Hubbry Logo
Sharif Sheikh AhmedSharif Sheikh AhmedMain
Open search
Sharif Sheikh Ahmed
Community hub
Sharif Sheikh Ahmed
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Sharif Sheikh Ahmed
Sharif Sheikh Ahmed
Sharif Sheikh Ahmed
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (Somali: Sheekh Shariif Sheekh Axmed, Arabic: شيخ شريف شيخ أحمد; born 25 July 1965) is a Somali politician who served as the 4th President of Somalia from 2009 to 2012. Before his presidency, he became the Chairman of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) from 2004 to 2007 and the Alliance of Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) from 2007 to 2009.

Key Information

In 2004, Sharif became the head of the ICU. By mid-2006, the organization had wrested control of Mogadishu from warlords and expanded territorial control across much of Somalia. This rapid rise prompted a full-scale Ethiopian invasion in late 2006, leading to the ICU's governing body to collapse. In the ensuing military occupation and Islamist insurgency, Sharif assumed leadership of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). Following Ethiopia's troop withdrawal in January 2009, he was elected President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

Sharif's TFG administration faced fierce opposition from militant groups like Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, which demanded the withdrawal of African Union troops that had been deployed following the invasion and the full implementation of Sharia law. In early 2009, his government nearly fell to an insurgent offensive in Mogadishu.[1] However, by 2011, his administration—with African Union support—managed to drive Al-Shabaab out of the capital.[2] Despite these gains, Somalia under Sharif's leadership continued to rank as a failed state, struggling with limited popular support and widespread governance challenges.[3][4] By the end of his term, the TFG transitioned into the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). In the 2012 presidential election, Sharif was defeated by Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.

After his presidency, Sharif founded the Islamic democratic Himilo Qaran political party and later established the Forum for National Parties. He also serves as chairperson of the Council of Presidential Candidates of Somalia.

Early life and career

[edit]

Education

[edit]

Born on 25 July 1965 in Mahaday, Somalia a town in the south of the Middle Shabelle region where he studied Islam, Arabic language and memorized the Qur'an as a child. He began his education at the Sheikh Sufi Institute, which was associated with Al-Azhar University in Egypt. He studied at Libyan and Sudanese universities in the mid-1990s, where he earned a bachelor's degree in Law and Islamic Shariah.[5]

Law career

[edit]
Main article: Islamic Courts Union

Sheikh Sharif departed for Somalia in 2000 at a time when Somalia was under the control of warlords and friends could not visit each other in Mogadishu due to clan separation and mistrust. The legacy of the civil war was apparent everywhere in Somalia and Sharif had ambitions of saving his country and his people. He established Al Shuruuq Agency, a cultural and heritage institution and the Federation of Adolescents in Mogadishu which facilitated social interaction for young Somalis who had never before crossed the boundaries formed by the warlords. As a result, the residents of Mogadishu began to cross the lines where friends, schoolmates, and elders can come together and express themselves in a positive way. Sharif became a regional attorney of his home province, middle Shabelle, where he was elected chairman of a provincial court in Jowhar between 2001 and 2002.[5]

Armed groups in the Somali capital who exploited the disintegration of the central government had been responsible for countless kidnappings and killings. The court was established through a campaign which Sharif led to secure the release of an abducted child. The court was successful in securing the release of the child and other abductees as well as looted vehicles. The court went on to suppress the violence of gangs and warlords which was prevalent throughout the capital. Subsequently, all five Islamic courts united and Sharif, who had always been seen as the moderate face of the Islamic Courts Union, was elected to become the chair.[6]

Somalia was already beginning to see swift political and economic changes under his first six months of leadership. Warlords and their influence were eliminated from the city with the help of the people's support which made it possible for the first time in sixteen years to reopen Mogadishu International Airport and Mogadishu Port.[7] Top UN officials have referred to this period as a 'Golden era' in the history of Somali politics.[8][9]

At the time the Transitional Federal Government which was established in Mbagathi, Nairobi in 2004, was a fragile body which was divided and weak. The Ethiopian army invaded Somalia claiming that it was trying to help the Transitional Federal Government and overthrew the Islamic Court Union. Sharif met with the US Ambassador to Kenya for talks concerning cooperation with the Transitional Federal Government, after which he left for Yemen to meet with other former Islamic Courts Union members.[10][11]

Pre-presidential political career

[edit]
See also: Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia

As an exiled opposition leader Sharif, the former leader of the Islamic Courts Union, was in search of a headquarters for establishing a new political party, the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia. In September 2007 nearly 500 delegates gathered in Asmara, Eritrea, including Islamists, parliamentarians, civil society and the diaspora and adopted a constitution. Sharif's party the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia signed a peace treaty with the Transitional Federal Government on 9 June 2008 in Djibouti called the Djibouti Agreement.[12]

Many members of the Islamic Courts Union and other resistance factions such as Al-Shabaab were alienated by Sharif Sheikh Ahmed’s conduct during the Djibouti negotiations, particularly after he signed the peace deal without consulting field commanders-despite the continued presence of Ethiopian troops. ICU personnel in Mogadishu during this period viewed Sharif's behavior as unprincipled.[13]

President of Somalia

[edit]

The Sharif administration successfully brought the Federal Government of Somalia through transitional status following the collapse of the previous governing administration in 1991.

His administration is credited with developing Somalia's constitution and setting up key institutions such as the police, the military and the judiciary.[14][15] He established the Somali National Army, opened the main sea port of Mogadishu and relaunched the central bank.[16]

Under Sharif's leadership, the Transitional Federal Government succeeded in driving out Al Shabaab from the capital city and its surroundings, establishing security, peace and reconciliation through the difficult transitional period.[17]

Presidential Election 2009

[edit]
Main article: 2009 Somali presidential election

After winning the vote in the early hours of 31 January 2009, President Sharif was sworn in later in the day at the Kempinski hotel in Djibouti.[18] Sharif vowed to form a broad-based government and invited all armed groups in the war-ravaged Horn of Africa nation to join the UN-sponsored reconciliation effort. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the UN's special envoy for Somalia, praised the "transparent" presidential vote. "We are finally seeing progress from the hard work by all sides to create an inclusive parliament," Ould-Abdallah said in a statement.[19]

Arab League summit

[edit]

In March 2009, Sharif attended the Arab summit in Bagdad to get support for his fight against Al-Shabaab, and establishment of security, peace and reconciliation.[20]

Press conference with Hillary Clinton

[edit]

