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Terry stop
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| Police investigative stops in the United States |
|---|
| Related concepts |
| Case law |
| Controversial aspects |
A Terry stop in the United States allows the police to briefly detain a person based on reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity.[1][2] Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause which is needed for arrest. When police stop and pat-down a pedestrian, this is commonly known as a stop and frisk. When police stop an automobile, this is known as a traffic stop. If the police stop a motor vehicle on minor infringements in order to investigate other suspected criminal activity, this is known as a pretextual stop.
In the United States at the federal level, the Supreme Court has decided many cases that define the intersection between policing and the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, Congress has not defined a baseline for police behavior. There has been some state action at both the legislative and judicial levels, and also some cities have passed laws on these issues.[3][4]
Some law academics are concerned that jurisprudence permitting Terry stops does not account for possible implicit bias of officers, and that this possibly results in racially skewed decision-making.[5] Communities that have high rates of incarceration may experience more intense and punitive policing and surveillance practices even during periods of time when general crime rates are decreasing.[6]
Origins
[edit]| The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,... | Reasonableness |
|---|---|
| ...and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. | Warrant |
The concept of a Terry stop originated in the 1968 Supreme Court case Terry v. Ohio, in which a police officer detained three Cleveland men on the street behaving suspiciously, as if they were preparing for armed robbery. The police conducted a pat down search and discovered a revolver, and subsequently, two of the men were convicted of carrying a concealed weapon.[8] The men appealed their case to the Supreme Court, arguing that the search in which the revolver was found was illegal under the Fourth Amendment. This brief detention and search were deemed permissible by the court, judging that the officer had reasonable suspicion which could be articulated (not just a hunch) that the person detained may be armed and dangerous. This was not mere "suspicion" but "reasonable suspicion" which could be articulated at a later date.[9]
This decision was made during a period of great social unrest in the United States in the 1960s, with rising crime, opposition to U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War and the civil rights movement, and race riots. It was thought that law enforcement needed to be provided with tools to deal with the unrest and new issues of urban crime. Some criticized the decision for watering down the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures; others praised it for balancing safety and individual rights.[9]: 94
Elements
[edit]The United States Supreme Court held that where: a police officer observes unusual conduct by a subject; the subject's conduct leads the officer reasonably to conclude that criminal activity may be afoot, and that the subject may be armed and presently dangerous; the officer identifies themselves as a police officer; the officer makes reasonable inquiries; and nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel the officer's reasonable fear for safety, the officer may conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of the subject in an attempt to discover weapons, and that such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourteenth Amendment, so that any weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence.[10]
Expansion through case law
[edit]Reasonable suspicion
[edit]To possess reasonable suspicion that would justify a stop, police must have "specific and articulable facts" that indicate that the person to be stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity. Because officers usually do not have supervision when they encounter civilians, they have discretion regarding whom to stop.[11] Reasonable suspicion depends on the "totality of the circumstances".[12] Reasonable suspicion is a vague term, and the Supreme Court concluded that it is to be decided on a case-by-case basis. It often arises from a combination of facts, each of which would, in itself, not be enough justification for the stop.
| Types of police-civilian encounters | |
|---|---|
| Consensual encounter | Requires neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion |
| Terry stop (investigative detention) | Requires reasonable suspicion |
| Arrest | Requires probable cause |
The suspicion must be that of an individual person. Police officers primarily use situational factors based on criminal behavior to determine whether a stop is needed. In essence, when they witness a person behaving suspiciously or violating the law, they are constitutionally permitted to stop them. Other factors informing the decision include personal attitudes and the decision-making model in effect where the officer works. These subjective influences naturally create the opportunity for bias on the part of police officers who possess animus toward a certain class of people.[11]
The three types of primary sources that courts should accept in order to determine suspiciousness are information obtained from third parties, information based on the suspect's appearance and behavior and the time and place of the suspected offense. Officers can define what they believe is normal, and if and how the suspect deviates from this.[11] Reasonable suspicion has been used for actions such as standing in the wrong place, nervousness, exceptional calmness or walking quickly in another direction.[5] Officers' experiences may make them suspicious of behavior that is usually innocuous.[13] For instance, a social interaction such as a hug or a handshake might be perceived as a drug deal.[13] Merely identifying that a person belongs to a broad category, such as physical location, race, ethnicity or profile, is insufficient for reasonable suspicion. However, stop-and-frisk has been validated on the basis of furtive movements, inappropriate attire, carrying objects such as a television or a pillowcase (in English law, "going equipped"), vague, nonspecific answers to routine questions, refusal to identify oneself and appearing to be out of place.[14]
Before 1968, the law required substantial evidence to impede liberty or seize property. However, the Fourth Amendment does not protect consensual encounters. In its Terry decision, the Supreme Court found that the police should have the power to search, even without probable cause, to protect themselves from weapons.[5] The Terry stop operates under the assumption that although stop-and-frisk is an intrusion, the potential harm from weapons outweighs it.[15]
The cases following Terry expanded the power of the police. While the original case was concerned with armed violence and firsthand observation by officers, Adams v. Williams (1972) extended the doctrine to drug possession substantiated by the secondhand hearsay of an informant.[16][17] The Adams v. Williams case set a precedent that police are not required to directly observe suspicious behavior if their reasonable suspicion is based upon information provided by a confidential informant.[5] Regarding the case, Justice Marshall stated: "Today's decision invokes the specter of a society in which innocent citizens may be stopped, searched, and arrested at the whim of police officers who have only the slightest suspicion of improper conduct."[5] United States v. Hensley (1985) ruled that police officers may stop and question suspects whom they recognize from "wanted" flyers issued by other police departments.[18][19] In Illinois v. Wardlow (2000), a person's unprovoked flight from Chicago police officers in "an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking" constituted reasonable suspicion to stop him.[20]
During Terry stops, police usually ask detainees to identify themselves. Several states require people to provide their names to the police upon request. In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada (2004), these stop-and-identify statutes were deemed constitutional.[21] While the specifics of stop-and-identify statutes and ordinances vary, a significant number of states and local jurisdictions have enacted such laws.[22] In New York, courts have limited the effects of Terry by creating a four-level continuum of intrusion, each of which requires its own level of suspicion.[23] This allows police officers to detain people if the officers possess an articulable and objectively credible reason.[24] In People v. DeBour, New York's highest court permitted the police to stop a person who simply crosses the street upon observing the police.[25]
Lacking reasonable suspicion, police may stop a person based on a hunch, constituting a consensual stop. United States v. Mendenhall found that police are not generally required to advise an individual that the stop is on a consensual basis nor that the person may leave at any time.[26] A person can typically determine whether a stop is consensual by asking, "Am I free to go?". If the officer responds in the negative or does not respond, the person is being detained under a Terry stop; otherwise, the person may leave. Mendenhall also found that a consensual stop can be converted into an unconstitutional Terry stop by circumstances such as "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." Police who conduct an unconstitutional Terry stop can face administrative discipline and civil suits.[27]
In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, two police officers issued Mimms a ticket for driving a car with an expired license plate. When they asked him to step out, they realized that he had a gun, and promptly arrested him. The court ruled in favor of the police, citing officer safety as their reason. Dissenting justices found that this furthers the expansion of Terry. They feared that the ruling set a precedent that officers could ask citizens to perform actions through warrantless intrusion.[5]
Search
[edit]A frisk, also known as a pat-down, of the surface of a suspect's garments is permitted during a Terry stop but must be limited to actions necessary to discover weapons and must be based on a reasonable suspicion the individual may be armed.[28] However, pursuant to the plain-feel doctrine (similar to the plain-view doctrine), police may seize contraband discovered in the course of a frisk, but only if the type of contraband is immediately apparent.[9]
The Supreme Court has placed very liberal requirements on what is "immediately apparent" regarding contraband. In an example provided by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers, an officer feels a hard pack of cigarettes while frisking a suspect and inspects the pack, discovering drugs inside. The officer is legally permitted to open the pack because he has prior knowledge, based on experience, that a small switchblade or tiny gun could be hidden in such a box.[29]
Subsequent court cases have expanded the definition of what constitutes a frisk and what is considered as admissible evidence. In Michigan v. Long, Terry stops were extended to searching the inside of a car passenger compartment if police have reasonable suspicion that an occupant may have access to a weapon there. In Minnesota v. Dickerson, the court ruled that "immediately recognized" contraband discovered during a Terry stop is also a lawful seizure.[30]
Consensual search
[edit]Based on the Supreme Court decision in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1972), a person waives Fourth Amendment protections when voluntarily consenting to a search. Police are not required to inform a person of their right to decline the search. Justice Marshall, in his dissent, wrote that it is a "curious result that one can choose to relinquish a constitutional right—the right to be free from unreasonable searches—without knowing that he has the alternative of refusing to accede to a police request."[31][32] Several cities and states require police to inform citizens of their right to deny a search.
