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Swedish nuclear weapons program
Swedish nuclear weapons program
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Kingdom of Sweden
Location of Kingdom of Sweden
Nuclear program start date1945
First nuclear weapon testNone
First thermonuclear weapon testNone
Last nuclear testNone
Largest yield testNone
Total testsNone
Peak stockpileNone
Current stockpileNone; the program was ended in 1972.
Current strategic arsenalNone
Cumulative strategic arsenal in megatonnageNone
Maximum missile range70 km (Robot 08)
NPT partyYes
FOA's old building in Ursvik, Sundbyberg. This building is now a school.

After World War II, Sweden considered building nuclear weapons to defend themselves against an offensive assault from the Soviet Union. From 1945 to 1972[1] the government ran a clandestine nuclear weapons program under the guise of civilian defence research at the Swedish National Defence Research Institute (FOA).

By the late 1950s the work had reached the point where underground testing was feasible. However, at this time the Riksdag prohibited research and development of nuclear weapons, pledging that research should be done only for the purpose of defence against nuclear attack. They reserved the right to continue development of offensive weapons in the future.

In recent years declassified documents have shown that Sweden was much closer to possessing the nuclear bomb than previously thought. By 1965 most of the bomb was already built and another 6 months would have been needed to arm it, had the project been given the green light. Another two bombs would have been built shortly thereafter.[2]

The option to continue development of weapons was abandoned in 1966, and Sweden's subsequent signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 began the wind-down of the program, which finally concluded in 1972. Sweden was strongly influenced to abandon its nuclear weapons program by the United States.[2]

Background

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During the final phase of World War II, the Swedish Government saw value in the future of nuclear energy, especially the Allied interest in Sweden's uranium-bearing black shale deposits. This led to suggestions that Sweden should establish state control over its natural resources, including uranium. Specifically, such controls would include export controls on uranium in collaboration with the American and British governments, exclusive Swedish controls over uranium ore, and a ban on commercial mining of uranium.[1]

Through its advisors, including Manne Siegbahn among others, the government realized the link between its ore and nuclear weapons. After American Ambassador Herschel Johnson brought up that question in a conversation with State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Stig Sahlin on 27 July 1945, the issue was raised at the government meeting on 2 August. On 11 September, Sweden committed itself to establish state control over mining and export of uranium. Sweden rejected the American suggestion of a right to purchase Swedish uranium as well as a right to veto proposed Swedish uranium exports.[3]

The opening of the Cold War and fears of an attack by the Soviet Union led to increasing interest in Sweden possessing its own nuclear arsenal. They were only interested in tactical nuclear weapons that would be used in a defensive role on Swedish territory or nearby seas.[4][not specific enough to verify] For reasons not directly related to security, Sweden never considered strategic nuclear weapons that could reach the Soviet Union. British and U.S. ideas heavily influenced the Swedish Armed Forces’ doctrinal thinking at that time.[original research?]

Early studies

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Physics-oriented defence research started in Sweden during World War II, and drew many outstanding Swedish physicists to the Military Institute of Physics (MFI) founded in 1941. Here the focus was on conventional weapons. In 1945, MFI merged with two other organizations to form the Swedish National Defence Research Institute (FOA) in compliance with a 1944 proposal to reorganize the Swedish defence research.[5] Research at the FOA was focused on such things as jet engines, rocket technology, shaped charge systems, and radars.

In August 1945, just a few days after the Hiroshima bombing, Sweden's Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Helge Jung, made a request via newly appointed research officer Torsten Schmidt that the recently founded FOA should find out what was known about those new weapons.[6] FOA's first report to the Supreme Commander in late 1945 was largely based on the Smyth Report, the official US report on Manhattan Project and physics behind it, which was published on 12 August.[7]

Connection between nuclear weapons program and civilian use of nuclear energy

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As soon as nuclear bombs became known, both nuclear weapons and nuclear energy drew significant attention in many countries. Immediately after the Smyth Report came out, discussions around peaceful use of nuclear energy in the US began.

Studies of military and civilian use of nuclear energy started in Sweden even before the end of 1945. In November 1945, the Atomic Committee (Atomkommittén, AC) was founded. AC was an advisory committee of experts with the mission to work out a defence plan and outline the alternative pathways for the development of civilian nuclear program (nuclear energy). In 1947, the government established the atomic energy company AB Atomenergi, 57 percent owned by the Government and the remaining 43 percent owned by a number of private companies active in the mining, steel and manufacturing industries. The company's task was to develop civilian nuclear power.[8]

Even though much of the military research was kept in secret, it seems that the connection between the military and civilian projects initially was not controversial, and necessary because of the lack of available resources and expertise. AB Atomenergi had a close relationship with FOA from the start, and signed a co-operation agreement in 1948. The FOA had already established a research area south of Stockholm (FOA Grindsjön) that became the epicentre for military research and development (R&D).[9] Thus, the Swedish nuclear program emerged as a joint government-business venture quite distinct from other nuclear weapon programs - traditionally solely state-run.[9] When the anti-nuclear weapons movement began to gain influence during the late 1950s and became stronger during the 1960s, the connection between military and civilian nuclear research become viewed with suspicion.

Beginning of the nuclear program

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Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces Nils Swedlund and Chief of Staff Richard Åkerman on their first day in office on April 1, 1951
Timeline of the Swedish nuclear weapons program
Year Event
1945 The United States tries to gain a monopoly over Swedish uranium assets.
Atomic bombs are dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
National Defence Research Institute (FOA) is assigned to conduct investigative mission, to collect the existing data on the nuclear issue.
Atomic Commission is founded.
1947 AB Atomenergi is founded.
1948 FOA is assigned to explore the possibilities for nuclear weapons acquisition in Sweden - the actual start of the nuclear weapons program.
1952 Air Force Chief Bengt Nordenskiöld makes public statement on Swedish nuclear weapons.
1953 The United States launches the Atoms for Peace program.
1954 Report by the Commander-in-Chief takes a formal position on nuclear weapons.
The first Swedish reactor R1 is set in operation.
The first Swedish contemplations about whether to purchase nuclear weapons from the US.
1955 The first detailed drafts of Swedish nuclear warhead are completed.
The Social Democratic government proves to be divided over the nuclear question.
Sweden and US conclude the first cooperation agreement on civilian nuclear energy.
1956 A government report suggests that Sweden invests in nuclear energy based on the domestic fuel cycle, the so-called “Swedish line.”
1957 Report by the Commander-in-Chief features a clear position on Swedish nuclear weapons.
The public debate on nuclear weapons takes off.
AB Atomenergi purchases American materials for the Ågesta site to accelerate the civilian nuclear energy program. However, guarantees that it would not be used for nuclear weapons purposes hamper plutonium supplies for the nuclear weapons program.
Swedish contemplations at ambassador's level over the opportunity to purchase nuclear weapons from the United States.
1958 FOA presents two alternative research programs: defense research (S-program) and nuclear explosive devices research (L-program).
First studies of solely military reactors are presented – to insure the plutonium production.
Commander-in-Chief in his annual defense budget report calls on the Government to officially choose the L-program although the Minister of Defense advised against it because of the serious split in the Social Democratic party.
Government rejects the request for the L-program, but recommends funding of S-program under another scheme. The parliament approves this decision.
1959 A working group with the Social Democratic Party offers a compromise in the form of enhanced defense research with preservation of the freedom of action.
1960 The Social Democratic Party Congress accepts the offer of compromise, and the Government issues directives with the suggested conditions.
The United States decides neither to sell nuclear weapons to Sweden nor to support Swedish domestic nuclear development.
Due to the problems with plutonium supply, the cost estimates for Swedish nuclear weapons acquisition increase remarkably.
1961 Nils Swedlund's retirement is followed by the first skeptical views on Swedish nuclear weapons acquisition within the Swedish Ministry of Defense.
1962 The Commander-in-Chief's 1962 report is still in favor of Swedish nuclear weapons, yet not as pronounced as the 1957 report.
Sweden begins to take an active stance in the international negotiations on non-proliferation. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is established.
1965 The 1965 report supports the initiative of Swedish nuclear weapons, but does not contain any concrete proposals on their implementation.
1966 Sweden abandons the freedom of action doctrine, and begins pushing for a non-proliferation agreement.
1967 Sweden begins phasing-out nuclear weapons research.
1968 Sweden ratifies the NPT[10] and terminates its nuclear research with the exception of actual defense research.
1972 Termination of nuclear program is complete as the plutonium laboratory is shut down.[10]
1974 Ågesta reactor is permanently shut down.
2012 3.3 kg plutonium and 9 kg of uranium are exported to the US as part of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.[11]

In October 1945, FOA made a request for additional funding for studies of nuclear weapons. The funding was eventually granted. Beginning in 1946, Sweden quickly established a well-organized and well-funded nuclear weapons research program (under guise of "civilian defence research") divided into five distinct areas: research, plutonium production, construction funding for reactors and enrichment facilities, acquisition of delivery systems, and testing and assembly of nuclear weapons.[12] The Department of Nuclear Physics was founded in early 1946 within FOA's department of Physics (FOA 2), and by mid-1946 there were about 20 FOA-researchers and similar number of external researchers engaged in research on nuclear weapons or nuclear energy. Sweden found itself in a favorable position as it was, and still is, very rich in natural uranium. However, the ore grade is quite low (mostly shale), and therefore requires extensive mining and milling. The natural uranium was subsequently supposed to be reprocessed and used as a fuel in the reactors (plutonium recycling).

In 1947, AB Atomenergi (AE) was founded under initiative of the Atom Committee with the goal of building experimental reactors and developing methods to extract uranium from low-grade Swedish deposits for both civilian and military needs. Since 1948, a division of functions occurred between FOA and AB Atomenergi. AE focused on developing methods to separate plutonium from uranium and fission products (reprocessing) in order to allow the plutonium to be used as fuel in the reactors (plutonium recycling). This procedure would enable a more efficient use of the natural uranium.[13] While FOA's uranium activities were carried out, a collaboration agreement was drawn up (with final approval by the Government in 1950) to make sure that military research could benefit from the recently launched civilian nuclear activities.[14]

The actual start of the nuclear weapons program occurred in 1948. In February, the FOA's board decided to turn defence research toward work on nuclear weapons, perhaps because of the divisions that occurred between FOA and AB Atomenergi. Only a few days after the decision, the Supreme Commander, Nils Swedlund, assigned the FOA to explore possibilities for Sweden to acquire nuclear weapons. The exploration was carried out quickly, and on 4 May 1948, the report was finalized with Gustaf Ljunggren (Chief of FOA 1, Department of Chemistry) and Torsten Magnusson (Chief of FOA 2) as signatories. Central in the investigation was that they advocated for investing in nuclear weapons based on plutonium rather than on highly enriched uranium (U-235) since the uranium option turned out to be technically more difficult. The investigation also included a summarized plan for a Swedish nuclear weapons project with primary estimates of time and expenses. According to the report, the time framework was determined by the installation of reactors, mining of the raw material for them and production of plutonium in the reactors rather than the construction of the nuclear weapon itself. The contributing factor for this estimate was the misestimated critical mass of a plutonium pit, believing it to be 20–50 kg instead of the actual 6 kg.[15]

Basic materials

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Plutonium ring

In order to create the plutonium needed for nuclear weapons, the plan was to run heavy water reactors where uranium would be turned into plutonium-239 (Pu-239). The basic materials needed in large amounts included, uranium, heavy water, and graphite, materials hard to obtain because of American export controls established to prevent other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Significant amounts of uranium existed as admixture in the Swedish black shale deposits that had already been used during WWII by Swedish shale oil companies to produce fuel, whose strategic value was first realized following Allied propositions.[1] Ranstad was projected to be a major source of uranium.[16]

Under secrecy, Sweden purchased five tons of heavy water from Norway. Later, they planned to produce heavy water at a plant in Ljungaverk. Acquisition of graphite was thought to be straightforward. Access to the required amount of plutonium remained the key technological question throughout the entire Swedish nuclear weapons program.

