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Metaphilosophy, sometimes called the philosophy of philosophy, is "the investigation of the nature of philosophy".[1] Its subject matter includes the aims of philosophy, the boundaries of philosophy, and its methods.[2][3] Thus, while philosophy characteristically inquires into the nature of being, the reality of objects, the possibility of knowledge, the nature of truth, and so on, metaphilosophy is the self-reflective inquiry into the nature, aims, and methods of the activity that makes these kinds of inquiries, by asking what is philosophy itself, what sorts of questions it should ask, how it might pose and answer them, and what it can achieve in doing so. It is considered by some to be a subject prior and preparatory to philosophy,[4] while others see it as inherently a part of philosophy,[5] or automatically a part of philosophy[6] while others adopt some combination of these views.[2]

The interest in metaphilosophy led to the establishment of the journal Metaphilosophy in January 1970.[7]

Many sub-disciplines of philosophy have their own branch of 'metaphilosophy', examples being meta-aesthetics, meta-epistemology, meta-ethics, and metametaphysics (meta-ontology).[8]

Although the term metaphilosophy and explicit attention to metaphilosophy as a specific domain within philosophy arose in the 20th century, the topic is likely as old as philosophy itself, and can be traced back at least as far as the works of Ancient Greeks and Ancient Indian Nyaya.[9]

Relationship to philosophy

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Some philosophers consider metaphilosophy to be a subject apart from philosophy, above or beyond it,[4] while others object to that idea.[5] Timothy Williamson argues that the philosophy of philosophy is "automatically part of philosophy", as is the philosophy of anything else.[6] Ludwig Wittgenstein argued that there is no "second-order philosophy" in the same way an explanation of the spelling of "spelling" is not second-order spelling,[10] or orthography of the word 'orthography' is not second-order orthography.[11] Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu write that the separation of first- from second-order study has lost popularity as philosophers find it hard to observe the distinction.[12] As evidenced by these contrasting opinions, debate persists as to whether the evaluation of the nature of philosophy is 'second-order philosophy' or simply 'plain philosophy'.

Many philosophers have expressed doubts over the value of metaphilosophy.[13] Among them is Gilbert Ryle: "preoccupation with questions about methods tends to distract us from prosecuting the methods themselves. We run as a rule, worse, not better, if we think a lot about our feet. So let us ... not speak of it all but just do it."[14]

Terminology

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The designations metaphilosophy and philosophy of philosophy have a variety of meanings, sometimes taken to be synonyms, and sometimes seen as distinct.

Morris Lazerowitz claims to have coined the term 'metaphilosophy' around 1940 and used it in print in 1942.[1] Lazerowitz proposed that metaphilosophy is 'the investigation of the nature of philosophy'.[1] Earlier uses have been found in translations from French.[15] The term is derived from Greek word meta μετά ("after", "beyond", "with") and philosophía φιλοσοφία ("love of wisdom").

The term 'metaphilosophy' is used by Paul Moser[16] in the sense of a 'second-order' or more fundamental undertaking than philosophy itself, in the manner suggested by Charles Griswold:[4]

"The distinction between philosophy and metaphilosophy has an analogue in the familiar distinction between mathematics and metamathematics."[16]

— Paul K. Moser, Metaphilosophy, p. 562

Some other philosophers treat the prefix meta as simply meaning 'about...', rather than as referring to a metatheoretical 'second-order' form of philosophy, among them Rescher[17] and Double.[18] Others, such as Williamson, prefer the term 'philosophy of philosophy' instead of 'metaphilosophy' as it avoids the connotation of a 'second-order' discipline that looks down on philosophy, and instead denotes something that is a part of it.[19] Joll suggests that to take metaphilosophy as 'the application of the methods of philosophy to philosophy itself' is too vague, while the view that sees metaphilosophy as a 'second-order' or more abstract discipline, outside philosophy, "is narrow and tendentious".[20]

In the analytic tradition, the term "metaphilosophy" is mostly used to tag commenting and research on previous works as opposed to original contributions towards solving philosophical problems.[21]

Writings

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Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote about the nature of philosophical puzzles and philosophical understanding. He suggested philosophical errors arose from confusions about the nature of philosophical inquiry.

C. D. Broad distinguished Critical from Speculative philosophy in his "The Subject-matter of Philosophy, and its Relations to the special Sciences", in Introduction to Scientific Thought, 1923. Curt Ducasse, in Philosophy as a Science, examines several views of the nature of philosophy, and concludes that philosophy has a distinct subject matter: appraisals. Ducasse's view has been among the first to be described as 'metaphilosophy'.[22]

Henri Lefebvre in Métaphilosophie (1965) argued, from a Marxian standpoint, in favor of an "ontological break", as a necessary methodological approach for critical social theory (while criticizing Louis Althusser's "epistemological break" with subjective Marxism, which represented a fundamental theoretical tool for the school of Marxist structuralism).

Paul Moser writes that typical metaphilosophical discussion includes determining the conditions under which a claim can be said to be a philosophical one. He regards meta-ethics, the study of ethics, to be a form of metaphilosophy, as well as meta-epistemology, the study of epistemology.[16]

Topics

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Many sub-disciplines of philosophy have their own branch of 'metaphilosophy'.[8] However, some topics within 'metaphilosophy' cut across the various subdivisions of philosophy to consider fundamentals important to all its sub-disciplines.

