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Anti-Chinese sentiment
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Anti-Chinese sentiment or Sinophobia refers to prejudice, hatred, hostility, and discrimination that is directed towards Chinese people or Chinese culture.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
It is frequently directed at Chinese minorities which live outside Greater China and it involves immigration, nationalism, political ideologies, disparity of wealth, in-group loyalty, the past tributary system of Imperial China, majority-minority relations, imperial legacies, and racism.[7][8][9][note 1]
A variety of popular cultural clichés and negative stereotypes of Chinese people have existed around the world since the twentieth century, and they are frequently conflated with a variety of popular cultural clichés and negative stereotypes of other Asian ethnic groups, known as the Yellow Peril.[12] Some individuals may harbor prejudice or hatred against Chinese people due to history, racism, modern politics, cultural differences, propaganda, or ingrained stereotypes,[12][13] often fuelled by reports of uncouth behavior from some Chinese nationals.[14][15]
The COVID-19 pandemic led to a resurgence of Sinophobia, the manifestations of it ranged from covert acts of discrimination such as microaggression and stigmatization, exclusion and shunning, to more overt forms of discrimination, such as outright verbal abuse and physical violence.[16][17][18][19][20]
Statistics and background
[edit]| Country polled | Favorable | Unfavorable | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| -73 | |||
| -61 | |||
| -59 | |||
| -56 | |||
| -53 | |||
| -38 | |||
| -36 | |||
| -33 | |||
| -29 | |||
| -26 | |||
| -22 | |||
| -21 | |||
| -17 | |||
| -16 | |||
| -8 | |||
| -7 | |||
| +9 | |||
| +11 | |||
| +15 | |||
| +20 | |||
| +21 | |||
| +22 | |||
| +33 | |||
| +52 | |||
| +68 |
| Country polled | Positive | Negative | Neutral | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| +69 | ||||
| +65 | ||||
| +58 | ||||
| +48 | ||||
| +35 | ||||
| +34 | ||||
| +34 | ||||
| +31 | ||||
| +29 | ||||
| +28 | ||||
| +26 | ||||
| +24 | ||||
| +14 | ||||
| +12 | ||||
| +11 | ||||
| +5 | ||||
| 0 | ||||
| -1 | ||||
| -7 | ||||
| -8 | ||||
| -16 | ||||
| -20 | ||||
| -26 | ||||
| -30 | ||||
| -33 | ||||
| -33 | ||||
| -35 | ||||
| -38 | ||||
| -42 | ||||
| -44 | ||||
| -46 | ||||
| -47 | ||||
| -48 | ||||
| -48 | ||||
| -50 | ||||
| -54 | ||||
| -56 | ||||
| -56 | ||||
| -56 | ||||
| -61 | ||||
| -71 | ||||
| -83 |
In 2013, Pew Research Center from the United States conducted a survey on sinophobia, finding that China was viewed favorably in half (19 of 38) of the nations surveyed, excluding China itself. The highest levels of support came from Asia in Malaysia (81%) and Pakistan (81%); African nations of Kenya (78%), Senegal (77%) and Nigeria (76%); as well as Latin America, particularly in countries heavily engaging with the Chinese market, such as Venezuela (71%), Brazil (65%) and Chile (62%).[23]
Anti-China sentiment
[edit]Anti-China sentiment has remained persistent in the West and other Asian countries: only 28% of Germans and Italians and 37% of Americans viewed China favorably while in Japan, just 5% of respondents had a favorable opinion of the country. 11 of the 38 nations viewed China unfavorably by over 50%. Japan was polled to have the most anti-China sentiment, where 93% saw the People's Republic in a negative light. There were also majorities in Germany (64%), Italy (62%), and Israel (60%) who held negative views of China. Germany saw a large increase of anti-China sentiment, from 33% disfavor in 2006 to 64% in the 2013 survey, with such views existing despite Germany's success in exporting to China.[23]
Positive views of China
[edit]Respondents in the Balkans have held generally positive views of China, according to 2020 polling. An International Republican Institute survey from February to March found that only in Kosovo (75%) did most respondents express an unfavourable opinion of the country, while majorities in Serbia (85%), Montenegro (68%), North Macedonia (56%), and Bosnia (52%) expressed favourable views.[24] A GLOBSEC poll on October found that the highest percentage of those who saw China as a threat were in the Czech Republic (51%), Poland (34%), and Hungary (24%), while it was seen as least threatening in Balkan countries such as Bulgaria (3%), Serbia (13%), and North Macedonia (14%). Reasons for threat perception were generally linked to the country's economic influence.[25]
According to Arab Barometer polls, views of China in the Arab world have been relatively positive, with data from March to April 2021 showing that most respondents in Algeria (65%), Morocco (62%), Libya (60%), Tunisia (59%), and Iraq (56%) held favourable views of the country while views were less favourable in Lebanon (38%) and Jordan (34%).[26]
History
[edit]Looting and sacking of national treasures
[edit]Historical records document the existence of anti-Chinese sentiment throughout the history of China's imperial wars.[27]
Lord Palmerston was responsible for sparking the First Opium War (1839–1842) with Qing China. He considered Chinese culture "uncivilized", and his negative views on China played a significant role in his decision to issue a declaration of war.[28] This disdain became increasingly common throughout the Second Opium War (1856–1860), when repeated attacks against foreign traders in China inflamed anti-Chinese sentiment abroad.[citation needed] Following the defeat of China in the Second Opium War, Lord Elgin, upon his arrival in Peking in 1860, ordered the sacking and burning of China's imperial Summer Palace in vengeance.[citation needed]
Chinese Exclusion Act 1882
[edit]In the United States, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was passed in response to growing Sinophobia. It prohibited all immigration of Chinese laborers and turned those already in the country into second-class persons.[29] The 1882 Act was the first U.S. immigration law to target a specific ethnicity or nationality.[30]: 25 Meanwhile, during the mid-19th century in Peru, Chinese were used as slave labor and they were not allowed to hold any important positions in Peruvian society.[31]

Chinese workers in England
[edit]Chinese workers had been a fixture on London's docks since the mid-eighteenth century, when they arrived as sailors who were employed by the East India Company, importing tea and spices from the Far East. Conditions on those long voyages were so dreadful that many sailors decided to abscond and take their chances on the streets rather than face the return journey. Those who stayed generally settled around the bustling docks, running laundries and small lodging houses for other sailors or selling exotic Asian produce. By the 1880s, a small but recognizable Chinese community had developed in the Limehouse area, increasing Sinophobic sentiments among other Londoners, who feared the Chinese workers might take over their traditional jobs due to their willingness to work for much lower wages and longer hours than other workers in the same industries. The entire Chinese population of London was only in the low hundreds—in a city whose entire population was roughly estimated to be seven million—but nativist feelings ran high, as was evidenced by the Aliens Act 1905, a bundle of legislation which sought to restrict the entry of poor and low-skilled foreign workers.[32] Chinese Londoners also became involved with illegal criminal organisations, further spurring Sinophobic sentiments.[32][33]
By region
[edit]East Asia
[edit]Korea
[edit]Discriminatory views of Chinese people have been reported,[34][35] and ethnic-Chinese Koreans have faced prejudices including what is said, to be a widespread criminal stigma.[36][37] Increased anti-Chinese sentiments had reportedly led to online comments related to violent anti-Chinese racism.[38][36]
Hong Kong
[edit]
Anti-Chinese sentiment in Hong Kong is mostly driven by political opposition to the PRC, but it is also motivated by racist hostility toward mainland Chinese.
In 2012, a group of Hong Kong residents published a newspaper advertisement depicting mainland visitors and immigrants as locusts.[39] In February 2014, about 100 Hong Kongers harassed mainland tourists and shoppers during what they styled an "anti-locust" protest in Kowloon. In response, the Equal Opportunities Commission of Hong Kong proposed an extension of the territory's race-hate laws to cover mainlanders.[40] Strong anti-mainland xenophobia has also been documented amidst the 2019 protests,[41] with reported instances of protesters attacking Mandarin-speakers and mainland-linked businesses.[42][43]
Japan
[edit]A survey in 2017 suggested that 51% of Chinese respondents had experienced tenancy discrimination.[44] Another report in the same year noted a significant bias against Chinese visitors from the media and some of the Japanese locals.[45]
Mongolia
[edit]Mongolian nationalist and Neo-Nazi groups are reported to be hostile to China,[46] and Mongolians traditionally hold unfavorable views of the country.[47] The common stereotype is that China is attempting to undermine Mongolian sovereignty in order to eventually incorporate it into China (the Republic of China has claimed Mongolia as part of its territory, see Outer Mongolia). Fear and hatred of erliiz (Mongolian: эрлийз, [ˈɛrɮiːt͡sə], literally, double seeds), a derogatory term for people of mixed Han Chinese and Mongol ethnicity,[48] is a common phenomena in Mongolian politics. Erliiz are seen as a Chinese plot of genetic pollution to chip away at Mongolian sovereignty, and allegations of Chinese ancestry are used as a political weapon in election campaigns. Several small Neo-Nazi groups opposing Chinese influence and mixed Chinese couples are present within Mongolia, such as Tsagaan Khas.[46]
Taiwan
[edit]In the late 1940s, the anti-mainland Chinese term "The dogs go and the pigs come" (狗去豬來) became popular in Taiwanese society as a result of dissatisfaction with the Republic of China controlled by a one-party system of KMT's rule and the February 28 incident caused by KMT regime.[49]
The English slogan "Say No To China, Say Yes To Taiwan" is often used by Taiwanese independence activists; the term is also related to opposition to the People's Republic of China, but it further denies the Chinese identity, including the Republic of China.[50]
Southeast Asia
[edit]Malaysia
[edit]Due to race-based politics and Bumiputera policy, there had been several incidents of racial conflict between the Malays and Chinese before the 1969 riots. For example, in Penang, hostility between the races turned into violence during the centenary celebration of George Town in 1957 which resulted in several days of fighting and a number of deaths,[51] and there were further disturbances in 1959 and 1964, as well as a riot in 1967 which originated as a protest against currency devaluation but turned into racial killings.[52][53] In Singapore, the antagonism between the races led to the 1964 Race Riots which contributed to the expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia on August 9, 1965. The 13 May Incident was perhaps the deadliest race riot to have occurred in Malaysia with an official combined death toll of 196[54] (143 Chinese, 25 Malays, 13 Indians, and 15 others of undetermined ethnicity),[55] but with higher estimates by other observers reaching around 600-800+ total deaths.[56][57][58]
Malaysia's ethnic quota system has been regarded as discriminatory towards the ethnic Chinese (and Indian) community, in favor of ethnic Malay Muslims,[59] which has reportedly created a brain drain in the country. In 2015, supporters of Najib Razak's party reportedly marched in the thousands through Chinatown to support him, and assert Malay political power with threats to burn down shops, which drew criticism from China's ambassador to Malaysia.[60]
It was reported in 2019 that relations between ethnic Chinese Malaysians and Malays were "at their lowest ebb", and fake news posted online of mainland Chinese indiscriminately receiving citizenship in the country had been stoking racial tensions. The primarily Chinese-based Democratic Action Party in Malaysia has also reportedly faced an onslaught of fake news depicting it as unpatriotic, anti-Malay, and anti-Muslim.[61]
Philippines
[edit]The Spanish introduced the first anti-Chinese laws in the Philippine archipelago. The Spanish massacred or expelled the Chinese several times from Manila, and the Chinese responded by fleeing either to La Pampanga or to territories outside colonial control, particularly the Sulu Sultanate, which they in turn supported in their wars against the Spanish authorities.[62] The Chinese refugees not only ensured that the Sūg people were supplied with the requisite arms but also joined their new compatriots in combat operations against the Spaniards during the centuries of Spanish–Moro conflict.[63]
Furthermore, racial classification from the Spanish and American administrations has labeled ethnic Chinese as alien. This association between 'Chinese' and 'foreigner' have facilitated discrimination against the ethnic Chinese population in the Philippines; many ethnic Chinese were denied citizenship or viewed as antithetical to a Filipino nation-state.[64] In addition to this, Chinese people have been associated with wealth in the background of great economic disparity among the local population. This perception has only contributed to ethnic tensions in the Philippines, with the ethnic Chinese population being portrayed as being a major party in controlling the economy.[64]
Indonesia
[edit]
The Dutch introduced anti-Chinese laws in the Dutch East Indies. The Dutch colonialists started the first massacre of Chinese in the 1740 Batavia massacre in which tens of thousands died. The Java War (1741–43) followed shortly thereafter.[65][66][67][68][69]
The asymmetrical economic position between ethnic Chinese Indonesians and indigenous Indonesians has incited anti-Chinese sentiment among the poorer majorities. During the Indonesian killings of 1965–66, in which more than 500,000 people died (mostly non-Chinese Indonesians),[70] ethnic Chinese were killed and their properties looted and burned as a result of anti-Chinese racism on the excuse that Dipa "Amat" Aidit had brought the PKI closer to China.[71][7] In the May 1998 riots of Indonesia following the fall of President Suharto, many ethnic Chinese were targeted by other Indonesian rioters, resulting in extensive looting. However, when Chinese-owned supermarkets were targeted for looting most of the dead were not ethnic Chinese, but the looters themselves, who were burnt to death by the hundreds when a fire broke out.[72][73]
Myanmar
[edit]Chinese people in Myanmar have also been subject to discriminatory laws and rhetoric in Burmese media and popular culture.[74]
Thailand
[edit]Historically, Thailand (known as Siam before 1939) has been seen as a China-friendly country, owing to close Chinese-Siamese relations, a large proportion of the Thai population being of Chinese descent and Chinese having been assimilated into mainstream society over the years.
In 1914, King Vajiravudh (Rama VI) originated the phrase "Jews of the Orient" to describe Chinese.[75]: 127 He published an essay using Western antisemitic tropes to characterize Chinese as "vampires who steadily suck dry an unfortunate victim's lifeblood" because of their perceived lack of loyalty to Siam and the fact that they sent money back to China.[75]: 127
During 1930s to 1950s, Prime Minister Plaek Phibunsongkhram launched a massive Thaification, the main purpose of which was Central Thai supremacy, including the oppression of Thailand's Chinese population and restricting Thai Chinese culture by banning the teaching of the Chinese language and forcing Thai Chinese to adopt Thai names.[76] Plaek's obsession with creating a pan-Thai nationalist agenda caused resentment among general officers (most of Thai general officers at the time were of Teochew background) until he was removed from office in 1944.[77]
Vietnam
[edit]There are strong anti-Chinese sentiments among the Vietnamese population, stemming in part from a past thousand years of Chinese rule in Northern Vietnam. A long history of Sino-Vietnamese conflicts followed, with repeated wars over the centuries. Though current relations are peaceful, numerous wars were fought between the two nations in the past, from the time of the Early Lê dynasty (10th century)[78] to the Sino-Vietnamese War from 1979 to 1989.