Already in Autumn 1948, criticism came out in a joint statement by AB Atomenergi and Atom Commission. The FOA reports predicted a military monopoly over Swedish uranium resources to the detriment of civilian research, and that much larger resources were being assigned to plutonium production. The feasibility of the plutonium project was under question. That was the first sign of antagonism of interests between military and civilian nuclear proponents. The plans had been predicated on the idea that each nuclear device required 50 kg rather than 6 kg of plutonium. None of those involved in the project realized that this was, in fact, an overestimation. Although the program was scaled to produce 5-10 weapons per year, given the estimated production of 1 kg of Pu-239 per day, it was actually scaled to produce sixty.[17]

1950s: The Government favors nuclear program

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Bengt Nordenskiöld, 1941

In the early 1950s, the rivalry between the United States and the USSR accelerated markedly. Nuclear arms production proliferation increased as significantly as the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear bomb in 1949, and in 1953, their first hydrogen bomb. The Korean War broke out and the US adopted the strategy of massive retaliation following any use of nuclear weapons. This policy boosted the strategic value of Scandinavia as a potential location for strategic bombers within striking distance of the USSR.

In 1952, Air Force Chief Bengt Nordenskiöld proposed that Sweden should move beyond the defensive research on nuclear weapons and their effects. FOA researched the potential acquisition of nuclear weapons. In 1954, Nils Swedlund, Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces, publicly declared that nuclear weapons were crucial for the country's national security. The 1954 report discussed new kinds of weapons including autonomous weapons, electronic warfare, and NBC (Nuclear/Biological/Chemical) weapons. Swedlund wrote in the preface to the report that Sweden needed protection and countermeasures against those new weapons, and needed to acquire the most appropriate and feasible ones for Sweden itself.[18] It was also emphasized that Sweden's nonaligned status implied that Sweden, unlike neighboring NATO-members, Denmark and Norway, did not benefit from any nuclear weapons guarantees from a superpower. In his assessment, Sweden's position between two superpowers and the rapidly changing technological environment, argued for Swedish possession of nuclear weapons.[19] Although the Defence Ministry and Supreme Commander avoided laying out any concrete plans for nuclear weapons acquisition in the 1954 report, even Sweden's official military publications were openly advocating nuclear armament. Although two years earlier, Air Force Chief Bengt Nordenskiöld had already advocated for Swedish possession of nuclear weapons, his comments were understood to be personal opinion and did not stoke much debate at the time.[20]

The R1 nuclear reactor below the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm, Sweden.

The Swedish parliament decided to carry out the heavy water program aimed at producing reactors loaded with natural uranium. The program was called den svenska linjen ("the Swedish line"), and was one of the largest industrial projects in Swedish history.[13] Another feature of the Sweden's nuclear policy was that the program remain mostly under state control.

The "Swedish line" included the following design principles: to use natural uranium as fuel since Sweden had an abundant stock of uranium; to use heavy water instead of light water as a moderator; to be able to refuel the reactor so that the used fuel can be replaced by the Plutonium isotope composition at certain phase of the process. [21][unreliable source?]

The first Swedish nuclear reactor, R1, was started in 1951 and it was placed in a dug out cavern below the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm. It was a small experimental reactor with a thermal power of 1 MW. The purpose of R1 was not to produce power or plutonium but to gain insight into reactor physics.[21][unreliable source?] Also, the uranium extraction site in Kvarntorp reached its intended production capacity. In 1953, the Swedish scientists realized that the critical mass for the plutonium fueled nuclear weapons had been overestimated and the figure was reduced down to 5–10 kg in a report by Sigvard Eklund, which meant that the production requirement for plutonium was significantly less than it was earlier anticipated. In 1955, FOA concluded that Sweden would be able to produce nuclear weapons once it had a plutonium reactor.[13]

In 1956 a second reactor, R2, was bought from the United States under bilateral safeguards. A third reactor, better known as Ågesta, was designed as a dual-use facility to produce electricity and a small amount of plutonium in a crisis. In 1957, FOA suggested using Ågesta to produce a small number of weapons quickly. A fourth power reactor, Marviken, was set to produce larger quantities of nuclear fuel for an arsenal of 100 weapons. In May 1957, the Supreme Commander gave FOA the task of carrying out a new study of the possibilities to produce nuclear weapons focused on the plutonium option.[13] Marviken was located approximately 150 km away from Stockholm. Initially it was designed as 100 MW pressurized heavy water reactor that had a secondary circuit, where steam is produced from plain water. In the meantime, parallel to the pressurized reactor, a larger and more complicated design of reactor was under way. The alternative construction included superheating mechanism, internal reshuffling machine, and a complex process of boiling water, which ultimately complicated design and raised serious concerns.[21][unreliable source?]

At a Government meeting in November 1955, the question about acquiring nuclear weapons by Sweden was raised for the first time. The opposition Conservative Party called for procurement of nuclear weapons, raising the public salience of the issue. In the 1955 polls, the majority of the Swedish population, the ruling Social Democrats, and the armed services voted in favor of a Sweden armed with nuclear weapons.[13] The Social Democrats were ambivalent: the majority was skeptical about the nuclear weapons program, whereas their leader and the then Prime Minister Tage Erlander leaned toward the nuclear option. The split in the ruling party became public knowledge. In 1956, an anti-nuclear faction of the party made it clear that they would not support the acquisition of nuclear weapons. As the party's crisis deepened in 1957, the majority of Social Democrats and the electorate apparently favored going nuclear. In 1957, the Supreme Commander in his report took an official position on the acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons by Sweden. That same year, the FOA (upon the Chief's request) undertook a detailed study of what would be needed to develop Swedish plutonium-based nuclear devices with estimates for timeframe and costs. Much was related to studies of plutonium and its properties, research that required very complex and highly protected facilities because of plutonium's many hazards.[22]

Tage Erlander 1952

The official position taken by Swedlund in 1957 brought the nuclear question into the realm of public policy debates in Sweden. Initially, the center-right politicians and the media were mostly positive while the social democrats were largely split. During the events that followed, the Government tried again to avoid taking an explicit position despite the fact that the defence position was laid out based on the Swedlund's position from 1957 and tensions were increasing globally. The pragmatic solution was to not directly invest into the development of Swedish nuclear weapons, but to provide increased funding for defence research in nuclear weapons, and to give the term "nuclear weapons" a very broad interpretation.[23]

Nuclear resistance begins

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Östen Undén

The United States was concerned with the prospect of a nuclear Sweden, which jeopardized the world with further nuclear proliferation. In 1956, the United States and Sweden signed an agreement on civilian nuclear energy cooperation. The two parties agreed to exchange information regarding the construction, operation and development of research reactors. The Swedish government committed itself to providing the AEC with information regarding nuclear energy developments in Sweden.[24] The deal also implied that the US nuclear umbrella would protect Sweden, and so there was no need for any nuclear arms. In May 1956, the National Federation of Social Democratic Women in Sweden took a stand against nuclear weapons, which heretofore had not been a major public issue in Sweden.[25] Swedlund's position became the focal point for an intense debate in the media during 1957. The FOA's chief director, Hugo Larsson, also helped to energize the debate with an interview in Dagens Eko in 1957, in which he said that Sweden had the resources to build nuclear weapons, which could be completed in 1963–1964.[26] Among the proponents of Swedish nuclear weapons program was Dagens Nyheter's chief editor, Herbert Tingsten, and former Social Democratic Defence Minister Per Edvin Sköld.[27] Even the prospective leader of the Liberal People's Party, Per Ahlmark, was an advocate of Swedish nuclear weapons.[28] Many of opponents of Swedish nuclear weapons development were found on the cultural left. The nuclear weapons issue would appear frequently in the press cultural pages. Meanwhile, among the opponents were Inga Thorsson, Ernst Wigforss, and Östen Unden. The editor of Folket i Bild, Per Anders Fogelström, advocated against Swedish nuclear weapons in the magazine, and published a book "Instead of the Atomic Bomb" together with Social Democratic student politician, Roland Morell. In 1957, they launched a petition against Swedish nuclear weapons, that was signed by 95,000 people and was handed over to Tage Erlander in February 1958.[25]

The polls from the 1960s also reflected rising public indignation with the nuclear weapons program. A grass-root movement - "Aktionsgruppen mot svenska atomvapen", AMSA (the Action Group Against Swedish Atomic Bombs) - was founded in the late 1950s, and became very successful in its struggle against Swedish nuclear weapon intentions.[29] Being a member of the U.N. Security Council, Sweden advanced a proposal for a nuclear test moratorium in 1957. "The international disarmament discussions and the nonproliferation norms emerging from the mid-1950s onwards and leading in 1968 to the NPT also affected the Swedish public debate and strengthened the arguments against Swedish nuclear weapons acquisition."[29]

Defence research and design research

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In July 1958, the FOA laid out two different research programs:[30] - "S-program" under the title "Research for Protection and Defence Against Atomic Weapons." - “L-program” entitled “Research for Preparation of Data for the Design of Nuclear Explosive Devices." The draft of the L-program was in essence an update of the data collected for the Supreme Commander a year earlier. The S-program, that emerged now for the first time, was described as a program to develop the knowledge about nuclear weapons which required the creation of Swedish defensive doctrine without nuclear weapons, which would be adopted to fight a war in which a nuclear strike could occur. Despite a completely different description of the purpose, the S-program included similar activities as the L-program, except it was stripped-down to around 75% of the cost. The S-program fit both the Chief's goal to acquire nuclear weapons and the Social Democratic Government's ambivalence, which the FOA under its new chief director, Martin Fehrm, had apparently realized. Thus, with such a proposition, the Government could fund almost all research activities necessary to pursue the Swedish nuclear weapons program, yet it asserted not to do so.

Regardless of the S-program's design, Swedlund decided to get immediate approval for the L-program. In separate discussions between the Chief and defence minister Sven Andersson in Autumn 1958 regarding nuclear weapons and the budget plan for the coming financial years, Andersson made it clear that he favored the acquisition of nuclear weapons, but the split within the Social Democrats was so stark that it was better to not bring up the matter for discussion. Prime Minister Erlander's view was to study the question within the committee of the party and to come up with a proposition by the annual party congress in 1960. Andersson attempted to persuade the Chief to not request budgetary resources for the L-program, because they would likely be rejected. Despite Andersson's suggestions, the Supreme Commander instead opted to include funds for L-program in his fiscal year 1959/1960 budget proposal. Swedlund's diaries and other documents suggest that he had limited understanding of the political game, not least within the parties, even though his own statements in 1957 contributed to the creation of nuclear weapons resistance. He also believed that many of the senior politicians would be able to handle the issue as he desired. His lack of flexibility and belief that personal connections would overcome political opposition ultimately killed his funding request for L-program.[31] While the L-program was left unfunded, FOA was given a large allocation for fiscal year 1959/1960 for "increased research in atomic-, missile-, countermeasure-, and other areas" in which the S-program was relevant.[32]

Freedom of action and enhanced defence research

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Olof Palme headed a parliamentary committee on the "nuclear issue".

In November 1958, Tage Erlander convened a party Atomic Weapons Committee (AWC) where advocates from both sides and military experts got together. The Prime Minister was initially inclined to take the pro-nuclear side, in the meantime he did not want to risk dividing the party over the nuclear issue. The Social Democrats, who kept losing their electorate, had to build a coalition with the adamantly anti-nuclear Communists.[33] Olof Palme was Secretary of the Working Group on the nuclear issue.