Aims

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Some philosophers (e.g. existentialists, pragmatists) think philosophy is ultimately a practical discipline that should help us lead meaningful lives by showing us who we are, how we relate to the world around us and what we should do. [citation needed] Others (e.g. analytic philosophers) see philosophy as a technical, formal, and entirely theoretical discipline, with goals such as "the disinterested pursuit of knowledge for its own sake".[23] Other proposed goals of philosophy include discovering the absolutely fundamental reason of everything it investigates, making explicit the nature and significance of ordinary and scientific beliefs,[24] and unifying and transcending the insights given by science and religion.[25] Others proposed that philosophy is a complex discipline because it has 4 or 6 different dimensions.[26][27]

Boundaries

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Main article: Definitions of philosophy

Defining philosophy and its boundaries is itself problematic; Nigel Warburton has called it "notoriously difficult".[28] There is no straightforward definition,[25] and most interesting definitions are controversial.[29] As Bertrand Russell wrote:

"We may note one peculiar feature of philosophy. If someone asks the question what is mathematics, we can give him a dictionary definition, let us say the science of number, for the sake of argument. As far as it goes this is an uncontroversial statement... Definitions may be given in this way of any field where a body of definite knowledge exists. But philosophy cannot be so defined. Any definition is controversial and already embodies a philosophic attitude. The only way to find out what philosophy is, is to do philosophy."[30]

— Bertrand Russell, The Wisdom of the West, p. 7

While there is some agreement that philosophy involves general or fundamental topics,[23][31] there is no clear agreement about a series of demarcation issues, including:

  • that between first-order and second-order investigations. Some authors say that philosophical inquiry is second-order, having concepts, theories and presupposition as its subject matter; that it is "thinking about thinking", of a "generally second-order character";[32] that philosophers study, rather than use, the concepts that structure our thinking. However, the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy warns that "the borderline between such 'second-order' reflection, and ways of practicing the first-order discipline itself, is not always clear: philosophical problems may be tamed by the advance of a discipline, and the conduct of a discipline may be swayed by philosophical reflection".[31]
  • that between philosophy and empirical science. Some argue that philosophy is distinct from science in that its questions cannot be answered empirically, that is, by observation or experiment.[33][34] Some analytical philosophers argue that all meaningful empirical questions are to be answered by science, not philosophy. However, some schools of contemporary philosophy such as the pragmatists and naturalistic epistemologists argue that philosophy should be linked to science and should be scientific in the broad sense of that term, "preferring to see philosophical reflection as continuous with the best practice of any field of intellectual enquiry".[31]
  • that between philosophy and religion. Some argue that philosophy is distinct from religion in that it allows no place for faith or revelation:[23] that philosophy does not try to answer questions by appeal to revelation, myth or religious knowledge of any kind, but uses reason, without reference to sensible observation and experiments". However, philosophers and theologians such as Thomas Aquinas and Peter Damian have argued that philosophy is the "handmaiden of theology" (ancilla theologiae).[35]

Methods

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Main article: Philosophical method

Philosophical method (or philosophical methodology) is the study of how to do philosophy. A common view among philosophers is that philosophy is distinguished by the ways that philosophers follow in addressing philosophical questions. There is not just one method that philosophers use to answer philosophical questions.

C.D. Broad classifies philosophy into two methods, he distinguished between critical philosophy and speculative philosophy. He described critical philosophy as analysing "unanalysed concepts in daily life and in science" and then "expos[ing] them to every objection that we can think of". While speculative philosophy's role is to "take over all aspects of human experience, to reflect upon them, and to try to think out a view of Reality as a whole which shall do justice to all of them".[36]

Recently, some philosophers have cast doubt about intuition as a basic tool in philosophical inquiry, from Socrates up to contemporary philosophy of language. In Rethinking Intuition[37] various thinkers discard intuition as a valid source of knowledge and thereby call into question 'a priori' philosophy. Experimental philosophy is a form of philosophical inquiry that makes at least partial use of empirical research—especially opinion polling—in order to address persistent philosophical questions. This is in contrast with the methods found in analytic philosophy, whereby some say a philosopher will sometimes begin by appealing to his or her intuitions on an issue and then form an argument with those intuitions as premises. However, disagreement about what experimental philosophy can accomplish is widespread and several philosophers have offered criticisms. One claim is that the empirical data gathered by experimental philosophers can have an indirect effect on philosophical questions by allowing for a better understanding of the underlying psychological processes which lead to philosophical intuitions.[38] Some analytic philosophers like Timothy Williamson[39] have rejected such a move against 'armchair' philosophy–i.e., philosophical inquiry that is undergirded by intuition–by construing 'intuition' (which they believe to be a misnomer) as merely referring to common cognitive faculties: If one is calling into question 'intuition', one is, they would say, harboring a skeptical attitude towards common cognitive faculties–a consequence that seems philosophically unappealing. For Williamson, instances of intuition are instances of our cognitive faculties processing counterfactuals[40] (or subjunctive conditionals) that are specific to the thought experiment or example in question.

Progress

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A prominent question in metaphilosophy is whether philosophical progress occurs and, moreover, whether such progress in philosophy is even possible.[41]

David Chalmers divides inquiry into philosophical progress in metaphilosophy into three questions.