Shortly after the 1975 Vietnamese defeat of the United States in the Vietnam War, the Vietnamese government persecuted the Chinese community by confiscating property and businesses owned by overseas Chinese in Vietnam and expelling the ethnic Chinese minority into southern Chinese provinces.[79] In February 1976, Vietnam implemented registration programs in the south.[80]: 94 Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam were required to adopt Vietnamese citizenship or leave the country.[80]: 94 In early 1977, Vietnam implemented what it described as a purification policy in its border areas to keep Chinese border residents to the Chinese side of the border.[80]: 94–95 Following another discriminatory policy introduced in March 1978, a large number of Chinese fled from Vietnam to southern China.[80]: 95 China and Vietnam attempted to negotiate issues related to Vietnam's treatment of ethnic Chinese, but these negotiations failed to resolve the issues.[80]: 95 During the August 1978 Youyi Pass Incident, the Vietnamese army and police expelled 2,500 refugees across the order into China.[80]: 95 Vietnamese authorities beat and stabbed refugees during the incident, including 9 Chinese civilian border workers.[80]: 95 From 1978 to 1979, some 450,000 ethnic Chinese left Vietnam by boat (mainly former South Vietnam citizens fleeing the Vietcong) as refugees or were expelled across the land border with China.[81]
The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War resulted in part from Vietnam's mistreatment of ethnic Chinese.[80]: 93 The conflict fueled racist discrimination against and consequent emigration by the country's ethnic Chinese population.These mass emigrations and deportations only stopped in 1989 following the Đổi mới reforms in Vietnam.[citation needed]
Cambodia
[edit]The first anti-Chinese sentiment was witnessed in Cambodia during the Lon Nol régime. This was followed by the right-wing military dictatorship who made the Chinese carry special papers with them, often as a sign of Khmer supremacy. Although some Khmer Rouge members were ethnic Chinese (Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, Nuon Chea, Kaing Guek Eav, even Pol Pot himself - although he went to great lengths to conceal his Chinese ancestry), and were less wary about the Chinese than they were with the Vietnamese, they carried on the racial policies of Lon Nol, although more extreme. Ethnic Chinese were banned from speaking Chinese, and Chinese New Year was outlawed. When the Khmer Rouge were overthrown by a communist government under the influence of Vietnam, some anti-Chinese laws were lifted, but were still kept in place. The Khmer Rouge had managed to kill around 200,000 ethnic Chinese during their rule.
South Asia
[edit]India
[edit]During the Sino-Indian War, the Chinese faced hostile sentiment all over India. Chinese businesses were investigated for links to the Chinese government and many Chinese were interned in prisons in North India.[citation needed] The Indian government passed the Defence of India Act in December 1962,[82] permitting the "apprehension and detention in custody of any person hostile to the country." The broad language of the act allowed for the arrest of any person simply for having a Chinese surname or a Chinese spouse.[83] The Indian government incarcerated thousands of Chinese-Indians in an internment camp in Deoli, Rajasthan, where they were held for years without trial. The last internees were not released until 1967. Thousands more Chinese-Indians were forcibly deported or coerced to leave India. Nearly all internees had their properties sold off or looted.[82] Even after their release, the Chinese Indians faced many restrictions on their freedom. They could not travel freely until the mid-1990s.[82] India and China have cold relations and have been found to engage in anti-Indian works, such as cyber slavery in Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos. They also control US immigration mafia, like donkey routes which have led to deportations after US President Donald Trump began anti-immigration and deportation pushes.[84]
Pakistan
Oceania
[edit]Australia
[edit]
The Chinese population was active in political and social life in Australia. Community leaders protested against discriminatory legislation and attitudes, and despite the passing of the Immigration Restriction Act in 1901, Chinese communities around Australia participated in parades and celebrations of Australia's Federation and the visit of the Duke and Duchess of York.
Although the Chinese communities in Australia were generally peaceful and industrious, resentment flared up against them because of their different customs and traditions. In the mid-19th century, terms such as "dirty, disease-ridden, [and] insect-like" were used in Australia and New Zealand to describe the Chinese.[85]
The causes of friction in local Australian communities were not merely rooted in bigotry or fear (although these elements were also present), but were substantially based on negative effects communities were observing and experiencing independently everywhere. As occurred in much of the western world, Chinese labourers typically arrived with temporary migration intentions, undercut local workers, and regularly sent remittance to family who remained in China, rather than investing substantially in local communities.[86]
A poll tax was passed in Victoria in 1855 to restrict Chinese immigration. New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia followed suit. Such legislation did not distinguish between naturalised, British citizens, Australian-born, and Chinese-born individuals. The tax in Victoria and New South Wales was repealed in the 1860s.
In the 1870s and 1880s, the growing trade union movement began a series of protests against foreign labour. Their arguments were that Asians and Chinese took jobs away from white men, worked for "substandard" wages, lowered working conditions, and refused unionisation.[87] Objections to these arguments came largely from wealthy land owners in rural areas.[87] It was argued that without Asiatics to work in the tropical areas of the Northern Territory and Queensland, the area would have to be abandoned.[88] Despite these objections to restricting immigration, between 1875 and 1888 all Australian colonies enacted legislation that excluded all further Chinese immigration.[88]
In 1888, following protests and strike actions, an inter-colonial conference agreed to reinstate and increase the severity of restrictions on Chinese immigration. This provided the basis for the 1901 Immigration Restriction Act and the seed for the White Australia policy, which although relaxed over time, was not fully abandoned until the early 1970s.
The Chifley government's Darwin Lands Acquisition Act 1945 compulsorily acquired 53 acres (21 ha) of land owned by Chinese-Australians in Darwin, the capital of the Northern Territory, leading to the end of the local Chinatown. Two years earlier, the territory's administrator Aubrey Abbott had written to Joseph Carrodus, secretary of the Department of the Interior, proposing a combination of compulsory acquisition and conversion of the land to leasehold in order to effect "the elimination of undesirable elements which Darwin has suffered from far too much in the past" and stated that he hoped to "entirely prevent the Chinese quarter forming again". He further observed that "if land is acquired from the former Chinese residents there is really no need for them to return as they have no other assets". The territory's civilian population had mostly been evacuated during the war and the former Chinatown residents returned to find their homes and businesses reduced to rubble.[89]
New Zealand
[edit]In the 1800s, Chinese citizens were encouraged to immigrate to New Zealand because they were needed to fulfill agricultural jobs during a time of white labor shortage. The arrival of foreign laborers was met with hostility and the formation of anti-Chinese immigrant groups, such as the Anti-Chinese League, the Anti-Asiatic League, the Anti-Chinese Association, and the White New Zealand League. Official discrimination began with the Chinese Immigrants Act of 1881, limiting Chinese emigration to New Zealand and excluding Chinese citizens from major jobs. Anti-Chinese sentiment had declined by the mid-20th century.
Papua New Guinea
[edit]In May 2009, during the Papua New Guinea riots, Chinese-owned businesses were looted by gangs in the capital city Port Moresby, amid simmering anti-Chinese sentiment reported in the country.[90] There are fears that these riots will force many Chinese business owners and entrepreneurs to leave the South Pacific country, which would invariably lead to further damage on an impoverished economy that had an 80% unemployment rate.[90] Thousands of people were reportedly involved in the riots.[91]
Tonga
[edit]In 2000, Tongan noble Tu'ivakano of Nukunuku banned Chinese stores from his Nukunuku District in Tonga. This followed complaints from other shopkeepers regarding competition from local Chinese.[92]
In 2006, rioters damaged shops owned by Chinese-Tongans in Nukuʻalofa.[93][94]
Solomon Islands
[edit]In 2006, Honiara's Chinatown suffered damage when it was looted and burned by rioters following a contested election. Ethnic Chinese businessmen were falsely blamed for bribing members of the Solomon Islands' Parliament. The government of Taiwan was the one that supported the then-current government of the Solomon Islands. The Chinese businessmen were mainly small traders from mainland China and had no interest in local politics.[93]
Europe
[edit]
Anti-Chinese sentiment became more common as China was becoming a major source of immigrants for the west (including the Western United States).[9] Numerous Chinese immigrants to North America were attracted by wages offered by large railway companies in the late 19th century as the companies built the transcontinental railroads.
Anti-Chinese policies persisted in the 20th century in the English-speaking world, including the Chinese Exclusion Act, the Chinese Immigration Act of 1923, anti-Chinese zoning laws and restrictive covenants, the policies of Richard Seddon, and the White Australia policy.
France
[edit]In France, there has been a long history of systemic racism towards the Chinese population, with many people stereotyping them as easy targets for crime.[95] As a result, France's ethnic Chinese population have been common victims of racism and crime, which include assaults, robbery, and murder; it is common for Chinese business owners to have their businesses robbed and destroyed.[95] There have been rising incidents of anti-Chinese racism in France; many Chinese, including French celebrity Frederic Chau, want more support from the French government.[95] In September 2016, at least 15,000 Chinese participated in an anti-Asian racism protest in Paris.[95]
Germany
[edit]In 2016, Günther Oettinger, the former European Commissioner for Digital Economy and Society, called Chinese people derogatory names, including "sly dogs", in a speech to executives in Hamburg and refused to apologize for several days.[citation needed]
Italy
[edit]Although historical relations between two were friendly and even Marco Polo paid a visit to China, during the Boxer Rebellion, Italy was part of Eight-Nation Alliance against the rebellion, thus this had stemmed anti-Chinese sentiment in Italy.[96] Italian troops looted, burnt, and stole a lot of Chinese goods to Italy, many are still being displayed in Italian museums.[97]
The 1969 hit song Arrivano i cinesi (the Chinese are coming) by Bruno Lauzi used anti-Chinese racism to criticize Italians who drew political inspiration from the Maoist model, describing them as "getting all yellow," and singing that they would soon turn "small, fast, and mute" if they kept obsessing over their "special book" (Quotations by Chairman Mao Zedong).[98]: 193–194
Portugal
[edit]In the 16th century, increasing sea trades between Europe to China had led Portuguese merchants to China, however Portuguese military ambitions for power and its fear of China's interventions and brutality had led to the growth of sinophobia in Portugal. Galiote Pereira, a Portuguese Jesuit missionary who was imprisoned by Chinese authorities, claimed China's juridical treatment known as bastinado was so horrible as it hit on human flesh, becoming the source of fundamental anti-Chinese sentiment later; as well as brutality, the cruelty of China and Chinese tyranny.[99] With the Ming dynasty's brutal reactions on Portuguese merchants following the conquest of Malacca,[100] sinophobia became widespread in Portugal, and widely practiced until the First Opium War, which the Qing dynasty was forced to cede Macao to Portugal.[101][note 2]
Russia
[edit]Spain
[edit]Spain first issued anti-Chinese legislation when Limahong, a Chinese pirate, attacked Spanish settlements in the Philippines. One of his famous actions was a failed invasion of Manila in 1574, which he launched with the support of Chinese and Moro pirates.[102] The Spanish conquistadors massacred the Chinese or expelled them from Manila several times, notably the autumn 1603 massacre of Chinese in Manila, and the reasons for this uprising remain unclear. Its motives range from the desire of the Chinese to dominate Manila, to their desire to abort the Spaniards' moves which seemed to lead to their elimination. The Spaniards quelled the rebellion and massacred around 20,000 Chinese. The Chinese responded by fleeing to the Sultanate of Sulu and supporting the Moro Muslims in their war against the Spanish. The Chinese supplied the Moros with weapons and joined them in directly fighting against the Spanish during the Spanish–Moro conflict. Spain also upheld a plan to conquer China, but it never materialized.[103]
United Kingdom
[edit]15% of ethnic Chinese reported racial harassment in 2016, which was the highest percentage out of all ethnic minorities in the UK.[104] The Chinese community has been victims of racially aggravated attacks and murders, verbal accounts of racism, and vandalism. There is also a lack of reporting on anti-Chinese discrimination in the UK, notably violence against Chinese Britons.[105]
The ethnic slur "chink" has been used against the Chinese community; Dave Whelan, the former owner of Wigan Athletic F.C., was fined £50,000 and suspended for six weeks by The Football Association after using the term in an interview; Kerry Smith resigned as an election candidate after it was reported he used similar language.[105]
Professor Gary Craig from Durham University carried out research about the Chinese population in the UK, and concluded that hate crimes against the Chinese community are getting worse, adding that British Chinese people experience "perhaps even higher levels of racial violence or harassment than those experienced by any other minority group but that the true extent to their victimization is often overlooked because victims were unwilling to report it."[105] Official police victim statistics put Chinese people in a group that includes other ethnicities, making it difficult to understand the extent of the crimes against the Chinese community.[105]
Americas
[edit]Canada
[edit]In the 1850s, sizable numbers of Chinese immigrants came to British Columbia during the gold rush; the region was known to them as Gold Mountain. Starting in 1858, Chinese coolies were brought to Canada to work in the mines and on the Canadian Pacific Railway. However, they were denied by law the rights of citizenship, including the right to vote, and in the 1880s, "head taxes" were implemented to curtail immigration from China. In 1907, a riot in Vancouver targeted Chinese and Japanese-owned businesses. In 1923, the federal government banned Chinese immigration outright,[30]: 31 passing the Chinese Immigration Act, commonly known as the Exclusion Act, prohibiting further Chinese immigration except under "special circumstances". The Exclusion Act was repealed in 1947, the same year in which Chinese Canadians were given the right to vote. Restrictions would continue to exist on immigration from Asia until 1967 when all racial restrictions on immigration to Canada were repealed, and Canada adopted the current points-based immigration system. On June 22, 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper offered an apology and compensation only for the head tax once paid by Chinese immigrants.[106] Survivors or their spouses were paid approximately CA$20,000 in compensation.[107]
Mexico
[edit]Anti-Chinese sentiment was first recorded in Mexico in 1880s. Similar to most Western countries at the time, Chinese immigration and its large business involvement have always been a fear for native Mexicans. Violence against Chinese occurred such as in Sonora, Baja California and Coahuila, the most notable was the Torreón massacre.[108]
Peru
[edit]Peru was a popular destination for Chinese slaves in the 19th century, as part of the wider blackbirding phenomenon, due to the need in Peru for a military and laborer workforce. However, relations between Chinese workers and Peruvian owners have been tense, due to the mistreatment of Chinese laborers and anti-Chinese discrimination in Peru.[31]
Due to the Chinese support for Chile throughout the War of the Pacific, relations between Peruvians and Chinese became increasingly tenser in the aftermath. After the war, armed indigenous peasants sacked and occupied haciendas of landed elite criollo "collaborationists" in the central Sierra – the majority of them were of ethnic Chinese, while indigenous and mestizo Peruvians murdered Chinese shopkeepers in Lima; in response to Chinese coolies revolted and even joined the Chilean Army.[109][110] Even in the 20th century, the memory of Chinese support for Chile was so deep that Manuel A. Odría, once dictator of Peru, issued a ban against Chinese immigration as a punishment for their betrayal.[111]
United States
[edit]

Starting with the California gold rush in the 19th century, the United States—particularly the West Coast states—imported large numbers of Chinese migrant laborers. Employers believed that the Chinese were "reliable" workers who would continue working, without complaint, even under harsh conditions.[112] The migrant workers encountered considerable prejudice in the United States, especially among the people who occupied the lower layers of white society, because Chinese "coolies" were used as scapegoats for depressed wage levels by politicians and labor leaders.[113] Cases of physical assaults on the Chinese include the Los Angeles Chinese massacre of 1871. The 1909 murder of Elsie Sigel in New York, for which a Chinese person was suspected, was blamed on the Chinese in general and it immediately led to physical violence against them. "The murder of Elsie Sigel immediately grabbed the front pages of newspapers, which portrayed Chinese men as dangerous to "innocent" and "virtuous" young white women. This murder led to a surge in the harassment of Chinese in communities across the United States."[114]
The emerging American trade unions, under such leaders as Samuel Gompers, also took an outspoken anti-Chinese position,[115] regarding Chinese laborers as competitors to white laborers. Only with the emergence of the international trade union, IWW, did trade unionists start to accept Chinese workers as part of the American working class.[116]
In the 1870s and 1880s, various legal discriminatory measures were taken against the Chinese. These laws, in particular, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, were aimed at restricting further immigration from China,[29] although the laws were later repealed by the Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act of 1943. In particular, even in his lone dissent against Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), then-Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote of the Chinese as: "a race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions, absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese race."[117]
In April 2008, CNN's Jack Cafferty remarked: "We continue to import their junk with the lead paint on them and the poisoned pet food [...] So I think our relationship with China has certainly changed. I think they're basically the same bunch of goons and thugs they've been for the last 50 years." At least 1,500 Chinese Americans protested outside CNN's Hollywood offices in response while a similar protest took place at CNN headquarters in Atlanta.[118][119]
Africa
[edit]South Africa
[edit]While the date of the first Chinese arrivals to Africa is contested, evidence from the Cape of Good Hope's refreshment station, in modern-day South Africa, indicates that Chinese convicts and slaves of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) arrived in the early 1650s. The Cape was used by the VOC as a penal settlement for criminals and exiles from the East Indies, including men from China. They were not incarcerated but instead put to work and were designated as "free blacks" after the terms of their incarceration had ended. The local Dutch and other white settlers were dispelled with the growth of early Chinese settlement and regulated them to a segregated neighborhood and burial ground. White settlers also introduced legislation to curb the activities of Chinese businesses out of fear that they would harm white traders. They also could not own land or real estate, had to pay fees to own a business, and had no rights as citizens.[120]
The importation to work in South African mines in the early 20th Century also stoked Anti-Chinese sentiment in the country. 60,000 Chinese laborers were brought to work in the Witwatersrand gold mines in South Africa between 1904 and 1910 in order to solve a native-labor shortage after the Boer war as the result of African laborer's resistance to returning to the mines where wages had been slashed and working conditions remained oppressive and because white unskilled labor was deemed too costly. Poor Afrikaners, as white unemployment remained high, blamed the Chinese workers and mine owners for keeping them poor and taking jobs away from them. Others against Chinese migration and work in the mines, argued that Asian migrants would eventually settle and become involved in trade, displacing white traders. The increasing opposition led to the phasing out of Chinese workers between 1907 and 1910.[121]
Under South African apartheid, Chinese residents were classified as "Coloured," and were subject to apartheid legislation such as the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950, the Immigrants Regulation Amendment Act 43 of 1953, the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 55 of 1949, the Immorality Amendment Acts of 1951 and 1957, and the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 49 of 1953. They were unable to vote until 1994, and needed permits to acquire or occupy property in white areas until 1985. Until the 1970s, Chinese South Africans were unable to own property, forcing them to rent from landlords and neighbors, which put them in a precarious position and made them vulnerable to exploitation, eviction, and prosecution.[122]
During the COVID-19 pandemic, anti-Chinese graffiti proliferated in South Africa which was fueled by the use of names like "China Virus," "Wuhan Virus," "Chinese flue," "Asian flue," and "Kung flue" to refer to the virus and the misinformation and conspiracy theories that circulated regarding the origins of COVID-19.[123]
Anti-Han sentiment
[edit]Anti-Han sentiment refers to fear or dislike of ethnic Han people. It includes hostility towards Han Taiwanese as well as mainland Han Chinese.[124] Given that Han people make up the overwhelming majority of China's population, the anti-Han sentiment is closely related to the anti-Chinese sentiment.