Palme presented his report on 12 November 1959. The report suggests that Sweden should choose to maintain its freedom of action, i.e. not to commit to any views in the issue of nuclear weapons acquisition. As a concession to the nuclear opponents, Palme suggested to postpone the final decision on the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Freedom of action should be maintained through continued nuclear weapons research and a clear demonstration to the nuclear weapons supporters that the research would not imply any real delay as the civil nuclear program had been pursued in parallel to the military program for several years. The research was not explicitly promoted as a replacement for L-program, rather it was promoted as "expanded defence research". This report implied that the drafted 1958 S-program could be continued and in fact moved even closer to the L-program in scope.[34] The leadership of the Social Democratic party adopted the working group's line on 14 December 1959, so did the Party Congress in 1960.[35] The Government Directive to FOA was issued on 17 June 1960.[36] As a result, in 1958, the Swedish government prohibited research and development (R&D) of nuclear weapons. Regardless, research activities related to how best to defend against a nuclear weapons attack were continued.[33]

In talks between Prime Minister Erlander and Supreme Commander Swedlund in 1959, Erlander confirmed that the program on enhanced defence research would give results with regard to the warhead design. He emphasized, however, that he was uncertain about the effect it would have on the nuclear weapons issue and would delay the final decision on production until closer to the estimated date of completion in 1963.[34] Thus, Palme preferred to postpone the crucial decision for years, with the goal of avoiding a serious split in the party, as opposed to a difficult compromise necessary to satisfy the desires of both sides for the long run. The implication of this doctrine meant that almost any nuclear weapons research could be pursued under the terms "defence research" and "freedom of action", while the Social Democratic leadership and the government had partially included the nuclear opponents’ lines in their public declarations. With the nuclear opponents essentially co-opted, AMSA's activity was diminished, and the Swedish peace movement started focusing primarily on advocating reduction of nuclear arsenals in the major nuclear powers. When the government brought up the issue in 1961, Erlander said that he himself now swung in the negative direction regarding the nuclear program, as compared to his views 3–4 years earlier, which he had never announced publicly. The decision that was expected to be made in the coming years remained suspended. The research was continued and the freedom of action doctrine was intact. Erlander's scientific adviser, Torsten Gustafson, was one of those advocating for the continued investment in research.[37]

The civilian research and nuclear weapons programs diverge

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US President Dwight D. Eisenhower

Following the 1956 decision regarding Sweden's roadmap towards nuclear power, the civilian nuclear program began to outpace the military nuclear program. This was in spite of the fact that the "Swedish line" was adopted partially to maintain Sweden's Freedom of action with respect to nuclear weapons development. The two programs diverged for multiple reasons. Although AB Atomenergi was part of the nuclear weapons program, its primary goal was to develop nuclear reactors suitable for power production, in the process staying ahead of energy suppliers such as Vattenfall and Asea. In the early 1950s, Sweden also gained access to American knowledge regarding nuclear technology. American President Dwight D. Eisenhower launched the Atoms for Peace program in his speech in December 1953. In 1955, the program was followed by the publication of a large amount of documents at the International Conference on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy in Geneva.

Through this program, Sweden was able to obtain materials from America both faster and cheaper than had it relied on internal production.[38] However, such access required comprehensive assurances that the materials were used only for civil purposes.[39] On 1 July 1955, the first agreement was signed between Sweden and the United States regarding nuclear material. A second agreement on cooperation in civil nuclear research was signed on 18 January 1956. As a result, Sweden got access to some previously classified materials, and the opportunity to import small amounts of enriched uranium and heavy water at prices lower than those from Norway. The agreement required guarantees that the materials would not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or for any other military purposes.[40]

The safeguards that AB Atomenergi issued for the R3 reactor (Ågestaverket) in 1957 implied challenges for the nuclear weapons program. It was not started up until 1963, and was put under bilateral safeguards according to an April 1958 agreement with the United States because it was to use U.S.-supplied fuel. The main source was supposed to be the Marviken reactor. However, Marviken's reactor design was found to be poor and work was abandoned in 1970.[41] From 1959 onwards, Swedish interest in pursuing a uranium mill at Ranstad (the construction of which was decided in 1958 and scheduled to open in 1963) and a domestic supply of heavy water declined. The idea of domestic supply of nuclear fuel and other strategic materials was thus gradually abandoned and the Swedish contribution to "the Swedish line" came to be limited down to the design and construction of nuclear reactors.[42]

Plutonium problem

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Control room in Ågesta

As the civilian nuclear program pursued energy, the problem of getting access to plutonium, for both research and subsequent production of nuclear weapons, loomed as the biggest technical problem for the nuclear weapons program. For many research purposes, such as metallurgy, plutonium containing more than 7% Pu-240 could be used, although this isotopic mixture could not be used as weapons-grade plutonium. Plutonium of this composition could be obtained relatively easily from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel from civilian reactors. However, to do so would require explicit violation of the agreed upon safeguards. A prerequisite for such activities would be conducting the nuclear reprocessing solely in Sweden, although the capacity to do so did not exist when reactor R3 was put into operation.[42] Thus, Reactor R3 was less useful to the nuclear weapons program than it was originally intended.

As a result, in 1957 the Swedish Government started to study the opportunity to set up and operate one or possibly two purely military reactors for plutonium production located in caverns. In July 1958, upon the study the AB Atomenergi and FOA concluded that a military reactor, using aluminum fuel elements and heavy water as moderator, would lead to lower costs of production than if they used civil reactors. However, that kind of reactor would require significant investments, and because of its proposed underground location, it would take 4.5 years to build the reactor.[43] The decreased civilian interest in domestic supply of raw materials resulted in revision of plans to build nuclear weapons facilities in Sweden in 1959 and 1960. However, now they required a uranium facility, heavy water reactor, and reprocessing plant to be able to supply plutonium. This led to a sharp increase in time and cost estimates.[42] These facilities were included in none of the 1958 drafts, – neither in the S- nor L- programs. Thus their funding was not included in the program for extended defence research approved by the Government. The Ministry of Defence and FOA's assessment of the situation in 1961 concluded that it was solely plutonium supply that was the limiting factor[36] for the nuclear weapons program. From 1961 onwards, the Ministry of Defence announced that the program's schedule was postponed for this reason.[44] The only plutonium that ever existed in Sweden was 100 grams received from the United Kingdom for research purposes. After Sweden gave up the idea of domestic plutonium production, the work was handed over to the Institute of Atom Energy (IFA) in Kjeller, Norway.[45]

Pondering over purchases of nuclear material from the United States

[edit]
MGR-1 Honest John missile and launcher
Cut-away model of the W48 artillery shell

In 1954, when the Supreme Commander advocated for Swedish nuclear weapons, internal production was not the only option considered. An agreement with Western powers that would quickly come to Sweden's aid, or a purchase of a small number of nuclear weapons from the West, most likely the US, were options also considered. The latter option appeared to be the best from both time and cost perspective, as far as it was possible. After 1954, the Swedish Government made inroads regarding the possibility of purchasing nuclear weapons from the US. The Swedish Government knew that American legislation forbid such exports but they hoped to be favorably treated, regardless of the fact that they were not a NATO member-state. The Swedish Government believed the US would be interested in a well-defended Sweden as a bulwark against Soviet aggression.[45]

FOA's Torsten Magnusson met with the American envoy Howard A. Robinson in November 1954, and Malte Jacobsson from the Atom Committee talked to Lewis Strauss from Atomic Energy Commission in April 1955. Sweden indicated that it would be interested in purchasing approximately 25 nuclear devices.[45] In 1957, Ambassador Erik Boheman raised the question at the US State Department, while the Swedish Ministry of Defence inquired about sending Swedish officers to train on the use of nuclear weapons. Boheman also mentioned that Denmark and Norway had already purchased weapons systems that could carry nuclear warheads, although neither country had devices to deploy on such systems. The American response was dismissive because Sweden, as a non-NATO state, did not have any mutual defence agreement with the US, which was a requirement in American law to even consider nuclear weapons cooperation. The message was clear - if Sweden reconsidered its nonalignment policy, the US would consider a new request from Sweden, otherwise discussions would be fruitless. Analysis from the US State Department in 1959, showed that Sweden did not have to be a NATO-member for the proposed nuclear weapons sales, but it had to, at the very minimum, have an agreement with the US regarding use of nuclear weapons, which would imply Sweden renouncing nonalignment. On 6 April 1960, the United States National Security Council decided that the Americans should not support the Swedish ownership of nuclear weapons, nor did it approve of the idea of a Swedish nuclear weapons program. The US Government believed that Western interests would be best served against the Soviet Union if Sweden invested its limited resources in conventional weapons, rather than an expensive nuclear weapons program.[46]

In 1960, while Sweden was deciding on its stance toward nuclear weapons, Swedish representatives, through their contacts with the American Department of Defence gained access to some secret information in the late 1960s. This information included nuclear weapons tactics, reconnaissance requirements, ideas regarding the necessity of quick decision-making, and nuclear physics data.[47] Swedish representatives also looked at the MGR-1 Honest John weapons system that could utilize W7 or W31 nuclear warheads. For artillery purposes, the US developed a W48 projectile for 155 mm artillery with 0.072 kiloton effect. Any plans for such a small Swedish nuclear device have never been recovered.

Planned nuclear devices

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Schematic design of a 1956 Swedish atomic bomb (which was never built)

The planned Swedish bombs intended to utilize Pu-239 as the fissile material. When the early drafts (circa 1955) were replaced by the more concrete estimates a proposed design, one of the first drafts was a bomb weighing 400–500 kg and 35 cm in diameter. A bomb of those dimensions could have been carried by the A 32 Lansen. A study conducted by the nuclear explosive group in 1961-1962 outlined a plan to acquire 100 tactical nuclear bombs with approximate yields of 20 kt.[48]

Planned delivery systems

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A Saab 32 Lansen at Kristianstad Airshow 2006

In military studies concerning the deployment of nuclear weapons, Swedish plans focused on bombs dropped by ground-attack aircraft. The Swedes planned to have a relatively small number of tactical nuclear weapons; the Saab 36 bomber was supposed to be able to carry an 800 kg free falling nuclear weapon, but development of the aircraft was cancelled in 1957.[49] Thus, it was the Air Force's most modern fighter-bomber that was intended to carry nuclear weapons as well as other weaponry. Had the program followed its original schedule, the Saab A32 Lansen would have been the relevant platform. According to the revised schedule in which nuclear weapons would have appeared first in the 1970s, the AJ 37 Viggen would have also been relevant.

Bandkanon 1

The studies of nuclear payloads also briefly discussed the possibility of using land-based missiles with a range of about 100 km, as well as nuclear-armed torpedoes. The most likely configuration would have been Sjöormen-class submarine firing modified Torped 61 torpedoes. Little else is known about these alternative plans, since the Swedish program focused mainly on bombs dropped by aircraft.[50] From 1957 to 1959, Saab developed Robot 330, a land attack missile with 500 km range, which was designed to carry nuclear warheads.[51] The project was shut down due to excessive costs.

Some other types of weapons outlined and developed during the 1950—60s were designed as carriers for nuclear weapons – among them, the Saab A36, a strategic bomber, Bandkanon 1, a 155 mm artillery piece, and Robot 08, an anti-ship missile. These claims have been circulating since the times when the defence studies were still classified. There were certainly first drafts concerning the physical shape of Swedish nuclear weapon when the Saab A36 was under development, but the project A36 was soon abandoned in favor of the Saab AJ 37 Viggen when the first detailed military (rather than merely physical or technical) studies were conducted in 1961–62. Thus, even if the A36 was not designed to be an integral part of the nuclear weapons program itself, it was constructed specifically as a nuclear weapons carrier. A36 pilots were to specialize in this task.[52]

As for Robot 08, the previously classified documents provide no support for the claim that something other than aerial bombs would have been prioritized. Nuclear-armed anti-ship missiles (as the RBS-15 is believed to have such a non-conventional option capability), as well as nuclear-armed torpedoes, would primarily have been targeted at naval transportation. However, the study of nuclear devices came to the conclusion that a bomb dropped in the home port would have the greatest impact. At sea, naval fleets would be dispersed to reduce casualties from nuclear attack.[50] Statements about plans on nuclear ammunition for 155 mm Swedish artillery greater than 25 km range should be viewed with even greater skepticism. Since the US developed nuclear ammunition for its 155 mm artillery and the USSR developed ammunition for its 152 mm, certainly a Swedish device was technically possible. The only American type of device of this calibre that was actually completed, W48, had only a 72-ton yield even though it required as much plutonium as a significantly higher yielding device. Explosives with greater effect were primarily used in artillery with 203 mm and 280 mm barrels. These artillery projectiles used a different design principal, linear implosion instead of a traditional spherical implosion bomb. Such designs sacrificed efficiency and yield to reduce the payload's diameter. Since Sweden's plutonium supply was always a limiting factor in its nuclear program, and cost-effectiveness was a concern, it is unlikely that Sweden would have sacrificed multiple aerial bombs to build one battlefield device, especially when taking into account the reduced yield and additional development expenses.