Traffic stops
[edit]
For practical purposes, a traffic stop is essentially the same as a Terry stop; for the duration of a stop, driver and passengers are "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court has held that drivers and passengers may be ordered to exit the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures. Drivers and passengers may be frisked for weapons upon reasonable suspicion they are armed and dangerous. If police reasonably suspect the driver or any of the occupants may be dangerous and that the vehicle may contain a weapon to which an occupant may gain access, police may perform a protective search of the passenger compartment. Otherwise, lacking a warrant or the driver's consent, police may not search the vehicle, but under the plain-view doctrine may seize and use as evidence weapons or contraband that are visible from outside the vehicle.[9]
As decided in Ohio v. Robinette (1996), after an officer returns the driver's identification, there is no requirement that the officer inform the driver of their freedom to leave; therefore, although the encounter has changed to a consensual encounter, questioning can continue, including a request to search the vehicle.[33]
Pretextual stops
[edit]Pretextual stops are a subset of traffic stops deemed constitutional by the Supreme Court in Whren v. United States (1996). They occur when a police officer wishes to investigate a motorist on other suspicions, generally related to drug possession, and uses a minor traffic infringement as a pretext to stop the driver. In the case of Whren, the defense used a "would-have" rule, asking whether a reasonable police officer would have made the stop without the suspicion of other criminal behavior. Some[34] consider that pretextual stops can allow racial profiling to occur. There are numerous petty violations that a typical driver might commit, and the officer can be selective about whom to detain for questioning.[35] Sixteen states ban pretextual stops that are based solely upon racial profiling or other immutable factors:[36]
- Arizona
- Arkansas
- California
- Colorado
- Connecticut
- Kansas
- Maryland
- Mississippi
- Montana
- Nebraska
- New Jersey
- New Mexico
- Oklahoma
- Rhode Island
- Utah
- West Virginia
Racial disparities
[edit]Police officers may develop schemas after continuously being exposed to certain environments, like high-crime minority neighborhoods, which can lead to their association of crime with race instead of focusing on suspicious behavior.[11] Officers who have been in the police force for longer are more likely to have suspicions based on non-behavioral reasons.[11] Forms of American culture that perpetuate negative stereotypes, such as black people being violent or white people committing white-collar crimes, can theoretically cause people to act on these stereotypes, even if they do not believe them, making implicit bias a possible factor in arrests.[37] Some argue that Black and Hispanic people are more likely to be targeted and are more likely to be stopped than population and relative crime rates might suggest.[38]
Terry stop regulations vary by area. Areas with high crime, such as public housing, might require less evidence for someone to be stopped.[38] This places the inhabitants of the area at greater risk for detainment.[38] In areas that are perceived to have high crimes, more police are deployed, which results in higher arrest rates, which are then used to justify more policing.[11] When controlling for location-based stops, one study found that white people were more likely to have a weapon than are black or Hispanic people.[38] Another study determined that the same proportion of racial groups were stopped during the day and at night, suggesting that stop decisions were not based on the physical appearance of the driver.[38] However, the study was interpreted to suggest that black people are more likely to be detained for longer periods of time.[38] The National Research Council states that "more research is needed on the complex interplay of race, ethnicity, and other social factors in police-citizen interactions."[11]
One study suggested a 27% increase in the likelihood of black people experiencing force during a stop compared to a white person, and a 28% increase in likelihood that the officer would draw their gun.[39] The study also determined that even during consensual stops, blacks are 29% more likely to experience force than other racial groups.[39] Young people were found more likely to experience force compared to older people.[39] In New York City between 1996 and 2000, there was a disproportionate number of complaints by blacks about officers' use of force.[13] Governmental and nongovernmental organizations investigations have confirmed that police-perpetrated abuse has affected many people of all races.[13] Another study blamed variances in types of nonverbal communication among races as a factor influencing some officers' suspicions.[11]
A 2009 study theorized that police officers could use their power to enforce their masculinity.[40] Because most police officers and detainees are men, officers are susceptible to the culture of honor stance and hypermasculinity, in which they are more prone to physical aggression in order to protect their social standing.[40]
A 2015 study concluded that immigration does not have a positive correlation with crime, but that immigrants are disproportionately stopped and arrested, leading to distrust of law enforcement.[41] The study also argued that immigrants typically possess less awareness of how to behave when stopped by the police.[41] After being stopped more often, immigrants may hold distrust towards the police.[41]
Effects
[edit]Usage of force
[edit]The experience of minority citizens, who are both more likely to be stopped by police and more likely to experience the use of force by the police after being stopped, has been characterized as a racial or ethnic "double jeopardy".[42] Acts of police force cause injury, death, civil litigation, public outrage, civil disorder, and a distrust towards the police.[42]
Eric Garner and NYPD, Freddie Gray and the Baltimore police, and Michael Brown and the Ferguson police are notable examples of police force at Terry stops that ended tragically.[42] Although racial disparities in the frequency of Terry stops are well known, less is known about the nature, prevalence, and factors predictive of use of force during Terry stops.[42]
Morrow et al. studied NYPD's SQF (stop, question, and frisk) records in 2010 to determine the frequency of force used at stops and whether the citizen's race/ethnicity was a factor in the decision to use force.[42] SQF tactics were found to disproportionately target minorities, regardless of control over variables like social and economic factors, precinct crime rates, and neighborhood racial or ethnic composition. SQF tactics did not seem to actually address crime either, as only 6% of stops yielded an arrest and only 0.15% of stops yielded a gun. In 2013, 44% of young minority New Yorkers had been stopped by NYPD nine or more times.[42]
Using the US Census Bureau's data from 2012, Morrow et al. analyzed racial/ethnic disparities in the use of force among NYPD.[42] Force was classified as hands, suspect on ground, suspect against wall, weapon drawn, weapon pointed, baton, handcuffs, pepper spray, and other; these were then categorized as no force, physical/non-weapon force, and weapon force. They found that non-weapon force occurred in 14.1% of SQF.[42] However, when this was further separated by racial categories, while for whites, only 0.9% experienced non-weapon force, 7.6% blacks and 5.0% Hispanics experienced non-weapon force, eight to nine times more likely than whites.[42] There is a possibility that these results are due to implicit biases of police officers, which could be shaped by previous experiences in the workforce.[42]
Psychological and emotional harm
[edit]A stop and frisk can be damaging to communities.[15] Kwate and Threadcraft argue that stop and frisk is a public health problem and works to "produce bodies that are harassed, stressed and resource deprived, if not altogether dead".[43] Stop and frisk creates an environment of fear that alters the behaviors of a community's inhabitants and limits their freedom of action.[43] The police conduct pat-downs that intrude upon the privacy of the individual, and can result in escalation through physical or sexual violence. During this process, officers sometimes use profanity and discriminatory slurs. Because of this, residents often have anger, fear, or distrust towards the police.[15]
For those with mental disorders and disabilities, pat-downs can be traumatic, especially for those with sensory disorders. Those who have suffered through sexual trauma, which is prevalent among men with criminal justice histories and black people in poorer urban areas, can relive their trauma through the invasive procedure, resulting in stress, depression, and anxiety.[15] This practice also increases the possibility of sexual exploitation or assault, especially in communities that are more vulnerable, like black and poor sex workers and sex trafficking victims.[15] Because ways of transporting drugs have evolved, some police officers utilize methods such as stripping the civilian and searching their body for drugs, which can be traumatizing for both users and nonusers of drugs.[13] Civilians have also reported that police officers often wait until their quota is filled up to bring the arrested civilians back to stations. Civilians must stay in the back of the van, which often was missing seats, for hours on end and packed with 15 or 16 people, without access to the bathroom.[13]