Historical acts of Sinophobic violence
[edit]List of non-Chinese "sinophobia-led" acts of violence against ethnic Chinese:
Australia
[edit]Canada
[edit]Mexico
[edit]Mongolia
[edit]- Mongol conquest of China
- Deportation of Chinese people to China in the 1960's
- Attacks against Chinese by the Tsagaan Khas
Indonesia
[edit]- 1740 Batavia massacre
- 1918 Kudus riot
- Mergosono massacre
- Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66
- 1967 Mangkuk Merah Tragedy
- 1980 Jawa Tengah Racial Riot
- Situbondo Riot
- Banjarmasin riot of May 1997
- May 1998 riots of Indonesia
- November 2016 Jakarta protests
Malaysia
[edit]Japan
[edit]
By Koreans
[edit]- Wanpaoshan Incident, on July 1, 1931
United States
[edit]- Chinese massacre of 1871
- Rock Springs massacre
- Issaquah riot of 1885
- Tacoma riot of 1885
- Seattle riot of 1886
- Hells Canyon Massacre
- Anti-Chinese violence in California
- Denver Riot of 1880
- Killing of Vincent Chin
Vietnam
[edit]Derogatory terms
[edit]There are a variety of derogatory terms for Chinese people. Many of these terms are racist.
In English
[edit]- Chinaman – the term Chinaman is noted as offensive by modern dictionaries, dictionaries of slurs and euphemisms, and guidelines for racial harassment.
- Ching chong – Used to mock people of Chinese descent and the Chinese language, or other East and Southeast Asian-looking people in general.
- Ching chang chong – same usage as 'ching chong'.
- Chink – a racial slur referring to a person of Chinese ethnicity, but could be directed towards anyone of East and Southeast Asian descent in general.
- Chinky – the name "Chinky" is the adjectival form of Chink and, like Chink, is an ethnic slur for Chinese occasionally directed towards other East and Southeast Asian people.
- Chonky – refers to a person of Chinese heritage with white attributes whether being a personality aspect or physical aspect.[126][127]
- Coolie – means laborer in reference to Chinese manual workers in the 19th and early 20th century.
- Slope – used to mock people of Chinese descent and the sloping shape of their skull, or other East Asians. Used commonly during the Vietnam War.
- Panface – used to mock the flat facial features of the Chinese and other people of East and Southeast Asian descent.
- Lingling – used to call someone of Chinese descent in the West.
In Filipino
[edit]- Intsik (Cebuan: Insik) is used to refer to refer people of Chinese ancestry including Chinese Filipinos. (The standard term is Tsino, derived from the Spanish chino, with the colloquial Tsinoy referring specifically to Chinese Filipinos.) The originally neutral term recently gained negative connotation with the increasing preference of Chinese Filipinos not to be referred to as Intsik. The term originally came from in chiek, a Hokkien term referring to one's uncle. The term has variations, which may be more offensive in tone such as Intsik baho and may used in a derogatory phrase, Intsik baho tulo-laway ("Smelly old Chinaman with drooling saliva").[128][129]
- Tsekwa (sometimes spelled chekwa) – is a slang term used by the Filipinos to refer to Chinese people.[130]
In French
[edit]- Chinetoque (m/f) – derogatory term referring to Asian people, especially of those from China and Vietnam.
In Indonesian
[edit]- Chitato – (China Tanpa Toko) – literally "Chinese people don't have shops" referring to ridicule for Indonesian Chinese descent who do not own shops.
- Aseng – A play on the word "asing" which means "foreigner" is used by local natives in Indonesia for Chinese descent.
- Panlok (Panda lokal/local panda) – derogatory term referring to Chinese female or female who look like Chinese, particularly prostitutes.[131]
In Japanese
[edit]- Dojin (土人, dojin) – literally "earth people", referring either neutrally to local folk or derogatorily to indigenous peoples and savages, used towards the end of the 19th century and early 20th century by Japanese colonists, to imply the backwardsness of Chinese people.[132]
- Shina (支那 or シナ, shina) – Japanese reading of the Chinese character compound "支那" (Zhina in Mandarin Chinese), originally a Chinese transcription of an Indic name for China that entered East Asia with the spread of Buddhism. This toponym quickly became a racial marker with the rise of Japanese imperialism,[133] and it is still considered derogatory, as is 'shina-jin'.[134][135] The slur is also extended toward left-wing activists by right-wing people.[136]
- Chankoro – derogatory term originating from a corruption of the Taiwanese Hokkien pronunciation of 清國奴 Chheng-kok-lô͘, used to refer to any "Chinaman", with a meaning of "Qing dynasty's slave".
In Korean
[edit]- Jjangkkae [ko] (Korean: 짱깨) – the Korean pronunciation of 掌櫃 (zhǎngguì), literally "shopkeeper", originally referring to owners of Chinese restaurants and stores;[137] derogatory term referring to Chinese people.
- Jjangkkolla (Korean: 짱꼴라) – this term has originated from Japanese term chankoro (淸國奴; lit. "slave of Qing Manchurian"). Later, it became a derogatory term that indicates people in China.[138]
- Orangkae (Korean: 오랑캐) – literally "Barbarian", derogatory term used against Chinese, Mongolian and Manchus.
- Doenom (Korean: 되놈) – Originally a demeaning word for Jurchen, meaning something similar to 'barbarian'. The Jurchens invaded Joseon in 1636 and caused long-term hatred. A Jurchen group later made the Qing dynasty, causing some Koreans to generalize the word to China as a whole.[139]
- Ttaenom (Korean: 때놈) – literally "dirt bastard", referring to the perceived "dirtiness" of Chinese people, who some believe do not wash themselves. It was originally Dwoenom but changed over time to Ddaenom.
In Mongolian
[edit]- Hujaa (Mongolian: хужаа) – derogatory term referring to Chinese people.
- Jungaa – a derogatory term for Chinese people referring to the Chinese language.
In Portuguese
[edit]- Pastel de flango (Chicken pastry) - it is a derogatory term ridiculing Chinese pronunciation of Portuguese language (changing R by L). This derogatory term is sometimes used in Brazil to refer to Chinese people.[140]
In Russian
[edit]- Kitayoza (Russian: китаёза kitayóza) (m/f) – derogatory term referring to Chinese people.
- Uzkoglazy (Russian: узкоглазый uzkoglázy) (m) – generic derogatory term referring to Chinese people (lit. 'narrow-eyed').
In Spanish
[edit]- Chino cochino – (coe-chee-noe, N.A. "cochini", SPAN "cochino", literally meaning "pig") is an outdated derogatory term meaning dirty Chinese. Cochina is the feminine form of the word.
In Italian
[edit]- Muso giallo – "yellow muzzle/yellow face", this term was used in an early 20th century play regarding Italian miners. Although it was not directed toward a Chinese person, but rather from one Italian to another, its existence nevertheless attested to the perceived 'otherness' of Chinese laborers within Italy.[141] The slur is used as an equivalent of "gook" or "zipperhead" in Italian dubs of English films.[142]
In Thai
[edit]- Chek/Jek (Thai: เจ๊ก) – derogatory term referring to Chinese people.
In Vietnamese
[edit]- Tàu – literally "boat". It is used to refer to Chinese people in general, and can be construed as derogatory but very rarely does. This usage is derived from the fact that many Chinese refugees came to Vietnam in boats during the Qing dynasty.[143]
- Khựa – (meaning dirty) derogatory term for Chinese people and combination of two words above is called Tàu Khựa, which is a common word.[143]
- Chệc – (ethnic slur, derogatory) Chink[144][145]
- Chệch[note 3] – (ethnic slur, derogatory) Chink, seldom used in actual spoken Vietnamese, but occurs in some translations as an equivalent of English Chink.
Sinophobia during the COVID-19 pandemic
[edit]
The COVID-19 pandemic, in which the virus was first detected in Wuhan, has caused prejudice and racism against people of Chinese ancestry; some people stated that Chinese people deserve to contract it.[147][148] The prevalence of this sentiment led to multiple acts of severe violence against people of Chinese ancestry, and it also led to multiple acts of violence against those who were wrongly supposed to have been of Chinese ancestry.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the victims of the violence and the verbal abuse ranged from toddlers to the elderly,[19] school children and their parents.[16] They were not just mainland Chinese: they were also Taiwanese, Hong Kongers, members of the Chinese diaspora and other Asians who are either mistaken for or associated with them.[18][16]
Several citizens across the globe also demanded a ban on Chinese people from their countries.[149][150] Racist abuse and assaults against Asian groups have also increased in both the UK and the US.[151][152] Former U.S. President Donald Trump also repeatedly called the coronavirus the 'Chinese virus';[153][154] however, he denied the fact that the term had a racist connotation.[155]
Notes
[edit]- ^ In Sinosphere, "anti-Chinese government" (反中[國], lit. "anti-Chinese [state]), "anti-Communist" (反共 / 反中共) or "anti-People's Republic of China" (反中華人民共和國), which means political opposition to the Chinese government or state, is distinct from "anti-Chinese racism" (反華 / 嫌中), which is a racist hatred of the Chinese people.[10][11]
- ^ Macao was a trading outpost of Portugal since the 1600s in an agreement between China and Portugal, as a non-sovereign holding of the Portuguese empire. The "cession" referred to here is that the sovereignty of Macao was ceded for the first time by China to Portugal after the defeat in the Opium Wars.
- ^ Alternative form of Chệc.
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envoy, had most effectively poured out his tale of woe, of deprivation at the hands of the Portuguese in Malacca; and he had backed up the tale with others concerning the reprehensible Portuguese methods in the Moluccas, making the case (quite truthfully) that European trading visits were no more than the prelude to annexation of territory. With the tiny sea power at this time available to the Chinese
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The murder of Elsie Sigel immediately grabbed the front pages of newspapers, which portrayed Chinese men as dangerous to "innocent" and "virtuous" young white women. This murder led to a surge in the harassment of Chinese in communities across the United States.
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Người ta còn dùng các từ như Khựa, Xẩm, Chú Ba… để chỉ người Tàu, cũng với hàm ý miệt thị, coi thường.
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Also, according to the "Dictionnaire Annamite–français", "Chec" (Chệc) was the nickname that the Vietnamese people at that time used for Huaqiao. "Chệc" was also how the Annamites called the ethnic Chinese in an unfriendly way. (Chệc: Que les Annamites donnent aux Chinois surnom en mauvaise partie) (J. F. M. Genibrel 1898: 79).
- ^ Nguyễn, Ngọc Chính (May 27, 2019). "Ngôn ngữ Sài Gòn xưa: Những vay mượn từ người Tàu". Khoa Việt Nam Học.
…Còn kêu là Chệc là tại tiếng Triều Châu kêu tâng Chệc nghĩa là chú. Người bên Tàu hay giữ phép, cũng như An-nam ta, thấy người ta tuổi đáng cậu, cô, chú, bác thì kêu tâng là chú là cậu vân vân. Người An-nam ta nghe vậy vịn theo mà kêu các ảnh là Chệc…
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'Some Muslims stated that the disease was "divine retribution" for China's oppression of the Uighur minority. The problem lay in confusing the Chinese population with the actions of an authoritarian government which is known for its lack of transparency,' he stated.
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Further reading
[edit]- Aarim-Heriot, Najia (2003). Chinese Immigrants, African Americans, and Racial Anxiety in the United States, 1848–82. University of Illinois Press.
- Ang, Sylvia, and Val Colic-Peisker. "Sinophobia in the Asian century: race, nation and Othering in Australia and Singapore." Ethnic and racial studies 45.4 (2022): 718–737. online
- Billé, Franck. Sinophobia : anxiety, violence, and the making of Mongolian identity (2015) online
- Chua, Amy. World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability (Random House Digital, 2004) online
- Ferrall, Charles; Millar, Paul; Smith, Keren. (eds.) (2005). East by South: China in the Australasian imagination. Victoria University Press.
- Hong, Jane H. Opening the Gates to Asia: A Transpacific History of How America Repealed Asian Exclusion (University of North Carolina Press, 2019) online review
- Jain, Shree, and Sukalpa Chakrabarti. "The Dualistic Trends of Sinophobia and Sinophilia: Impact on Foreign Policy Towards China." China Report 59.1 (2023): 95–118. doi.org/10.1177/00094455231155212
- Lew-Williams, Beth. The Chinese Must Go: Violence, Exclusion, and the Making of the Alien in America (Harvard UP, 2018)
- Lovell, Julia. The Great Wall: China against the world, 1000 bc–ad 2000 (Grove/Atlantic, 2007). online
- Lovell, Julia. Maoism: A Global History (2019), a comprehensive scholarly history excerpt
- Lovell, Julia. "The Uses of Foreigners in Mao-Era China: 'Techniques of Hospitality' and International Image-Building in the People's Republic, 1949–1976." Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 25 (2015): 135–158. online
- McClain, Charles J. (1996). In Search of Equality: The Chinese Struggle Against Discrimination in Nineteenth-Century America. University of California Press.