Intended employment of nuclear weapons

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Harbour and shipyard in Gdańsk - were considered as a potential target on the Baltic Sea

From the beginning, the Swedes dismissed the opportunity to acquire their own strategic nuclear forces that could reach an adversary's major population centers, because Sweden had no strategic bombers. Instead, the Swedish Government sought to develop tactical nuclear weapons to be used against militarily significant targets in Sweden's neighboring countries, in the event of war. The prime example of such a target could be enemy ports on the Baltic Sea, another such target could be enemy air bases.[48] As most ports were located in close proximity to civilian population centers, they too would suffer if Swedish nuclear weapons were used. With this in mind, the Ministry of Defence arrived at the conclusion that any such use would have major political consequences, even if the device employed was a tactical rather than strategic nuclear weapon.[48]

The Swedish Government intended to possess tactical nuclear weapons primarily as a deterrent against attacks on Sweden. Assuming the aggressor was not deterred, they would have been forced to make significant tactical adjustments due to the risk of being subject to nuclear attack. Much of the tactical adjustments would have largely been the commitment of a larger amount of time and resources to the attack. In this respect, the possession of nuclear weapons would help to restore balance of conventional forces.[53] In order to prevent the elimination of nuclear striking ability by a surprise attack, the Swedish Government outlined a system where the majority of warheads would be stored divided amongst heavily defended caverns, and the rest would move between airbases. These plans were named as "Ahasverus system" and can be compared to the idea of second-strike capability.[54]

The shift in opinion at the ministry of defence

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Saab JA 37 37447 Swedish Air Force

After the ardent nuclear advocate Nils Swedlund retired and turned the post of Supreme Commander over to Torsten Rapp, some officials in the Ministry of Defence began to express doubts regarding the nuclear weapons program. This can be understood in light of delays caused by plutonium enrichment challenges and growing cost estimates. The first skeptical views came from the Air Force and were announced in 1961 by Air Chief of Staff Stig Norén to his counterparts in other branches of the military and to the elected Defence Chief of Staff, Carl Eric Almgren in connection with the preparation work for the 1962 report. As result, a special working group, the nuclear explosive group, was formed under the leadership of Colonel Åke Mangård. This group worked from June 1961 until February 1962 and conducted comprehensive analyses of the consequences and the military value of possession of nuclear weapons. Through influence of the Air Force, the 1962 report expressed a more ambivalent position towards nuclear weapons than the 1957 report, though it was still largely positive.[55]

It may seem paradoxical that the Air Force changed opinion on nuclear weapons given the expansion of the relative importance of the US Air Force following America's adoption of nuclear weapons.[56] At the time, however, the Air Force was facing an expensive acquisition of the Saab 37 Viggen, and feared that a full-scale nuclear weapons program would compete with it for resources. One of the points that Norén wanted to investigate was what conventional forces Sweden could acquire if it decided not to develop nuclear weapons. It was the plan that the United States suggested Sweden to follow in 1960.[57] However, it remains unclear whether or not this suggestion influenced Sweden's defence officials.

The rumor that Swedlund was replaced by an Air Force officer sometimes arises given that the Ministry of Defence chose to prioritize new aircraft over nuclear weapons. Some have pointed out that the increase in flexibility was likely due to replacing Swedlund with somebody new, as his successor did not have a strong opinion one way or the other.[55] In the 1965 report, the Supreme Commander took another step away from assuming a nuclear armed Sweden. Although they were still advocating for Swedish nuclear weapons in general terms, they were no longer emphasized in defence planning. They felt that there was an imminent risk that Swedish nuclear possession would be prohibited as a result of the ongoing disarmament negotiations. The report also looked favorably on the notion of defending Sweden with modern conventional forces as they now embraced the Margin Doctrine. The Margin Doctrine assumed that an invasion of Sweden would not occur in isolation, but rather as a part of a major conflict; in such a situation, a large power (e.g. the USSR) would be unlikely to deploy its full military forces against Sweden.[58]

The 1980 referendum

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The debate among the major Swedish political parties over the nuclear program had been intensified throughout the 1970s. In 1973, the ruling Center Party declared that it was against Sweden's nuclear power program, thereby letting the coalition government to become a leader in the anti-nuclear movement aimed at the program's complete elimination. The Three Mile Island accident in the United States in 1979 undermined public confidence in the safety of Sweden's nuclear program. The aforementioned political and societal divisions over the Swedish nuclear program led to a referendum on the subject held in 1980.[59] "The referendum was of a non-binding, "advisory" nature and voters who supported nuclear energy were not given the choice to do so. The referendum's result heavily favored option two, 39.1 percent of the votes, and option three, 38.7 percent of the votes, with option three receiving 18.9 percent of the 4.7 million votes cast, representing a 75.7 percent voter turnout."[60] The 1980 referendum induced the Swedish parliament to decide that Sweden's nuclear power program should be "phased-out" by 2010 and no further nuclear power plants should be built. That decision made the Swedish government the first out of five governments that have approved a national nuclear phase-out policy: Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain.[61]

The end of nuclear weapons program and Swedish disarmament policy

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In the late 1950s, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs Östen Undén advocated for the nuclear test ban treaty in the United Nations (UN).[62] Since 1962 Sweden has been actively involved in the international disarmament negotiations. Once the decision to cease offensive nuclear weapons research activities was made, the Swedish government was seeking to create an international legal framework to regulate nuclear weapons-related research and activities. On 4 December 1961, the United Nations General Assembly, based on a Swedish initiative, adopted Resolution 1664 (XVI). The resolution called on the UN Secretary-General to investigate the circumstances under which non-nuclear weapon states would give up the nuclear option.[63]

In March 1962, Sweden joined seven other neutral countries, members of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, a predecessor to the Conference on Disarmament (CD). In 1968, Sweden signed the Nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and thereby publicly committed itself against the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Shortly after joining the NPT, Sweden became a founding member of the Zangger Committee, which was designed to work out the exact definitions of the material and equipment to be restricted by the NPT. The Committee drafted a "Trigger List" of "source or special fissionable materials" and "equipment or materials specially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of fissile materials".[64] In continuation, Sweden has occupied an active position in generating of new agreements that would control the export of the listed items to non-NPT states. These agreements and Trigger List have subsequently constituted the first major agreement on nuclear export regulations.[65]

The negotiations between the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the US in August 1962 ended in an agreement to abandon all nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater. Leaders of other states were also encouraged to sign the treaty, which came as a surprise to Sweden. After a brief time for consideration, the Swedish government decided to sign the Treaty despite their Freedom of action doctrine. In the meantime, the Treaty did not prohibit underground nuclear tests thus the Freedom of action could be maintained.[66]

After the CTBT entered into force in 1963, the FOA was assigned to build a seismographic complex to monitor the compliance with the treaty. The Swedish negotiators were quiet on the question of non-proliferation for years, particularly in view of the Swedish freedom of action doctrine. Until 1965, there was an official directive to not raise the issue. The situation changed in early 1966. In March 1966, Undersecretary of the Defence Department Karl Frithiofson in his speech before the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences publicly announced that it was of no interest to Sweden to acquire nuclear weapons, which was a slight difference from the Freedom of action doctrine.[67]

Reasons to abandon nuclear program

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Firstly, it appeared increasingly problematic to find room for a nuclear weapons program in the defence economy; secondly, the situation was proving that future wars would be likely waged with conventional weapons (especially, after studying the NATO's flexible response doctrine); thirdly, it was decided (yet unclear how) that Sweden was covered by the US nuclear umbrella.[68] Just before the Government's position became known, the Defence Ministry announced that Sweden's security would be undermined if the country joined the non-proliferation agreement, because the treaty addressed small countries that hadn't acquired any nuclear weapons yet, while the US and the Soviet Union's nuclear possessions remained untouched. Thus, Sweden was under risk to yield its Freedom of action to nothing in return, while the nuclear threat against the country would remain.[67]

The United States was not particularly in favor of a nuclear Sweden. The cooperation agreement between Sweden and the United States, that established bilateral safeguards for Swedish nuclear installations, forbade Sweden from using equipment and materials to develop nuclear weapons. In the meantime, the use of U.S. uranium would mean accepting inspection requirements, which would prevent the uranium in question from being used for weapons production. The more Sweden's research in nuclear weapons was becoming dependent on U.S. military assistance, the more the United States was willing to steer Sweden away from implementing its plans to create a nuclear weapon.[69]

Finally, Swedish politicians and diplomats across party lines have been very outspoken about nonproliferation and disarmament. The most well-known individuals include Dr. Hans Blix, Rolf Ekéus, and Henrik Salander, who have chaired, or currently chair, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, the United Nations Special Commission, and the Middle Powers Initiative, respectively. Additionally, the late Anna Lindh, Sweden's former minister for foreign affairs, took the lead in promotion of non-proliferation policy, which eventually affected the European Union's strategy to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Lindh also instigated the International WMD Commission, chaired by Blix, which in 2006 released its study, which offers over 60 recommendations on how to reduce the threat posed by WMD.[69] The negotiations resulted in the non-proliferation treaty, which was ready for signature in 1968. Sweden signed the treaty on 19 August 1968, immediately after West Germany had done the same.[70]

Karl Frithiofson in his speech in March 1966 announced that Sweden gave up its plans to acquire nuclear weapons, which in its turn put the end to the freedom of action doctrine. In 1968, the doctrine was turned into defence investigation, and with the signature of the NPT in 1968 FOA began the process of dismantling of nuclear-weapons related research.[67]

Disarmament of Swedish nuclear sites

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The roll-up of FOA's nuclear weapons research started in 1967 while the shift to another defence research direction (conventional weapons-related) occurred. From 1968 onward, the remained nuclear weapons-related research focused on security issues, whereas the activities directly related to the nuclear program were completed in 1972. The plutonium laboratory in Ursvik was shut down.[71]

Reactor R2 went critical in 1960. In 1963, FOA halted criticality experiments, and by July 1972, even theoretical research using its acquired plutonium was shut down. Earlier, primarily due to cost, Sweden opted to use U.S.-designed light water reactors using imported enriched uranium in lieu of heavy water reactors operating on indigenous uranium. Also, the Swedish supreme commander announced that the country abandoned the nuclear option in 1965. Another key event was an electrical problem at the Ågesta that jeopardized the reactor's cooling system. Although a meltdown was averted, the Swedish government was informed. The public, however, was kept in the dark until 1993, as the government was afraid that such a disclosure would endanger public support for nuclear energy.[61] The year 1974 also marked the final disassembly of all plutonium facilities and a reorganization of FOA that dispersed its nuclear expertise. The Ågesta reactor was permanently shut down. Vattenfall, the contractor responsible for the Marviken reactor, became increasingly skeptical of the project's chances for success. Two key areas were mentioned: the idea of using superheated water and the reshuffling machine. Additionally, it became apparent that the plant would not satisfy the safety standards established by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in the late 1960s. By 1969, the plans to build a superheated reactor were scrapped.[21]

The first commercial nuclear power plant Oskarshamn 1 was commissioned in 1972 and was followed by another eleven units sited at Barsebäck, Oskarshamn Ringhals and Forsmark in the time period up to 1985. The twelve commercial reactors constructed in Sweden comprise 9 BWRs (ASEA-ATOM design) and 3 PWRs (Westinghouse design).[72] In 2004, Studsvik Nuclear (an institute established in 1958 for the Swedish nuclear program with research reactors) decided to permanently shut down the two research reactors (R2 and R2–0) at the Studsvik site. They were closed in June 2005. "The decision was taken on economical grounds, the licenses had recently been extended until 2014, subject to certain conditions. The reactors were mainly used for commercial materials testing purposes, isotope production, neutron source for research purposes, medical applications and higher education. They are currently under decommissioning."[73] Foreign observers judged that Swedish nuclear capabilities reached a very advanced level and that, at the end of its nuclear program, Sweden was technically capable of building a nuclear weapon within a short time.[74]

After the nuclear weapons program: defence research and support for disarmament

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Nuclear weapons related activity, however, continued at FOA even after the dismantling was completed in 1972, but to a much lesser extent. Resources in 1972 amounted about the third of the stock in 1964–1965.[71] Actual defence research on nuclear weapons effects continued. It did not include design research or any part of the Freedom of action doctrine. Paradoxically, that part of the nuclear research was given a low priority because "defence research" was merely a politically correct name. The remaining technical expertise in construction of nuclear weapons was later utilized in different disarmament contexts.