In a study conducted by Cooper et al., young men who do not use drugs stated that they feel uncomfortable when stopped by a police officer because they were afraid that "unnecessary violence or life disruption was imminent during every police stop".[13] Those who have been stopped more often develop more allostatic load, resulting in low self esteem and despair. When residents of a community know they are being treated both unfairly, and unfairly due to their social identity, they are more likely to anticipate stigma and rejection due to their race.[15] Marginalized communities that experience recurring injustice from the police distrust them and become more cynical of them, resulting in legal cynicism, which in turn results in decreased cooperation and respect toward the legal system.[15] This loss of faith in the system causes depressed civic and political engagement. Community residents are less likely to call for the police to help when they believe the police are not on their side, instead turning towards other community members. This distrust towards police is passed down from generation to generation, otherwise known as legal socialization, as a means of protection, forcing the community to live in perpetual fear.[15]
Items that are discovered during pat-downs that are incriminating, like clean needles, condoms, and other harm reduction tools, are used less to prevent arrest; this then is a danger to public health.[15]
Solutions
[edit]Many police departments all over the country have adapted courtesy policing as a response to criticism of racial profiling and police violence.[44] Courtesy policing is when the police build rapport with the community through respect and friendliness.[44] Legitimacy policing is a method used by police officers to interact with the community, where, in order to achieve a desired outcome, police officers utilize both punitive and courtesy strategies.[44] While courtesy policing is used to gain trust and collect information, the punitive approach is used whenever it appears that the stopped people did not comply, making the police more aggressive; these approaches are adapted on a shifting continuum to the actions of the people they stop. People of color are more likely to see this community policing as degrading.[44]
Cooper believes that in order to address hypermasculinity, which increases physical aggression in the police force, officers should be taught to not use command presence (where they use an authoritative tone of voice or even become physically violent) in situations where it is not needed.[40] It should still be used when the officer is in a dangerous situation, but not when a situation does not require force. Instead of the officer punishing the harm doer, the officer should instead make it a goal to have a full understanding of the situation. Police training culture should not emphasize aggressive approaches and instead advocate for a more patient approach.[40] An emphasis should be put on how to communicate with civilians who challenge their authority. Officers should also be made aware of any potential biases they may have.[40]
Terry was originally created to prevent imminent armed robberies. However, 90% of individuals who are stop-and-frisked in New York City were free to leave afterwards.[38] This demonstrates that they were not about to do serious criminal activity, which goes against Terry's purpose of preventing serious crime. Hutchins wishes to narrow the scope of Terry, and prevent certain police encounters from happening in the first place, and proposes to limit the reach of Terry stops so that officers may not stop someone based on a possessory offense under nothing more than reasonable suspicion.[5] Goel calls for the optimization of stop relating to criminal possession of a weapon (CPW). Because having a lower threshold of evidence to stop someone disproportionately affects black and Hispanic people, optimization would result in less racial disparities for Terry stops.[38] Goel examines NYPD's three million stops for cases where the stop yielded an individual involved with criminal possession of a weapon. In approximately 43% of these stops, there was less than 1% of a chance that the suspect had a weapon.[38] Goel found that five stop circumstances are more likely to increase the likelihood of recovering a weapon for a stop: suspicious weapon, sights and sounds of criminal activity, suspicious bulge, witness report, and ongoing investigation.[38]
Kwate and Threadcraft advocate for three ways to address Stop and Frisk, as a public health issue. First, they believe the health department's citywide health surveys should include Stop and Frisk encounters, so that the data can be used to investigate health outcomes of a Stop and Frisk. Second, within 24 hours, reports of traumatic stops should be received by the city. Third, a registry should be created in which communities can report police encounters.[43] Torres calls for more comprehensive data in stop and frisk reports.[41] Specifically, since Latinos can also be white and black, current data is not as accurate.
Data collection
[edit]The following states require stop-and-frisk data collection:[36]
Using public record requests, the Stanford Open Policing project amassed 60 million state traffic stops in 20 states over the period 2011 through 2015.[45][46]
North Carolina was the first state in the country to require the release of all traffic stop data starting in 2000.[47] Researchers have analysed 20 million traffic stops from this data finding that African Americans as a share of the population were twice as likely to be pulled over than whites and four times as likely to be searched. Hispanics were not more likely to be pulled over, but had a higher likelihood of being searched.[48]
There is a push to release more open police data nationwide. In 2015, the White House launched the Police Data Initiative which, as of 2018[update], has 130 participating police departments, some of which provide data sets on stop-and-frisk.[49][50] The 130 departments cover 15% of the population.[51]
See also
[edit]Notes
[edit]References
[edit]- ^ "Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)". Google Scholar. Retrieved September 11, 2019.
- ^ "United States v. Sokolow, 490 US 1, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989)". Google Scholar. Retrieved September 11, 2019. ("In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 30 (1968), we held that the police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity "may be afoot," even if the officer lacks probable cause.")
- ^ Barry Friedman, Tracey Meares, and Charles H. Ramsey, moderated by Jeffrey Rosen. A Discussion on Privacy and Policing at the National Constitution Center (Video). Philadelphia, PA: National Constitution Center. Archived from the original on December 12, 2021.
- ^ Gorman, Michael J. (2007). "Survey: State Search and Seizure Analogs" (PDF). Mississippi Law Journal. 77.
- ^ a b c d e f g Hutchins, Renee (2013). "Stop Terry: Reasonable Suspicion, Race, and a Proposal to Limit Terry Stops". Digital Commons.
- ^ Pettit, Becky; Gutierrez, Carmen (May 2018). "Mass Incarceration and Racial Inequality". American Journal of Economics and Sociology. 77 (3–4): 1153–1182. doi:10.1111/ajes.12241. PMC 9540942. PMID 36213171.
- ^ Stelzner, Luis G. (1980). "The Fourth Amendment: The Reasonableness and Warrant Clauses". New Mexico Law Review. 10 (1).
- ^ "Terry v. Ohio". Oyez. Retrieved November 13, 2018.
- ^ a b c d Samaha, Joel (2011). Criminal Procedure (8th ed.). Cengage Learning. ISBN 978-1133171171.
- ^ Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968).
- ^ a b c d e f g h Alpert, Geoffrey P.; Macdonald, John M.; Dunham, Roger G. (May 2005). "Police Suspicion and Discretionary Decision Making During Citizen Stops". Criminology. 43 (2): 407–434. doi:10.1111/j.0011-1348.2005.00012.x. ISSN 0011-1384.
- ^ Susskind, R.S. (1993). "Race, Reasonable Articulable Suspicion, and Seizure". American Criminal Law Review. 31: 327. Retrieved November 13, 2018.
- ^ a b c d e f g Cooper, Hannah; Moore, Lisa; Gruskin, Sofia; Krieger, Nancy (July 2004). "Characterizing Perceived Police Violence: Implications for Public Health". American Journal of Public Health. 94 (7): 1109–1118. doi:10.2105/ajph.94.7.1109. ISSN 0090-0036. PMC 1448406. PMID 15226128.
- ^ Hess, Kären M.; Orthmann, Christine Hess (2010), Criminal Investigation (9th ed.), p. 100
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Bandes, Susan A.; Pryor, Marie; Kerrison, Erin M.; Goff, Phillip Atiba (March 2019). "The mismeasure of Terry stops: Assessing the psychological and emotional harms of stop and frisk to individuals and communities". Behavioral Sciences & the Law. 37 (2): 176–194. doi:10.1002/bsl.2401. ISSN 0735-3936. PMID 30912171. S2CID 85518215.
- ^ Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (2d Cir. 1972) ("Here, the information from the informant had enough indicia of reliability to justify the officer's forcible stop of petitioner and the protective seizure of the weapon, which afforded reasonable ground for the search incident to the arrest that ensued").
- ^ Harris, David A. (1994). "Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry" (PDF). UC Davis Law Review. 28 (1).
- ^ United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (6th Cir. 1985) ("If a 'wanted flyer' has been issued on the basis of articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the person wanted has committed an offense, then reliance on that flyer justifies a stop to check identification, to pose questions, or to detain the person briefly while attempting to obtain further information").
- ^ Weiss, Rachel S. (2009). "Defining the Contours of United States v. Hensley: Limiting the Use of Terry Stops for Completed Misdemeanors". Cornell Law Review. 94 (5).