- Mungello, David E. (2009). The Great Encounter of China and the West, 1500–1800. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Ngai, Mae. The Chinese Question: The Gold Rushes and Global Politics (2021), Mid 19c in California, Australia, and South Africa
- Ratuva, Steven. "The Politics of Imagery: Understanding the Historical Genesis of Sinophobia in Pacific Geopolitics." East Asia 39.1 (2022): 13–28. online
- Renshaw, Daniel. "Prejudice and paranoia: a comparative study of antisemitism and Sinophobia in turn-of-the-century Britain." Patterns of Prejudice 50.1 (2016): 38–60. around year 1900. online
- Schumann, Sandy, and Ysanne Moore. "The COVID-19 outbreak as a trigger event for sinophobic hate crimes in the United Kingdom." British Journal of Criminology 63.2 (2023): 367–383. online
- Slimming, John (1969). The Death of a Democracy. John Murray Publishers Ltd. ISBN 978-0-7195-2045-7. Book written by an Observer/UK journalist, who was in Kuala Lumpur at the time.
- Tsolidis, Georgina. "Historical Narratives of Sinophobia–Are these echoed in contemporary Australian debates about Chineseness?." Journal of Citizenship and Globalisation Studies 2.1 (2018): 39–48. online
- von Vorys, Karl (1975). Democracy Without Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-07571-6. Paperback reprint (2015) ISBN 978-0-691-61764-0.
- Ward, W. Peter (2002). White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Toward Orientals in British Columbia. McGill-Queen's Press. 3rd edition.
- Witchard, Anne. England's Yellow Peril: Sinophobia and the Great War (2014) excerpt
External links
[edit]
Media related to Anti-Chinese sentiment at Wikimedia Commons
The dictionary definition of Sinophobia at Wiktionary
Anti-Chinese sentiment
View on GrokipediaDefinition and Terminology
Core Definition and Scope
Anti-Chinese sentiment, also known as Sinophobia, refers to prejudice, fear, or hatred directed toward China, Chinese people, Chinese culture, or attributes perceived as "Chineseness," often manifesting as discrimination, stereotyping, or violence against ethnic Chinese individuals or communities. In Chinese online communities, "反华" (fǎnhuá) refers to opposition to the Chinese state or culture.[10][11] This sentiment targets not only citizens of the People's Republic of China but also overseas Chinese diaspora, irrespective of their citizenship or loyalty to host nations, and can include hostility toward Chinese-language speakers or those associated with Chinese heritage.[12] Empirical instances include economic boycotts, social exclusion, and physical attacks, with historical data showing spikes during events like the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act in the United States, which barred Chinese immigration based on racial animus rather than policy merits.[13] The scope of anti-Chinese sentiment extends beyond isolated incidents to systemic patterns, encompassing verbal harassment, property vandalism, and policy-driven exclusion, often rationalized through stereotypes of Chinese as unassimilable, economically predatory, or culturally inferior.[14] Quantitatively, surveys during the COVID-19 pandemic documented a global uptick, with over 3,800 anti-Asian hate incidents reported in the U.S. alone from March 2020 to June 2021, many targeting ethnic Chinese due to associations with the virus's origin in Wuhan.[15] It differs from generalized xenophobia by its specific focus on ethnic or cultural markers, persisting across contexts from labor competition in 19th-century California to contemporary espionage fears amid U.S.-China technological rivalry, though credible evidence links many such fears to verifiable state behaviors like intellectual property theft rather than innate traits.[16] Critically, the scope excludes legitimate geopolitical or ideological critiques of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), such as condemnations of Uyghur internment camps—estimated to hold over 1 million individuals since 2017—or aggressive South China Sea claims, which address state actions and can be substantiated through satellite imagery and defector testimonies.[17] Conflating these with anti-Chinese racism risks diluting accountability for authoritarian policies, as evidenced by how some advocacy groups have pressured media to soften CCP reporting to avert diaspora backlash, despite data showing most ethnic Chinese abroad oppose the regime's domestic repression.[18] Thus, while sentiment may amplify amid tensions, its irrational core lies in attributing collective guilt to non-combatants, a causal fallacy unsupported by disaggregated crime or economic data attributing harms solely to ethnicity.[19]Distinction from Anti-CCP and Geopolitical Criticism
Anti-Chinese sentiment targets individuals or groups based on their Chinese ethnicity or descent, manifesting as discrimination, stereotypes, or violence unrelated to political affiliation. In contrast, anti-CCP sentiment opposes the specific governance, ideology, and actions of the Chinese Communist Party, including authoritarian controls, censorship, and human rights abuses, without imputing fault to non-CCP Chinese people.[17] [20] Geopolitical criticism evaluates the PRC's state conduct in international arenas, such as aggressive territorial assertions in the South China Sea—where artificial island-building and militarization have defied 2016 arbitral rulings—or coercive trade practices like intellectual property appropriation, which are attributable to regime decisions rather than ethnic predispositions.[21] These critiques emphasize verifiable behaviors, such as the PRC's rejection of the Permanent Court of Arbitration's findings on July 12, 2016, and subsequent escalation of patrols, allowing for potential policy shifts absent ethnic animus.[21] Evidence of the distinction appears in widespread ethnic Chinese-led resistance to CCP policies, including the 2019 Hong Kong protests, where up to 2 million predominantly Han Chinese demonstrators—over a quarter of the city's population—opposed an extradition bill enabling transfers to mainland courts under CCP jurisdiction, sparking clashes that resulted in over 10,000 arrests by December 2020.[22] Taiwan's populace, 95% ethnic Han Chinese per 2023 census data, sustains democratic opposition to CCP unification demands through referendums and elections, with 2024 polls showing majority support for the status quo against forcible integration.[20] The CCP routinely merges these categories in propaganda, labeling policy detractors as racists to evade scrutiny, as seen in disinformation campaigns amplifying "anti-Asian hate" narratives to counter criticism of interference abroad, including harassment of diaspora critics.[23] [24] This tactic, documented in PRC state media responses to events like the 2021 U.S. House Select Committee on the CCP's formation, conflates regime accountability with ethnic prejudice, thereby inhibiting discourse on issues like transnational repression affecting over 100 documented cases of ethnic Chinese dissidents since 2014.[24][25] Preserving the separation enables rigorous evaluation of CCP-driven threats—such as espionage networks implicated in 2023 U.S. indictments of over 60 PRC-linked actors—while isolating genuine ethnic bias, which spiked 150% in U.S. anti-Asian incidents post-2020 but remains analytically distinct from state-focused analyses.[17]Rational Drivers vs Irrational Prejudice
Concerns regarding Chinese actions, particularly those attributable to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), have often been conflated with ethnic prejudice against individuals of Chinese descent. Rational drivers stem from verifiable patterns of state-sponsored economic coercion, intellectual property (IP) theft, and espionage that impose measurable costs on other nations' economies and security. For instance, the FBI has estimated that IP theft linked to China costs the U.S. economy between $225 billion and $600 billion annually, encompassing counterfeit goods, pirated software, and stolen trade secrets. This figure is supported by multiple U.S. government assessments highlighting systematic efforts by Chinese entities to acquire foreign technology through illicit means, such as cyber intrusions and talent recruitment programs that compel participants to transfer proprietary information.[26][27] Security threats further underpin evidence-based wariness, including widespread espionage operations coordinated by CCP agencies like the Ministry of State Security. A comprehensive survey by the Center for Strategic and International Studies documented 224 reported instances of Chinese espionage targeting the United States since 2000, involving theft of military, commercial, and scientific secrets. The FBI reports that approximately 80% of its economic espionage prosecutions involve conduct benefiting the Chinese state, with cases spanning 2020 to 2025 including convictions of individuals smuggling aviation data, hacking telecom networks, and recruiting insiders in critical sectors like semiconductors and biotechnology. Additionally, the CCP's United Front Work Department orchestrates influence operations abroad, blending propaganda, elite capture, and interference to advance Beijing's interests, as evidenced by coordinated efforts to shape overseas Chinese diaspora communities and suppress dissent on issues like Hong Kong and Xinjiang. These activities, distinct from individual behaviors, justify heightened scrutiny of affiliations with CCP-linked entities rather than blanket ethnic targeting.[28][29][30] In contrast, irrational prejudice manifests as unfounded generalizations or violence detached from specific evidence of harm, such as sporadic attacks on ethnic Chinese individuals during the COVID-19 pandemic, where assailants invoked the virus's origin without linking to personal culpability. Historical tropes like the "Yellow Peril," portraying Chinese people inherently as an existential threat due to population size or cultural otherness, exemplify this disconnect, often amplified by sensationalist media but lacking causal ties to empirical threats. Academic and mainstream sources frequently frame legitimate geopolitical critiques—such as territorial aggression in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait—as irrational xenophobia, reflecting institutional biases that prioritize narrative harmony over data-driven analysis of state behaviors. This conflation risks eroding defenses against real risks while excusing prejudice by diluting accountability for documented CCP predations. Distinguishing the two requires evaluating actions empirically: responses to verifiable state aggression represent adaptive realism, whereas ethnic animus without evidentiary basis constitutes prejudice.[2]Historical Origins
Pre-Modern and Early Instances
In pre-modern East Asia, hostilities toward Chinese influence often stemmed from imperial expansions rather than ethnic prejudice against Chinese populations per se. Vietnam experienced repeated invasions and occupations by Chinese dynasties, beginning with the Han conquest in 111 BC, which imposed direct rule and cultural assimilation efforts, provoking rebellions such as the uprising led by the Trưng sisters in 40 AD against Han administrator Tô Định. These conflicts fostered long-term resentment toward Chinese governance and its associated cultural impositions, evident in Vietnamese assertions of independence under subsequent dynasties like the Lê (1428–1789), though direct evidence of widespread anti-Chinese civilian sentiment remains tied to political resistance rather than irrational bias. Similar dynamics appeared in Korea during the Yuan dynasty's (1271–1368) invasions and tributary impositions on the Goryeo kingdom, where forced marriages and military levies bred grudges, yet these were framed more as anti-Mongol-Yuan than purely anti-Han. Early manifestations of targeted anti-Chinese violence emerged in Southeast Asian colonial contexts, where Chinese merchant diasporas faced economic rivalry and suspicions of disloyalty. In the Spanish Philippines, Chinese sangleys (Hokkien traders) dominated inter-island and galleon trade by the late 16th century, comprising up to 20 times the Spanish population in Manila by 1603, which fueled fears of rebellion amid Ming-Qing transitions. This culminated in the 1603 Sangley revolt, triggered by rumors of a Chinese plot to overthrow Spanish rule, leading to massacres that killed an estimated 20,000–25,000 Chinese, with Spanish forces and native allies systematically exterminating communities in Manila and beyond.[31] Subsequent pogroms in 1639 and 1662 followed similar patterns, driven by economic dominance—Chinese controlled much of the retail and artisan sectors—and perceived threats from mainland China, embedding anti-Chinese rhetoric into colonial administration and local vocabularies.[31] A parallel incident occurred in the Dutch East Indies at Batavia (modern Jakarta) in 1740, where economic pressures from a sugar boom exacerbated tensions with the Chinese community, who held key roles in trade, agriculture, and moneylending. Amid a famine in 1739–1740, rumors spread that Chinese were poisoning wells and plotting an uprising with Javanese peasants, prompting Dutch authorities to authorize the killing of Chinese males on October 9, 1740, which escalated into a citywide pogrom lasting until October 22. Estimates place the death toll at 5,000–10,000 ethnic Chinese, with survivors fleeing or being enslaved, marking one of the deadliest pre-19th-century anti-Chinese massacres and reflecting a mix of colonial scapegoating, local resentments over Chinese land leases displacing Javanese farmers, and VOC (Dutch East India Company) efforts to consolidate control.[32] These events highlight causal factors like competition for resources and fears of external allegiance, distinct from later ideological racisms, though they prefigured patterns of diaspora targeting.[33]19th-Century Immigration Waves and Exclusion Policies
Significant waves of Chinese immigration occurred in the mid-19th century, primarily to North America and Australia, driven by labor demands in mining and infrastructure projects. In the United States, Chinese laborers began arriving during the California Gold Rush starting in 1849, with numbers reaching 20,000 by 1852.[34] Between 1849 and 1882, approximately 300,000 Chinese entered the US, many via San Francisco, initially seeking fortune in placer mining before shifting to railroad construction, where they comprised a substantial portion of the Central Pacific workforce in the 1860s. By 1870, the Chinese population in the US stood at 63,000, with 77% concentrated in California, contributing over $5 million annually in mining taxes.[35] Similar patterns emerged elsewhere. In Australia, Chinese migrants flocked to Victoria and New South Wales goldfields from 1851, prompting early restrictions like the 1855 Chinese Immigration Act in Victoria, which limited ship passengers to one Chinese per 10 tons.[36] In Canada, over 15,000 Chinese workers arrived in the early 1880s to build the Canadian Pacific Railway's challenging western sections, enduring hazardous conditions for low wages.[37] In Peru, around 100,000 Chinese coolies were imported between 1849 and 1874 as indentured laborers for guano extraction and railroads, often under coercive contracts resembling slavery.[38] Economic competition fueled anti-Chinese sentiment as gold resources dwindled and immigrants transitioned to urban trades like laundering and manufacturing, accepting lower pay than white workers, which labor groups argued depressed wages and displaced locals.[13] This tension manifested in violence, such as the 1880 Denver riot where mobs attacked Chinese neighborhoods amid job scarcity.[39] In response, the US enacted the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, suspending laborer immigration for 10 years and barring naturalization, justified by Congress as protecting American workers from "cheap" foreign labor.[40] [41] Australia imposed colony-specific caps, culminating in the 1881 Influx of Chinese Restriction Act in New South Wales to curb entries from neighboring goldfields.[42] Canada followed with a $50 head tax in 1885, escalating to exclusionary measures. These policies reflected causal pressures from labor market saturation rather than mere prejudice, though racial stereotypes amplified enforcement.[43]20th-Century Conflicts and Ideological Tensions
The establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 following the Chinese Civil War intensified ideological tensions in the West, where the communist victory was perceived as a triumph of Mao Zedong's revolutionary ideology over democratic forces, exacerbating fears of global communist expansion and associating ethnic Chinese with subversive threats.[16] This shift intertwined anti-communist fervor with preexisting racial prejudices, as Western policymakers and publics increasingly viewed China not merely as a nation but as the epicenter of a monolithic ideological menace, prompting policies like the U.S. Internal Security Act of 1950 that scrutinized Chinese American loyalties amid espionage concerns.[16] The Korean War (1950–1953) markedly amplified anti-Chinese sentiment in the United States and allied nations, as China's intervention with over 1.3 million "People's Volunteer Army" troops in October 1950 directly confronted United Nations forces, prolonging the conflict and contributing to approximately 36,000 American military deaths.[44] This military commitment, framed by Beijing as defensive against U.S. imperialism, was interpreted in the West as aggressive expansionism, fueling public outrage and linking overseas Chinese communities to suspected fifth-column activities; for instance, Chinese Americans faced heightened FBI surveillance and loyalty oaths, with public discourse portraying them as potential conduits for communist influence amid McCarthy-era purges.[44][16] In South Asia, the Sino-Indian War of October–November 1962 crystallized territorial and ideological clashes, with Chinese forces advancing into disputed Himalayan border regions, overrunning Indian defenses and capturing Aksai Chin, which India viewed as unprovoked aggression violating the "Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai" (India-China brotherhood) rhetoric of the 1950s.[45] The conflict prompted immediate backlash against India's ethnic Chinese population of around 30,000–50,000, primarily in Calcutta and Mumbai, leading to mass detentions in internment camps without due process, property seizures, and forced deportations to China or Taiwan; by 1963, over 10,000 had been expelled, embedding racial profiling into national security responses and sustaining distrust toward Chinese diaspora as perceived spies or sympathizers.[46][47] Ideological rifts extended to intra-communist dynamics, as the Sino-Soviet split from the late 1950s onward—escalating into border clashes in 1969—highlighted Mao's rejection of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization and peaceful coexistence with the West, positioning China as a radical outlier that alarmed both Soviet allies and capitalist states with its export of revolutionary fervor.[48] China's material and advisory support for North Vietnam during the Vietnam War (1955–1975), including over 300,000 engineering troops and billions in aid, reinforced Western narratives of Beijing as a persistent ideological antagonist underwriting proxy insurgencies, though this primarily targeted the regime rather than diaspora communities directly.[45] In Japan, post-World War II recovery intertwined with lingering resentments from earlier invasions, but Cold War alignments amplified perceptions of communist China as an existential threat, contributing to public wariness despite economic ties.[49]Underlying Causes
