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Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate

St Volodymyr's Cathedral in Kyiv
AbbreviationUOC-KP
TypeEastern Orthodox
Classification
  • Independent Eastern Orthodox (1992 – October 2018)
  • Canonical Eastern Orthodox (October–December 2018)
  • Independent Eastern Orthodox (2019–present)
PrimatePatriarch Filaret
LanguageUkrainian, Church Slavonic
HeadquartersUkraine Kyiv, Ukraine
TerritoryUkraine Ukraine
FounderMetropolitan Filaret (Denysenko)
Independence1992
Separated from
Merged intoOrthodox Church of Ukraine (2018)
Defunct15 December 2018 (Reneged and re-established since 2019)
MembersReported as 25 percent of religious Ukrainian population by Razumkov Centre (2016); less than 100,000 (2019)
Official websiteUkrainian Orthodox Church

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP; Ukrainian: Украї́нська Правосла́вна Це́рква – Ки́ївський Патріарха́т (УПЦ-КП), romanized: Ukrainska Pravoslavna Tserkva — Kyivskyi Patriarkhat (UPTs-KP)) was an Orthodox church in Ukraine, in existence from 1992 to 2018. Its patriarchal cathedral was St Volodymyr's Cathedral in Kyiv.

After its unilateral declaration of autocephaly in 1992, the UOC-KP was not recognised by the other Eastern Orthodox churches, and was considered a "schismatic group" by the Moscow Patriarchate and Ecumenical Patriarchate.[1][2][3] Patriarch Filaret (Denysenko) was enthroned in 1995 and excommunicated by the Russian Orthodox Church in 1997,[4][5] an action not recognized by the UOC-KP synod.[6] In 2018, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople moved unilaterally and against canonical norms to facilitate a "unification council", in contradiction to his previous statement "recognizing the fullness of the Russian Orthodox Church's exclusive competence on this issue".[7] The canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church rejected these overtures, noting its universal recognition as sole canonical authority on the territory of Ukraine and the political nature of the proposed council.[8] Constantinople ignored this, "reinstated" Filaret as a bishop and facilitated the convening of a unification council.[9][10][11][12][13] In December 2018, the unification council of the Eastern Orthodox churches of Ukraine decided to unite the UOC-KP with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), creating the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) which was subsequently granted autocephaly by the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople in January 2019.

A conflict between Filaret and Epiphanius, the Metropolitan of the OCU following the December 2018 unification council, erupted and resulted in Filaret claiming continuation of the UOC-KP on 20 June 2019. The UOC-KP is not currently recognized by, or in communion with any of the mainstream Orthodox churches that are members of Eastern Orthodoxy. The OCU is recognized by only three of the fourteen universally recognized autocephalous churches.

History

[edit]
See also: History of Christianity in Ukraine, History of the Russian Orthodox Church, and 2018 Moscow–Constantinople schism

The Kyiv Patriarchate considers itself an independent church,[14] a successor of the Metropolis of Kyiv and all Rus[14] which existed under the Ecumenical Patriarchate until 1686 (when Constantinople transferred it to the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church). In January 1992, after Ukraine became an independent state during the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Moscow Patriarchate was able to freely elect a new Patriarch. Filaret was passed over in favor of Alexius II. Embroiled in scandal, Metropolitan of Kyiv Filaret promised the Synod of Ukraine to resign his position.[15] Before this could occur, he convened a small assembly of bishops from western Ukraine at the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra which submitted a request for Ukrainian autocephaly to the Moscow Patriarch.[16] The Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate responded that it would grant autocephaly if the request were made by an official request of the Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and the appeal were addressed to the people of Ukraine, to allow them the opportunity to make their desires known.[17][16]

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In June 1992, the Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church defrocked Filaret Denysenko, citing his refusal to honor his oath to step down as primate of Ukraine, his slander of the council's decisions against him, illegal services, and inciting of schism.[18] That same month, Filaret helped establish the UOC-KP. Its nominal primate was the émigré Mstyslav (Skrypnyk), primate of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Mstyslav never approved the union of the UAOC and UOC-KP.[19] Although Metropolitan Filaret had been the driving force of the Kyiv Patriarchate, it was not until the sudden death of Patriarch Volodymyr (Romaniuk) in July 1995 that he was elected the Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine in October of that year. Filaret had been defrocked by the Moscow Patriarchate (in which he had been ordained and served as bishop from February 1962 to spring 1992) and was excommunicated in February 1997.[5]