- ^ Bernache, Damien (2008). "The 'High-Crime Area' Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis". American University Law Review. 57 (6).
- ^ Nederhood, Robert (2005). "All or Nothing: The Supreme Court Answers the Question What's in a Name". Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology. 95 (3).
- ^ "Stop and Identify Statutes in the United States" (PDF). Immigrant Legal Resource Center. February 1, 2018. Retrieved April 21, 2021.
- ^ "Close Encounters of the Police Kind". New York State Bar Association. p. 1. Archived from the original (PDF) on October 27, 2023. Retrieved June 18, 2022.
- ^ "People v Ddebour".
- ^ New York Court of Appeals (June 15, 1976). "People v De Bour". nycourts.gov. Archived from the original on October 27, 2023. Retrieved October 27, 2023.
- ^ Writing for the court in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) Justice Stewart stated,
Our conclusion that no seizure occurred is not affected by the fact that the respondent was not expressly told by the agents that she was free to decline to cooperate with their inquiry, for the voluntariness of her responses does not depend upon her having been so informed.
— 446 U.S. at 555
- ^ "Consensual Encounters". Police Magazine. February 5, 2016. Retrieved December 16, 2018.
- ^ Argiriou, Steven. "Terry Frisk Update" (PDF). Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. Retrieved November 13, 2018.
- ^ Terry Frisk Update (PDF) (Report). Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers.
- ^ Gandy, Imani (October 7, 2016). "Boom! Lawyered: Stop-and-Frisk Edition". Rewire.News. Retrieved November 13, 2018.
- ^ Loewy, Arnold H. (2010). "Knowing 'Consent' Means 'Knowing Consent' – The Underappreciated Wisdom of Justice Marshall's Schneckloth v. Bustamonte Dissent" (PDF). Mississippi Law Journal. 79 (1).
- ^ Burke, Alafair S. (2016). "Consent Searches and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness". Florida Law Review. 67 (2).
- ^ Dery, George M. III (1998). "'When Will This Traffic Stop End?': The United States Supreme Court's Dodge of Every Detained Motorist's Central Concern—Ohio v. Robinette". Florida State University Law Review. 25 (3).
- ^ Neath, Scarlet. "Redesigning Public Safety: Traffic Safety". Center for Policing Equity. Retrieved May 17, 2023.
- ^ Harris, David A. (1997). "Driving While Black and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops". Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. 87 (2): 544–582. doi:10.2307/1143954. JSTOR 1143954.
- ^ a b "Born Suspect: Stop-and-Frisk Abuses & the Continued Fight to End Racial Profiling in America" (PDF). NAACP. 2014.[permanent dead link]
- ^ Correll, Joshua; Park, Bernadette; Judd, Charles M.; Wittenbrink, Bernd (December 30, 2004), "The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals", Social Cognition, Psychology Press, pp. 451–469, doi:10.4324/9780203496398-28, ISBN 978-0-203-49639-8, retrieved April 27, 2021
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Goel, Sharad; Rao, Justin M.; Shroff, Ravi (March 1, 2016). "Precinct or prejudice? Understanding racial disparities in New York City's stop-and-frisk policy". The Annals of Applied Statistics. 10 (1). doi:10.1214/15-aoas897. ISSN 1932-6157.
- ^ a b c Kramer, Rory; Remster, Brianna (2018). "Stop, Frisk, and Assault? Racial Disparities in Police Use of Force During Investigatory Stops". Law & Society Review. 52 (4): 960–993. doi:10.1111/lasr.12366. ISSN 1540-5893. S2CID 149764658.
- ^ a b c d e Cooper, Frank (January 1, 2009). ""Who's the Man?": Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police Training". Scholarly Works.
- ^ a b c d Torres, Jose (2015). "Race/Ethnicity and Stop-and-Frisk: Past, Present, Future". Sociology Compass. 9 (11): 931–939. doi:10.1111/soc4.12322. ISSN 1751-9020.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Morrow, Weston J.; White, Michael D.; Fradella, Henry F. (May 18, 2017). "After the Stop: Exploring the Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Police Use of Force During Terry Stops". Police Quarterly. 20 (4): 367–396. doi:10.1177/1098611117708791. ISSN 1098-6111. S2CID 149308626.
- ^ a b c Kwate, Naa Oyo A.; Threadcraft, Shatema (2017). "Dying Fast and Dying Slow in Black Space: Stop and Frisk's Public Health Threat and a Comprehensive Necropolitics". Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race. 14 (2): 535–556. doi:10.1017/S1742058X17000169. ISSN 1742-058X. S2CID 149517503.
- ^ a b c d Rios, Victor M.; Prieto, Greg; Ibarra, Jonathan M. (February 2020). "Mano Suave–Mano Dura : Legitimacy Policing and Latino Stop-and-Frisk". American Sociological Review. 85 (1): 58–75. doi:10.1177/0003122419897348. ISSN 0003-1224. S2CID 213659099.
- ^ "Stanford Open Policing project". Stanford Computational Journalism Lab.
- ^ Pierson, Emma (2017). "A large-scale analysis of racial disparities in police stops across the United States". arXiv:1706.05678 [stat.AP].
- ^ "North Carolina Traffic Stop Statistics: Frequently Asked Questions". North Carolina Attorney General.[permanent dead link]
- ^ Baumgartner, Frank R.; Epp, Derek A.; Shoub, Kelsey (2018). Suspect Citizens: What 20 Million Traffic Stops Tell Us About Policing and Race. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1108454049.
- ^ Smith, Megan; Austin Jr, Roy L. (May 18, 2015). "Launching the Police Data Initiative". The White House, President Barack Obama.
- ^ "National Police Foundation Publishes Best Practices Guide for Police Open Data". National Police Foundation. Police Foundation. November 29, 2018.[permanent dead link]
- ^ Jackman, Tom (April 26, 2016). "Only 53 police agencies participating in national push for use of force statistics". Washington Post.
Further reading
[edit]- Katz, Lewis R. (2004). "Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View" (PDF). Mississippi Law Journal. 74. Archived from the original (PDF) on November 14, 2018. Retrieved November 26, 2018.
- Meares, Tracey L. (2015). "Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident". The University of Chicago Law Review. 82 (1).
- Rubin, John. "Police Investigation: Stops, Searches, and Arrests". Indigent Defense Manuals. UNC School of Government. Retrieved January 22, 2019.