Sweden and non-proliferation movement

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In 1974, a multilateral export control regime — the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was created as a successor to the Zangger Committee. The NSG established general guidelines on nuclear transfers and dual-use technologies to further restrict the management of nuclear exports. Sweden as well as seven other states (Belgium, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Switzerland), joined the NSG between 1976 and 1977.[33]

In 1980, Prime Minister Olof Palme established the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, also known as the Palme Commission. The Commission favored the demilitarization of space, the elimination of chemical arms from Europe, and the reduction of conventional weapons. The commission also advocated negotiations in Europe to reduce political tensions among the states and political actors that could have a potential for military conflict.[75] In the early 1980s, Sweden was one of 58 nations signatory to the convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. In compliance with the convention, Sweden adopted the Nuclear Activities Act and the Nuclear Activities Ordinance in 1984. The Acts were designed to prevent unlawful dealings with nuclear material and thereby ensure the safety of nuclear activities.[76]

By 1984, Sweden had signed and ratified the Antarctic Treaty. The Treaty was established in 1961 to ban all military activity in Antarctica. The Antarctic Treaty was not, however, the first "nonarmament" treaty that Sweden signed. Previously it had participated in the establishment of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967, which restricts the placement of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction in space.[33] The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster evoked fears of radiation and safety. As a reaction to it, the Social Democratic-led Swedish government set 1995/1996 as years to start the implementation of a phase-out plan, including the shut-down of two nuclear reactors.[77] Additionally, in 1999 and 2005 two other nuclear reactors (Barsebäck I and Barsebäck II, respectively) were closed. In 1992, in order to improve safety of Russian nuclear power plants, Sweden started cooperating with Russia on nuclear safety, radiation protection, nonproliferation, and proper nuclear waste management.[78]

Sweden has also been an active participant at various international nonproliferation and disarmament meetings throughout the years. In 1998, Sweden was a founding member of the "New Agenda Coalition" (NAC). NAC called on the nuclear weapon states to commit to their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the NAC proposed the "13 steps" thereby breaking the meeting's deadlock. The "13 steps" provided a series of steps to meet the disarmament obligations contained in Article VI.[33] Regarding the challenges of the phasing-out of nuclear energy in Sweden, the International Energy Agency's (IEA) 2004 review of Swedish energy policies called on Sweden to consider the costs of replacing nuclear power and the potential implications for energy security, greenhouse gas emissions, and economic growth.[79]

However, regardless of potential risks associated with nuclear plants, the IEA's 2004 and 2008 reviews of Swedish energy policy elicited that abolishing nuclear energy would be very difficult, as around 45% of electricity in Sweden originates from nuclear power. It also assumed that in the post-Kyoto period targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions would be stricter.[80] In the meantime, with years public opinion against nuclear energy has diminished. In 2009, 62 percent of Swedes supported a Swedish nuclear program. Only 19 percent was against.[81] As a result, the phase-out policy was abandoned in early 2009.

Documents from the nuclear weapons program

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According to the Swedish rules of secrecy, classified documents can be released after 40 years. Many documents on the Swedish nuclear program's development phase and most intensive periods had therefore been gradually opened to public during the 1990s, and laid the foundation for studies for such experts as Wilhelm Agrell and Thomas Jonter. Certain documents that are still classified can only be released after 70 years – thus, these documents on the Swedish nuclear program are not publicly available yet.

Controversies around activities after 1985

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In 1985, newspaper Ny Teknik published some articles on the Swedish nuclear weapons acquisition and some facts that were previously unknown. The newspaper presented them as revelations. Ny Teknik argued that activities at FOA continued which appeared to be in direct conflict with the government's decision in 1958.[10] As a result, the government appointed the then Legal Counsel of the Defence Department Olof Forssberg to investigate the issue. Forssberg's investigative work "Swedish nuclear weapons research 1945-1972" was completed in 1987. It concluded that no research had been conducted beyond the approved decision on defence research.[82]

In November 1994, The Washington Post came out with an announcement that Sweden could have kept its nuclear weapons option open on the sly. That statement stemmed from the fact that the R3 reactor in Ågesta facility was still in place, but it was not subject to the ongoing inspection within the NPT framework. The reactor was shut down in 1974, but not dismantled. The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) pointed out that the reason for the facility not to be covered by the inspection was that Sweden signed the NPT in 1975 (not in 1968 when the NPT was ratified). Only then R3 was taken out of service and all fissile material was removed. Since none of the remaining components of the reactor had been maintained since 1974, the site was not viewed as an immediate subject for the SKI inspection.[83]

See also

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References

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Sources

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia

The Swedish nuclear weapons program encompassed a clandestine research and development effort conducted by the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA) from 1945 to 1972, aimed at acquiring indigenous nuclear weapons capability as a strategic deterrent amid tensions and perceived vulnerabilities in Sweden's neutrality policy. Motivated by fears of Soviet expansionism and the limitations of conventional defenses, the program integrated nuclear research with civilian energy initiatives, including uranium prospecting, heavy water reactor construction at Ågesta, and plutonium reprocessing studies, positioning Sweden among a select group of nations capable of weaponizing by the late .
Key advancements included the production of weapons-grade from reactors and exploratory designs for implosion-type devices, tested through large-scale conventional explosives simulations, alongside adaptations of delivery systems such as Saab Lansen aircraft and Bandkanon for potential tactical nuclear roles. Political deliberations under Prime Ministers and weighed security imperatives against ethical concerns and alliance pressures, culminating in the program's termination in 1972, with Sweden ratifying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970 and redirecting resources to peaceful nuclear applications. This decision reflected a strategic pivot toward multilateral advocacy, though declassified archives reveal the depth of prior commitments to nuclear autonomy. The program's legacy underscores Sweden's pragmatic approach to deterrence, where empirical assessments of plutonium yields and reactor efficiencies informed feasibility studies, yet international norms and domestic pacifist sentiments ultimately prevailed over first-order security calculations. Archival evidence from FOA documents, analyzed in post-declassification reviews, highlights systemic underreporting in public discourse, contrasting with biased narratives in some academic and media accounts that downplay the program's technical maturity.

Geopolitical and Strategic Foundations

Pre-World War II Interests and Post-War Motivations

Prior to , Sweden conducted no formal research into nuclear weapons, as the military and destructive potential of atomic fission remained undeveloped and largely theoretical until the Manhattan Project's success. The nation's scientific community, including physicists at institutions like the Royal Institute of Technology, followed international advances in , such as and Strassmann's 1938 discovery of fission, but these efforts focused on fundamental research rather than weaponry. 's policy of armed neutrality, codified since the early , prioritized technological self-reliance in conventional arms to deter aggression without alliances, yet nuclear options were absent from pre-war defense planning amid limited global knowledge of feasibility. Sweden's pre-war uranium resources, estimated at over 500,000 tons in alum shale deposits in the Ranstad region, drew attention for potential industrial uses like fertilizers, but not for until post-war realizations. During the war itself, informal discussions occurred among figures like future Prime Minister and physicist Torsten Gustafson on emerging atomic possibilities, influenced by Allied intelligence leaks, though these yielded no organized program due to secrecy and Sweden's neutrality constraints. Post-World War II motivations crystallized immediately after the atomic bombings of and , prompting Swedish elites to view nuclear arms as essential for preserving neutrality against Soviet expansionism. On August 17, 1945, Defense Staff officer Torsten Schmidt directed the newly formed National Defense Research Institute (FOA, established 1945) to evaluate atomic bomb production feasibility, driven by fears that conventional defenses—Sweden's 700,000-strong mobilized forces in 1940—proved inadequate against modern great-power assaults, as evidenced by wartime violations of Swedish airspace and territorial waters by both Axis and Allied forces. In November 1945, the government created the Atomic Committee (Atomkommittén) under professor Malte Jacobsson, comprising experts like Nobel physicist and , to coordinate military and civilian nuclear studies, reflecting a dual-use strategy for deterrence and . Primary rationales included deterring Soviet invasion—given the Red Army's proximity and 1940s occupations of neighboring —and avoiding entanglement in bipolar alliances, as U.S. policies offered no ironclad guarantees for non-aligned states. Domestic reserves (up to 100,000 tons extractable) and planned heavy-water reactors enabled plutonium production without foreign , aligning with first-order defense needs: a credible second-strike capability to impose unacceptable costs on aggressors, per FOA's early assessments. By 1948, FOA reports affirmed technical viability, citing Sweden's scientific prowess and resources, while emphasizing nuclear weapons' role in compensating for numerical inferiority against the Soviet Union's 5 million troops and growing atomic arsenal. These motivations persisted into the early , rooted in causal realism: without independent nuclear deterrence, neutrality risked collapse under asymmetric threats, as historical precedents like the 1809 loss of underscored.

Swedish Armed Neutrality and Deterrence Rationale

Sweden maintained a policy of armed neutrality since the early 19th century, emphasizing self-reliant military strength to deter aggression and preserve independence without formal alliances. This doctrine necessitated a capable defense force to counter potential invasions, particularly along its extensive coastline vulnerable to amphibious assaults. Post-World War II, the rapid Soviet military buildup and expansionist actions heightened fears of encirclement, prompting Swedish military planners to view nuclear weapons as essential for enhancing deterrence credibility. The rationale centered on addressing Sweden's conventional inferiority against the Soviet Union's numerically superior forces, where traditional defenses alone might prove insufficient to prevent occupation. Tactical nuclear weapons were envisioned for battlefield use to impose unacceptable costs on invaders, thereby discouraging attacks and upholding neutrality without escalating to strategic exchanges. A 1954 study by the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (ÖB-54 report) explicitly advocated nuclear armament as a deterrent against foreign invasion, reflecting broad military consensus that such capabilities would ensure self-sufficiency in defense planning. Indigenous nuclear development was prioritized to avoid dependence on foreign suppliers, aligning with neutrality's imperative for autonomous capabilities amid international restrictions on fissile materials. supported initial efforts in the late 1940s and early 1950s, viewing production as a dual-purpose hedge for energy and potential weapons, though decisions were deferred to navigate disarmament diplomacy. This approach aimed to create a "minimum deterrent" that signaled resolve to aggressors, particularly the USSR, without compromising Sweden's non-aligned status. Soviet warnings that a Swedish arsenal would forfeit neutral protections underscored the high-stakes calculus, yet reinforced the logic of domestic capability for survival in a bipolar world.