  1. The Existence Question: is there progress in philosophy?
  2. The Comparison Question: is there as much progress in philosophy as in science?
  3. The Explanation Question: why isn't there more progress in philosophy?[42]

Ludwig Wittgenstein, in Culture and Value remarked, "Philosophy hasn't made any progress? - If somebody scratches the spot where he has an itch, do we have to see some progress?...And can't this reaction to an irritation continue in the same way for a long time before the cure for an itching is discovered?".[43]

According to Hilary Putnam philosophy is more adept at showing people that specific ideas or arguments are wrong than that specific ideas or arguments are right.[44]

The work of David Lewis has been the subject of a quantitative analysis conducted by philosopher Benj Hellie in order to study his rate of philosophical progress. According to Hellie, Lewis’s most significant breakthroughs only started to occur during the midpoint of Lewis’s philosophical career, after transitioning from framing a descriptive science of mind and meaning to focusing on metaphysics. Hellie then argues that future philosophers can learn much about Lewis’s right and wrong steps in order to maximize philosophical breakthroughs.[45]

See also

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Metaphilosophy

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Metaphilosophy is the branch of that systematically investigates the , aims, methods, scope, and value of itself. It addresses core questions such as: What is ? How should philosophical inquiry be conducted? And why does it matter? Although reflections on the character of philosophical practice trace back to ancient thinkers like , who distinguished philosophy from other forms of inquiry in works such as his Metaphysics, the term "metaphilosophy" emerged in the mid-20th century. Philosopher Morris Lazerowitz is credited with coining the English term around 1940, using it to describe inquiries into why philosophical disputes persist unresolved, as in his 1942 review where he noted that "the most important philosophical question is: ‘Why are no philosophical disputes ever settled?’" Earlier precursors include Heinrich Struve's 19th-century critical analyses of philosophy's historical development and Jacques Maritain's late-1920s references in correspondence. The field gained prominence post-World War II, influenced by and debates over philosophy's scientific status, leading to the establishment of the journal Metaphilosophy in 1970. Key approaches in metaphilosophy divide along major philosophical traditions. In the analytic tradition, which dominates English-language , metaphilosophy emphasizes methodological questions, such as the role of conceptual analysis, thought experiments, and in resolving philosophical problems. Influential works include David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Nola's edited volume Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism (2009), which explores how integrates with empirical sciences. Analytic metaphilosophers like argue for as continuous with science, prioritizing armchair reasoning grounded in linguistic and conceptual clarity. In contrast, continental metaphilosophy, rooted in European thinkers like Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida, views philosophy as inherently historical, cultural, and interpretive, often critiquing its pretensions to universality or objectivity. Heidegger's Being and Time (1927) exemplifies this by questioning philosophy's foundational assumptions through existential phenomenology, while post-structuralists highlight power dynamics in philosophical discourse. These approaches often prioritize humanistic or applied dimensions, such as philosophy's role in ethics, politics, and everyday life, over purely theoretical pursuits. Beyond these divides, contemporary metaphilosophy grapples with , including (x-phi), which uses empirical methods to test philosophical intuitions, as advanced by Joshua Alexander and Jonathan Weinberg (2007). Recent developments, such as the growing focus on conceptual engineering and the continued expansion of , reflect the field's ongoing evolution as of 2025. Debates also address philosophy's progressiveness, cognitivism (whether philosophical claims can be true or false), and its relation to other disciplines like and . Overall, metaphilosophy underscores philosophy's self-reflective capacity, ensuring its relevance amid evolving intellectual landscapes.

Definition and Terminology

Core Definition

Metaphilosophy is the branch of that investigates the fundamental nature of itself, including its subject matter, methods, and value. This inquiry addresses core aspects such as the goals of philosophical practice, the criteria for philosophical progress, and the boundaries of what constitutes legitimate philosophical discourse. As a , metaphilosophy treats not as a fixed body of knowledge but as an ongoing activity subject to critical evaluation. Central to metaphilosophy is its reflexive character, in which philosophy turns inward to scrutinize its own presuppositions, methodologies, and underlying assumptions. This self-examination reveals how philosophical arguments depend on implicit commitments, such as views about , reasoning, or , and challenges philosophers to justify their approaches. Unlike external critiques from other fields like or , metaphilosophy operates from within , using philosophical tools to assess the discipline's coherence and efficacy. A key distinction in metaphilosophy lies between first-order , which involves direct substantive inquiry into traditional topics such as , , or , and second-order metaphilosophy, which reflects on the and of those very inquiries. First-order seeks answers to questions like "What is ?" or "What exists independently of the mind?", while second-order metaphilosophy probes the frameworks enabling such questions, such as the role of or the standards for resolving disputes. This layered approach underscores metaphilosophy's role in clarifying the conditions under which philosophical work can be deemed successful or meaningful. Metaphilosophical questions exemplify this reflective depth, including "What counts as a philosophical problem?" which interrogates the origins and legitimacy of issues deemed worthy of philosophical attention, and "Is a , art, or something else?", which examines its epistemological status and relation to other human endeavors. Other inquiries might ask "How should be done?" or "What is the aim of ?", prompting evaluations of methods like conceptual clarification or dialectical argumentation. These questions highlight metaphilosophy's potential to reshape philosophical practice by revealing hidden biases or alternative paradigms.