External links
[edit]- United States Supreme Court - Terry v. Ohio - Court Documents
Terry stop
View on GrokipediaHistorical and Legal Foundations
Precedents and Early Practices
Prior to the 1968 Terry v. Ohio decision, police authority to stop and frisk suspicious persons in the United States derived primarily from English common law traditions, where night watchmen and constables possessed the power to detain individuals appearing suspicious, particularly after dark, to inquire about their business and prevent crime. This practice carried over to colonial America through watch and ward systems in cities like Boston and New York, where constables could question and briefly detain persons loitering or behaving suspiciously under local ordinances aimed at maintaining public order. By the early 19th century, as modern urban police departments formed—such as in Boston in 1838 and New York in 1845—officers routinely stopped individuals for vagrancy, loitering, or disorderly conduct, often leading to frisks for weapons if the person seemed dangerous, though these actions lacked uniform constitutional guidelines and relied on state statutes or common law.[7] In the early 20th century, amid rising urbanization and crime in industrial cities, police departments expanded field stops of suspicious persons as a preventive measure, frequently targeting transients, immigrants, or those in high-crime areas under broad loitering laws. For instance, New York City police conducted aggressive interrogations of "undesirables" to deter petty crime, documenting encounters on field cards to build intelligence files.[8] These practices varied by jurisdiction, with some departments formalizing them in manuals that permitted pat-downs for officer safety when suspicion of armament existed, but admissibility of resulting evidence often hinged on state court interpretations rather than federal standards.[8] A significant codification effort came with the Uniform Arrest Act, drafted in 1942 by the Interstate Commission on Crime Prevention to standardize procedures across states. The Act authorized officers to stop any person in a public place "when there is reasonable ground to suspect that he has committed a felony" or to demand identification from those unable to account for themselves, and explicitly permitted a frisk for weapons if the officer reasonably believed the person was armed and dangerous. While not universally adopted, it influenced legislation in states like California, Illinois, and Delaware, providing a model for brief detentions up to two hours and limited searches, which helped legitimize pre-arrest investigative stops amid post-World War II concerns over urban crime and police efficiency. By the 1950s and early 1960s, major departments such as those in Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Cleveland employed "field interrogation" routines, logging thousands of stops annually to gather information and recover weapons, though these often sparked complaints of overreach, particularly in minority communities.[8]Terry v. Ohio (1968)
In Cleveland, Ohio, on October 31, 1963, Detective Martin McFadden, an experienced plainclothes officer with 39 years of service, observed petitioner John W. Terry and two other men—Richard Chilton and Katz—repeatedly pacing back and forth in front of Zelman's jewelry store while peering inside and conferring with each other, behavior McFadden inferred from his expertise indicated they were casing the store for an armed robbery.[1] Approaching the trio on the street, McFadden identified himself as a police officer, spun Terry around, and patted down his outer clothing, discovering a .38-caliber revolver in Terry's left overcoat pocket; similar frisks of Chilton and Katz yielded additional concealed pistols, leading to their arrests for carrying concealed weapons in violation of Ohio law.[1] [2] Terry and Chilton were convicted at trial in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, with sentences of up to three years for Terry and one to ten years for Chilton; the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Ohio Supreme Court denied further appeal, finding no substantial constitutional question presented.[1] [9] The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on March 13, 1967, to resolve whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits investigative stops and protective frisks short of probable cause for arrest, specifically addressing the admissibility of evidence from such encounters in a street confrontation between citizens and police.[1] In an 8-1 decision authored by Chief Justice Earl Warren and issued on June 10, 1968, the Court held that where a police officer observes unusual conduct leading to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, the officer may briefly stop the suspect and conduct a limited frisk for weapons if the officer reasonably believes the individual is armed and presently dangerous, provided the frisk is confined to an outer clothing pat-down necessary for officer safety and does not extend to a full search for evidence of crime.[1] [2] The Court rejected applying the full probable cause standard from cases like Henry v. United States (1960), which required belief a crime had been committed, reasoning instead that street encounters demand a balancing of the government's interests in effective crime prevention, officer safety, and public security against the individual's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.[1] The majority emphasized an objective test based on the totality of circumstances: the stop must rest on specific, articulable facts, rather than a mere hunch, that would warrant a prudent person in believing intervention was necessary, while the frisk requires separate reasonable suspicion of danger from weapons, limited to discovering items that could be used offensively rather than probing for contraband or evidence.[1] Applying this to the facts, the Court found McFadden's observations of the men's furtive movements, trained gaze into the store window, and mutual consultations provided reasonable suspicion for the stop, and the experienced officer's belief that such robbers often arm themselves justified the limited frisk, rendering the seized revolvers admissible.[1] Justice Douglas dissented alone, arguing the ruling effectively authorized judicially unsupervised police discretion to seize and search without warrant or probable cause, inverting Fourth Amendment protections by granting officers broader authority than magistrates possess and risking abuse in pretextual or discriminatory stops.[10] Justices Harlan and White concurred, with Harlan elaborating a two-pronged inquiry—reasonable suspicion for the stop and additional grounds for the frisk—that later became the prevailing framework, while White stressed the empirical reality of armed street crime necessitating such measures for police survival.[1] [10] Justice Black concurred in the judgment but disavowed portions of the opinion discussing historical intrusions like common-law "stop and frisk," insisting the Fourth Amendment's text alone sufficed without extraneous justifications.[9]Evolution of the Reasonable Suspicion Standard
The reasonable suspicion standard, articulated in Terry v. Ohio (1968), permits law enforcement officers to conduct brief investigatory stops and limited frisks when they possess specific, articulable facts, viewed through the lens of trained experience, that criminal activity may be afoot, a threshold lower than probable cause but requiring more than an inchoate hunch.[11] This standard emerged as a balance between individual privacy under the Fourth Amendment and public safety needs, allowing stops based on objective observations rather than requiring certainty of guilt.[10] Contemporaneous cases refined its application: in Sibron v. New York (1968), the Court limited frisks to situations where officers reasonably suspect the subject is armed and dangerous, rejecting broad searches under the guise of investigation. Subsequent decisions expanded the factual bases for reasonable suspicion while emphasizing reliability. In Adams v. Williams (1972), the Court upheld a stop initiated by a known informant's tip about a concealed weapon and narcotics, holding that such information from a reliable source can furnish the necessary suspicion, even without direct corroboration at the scene, as it aligns with Terry's allowance for officer protection.[12] By United States v. Cortez (1981), the standard evolved to require a "totality of the circumstances" assessment, incorporating not just isolated facts but also rational inferences drawn from context, such as patterns of behavior in known smuggling areas, to determine if suspicion is objectively reasonable.[13] The 1990s and 2000s further clarified the standard's flexibility with informant reliability and behavioral cues. Alabama v. White (1990) established that an anonymous tip can support reasonable suspicion if sufficiently corroborated by independent police verification, such as predicting specific details like a vehicle's route and occupant description, thereby providing indicia of reliability under the totality test.[14] In Illinois v. Wardlow (2000), unprovoked flight upon sighting officers in a high-crime area was deemed a strong indicator of wrongdoing, contributing substantially to reasonable suspicion, though mere presence in such areas alone is insufficient.[15] United States v. Arvizu (2002) rejected rigid, checklist-based reviews of factors, mandating courts defer to officers' holistic judgments based on experience, such as unusual travel patterns and evasion, to avoid fragmenting the totality analysis and undermining practical enforcement.[16] These rulings collectively broadened the standard's evidentiary scope while anchoring it in objective, contextual reasoning, though critics note the inherent subjectivity risks overreach absent rigorous judicial scrutiny.[17]Core Legal Elements
Criteria for Initiating a Stop
A Terry stop may be initiated when a law enforcement officer observes specific and articulable facts, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant a belief that criminal activity may be afoot.[11] This standard, articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), permits brief detention without probable cause or a warrant, provided the suspicion exceeds a mere hunch or generalized feeling.[18] The Supreme Court emphasized that such facts must be objectively verifiable, drawing from the officer's observations rather than subjective intuition alone.[19] Reasonable suspicion is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the stop, incorporating the officer's training, experience, and rational inferences from the context.[20] For instance, behaviors such as evasive actions in a high-crime area, proximity to a recently reported crime matching the suspect's description, or unusual bulges suggesting concealed weapons can contribute to reasonable suspicion when combined.[21] However, isolated factors like presence in a high-crime neighborhood or minority status alone do not suffice, as courts require particularized suspicion tied to the individual rather than categorical assumptions.[22] The threshold remains lower than probable cause, which demands a fair probability of criminal activity, but it demands more than "an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch'" to justify the seizure.[11] Subsequent rulings, such as United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), reinforced that suspicion arises from a "whole picture" of facts, allowing officers to act on predictive judgments grounded in experience without waiting for probable cause to develop.[18] Courts reviewing stops assess whether a reasonable officer could have perceived the facts as indicative of wrongdoing, often deferring to articulated rationales unless clearly pretextual or unsupported.[19]Distinction from Probable Cause and Arrest
