability.

Western Appropriations and Critiques

Arthur Schopenhauer drew extensively from Indian philosophical texts, particularly the Upanishads and Buddhist doctrines, integrating concepts of will and representation that paralleled his own pessimism about existence. He accessed these through early translations like those mediated by Friedrich Majer, viewing Hindu and Buddhist ideas as superior to much of Western optimism in addressing suffering's causality. This appropriation influenced subsequent European thinkers, though Schopenhauer's interpretations selectively emphasized ascetic denial over Eastern ritualism or social structures. Swami Vivekananda's address at the 1893 Parliament of the World's Religions in marked a pivotal introduction of to Western audiences, emphasizing universal tolerance and monistic metaphysics drawn from Advaita traditions. His speeches, attended by over 7,000 delegates, spurred the establishment of societies in the United States and Europe, fostering early practices and influencing figures like in pragmatic psychology. This event catalyzed appropriations in Transcendentalist circles, extending Emerson's prior engagement with the into organized spiritual movements. In the 20th century, popularized Zen Buddhism through lectures and texts like Essays in Zen Buddhism (1927–1934), adapting Rinzai practices for Western intellectuals by stressing direct intuition over doctrinal rigidity. His works impacted the and cited Suzuki in promoting spontaneous enlightenment—and the 1960s counterculture, where Zen informed mindfulness detached from its monastic ethical constraints. Such adaptations often prioritized individualistic experiences, sidelining Zen's historical ties to discipline or hierarchical sanghas. Western critiques, exemplified by G.W.F. Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy, portrayed Eastern thought as stagnant lacking dialectical progress toward freedom, with reduced to state cult and to moral platitudes without speculative depth. Hegel argued Oriental realms represented history's childhood, subordinate to Western Geist's realization, a view rooted in his teleological but critiqued today for Eurocentric bias. Modern analytic philosophers fault Eastern metaphysics for unfalsifiable claims, such as karmic causation or non-dual consciousness, which evade empirical testing central to . Figures like implicitly extend critiques of to mystical ontologies, deeming reincarnation or nirvana hypotheses non-scientific absent verifiable predictions. Appropriations face charges of superficiality, cherry-picking meditative techniques for therapeutic ends while ignoring causal social hierarchies in or caste implications in , often diluting original rigor.

Contemporary Scholarship and Empirical Reassessments (Post-2000)

Post-2000 scholarship on Eastern philosophy has increasingly incorporated empirical methods to evaluate claims about meditative practices derived from and Daoism, revealing modest neurobiological effects such as reduced activity during tasks, which correlates with improved emotion regulation, though long-term benefits remain inconsistent across randomized controlled trials with adequate controls. Studies on Chinese Buddhist traditions integrating have documented physiological relaxation, including a 7.3% reduction, but these outcomes are comparable to secular relaxation techniques and do not substantiate metaphysical assertions of enlightenment or non-duality. Similarly, assessments of Confucian quiet-sitting emphasize its distinction from Buddhist detachment, focusing instead on ethical cultivation, yet empirical links to daily show only associative, not causal, improvements in , highlighting potential cultural confounders in cross-study comparisons. Philosophical reassessments have shifted toward pragmatic, non-metaphysical interpretations, with Roger T. Ames advocating a "role ethics" in Confucianism that prioritizes relational processes over individual substance ontology, arguing that concepts like ren (humaneness) emerge from social dynamics rather than innate essences. This processual view extends to Daoism, where recent textual analyses of early manuscripts challenge attributions of mystical cosmology to Laozi, suggesting wu wei (non-action) as adaptive spontaneity grounded in observable environmental interactions rather than transcendent forces. In Buddhism, scholars like those examining predictive mind models propose deconstructive meditation alters perceptual predictions but fails to empirically validate core doctrines such as impermanence (anicca) beyond subjective reports, critiquing traditional interpretations for conflating phenomenological experience with ontological truth. Progressive Confucianists, including Chenyang Li and Stephen C. Angle, have explored compatibilities with democratic pluralism, yet these syntheses often overlook hierarchical emphases in classical texts, potentially driven by contemporary ideological pressures. Critiques of metaphysical claims have gained traction, noting the absence of falsifiable evidence for Buddhist karma cycles or Daoist as causal agents, with reassessments favoring instrumentalist readings where such ideas served historical social functions like moral deterrence rather than descriptive accuracy. Cross-cultural inventories measuring adherence to the "" (Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism) link them to lower stigma in help-seeking in East Asian contexts, but attribute this to communal norms rather than philosophical superiority, underscoring empirical shortcomings in universality claims. Academic discourse, while advancing philological rigor in —evident in reevaluations of Mohist logic and Confucian li (ritual propriety)—has been cautioned against overemphasizing harmony at the expense of rational critique, a tendency traceable to institutional preferences for relativistic narratives over stringent causal analysis.