Etymology and Key Terms

The term "metaphilosophy" derives from the Greek prefix meta-, meaning "beyond," "after," or "about," combined with philosophia, denoting "love of wisdom." This linguistic structure parallels terms like "metaphysics," emphasizing a reflective stance on the subject matter. The English word was coined by philosopher Morris Lazerowitz around 1940, who defined it as "the investigation of the nature of philosophy." Lazerowitz first used the term in print in 1942 and further elaborated it in his seminal 1964 book Studies in Metaphilosophy, where he explored philosophy's underlying assumptions and linguistic underpinnings, and in his 1970 article in the inaugural issue of the journal Metaphilosophy. Although Lazerowitz claimed to have invented the term, precursors exist in other languages, such as the French métaphilosophie, employed by Henri Lefebvre in his 1965 work Métaphilosophie: Prolégomènes (translated as Metaphilosophy in 2016), where it signifies a transformative critique of philosophy's role in social praxis. Earlier conceptual forerunners include Immanuel Kant's notion of "philosophical propaedeutic," introduced in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) as a preparatory discipline to secure the foundations of metaphysics by examining reason's limits and methods. Kant viewed this propaedeutic as essential for transforming metaphysics into a rigorous science, prefiguring modern metaphilosophical inquiry into philosophical methodology. Key terms in metaphilosophy include "metaphilosophy" itself, which broadly encompasses the study of 's aims, methods, and value; "philosophy of philosophy," often used synonymously but sometimes distinguished as a first-order application of philosophical tools to philosophical practice (e.g., analyzing arguments within philosophy) versus a second-order inquiry transcending it. "" refers specifically to the examination of procedures for philosophical inquiry, such as conceptual analysis or thought experiments, emphasizing how philosophers justify claims. "Reflexive philosophy" denotes self-referential aspects of philosophy that turn inward to its own processes, akin to Wittgenstein's view of philosophy as a " of ." These terms overlap but highlight different emphases: methodology focuses on tools, while reflexive philosophy stresses self-examination. The terminology has evolved from Kant's propaedeutic framework, which treated philosophical groundwork as preliminary to substantive inquiry, to 20th-century analytic developments prioritizing linguistic and logical clarification. In analytic traditions, "metaphilosophy" often centers on methodological rigor and the , as seen in Timothy Williamson's The Philosophy of Philosophy (2007), which advocates treating as continuous with empirical disciplines. Continental traditions, by contrast, employ variations like métaphilosophie to integrate historical, existential, and deconstructive elements, as in Lefebvre's Marxist reconfiguration of for ends or Heidegger's hermeneutic questioning of ontological foundations. This divergence reflects broader analytic emphasis on precision versus continental focus on contextual embeddedness, though both traditions engage reflexive self-critique.

Historical Development

Ancient and Medieval Origins

The roots of metaphilosophical inquiry trace back to thought, where philosophers began reflecting on the nature and limits of itself. In Plato's Apology, recounts how the Delphic oracle's pronouncement that no one was wiser than he prompted a systematic examination of reputedly wise individuals—politicians, poets, and craftsmen—revealing their false pretensions to knowledge while affirming his own awareness of ignorance as the essence of human . This Socratic practice of elenchus, or , positioned as a critical self-interrogation aimed at uncovering truth amid apparent expertise. further developed these reflections in his Metaphysics, describing "first " as the study of being qua being and the primary causes that underlie all sciences, pursued not for utility but for its own sake as the highest form of . He emphasized that true involves grasping the "why" of things through universal principles, distinguishing it from more particular disciplines like physics. In the Hellenistic and Roman periods, such self-reflection evolved into views of philosophy as an integrated way of life, with thinkers delineating its practical and dimensions. The Stoics, including , conceived philosophy not merely as theoretical discourse but as a therapeutic for achieving through and rational control over passions, integrating logic, physics, and into a cohesive system for moral transformation. , in his Academica, engaged deeply with these traditions by surveying major philosophical sects—such as the Epicureans, Stoics, Peripatetics, and Academics—debating their doctrines on , , and the probable truth attainable by human reason, while aligning himself with the skeptical New Academy's rejection of dogmatic certainty. He portrayed philosophy as a dialogic pursuit that reconciles diverse schools, underscoring its role in refining judgment amid intellectual pluralism. Medieval developments built on these foundations by intertwining philosophical reflection with theological , particularly in Christian contexts. Augustine of Hippo's Confessions exemplifies an method, where he delves into his and inner life to trace the soul's restlessness toward , analyzing personal temptations and conversions as a pathway to self-knowledge and . This autobiographical approach highlighted 's potential for spiritual ascent while acknowledging its subordination to faith. Thomas Aquinas, in his Summa Theologica, systematically integrated Aristotelian with , arguing that while reason can demonstrate 's existence and certain natural truths, it reaches its limits in comprehending mysteries like the , necessitating revelation as a higher science that employs as a supportive tool. Aquinas thus debated 's boundaries relative to faith, viewing it as a to that clarifies but does not supplant divine doctrine. These ancient and medieval instances mark the emergence of as a self-aware , increasingly conscious of its methods, aims, and demarcations from adjacent pursuits like and . Early thinkers, from onward, critiqued poetry's mimetic illusions as inferior to dialectical truth-seeking, while distinguishing philosophy from rhetoric's persuasive arts by prioritizing rational argumentation over emotional appeal. This self-delimitation fostered philosophy's identity as a reflective enterprise, probing not only external realities but its own epistemic foundations.