A Terry stop authorizes a brief investigatory detention based on reasonable suspicion, defined as specific, articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences, indicate possible criminal activity or immediate danger to officer safety, rather than the higher threshold of probable cause required for arrests or warrantless searches.[11][10] Probable cause necessitates facts establishing a fair probability that a crime has occurred and the individual perpetrated it, sufficient to issue an arrest warrant or justify seizure of evidence, as articulated in cases like Mallory v. United States (354 U.S. 449, 1957).[19] This distinction preserves Fourth Amendment protections by limiting intrusions to those proportionate to the government's interest in crime prevention and officer safety, without permitting full custodial arrests on mere suspicion.[2] Unlike an arrest, which imposes a formal, custodial restraint on liberty—often involving transportation to a station, booking, and Miranda warnings for interrogation—a Terry stop remains temporary and non-custodial, focused solely on confirming or dispelling suspicions through minimal inquiry or a protective frisk.[23][24] Courts assess the stop's validity by its duration and intrusiveness; excessive prolongation without developing probable cause transforms it into a de facto arrest, rendering any evidence inadmissible, as emphasized in post-Terry rulings like United States v. Sharpe (470 U.S. 675, 1985), which upheld a 20-minute stop but stressed brevity relative to investigative needs.[25] If probable cause arises during the encounter—such as through observed contraband or admissions—the stop may lawfully escalate to an arrest, but absent such development, release is mandated to avoid Fourth Amendment violations.[21]Scope of Frisk and Protective Search
The scope of a frisk authorized under Terry v. Ohio is narrowly confined to a pat-down of the suspect's outer clothing for the limited purpose of discovering weapons that could endanger the officer or others nearby.[11] This self-protective search requires not only reasonable suspicion for the initial stop but also a separate, articulable basis to believe the individual is armed and presently dangerous, distinguishing it from a general investigatory probe for evidence of crime.[2] The Supreme Court emphasized that the frisk must remain "strictly limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons," prohibiting intrusions into pockets, undergarments, or other areas unless the officer feels an object that immediately suggests a weapon through touch.[11] Courts have invalidated frisks exceeding this boundary, as in Sibron v. New York (1968), where an officer's act of reaching into a suspect's pocket during a pat-down—without first detecting a weapon-like object—transformed the search into an unlawful full intrusion unsupported by probable cause. Similarly, Ybarra v. Illinois (1979) held that a protective frisk cannot extend to bystanders or others without individualized reasonable suspicion of being armed, rejecting blanket applications during premises searches. The "plain feel" doctrine, established in Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993), permits seizure of contraband immediately identifiable as such during a lawful pat-down, but only if the officer's manipulation of clothing stays within the frisk's weapon-focused bounds and does not devolve into a general evidence hunt.[26] Protective searches, as an extension of the Terry frisk rationale, prioritize officer safety by allowing limited sweeps beyond the person in certain contexts, such as the passenger compartment of a vehicle under Michigan v. Long (1983), where accessible areas may be checked if there is reasonable suspicion the suspect is dangerous and could grab a weapon.[27] However, these searches remain temporally and spatially constrained, ending once the immediate threat is dispelled or the stopped individual is secured, and they cannot justify rummaging for non-weapon items without additional justification.[20] Empirical assessments of frisk efficacy, such as those from federal training analyses, underscore that deviations from this scope often lead to suppression of evidence in court, reinforcing the doctrine's emphasis on minimal intrusion calibrated to protective needs rather than evidentiary gains.[26]Case Law Developments
Extensions to Vehicles and Traffic Stops
The reasonable suspicion standard established in Terry v. Ohio extends to brief investigatory detentions of vehicles when officers possess specific, articulable facts suggesting criminal activity, distinguishing such stops from routine traffic enforcement requiring probable cause for observed violations.[28] In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the Supreme Court ruled that random vehicle stops for license and registration checks absent reasonable suspicion violate the Fourth Amendment, emphasizing that investigatory stops must be justified by objective facts indicating potential wrongdoing rather than whim or general enforcement needs.[29] This ruling affirmed that while vehicles enjoy reduced privacy expectations due to mobility, seizures still demand articulable suspicion to balance law enforcement interests against individual liberty.[30] For traffic stops initiated on probable cause, such as observed infractions, the Supreme Court in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), held that an officer's subjective motivations are irrelevant if objective probable cause exists, permitting pretextual enforcement provided the stop aligns with traffic laws.[31] However, Terry principles apply to purely investigatory vehicle encounters, where totality of circumstances—including evasive maneuvers, unusual routes, or matching suspect descriptions—can support a stop without a traffic violation.[32] Extensions beyond the stop's initial mission, such as prolonging detention for unrelated inquiries like dog sniffs, require independent reasonable suspicion, as clarified in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), which prohibited extending routine traffic stops without additional justification to avoid transforming seizures into de facto arrests.[33] Regarding frisks, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), extended Terry's protective search doctrine to vehicles, permitting officers to frisk the passenger compartment during a lawful stop if they reasonably believe the suspect is dangerous and could quickly access weapons within reach.[34] Unlike full vehicle searches under the automobile exception requiring probable cause, Long limited frisks to areas accessible to occupants for officer safety, with any contraband in plain view during the search admissible as evidence.[35] This balances the inherent risks of vehicle stops—where passengers may conceal arms—with Fourth Amendment constraints, restricting searches to protective purposes rather than general evidentiary fishing.[36] Subsequent cases reinforce that vehicle frisks demand particularized suspicion of danger, not mere presence of a vehicle, ensuring they remain narrowly tailored to immediate threats.[37]Limitations on Duration and Intrusiveness
The duration of a Terry stop is constrained by the requirement that it remain a brief investigatory detention rather than evolving into a de facto arrest, which demands probable cause. In United States v. Sharpe (1985), the Supreme Court rejected a rigid time limit, upholding a 20-minute detention as reasonable where officers acted diligently to confirm or dispel suspicions of illegal activity and the suspects' evasive actions contributed to the delay, emphasizing a totality-of-circumstances analysis that balances governmental interests in crime investigation and officer safety against individual liberty.[38] This approach avoids per se rules, as prolonged detentions may still comply with the Fourth Amendment if justified by ongoing reasonable suspicion and efficient police conduct.[38] In the context of traffic stops, which incorporate Terry principles, the Court in Rodriguez v. United States (2015) clarified that officers may not extend the stop beyond the time necessary to address the traffic violation and related safety concerns—such as checking driver's license, registration, and conducting ordinary inquiries—without independent reasonable suspicion.[33] There, a seven-to-eight-minute prolongation for a dog sniff, after the initial mission was complete, violated the Fourth Amendment, as such investigative measures unrelated to the stop's purpose impermissibly seize the driver.[33] Regarding intrusiveness, the frisk authorized under Terry is narrowly limited to a pat-down of the outer clothing to detect concealed weapons, permissible only upon reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed and presently dangerous, thereby protecting officer safety without constituting a full search.[11] The Supreme Court in Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993) established the "plain feel" doctrine, allowing seizure of contraband immediately identifiable by touch during a lawful weapons frisk, analogous to the plain view exception, but prohibiting further manipulation or squeezing of objects to determine their nature, as occurred when an officer exceeded the frisk's protective scope to confirm a lump as cocaine.[39] This ensures the encounter's scope aligns strictly with its investigatory justification, preventing exploratory searches that encroach on privacy interests absent probable cause.[39]Pretextual and Investigative Stops