After the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, 38 of the church's 46 parishes in Crimea ceased to exist; three churches were seized by Russian authorities.[20] The Kyiv Patriarchate is unrecognised by any other Orthodox churches. In April 2018, the Ecumenical Patriarchate began to consider a request by the Ukrainian Parliament and US Government to grant canonical status to the UOC-KP in Ukraine.[21][9]

11 October 2018 Ecumenical Patriarchate decision

[edit]
Further information: Autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine

In early September 2018, Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew announced his desire to abolish Constantinople's 1686 transfer of "the region of today's Metropolis of Kyiv" to the Moscow Patriarchate.[22] On 11 October 2018, after a synod, the Patriarchate of Constantinople renewed an earlier decision to move towards granting autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.[23][24][25] The synod also withdrew Constantinople's 332-year qualified acceptance of the Russian Orthodox Church's jurisdiction over the Ukrainian Church, contained in a 1686 letter — a move unprecedented in the history of the Orthodox Church.[24][25] It lifted the excommunications of Patriarch Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) and Metropolitan Makariy of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC); both bishops were "canonically reinstated to their hierarchical or priestly rank, and their faithful ... restored to communion with the Church."[26][27][28] These moves were widely condemned across the Orthodox world. Virtually every Orthodox Primate protested these decisions, and even Greek bishops wrote rebukes of Constantinople's actions.[29][30]

The following day, the UOC-KP declared that the decision restored the canonical recognition of the episcopate and clergy of the Kyiv Patriarchate.[31][32] It was later clarified that the Ecumenical Patriarchate considered Filaret "the former metropolitan of Kyiv"[33][34][35][36] and Makariy "the former Archbishop of Lviv"[34][35] and, on 2 November 2018, the Ecumenical Patriarchate did not recognise the UAOC or the UOC-KP and their leaders.[37][38] The Ecumenical Patriarchate declared that it recognised sacraments performed by the UOC-KP and the UAOC as valid.[39][40]

On 20 October 2018, the UOC-KP changed the title of its leader to "His Holiness and Beatitude (name), Archbishop and Metropolitan of Kyiv – Mother of the Rus Cities and of Galicia, Patriarch of All Rus-Ukraine, Holy Archimandrite of the Holy Assumption Kyiv-Pechersk and Pochayiv Lavra".[41][42][43] The abridged form is "His Holiness (name), Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus’-Ukraine", and the form for interchurch relations is "Archbishop, Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Rus'-Ukraine".[41][42][44][45][46][47] The full title and the interchurch-relations version's mention of "archbishop" and "metropolitan" and the abridged form's mention of "patriarch" have caused confusion.[42][43]

Dissolution and merger with the UAOC into the OCU

[edit]
Main article: Unification council of the Orthodox churches of Ukraine

On 15 December 2018, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and UOC-KP hierarchies decided to dissolve the churches. That day, the UAOC, the UOC–KP and two members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) were going to merge to form the Orthodox Church of Ukraine after a unification council.[48]

According to Filaret, "the Kyiv Patriarchate has not been liquidated. It is not liquidated. They want to present the situation as if it was liquidated. The Kyiv Patriarchate can be liquidated by the one who created it".[49][50][51] The Ukrainian Ministry of Culture, "in response to a widely circulated statement by the media, alleging that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate still exists or is being restored in Ukraine", published a report that the UOC-KP had "actually and legally ceased its activities".[52] Filaret said, "The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) remains registered with state bodies. In particular, the Kyiv Patriarchate remains registered. This means the Kyiv Patriarchate continues to legally exist."[53] According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice, the UOC-KP still existed.[54][55]

Separation from the OCU and reestablishment of the UOC–KP

[edit]

The local council of the UOC-KP (convened by Filaret) decided to cancel the decisions of the unification council of the Orthodox churches of Ukraine on 20 June 2019,[56][57] during the conflict between Filaret and Epiphanius.