Modern and Contemporary Evolution

The explicit emergence of metaphilosophy as a systematic inquiry into the nature, methods, and aims of began during the Enlightenment, with Immanuel Kant's (1781) serving as a foundational propaedeutic to philosophical investigation by examining the limits of human reason and the conditions for metaphysical knowledge. Kant argued that such a critique was essential before undertaking substantive , establishing a reflective framework that distinguishes valid from illusory uses of reason. This approach marked a shift from implicit philosophical self-examination to deliberate methodological scrutiny. Building on Kantian , developed a dialectical method of self-examination in works like the (1807), portraying as an ongoing process where contradictions in thought and history drive toward absolute knowledge through mutual recognition and synthesis. Hegel's dialectics emphasized philosophy's role in comprehending its own evolution, influencing subsequent views of philosophical progress as inherently reflexive. In the 20th century, metaphilosophy formalized within distinct traditions. In the analytic vein, Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1921) redefined philosophy as an activity of clarifying and the boundaries of meaningful , dismissing much traditional metaphysics as ineffable or nonsensical. Wittgenstein's later (1953) further evolved this into a therapeutic examination of philosophical confusions arising from use. Parallelly, in , Martin Heidegger's "What is Philosophy?" (1956), delivered as lectures in 1955, probed philosophy's essence as a questioning of being (Sein) that resists reduction to or technology, urging a return to its primordial origins amid modern forgetting of being. Heidegger viewed metaphilosophy as confronting philosophy's historical destiny, distinguishing it from calculative thinking. Following these 20th-century advancements, post-2000 developments saw metaphilosophy gain institutional traction. The journal Metaphilosophy, established in 1970 by Terrell Ward Bynum and Richard Reese to explore philosophy's foundations and interrelations, expanded significantly in the 2010s with special issues on , pluralism, and global perspectives, reflecting growing scholarly output. By 2021, it marked fifty years with reflections on its role in addressing philosophy's methodological crises. Recent debates have centered on philosophy's adaptability to and AI ethics, questioning how traditional methods integrate with empirical and computational approaches. For instance, discussions since the examine whether philosophy should incorporate cognitive architectures for ethical AI, emphasizing transparency and value alignment in interdisciplinary contexts. These debates highlight philosophy's relevance amid technological disruption, such as in assessing AI's impact on . Institutionally, metaphilosophy has permeated philosophy curricula and conferences. Conferences, tracked via platforms like PhilEvents, have hosted numerous events on metaphilosophical themes since 2015, fostering on 's scope. Concurrently, non-Western perspectives have proliferated post-2015, including African metaphilosophies emphasizing communal and Asian traditions critiquing Western , challenging Eurocentric biases and promoting pluralistic curricula. This growth underscores metaphilosophy's evolution toward inclusivity and global relevance.

Relationship to Philosophy

Metaphilosophy as Self-Reflection

Metaphilosophy embodies the self-reflective dimension of by turning inward to interrogate its own foundations, methods, and presuppositions, functioning as a critical examination of the discipline's core identity. Unlike , which broadly addresses the nature of knowledge, metaphilosophy specifically targets as an enterprise, probing questions such as what constitutes legitimate philosophical and how philosophical problems arise. This introspective approach, as articulated by Morris Lazerowitz, involves investigating the nature, point, and method of itself, revealing implicit assumptions that shape substantive philosophical positions. Among its primary functions, metaphilosophy clarifies the often unexamined assumptions underlying philosophical debates, thereby facilitating the resolution of meta-disagreements that stall progress. For instance, in disputes like realism versus , metaphilosophical scrutiny can expose presuppositions about truth, , and verification, allowing philosophers to reframe or dissolve entrenched oppositions rather than merely defending one side. Similarly, it aids in resolving broader meta-disagreements by promoting hermeneutic strategies that seek common ground or productive tension between competing discourses, as proposed by . Beyond theoretical clarification, metaphilosophy guides philosophical education by encouraging students to reflect on the discipline's methods and value, fostering metacognitive skills and active engagement with core questions like "What is ?" This approach not only deepens understanding but also equips learners with transferable abilities, positioning them as informed participants in the philosophical community. A notable example of metaphilosophy's self-reflective power is its analysis of biases in traditional philosophical problems, particularly the analytic-continental divide. Empirical studies of philosophical texts demonstrate no significant differences in argument structures between the two traditions, suggesting that perceived divides stem more from stylistic or institutional biases than substantive methodological disparities. This revelation challenges entrenched stereotypes and promotes a more unified view of . Complementing this, the therapeutic conception of , advanced by , underscores metaphilosophy's role in clarifying to dissolve pseudo-problems. Wittgenstein envisioned not as a body of doctrine but as an activity that combats "the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of ," using simple reflections on everyday usage to free thinkers from conceptual traps. Alongside conceptual and normative reflection, a strand of contemporary metaphilosophy uses computational and quantitative methods to study philosophy as a practice and as a literature. This includes bibliometrics and citation analysis in philosophy journals, computational text-mining applied to the structure of philosophical subfields, and unsupervised clustering approaches to “model the structure of recent philosophy” (Synthese, 2020). In parallel, “network science of philosophy” work uses network methods to analyze patterns of collaboration, citation, and intellectual centrality, including discussions in Metaphilosophy (2022). The point is not to treat these results as philosophical conclusions by themselves, but to make the dynamics of philosophical production—research fronts, schools, and implicit gatekeeping—available for explicit metaphilosophical critique.