Economic Competition and Labor Dynamics
In the 19th century United States, Chinese immigrants primarily arrived as laborers for railroads and mining, accepting wages 20-30% lower than those of white workers, which intensified labor market competition and contributed to widespread resentment among native-born workers.[13] This economic pressure manifested in organized opposition, such as the California Workingmen's Party, which advocated for restrictions citing the displacement of American workers by cheaper Chinese labor.[50] The resulting tensions culminated in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which suspended immigration of Chinese laborers for 10 years, explicitly targeting economic competition as a core justification.[40] Similar dynamics emerged in Australia during the 1850s gold rushes, where Chinese miners comprised up to 20% of the workforce in Victoria by 1857, prompting claims of undercutting local wages and leading to restrictive policies like the 1855 mining license fees aimed at Chinese diggers.[51] Anti-Chinese sentiment peaked between 1860 and 1889, driven by perceptions of economic rivalry in labor-intensive sectors, including cabinet-making where Chinese workers' lower costs sparked boycotts and union agitation.[51] These measures evolved into the White Australia Policy post-1901, reflecting enduring concerns over labor market saturation by Chinese immigrants willing to work for reduced pay. In Southeast Asia, ethnic Chinese minorities, often comprising 1-3% of populations in countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, have historically dominated commerce and industry, controlling 70-80% of private economic activity in Indonesia by the late 20th century, fostering resentment among indigenous majorities who viewed them as exploitative middlemen.[52] This disparity, rooted in colonial-era migration and networked business practices, incited periodic violence, such as the 1998 Indonesian riots targeting Chinese-owned businesses amid economic crises.[53] Governments in the region, responding to popular economic grievances, implemented assimilation policies and restrictions pre-World War II to curb Chinese economic influence.[53] Contemporary globalization has amplified these patterns through China's integration into world trade, with the "China shock" of surging imports from 2001-2019 linked to 2-2.4 million U.S. manufacturing job losses, particularly in import-competing sectors, heightening anti-Chinese economic perceptions.[54] Empirical studies attribute about 59% of U.S. manufacturing employment decline in that period to Chinese import competition, correlating with reduced local sentiment toward China in exposed labor markets. While some analyses contend the net job loss figure is overstated relative to total manufacturing shifts, the localized wage suppression and community disruption have causally contributed to protectionist backlashes and unfavorable views of Chinese economic practices.[55]Cultural Clashes and Stereotypes
Cultural differences between Chinese immigrants and host populations have long manifested in stereotypes that amplified anti-Chinese sentiment. In the 19th-century United States, Chinese laborers clustered in urban ethnic enclaves called Chinatowns, which native-born Americans viewed as hotbeds of disease and immorality owing to dense living arrangements and exclusion from mainstream housing.[56] Propagandists emphasized alleged Chinese uncleanliness, particularly in San Francisco, where sanitation practices diverging from Western norms were sensationalized to stoke public alarm and support immigration restrictions.[57] These clashes extended to social and moral domains, with Chinese women routinely stereotyped as prostitutes based on unfamiliar cultural signals such as traditional dress and collective wailing, interpreted by authorities as evidence of deceit.[56] Broader "Yellow Peril" imagery framed Chinese culture as an existential threat, depicting adherents as unassimilable due to purportedly inferior customs and loyalties that clashed with individualistic Western ideals.[57][58] In Australia, similar narratives linked Chinese presence to cultural backwardness, including unrefined behaviors and atavistic traits, justifying policies like the White Australia Policy of 1901.[58] In Southeast Asia, stereotypes portray ethnic Chinese as clannish and disloyal, favoring kin-based networks over broader societal integration, which conflicts with indigenous emphases on communal equity and national allegiance.[59] Indonesian surveys reveal persistent views of Chinese Indonesians as greedy, selfish, and economically exclusive, with these cultural perceptions emerging as the primary driver of prejudice (regression coefficient b = .57, p < .001).[59] Such stereotypes, intertwined with mercantile success attributed to nepotism rather than open competition, have historically precipitated clashes, as seen in Malaysia where ethnic cultural divides underpin social conflicts.[60][61] These tensions often stem from observable differences in business practices, like reliance on guanxi (personal connections), perceived as opaque and preferential by outsiders.[59]Security Threats, Espionage, and Expansionism
Perceptions of Chinese espionage have intensified anti-Chinese sentiment, particularly in Western nations, due to documented state-sponsored activities targeting intellectual property and critical infrastructure. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identifies China's counterintelligence and economic espionage as a grave threat, with efforts linked to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) involving theft of trade secrets estimated to cost the U.S. economy between $225 billion and $600 billion annually in counterfeit goods, pirated software, and stolen innovations.[26] A Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) survey documents 224 reported instances of Chinese espionage against the United States since 2000, including cyber intrusions and human intelligence operations.[28] High-profile cases include the 2025 conviction of U.S. Navy sailor Jinchao Wei for transmitting national defense information to Chinese intelligence, and indictments of 12 Chinese hackers in March 2025 for global cyber operations.[62][63] These incidents, often involving ethnic Chinese operatives or proxies, fuel suspicions of dual loyalty and systemic infiltration in academia, industry, and government, exacerbating ethnic profiling amid broader national security concerns.[64] China's military expansion in the South China Sea has heightened regional alarms over territorial aggression, contributing to sentiment viewing the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as a destabilizing force. From 2014 to 2016, China constructed over 3,200 acres of artificial islands on disputed reefs, equipping them with airstrips, radar systems, and missile batteries despite President Xi Jinping's 2015 pledge against militarization.[65] These bases enable control over approximately 90% of the sea via the nine-dash line claim, rejected by a 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling favoring the Philippines.[66] Confrontations, such as ramming Philippine vessels in 2024, underscore enforcement tactics that prioritize dominance over international norms, prompting alliances like U.S.-Philippine joint exercises in October 2024.[67] Such actions evoke historical fears of imperial overreach, framing China as an expansionist power willing to coerce neighbors for resource access and strategic denial. Threats toward Taiwan represent a flashpoint for global anti-Chinese sentiment, with PLA exercises simulating blockades and invasions signaling intent to enforce unification by force if necessary. In August 2022, following U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit, China conducted live-fire drills encircling Taiwan, launching ballistic missiles over the island for the first time.[68] Similar operations occurred in May 2024 after Taiwan President Lai Ching-te's inauguration, involving over 100 aircraft and warships in a three-day show of force.[68] These provocations, coupled with Xi's repeated assertions of reunification as a core interest, amplify perceptions of irredentist ambition, drawing parallels to Russia's Ukraine incursion and justifying arms buildups in allies like Japan and Australia. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, has drawn criticism for expansionist undertones through economic leverage, fostering dependencies that enable strategic footholds. While debates persist over "debt-trap diplomacy," evidence shows BRI lending contributing to distress in at least eight countries, with opaque terms leading to asset concessions like Sri Lanka's 99-year lease of Hambantota Port to China in 2017 after default.[69][70] China holds significant bilateral debt shares in BRI participants, often prioritizing infrastructure for dual-use military purposes, such as ports in Pakistan and Djibouti.[71] This model, involving over $1 trillion in commitments, raises alarms of neocolonialism, as recipient nations face repayment strains amid slowed Chinese growth, reinforcing narratives of predatory global influence.[72]Manifestations by Region
East Asia
In East Asia, anti-Chinese sentiment often arises from historical memories of invasions and tribute systems, compounded by contemporary territorial disputes, economic dependencies, and perceptions of aggressive expansionism by the People's Republic of China (PRC). Unlike in Southeast Asia, where ethnic Chinese minorities face direct socioeconomic tensions, East Asian manifestations frequently target the PRC government and its policies, though spillover effects impact perceptions of Chinese nationals. Surveys indicate persistently high unfavorable views: in Japan, only 13% held a favorable opinion of China in 2025, while in South Korea, favorable views fell to 19% that year.[73][73]Japan
Anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan has roots in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when imperial rivalry escalated into conflicts like the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), fostering views of China as a declining yet threatening power. Post-World War II, mutual historical grievances persisted, but Japanese sentiment intensified in the 2010s amid disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, where PRC incursions prompted public protests and bolstered support for defensive measures.[74] By 2024, 89% of Japanese respondents reported negative views of China, down slightly from prior years but still reflecting concerns over military assertiveness and economic coercion, such as rare earth export restrictions in 2010.[75] The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated tensions, with analyses of online discourse showing heightened anti-Chinese rhetoric linked to origin theories and mask-hoarding stereotypes.[76] Espionage fears have also risen, evidenced by arrests of PRC nationals for alleged spying on military sites, contributing to broader security anxieties. Despite cultural affinities and low Chinese immigrant populations limiting ethnic clashes, social media amplifies isolated incidents, though government policies emphasize restraint to avoid escalation.[77][74]Korea
In South Korea, anti-Chinese sentiment surged after China's 2016–2017 economic retaliation against the deployment of the U.S. THAAD missile defense system, including bans on Korean tourism, entertainment, and Lotte retail operations, which cost billions and bred perceptions of unreliability.[78] This was compounded by cultural disputes, such as PRC claims to origins of kimchi and hanbok, viewed as appropriation amid Korea's emphasis on indigenous heritage. By 2022, 80% of South Koreans held negative views of China, surpassing attitudes toward North Korea in some polls.[79][80] Recent incidents, including violent crimes attributed to Joseonjok (ethnic Koreans from China) and North Korean defector balloon campaigns highlighting PRC repatriations, have fueled protests and online vitriol.[81][82] Maritime encroachments in the Yellow Sea and spyware scandals further entrench distrust, with 2025 surveys showing deepened negativity tied to societal comportment and regional bullying perceptions.[83] While primarily directed at the PRC regime's illiberalism and imperialism, sentiment occasionally affects Chinese tourists and businesses, though South Korea's economic ties with China—its largest trading partner—temper overt hostility.[84]Other East Asian Contexts
In Taiwan, unfavorable views of mainland China stem predominantly from existential threats posed by PRC unification claims, including military exercises following Nancy Pelosi's 2022 visit and frequent air incursions. A 2023 Pew survey found two-thirds of Taiwanese viewing China's influence as a major threat, with 67% identifying primarily as Taiwanese rather than Chinese, reflecting a distinct identity forged post-1949.[85][86] While discrimination against mainland Chinese spouses or workers occurs, sentiment largely targets the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), not ethnicity, as evidenced by cross-strait marriages and business ties; however, populist rhetoric amplifies fears of cultural assimilation.[87] Mongolia exhibits acute sinophobia rooted in historical subjugation under Qing rule (1691–1911) and fears of demographic swamping by its southern neighbor, which supplies 90% of imports and dominates mining sectors. A 2016 survey showed 53% unfavorable views, fueling protests against Chinese rail projects and resource extraction, often framed as existential threats.[88] Neo-Nazi groups, though marginal, symbolize extreme backlash against perceived expansionism, with graffiti and vandalism targeting Chinese businesses amid economic vulnerability post-2010s commodity busts.[89] This contrasts with official hedging via the "third neighbor" policy courting Russia and the West, yet public anxiety persists due to geographic encirclement and cultural narratives of Han dominance.[90]Japan
Anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan has historical roots dating back to the early 20th century, exacerbated by rumors during the Great Kantō Earthquake of September 1, 1923, when unfounded fears of arson and well-poisoning by Chinese and Korean residents led to mob violence resulting in the deaths of several hundred Chinese alongside thousands of Koreans.[91] These incidents reflected broader xenophobic anxieties in the chaotic aftermath of the disaster, though Chinese communities in Japan were small and primarily urban laborers. Prewar perceptions often framed China as a declining empire, contrasting with Japan's modernization, but overt organized anti-Chinese campaigns were limited compared to Western exclusionary policies. Post-World War II relations initially improved with diplomatic normalization in 1972, yet public sentiment deteriorated from the late 1980s onward due to disputes over Japanese history textbooks, Chinese territorial claims, and military assertiveness. The 2010 Senkaku Islands incident, involving the collision of a Chinese fishing vessel with Japanese Coast Guard ships near the disputed archipelago (known as Diaoyu in China), sparked large-scale protests in Japan against perceived Chinese aggression, with demonstrators in Tokyo and other cities condemning Beijing's diplomatic pressure and economic retaliation, such as the temporary ban on rare earth exports.[92] Similar rallies occurred in 2012 following Japan's nationalization of the islands, fueling nationalist sentiments without widespread violence against Chinese residents.[49] Contemporary surveys indicate persistently high levels of unfavorable views, with only 13% of Japanese holding a positive opinion of China in 2025, down from earlier decades and driven by factors including territorial incursions—Chinese government vessels have repeatedly entered waters around the Senkaku Islands, with 347 such intrusions recorded in fiscal year 2021 alone—and concerns over espionage and economic coercion.[73][93] Pew Research data from 2018 showed 78% unfavorable views, the highest among surveyed nations, attributed largely to security threats rather than economic competition or cultural differences.[94] A 2019 Genron NPO poll similarly identified China's military buildup and lack of mutual trust as primary causes, with 89% of respondents viewing bilateral ties negatively.[95] Manifestations remain largely non-violent, contrasting with anti-Japanese unrest in China, including occasional protests, online backlash against Chinese influence in media or business, and subtle discrimination against the approximately 780,000 Chinese residents (as of 2023), such as housing denials reported by 40% of foreign respondents in a 2017 government survey.[96] Government policies emphasize restraint to avoid escalation, with police monitoring nationalist groups, though underlying tensions persist amid ongoing East China Sea patrols and historical grievances amplified by state media on both sides.[74]Korea
Anti-Chinese sentiment in Korea traces its origins to the Joseon dynasty's tributary relations with Qing China, where perceptions of cultural and political subjugation bred long-standing resentment, as evidenced by historical records of Korean elites viewing Chinese dominance as a threat to sovereignty.[97] This historical backdrop persisted into the 20th century, compounded by China's intervention in the Korean War (1950–1953), which resulted in over 400,000 Chinese casualties and deepened animosities among Koreans who associated the People's Volunteer Army with prolonged conflict and division of the peninsula.[98] In modern South Korea, sentiment shifted markedly after the 2017 deployment of the U.S. THAAD missile defense system, which prompted China to impose unofficial economic sanctions, including bans on Korean K-pop concerts, tourism restrictions, and boycotts of Lotte Group products, costing South Korea an estimated $7.5 billion in losses.[99] These retaliatory measures eroded trust, with public opinion polls showing unfavorable views of China rising from 37% in 2015 to 77% by 2022, the highest globally according to Pew Research data analyzed in comparative studies.[98] By 2025, anti-Chinese sentiment reached 66.3% in a JoongAng Ilbo and East Asia Institute survey, driven by entrenched perceptions of China as a regional bully, including territorial disputes over the Yellow Sea and cultural frictions such as claims of Chinese appropriation of Korean traditions like kimchi and hanbok.[82] Violent crimes by ethnic Korean-Chinese (Joseonjok) suspects, who comprise a disproportionate share of certain offense categories despite being 0.3% of the population, have amplified stereotypes of criminality and social disruption.[81] Protests surged in 2025, with far-right groups rallying against visa-free entry for Chinese tourists—numbering over 6 million annually pre-policy—and amid preparations for Xi Jinping's visit, reflecting broader fears of economic dependency and security threats from China's support for North Korea.[100][101] In North Korea, anti-Chinese sentiment manifests more covertly due to state control, but historical grievances from the Korean War and ongoing economic reliance—China supplies 90% of North Korea's trade—fuel elite distrust, occasionally surfacing in propaganda emphasizing self-reliance over "big brother" influence.[98] Public expressions remain suppressed, though defections and smuggled media highlight underlying resentments toward Chinese repatriation policies for North Korean escapees.[78]Other East Asian Contexts