On 31 July 2019, the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture said the UOC-KP had ceased to exist.[58][59] However, on 4 September 2019, the District Administrative Court of Kyiv [uk] suspended the liquidation of the UOC-KP at the request of the UOC-KP.[60][61] On 11 September, another decision of the same court blocked "the Justice Ministry of Ukraine, the Culture Ministry of Ukraine, its structural sub-units, central-government and local authorities, and notaries public from performing any registration regarding the Kyiv Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate [UOC-KP], and their assets"[62][63] On 11 November 2019, the Court of Appeal of the District Administrative Court of Kyiv confirmed legality of the process of liquidation of the UOC-KP.[64][65]

On 14 December 2019, after the meeting of the enlarged Bishops' Council, held on 14 December in Kyiv on the occasion of the anniversary of the creation of the OCU, Epiphanius declared that the procedure of liquidation of the UAOC as well as the UOC-KP had been completed the day before. He added: "Such structures no longer exist. In confirmation of that, in the State Register there is marked 'activity DISCONTINUED'".[66] In the same month, the UOC-KP stated it did not recognize the liquidation.[67]

In January 2020, the UOC-KP announced that Filaret had officially withdrawn his signature from 15 December 2018 act of dissolution of the UOC-KP.[68][69]

Statistics

[edit]

The Kyiv Patriarchate has 44 percent of Orthodox Christians, compared to 12.8 percent for the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate. Although the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine (UOC-MP) has twice as many parishes, the UOC-KP had three times as many members. The former had 38 percent of all Orthodox and 25 percent of the population in 2016, and the Russian Orthodox had 23 percent of the Orthodox and 15 percent of the population. The UOC-KP had 34 dioceses worldwide, and over 5,100 parishes in Ukraine. Its United States vicariate consisted of 15 parishes, with its main cathedral St. Andrew's in Bloomingdale, Illinois.[70] The church had six parishes in Australia, and over 40 in western Europe. The Russian government's reported negative influence on the Moscow Patriarchate and claims that it is using the patriarchate as a "tool of influence over Ukraine" led to a renewed April 2018 drive to recognise an independent Ukrainian Orthodox church which, according to Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, would help "eliminate internal strife and conflicts within the state."[21][71]

UOC-KP adherents in Ukraine, excluding Crimea and breakaway areas of Donbas:

Date Percentage Source
May–June 2016 33 [72]
June–July 2017 44 [73]
May–June 2018 36 [74]

Primates

[edit]
Filaret and Poroshenko, holding a bouquet of white roses
Patriarch Filaret with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, 21 October 2018

In November 1991 the all-Ukrainian sobor of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, called by Metropolitan Filaret Denysenko, issued a request to the patriarch of Moscow for the autocephaly of the Ukrainian church.[75] The sobor of the ROC held in April 1992 refused that request and decided to replace Metropolitan Filaret with Volodymyr Sabodan. In response to this, at the all-Ukrainian sobor in June 1992 one part of the Ukrainian Orthodox church, led by Metropolitan Filaret, decided to separate from the ROC and unite with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) to form the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate under Patriarch Mstyslav.[75] Mstyslav never approved of the union of the UAOC and the UOC-KP.[75]

Patriarch Mstyslav (Stepan Ivanovych Skrypnyk) was Patriarch of Kyiv and all Rus’-Ukraine and primate of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) and Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC–KP) from 1991 to 1993. After Mstyslav's death in 1993, the temporary union ended and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church separated. The primates of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Kyiv Patriarchate continued to hold the title of patriarch:

On 20 October 2018, the UOC-KP changed the title of its primate to "His Holiness and Beatitude (name), Archbishop and Metropolitan of Kyiv – Mother of the Rus Cities and of Galicia, Patriarch of All Rus-Ukraine, Holy Archimandrite of the Holy Assumption Kyiv-Pechersk and Pochayiv Lavra".[42][43][76] The abridged form is "His Holiness (name), Patriarch of Kyiv and All Russia-Ukraine", and the form for inter-church relations is "Archbishop, Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Rus'-Ukraine".[42][44][45][46][47][76] Metropolitan Hilarion called the bestowal of title a "farce".[2][77]

Administration

[edit]

Before the first disestablishment:[78]

Dioceses

[edit]

Exarchates and vicariates

[edit]
  • Exarchate in Greece
  • Ukrainian Orthodox Vicarate of the UOC-KP in the US and Canada[84]
  • Vicariate in Australia
  • European Exarchate
  • Russian Exarchate