Distinctions from Other Philosophical Disciplines

Metaphilosophy distinguishes itself from the philosophy of science by focusing on the nature, methods, and aims of philosophy as a discipline, rather than on the empirical sciences themselves. Whereas the philosophy of science investigates the foundations, methodologies, and epistemic status of scientific inquiry—such as the role of falsification in theory testing or the demarcation between science and pseudoscience—metaphilosophy interrogates philosophy's own aspirations to scientific rigor without delving into the specifics of scientific practice. For instance, metaphilosophers might question whether philosophy should adopt empirical methods akin to those in science, but they do so to reflect on philosophical self-understanding, not to prescribe changes to scientific methodology. In contrast to , which broadly examines the nature, sources, and limits of across domains including , justification, and , metaphilosophy targets the epistemological underpinnings unique to philosophical . addresses general questions like the reliability of sensory or the of warranted , often drawing on examples from everyday or scientific ; metaphilosophy, however, scrutinizes claims inherent to , such as the justification of a priori reasoning or the evidential role of conceptual analysis in resolving disputes. This higher-level reflection highlights how philosophical differs from applied epistemological analysis in other fields. Metaphilosophy occupies a higher-order position relative to subdisciplinary metasubfields like metaethics and metametaphysics, treating them as instances of philosophical practice rather than objects of direct analysis. explores the semantics, , and of moral language and concepts, such as whether moral statements are truth-apt or the nature of ; metaphilosophy steps back to assess the broader status of such inquiries within , questioning their methodological validity or contribution to philosophical progress. Similarly, metametaphysics investigates the foundations and methods of metaphysics—debating issues like the reality of possible worlds or the deflationary approach to —while metaphilosophy evaluates metaphysics' role in the philosophical enterprise as a whole, often viewing metametaphysics as a specialized branch under its purview. Despite these distinctions, metaphilosophy frequently overlaps with and critiques the boundaries of other disciplines, revealing philosophy's porous edges. For example, naturalized approaches inspired by Quine integrate epistemological concerns with scientific naturalism, blurring lines between philosophy and empirical inquiry without fully collapsing into . In recent 2020s discussions, metaphilosophers have critiqued and incorporated to challenge traditional disciplinary silos, using tools like network analysis of philosophical texts and to map conceptual boundaries and assess progress, thereby questioning philosophy's insularity from data-driven .

Key Writings and Thinkers

Foundational Texts

Plato's Theaetetus, composed around 369 BCE, serves as an early foundational text in metaphilosophy by examining the nature of and the practice of philosophical inquiry itself. In the dialogue, engages with Theaetetus to explore , ultimately highlighting the elusiveness of absolute epistemological foundations and the reflexive role of in questioning its own methods. This work establishes metaphilosophy's concern with philosophy's boundaries, portraying it as a dialectical process rather than a quest for definitive truths. Immanuel Kant's (1783) further solidifies metaphilosophy's focus on the conditions and limits of philosophical knowledge, particularly in metaphysics. Kant argues that synthetic a priori judgments underpin scientific certainty but constrain metaphysical speculation, urging a critical self-examination of philosophy's epistemic scope to avoid dogmatism. By framing as a requiring methodological reform, the text addresses an in metaphysics, distinguishing viable inquiry from illusory pursuits. Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1953) marks a pivotal shift in 20th-century metaphilosophy, critiquing traditional views of and meaning as representational mirrors of . Wittgenstein advocates dissolving philosophical problems through ordinary analysis, viewing not as a theory-building enterprise but as therapeutic clarification. This approach influences post-analytic by challenging and emphasizing contextual practices, contributing to debates on philosophy's aims amid identity crises in analytic traditions. Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) critiques representationalism as the core of philosophy's self-conception since Descartes, arguing it fosters an unnecessary quest for foundations in knowledge and mind. Rorty proposes edifying philosophy that promotes conversation over systematic truth-seeking, highlighting a crisis of identity in analytic philosophy's scientistic aspirations. This work catalyzes post-analytic shifts toward and pluralism, reshaping metaphilosophical reflections on progress and method. Nicholas Rescher's Philosophical Standardism: An Empiricist Approach to (1994) advocates methodological pluralism, treating philosophical generalizations as flexible standards rather than rigid universals. Rescher defends an empiricist metaphilosophy that accommodates diverse approaches while maintaining coherence, addressing philosophy's identity through contextual evaluation of doctrines. The text underscores metaphilosophy's role in navigating pluralism amid evolving disciplinary boundaries. Recent anthologies, such as Søren Overgaard, Paul Gilbert, and Stephen Burwood's An Introduction to Metaphilosophy (2013), compile thematic overviews of metaphilosophy's core issues, including analytic-continental divides and applied dimensions. These collections synthesize earlier texts' legacies, facilitating accessibility in curricula by framing 's self-reflection as essential to contemporary practice. Their influence extends to modern syllabi, where discussions of digital philosophy—exploring AI's implications for and method—build on foundational critiques of identity and , as seen in emerging programs integrating technology with metaphilosophical inquiry.

Influential Figures

Socrates, through Plato's dialogues, advanced metaphilosophy by portraying philosophy as the relentless pursuit of wisdom through dialectical questioning, emphasizing that the unexamined life is not worth living. extended this by developing a metaphilosophical vision in works like The Republic, where philosophy serves as the highest form of knowledge, guiding the soul toward the Forms and enabling just governance. contributed a structured metaphilosophy by organizing philosophy into a hierarchy, with first philosophy (metaphysics) as the foundational study of being qua being, subordinate to which are the special sciences like physics and . In the modern era, Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy provided a meta-framework for all inquiry, limiting metaphysics to the conditions of possible experience and thereby redefining philosophy's scope and methods in his . Friedrich Nietzsche critiqued philosophical dogmatism in (1886), arguing that traditional philosophers imposed absolute truths and moral binaries without sufficient self-examination, calling instead for a "philosophy of the future" that embraces and life-affirmation. Among contemporary figures, W.V.O. Quine challenged philosophical foundations in (1960), introducing the indeterminacy of translation to argue that radical translation between languages reveals in meaning and , undermining analytic-synthetic distinctions central to . advanced historical in his 2002 collection Historical Ontology, examining how philosophical concepts and objects emerge through historical practices, urging philosophers to historicize their inquiries rather than assume timeless essences. has influenced recent metaphilosophy through her work on conceptual engineering, particularly in Resisting Reality (2012), where she advocates revising philosophical concepts like and race to address social injustices, integrating ameliorative aims into . Up to 2025, debates on decolonial metaphilosophy draw heavily on Kwasi Wiredu's influence, as seen in his call for conceptual to divest of undue Western influences and reclaim indigenous epistemic frameworks. To highlight diversity in metaphilosophy, Nishida Kitarō, founder of the , contributed by synthesizing with in An Inquiry into the Good (1911), proposing a "logic of place" (basho) that reorients philosophy toward absolute nothingness as the ground of being, challenging Eurocentric assumptions about philosophical universality.