Program Initiation and Infrastructure (1945-1954)

Initial Studies and Organizational Setup

Following the atomic bombings of and in August 1945, the Swedish Supreme Commander tasked the newly established Swedish National Defence Research Institute (FOA), founded on April 1, 1945, with investigating the feasibility of nuclear weapons and defense against them. FOA, initially comprising about 150 employees across departments for chemistry, physics, and other fields, coordinated early efforts with limited domestic expertise in . Torsten Magnusson, head of FOA's physics section, produced an initial report in 1945 assessing bomb design, effects, and production challenges, emphasizing the need for fissile material like or . Funding for these preliminary studies began modestly at 1.625 million SEK in 1945, rising to 3.5 million SEK by 1946–1947, with parliamentary approval under the guise of defense research. In November 1945, the government formed the Atomic Committee (Atomkommittén), comprising 10 experts including physicists and , to advise on both civilian and military nuclear applications. This body recommended pursuing production through heavy-water reactors fueled by domestic , leading to collaborations with the Geological Survey of Sweden (SGU), mining firm Boliden Gruv AB, and academic institutions like the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH). By December 1945, Gustaf Ljunggren proposed integrating pathways with civilian nuclear energy development. FOA's 1948 study formalized the "Swedish line," estimating production would require 500–1,000 tons of , cost 450 million SEK, and take over eight years, favoring over enrichment due to technical and economic hurdles. Organizational expansion accelerated with the 1947 founding of AB Atomenergi (AE), a company 57% state-owned, to advance civilian nuclear infrastructure while supporting military goals through a 1949 FOA-AE agreement. Key personnel included Sigvard Eklund, who led FOA's efforts, and chemists like Jan Rydberg, enabling studies on fission, production, and extraction. By 1953, FOA's assessments under Eklund projected feasibility for 1–5 bombs annually using 150 MW reactors, though full commitment awaited later decisions; these efforts remained classified, framed as protection research to maintain Sweden's neutral stance.

Acquisition of Basic Materials and Early Experiments

In October 1945, shortly after the atomic bombings of and , the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA) initiated efforts to identify domestic sources of , primarily focusing on kolm-type shale deposits through the Geological Survey of Sweden (SGU). Collaborations were established with mining companies such as Boliden Gruv AB and academic institutions including the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) and to develop extraction methods. By 1946, experimental techniques for detecting and extracting small quantities of from these shales had been developed, laying the groundwork for industrial-scale production. AB Atomenergi, established in 1947 as a government-majority-owned , took responsibility for scaling up production, planning to process shales from sites like Kvarntorp to yield approximately 5 tons of annually by 1948, with capacity potentially doubling thereafter. Parallel efforts addressed acquisition, essential for moderation; FOA began research into production methods in 1945, including electrolysis at facilities like Ljungaverket, but by 1953 studies recommended importing from at rates of 7 tons per year, expandable to 15 tons, due to lower costs compared to domestic synthesis. These materials were targeted to support production for potential weapons, with estimates requiring 500–1,000 tons of and significant or for initial operations. Early experiments commenced in late 1945 under the newly formed Atomic Committee (Atomkommittén), which included physicists and , advising on integrating civilian and military nuclear research. FOA's studies in 1946 focused on processes and synthesis, followed by the establishment of a laboratory in 1947 equipped with a Van de Graaff accelerator for measuring neutron cross-sections. By February 1948, FOA was formally tasked with evaluating nuclear weapons manufacturing feasibility, projecting the capacity for 5–10 devices annually once reactors were operational. A milestone came in 1954 with the activation of the R1 at KTH, fueled by 3 tons of borrowed from and moderated by 5 tons of from , enabling initial plutonium irradiation experiments. These efforts, conducted under the dual-use guise of civilian energy research, demonstrated Sweden's technical progress toward production by the mid-1950s, though full-scale weapons development remained contingent on further .

Commitment and Expansion (1954-1960)

Government Endorsement and Defense Doctrine Shift

In 1954, Nils Swedlund, the Supreme Commander of the , publicly advocated for the acquisition of nuclear weapons as essential for national security, arguing in his ÖB-54 study that they would enable credible deterrence against potential aggressors while preserving Sweden's policy of armed neutrality. This position reflected a doctrinal , as military planners increasingly viewed conventional forces alone as insufficient in an era of nuclear-armed superpowers, particularly given Soviet conventional superiority in the and the perceived risks of invasion scenarios where tactical nuclear strikes could disrupt enemy advances. The government's response under Prime Minister initially aligned with this military assessment, as Erlander had previously defended nuclear research in parliamentary debates and the administration continued funding the Swedish National Defence Research Institute (FOA) for both defensive effects studies and underlying weapons feasibility assessments. A 1955 FOA report confirmed the technical viability of producing a plutonium-based device, provided reactors were utilized for fuel production, thereby endorsing the integration of nuclear capabilities into defense planning without immediate commitment to full-scale weaponization. This tacit endorsement marked a shift from pre-1950s emphasis on total defense through mass mobilization and territorial denial to a more proactive deterrence posture incorporating potential offensive nuclear elements, justified by first-hand assessments of nuclear blast effects and the obsolescence of non-nuclear strategies against . By 1958, the Riksdag's approval of a new defense bill further solidified this doctrinal pivot, allocating increased resources to FOA for nuclear-related research under the guise of protection studies while explicitly keeping the weapons option open for future political decision. The legislation responded to heightened tensions, including the Hungarian Revolution and ongoing superpower arms racing, by prioritizing adaptability to nuclear threats and authorizing military branches to plan for tactical nuclear delivery systems like aircraft and artillery. Conservative and military factions, including Swedlund's successors, reinforced this stance, contending that nuclear armament would compel adversaries to weigh higher costs in any attack on Swedish territory, thus enhancing neutrality's viability without alliance dependencies. However, Erlander's government balanced this by tying nuclear pursuits to civilian reactor development via the "Swedish Line" approach, approved in 1956, which dual-purposed infrastructure for potential extraction. This period's endorsements and shifts were driven by empirical evaluations of geopolitical vulnerabilities—such as Sweden's exposed northern flanks and limited manpower reserves—rather than ideological aversion to , though they sparked initial public and intra-party debates that foreshadowed later resistance. The military's rationale emphasized causal deterrence mechanics: possessing even a modest arsenal would impose unacceptable risks on invaders, altering invasion calculus in Sweden's favor, as conventional parity was deemed unattainable amid rapid technological asymmetries.

Integration of Military and Civilian Nuclear Efforts

In the wake of the 1954 parliamentary endorsement of a defense doctrine incorporating nuclear weapons as a potential deterrent, Sweden's and civilian nuclear efforts became closely intertwined to achieve self-sufficiency in production and reactor technology. The Swedish National Defence Research Institute (FOA) collaborated extensively with the state-owned AB Atomenergi (AE), which was tasked with developing civilian infrastructure capable of supporting weapons-grade material extraction. This integration was formalized through prior agreements, such as the 1949 pact between FOA and AE dividing responsibilities—AE handling processing, fuel fabrication, and reactor development, while FOA focused on weapon design and effects research—but accelerated after 1954 with AE conducting targeted studies for FOA on yields from heavy-water reactors. Central to this synergy was the "Swedish line" policy, approved by parliament in 1956, which prioritized heavy-water reactors fueled by domestic to enable both energy production and high-purity for bombs, avoiding reliance on imported . AE's facilities, including production scaling to 5 tons annually by the early 1950s and early reprocessing experiments, directly fed into FOA's 1955 , which projected initial weapon production by 1959–1963 using 6 kg of per device at costs of SEK 240–378 million for prototypes. Dual-use reactors like the planned Ågesta (operational in 1963 but conceptualized earlier) and Marviken were engineered for potential on-load refueling to yield weapons-grade (8–15 kg per device) without IAEA safeguards initially, with AE exploring inspection-free heavy-water configurations in 1959 at FOA's request. By 1957–1958, this cooperation extended to joint working groups evaluating plutonium recycling and metallic production, with FOA funding portions of shared equipment like the 1956 Van de Graaff accelerator for materials testing. AE's January and July 1958 reports to FOA recommended dedicated military reactors for efficiency but affirmed civilian plants' viability for covert production, influencing parliament's July 1958 approval of "protection research" as a delaying overt weaponization while preserving dual capabilities. Despite U.S. "" constraints in 1956 prohibiting military diversion of supplied materials (e.g., 6 kg of 20% ), Sweden maintained parallel indigenous paths, with AE procuring 36 tons of by 1959 toward a 70.5-ton goal for scaled plutonium output. This structure masked military intent under civilian auspices, prioritizing causal self-reliance amid neutrality but introducing inefficiencies, as civilian energy demands sometimes diverted resources from pure weapons timelines.

Technical Advancements and Challenges

Plutonium Production and Reprocessing Hurdles

Sweden's nuclear weapons program identified as the primary due to its perceived lower technical complexity compared to enrichment, necessitating specialized and reprocessing facilities. Early studies in 1948 estimated that a large could yield 1 kg of per day, sufficient for 5-10 bombs annually, but required substantial feedstock and moderators. By 1953, plans called for 150 MW thermal to produce 3-5 bombs per year, demanding 10-40 tons of and 20-80 tons of initially. Heavy water reactors like Ågesta (operational from 1964 to 1974) and Marviken were central to production, designed for dual civilian power and military breeding purposes. Ågesta, a 65 MW thermal reactor, could theoretically produce 18-20 kg of weapons-grade annually through frequent fuel changes to minimize , but its dual-role requirements introduced design complications. Marviken, intended for 140 MWe output, faced insurmountable technical hurdles from these conflicting objectives—power efficiency versus low-irradiation —and was abandoned unoperated in 1970 without ever being fueled. Domestic conversion to metal proved technically demanding, with experimental output limited to 5 tons per year from sources like Kvarntorp, insufficient for scaled production. Reprocessing spent fuel to extract plutonium posed additional engineering barriers, as no dedicated facility was constructed despite proposals for sites at Hånö, Sannäs, and Studsvik. A planned chemical separation plant was estimated at 22.8 million SEK to build, with annual operating costs of 7.6 million SEK, capable of yielding 65-130 kg of plutonium yearly, but required 4 years to erect and faced personnel shortages—needing 500 staff, including 100 university graduates. Heavy water supply remained precarious, relying on uncertain Norwegian imports of 7-15 tons annually without guarantees, while domestic alternatives were delayed by high costs and technical immaturity. International constraints exacerbated these issues, as U.S. export controls on mandated inspections incompatible with covert weapons production, and policies favoring cheap light-water technology undermined heavy-water paths. Overall costs for infrastructure ballooned, with 1953 estimates at 240-378 million SEK upfront plus 26-41 million SEK annually, straining resources without assured yields. These combined technical, material, and external hurdles delayed projected timelines, pushing potential production from the early to the 1970s, ultimately contributing to the program's abandonment.

Weapon Designs and Non-Nuclear Testing

Swedish nuclear weapon designs, developed primarily by the Swedish National Defence Research Institute (FOA), emphasized plutonium-based implosion-type bombs, deemed preferable to uranium-235 gun-type designs due to efficiency in fissile material usage and production feasibility. Early assessments in 1948 estimated requirements at 36-72 kg of plutonium per device, later refined to 8-15 kg by 1953 studies. By 1955, FOA's analysis under Torsten Magnusson specified tactical weapons weighing approximately 100 kg, incorporating 6 kg of for yields estimated at 5-50 kilotons, suitable for delivery via aircraft such as the or torpedoes. These designs aimed for annual production of 3-5 bombs, scaling to support up to 100 tactical devices, contingent on plutonium output from reactors like Ågesta and Marviken. Non-nuclear testing focused on validating design components and simulating effects without fission. FOA conducted theoretical calculations and initiation studies from 1945-1953, including for metallurgy. Practical explosive simulations began in 1956 at Nausta in northern , followed by a major 1957 test at Malm in using 36 tons of nitrolite explosive, calibrated to replicate effects equivalent to a 20-kiloton nuclear at scaled distances. These zero-yield experiments confirmed non-nuclear components' performance, such as lenses and tampers, advancing 's latent capability to assemble a functional device within approximately six years of decision. By the mid-1950s, FOA had mastered implosion theory and successfully tested conventional explosive assemblies integral to the compression mechanism.