In Mongolia, anti-Chinese sentiment has deep historical roots stemming from the Qing dynasty's (1644–1912) colonization and exploitation of Mongolian territories, including forced labor, land seizures, and cultural suppression, which fostered enduring resentment toward Han Chinese dominance.[102] This legacy persists in modern fears of economic encroachment, with widespread perceptions that Chinese mining investments and labor inflows threaten Mongolian sovereignty and resources; for instance, public opposition halted a $485 million Chinese-funded rail project in 2018 due to concerns over debt traps and cultural dilution.[88] Manifestations include graffiti campaigns demanding the expulsion of Chinese residents, sporadic violence against Chinese workers, and the rise of ultra-nationalist groups, some adopting neo-Nazi iconography to symbolize resistance to perceived Chinese "invasion," as documented in ethnographic studies of urban youth subcultures.[103] [89] These attitudes are amplified by grievances over Inner Mongolia's assimilation policies under PRC rule, where ethnic Mongolians report linguistic and cultural erasure, fueling solidarity protests in independent Mongolia.[90] In Taiwan, sentiment toward mainland Chinese individuals is more politically driven than ethnically motivated, given the shared Han Chinese heritage of most Taiwanese, but negative views of "mainland China" as a whole reached 66% unfavorable in a 2020 survey, correlating with opposition to PRC unification efforts and perceptions of authoritarian overreach.[104] Instances of discrimination have surfaced against PRC migrant workers, with reports of exploitative labor practices by Taiwanese firms—such as wage theft, excessive hours, and poor living conditions—prompting complaints from over 700 Chinese laborers in 2023–2024, which in turn heightened reciprocal tensions.[105] Historical divides between benshengren (pre-1949 Taiwanese residents) and waishengren (1949 mainland evacuees) have occasionally manifested as intra-island resentments, though these are increasingly subsumed under broader anti-CCP stances rather than blanket anti-Chinese prejudice.[87] Public discourse often frames such attitudes as defensive responses to PRC military threats and infiltration attempts, rather than cultural animus.[106]Southeast Asia
Anti-Chinese sentiment in Southeast Asia has historically manifested through violent pogroms, riots, and discriminatory policies, often triggered by economic competition where ethnic Chinese minorities dominated commerce and trade, fostering resentment among indigenous populations facing poverty and limited opportunities.[107] These tensions were exacerbated by perceptions of dual loyalty, especially during geopolitical conflicts involving China, leading to scapegoating during crises.[9] In Indonesia, one of the earliest major incidents was the 1740 Batavia massacre, where Dutch colonial authorities and local mobs killed between 5,000 and 10,000 ethnic Chinese amid fears of rebellion and economic rivalry, following a peasant uprising that authorities attributed to Chinese instigation.[32] More recently, during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, anti-Chinese riots erupted in Jakarta and other cities from May 13-15, 1998, resulting in over 1,000 deaths—mostly Chinese Indonesians—along with widespread looting, arson, and documented rapes targeting Chinese women, as economic collapse led to scapegoating of the commercially dominant Chinese minority.[108] [109] These events highlighted how structural economic disparities and political instability could ignite latent hostilities.[110] Malaysia experienced severe ethnic violence in the 13 May 1969 race riots in Kuala Lumpur, where clashes between Malays and Chinese following contentious election results—perceived as a loss of Malay political dominance—led to at least 196 official deaths (though estimates suggest up to 600-800, disproportionately Chinese) and the displacement of thousands, driven by frustrations over Chinese economic advantages despite affirmative action policies favoring Malays.[111] [112] In Vietnam, post-1975 communist policies nationalized private businesses, disproportionately affecting ethnic Chinese (Hoa) who controlled much of the southern economy, culminating in the 1978-1979 expulsion or flight of approximately 450,000 Hoa amid the Sino-Vietnamese border conflict, as Hanoi viewed them as potential fifth columnists loyal to China.[113] [114] In the Philippines, while overt violence has been rarer, anti-Chinese sentiment arose from historical labor restrictions under U.S. colonial rule and persists through stereotypes of economic exploitation, intensified recently by South China Sea disputes questioning the loyalty of Chinese-Filipinos, who comprise about 1-2% of the population but hold significant business influence.[115] [21] Thailand has seen less explosive conflict due to successful assimilation policies from the early 20th century, which encouraged intermarriage and cultural adoption, though underlying Sinophobia lingers in narratives framing historical Chinese migration as a threat to national identity and sovereignty.[116] Across the region, these patterns reflect causal links between minority economic success, majority exclusion from wealth creation, and episodic mobilizations during scarcity or political upheaval, rather than mere cultural incompatibility.[117]Indonesia
Anti-Chinese sentiment in Indonesia originated in the colonial era of the Dutch East Indies, where ethnic Chinese served as intermediaries in trade and agriculture, fostering resentment among native Indonesians over economic advantages. Tensions escalated in October 1740 with the Batavia massacre in modern-day Jakarta, where Dutch authorities, fearing a Chinese rebellion amid falling sugar prices and labor competition, incited and participated in the killing of approximately 10,000 ethnic Chinese residents, alongside Javanese mobs.[33][118] This event decimated the local Chinese population and set a precedent for periodic violence tied to perceptions of Chinese economic exploitation. Post-independence, under President Suharto's New Order regime (1966–1998), state policies institutionalized discrimination against Chinese Indonesians, who represented about 3% of the population but dominated much of the private sector economy through entrepreneurship and trade networks. Measures included prohibitions on Chinese-language schools, media, and cultural expressions like public celebrations of Chinese New Year, alongside mandates for name changes to Indonesian forms and restrictions on business ownership to promote assimilation and curb perceived clannishness.[119][120] These policies exacerbated underlying envy from pribumi (native) Indonesians, who attributed socioeconomic disparities to Chinese favoritism and opacity in dealings.[59] Violence recurred during economic crises, most severely in the May 1998 riots triggered by the Asian financial meltdown, with mobs in Jakarta, Solo, and Medan systematically targeting Chinese properties, leading to over 1,000 deaths—primarily from fires during looting—and at least 168 reported rapes of ethnic Chinese women, often with impunity.[121][110] Blame focused on Chinese control of commerce amid widespread poverty, culminating in Suharto's resignation. Earlier incidents, such as 1980 riots in Central Java destroying Chinese shops and 1994 clashes in Medan killing one, highlighted recurrent patterns linked to rumors and scarcity.[122][119] Following 1998 reforms under Presidents Habibie and Wahid, discriminatory laws were repealed, including legalization of Chinese organizations and designation of Chinese New Year as a national holiday in 2003, enabling greater cultural visibility.[120] However, latent resentments endure, fueled by persistent economic imbalances and stereotypes of Chinese insularity; surveys show many Indonesians perceive the community as exerting undue economic sway.[120] In the 2020s, while COVID-19 sparked isolated hate speech without mass violence, electoral campaigns have revived "pribumi empowerment" rhetoric against Chinese-linked oligarchs, underscoring unresolved tensions from historical epistemic erasure and violence.[123][124]
Malaysia
Anti-Chinese sentiment in Malaysia stems primarily from ethnic economic disparities, with Malaysian Chinese comprising approximately 22.6% of the population in 2020 but historically dominating commerce and urban economies due to entrepreneurial networks established during British colonial rule.[125] This dominance fostered resentment among the Malay majority (about 69.8%), who were largely rural and agrarian, perceiving Chinese success as exploitative amid post-independence nation-building.[111] Tensions escalated after the 1969 general elections, where opposition parties, including those backed by Chinese voters, reduced the ruling Alliance Party's parliamentary majority from 74 to 51 seats, prompting celebrations in Kuala Lumpur that Malay nationalists interpreted as provocative.[112] The May 13, 1969, riots erupted in the capital, involving targeted attacks on Chinese neighborhoods, with official figures reporting 196 deaths (mostly Chinese) over several days, though unofficial estimates suggest up to 600-800 fatalities and widespread property destruction.[111] [112] The violence, fueled by political incitement and longstanding grievances over socioeconomic inequality—where Chinese held 70% of non-agricultural income despite being a minority—led to a state of emergency, suspension of parliament, and the ousting of moderate leaders.[111] In response, the government introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971, mandating 30% Bumiputera (Malay and indigenous) ownership in enterprises and quotas in education and public sector jobs to redistribute wealth, explicitly aiming to diminish associations of race with economic roles.[126] The NEP and subsequent policies institutionalized preferences for Bumiputera, resulting in de facto discrimination against ethnic Chinese through university admission quotas (e.g., limiting non-Bumiputera to 10-20% in public institutions), restricted access to government contracts, and civil service hiring biases favoring Malays.[127] [125] These measures, justified as corrective for historical inequities, have persisted beyond the NEP's 1990 end, with extensions under visions like Wawasan 2020, exacerbating perceptions of systemic exclusion and prompting Chinese emigration or private sector pivots.[126] Critics argue the policies hinder merit-based competition, perpetuating Malay dependency while Chinese adapt via family businesses, yet fueling narratives of Chinese "control" in retail and manufacturing.[128] In contemporary Malaysia, anti-Chinese rhetoric manifests in political discourse, where Malay nationalists invoke 1969 fears to oppose Chinese-linked investments or cultural assertions, such as 2024 incidents of Chinese nationals waving PRC flags at events, framed by right-wing groups as sovereignty threats.[60] China's growing economic influence, including Belt and Road projects, amplifies suspicions of "selling out" to Beijing, blending domestic ethnic animus with geopolitical unease, though empirical data shows Chinese Malaysians' loyalty to the nation despite grievances.[112] Sporadic protests, like anti-Chinese demonstrations in 2000 against perceived special rights challenges, underscore ongoing cultural clashes over language and identity policies prioritizing Malay.[125] Despite economic integration, these sentiments reflect unresolved causal dynamics of policy-induced resentments rather than inherent cultural incompatibility.[127]Philippines
Anti-Chinese sentiment in the Philippines traces back to the Spanish colonial era, when Chinese merchants and laborers, known as sangleys, faced periodic massacres and expulsions due to perceived economic competition and fears of rebellion. In 1603, a major Chinese uprising in Manila led to the deaths of thousands of Chinese residents in retaliatory violence by Spanish forces.[31] Similar pogroms occurred in 1639 and 1662, driven by suspicions of disloyalty and espionage, embedding early stereotypes of Chinese as unassimilable outsiders. During the American colonial period, the U.S. extended its Chinese Exclusion Act to the Philippines in 1903, limiting Chinese immigration primarily to laborers while exempting merchants, which institutionalized restrictions based on racial and economic anxieties.[115] Post-independence, Chinese Filipinos—comprising about 1.2-1.5% of the population but controlling an estimated 20-30% of retail trade and significant portions of banking and real estate—have encountered resentment rooted in perceptions of economic dominance and cultural insularity. This has manifested in regulatory measures, such as the 1935 Retail Trade Nationalization Law, which barred non-citizens from retail to curb Chinese business influence, and occasional social discrimination, including stereotypes of clannishness and dual loyalty.[129] Unlike in Indonesia or Malaysia, large-scale ethnic violence has been rare, with Chinese Filipinos largely integrated through intermarriage and naturalization, though post-World War II influxes of mainland Chinese exacerbated assimilation concerns.[130] In recent decades, territorial disputes in the South China Sea have intensified anti-China attitudes, often blurring into ethnic prejudice against Chinese Filipinos (Tsinoys). Incidents like the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff and China's rejection of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling have fueled public outrage, with Chinese coast guard vessels ramming Philippine boats and blocking resupply missions at Second Thomas Shoal as of 2024.[131] Polls reflect this shift: a 2017 Pew survey found 55% of Filipinos viewing China unfavorably, rising to 76% identifying China as the greatest national threat in a 2024 SWS poll amid escalating maritime confrontations.[132] [133] Digital disinformation campaigns have amplified nationalist and racist narratives, portraying Chinese investments as infiltration and prompting loyalty scrutiny of Tsinoys, as seen in the 2024 Alice Guo scandal involving alleged POGO-linked figures.[134] While politicians have historically avoided overt Sinophobia, rising tensions risk spillover violence, with Chinese Filipinos reporting heightened discrimination in employment and social settings.[21][135]Vietnam
Anti-Chinese sentiment in Vietnam stems from over a millennium of historical invasions and occupations by Chinese dynasties, beginning with the colonization of northern Vietnam from 111 BC until 939 AD, during which Vietnamese resistance movements frequently challenged Chinese rule.[136] This legacy fosters a view of China as an enduring northern threat, reinforced by subsequent invasions, including during the Ming dynasty in the 15th century and the Qing dynasty's interventions.[137] Such historical grievances contribute to a cultural narrative emphasizing Vietnamese independence struggles against Chinese domination, evident in folklore and national education.[138] The ethnic Chinese minority, known as Hoa, numbering around 1 million or about 1% of Vietnam's population as of recent estimates, has faced periodic discrimination tied to perceptions of dual loyalty and economic dominance.[139] Post-1975 unification, Vietnam's socialist reforms targeted private enterprises, disproportionately affecting Hoa traders, leading to the paihua policy that encouraged ethnic reclassification and prompted an exodus of approximately 250,000 Hoa by 1979 amid confiscations and harassment.[140] Tensions escalated into anti-Chinese pogroms in northern Vietnam from late 1978 through the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, displacing many Hoa and resulting in violence against Chinese-associated businesses and communities, partly as retaliation for perceived alignment with China.[141] In contemporary Vietnam, anti-Chinese sentiment manifests prominently through protests against China's territorial claims in the South China Sea, particularly over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, which Vietnam administers or claims based on historical sovereignty assertions dating to the 17th century.[142] The 2011 protests, triggered by Chinese interference with Vietnamese fishing and oil exploration vessels, saw weekly demonstrations in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City from June 5 onward, lasting nearly three months with up to 11 events drawing hundreds of participants chanting against Chinese aggression.[143] These were among the largest sustained anti-China actions since the 1979 war, reflecting public frustration with Beijing's "nine-dash line" claims encroaching on Vietnam's exclusive economic zone.[144] The 2014 crisis intensified sentiments when China deployed the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig into disputed waters on May 1, prompting nationwide riots from May 11-15 that targeted factories perceived as Chinese-owned, resulting in at least 15 facilities burned, 21 deaths, and nearly 100 injuries, primarily in Binh Duong province industrial zones.[145][146] Vietnamese authorities permitted initial protests but cracked down amid violence, which damaged foreign investments but highlighted deep-seated resentment over China's maritime expansionism, including island-building and militia deployments.[137] Surveys and media analyses indicate that such incidents amplify nationalism, with state media often amplifying anti-China rhetoric to bolster domestic legitimacy while avoiding full confrontation.[9] Economic boycotts of Chinese goods and online campaigns further sustain this sentiment, though Vietnam maintains pragmatic trade ties exceeding $100 billion annually as of 2023.[138]Other Southeast Asian Contexts