Central Topics in Metaphilosophy

Aims of Philosophical Inquiry

The aims of philosophical inquiry have long been a central concern in metaphilosophy, reflecting on what philosophy seeks to achieve as a discipline. Traditionally, philosophy pursued sophia or wisdom, aiming to foster understanding of reality's fundamental principles and provide ethical guidance for human flourishing. , for instance, viewed philosophy as originating in wonder and directed toward grasping first causes, ultimately promoting the contemplative life as the highest form of human activity, wherein intellectual virtue enables contemplation of unchanging truths as the path to or well-being. In , these aims diverged into contrasting approaches, highlighting metaphilosophical debates over philosophy's proper goals. Analytic philosophers emphasized conceptual clarification through logical analysis, as seen in Bertrand Russell's and early Ludwig Wittgenstein's efforts to dissect propositions and reveal the world's logical structure, aiming to resolve philosophical puzzles by aligning language with reality. In contrast, continental thinkers like sought existential transformation via phenomenology, aspiring to establish a foundational that brackets everyday assumptions to access pure and essences. Wittgenstein's later work introduced a therapeutic aim, treating philosophy not as theory-building but as a practice to dissolve confusions arising from linguistic misuse, thereby liberating thought from illusory problems. Contemporary metaphilosophy extends these debates, incorporating philosophy's role in public discourse while questioning universal aims amid pluralism. Post-2000 developments have highlighted as a key aim, where informs policy on issues like and , bridging abstract inquiry with practical decision-making in democratic societies. Recent critiques, particularly in decolonizing philosophy, challenge Eurocentric , arguing that traditional aims overlook diverse cultural perspectives and advocating for inclusive approaches that recognize 's situatedness in pluralistic global contexts. Metaphilosophically, these aims are assessed as potentially unachievable in a singular form, given philosophy's inherent open-endedness; while some traditions posit definitive goals like truth or , others view the discipline as a perpetual self-critique without fixed endpoints, continually adapting to cultural and intellectual shifts.

Boundaries and Scope of Philosophy

The boundaries and scope of are central concerns in metaphilosophy, which examines what qualifies as philosophical and how it is delimited from other domains of thought. Internally, is often divided into core areas that address fundamental questions about , , and value. Metaphysics investigates the nature of , including questions of being, substance, and . explores the sources, limits, and justification of . , or axiology more broadly, concerns moral principles, values, and human conduct. Logic provides the tools for valid reasoning across these domains. These core areas form the traditional backbone of , focusing on conceptual analysis and a priori reflection. Peripheral areas, such as , extend these inquiries but often intersect with empirical disciplines, raising questions about internal limits. For instance, analyzes concepts like and through rational argumentation, whereas employs experimental methods to study functions empirically. This distinction highlights philosophy's emphasis on normative and conceptual issues over descriptive data collection. Externally, philosophy is demarcated from science by its primary reliance on a priori reasoning and conceptual clarification, in contrast to science's empirical testing and observation. The in underscores this divide, where philosophy critiques scientific methods and assumptions without conducting experiments itself. Similarly, philosophy differs from in its commitment to rational argumentation accessible to all, avoiding appeals to faith or divine revelation as foundational evidence. integrates reason with scriptural authority and belief, such as doctrines of the , which philosophy might analyze but not presuppose. Debates over philosophy's boundaries often pit against traditionalism, particularly since the early 2000s. , or x-phi, represents an expansionist approach by incorporating empirical surveys and psychological experiments to probe folk intuitions on topics like and , challenging the traditional armchair reliance on philosophers' intuitions alone. Pioneering studies, such as those questioning the analytic-synthetic distinction through data, argue that this method broadens philosophy's evidential base and enhances its rigor. Traditionalists counter that such risks diluting philosophy's conceptual focus, confining it to descriptive rather than normative inquiry. The inclusion of non-Western perspectives further fuels debates on scope, particularly through the recognition of as legitimate since the 2010s. These systems, encompassing holistic worldviews from oral traditions and relational ontologies in African, Native American, and Oceanic contexts, challenge Western 's individualism and abstract by emphasizing interconnectedness with land and community. efforts argue that gatekeeping criteria, like written texts or propositional logic, exclude these sources, advocating for a broader definition of philosophical legitimacy based on critical reflection and cultural depth. Metaphilosophical implications arise in defining criteria for "philosophical legitimacy," where challenges like W.V.O. Quine's blur traditional boundaries. In his 1969 essay, Quine proposed replacing normative with a descriptive of , treating it as a branch of empirical informed by and . This view undermines philosophy's autonomy by subordinating it to scientific methods, prompting debates on whether such naturalization erodes philosophy's critical role or enriches it through interdisciplinary integration.