Planned Delivery Systems and Tactical Employment

Swedish military planning for nuclear weapons emphasized tactical delivery systems suitable for defending against a potential Soviet , prioritizing as the primary means of deployment. The Saab A32 Lansen, entering service in 1955, was designated as the initial carrier for nuclear bombs, with modifications enabling it to deliver devices weighing approximately 100 kg containing 6 kg of . The subsequent Saab JA 37 Viggen, planned for the late , was similarly adapted for nuclear missions, reflecting a shift toward more advanced supersonic platforms capable of carrying bombs or missiles with yields of 5–50 kilotons. These were selected for their range, speed, and ability to operate from dispersed bases, aligning with Sweden's doctrine of mobile defense. Alternative delivery options included surface-to-surface missiles and artillery, though these remained exploratory. Swedish evaluators considered the American rocket system, which could accommodate warheads like the W7 or , for potential adaptation to deliver tactical nuclear payloads against amphibious landings or troop concentrations. Saab explored ground-based missile designs informed by Försvarets forskningsanstalt (FOA) data for 50-kiloton devices, while the Bandkanon 1 self-propelled , introduced in 1966, was assessed for shells in 15 cm caliber, limited by accuracy and range constraints to about 40 kg projectiles. Submarine-launched nuclear torpedoes were also contemplated for coastal defense, extending deterrence to maritime threats. Overall, plans targeted production of 100 such devices by 1972, with a focus on lightweight, versatile warheads compatible across platforms. Tactical employment centered on a "" strategy to disrupt invading forces rather than , emphasizing immediate battlefield use to exploit Sweden's terrain and neutrality-based deterrence. Nuclear strikes were envisioned to target enemy landing zones, supply lines, and reinforcements, particularly to sever amphibious assaults from sea support and compel dispersion for conventional counterattacks. This approach, outlined in studies and FOA reports, aimed to make invasion prohibitively costly without escalating to full-scale nuclear exchange, integrating weapons into revised defense tactics that prioritized tactical yields over . The cancelled Saab A36 bomber project in 1957 underscored a pivot away from deep-strike capabilities toward defensive, short-range applications against Warsaw Pact threats in the .

Political Pressures and Internal Debates (1960-1968)

Rise of Domestic Nuclear Resistance

In the late 1950s, divisions surfaced within the ruling Social Democratic Party (SAP) over nuclear armament, with Prime Minister initially favoring a defensive nuclear capability to maintain Sweden's armed neutrality, while party women and youth organizations, including the Social Democratic Youth League (SSU), mounted early opposition citing ethical concerns and risks of escalation. In June 1959, the SAP formed an internal committee co-chaired by Erlander and rising politician to evaluate the nuclear weapons question, producing a 1960 report that endorsed continued research but deferred a production decision, reflecting the party's ambivalence and Erlander's emphasis on consensus amid growing intra-party skepticism. Public resistance crystallized in 1961 with the founding of the Swedish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (SCND), which organized an initial march in drawing approximately 400 participants protesting the and domestic weapons research, followed by demonstrations at the Swedish Defence Research Institute (FOA) in Ursvik targeting military plans. This mobilization expanded through the decade, amplified by the 1965 formation of the Action Group Against Swedish Nuclear Weapons (Aktionsgruppen mot svenska kärnvapen, AMK), which employed direct actions and public campaigns to highlight the moral and strategic perils of proliferation. Opinion polls throughout the documented escalating public opposition, shifting from tentative support for defensive measures in the early period to widespread rejection by the mid-1960s, influenced by global test ban debates and domestic fears of Soviet retaliation. The SAP's internal schism, exacerbated by these movements, culminated in the party's 1965 congress rejecting acquisition, prioritizing non-proliferation advocacy over armament and aligning with broader ethical norms against nuclear escalation. Anti-nuclear actors, including intellectuals and pacifist groups, leveraged media and petitions to frame weapons development as incompatible with Sweden's neutral identity, ultimately eroding elite consensus despite military advocacy.

International Influences and Non-Proliferation Pressures

The maintained a consistent policy to deter Sweden from developing nuclear weapons, starting with post-World War II efforts from 1945 to 1952 aimed at preventing the military exploitation of Swedish uranium resources and access to enriched materials or advanced equipment. This opposition intensified through bilateral agreements, such as the 1956 civilian nuclear cooperation pact that prohibited the use of US-supplied and for weapons purposes. By April 6, 1960, a US memorandum explicitly discouraged Swedish nuclear armament, promoting instead enhanced conventional defenses and subtle alignment with strategies to counter Soviet threats without proliferation risks. US leverage grew as Sweden became dependent on American technology for delivery systems and enriched uranium supplies, which reduced the strategic necessity of an indigenous bomb while enabling Washington to condition aid against weapons development. These incentives, combined with implicit assurances against Soviet , eroded support for the program among Swedish military planners by the mid-1960s. Broader non-proliferation dynamics amplified these pressures, with US-Soviet talks from the 1950s delaying Swedish timelines and fostering global norms against horizontal proliferation. 's involvement in forums, including the 1962 Eighteen Nation Committee on , exposed policymakers to intensifying international expectations for restraint. The decisive shift occurred on August 19, 1968, when signed the on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state, committing to forgo acquisition and aligning with the emerging global regime despite initial reservations over verification and superpower hypocrisy. This ratification in 1970 solidified abandonment, influenced by fears of diplomatic isolation and in a proliferation-sensitive environment.

Policy Divergence Between Civilian Power and Weapons Goals

Sweden's nuclear policy in the 1960s increasingly diverged between advancing civilian for and pursuing military weapons capabilities, driven by technological choices and external constraints. Initially integrated through dual-use infrastructure managed by AB Atomenergi, established in 1947, the programs relied on heavy-water s capable of producing weapons-grade alongside . The Ågesta (R3), operational from 1964, exemplified this approach, designed to generate 10 MW of while enabling production in a under nominal civilian safeguards. However, by the mid-1960s, policy shifted toward light-water s (LWRs) dependent on U.S.-supplied , as evidenced by the 1965 order for 1 (400 MW), which imposed IAEA safeguards incompatible with clandestine weapons material production. This pivot, formalized in a 30-year U.S. supply agreement, prioritized reliable civilian over military hedging, rendering dedicated weapons s economically and politically unfeasible. Prime Minister Tage Erlander, who had earlier endorsed nuclear weapons for deterrence against Soviet threats, influenced this divergence by advocating delay and reassessment amid party divisions and public opposition. By , Erlander argued that acquiring weapons would heighten vulnerability and undermine Sweden's non-aligned stance, favoring instead the moral and strategic benefits of restraint. Domestic consensus norms and rising anti-nuclear sentiment within the Social Democrats further decoupled the paths, slowing military research while accelerating civilian deployment to meet growing electricity demands. Reprocessing spent fuel, essential for weapons but uneconomical for power generation, was de-emphasized in civilian policy, highlighting the programs' separation. U.S. nonproliferation pressures reinforced this, as safeguards on dual-use facilities like Ågesta limited their military utility. The divergence culminated in the 1968 defense proposals declaring nuclear weapons acquisition contrary to Sweden's interests, paving the way for NPT signature without pursuing parallel military infrastructure. This policy realignment ensured civilian nuclear power's expansion—eventually supplying 30% of electricity by the —but foreclosed weapons options, as LWR adoption eliminated pathways without international cooperation.

Termination and Dismantlement (1968-1972)

Key Decisions and the 1972 Renunciation

In 1968, the Swedish government under Prime Minister formally abandoned the option to develop nuclear weapons through the passage of the defence bill (Proposition 1968:110), which stated that such acquisition was not in 's national interest and ended the policy of preserving "freedom of action" on nuclear armament. This legislative decision followed internal debates and the rejection of the Swedish National Defence Research Institute's (FOA) phased procurement proposals in 1966, redirecting resources away from offensive nuclear capabilities. On August 19, 1968, signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), committing to forgo nuclear weapons development in alignment with emerging international norms. Erlander, who had initially supported nuclear options in the and amid security concerns, shifted stance by the late due to domestic political divisions within the Social Democratic Party, rising anti-nuclear sentiment, and the prioritization of civilian nuclear energy over military applications. His earlier compromise had already restricted FOA research to protective measures against nuclear threats, limiting offensive design work and setting precedents for the 1968 renunciation. ratified the NPT on , 1970, legally binding the nation to non-proliferation and necessitating the cessation of any residual weapons-oriented activities. The 1972 renunciation culminated in FOA's termination of plutonium experiments, the critical material for potential bomb cores, effectively dismantling the program's technical remnants. research facilities at Ursvik were shut down by the 1971/72 fiscal year, with decontamination completed and small stockpiles of fissile materials—totaling around 100 grams of —retained only for non-weapons research before later transfer or disposal in the and . This final step aligned with post-NPT obligations and reflected a consensus that indigenous nuclear deterrence was untenable given economic costs, alliance dynamics, and ethical considerations favoring advocacy.

Strategic, Economic, and Ethical Reasons Analyzed

The termination of Sweden's nuclear weapons program in 1968 was driven by a confluence of strategic assessments deeming nuclear arms incompatible with armed neutrality, prohibitive economic burdens amid competing priorities, and ethical imperatives shaped by domestic anti-nuclear sentiment. , who had initially supported the program in the early postwar years, shifted toward opposition by the mid-1960s, prioritizing party unity and public consensus over acquisition. This decision reflected evaluations that nuclear weapons would function as a "war magnet" for a neutral state, potentially drawing Soviet aggression without guaranteeing deterrence, as military planners concluded they offered limited value against superior nuclear powers. U.S. policies, including offers of nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation pressures, further eroded strategic incentives by aligning Sweden's defense posture with conventional forces optimized for territorial denial rather than escalation. Economically, the program demanded substantial investment, estimated at SEK 1,115–1,988 million (equivalent to $1.4–2.5 billion in 2008 dollars) for producing around 100 tactical weapons, diverting resources from Sweden's expanding welfare state and robust conventional military. The dual-use infrastructure, reliant on costly heavy-water reactors, clashed with cheaper light-water alternatives for civilian power, such as the U.S.-supplied fuel for Oskarshamn 1 in 1965, rendering military plutonium production uneconomical. Social Democratic priorities favored social spending and army/navy modernization over nuclear expenditures, as introducing atomic capabilities would necessitate reallocating defense budgets to the detriment of broader forces. Ethically, surging public opposition crystallized the program's incompatibility with Sweden's self-image as a moral leader in , with polls showing a reversal from majority support in the to 69% opposition by 1965. Grassroots campaigns, including Aktionsgruppen mot svenska atomvapen, amplified pacifist voices within the Social Democratic Party, pressuring Erlander to align with figures like Inga Thorsson who viewed nuclear arms as antithetical to neutral, peaceful principles. This ethical framework, reinforced by Sweden's advocacy for UN test bans since 1957, framed acquisition as a betrayal of international norms, ultimately tipping the balance against proceeding despite technical feasibility.

Legacy, Disarmament, and Hindsight

Post-Program Dismantlement of Nuclear Sites

The Ågesta nuclear power plant (also known as R3), located near and designed with dual civilian and potential plutonium production capabilities, was permanently shut down on June 2, 1974, following the program's termination and amid shifting energy policies. Decommissioning efforts, managed by , included initial preparations in the 1970s for fuel removal and containment, but full-scale dismantling commenced in 2020 under a contract with Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB. This phase involved segmenting the , control rods, and approximately 1,800 tonnes of radioactive components for disposal, with the project expected to conclude within 3-6 years, adhering to Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) approvals for safety and waste handling. The Marviken nuclear plant, a heavy-water moderated boiling intended originally for plutonium extraction but repurposed for safety research after weapons ambitions waned, was completed in 1968 without ever loading . Post-1972, it served for non-nuclear tests until the 1990s, after which extensive and occurred, including removal of the structure and auxiliary systems. By late 2018, the site—now free of radiological hazards—was sold to a company for non-nuclear reuse, marking the effective end of its nuclear-related infrastructure. Research facilities tied to the weapons program, such as those at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOA, later FOI) in Ursvik, saw scaled-back operations after 1972, with weapons-specific nuclear activities curtailed to comply with Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations. While some defense-related research persisted at reduced levels into the 1980s and beyond, key plutonium handling and reprocessing plans were abandoned, and site resources were reallocated or decommissioned, including relocations of specialized groups by 2000 to consolidate non-weapons functions. Official inspections and reports to the (IAEA) verified the cessation of proliferation-sensitive work, emphasizing transparency in phasing out military nuclear infrastructure.