On 6 August 2009, Sharif and US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton held a joint press conference in Nairobi, Kenya discussing the challenges facing Somalia, and the possibility of achieving peace, stability and reconciliation for the Somalis.[21]

Center for Strategic and International Studies

[edit]

On 30 September 2009, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (C.S.I.S.) in Washington hosted a statesman's forum with Sharif on Somalia promoting peace through international engagement.[22]

Speech at United Nations headquarters in New York

[edit]

On 10 October 2009, Sharif presented a speech at the General Debate of the 64th Session of the General Assembly at the United Nations headquarters in New York on promoting peace, security, reconciliation and the delivery of humanitarian assistance.[23]

2010 Istanbul Conference on Somalia

[edit]

In May 2010, at the Istanbul Conference on Somalia, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said that the only chance to bring stability to Somalia was to support the government of Sharif. He specifically voiced his support for Sharif himself, saying that he needed to be in power and to strengthen his leadership.[24]

Speech at the United Nations

[edit]

On 25 September 2010, Sharif's speech at the United Nations was about promoting regional stability, security and reconstruction in Somalia.[25]

Appointment of Prime Minister

[edit]

Sharif appointed former First Secretary of the Somali embassy in Washington, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, as the new Prime Minister of Somalia in October 2010 after the resignation of Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke.[26] United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a statement commending the Somali leadership for having reached a consensus on procedural arrangements that facilitated a transparent and consultative confirmation of the new Premier.[27]

Al Shabaab withdrawal from Mogadishu

[edit]
Sharif in 2011

On 6 August 2011, Sharif announced that his military had defeated Islamist rebels battling to overthrow his Western-backed government after Al Shabaab began withdrawing fighters from the capital Mogadishu.[28]

Kampala Accord

[edit]
Main article: Kampala accord

The Kampala Accord was an agreement made in Kampala, Uganda in line with the Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic to bring and end to the transitional phase of the Transitional Federal Government on 20 August 2011. It was signed on 9 June 2011 by HE Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, President of the Transitional Federal Government, Hon Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament, H.E. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda and Augustine Mahiga, Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations.[29]

AMISOM visit

[edit]

In September 2011, Sharif visited Burundian peacekeepers serving in his country in a show of support for African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). "I came to pay a visit to the AMISOM peacekeepers and the Somali soldiers," the president told reporters before heading back to Villa Somalia after meetings ended. "The intention was to find out how the soldiers are doing and how ready they are to help the Somali people and the government. As you can see they are really prepared and have high spirits to end the problems affecting the Somali people. The two forces have a good working relationship, and we hope their partnership will result in a victory for our country and removal of the enemy."[30]

Operation Linda Nchi

[edit]
Main article: Operation Linda Nchi

Operation Linda Nchi ("Protect the country"; Swahili: Linda Nchi) is the codename for a co-ordinated military operation between the Kenyan military and the Somali military that began on 16 October 2011, when troops from Kenya crossed the border into the conflict zones of southern Somalia.

Kampala Talks

[edit]

In November 2011, Sharif met with Ugandan counterpart Yoweri Museveni to discuss security in Somalia and in the eastern Africa region. Sharif was accompanied by a number of ministers and legislators.[31]

Garowe Conference

[edit]

In February 2012, Sharif and other Somali government officials met in the northeastern town of Garowe to discuss post-transition political arrangements. After extensive deliberations attended by regional actors and international observers, the conference ended in a signed agreement between the President, Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, Speaker of Parliament Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, Puntland President Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, Galmudug President Mohamed Ahmed Alin and Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a representative Khalif Abdulkadir Noor stipulating that: a) a new 225 member bicameral parliament would be formed, with a lower house and an upper house seating 54 senators; b) 30% of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) is earmarked for women; c) the President is to be appointed via a constitutional election; and d) the Prime Minister is selected by the President and he/she then names his/her Cabinet.[32][33]

London Conference on Somalia

[edit]

Sharif spoke at the London Conference on Somalia on 23 February 2012. Sharif said: "To all of you who have exerted every effort so that you could put an end to the suffering of the Somali people, we would like to say that we appreciate this wonderful effort." US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and representatives from over 40 governments attended the London Conference on Somalia, to discuss the rebuilding of Somalia and the tackling of piracy, terrorism and famine. [34]

2012 Istanbul Conference on Somalia

[edit]

On 1 June 2012, Sharif and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon attended the Istanbul Conference on Somalia to promote global reconstruction efforts and to back up on going stabilisation efforts.[35]

New constitution

[edit]
Sharif in Balad, Somalia in 2012

On 23 June 2012, the Somali Federal Government and regional leaders met again and approved a draft constitution after several days of deliberation. The National Constituent Assembly overwhelmingly passed the new constitution on 1 August, with 96% voting for it, 2% against it, and 2% abstaining.[36]

Dubai Charter

[edit]

The second UAE counter piracy conference was held at the Madinat Jumeirah in Dubai on 27–28 June. It was attended by more than 400 delegates including Foreign Ministers, the United Nations' International Maritime Organisation, industry leaders, welfare organisations and academic experts. The Conference Keynote Address was given by Sharif from the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. The event concluded with a strong call for a "comprehensive approach" against pirates that includes national governments, international organisations and the global maritime industry.

On 28 June 2012, Sharif signed a cooperation deal with Ahmed Mahamoud Silanyo, President of the separatist Somaliland region in northwestern Somalia. Referred to as the Dubai Charter, the agreement calls for greater coordination between Somalia's various political units and is part of broader international reconciliation efforts among all Somali parties. The presidents of the autonomous Puntland and Galmudug regions as well as the UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs also attended the signing.[37]

2012 Presidential Elections

[edit]
Main article: 2012 Somali presidential election

Sharif's participation in the presidential contest and his acceptance of the results of his defeat was a demonstration of democracy coming to Somalia. He was widely praised for the peaceful handover of power. It was the first such transfer witnessed in Somalia in four decades.[38]

Post-presidency (2012–present)

[edit]

Sharif has been called 'The Father of Modern Somalia' due to his achievements during his presidential term.[39][40]

2017 presidential elections

[edit]
Sharif (right) and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (left), flanking Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed at Mohamed's inauguration as president in 2017
Main article: 2017 Somali presidential election

In the 2017 presidential election, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, who Sharif had earlier instated as Prime Minister, succeeded Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President of Somalia.[41] In the second and final round of parliamentary votes, Sharif received 45 votes to Mohamed's 185.[42]

Himilo Qaran

[edit]
Main article: Himilo Qaran

Sharif founded the Himilo Qaran party in December 2018 ahead of the 2020 elections.[43] In 2019 Himilo Qaran joined the Forum for National Parties an alliance of Somali political parties.[44] In October 2019 Himilo Qaran joined the alliance of Somali political parties, the Forum for National Parties.[citation needed]

Forum for National Parties

[edit]
Main article: Forum for National Parties
Sharif Sheikh Ahmed holding a video conference with the Forum for National Parties

In September 2019 Sharif founded the Forum for National Parties an alliance of six political parties including his own party Himilo Qaran and the UPD which is the party of his successor Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. The FNP alliance has united the leadership of the country to work together toward resolving Somalia's political and security issues.[45]

Since it was formed, the FNP has campaigned on various issues which include humanitarian aid, dialogue with FGS, and the Somali election model.