Pretextual stops involve law enforcement initiating a detention based on facts establishing reasonable suspicion or probable cause for a minor infraction, while harboring an unarticulated intent to investigate unrelated suspected criminal activity.[40] In the framework of Terry v. Ohio, which authorizes brief investigative seizures upon reasonable suspicion of criminal involvement, pretextual motivations do not invalidate the stop if the objective circumstances justify the intrusion under the Fourth Amendment.[11] The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized an objective reasonableness standard, eschewing inquiries into officers' subjective intentions to avoid judicial entanglement in policing motives.[31] The landmark decision in Whren v. United States (1996) addressed pretext in traffic enforcement, ruling unanimously that a stop supported by probable cause for a traffic violation remains constitutional irrespective of the officer's ulterior investigative aims, such as drug interdiction.[31] Although Whren concerned probable cause rather than Terry's reasonable suspicion threshold, federal courts have extended its objective test to investigative stops lacking full probable cause, holding that as long as articulable facts support reasonable suspicion for the initial detention—such as erratic driving or pedestrian loitering indicative of potential crime—the stop withstands scrutiny.[41] This application preserves operational flexibility for officers facing fluid street encounters, where requiring alignment between stated and actual suspicions could hinder effective crime prevention.[42] Investigative stops under Terry inherently serve to confirm or dispel suspicions through brief inquiry or observation, distinguishing them from arrests requiring probable cause.[10] When pretextual, these stops often arise in vehicular contexts, where minor traffic anomalies provide the reasonable suspicion hook for broader probing, as affirmed in cases like Arkansas v. Sullivan (2001), where the Court applied Whren's logic to uphold a stop based on reasonable suspicion of speeding despite investigative ulterior motives.[31] Lower federal circuits consistently reject suppression of evidence from such stops, prioritizing the quantum of suspicion over motivational purity.[43] However, the stop's duration and scope remain constrained by its investigative purpose; prolongation beyond what is reasonably necessary to address the initial suspicion risks tainting subsequent discoveries.[44] Some state courts diverge, invalidating pretextual Terry stops under broader state constitutional protections. For example, the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Ladson (1999) suppressed evidence from a stop initiated for a cracked taillight but aimed at drug investigation, deeming such pretext violations of article I, section 7 of the state constitution, which demands objective reasonableness untethered from arbitrary discretion.[45] This ruling reflects concerns over discriminatory enforcement patterns, though federal precedent governs in U.S. constitutional challenges.[40] Critics of the federal approach argue it enables racial profiling by insulating stops from intent-based review, yet empirical analyses indicate pretextual mechanisms facilitate contraband recovery without necessitating probable cause thresholds that could impede transient investigations.[41]Practical Applications
Pedestrian Encounters
In Terry v. Ohio (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court established the constitutionality of brief investigative stops of pedestrians based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, originating from an encounter where Cleveland police observed two individuals repeatedly pacing and peering into store windows before casing a potential robbery target.[11] The officer approached the suspects on foot, announced his presence, and conducted a limited pat-down frisk after identifying himself, uncovering concealed firearms that provided probable cause for arrest.[2] This ruling permits officers to detain pedestrians temporarily for questioning when specific, articulable facts suggest involvement in or imminent commission of a crime, drawing from the totality of circumstances rather than mere hunches.[46] Subsequent case law has refined pedestrian stops by emphasizing behavioral indicators in context. In Illinois v. Wardlow (2000), the Court held that unprovoked flight upon sighting police in a high-crime area known for narcotics distribution constitutes reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop, as Wardlow's evasive actions while holding a bag in such a locale justified pursuit, detention, and a protective frisk yielding a loaded handgun.[15] Similarly, evasive maneuvers like sudden turns away from officers or furtive gestures suggesting concealment of contraband can support initiation, provided they are not isolated from other objective factors such as matching a suspect description or presence during a reported incident.[47] Officers must articulate these bases post-hoc, as courts evaluate whether the suspicion was particularized to the individual rather than generalized to a neighborhood.[19] The scope of pedestrian encounters remains narrowly tailored to investigative needs, limiting frisks to outer clothing pats for weapons if the officer reasonably believes the subject is armed and poses a danger, without extending to full searches absent probable cause.[26] Detention duration must be minimal—typically minutes—to confirm or dispel suspicion, as prolonged holds without escalating evidence violate the Fourth Amendment, as clarified in cases prohibiting fishing expeditions.[48] In practice, these stops often involve commands to halt, identification requests (upheld in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada (2004) for states with "stop and identify" statutes), and visual observations for bulges or anomalies warranting further action.[21] Empirical analyses of millions of street stops indicate that pedestrian Terry encounters frequently yield weapons or contraband when suspicion aligns with behavioral cues like flight or high-crime context, though low overall "hit rates" underscore the doctrine's balance between public safety and individual liberty.[49] Departments deploy these tactics in proactive policing, such as foot patrols targeting drug markets or violent hotspots, where stops deter crime by disrupting potential offenders, per systematic reviews of high-volume implementations.[3] However, courts invalidate stops lacking individualized justification, emphasizing that mere presence in suspicious areas or minority demographics alone insufficiently grounds reasonable suspicion.[50]Vehicle and Traffic Enforcement
In vehicle and traffic enforcement, principles from Terry v. Ohio permit law enforcement officers to initiate brief investigatory stops of motorists upon reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation or related criminal activity, treating the stop as a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.[1] The Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse (1979) ruled that random or arbitrary vehicle stops without specific, articulable facts indicating a violation are unconstitutional, requiring individualized suspicion to justify the intrusion.[29] This standard ensures stops are not mere fishing expeditions but targeted interventions based on observed infractions, such as speeding, failure to signal, or equipment defects.[51] Subsequent rulings clarified the scope of such stops. In Whren v. United States (1996), the Court held that an officer's subjective motivations, including pretextual intent to investigate unrelated crimes, do not invalidate a stop if there exists probable cause—or equivalently, reasonable suspicion—for a traffic violation, emphasizing objective reasonableness over intent.[31] For officer safety, Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977) authorizes requiring the driver to exit the vehicle during a lawful stop without additional suspicion, a de minimis intrusion outweighed by the risk of hidden threats; this was extended to passengers in Maryland v. Wilson (1997).[52] Protective frisks of the vehicle's passenger compartment are permissible under Michigan v. Long (1983) if officers reasonably believe it contains a weapon accessible to occupants.[34] The duration of traffic stops must remain reasonable and tied to the stop's "mission"—addressing the violation through checks of license, registration, and warrants—without undue prolongation absent further suspicion, as affirmed in Rodriguez v. United States (2015).[33] In practice, these stops facilitate enforcement of traffic laws, with officers issuing warnings, citations, or arrests; for instance, Bureau of Justice Statistics data from 2022 indicate that traffic-related police contacts affected millions, with outcomes including 43% citations and 9% no enforcement action.[53] Such encounters also yield contraband recoveries, though search rates are low (around 2-5% of stops), with contraband found in approximately 20-30% of those searches per analyses of large datasets.[54] Empirical evidence underscores dual roles in safety and crime control: traffic stops contribute to officer safety by mitigating ambush risks through exit orders and frisks, while enabling discoveries of unlicensed drivers, impaired operators, and hidden weapons or drugs.[55] Studies show investigative traffic stops recover contraband and deter crime in high-risk areas, though low overall hit rates (under 1% of stops yielding seizures) have fueled debates on efficiency; nonetheless, targeted enforcement correlates with reduced violent incidents in some jurisdictions.[3]Integration with Broader Policing Strategies
Terry stops, authorized under the reasonable suspicion standard established in Terry v. Ohio (1968), serve as a foundational tool in proactive policing strategies aimed at preventing crime rather than merely responding to it after occurrence. These brief investigative detentions allow officers to interrupt potential criminal activity in real time, integrating with broader approaches by enabling targeted interventions based on observed behaviors indicative of imminent threats, such as furtive movements or presence in high-risk contexts.[56] Empirical analyses indicate that such stops, when deployed systematically, contribute to crime reductions by deterring opportunistic offenses and facilitating the recovery of weapons or contraband that might otherwise enable violence.[3] In broken windows policing, which emphasizes swift enforcement of low-level disorders to prevent escalation to serious crimes, Terry stops play a central role by allowing officers to address visible signs of disorder—such as loitering or suspicious casing of property—without requiring probable cause for arrest.[57] This strategy, implemented notably in New York City during the 1990s under Commissioner William Bratton, relied on high volumes of pedestrian stops to signal intolerance for minor infractions, correlating with observed declines in overall violent crime rates from 1990 to 1999, during which homicides dropped by approximately 70%. However, the approach demands disciplined application to avoid diluting the reasonable suspicion threshold, as unchecked expansion risks eroding public trust without proportional safety gains.[58] Hot spots policing further embeds Terry stops within data-driven deployments to micro-geographic areas with concentrated crime, where officers use reasonable suspicion to conduct stops that disrupt patterns of repeat victimization or offender activity.[59] Systematic reviews of randomized controlled trials show that intensified stop activity in these locales yields statistically significant reductions in total crime, with effect sizes averaging a 15-20% drop in incidents, often accompanied by diffusion of benefits to adjacent untreated areas due to displaced offenders facing heightened scrutiny.[3] This integration leverages crime mapping and analytics to prioritize stops, enhancing efficiency over random patrols, though success hinges on focusing on empirically validated indicators like temporal clustering of incidents rather than demographic proxies alone.[60] Beyond these, Terry stops support intelligence-led and problem-oriented policing by generating actionable data on suspects, networks, and hotspots through field interrogation observations (FIOs), which inform predictive models without necessitating arrests.[61] For instance, aggregated stop data has been used to identify prolific offenders in programs like Chicago's Strategic Subjects List, where reasonable suspicion encounters contribute to resource allocation that targets high-risk individuals, reducing gun violence by up to 23% in evaluated interventions.[62] Such applications underscore the stop's versatility in causal chains of prevention, provided they adhere to articulated, behavior-based justifications to maintain legal integrity.[48]Empirical Impacts on Public Safety