Sweden's Role in Global Non-Proliferation

Following the termination of its nuclear weapons research program in 1972, Sweden positioned itself as a proponent of and non-proliferation, signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on August 19, 1968, and ratifying it on January 9, 1970, as a non-nuclear-weapon state. This commitment aligned with 's formal renunciation of nuclear arms, enabling it to advocate for stricter international safeguards and verification mechanisms while leveraging its technical expertise from prior research to support global efforts. Sweden contributed to the (IAEA) by funding safeguards research and development programs, emphasizing enhanced inspection protocols to prevent diversion of nuclear materials for weapons purposes. In 2002, it signed an Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, which it ratified in 2004, expanding the agency's access to information and sites for verifying peaceful nuclear activities. Swedish diplomats actively participated in negotiations, supporting treaties such as the (CTBT) and initiatives for fissile material cut-off, positioning Sweden as a "white knight" state in non-proliferation diplomacy during the late . However, Sweden's non-proliferation stance evolved amid heightened threats, particularly Russia's 2022 invasion of , leading to its accession on March 7, 2024. While maintaining NPT adherence, Sweden voted in favor of adopting the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) but declined to sign or ratify it, citing incompatibility with 's nuclear deterrence posture and opting instead for frameworks like the NPT and CTBT. This shift reflected a pragmatic reassessment, prioritizing alliance-based over unilateral advocacy, though Sweden continued to push for negative assurances from nuclear states within NPT review processes.

Contemporary Debates and Strategic Reassessments Post-NATO

Sweden's accession to NATO on March 7, 2024, prompted strategic reassessments of its defense posture, including integration into the alliance's nuclear deterrence framework under Article 5, which extends collective defense to potential nuclear scenarios. The Swedish government affirmed support for NATO's strategic deterrence while upholding commitments to arms control and non-proliferation, as outlined in the March 20, 2024, Statement of Government Policy. In May 2024, Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson explicitly stated that Sweden would not exclude hosting U.S. nuclear weapons, a departure from prior policies prohibiting foreign nuclear deployments, driven by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and perceived escalatory risks in the Baltic region. This position contrasted with the opposition Social Democratic Party's insistence against stationing NATO nuclear arms on Swedish soil. By October 2025, demonstrated deeper alliance alignment by participating in NATO's annual Steadfast Noon nuclear exercise for the first time, deploying JAS 39 Gripen fighters from the Blekinge Wing to practice conventional support for nuclear operations, without direct involvement in nuclear handling. This marked a symbolic "coming out" from 's historical nuclear aversion, reflecting reassessments of deterrence needs in the High North amid Russia's military buildup in the Baltic and , where has lowered its nuclear use threshold since 2022. Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) analyses emphasize the need for clearer comprehension of evolving nuclear roles—such as Russia's and China's expanded reliance on them— to enhance NATO's tailored deterrence, recommending prioritize survivable conventional forces that complement rather than replicate nuclear capabilities. Domestic debates intensified in 2025 over indigenous nuclear options, fueled by Russia's aggression and doubts about extended deterrence reliability. In March 2025, leader advocated keeping nuclear weapons "on the table," citing Sweden's dormant expertise from the nuclear weapons program terminated in 1972 and the imperative for self-reliant deterrence against proximate threats. Similarly, MEP Alice Teodorescu Mowe called for Sweden's inclusion in a unified European nuclear strategy to bolster credibility. In January 2026, Dagens Nyheter published an editorial urging discussion on revisiting nuclear weapons options, potentially in a Nordic framework led by Sweden, amid concerns over the security implications of NATO membership. Furthermore, in January 2026, Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson revealed that Sweden is engaged in early-stage discussions with France and the United Kingdom regarding potential nuclear weapons cooperation or deterrence protection, emphasizing their preliminary nature amid post-NATO strategic shifts. These views, echoed in media and expert commentary, argue that membership necessitates reevaluating non-proliferation absolutism, given empirical failures of past restraint against revisionist powers. However, senior military officials, including Supreme Commander , clarified in October 2025 that no active program revival is underway, with focus remaining on conventional enhancements and interoperability; developing sovereign warheads would require vast industrial reinvestment, estimated at decades and billions of kronor, amid legal barriers under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Polling indicates mixed public support, with around 40% open to hosting foreign nukes but minimal backing for domestic production. Strategic analyses post-accession highlight nuclear implications for Nordic-Baltic defense, including extended deterrence gaps in remote areas where rapid response times challenge U.S. commitments. FOI and allied think tanks urge Sweden to invest in dual-use technologies, such as long-range precision strikes, to blur conventional-nuclear thresholds and deter escalation without pursuing proliferation. Defence Minister has framed these debates within broader "wartime readiness," prioritizing contributions over unilateral nuclear bids, as Russia's 2020 doctrine revisions and Baltic deployments underscore hybrid threats demanding integrated, not isolated, responses. Critics from disarmament circles, including the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, decry such shifts as eroding Sweden's historical advocacy, though empirical data on deterrence efficacy—evident in 's stability—supports pragmatic adaptation over ideological purity.

Controversies and Alternative Viewpoints

Alleged Secrecy and Activities Beyond 1972

In April 1985, the Swedish government publicly acknowledged conducting a series of secret underground tests in early 1972 near , involving conventional explosions of imported weapons-grade to assess dispersal patterns and environmental impacts for purposes rather than weapon development. These tests utilized approximately 100 grams of and were framed as part of broader efforts to enhance protections against potential nuclear attacks, with officials emphasizing that no nuclear detonation occurred and affirming Sweden's lack of intent or capability to produce bombs at that time. Following the 1972 renunciation, the Swedish National Defence Research Institute (FOA) terminated all plutonium experimentation at its Ursvik facility, with sites decontaminated and inspected by the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute by mid-1972. However, limited retention of nuclear materials persisted, including 2 grams of plutonium, 20 kilograms of natural uranium, and 110 kilograms of depleted uranium, held until their removal in the mid-1980s for use in non-proliferative research. This residual work at FOA shifted exclusively to defensive applications, such as modeling nuclear effects like electromagnetic pulses and supporting Sweden's international disarmament initiatives, including technical input for the 1983 Swedish proposal in Geneva for a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Declassifications of program documents in the mid-1990s exposed the pre-1972 scope but also highlighted enduring , with some subject to a 70-year rule delaying full release until the . The compartmentalized structure of the original research—where no single individual held complete knowledge—combined with incomplete archiving, has prompted allegations from analysts that undocumented knowledge or capabilities may have lingered covertly, potentially enabling a rapid reconstitution if geopolitical pressures shifted. Yet, IAEA safeguards inspections and official provide no evidence of prohibited weapons-oriented pursuits post-renunciation, attributing opacity to standard practices rather than active hedging.

Criticisms of Abandonment in Light of Current Threats

Critics of Sweden's 1972 nuclear renunciation argue that the decision, made under assumptions of enduring European stability and U.S. security guarantees, has proven shortsighted amid Russia's revanchist actions since 2014 and especially its , , invasion of , which demonstrated the fragility of conventional deterrence against a nuclear-armed adversary willing to escalate. These viewpoints, advanced by defense analysts and politicians, posit that retaining or reviving an indigenous capability—given Sweden's advanced 1960s research yielding weapons-grade and designs—would have bolstered self-reliant deterrence, reducing vulnerability to hesitancy in a crisis. Russia's nuclear signaling, including doctrinal updates lowering thresholds for use and threats against Nordic states post-Sweden's March 7, 2024, accession, has intensified calls for reassessment, as extended deterrence from 's nuclear powers may lack the immediacy of national control. Swedish hawks, including figures in conservative and nationalist circles, contend that the abandonment prioritized ethical and economic rationales over strategic prudence, leaving Sweden exposed to hybrid threats like sabotage and cyberattacks from , which possesses over 5,580 warheads and has conducted unscheduled exercises signaling readiness. In September 2025, politicians urged placing nuclear options "on the table" to counter Putin's aggression, echoing arguments that membership does not fully mitigate risks if U.S. commitments waver under domestic . Proponents highlight Sweden's historical near-miss with deployable weapons, such as tactical devices for Saab Lansen aircraft, which could have integrated with modern platforms like the JAS 39 Gripen, providing asymmetric leverage without full strategic escalation. While Sweden's Supreme Commander denied active revival plans on October 8, 2025, the discourse reveals broader hindsight: the 1972 shift dismantled infrastructure like the Ågesta reactor and Marviken facility prematurely, forfeiting dual-use expertise amid a environment where Russia's 2020 nuclear amendments and Ukraine-era rhetoric have eroded non-proliferation norms. Critics from think tanks argue this renunciation assumed mutual vulnerability would suffice, yet Russia's invasion—coupled with threats to and —underscores that neutralist ill-prepared for peer competitors flouting treaties like the INF accord. Such perspectives, though marginal in official policy, gain traction as Sweden reallocates defense spending to 2.6% of GDP by 2028, prompting questions on whether reallocating to nuclear R&D would enhance credibility over conventional buildup alone.

Pro-Nuclear Perspectives on Self-Reliance and Deterrence

Advocates for Sweden's nuclear weapons program historically emphasized its necessity for national self-reliance amid Cold War threats from the Soviet Union, arguing that nuclear capabilities would enable independent deterrence without reliance on foreign alliances. In the post-World War II era, Swedish military leaders, including the Supreme Commander, publicly urged the immediate adoption of nuclear weapons to counter superior conventional forces, viewing self-sufficiency in nuclear technology as essential for a neutral power's survival. This perspective held that Sweden's domestic uranium resources and research infrastructure, developed since 1945, positioned it to achieve autonomous defense, reducing vulnerability to external pressures or betrayals. Pro-nuclear arguments centered on deterrence through credible second-strike capabilities, such as like the Saab Lansen and Viggen designed for nuclear delivery targeting Soviet Baltic assets, which would impose unacceptable costs on potential aggressors. Military planners contended that conventional defenses alone could not reliably deter invasion by a nuclear-armed , necessitating a to maintain strategic balance and preserve sovereignty. These views persisted into the 1960s, with proponents warning that forgoing weapons development would leave dependent on implicit U.S. protection, undermining its policy of armed neutrality. In contemporary debates, particularly following Russia's 2022 invasion of and NATO accession in 2024, Swedish defense experts and politicians have revived pro-nuclear perspectives, advocating resumption to ensure self-reliance amid doubts over alliance commitments. Jimmie Åkesson, leader of the , stated in 2025 that "everything should be on the table," citing Sweden's historical nuclear expertise and recent Russian drone violations of airspace as justification for deterrence against escalating threats. Robert Dalsjö of the Swedish Defence Research Agency echoed this, calling for discussion of "independent nuclear weapons with a Swedish component" to bolster credibility beyond 's conventional guarantees. Analyst Johan Wennström argued that national nuclear control would protect Sweden from U.S. policy shifts, proposing revival of the program leveraging existing and technical know-how for a reliable deterrent against . Alice Teodorescu Måwe, a Christian Democrats MEP, supported exploring a shared European , positing that collective self-reliance enhances deterrence while addressing NATO's potential limitations in high-threat scenarios. These advocates maintain that Sweden's non-proliferation commitments under the NPT allow withdrawal for "supreme interests," prioritizing empirical security needs over ideals in an era of nuclear-armed adversaries.

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