Council of Presidential Candidates

[edit]
Main article: Council of Presidential Candidates in Somalia

In November 2020 Sharif was elected as chairman of the Council of Presidential Candidates, which has been active in holding the Somali government to account on the procedures concerning of the upcoming elections.[46] The CPC has worked on resolving issues such as security issues and the election impasse in the 2021 elections.

2022 presidential elections

[edit]
Main article: 2022 Somali presidential election

In January 2019 Sharif announced his intention to stand for the 2021 presidential election on the ticket of his political party Himilo Qaran, citing the "inability of the current leadership to restore peace and security" against al-Shabaab militants who still control large rural regions of the country.[47][48] As a group of 14 presidential candidates met in Mogadishu for a six-day conference in November 2020 the Council of Presidential Candidates was formed and Sharif was nominated as chairman.[46]

On 15 May 2022, Sharif received 39 of 328 parliamentary votes cast in the first round of voting, placing him in fifth place and not proceeding to the second round.[49] Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was the winner.[50]

Recognition

[edit]

Fellowship, Boston University

[edit]

Sharif is beneficiary of the former-Presidents-In-Residence fellowship initiated by Boston University in Massachusetts, USA. The scholarship is administered by the African Presidential Archives and Research Center (APARC). It hosts programs including debates on public policy to extend knowledge of the complexities and resources in Africa.[51]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Sharif Sheikh Ahmed

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia

Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (born 25 July 1964) is a Somali political and religious figure who served as the seventh president of the from 2009 to 2012. A member of the clan's Abgal sub-clan, Ahmed studied Islamic theology and law, including time in , before entering politics as an educator and judge. He gained prominence as chairman of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which in 2006 expelled U.S.-backed warlords from and much of southern , imposing sharia-based order that temporarily reduced clan violence and banditry despite harboring extremist elements. Following the UIC's defeat by Ethiopian invasion forces allied with the weak TFG, Ahmed led the moderate wing of the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia, negotiating the 2008 Djibouti Agreement that positioned him for the presidency. His administration prioritized national reconciliation, Islamist faction integration, and counterinsurgency against Al-Shabaab, but contended with corruption, military setbacks, and dependency on and foreign support amid persistent territorial losses. After losing the 2012 election to , Ahmed returned to opposition roles, including as a parliamentarian and leader of forums advocating electoral reforms and critiquing federal governance failures as of 2025.

Early Life and Background

Family Origins and Childhood

Sharif Sheikh Ahmed was born on 25 July 1964 in the region of , specifically associated with locations such as or the Mahaday district northeast of . He belongs to the sub-clan of the clan, a major Somali clan group whose lineage traces to the broader Darod-Hawiye confederation rooted in nomadic pastoralist traditions in central . Specific details on his immediate family, such as parental occupations or , remain sparsely documented in available records, with no verified accounts of prominent ancestral roles beyond clan affiliations. During his childhood, Ahmed grew up in a region marked by 's pre-civil war stability under the regime, though experienced periodic clan tensions. He received his primary and within , initially attending local Islamic schools that emphasized Quranic memorization and basic religious instruction, aligning with traditional Somali upbringing in Hawiye-dominated areas. By , he had demonstrated early aptitude in , though formal progression to advanced scholarship occurred later.

Religious Education and Early Career

Sharif Sheikh Ahmed was born in in the Mahaday district of central , within the region. He received his initial through Islamic schools in , where he mastered the Qur'an and Islamic during his youth. In the , Ahmed pursued advanced studies abroad, attending institutions in and , including legal training at a Libyan university. Upon returning to , he worked as a teacher in , instructing students in , Arabic, and Islamic religious studies at from the late until 2004. This period established his reputation as a scholar and educator within Somali Muslim communities, emphasizing moderate interpretations of Islamic teachings amid the country's civil unrest.

Pre-Presidential Political Involvement

Role in the

Sharif Sheikh Ahmed emerged as a key figure in Somalia's (ICU), a coalition of Sharia-based courts that sought to establish order amid the country's post-1991 civil war chaos. Initially serving as chairman of a local Islamic court in Mogadishu's Towfiq district, he gained prominence for dismantling organized gang activities through judicial enforcement, which bolstered the court's influence. By 2004, he was elected chairman of the ICU's Executive Council, positioning him as the organization's primary leader during its rapid expansion. Under Ahmed's leadership, the ICU unified disparate courts and launched a offensive that captured from entrenched by June 2006, marking the first time in over a decade that a single authority controlled the capital. This success extended ICU control over much of southern , where it imposed law, restored basic services like markets and security, and reduced factional violence, though it also suppressed dissent and aligned with stricter Islamist elements. Ahmed, often characterized as a relative moderate within the group compared to hardliners like , advocated for dialogue with external actors while rejecting foreign intervention, including Ethiopian troop deployments. As ICU chairman, Ahmed coordinated the executive committee and public messaging, declaring the union's intent to govern independently and warning against incursions by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) backed by . His role emphasized administrative consolidation over purely militant pursuits, fostering a period of relative stability that contrasted with prior rule, though the ICU's tolerance of al-Qaeda-linked foreign fighters drew international condemnation. The Ethiopian in December 2006 dismantled ICU territorial gains, forcing Ahmed into exile in and , where he continued advocating for the group's remnants through the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia.