Criticisms and Controversies

Empirical Shortcomings of Metaphysical Claims

Metaphysical claims in Eastern philosophies, such as and and , or the vital energy qi in , frequently posit unobservable causal mechanisms governing , , and moral consequences across lifetimes. These doctrines, while providing explanatory frameworks for and , have proven resistant to empirical verification, as they depend on subjective experiences, scriptural authority, or anecdotal reports rather than controlled, reproducible . Scientific inquiry demands and measurable outcomes, criteria unmet by these assertions, which often invoke non-physical essences without identifiable physical correlates. Reincarnation, central to the cycle of samsara in Indic traditions, lacks objective evidence despite extensive case collections. Investigations by psychiatrist , spanning 1961 to 2003 and involving over 2,500 purported past-life memories in children, relied on verbal testimonies and birthmark correspondences but failed to exclude alternatives like , parental coaching, or , with no mechanism for migration confirmed by or physics. Mainstream holds that no rigorous, replicable experiments support soul transmigration, attributing reported phenomena to psychological or cultural factors rather than literal rebirth. Similarly, karmic causation—positing precise moral retribution across existences—observes behavioral patterns akin to causality in ethics but extends to unverifiable interdimensional ledgers, untestable beyond probabilistic correlations dismissed as . The Taoist concept of as a pervasive life force animating meridians and eludes detection through empirical means. Attempts to measure emissions or flows using instruments like gas discharge visualization or bioelectromagnetic sensors have yielded inconsistent or null results, with benefits from or attributable to effects, relaxation responses, or neurophysiological mechanisms rather than a distinct . Peer-reviewed analyses classify as non-falsifiable by scientific standards, rendering it incompatible with causal realism grounded in observable interactions. Buddhist and claims of enlightenment or non-dual realization (nirvana or ) further illustrate these gaps, describing transcendent states beyond duality or self. While meditation-induced alterations in brain activity—such as reduced engagement—are empirically documented via fMRI studies post-2000, these reflect subjective phenomenology, not objective validation of metaphysical ultimates like (shunyata) or undifferentiated . Assertions of irreversible liberation from remain introspective and unverifiable, as no neural or behavioral markers distinguish "enlightened" cognition from advanced without self-reported claims, underscoring the divide between experiential insight and empirical proof.

Social and Political Consequences

Confucian doctrines emphasizing hierarchical roles, , and social harmony have historically reinforced authoritarian political structures in , prioritizing state stability over individual rights and dissent. In imperial , this manifested in the examination system, which selected officials based on mastery of Confucian , yet entrenched a paternalistic that suppressed and merchant classes to maintain order, contributing to relative to from the onward. Modern revivals, such as the integration of Confucian values into China's Socialist Core Values and since 2014, aim to cultivate moral behavior through surveillance and penalties, enabling centralized control but raising concerns over privacy and coerced conformity. Critics argue this inegalitarian framework inherently resists liberalization, as authority flows top-down without mechanisms for challenging rulers. Hinduism's varna system, codified in texts like the around 200 BCE–200 CE, evolved into the jati-based hierarchy that has perpetuated and political fragmentation in . By the medieval period, this rigid division limited inter-caste mobility, with lower castes facing ritual pollution and economic exclusion, fostering dependencies that upper castes exploited for labor and influence. In contemporary politics, caste identities drive electoral mobilization, as seen in the 2022 Uttar Pradesh assembly elections where parties allocated tickets disproportionately to dominant castes like Yadavs and Dalits, resulting in policies skewed toward reservations—such as the 27% quota for Other Backward Classes upheld in —often exacerbating communal tensions rather than addressing universal development. This system has sustained disparities, with Scheduled Castes comprising 16.6% of 's population in the 2011 census yet holding only 18% of parliamentary seats despite . Buddhist principles of karma and non-violence have occasionally justified political quiescence in , deterring challenges to unjust rulers by framing suffering as karmic retribution, while institutional alliances with states have enabled ethnic violence contradicting doctrinal . In since 2011, Buddhist nationalists like the have incited , displacing over 700,000 by 2017, through a tacit political bargain where legitimize majoritarian policies in exchange for . Similarly, in Sri Lanka's 1983–2009 , Sinhalese Buddhist clergy supported anti-Tamil policies, contributing to over 100,000 deaths. Taoism's , advocating non-interference, offered scant blueprint for collective action against oppression, historically limiting its role to esoteric rebellions like the Yellow Turban uprising in 184 CE rather than systemic reform. Overall, these philosophies' causal emphasis on acceptance of natural orders has empirically correlated with resilient hierarchies, impeding egalitarian upheavals seen in Western liberal traditions.

Debates on Universality vs. Cultural Relativism

The debate over universality versus cultural relativism in Eastern philosophy questions whether doctrines such as Buddhist anatta (no-self) or Confucian ren (humaneness) embody timeless truths applicable beyond their cultural origins or remain contingent on specific social, linguistic, and historical frameworks. Advocates for universality, exemplified by Swami Vivekananda's 1893 address at the World's Parliament of Religions, posit that Vedantic non-dualism reveals a perennial unity across religious traditions, with all paths converging on shared spiritual realizations. Empirical assessments bolster claims of universality for certain practices; , derived from Buddhist vipassana, demonstrates cross-cultural efficacy in reducing anxiety and enhancing emotional regulation, as evidenced by meta-analyses of randomized controlled trials involving thousands of participants from varied demographics, including non-Asian cohorts. These findings suggest that psychological mechanisms underlying such techniques operate independently of cultural embedding, yielding measurable benefits like lowered levels and improved attention spans. Relativist perspectives emphasize contextual embeddedness, arguing that Eastern concepts defy universal export due to their reliance on indigenous cosmologies and social structures; for instance, Daoist aligns with agrarian Chinese harmony rather than individualistic Western paradigms, potentially distorting when decontextualized. In the 1990s Asian values debate, Confucian emphasis on communal duties was invoked to challenge Western universalism, positing that relativism better accommodates hierarchical ethics over abstract individualism. Critiques of relativism highlight its risks, such as hindering cross-cultural evaluation of practices; philosopher James Rachels argued that cultural differences do not entail moral equivalence, urging assessment via objective criteria like human welfare outcomes, which could apply to Eastern philosophies by prioritizing verifiable effects over doctrinal sanctity. Comparative philosophers like those engaging Chinese and Western traditions advocate dialogic approaches, testing universality through mutual critique while respecting origins, though postmodern influences in academia often favor relativist interpretations that may underplay empirical universals. This tension persists in modern applications, where Eastern-derived therapies succeed globally yet metaphysical claims, such as karmic causality, lack comparable cross-cultural validation.

References

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