In Thailand, ethnic Chinese have been deeply integrated into society since the mid-20th century, following assimilation policies under leaders like Phibun Songkhram that enforced Thai language use and cultural conformity to mitigate perceived foreign loyalties.[147] These measures, including restrictions on Chinese schools and media, stemmed from nationalist fears of Chinese communist influence during the Cold War era.[148] By the 1960s, such sentiments had largely subsided as intermarriage and economic participation rose, though sporadic resentment persists among underclasses due to the economic dominance of Thai Chinese businesses.[149] Recent public discontent has targeted mainland Chinese influence, including backlash against a proposed Chinese digital wallet system in 2024, viewed as enabling corruption and economic overreach.[150] Myanmar has experienced acute anti-Chinese violence, notably the 1967 riots in Rangoon, where Burmese mobs attacked Chinese communities in response to government bans on Mao badges and cultural expressions amid the Cultural Revolution's spillover.[151] The unrest, fueled by economic competition and perceptions of Chinese disloyalty, resulted in hundreds of deaths, widespread property destruction, and mass evacuations to China.[152] In recent years, resentment has intensified due to China's diplomatic and economic backing of the military junta post-2021 coup, including arms supplies and infrastructure projects like the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, which locals associate with environmental degradation and resource exploitation.[153][154] This has led to attacks on Chinese factories and diplomatic sites, such as the 2024 assault on the Chinese consulate in Mandalay.[154] In Cambodia, anti-Chinese sentiment surged in the late 2010s amid rapid Chinese investment exceeding $10 billion annually by 2019, concentrated in real estate, casinos, and special economic zones, often displacing locals and straining infrastructure.[155] The influx of over 100,000 Chinese workers and tourists has fostered perceptions of cultural imposition and crime, including scams and gambling dens in Sihanoukville, exacerbating Khmer nationalism.[156] Historical precedents include post-1970 coup policies under Lon Nol that nationalized Chinese businesses, targeting the community—estimated at 1 million before the Khmer Rouge era—for perceived pro-communist ties.[157] Opposition figures have leveraged these grievances, framing Chinese influence as undermining sovereignty, though government reliance on Beijing for aid tempers overt action.[158] Countries like Laos, Brunei, and Timor-Leste exhibit limited documented anti-Chinese sentiment, with economic dependencies on Chinese Belt and Road Initiative projects fostering pragmatic ties rather than widespread hostility.[159] In Laos, Chinese railway and hydropower investments have raised debt concerns but not sparked ethnic targeting, given the small Chinese diaspora.[160] Brunei's oil-dependent economy similarly prioritizes stable relations with China over domestic frictions.[161]Western Countries
Anti-Chinese sentiment in Western countries emerged prominently in the mid-19th century amid large-scale Chinese immigration driven by demand for cheap labor in infrastructure projects such as railroads and mining. In the United States, Chinese workers comprised about 10 percent of California's labor force by 1870, leading white laborers to perceive them as undercutting wages and job opportunities during economic downturns like the 1870s depression.[162] Similar dynamics unfolded in Canada and Australia, where Chinese miners and railway builders faced hostility from European settlers fearing economic displacement.[163] This resentment culminated in restrictive policies, including the U.S. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which suspended immigration of Chinese laborers for 10 years and barred naturalization, marking the first federal law to target a specific ethnic group.[13] In Canada, the Chinese Immigration Act of 1885 imposed a $50 head tax on Chinese entrants, later raised to $500 by 1903, effectively limiting inflows while generating revenue from the few admitted.[164] Australia enacted colonial-era poll taxes and, post-federation in 1901, the Immigration Restriction Act enforcing the White Australia policy, which used dictation tests to exclude non-Europeans, including Chinese.[42] These measures reflected not only labor protectionism but also cultural anxieties amplified by "Yellow Peril" propaganda portraying East Asians as an existential threat to Western civilization through overwhelming numbers and moral degeneracy.[57] In Europe, historical sentiment was less tied to mass immigration but influenced by imperial rivalries and missionary reports of Chinese "barbarism," contributing to broader Sinophobia. Russia experienced tensions from border conflicts and perceptions of Chinese expansionism in Siberia. Contemporary manifestations include heightened scrutiny over Chinese espionage and economic influence; for instance, U.S. indictments of Chinese nationals for cyber theft of COVID-19 research in 2020 underscored ongoing national security concerns fueling public distrust.[165] The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated incidents, with documented increases in anti-Asian violence in the U.S. and Europe linked to associations with the virus's origins in China, though rooted in empirical questions about laboratory leaks and opacity in reporting.00268-0/fulltext) Such sentiments often stem from verifiable issues like intellectual property theft—estimated at hundreds of billions annually by U.S. agencies—and military assertiveness, rather than unfounded prejudice alone.[166]United States
Anti-Chinese sentiment in the United States originated in the mid-19th century, coinciding with the arrival of Chinese laborers during the California Gold Rush and the construction of the Transcontinental Railroad. These immigrants, primarily from Guangdong province, numbered over 300,000 by 1880, filling demanding roles in mining and infrastructure at wages lower than those demanded by white workers, which fueled economic resentment among American laborers who viewed Chinese workers as undercutting their bargaining power.[13] Cultural differences, including perceptions of Chinese customs as incompatible with American society—such as opium use and communal living—exacerbated ethnic prejudices, leading to widespread discrimination in housing, employment, and legal rights.[13] This tension culminated in legislative measures, most notably the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which prohibited the immigration of Chinese laborers for a decade and barred Chinese residents from naturalization, marking the first U.S. law to restrict immigration based explicitly on nationality. Signed into law on May 6, 1882, by President Chester A. Arthur, the act responded to pressures from labor organizations and Western politicians who argued that unrestricted Chinese influx threatened American wages and social cohesion.[40] Its effects included family separations, a skewed gender imbalance among Chinese Americans (with males vastly outnumbering females), and stunted community growth, as re-entry was restricted even for those temporarily abroad.[167] Renewed and expanded in 1892 and 1902, the exclusion framework persisted until partial repeal via the Magnuson Act of 1943, influenced by wartime alliances against Japan.[13] Violence accompanied these policies, with notable anti-Chinese riots in the late 19th century. The Denver Riot of October 31, 1880, saw a mob of around 3,000 white residents attack Chinatown, destroying businesses and homes while police stood by, resulting in property damage estimated at $12,000 but no deaths due to prior evacuation warnings.[168] Similar expulsions occurred in Tacoma on November 3, 1885, where city officials coordinated the forced removal of 600 Chinese residents, burning their homes and laundries, and in Seattle from February 6-9, 1886, where riots left one Chinese man dead and prompted federal intervention to enforce exclusion compliance.[169] These events, driven by organized labor campaigns and nativist rhetoric framing Chinese as an existential "Yellow Peril"—a threat of racial dilution and economic domination—reflected broader propaganda in media and politics portraying East Asians as inherently unassimilable.[57] In the 20th century, sentiment moderated somewhat post-World War II, with Chinese Americans achieving higher socioeconomic status, often stereotyped as a "model minority" by the 1960s, though underlying suspicions persisted amid Cold War dynamics. Contemporary manifestations include heightened scrutiny over national security, with U.S. government initiatives like the Department of Justice's China Initiative (2018-2022) targeting alleged intellectual property theft and espionage linked to the People's Republic of China, leading to indictments of ethnic Chinese researchers despite criticisms of overreach. Public opinion polls reflect this wariness: a 2025 Pew Research survey found 77% of Americans hold unfavorable views of China, down slightly from 81% in 2024, primarily attributing negativity to the Chinese Communist Party's policies rather than Chinese people, though conflation occurs in rhetoric.[170] The COVID-19 pandemic intensified anti-Asian incidents, with FBI data showing anti-Asian hate crimes rising to 279 reported offenses in 2020 from 161 in 2019, a 73% increase, amid associations of the virus origin with China.[171] Advocacy groups like Stop AAPI Hate documented over 11,000 incidents from 2020-2022, including verbal harassment and physical assaults, though underreporting remains an issue due to community distrust of authorities.[172] By 2025, incidents persisted at elevated levels—nearly three times pre-pandemic averages—despite declining pandemic urgency, underscoring how geopolitical tensions, including U.S.-China trade disputes and technology restrictions on firms like Huawei and TikTok, sustain broader sentiment.[173] Economic competition in sectors like semiconductors and rare earths continues to frame China as a strategic rival, influencing policy and public discourse without uniformly translating to violence against Chinese Americans.[174]Canada
Chinese laborers began arriving in Canada in significant numbers during the 1858 Fraser River Gold Rush and were recruited en masse for the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway in the 1880s, comprising about 15,000 workers who faced hazardous conditions and low wages.[175] Post-completion of the railway in 1885, widespread economic fears and racial prejudice among white laborers led to the federal Chinese Immigration Act, imposing a $50 head tax on Chinese entrants to deter further immigration; this escalated to $100 in 1900 and $500 in 1903, affecting approximately 82,000 individuals until 1923 and generating revenue exceeding $23 million.[175] Additional restrictions included provincial laws in British Columbia barring Chinese from professions, voting, and property ownership, fostering segregated "Chinatowns" and social exclusion.[176] The Chinese Immigration Act of 1923, known as the Exclusion Act, virtually halted Chinese immigration by permitting entry only to merchants, students, diplomats, and immediate family of Canadian citizens, resulting in family separations and "bachelor societies" where men outnumbered women by ratios as high as 20:1 in some communities.[177] This legislation reflected peak anti-Chinese sentiment, justified by claims of economic competition and cultural incompatibility, and remained in effect until partial repeal in 1947 amid post-World War II shifts, with full racial equality in immigration policy not achieved until 1967.[178] In 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper issued a formal apology on behalf of Parliament, accompanied by symbolic redress payments of $20,000 to surviving head tax payers and their spouses, acknowledging the policies' discriminatory intent.[175] Contemporary anti-Chinese sentiment has resurfaced amid geopolitical tensions and health crises, notably during the COVID-19 pandemic starting in 2020, which saw a documented surge in anti-Asian incidents often targeting those perceived as Chinese, including verbal harassment, vandalism, and physical assaults.[179] Community organizations reported over 1,000 cases of anti-Asian racism in Canada by mid-2021, with women comprising nearly 60% of victims, linked to rhetoric blaming China for the virus's origins.[180] Official statistics from the RCMP noted elevated hate crimes against those of Asian background in 2020-2021, though underreporting persists due to cultural stigma around victimhood.[181] These events echo historical patterns but occur against a backdrop of larger Chinese Canadian populations, prompting government initiatives like the Anti-Racism Strategy while highlighting persistent spillover from state-level criticisms of the People's Republic of China into ethnic targeting.[182]Australia
Anti-Chinese sentiment in Australia emerged prominently during the mid-19th century gold rushes, when significant numbers of Chinese migrants arrived seeking fortune in Victoria and New South Wales. European miners resented Chinese laborers for their willingness to work for lower wages and in harsher conditions, perceiving them as economic competitors who undercut claims and resources. This tension escalated into violent riots, including the Buckland Valley riot on July 4, 1857, in Victoria, where miners expelled Chinese from the fields. Similar unrest occurred at Lambing Flat (now Young) in New South Wales between November 1860 and July 1861, where mobs of up to 1,000 European diggers repeatedly attacked Chinese camps, destroying tents, burning stores, and driving approximately 2,000 Chinese miners from their claims, though fatalities were limited due to interventions by colonial troopers.[183] These disturbances prompted colonial governments to enact restrictive measures, such as Victoria's 1855 tax on Chinese arrivals and limits on ships' passenger numbers, aimed at curbing influxes deemed threatening to social cohesion and labor markets. Federation in 1901 formalized this exclusion through the Immigration Restriction Act, instituting a dictation test in European languages to effectively bar non-European entrants, primarily targeting Chinese and other Asians as part of the White Australia Policy. This policy, supported across political lines, reflected widespread fears of cultural dilution and economic displacement, remaining in place until gradual dismantling began in the 1960s under Prime Minister Harold Holt, with full abolition by 1973.[184][185] In the contemporary era, anti-Chinese sentiment has largely shifted from ethnic exclusion to geopolitical distrust of the People's Republic of China government, fueled by Beijing's assertive foreign policy, including military expansion in the South China Sea, alleged espionage, and economic coercion following Australia's 2020 call for an independent COVID-19 origins inquiry. Trade sanctions imposed by China on Australian exports like barley, wine, and coal from 2020 onward exacerbated bilateral tensions, contributing to plummeting public trust; Lowy Institute polls indicate only 17% of Australians trusted China to act responsibly in world affairs by 2024, with 93% viewing its regional military activities negatively in 2021. While this fosters criticism of the Chinese Communist Party rather than ethnic Chinese communities, spillover effects include heightened discrimination against Chinese-Australians, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic when associations with the virus's origins led to reports of verbal abuse, physical assaults, and threats, affecting nearly one in five Chinese-Australians as of 2022.[186][187]Europe (e.g., UK, France, Russia)
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the "Yellow Peril" ideology permeated European discourse, framing Chinese expansion and migration as an existential threat to Western civilization. Originating in France with the term "Le Péril Jaune" in 1897, the concept gained traction across Europe following the Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901), with figures like Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany invoking it to warn of a unified Asian menace against European powers.[188] This sentiment was fueled by imperial rivalries, economic competition from Chinese labor, and cultural anxieties, manifesting in media portrayals of Chinese as inscrutable hordes rather than individuals.[189] In the United Kingdom, anti-Chinese prejudice emerged prominently in the early 20th century amid Chinese seafarer settlements in port cities like Liverpool and London's Limehouse, where opium dens and gambling were sensationalized as moral threats.[190] By 1911, Sinophobia had intensified, linking Chinese immigrants to crime and disease in public rhetoric. Modern incidents surged during the COVID-19 pandemic, with UK police recording a 300% increase in hate crimes against Chinese and East/Southeast Asians in the first quarter of 2020 compared to the prior year, driven by associations of the virus with China.[191] Overall, anti-East Asian hate crimes rose nearly 70% during the pandemic, with ethnic Chinese reporting the highest exposure to racist abuse among minorities in a 2020 poll.[192][193] France has witnessed episodic violence against Chinese communities, often tied to perceptions of economic competition and cultural otherness. In June 2013, six Chinese students were assaulted in Hostens, Gironde, amid racist insults, highlighting vulnerabilities in rural areas.[194] The COVID-19 era amplified these tensions, with surveys documenting a sharp rise in racist incivilities targeting those perceived as Chinese, prompting protests in 2021 under slogans like "The virus has no nationality."[195][196] Chinese descendants, numbering around 700,000, have historically faced prejudice but increasingly organized against it, as seen in community responses to attacks on businesses and individuals.[196] In Russia, attitudes toward Chinese people are generally favorable, with public opinion polls from the Levada Center indicating 70-80% positive views of China as a friendly nation or strategic partner, influenced by political alignment, cultural exchanges such as increased Chinese language learning, and positive tourism experiences in urban centers like Moscow and St. Petersburg where Russians often display enthusiasm and helpfulness.[197] However, sentiment varies by region, age, and experience, with anti-Chinese sentiment having deep roots in border regions like the Russian Far East, where fears of demographic swamping by Chinese migrants peaked in the 1990s amid post-Soviet economic turmoil and illegal cross-border trade.[198] Negative factors include stereotypes of poor-quality goods, historical territorial disputes, concerns over immigration and economic expansion, and broader anti-Asian racism more pronounced toward Central Asians than Chinese, leading to greater vigilance in remote areas like Vladivostok. Nationalism and anti-immigrant attitudes strongly correlate with Sinophobia, as evidenced by 2019 protests in Siberia against perceived Chinese land grabs and environmental degradation from logging.[199][200] Incidents of mistreatment, such as the 2023 denial of entry to five Chinese citizens at the border, underscore ongoing frictions despite official Sino-Russian alignment, with public anxieties focusing on labor displacement and cultural dilution.[201][202]Other Regions