Methods and Epistemology

Philosophy utilizes core methods such as argumentation, thought experiments, and conceptual clarification to advance and resolve conceptual disputes. Argumentation forms the backbone of philosophical discourse, involving the construction and evaluation of deductive and to support or refute positions. Thought experiments, in particular, allow philosophers to explore hypothetical scenarios that isolate variables and test theoretical commitments without empirical constraints; for instance, Gettier's 1963 cases demonstrate how a can be justified and true yet fail to constitute due to epistemic , as in the example where Smith justifiably believes Jones owns a Ford but the true disjunct (Brown in ) is accidentally correct. Conceptual clarification, meanwhile, seeks to elucidate the necessary and sufficient conditions for key terms, often drawing on linguistic and logical analysis to refine understanding and avoid ambiguity. The epistemological foundations of these methods emphasize a priori reasoning and the role of intuitions, while facing critiques of traditional . A priori reasoning enables philosophers to derive truths independent of sensory experience, relying on rational deduction and conceptual necessities to establish justificatory grounds. Intuitions function as initial judgments that provide evidence, akin to ordinary cognitive capacities rather than a distinct faculty; argues that what are termed "philosophical intuitions" are simply applications of , defeasible but integral to theory-building, as seen in responses to thought experiments like Gettier cases. Critiques of , which posits self-evident as the bedrock of justification, have led to alternatives like ; Laurence BonJour's framework holds that epistemic justification arises from the mutual support and explanatory coherence within a system of beliefs, avoiding by distributing warrant holistically rather than hierarchically. Philosophical traditions diverge in their methodological approaches, with favoring formalism and emphasizing phenomenology. Analytic methods prioritize logical precision, symbolic notation, and conceptual analysis to achieve clarity and rigor, often modeling philosophical practice on scientific standards of argumentation. In contrast, continental approaches, rooted in phenomenology, focus on descriptive accounts of , assumptions to uncover subjective structures of , as exemplified by Edmund Husserl's technique for suspending judgments on external reality. These differences highlight ongoing metaphilosophical tensions regarding the scope of formal versus interpretive tools in philosophical . Since the 2000s, (x-phi) has introduced empirical methods to metaphilosophy, challenging traditional reliance on armchair reflection through surveys and behavioral studies that probe folk intuitions on philosophical concepts. Pioneered by figures like Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols, x-phi employs quantitative data to test the stability and cultural variability of responses to scenarios, such as moral judgments or epistemic attributions, revealing potential biases in intuitive reasoning. This approach integrates interdisciplinary tools from to validate or refine a priori methods, marking a shift toward hybrid epistemologies. Metaphilosophical critiques increasingly question the validity of these methods, particularly the armchair philosophy versus calls for interdisciplinary integration. The "negative program" in x-phi argues that armchair methods, dependent on unexamined intuitions, are unreliable due to demographic sensitivities and contextual framing effects, as evidenced by variations in epistemic judgments across cultural groups. Defenders counter that such critiques risk overgeneralizing , proposing instead that experimental data can complement armchair analysis by identifying biases without supplanting rational judgment. These debates underscore the evolving epistemological standards in , balancing traditional a priori tools with empirical scrutiny.

Notions of Progress and Change

Traditional views on in often contrast linear advancement with cyclical repetition. conceived of philosophical and historical development as a dialectical process of , , and synthesis, wherein ideas refine and toward greater and freedom. In Hegel's system, accumulates and sublates previous insights, forming a teleological march toward absolute knowledge, as exemplified in his Lectures on the . Conversely, rejected such linear optimism through his doctrine of , positing a cyclical cosmos where events recur infinitely without cumulative improvement. This notion, introduced in , challenges progressive narratives by emphasizing affirmation of existence amid repetition, critiquing Hegelian history as illusory comfort. Modern debates on philosophical progress draw analogies from the , particularly Thomas Kuhn's paradigm shifts. Kuhn's framework, adapted to philosophy, suggests episodic revolutions rather than steady accumulation, where entrenched conceptual frameworks yield to anomalies, fostering discontinuous change. , emphasizing logical clarification and problem-solving, aligns with a cumulative model of progress through incremental resolutions, such as refining arguments in metaphysics or . In contrast, continental traditions, especially , often reject Enlightenment-inspired as a grand . , in , argues that such narratives of emancipation and advancement have lost legitimacy in a fragmented, pluralistic era, favoring localized language games over universal improvement. Contemporary assessments employ empirical metrics to evaluate , revealing mixed results. highlights resolutions of paradoxes—like the sorites or liar—as instances of advancement, alongside conceptual clarifications, though overall convergence on core issues remains low, as evidenced by the 2009 PhilPapers survey showing persistent disagreement on topics like (59% compatibilist, 14% , 12% no , and 15% other). The 2020 PhilPapers survey confirmed this pattern, with 59% compatibilism, 13% , 10% no , and the rest other, indicating continued lack of consensus. Meta-analyses from the , including Chalmers' analysis, indicate some domain-specific progress in analytic subfields via argumentative refinement, but lags behind sciences in consensus due to premises' deniability. Challenges from global further complicate these views; post-2020 critiques underscore as a barrier, where Western paradigms marginalize non-European traditions, impeding inclusive . Philippe Major argues that 's boundary-setting practices perpetuate structural exclusion, advocating sociometaphilosophy to integrate diverse voices. Metaphilosophically, the lack of broad consensus raises questions about philosophy's : does it signal stagnation, or does persistent diversity reflect adaptive richness? Yafeng Shan contends that need not invoke to justify its value, as its aim lies in critical rather than convergence, allowing pluralism as a form of . Conversely, proponents like Finnur Dellsén view enhanced understanding through debate as measurable advancement, suggesting diversity enables broader epistemic gains without requiring uniformity. These implications underscore metaphilosophy's role in reframing success beyond linear metrics.

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