Designation as Terrorist and Moderation Efforts

In December 2001, the United States designated several entities under Executive Order 13224 for supporting terrorism, initiating a framework that later targeted Somali Islamist groups associated with al-Qaeda. By 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), chaired by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed since 2004, controlled much of southern Somalia, including Mogadishu, prompting U.S. concerns over its sheltering of foreign fighters and links to designated terrorists like those in al-Itihaad al-Islamiya. Although Ahmed himself was not individually listed as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, the U.S. and Ethiopian governments portrayed the ICU's leadership, including moderates like Ahmed, as enabling a terrorist haven, contributing to Ethiopia's December 2006 invasion that dismantled the ICU. Ahmed, detained briefly in Kenya amid the fallout, consistently rejected these accusations, asserting the ICU's focus on local stability rather than global jihad. Ahmed's moderation efforts distinguished him from ICU hardliners such as , who was designated a terrorist by the U.S. in 2001 for ties. As a religious scholar emphasizing pragmatic governance over strict Salafism, Ahmed advocated for implementation through local courts to curb clan violence, denying presence and positioning the ICU as a counter to warlordism rather than an extremist vanguard. Post-invasion, in July 2007, he co-founded the moderate Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS) in , , explicitly rejecting violence against civilians and pledging democratic participation, which facilitated peace talks in 2008 merging ARS with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). This shift alienated radicals, who formed al-Shabaab—a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization in March 2008—highlighting Ahmed's causal role in fracturing the Islamist coalition toward inclusivity. These initiatives culminated in Ahmed's January 31, 2009, election as TFG president by 414 of 422 votes, earning U.S. recognition as a stabilizing force despite initial skepticism. His administration cooperated on counter-terrorism, including AMISOM deployments, though critics noted persistent insurgent challenges stemming from the prior ICU ouster's effects. Ahmed's trajectory underscored a deliberate pivot from perceived militancy to , informed by first-hand observation of Somalia's rather than ideological purity.

Path to Presidency

2009 Presidential Election

The 2009 Somali presidential election occurred amid a prolonged political crisis following the resignation of Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President on December 29, 2008, driven by internal divisions, military setbacks against Islamist insurgents, and pressure from international donors. The election aimed to unify the fractured TFG with moderate opposition elements, particularly the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of (ARS), led by Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a former chairman of the (ICU) who had positioned himself as a moderate after splitting from hardline factions. To facilitate this reconciliation, the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) was expanded under the December 2008 Djibouti Agreement to include ARS representatives, increasing its size and clan balance, though the body remained indirect and clan-selected rather than popularly elected. Due to insecurity preventing sessions in , particularly in , the TFP convened in for the indirect vote on January 30–31, . Multiple candidates competed in the first round, including Nur Hassan Hussein, who withdrew before the runoff, clearing a path for Sharif; other contenders included Maslah Mohamed , son of the former dictator Mohamed . In the second round, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed secured 293 votes against Barre's 79 out of approximately 372 parliamentarians, achieving a clear majority. Speaker Aden Mohamed Nur declared him president on January 31, . Sharif's victory was welcomed by international actors, including the and , as a step toward inclusive and countering al-Shabaab's advances, though persisted given his ICU ties and the TFP's history of and inefficacy. He was sworn in on February 1, 2009, pledging national reconciliation, security restoration, and dialogue with insurgents, while rejecting . The , however, highlighted ongoing challenges: the TFP's legitimacy was questioned due to clan quotas and external influence, and al-Shabaab immediately denounced Sharif as an apostate, intensifying attacks.

Formation of Transitional Federal Government

On 31 January 2009, an expanded Transitional Federal Parliament, convened in as part of the ongoing reconciliation process between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), elected Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as with 293 votes out of 422 cast in the final round. The parliament's expansion from 275 to 550 members, agreed upon in August 2008, incorporated ARS representatives to foster national unity and extend the transitional mandate by two years until August 2011. Ahmed's election followed the resignation of President on 29 December 2008 amid internal TFG disputes and the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces earlier that month. He was sworn in immediately after the vote, marking a shift toward moderate Islamist leadership within the TFG framework established in 2004. Following his inauguration, Ahmed prioritized forming an inclusive executive to consolidate the unity government. On 13 February 2009, he nominated Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, a diplomat and son of Somalia's second president, as , a choice endorsed for bridging factional divides. Sharmarke, approved by , then assembled a cabinet reflecting the TFG-ARS power-sharing formula, with 14 ministers announced on 23 February 2009—half from each faction—focusing on key portfolios like defense, , and to address and governance vacuums. The cabinet's formation faced delays due to clan-based negotiations but was completed by May 2009 after parliamentary ratification, aiming to relocate operations to despite ongoing insurgent threats from al-Shabaab. This structure emphasized , with Ahmed publicly committing to Sharia-compliant policies while rejecting , though implementation was hampered by resource shortages and internal rivalries. The new government's establishment drew international support, including from the , , and , which viewed it as a potential turning point for stability after years of fragmentation. However, al-Shabaab and allied militants denounced the TFG as illegitimate, launching attacks on shortly after Ahmed's arrival there on 14 February 2009, underscoring the fragility of the transitional institutions. By March 2009, the unity cabinet had begun operations, but persistent clan power struggles and limited territorial control limited its effectiveness in the transitional phase.

Presidency (2009–2012)

Security and Counter-Terrorism Efforts

Sharif Sheikh Ahmed's administration prioritized the establishment of national security institutions to combat Al-Shabaab, including the recruitment and training of the Somali National Army (SNA) and police forces, amid ongoing insurgent threats following the Ethiopian troop withdrawal in January 2009. Efforts included constructing training facilities to enhance military capacity against terrorism. The TFG collaborated with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), deploying troops from and to protect government areas in and support counter-insurgency operations. Joint TFG-AMISOM offensives from 2010 to 2011, known as the Battle of Mogadishu, expelled Al-Shabaab from key districts, with the insurgents withdrawing from the capital in August 2011 after failed attempts to retake it. By October 2011, TFG and AMISOM forces had secured the last Al-Shabaab stronghold in Daynile district. Ahmed personally led frontline engagements, joining SNA troops in June 2010 to fight anti-government Islamists in . His government also pursued defections and reconciliation, integrating moderate opposition elements and, by , persuading hundreds of Al-Shabaab fighters—including key commanders—to abandon the group. In August 2009, Ahmed affirmed the TFG's resolve to confront Al-Shabaab, characterized as an Al-Qaida-linked terrorist organization. However, Al-Shabaab maintained guerrilla capabilities, launching attacks such as the May 2012 ambush on Ahmed's convoy that killed one soldier and wounded four others. These efforts expanded TFG control to parts of but left vast rural areas under insurgent dominance.