Africa
In South Africa, anti-Chinese sentiment dates to the early 20th century, exemplified by the Cape Chinese Exclusion Act of 1904, which banned Chinese immigration and marked one of the first such laws in southern Africa.[203] During apartheid, Chinese South Africans occupied a precarious racial status, often treated similarly to coloured people with restricted business and residential rights despite occasional white classification benefits.[204] Economic competition has fueled modern tensions, with attacks on Chinese-owned shops and properties rising due to perceptions of unfair trade practices by local competitors.[205] In 2019, a Johannesburg court addressed a hate speech case where Chinese were labeled the "scum of the Earth" in genocidal rhetoric, highlighting ongoing discrimination.[206] In Zimbabwe, anti-Chinese sentiment escalated in 2025 amid violent incidents involving Chinese nationals in mining operations, including assaults on local workers during labor disputes.[207] The Chinese embassy issued warnings to its citizens to respect local laws following a spate of such violence, noting that impunity contributed to widespread resentment.[208] Trade unions reported increased confrontations, with Chinese firms accused of exploitation and human rights violations in sectors like gold mining.[209]Latin America
In Peru, historical anti-Chinese violence peaked in the 1909 Lima riots, where mobs targeted Chinese neighborhoods, leading to the destruction of areas like callejón Otaiza on orders from Mayor Guillermo Billinghurst, who deployed 140 police and military personnel on May 12.[210] These events stemmed from post-War of the Pacific resentments and economic grievances against Chinese laborers imported as coolies in the 19th century.[211] Persistent discrimination continued into the 20th century through riots and exclusionary policies amid fears of cultural and economic dominance.[211] Mexico experienced intense anti-Chinese campaigns from the 1910s to 1930s, driven by nativist movements portraying Chinese immigrants as threats to Mexican labor and society.[212] In northern states like Sonora and Sinaloa, associations organized expulsions between 1931 and 1934, resulting in thousands of Chinese-Mexicans deported or forced to flee, often after destruction of businesses and intermarriages banned under racial purity pretexts.[213][214] These efforts, peaking in 1931, dismantled thriving Chinese communities established since the late 19th century.[214]South Asia and Oceania
In India, anti-Chinese sentiment intensified after the June 2020 Galwan Valley border clash, prompting widespread calls for economic boycotts and stricter regulations on Chinese investments.[215] The government blocked over 200 Chinese apps and scrutinized firms like Huawei, reflecting public outrage over territorial disputes and supply chain dependencies, though business lobbies occasionally pushed back against full decoupling.[215][216] In Pacific Island nations of Oceania, anti-Chinese undercurrents arise from rapid Chinese infrastructure investments and police deployments, fostering grassroots resentment over perceived interference and debt burdens.[217] Local politicians have exploited these sentiments for electoral gain, particularly during instability where Chinese support for regimes clashes with community interests.[218] Incidents of violence against Chinese projects remain sporadic but tied to broader geopolitical rivalries with Western powers.[217]Africa (e.g., South Africa, Zimbabwe)
In South Africa, historical anti-Chinese sentiment emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries when approximately 63,000 Chinese laborers were imported for gold mines between 1904 and 1910, only to face exclusionary laws like the 1904 Chinese Exclusion Act and subsequent immigration bans due to perceptions of them as economic threats and racial inferiors under white minority rule.[219] These policies confined Chinese South Africans—numbering around 10,000 by the apartheid era—to "coloured" status, subjecting them to pass laws and residential restrictions while barring them from skilled trades.[219] Post-1994, renewed Chinese immigration, particularly small traders importing cheap goods, has sparked resentment among local entrepreneurs who accuse them of undercutting prices through direct sourcing from China and evading regulations, exacerbating unemployment in informal sectors where Chinese outlets dominate townships.[220] This competition has fueled sporadic hostility, including verbal abuse and petty vandalism, though Chinese communities have largely avoided the lethal xenophobic attacks targeting African migrants, partly due to their relative economic niche and lower visibility in high-risk areas.[221] Economic downturns since the 2010s have amplified these tensions, with surveys indicating that direct rivalry with Chinese labor and vendors drives much of the prejudice rather than cultural factors.[222] In Zimbabwe, anti-Chinese sentiment has escalated amid large-scale investments in mining and infrastructure since the early 2000s, where Chinese firms control key projects but face accusations of labor exploitation, substandard construction, and environmental degradation.[223] Notable incidents include the October 2025 fatal shooting of a local man by a Chinese worker at a mine in Bindura, which ignited protests over perceived impunity, as Chinese managers reportedly bribed officials to evade prosecution, highlighting broader grievances about violence against Zimbabweans by expatriate staff.[223][224] Civil society groups have condemned these operations for fostering inequality, with reports documenting assaults, unfair dismissals, and debt-trap loans totaling over $1 billion by 2023, eroding public support despite official praise for Chinese aid during economic crises.[225] Chinese embassy advisories in October 2025 explicitly warned nationals against provocative behavior to curb "rising anti-Chinese sentiment," reflecting how impunity in disputes—often involving physical confrontations—has politicized resentment, occasionally manifesting in populist rhetoric during elections.[224][226]Latin America (e.g., Mexico, Peru)
Chinese immigrants arrived in Mexico during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, primarily as laborers for railroads and agriculture under the Porfirio Díaz regime, numbering around 20,000 to 30,000 by 1910.[227] Their economic success in commerce fueled resentment among local populations, leading to xenophobic campaigns that portrayed Chinese as unfair competitors and carriers of disease.[228] This culminated in the Torreón massacre of May 13–15, 1911, during the Mexican Revolution, when revolutionary forces under Francisco I. Madero killed 303 Chinese residents—approximately half the local Chinese population—looting and burning their homes and businesses after claims, later disputed, that Chinese had fired on troops.[229] [230] Subsequent expulsions in northern states like Sonora in the 1930s deported thousands, enforced by laws prohibiting Chinese-Mexican marriages and segregating communities.[231] Mexico's government issued a formal apology for the Torreón massacre on May 17, 2021, acknowledging state complicity in the racism and xenophobia.[229] In Peru, Chinese coolies were imported starting in the 1840s to replace enslaved African labor on guano and sugar plantations, with over 90,000 arriving by 1874 amid harsh conditions that sparked mutinies and high mortality.[232] Post-contract, many transitioned to urban trades, dominating laundries, restaurants, and retail in Lima's Barrio Chino, which bred envy and stereotypes of Chinese as exploitative middlemen amid economic downturns.[233] Tensions erupted in May 1909 riots in Lima, where working-class mobs looted Chinese-owned stores, attacked individuals, and destroyed property, prompting Chinese community petitions for protection and contributing to restrictive immigration laws by 1910.[232] [233] Similar xenophobia affected Japanese immigrants, but Chinese faced targeted violence tied to labor competition and cultural othering, with authorities often unresponsive or complicit.[232] Broader patterns in Latin America echoed these dynamics, with U.S. influence post-1898 amplifying anti-Asian exclusionary policies across the hemisphere, including quotas and propaganda depicting Chinese as threats to national identity and hygiene.[234] Modern expressions include online discourse framing Chinese investments in infrastructure as neocolonial exploitation, though overt violence remains rare compared to historical episodes.[235] These legacies persist in subtle discrimination against Chinese-Peruvians and Mexican-Chinese communities, despite their integration and contributions to cuisine and entrepreneurship.[236]South Asia and Oceania
In India, anti-Chinese sentiment intensified during the 1962 Sino-Indian War, when approximately 3,000 Indians of Chinese descent were detained in internment camps without trial, and Chinese-owned businesses were scrutinized for suspected espionage links to Beijing.[46] This historical episode, rooted in wartime suspicions, resurfaced in public memory amid renewed border tensions. The June 15, 2020, Galwan Valley clash, which killed 20 Indian soldiers, triggered nationwide campaigns to boycott Chinese goods, with consumers targeting products like electronics and apparel, driven by perceptions of Chinese aggression and economic dependency.[237] A 2023 Pew Research survey found India among the top three countries with the sharpest post-pandemic increase in unfavorable views of China, rising to 67% by 2023 from lower levels pre-2020, attributed to territorial disputes and supply chain vulnerabilities.[238] Beijing has expressed concern over this trend, linking it to stalled diplomatic progress since the 2020 standoff.[239] In Pakistan, anti-Chinese sentiment remains limited despite economic integration through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which has invested over $60 billion since 2013; however, sporadic attacks on Chinese workers—such as the 2018 killing of two engineers in Balochistan—highlight localized resentment tied to resource extraction and perceived exploitation rather than broad cultural prejudice.[240] In New Zealand, historical opposition to Chinese immigration peaked during the 1860s Otago gold rush, leading to the 1881 Chinese Immigrants Act imposing a £10 poll tax (equivalent to about two months' wages) and head taxes until 1944, justified by claims of economic competition and moral threats from single male laborers.[241] Public hysteria in Dunedin, including a 1881 mayoral meeting demanding an immigration ban, reflected fears of "racial purity" dilution.[241] Contemporary incidents, amplified during the COVID-19 pandemic, include verbal harassment and vandalism against Chinese communities, with a 2021 University of Auckland study documenting increased racism linked to origin-of-virus narratives, though official data shows hate crimes against Asians numbered under 100 annually pre-2020.[242] In Pacific Island nations, anti-Chinese sentiment often stems from Chinese migrants' dominance in retail and trade, fostering perceptions of economic exclusion. Papua New Guinea experienced anti-Chinese riots in 2009, targeting shops amid grievances over imported goods undercutting locals, echoing earlier unrest in the 1990s.[243] The November 2021 Honiara riots in Solomon Islands saw Chinese-owned businesses looted and burned, with rioters explicitly voicing anti-Chinese rhetoric tied to commercial favoritism following Honiara's 2019 switch from recognizing Taiwan to China.[244] In Fiji, while no major pogroms occurred, resentment toward Chinese traders has surfaced in political discourse, exacerbated by Beijing's post-2006 coup aid, which critics view as enabling authoritarianism without broad local benefits.[245] These episodes underscore causal links between rapid Chinese economic inroads—such as loans exceeding 10% of GDP in some islands—and grassroots backlash against perceived interference.[217]Acts of Violence and Discrimination
Historical Pogroms and Riots
One of the earliest large-scale pogroms against ethnic Chinese occurred in Batavia (modern Jakarta), Dutch East Indies, in October 1740, where mobs of Europeans, slaves, and locals killed between 5,000 and 10,000 Chinese residents amid rumors of a Chinese uprising and economic competition over trade and labor.[32][246] The violence, lasting from October 9 to 22, involved systematic house-to-house searches, burnings, and killings, triggered by declining sugar prices and Chinese dominance in urban commerce, leading to the near-elimination of Batavia's Chinese population.[247] In Australia, the Lambing Flat riots of 1860–1861 in New South Wales goldfields saw European miners repeatedly attack Chinese prospectors, expelling over 1,000 from claims due to resentment over perceived claim-jumping and lower wages accepted by Chinese laborers.[248] The disturbances, peaking in July 1861 with military intervention, resulted in hundreds injured and contributed to restrictive immigration policies limiting Chinese arrivals to one per 100 tons of ship tonnage.[248] In the United States, the Los Angeles Chinese Massacre on October 24, 1871, involved a mob of about 500 lynching 18 Chinese immigrants after a gang-related shooting, with victims hanged from makeshift gallows in a wave of retaliatory violence fueled by longstanding interracial tensions and opium trade disputes.[249] Eight perpetrators were convicted but later released on technicalities, reflecting weak enforcement against anti-Chinese aggression.[250] The Denver anti-Chinese riot on October 31, 1880, saw a crowd of around 3,000 destroy most of the city's Chinatown, killing one Chinese man, injuring dozens, and causing damages estimated at $25,000, incited by election-day agitation and fears of Chinese labor undercutting wages.[168][251] Federal troops restored order, but the event exemplified widespread Western U.S. mobilization against Chinese communities amid the 1882 Exclusion Act debates.[252] The Rock Springs Massacre on September 2, 1885, in Wyoming Territory, erupted when 150 white Union Pacific coal miners attacked Chinese coworkers, killing at least 28, wounding 15, and expelling 500 more, driven by wage competition as Chinese miners accepted lower pay during a strike.[253] Rioters burned over 70 Chinese homes and looted possessions, with no convictions despite federal inquiries, highlighting institutional tolerance for such labor-driven violence.[254] These incidents, often rooted in economic displacement from Chinese immigration during industrialization and mining booms, prompted international condemnation but reinforced exclusionary laws without addressing underlying causal factors like union strategies favoring native workers.[255]Modern Incidents and Hate Crimes
In May 1998, amid Indonesia's economic crisis and the fall of President Suharto, widespread riots erupted in Jakarta and other cities, targeting ethnic Chinese Indonesians. Mobs looted and burned thousands of Chinese-owned shops and homes, resulting in over 1,000 deaths, primarily from arson and violence, and numerous documented cases of rape against Chinese women. The violence, which lasted several days starting May 13, was fueled by longstanding economic resentments toward the ethnic Chinese minority, perceived as disproportionately wealthy and aligned with the Suharto regime, though investigations later revealed orchestration by military elements to divert unrest from political targets. An estimated 168 cases of sexual violence were reported, though underreporting was likely due to stigma and inadequate official response.[256][121][257] In France during the 2010s, Chinese immigrants, particularly in Paris suburbs like Aubervilliers and Belleville, faced a surge in targeted robberies and assaults, often by organized gangs from North African or sub-Saharan African backgrounds exploiting perceptions of Chinese frugality and cash-based businesses. In 2016 alone, at least 100 such attacks were reported in Aubervilliers in the first seven months, culminating in the fatal stabbing of tailor Zhang Chaolin on August 20, which sparked protests by thousands demanding better police protection. Community leaders attributed the violence to ethnic profiling and resentment over economic success, with over 200 incidents recorded nationwide in 2016, though French authorities classified many as common crimes rather than hate-motivated, leading to criticism of under-policing and cultural insensitivity. Similar patterns emerged in earlier years, with marches in 2010 and 2011 following spikes in muggings and verbal harassment.[258][259][260] In North America, modern hate crimes against individuals of Chinese descent prior to the COVID-19 era were relatively sporadic but documented through official statistics. In the United States, FBI data recorded 158 anti-Asian bias incidents in 2019, many involving Chinese victims amid broader perceptions of economic competition. In Canada, Vancouver police noted 12 hate crimes targeting East Asians in 2019, often verbal assaults or vandalism linked to anti-immigrant sentiment. These figures, while lower than post-2020 surges, reflected persistent underreporting due to community distrust of authorities and cultural barriers to crime notification. Australia saw isolated incidents, such as verbal harassment and property damage against Chinese students in the 2010s, tied to housing affordability strains in cities like Sydney, though comprehensive pre-pandemic data remains limited.[261][262][263]Derogatory Terms and Stereotypes
Terms in Major Languages
The primary English term for anti-Chinese sentiment is Sinophobia, denoting fear, contempt, or hatred toward China, its people, or culture; it combines "Sino-" (from Latin Sinae for China) with "-phobia" (fear), with the earliest recorded use in 1876.[264] [265] In Mandarin Chinese, the term 排华 (pái huá) specifically refers to anti-Chinese policies, actions, or sentiments, including discrimination or exclusion targeting ethnic Chinese; it has been applied historically to events like the U.S. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, translated as 排华法案.[266] [267] European languages often employ cognates of Sinophobia:| Language | Term | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| French | Sinophobie | Used to describe aversion or bias against China or Chinese elements, as in analyses of U.S.-China tensions.[268] [269] |
| Spanish | Sinofobia | Equivalent term for fear or dislike of China or Chinese people/culture.[270] [271] |
| German | Sinophobie | Direct adaptation referring to anti-Chinese prejudice, though broader terms like Chinafeindlichkeit (hostility toward China) may also appear in political discourse.[267] |