Evidence of Crime Deterrence and Reduction
A systematic review and meta-analysis of 40 studies on police-initiated pedestrian stops, including those akin to Terry stops, found statistically significant crime reductions in treatment areas, with a 13% decrease in overall crime relative to controls (95% confidence interval: -16% to -9%, p < 0.001).[3] These interventions, often deployed in high-crime hotspots, showed no evidence of spatial displacement of crime; instead, adjacent areas experienced a 7% crime drop (95% CI: -9% to -4%, p < 0.001).[3] The analysis covered diverse contexts, primarily urban settings, and emphasized that such stops enhance deterrence through increased perceived risk of apprehension, aligning with economic models of crime where certainty of detection outweighs severity of punishment.[3] The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine's 2018 report on proactive policing concluded that strategies incorporating pedestrian stops, such as stop-question-and-frisk (SQF) tactics, demonstrate promising evidence of crime control, particularly when focused on high-risk places and times.[63] For instance, SQF's person-focused approach yielded modest reductions in violent crime in evaluated programs, though the committee noted the evidence base is stronger for place-based applications like hotspot policing, where stops form a core component alongside patrols.[63] Complementary meta-analyses of hotspot interventions, which frequently utilize Terry-authorized stops, report consistent declines in total crime and disorder, with effect sizes indicating 20-30% relative reductions in targeted zones without spillover increases elsewhere.[64] These findings counter claims of negligible impact by highlighting causal mechanisms like opportunity denial and general deterrence, supported by randomized trials and quasi-experimental designs that control for confounding factors such as concurrent policing changes.[3] However, effect heterogeneity exists, with stronger outcomes in youth-involved crime and U.S. contexts versus Europe, underscoring the need for targeted implementation to maximize benefits.[3] Academic sources skeptical of broad efficacy, often from advocacy-oriented analyses, tend to overlook these aggregated results, which derive from rigorous, peer-reviewed evaluations rather than correlational citywide trends.[3]Officer Safety Outcomes
The Terry v. Ohio (1968) decision authorizes protective frisks during investigatory stops when officers possess reasonable suspicion that the subject is armed and presently dangerous, explicitly to neutralize threats to officer safety. This rationale stems from the recognition that encounters with potentially armed individuals pose acute risks, as evidenced by FBI Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) data documenting felonious deaths frequently occurring during traffic-related or pedestrian enforcement actions, where 88% of such killings from 2010–2020 involved gunfire and 92.8% transpired before full subject approach.[65] Aggregate LEOKA statistics reveal persistent vulnerabilities: in 2023, agencies reported 79,091 assaults on officers, the highest decennial rate, with subsets involving traffic pursuits, stops, or investigatory contacts contributing notably to injuries from hands, fists, or weapons.[66] For instance, in 2019, 6 officers sustained injuries from firearms, knives, or cutting instruments specifically during traffic-related incidents.[67] However, per-stop risks remain low; an analysis of over 6.5 million routine traffic stops (encompassing Terry-applicable scenarios) found felonious killings in 1 per approximately 1.3 million stops and serious injury assaults in 1 per 361,111 stops, underscoring that while dangers exist, most encounters resolve without violence.[41] Weapon recoveries via frisks provide a direct, albeit infrequent, safety mechanism. In New York City, where stop-and-frisk practices peaked pre-2013, officers recovered weapons (guns, knives, or other) in 1.9% of frisks conducted in 2011 across 381,704 instances, with firearms comprising a smaller subset—often under 1% of total stops citywide.[68] [69] Similar patterns hold elsewhere: in Washington, D.C., gun seizures occurred in about 1% of stops from 2022–2023.[70] These yields, while modest, have disarmed individuals in scenarios where immediate threats were probable, preventing potential uses against officers, though comprehensive causal studies tying frisk volumes to averted injuries are limited by the inherent difficulty in measuring null events (e.g., unmanifested attacks).[3] Proponents of expanded Terry authority argue that even low recovery rates justify frisks in targeted, high-suspicion contexts, as unfrisked armed subjects elevate ambush risks, corroborated by LEOKA patterns of pre-approach shootings.[56] Critics, including analyses from advocacy groups, contend the low hit rates indicate overreach with negligible aggregate safety gains, potentially eroding trust without proportionally reducing officer harms.[69] Absent randomized policy trials, outcomes reflect a balance where frisks mitigate discrete risks but do not demonstrably lower overall assault trends amid rising totals.[66]Recovery of Contraband and Weapons
In jurisdictions employing high volumes of Terry stops, empirical data indicate recoveries of illegal firearms numbering in the hundreds to over a thousand annually, alongside substantial contraband seizures, though per-stop yield rates for weapons remain low at typically under 1%. For instance, in New York City, stop-question-and-frisk (SQF) practices recovered 627 firearms from 160,851 documented stops in 2003, equating to a 0.39% gun yield rate.[71] By 2011, amid 685,724 stops—the program's peak—firearm recovery rates fell below 0.2%, yet still yielded an estimated 1,000 or more guns based on aggregated NYPD reports, demonstrating scale-dependent impacts despite declining efficiency.[72][73] Contraband yields, encompassing narcotics and other illegal items, exhibit higher rates than weapons alone, often 2-3% of frisks conducted during stops. Analysis of New York Police Department data from 2004 to 2010 revealed contraband discoveries in 29.7 to 38.6 per 1,000 frisks, with total findings rising 101% over the period amid increased frisk volume, though per-frisk efficiency declined.[74] These outcomes stem from frisks authorized only upon reasonable suspicion of armament, limiting blanket searches but enabling targeted recoveries; for example, predictive modeling of NYC SQF data shows that the most suspicious half of stops accounted for 83% of guns recovered, underscoring the value of articulated indicators in prioritizing effective interventions.[75] In other U.S. cities, similar patterns emerge, with weapon recoveries tied to proactive stop volumes but constrained by low hit rates. Baltimore Police Department searches in 2012, a subset of Terry-authorized actions, yielded 9 guns from 494 instances (1.8% rate), primarily drugs otherwise.[76] Washington, D.C., recorded gun seizures in about 1% of pedestrian stops from 2022 to 2023, per Metropolitan Police data, reflecting localized variations influenced by enforcement intensity and crime patterns.[70] Such recoveries, while modest per encounter, aggregate to meaningful public safety contributions in weapon-saturated environments, as evidenced by post-reduction declines in seizures correlating with reduced stop frequencies.[77]Demographic and Outcome Patterns
Statistical Disparities in Stop Rates
Analysis of nearly 100 million traffic stops collected by the Stanford Open Policing Project, covering 21 states from 2001 to 2017, indicates that Black drivers faced stop rates about 20% higher than White drivers relative to their proportion of the local residential population.[78] This disparity was consistent across jurisdictions, with Black drivers comprising a larger share of stops than their population percentage in most datasets analyzed.[79] For state patrol stops specifically, the annual per-capita stop rate stood at 0.10 for Black drivers versus 0.07 for White drivers.[79] Pedestrian Terry stops exhibit similar patterns in major urban areas. In New York City, data from the NYPD's stop-and-frisk practices in 2010 showed White individuals accounting for only 10% of stops despite representing approximately one-third of the population, while Black residents, 25% of the population, were stopped at substantially higher rates alongside Latinos at 28% of the population.[80] Between 2003 and 2013, Black and Latino individuals together comprised over 80% of all documented stops, exceeding their combined population share of under 50%.[81] A self-reported survey of New Yorkers aged 18-34 from 2013-2019 found that 47% of Black respondents and 45% of Hispanic/Latino respondents experienced at least one stop-and-frisk, compared to 38% of White respondents.[82] In Ferguson, Missouri, a 2015 U.S. Department of Justice investigation of police data from 2012-2014 determined that African Americans, 67% of the local population, accounted for 73% of traffic stops, with even higher representation in subsequent enforcement actions like searches (80%).[83] These figures contributed to the report's conclusion of disparate impact in stop initiation and outcomes.[83]| Jurisdiction/Study | Demographic Group | Stop Rate Relative to Population Share |
|---|---|---|
| Stanford Open Policing Project (National Traffic Stops, 2001-2017) | Black drivers | ~20% higher than Whites[78] |
| NYPD Stop-and-Frisk (2010 Pedestrian Stops) | Whites | 10% of stops vs. ~33% population[80] |
| Ferguson PD (2012-2014 Traffic Stops) | African Americans | 73% of stops vs. 67% population[83] |