Government Instability and Internal Conflicts

During Sharif Sheikh Ahmed's presidency, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) experienced significant internal instability characterized by frequent changes in prime ministers and factional disputes that undermined governance and military cohesion. Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, appointed in May 2009, resigned on September 21, 2010, amid ongoing disagreements with President Ahmed over resource allocation and escalating insurgent attacks, which exacerbated perceptions of governmental paralysis. Ahmed then appointed (Farmajo) as on October 14, 2010, but dismissed him on June 9, 2011, as part of a compromise to resolve broader leadership deadlocks; Farmajo's tenure, though marked by some efforts, ended due to persistent cabinet infighting and failure to unify clans. Abdiweli Mohamed Ali succeeded him in June 2011, becoming the fourth under the TFG since 2004, highlighting the revolving door of executive leadership driven by clan rivalries and power-sharing disputes. A major source of internal conflict was the rivalry between President Ahmed and parliamentary Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, rooted in competing visions for mandate extension, constitutional processes, and command. By mid-2010, tensions escalated when Speaker Adan challenged Ahmed's handling of prime ministerial approvals and accused him of foreign influence in derailing local efforts, leading to a parliamentary vote-of-no-confidence threat against the government. This infighting halted coordinated operations against al-Shabaab insurgents, as disagreements over extending the TFG's mandate—originally set to expire in August 2011—paralyzed decision-making and allowed insurgents to regain territory in . The deadlock persisted for five months until the Kampala Accord, signed on June 9, 2011, under international mediation, which extended the transition by one year, mandated a , and established benchmarks for ending the transitional period, though underlying distrust between Ahmed and Adan lingered. These internal divisions were compounded by factional splits inherited from the (ICU), where Ahmed's pragmatist wing clashed with hardline groups like , led by former allies who rejected the TFG's Western-backed framework and allied tactically with al-Shabaab. By May 2009, such infighting reduced TFG control to just 35% of districts, with insurgents exploiting governance vacuums to launch offensives that further eroded public confidence. Political spoilers, including clan-based maneuvering and unaccounted revenues estimated at $131 million, perpetuated corruption allegations and hampered unified action, contributing to the TFG's reliance on forces for survival rather than domestic legitimacy. Despite these challenges, the internal conflicts underscored the TFG's fragility, where personal and clan ambitions often superseded national security priorities.

Diplomatic Engagements and International Support

During his presidency, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed prioritized diplomatic outreach to secure international legitimacy for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) amid ongoing conflict with al-Shabaab, emphasizing moderation to attract Western and regional backing. In August 2009, he met U.S. Secretary of State in , where the U.S. pledged support for the TFG's fight against al-Shabaab, described as a terrorist group linked to al-Qaida, marking an early endorsement from a key counter-terrorism partner. Earlier that year, in April, Sharif visited , receiving commitments for humanitarian and reconstruction aid, which laid groundwork for Ankara's expanded role in . Sharif actively engaged multilateral forums to bolster military and financial assistance. He addressed the in September 2010, outlining TFG progress in stabilizing and calling for sustained international aid to counter insurgent threats. The Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), under AU auspices, received Sharif's endorsement for mandate expansions, enabling Ugandan and Burundian troops to secure parts of the capital by August 2011, with funding channeled through UN and Western donors. hosted two major conferences on during his tenure: the May 2010 gathering, attended by Sharif and delegates from 55 countries, which focused on private-sector involvement in reconstruction; and the May 2012 event, where his convoy faced al-Shabaab attack en route, underscoring risks amid pledges for governance and security aid. Relations with the UN intensified in 2012, including a February meeting with Secretary-General on the sidelines of the London Conference on , where discussions centered on TFG reforms and anti-terrorism coordination. Turkey's bilateral support grew prominently, with Sharif praising Ankara's assistance in a September 2011 statement and participating in a June 2012 press conference alongside Turkish officials and the UN chief, highlighting joint efforts in aid delivery despite logistical challenges. Overall, these engagements yielded over $1 billion in pledged international aid by 2012, primarily for security and humanitarian needs, though absorption was hampered by governance weaknesses within the TFG.

Constitutional Reforms and Transition to Permanent Government

During Sharif Sheikh Ahmed's presidency of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), efforts focused on fulfilling the 2004 Transitional Federal Charter's mandate to draft a provisional and transition to a permanent federal government by August 2012. In June 2011, Sharif signed the UN-mediated Accord with parliamentary speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, extending the TFG's mandate while committing to accelerated reforms, including constitution-making and elections to end the transition. This accord addressed internal TFG divisions and aligned with the peace process that had brought Sharif to power. Subsequent consultations advanced the constitutional framework through the Somali Roadmap, signed in September 2011 by TFG principals including Sharif, which outlined priorities like establishing an Independent Federal Constitution Commission to draft the document. In December 2011, the Garowe I Principles emerged from a constitutional conference in , attended by Sharif, endorsing a federal , a 225-member , and a National (NCA) to approve the draft . These principles built on earlier drafts and aimed to balance clan representation via the 4.5 formula while promoting . Garowe II in February 2012, also under Sharif's TFG auspices, operationalized these by specifying the NCA's composition (825 members selected by traditional elders) and requiring a two-thirds approval threshold for the . The Independent Federal Constitution Commission, appointed in 2010 but operationalized under the Roadmap, completed the draft by mid-2012, incorporating Islamic principles, federal structures, and rights protections. The NCA convened in in July 2012 despite security threats from al-Shabaab, debating contentious issues like sharia's role and regional autonomies. On August 1, 2012, the NCA provisionally adopted the Provisional Federal Constitution with over 96% support, signed by as TFG president, formally ending the transitional phase. This enabled the selection of a new bicameral parliament on August 20, 2012, which then elected as president on September 10, 2012, establishing the . Critics, including some groups, argued the process lacked broad , relying on elite and clan-based consultations amid ongoing insecurity that limited inclusivity. Nonetheless, the provided a foundation for , with Sharif's administration credited for navigating factional disputes to meet the deadline, though implementation faced delays in subsequent years.

Major Controversies and Criticisms

Sharif Sheikh Ahmed's presidency was marred by persistent internal divisions within the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), including repeated clashes with parliamentary speaker Sheikh Aden Mohamed Nur Madobe and frequent dismissals of prime ministers, such as the ousting of in 2010 and Abdiweli Mohamed Ali in 2011, which paralyzed governance and eroded institutional stability. These conflicts, often rooted in clan rivalries and personal ambitions, led to a near-collapse of executive-parliamentary relations, with Madobe attempting to remove Sharif via motions in 2010, exacerbating factionalism and hindering policy implementation. A 2012 United Nations Monitoring Group report highlighted systemic among TFG senior leaders, alleging of millions in international aid intended for and salaries, which contributed to soldier desertions and operational failures. The report described the government as effectively operating under the Somali idiom "ka bosh, ka bosh" (nothing, nothing), implying pervasive graft that undermined efforts, though dismissed the accusations as baseless and politically motivated during his re-election campaign. Security shortcomings drew sharp criticism, as Al-Shabaab maintained control over much of southern despite African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) support, with the TFG unable to extend authority beyond limited districts and facing repeated insurgent attacks, including suicide bombings that killed hundreds. Sharif's administration was faulted for failing to forge a unified national army, with unpaid troops defecting to militants and reliance on foreign troops exposing leadership weaknesses, as evidenced by the assassination of security minister Omar Hashi and ongoing territorial losses. Critics, including analysts from think tanks, argued Sharif's background as a moderate Islamist from the fueled skepticism about his commitment to countering extremism, with some viewing his moderation efforts as insufficiently aggressive against Al-Shabaab hardliners who had rejected his overtures. This perception persisted amid reports of abuses by TFG-aligned militias, such as extrajudicial killings and arbitrary detentions, which further damaged credibility despite international backing.

Post-Presidency Political Activities

Electoral Campaigns (2012–2022)

Sharif Sheikh Ahmed campaigned for re-election as president in the indirect parliamentary vote held on , 2012. In the first round, he secured a place in the runoff alongside after other candidates, including incumbent Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, were eliminated. However, in the decisive second round, Ahmed received 79 votes compared to Mohamud's 190, marking the end of his presidential tenure. Between 2012 and 2017, Ahmed's direct electoral participation was limited, with no candidacy in the 2016-2017 federal elections that saw Mohamed Abdullahi "Farmajo" Farmajo elected president. He instead engaged in broader , critiquing and supporting clan-based alliances amid ongoing instability. Ahead of the protracted 2021-2022 electoral cycle, Ahmed intensified campaigning, launching efforts in on November 26, 2020, to build support for the delayed presidential vote. He was subsequently elected to the House of the People on May 3, 2022, positioning him within the voting body for the . Ahmed entered the presidential race on , 2022, as one of 35 candidates, with reports identifying him as a frontrunner alongside and Farmajo. Despite his opposition role against Farmajo's term extension attempts, he did not advance in the multi-round voting, as Mohamud secured victory with 207 votes in the final round.

Formation of Political Alliances and Parties

Following his presidency, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed established the Himilo Qaran in December 2018, describing it as an Islamic democratic organization focused on national unity, governance reform, and participation in Somalia's inaugural direct scheduled for 2021. The party's formation reflected Ahmed's intent to leverage his experience in transitional governance to advocate for inclusive political processes amid ongoing clan-based electoral disputes. In October 2019, Ahmed's Himilo Qaran merged into or co-formed the Forum for National Parties (FNP), a broader opposition alliance alongside the Union for Peace and Development (UPD) party led by former President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, aiming to challenge incumbent President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmajo's administration. The FNP positioned itself as a coalition emphasizing electoral transparency, federalism, and opposition to perceived authoritarian extensions of power, drawing members from multiple regions and clans to counter government influence in voter registration and parliamentary selections. The FNP's structure allowed Ahmed to coordinate opposition strategies, including joint statements against electoral delays and military interventions in regional politics, though internal tensions emerged as Farmajo's forces consolidated control ahead of the delayed 2021-2022 polls. Ahmed registered his presidential candidacy through the FNP, underscoring the alliance's role in sustaining his political relevance despite the indirect electoral system's veto dynamics. These formations highlighted Ahmed's shift toward institutionalized opposition, prioritizing multi-party coalitions over individual campaigns to navigate Somalia's fragmented power-sharing framework.

Recent Opposition Role and Criticisms of Successors (2022–Present)

Since the re-election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as president in May 2022, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed has emerged as a prominent figure in Somalia's opposition, leading the Himilo Qaran party and participating in coalitions such as the Forum for National Parties to advocate for electoral and constitutional reforms. These groups have positioned themselves against perceived unilateral actions by the government, particularly regarding the 2026 elections and amendments to the provisional constitution. In March 2024, Sharif warned Mohamud against altering the constitution without broad consensus, arguing that such moves risked destabilizing the fragile political framework despite international support. Sharif has repeatedly accused Mohamud's administration of exacerbating political divisions and undermining democratic processes. In May 2025, he criticized the government for reversing commitments to inclusive electoral models, claiming this shift favored executive control over multiparty consultations. He further alleged in the same month that the administration was deepening rifts by prioritizing partisan agendas over national unity. By June 2025, opposition coalitions including Sharif condemned Mohamud's electoral roadmap as a vehicle for democratic backsliding, warning of heightened tensions ahead of polls. Security policy has been a focal point of Sharif's critiques, with him attributing the resurgence of al-Shabaab to Mohamud's strategic missteps. In 2025, Sharif stated that government political decisions had allowed militants previously displaced to regroup, worsening insecurity across regions. Earlier that month, opposition voices, including Sharif's allies, accused the president of sidelining counter-terrorism efforts in favor of divisive domestic politics. In August 2025, Sharif joined former presidents and in demanding the return of seized public lands, decrying abuses of power and misappropriation under Mohamud's tenure. Tensions escalated in late 2025 amid clashes between opposition and security forces. On September 25, 2025, Sharif was present during a deadly standoff in where opposition leaders evaded arrest, later accusing the government of plotting assassinations against critics. In October 2025, his public donation to a claimant asserting familial ties to Mohamud was interpreted by some as an attempt to discredit the president, though it drew backlash and highlighted ongoing personal and political animosities. These activities underscore Sharif's role in mobilizing opposition against what he portrays as authoritarian tendencies, amid broader concerns over governance and stability as approaches its next electoral cycle.

Legacy and Assessments

Key Achievements and Positive Impacts

Sharif Sheikh Ahmed's presidency facilitated the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from in January 2009, shortly after his election, which diminished al-Shabaab's propaganda leverage portraying the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as an Ethiopian puppet and thereby reduced some sources of popular resentment against the government. This shift enabled a recalibration of alliances, allowing moderate Islamists like Ahmed to consolidate support against extremist factions. Under Ahmed's leadership, the TFG collaborated with the Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), whose expanded presence from 2009 onward proved essential to the government's survival and enabled incremental territorial gains, including the securing of key districts in by 2011 through joint operations that dislodged al-Shabaab fighters. These efforts contributed to the government's control over approximately 60% of by mid-2011, marking a relative stabilization in the capital compared to the near-total insurgent dominance prior to his term. Ahmed's administration also initiated drives for and implemented salary payments to civil servants and , fostering rudimentary institutional functionality amid pervasive and desertion issues. Diplomatic initiatives during Ahmed's tenure secured enhanced international backing, including U.S. recognition of the TFG's counter-terrorism resolve against al-Shabaab's al-Qaida linkages, which unlocked , advisory, and logistical aid to Somali forces. The Accord, negotiated under his auspices, extended the transitional mandate while advancing a roadmap for elections and power-sharing, culminating in the orderly transfer to a provisional and the subsequent government's formation in —averting total collapse and laying groundwork for despite ongoing clan rivalries. These steps, though partial, represented causal progress in disrupting jihadist momentum and rebuilding state legitimacy in a fragmented .

Failures, Criticisms, and Unresolved Challenges

Despite initial military gains in supported by the Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) under Sharif Sheikh Ahmed failed to extend effective control beyond limited urban enclaves, with Al-Shabaab retaining dominance over much of southern and central throughout his 2009–2012 tenure. The government faced repeated setbacks, including high-profile assassinations, suicide bombings, and territorial losses, underscoring its inability to build a cohesive apparatus or integrate clan militias into a unified force. Corruption permeated the TFG administration, with the Monitoring Group reporting in 2012 that senior leaders, including figures close to Sharif, engaged in systematic of public funds, including up to $12 million in unaccounted expenditures in 2011 alone. Sharif Sheikh Ahmed these accusations, attributing them to political motivations amid his re-election campaign, but the allegations highlighted entrenched graft that diverted aid and salaries, eroding troop morale and . Independent assessments described the tenure as marked by incompetence, delivering minimal services or even in held areas. Deep internal divisions plagued the TFG, including power struggles between Sharif and parliamentary speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, which stalled legislative progress and constitutional implementation. The failure to clearly delineate executive and legislative roles under the Transitional Federal Charter exacerbated factionalism, preventing the formation of stable institutions and contributing to repeated parliamentary crises. Unresolved challenges from Sharif's presidency include the enduring Al-Shabaab insurgency, which his government could not dismantle despite international backing, leaving Somalia with fragmented security and ongoing territorial disputes. Institutional weaknesses, such as unaddressed clan-based and inadequate federal structures, persisted into subsequent administrations, perpetuating cycles of and dependency. Critics attribute these legacies to the TFG's prioritization of elite survival over , resulting in a handover to permanent governance without foundational reforms.

International Recognition and Honors

Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed's presidency from 2009 to 2012 garnered significant international recognition as the legitimate authority in , following his on January 31, 2009, by the Transitional Federal Parliament in under the auspices of the and (IGAD). This endorsement marked a pivotal shift, uniting moderate Islamist factions from the for the Reliberation of (ARS) with existing transitional structures, and was affirmed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1872, which welcomed his inclusive call for national reconciliation and urged all parties to support the resulting government. The , European Union, and League of Arab States provided diplomatic backing, viewing his moderate Islamist background as a counter to extremist groups like Al-Shabaab, which enabled increased foreign aid and the bolstering of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops from approximately 3,000 to over 8,000 personnel by . This support included U.S. training for Somali security forces and over $200 million in annual assistance, reflecting confidence in his administration's potential to restore stability despite ongoing insurgencies. Upon transitioning power in August 2012, Ahmed received commendations for his statesmanship, including a tribute praising his "magnanimity" in conceding electoral defeat without contestation, which facilitated a smoother to the subsequent government. However, no major personal awards, medals, or honorary degrees have been prominently documented in official records from governments or international bodies during or after his tenure.

References

  1. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7865808.stm
  2. https://historica.fandom.com/wiki/Sharif_Sheikh_Ahmed
  3. https://www.hiiraan.com/news2/2007/jan/hol_person_of_the_year_2006_sheikh_sharif_sheikh_ahmed.aspx
  4. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2009/5/30/profile-sharif-ahmed
  5. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/sheikh-sharif-a-history-of-balancing-acts--1305632
  6. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/former-somalia-president-elected-mp-3802754
  7. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-10/somalia-41.php
  8. https://link.springer.com/rwe/10.1057/978-1-349-95839-9_711
  9. https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Sharif_Sheikh_Ahmed
  10. https://www.hiiraan.ca/op4/2010/mar/13870/president_sheikh_sharif_one_year_later.aspx
  11. https://www.hiiraan.com/news/2006/may/somali_news17_5.aspx
  12. https://www.npr.org/2007/01/23/6952493/leading-member-of-islamic-courts-held-in-kenya
  13. https://mappingmilitants.org/files/group-profiles/islamic_courts_union.pdf
  14. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/01/former_islamic_court.php
  15. https://jamestown.org/brief/new-islamist-leaders-emerge-in-somalia/
  16. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/politics-and-government/islamic-courts-union-icu
  17. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2009/11/04/somali-president-sheikh-sharifs-diplomatic-efforts-in-the-u-s/
  18. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/po689
  19. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2006/10/26/update-islamist-radicals-still-on-the-march-in-somalia/
  20. https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/key-facts-somalis-islamic-courts
  21. https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2009-01-31-voa7-68795232/411670.html
  22. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20100204_RL33911_c5e5b41cf8f60a0465ff923177a17952623209d1.html
  23. https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/somalia/150667.htm
  24. https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalias-expanded-parliament-elects-new-president
  25. https://news.un.org/en/story/2009/02/289552
  26. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2009/1/31/somali-mps-elect-new-president
  27. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2009/2/1/new-somali-president-sworn-in-2
  28. https://press.un.org/en/2009/sc9588.doc.htm
  29. https://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2009%252F01%252F31%252F65383
  30. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/somalia.php
  31. https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/somalia/141945.htm
  32. https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/somalia/130545.htm
  33. https://www.islamweb.net/en/article/148784/new-somali-president-sworn-in
  34. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2009/2/13/new-somalia-pm-appointed
  35. https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/somalia-1960-present/
  36. https://press.un.org/en/2009/sc9620.doc.htm
  37. https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2009-02-13-voa18-68769307/410797.html
  38. https://news.un.org/en/story/2009/02/289932
  39. https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2009/Jan/9524/sharif_returns_to_power_as_militants_advance.aspx
  40. https://www.csis.org/analysis/amisoms-five-challenges
  41. https://safety4sea.com/in-turkey-un-chief-says-somalia-needs-help-in-building-own-security-forces/
  42. https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/tfgamisom-forces-retake-last-al-shabab-stronghold-mogadishu
  43. https://www.cfr.org/media/59151/modal?anchor=timeline-59151
  44. http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/06/30/somalia.president.fighting/index.html
  45. https://news.un.org/en/story/2010/09/353272
  46. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2023/09/can-soft-power-defeat-al-shabab-in-somalia?lang=en
  47. https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/08/126956.htm
  48. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18255185
  49. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/somalia-unrest
  50. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/world/africa/10somalia.html
  51. https://amisom-au.org/en/2011/09/somalia-finally-gets-a-new-prime-minister/
  52. https://www.keydmedia.net/article/conflict_between_two_very_closest_colleagues_sharif_ahmed_and_sharif_hassan
  53. https://jamestown.org/program/conflict-between-somali-leaders-halts-military-operations-against-islamist-insurgents/
  54. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SitRep2013_9July-Asamoah.pdf
  55. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-diagnosis-of-somalias-failing-transitional-government/
  56. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%257B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%257D/s_2013_413.pdf
  57. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%257B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%257D/Somalia%2520S%2520PV%25206173.pdf
  58. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/saving-a-failing-state/
  59. http://en.people.cn/90001/90777/90856/6995115.pdf
  60. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18275703
  61. https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/former-secretary-general/readout/2012-02-23/readout-of-the-secretary-generals-meeting-he-mr-sheikh-sharif-sheikh-ahmed-president-of-somalia
  62. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/archive/turkish-people-stood-by-us/410389
  63. https://press.un.org/en/2012/sgt2851.doc.htm
  64. https://ips-dc.org/new_report_reveals_somalias_missing_millions/
  65. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2022/07/sogarowefactsheet_1.pdf
  66. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/166833/SitRep2013_9July-Asamoah.pdf
  67. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2022/07/sogaroweiiprinciplesen2012_1.pdf
  68. https://www.peaceagreements.org/agreements/1680/coding/The%2520Garowe%2520II%2520Principles%2520on%2520Federalism%2C%2520System%2520of%2520Government%2520and%2520Ending%2520of%2520Transition%2520through%2520operationalizing%2520Garowe%2520I%2520%28Garowe%2520II%29
  69. https://www.refworld.org/legal/legislation/natlegbod/2012/en/97615
  70. https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/08/195982.htm
  71. https://www.c-r.org/accord/legitimacy-and-peace-processes/constitutional-review-%25C2%25A0peace-processes-securing-local-0
  72. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/somali-president-hits-back-against-un-graft-charges-idUSBRE87G0UE/
  73. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2012/8/19/somalias-president-denies-un-graft-report
  74. https://www.voanews.com/a/un-reports-says-somali-government-corrupt/1405372.html
  75. https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/204377.pdf
  76. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/10/somalia-chooses-new-president-elections
  77. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19540325
  78. https://www.dw.com/en/new-president-old-problems-in-somalia/a-16229411
  79. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2022-05/somalia-25.php
  80. https://www.ftlsomalia.com/10238-2/
  81. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/15/legislators-in-somalia-gather-to-elect-new-president
  82. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/15/world/africa/somalia-election-president.html
  83. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/somalia2-former-presidents-form-new-political-alliance/1599155
  84. https://sonna.so/en/federal-government-and-forum-for-national-parties-continue-second-round-of-dialogue/
  85. https://plusnews.ug/sharif-sheikh-ahmed-registered-to-contest-for-somalia-presidency/
  86. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/somalia/b208-electoral-showdown-somalia-averting-another-round-turmoil
  87. https://hornobserver.com/articles/2683/Former-Somali-President-Sharif-warns-Hassan-Sheikh-highlighting-three-main-concerns
  88. https://shabellemedia.com/former-president-accuses-hassan-sheikh-of-reversing-position-on-elections/
  89. https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia-ex-president-accuses-hassan-sheikh-s-administration-of-deepening-political-divisions
  90. https://hornobserver.com/articles/3344/Somalia-Opposition-Slams-President-Hassan-Sheikhs-Electoral-Agenda-Warns-of-Democratic-Backsliding
  91. https://shabellemedia.com/ex-leader-blames-president-hassan-sheikhs-policies-for-resurgence-of-al-shabaab/
  92. https://www.somaliguardian.com/news/somalia-news/somalias-opposition-accuses-president-of-abandoning-al-shabaab-war-for-divisive-political-agendas/
  93. https://hornobserver.com/articles/3461/Return-Stolen-Lands-Three-Former-Somalia-Presidents-Tell-Hassan-Sheikh
  94. https://www.somaliguardian.com/news/somalia-news/somalias-opposition-leaders-survive-deadly-standoff-with-security-forces/
  95. https://www.dawan.africa/news/former-president-sharif-sheikh-ahmed-accuses-government-of-plotting-to-kill-opponents
  96. https://radiodalsan.com/english-news/293890/sharifs-political-gamble-to-undermine-hassan-sheikh-backfires
  97. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/10/somalia-private-meeting-3.php
  98. https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/strategic-forums/57/
  99. https://enoughproject.org/reports/somalia-after-ethiopian-occupation-first-steps-end-conflict-and-combat-extremism
  100. https://theglobalobservatory.org/2019/12/positive-impacts-challenges-facing-the-african-union-mission-in-somalia/
  101. https://www.un.org/en/ga/65/meetings/generaldebate/View/SpeechView/tabid/85/smid/411/ArticleID/173/reftab/231/t/Somalia/Default.html
  102. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/somalias-transitional-government
  103. https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/170-somalia-the-transitional-government-on-life-support.pdf
  104. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-weak-hand-of-somalias-new-president/
  105. https://mecouncil.org/publication/engaging-al-shabaab-in-somalia-military-failures-and-the-merits-of-dialogue/
  106. https://pambazuka.org/destination-oblivion-failure-western-policy-somalia
  107. https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/5171/download?inline
  108. https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2010/138314.htm
  109. https://docs.un.org/en/S/PV.6848
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.