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate

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from Grokipedia
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) was an Eastern Orthodox body in , formed in 1992 through the unification of dissident elements from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate with the , under the leadership of former Metropolitan Filaret (Mykhailo Denysenko) of . Filaret, who had sought for the Ukrainian church amid the but faced deposition and by the Moscow Patriarchate, proclaimed himself Patriarch of and All Ukraine-Rus' in 1995. The UOC-KP positioned itself as the legitimate heir to ancient Kyivan Rus' , emphasizing Ukrainian and independence from Moscow's control, yet it operated without recognition from the or other mainstream Orthodox churches for most of its existence, rendering it schismatic in their eyes. In its pursuit of , the UOC-KP grew to represent a significant portion of Ukraine's Orthodox faithful, particularly in central and western regions, through aggressive and alignment with post-independence state aspirations, though it faced ongoing internal divisions and external condemnation as a politically motivated . The church's defining achievement culminated in 2018, when, alongside the , it dissolved itself at a unification council to create the (OCU), which received a of from , marking the end of 's dominance over Ukrainian but also sparking a broader in world between and . Despite this merger, Filaret's subsequent attempts to revive the UOC-KP highlighted lingering tensions over authority and autonomy within the new OCU structure.

Origins and Early Schism

Historical Context Prior to 1992

The Orthodox faith was introduced to the territory of modern in 988 AD, when Prince Volodymyr the Great of Kyivan Rus' adopted Christianity as the through baptism in the River, establishing the Metropolis of under the jurisdiction of the . This event marked the foundation of Eastern Orthodox Christianity in the region, with serving as a major ecclesiastical center predating the rise of by centuries. Following the Mongol invasions in the 13th century and subsequent political fragmentation, the Metropolis of Kyiv faced pressures from regional powers, including the and the Kingdom of Poland. In 1686, amid geopolitical maneuvering by Muscovite Russia—including diplomatic pressure and financial incentives on the Ottoman-controlled Ecumenical Patriarch IV—the Metropolis was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate, though this act was later contested as uncanonical due to its conditional nature and lack of full cession of authority. Under the from the onward, the church in Ukrainian territories remained subordinated to , with efforts to promote and cultural distinctiveness often suppressed in favor of policies. The 1917 spurred brief attempts at ecclesiastical , culminating in the proclamation of the (UAOC) on 14 October 1921 at the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council in , which sought full amid 's short-lived struggles. However, Soviet consolidation of power led to the UAOC's dissolution by the mid-1920s, with its leaders arrested, exiled, or executed during Stalinist purges that decimated independent religious movements. In the Soviet era, the Orthodox Church in operated as an under strict Patriarchate control, re-established post-World War II in 1946 to align with state ideology; instrumentalized it to legitimize Soviet rule, suppressing Ukrainian national elements while allowing limited revival under Communist oversight. By the late 1980s, during Mikhail Gorbachev's , Metropolitan Filaret (Mykhailo Denysenko), appointed as Permanent Representative (Exarch) of the Patriarchate to in 1989, oversaw a resurgence in church activity amid reforms, including the registration of over 1,000 parishes. Filaret, who had risen through the ranks of the since his in 1962, advocated for greater autonomy for the Ukrainian exarchate, reflecting growing nationalist sentiments as moved toward independence from the USSR. This period saw tensions with intensify, as the Ukrainian church's structure—comprising around 8,000 parishes by 1991—remained canonically tied to the in despite local demands for .

Formation in 1992 and Initial Schism from Moscow

Following Ukraine's declaration of independence on August 24, 1991, demands grew within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), then under the Patriarchate, for to align ecclesiastical structures with the new state. On November 1, 1991, the UOC's Bishops' Council appealed to and All Russia to grant independence to the Ukrainian church. This was reinforced by the All-Ukrainian Sobor convened by Metropolitan Filaret (Denysenko) of and later that month, which issued a formal request for , emphasizing the historical and basis for a self-governing Ukrainian church separate from 's jurisdiction. Moscow's response came at the Russian Orthodox Church's Hierarchical Council from March 31 to April 4, 1992, which denied the petition and instructed Filaret to submit his resignation as Metropolitan of , citing unspecified pressures and allegations against him. Filaret refused, retracting an earlier provisional agreement to resign and arguing it contradicted the expressed will of Ukrainian and for . The Patriarchate's suspended him on May 27, 1992, and deposed him on June 11, 1992, accusing him of violating obedience and fueling division. This escalation prompted several bishops loyal to Filaret to break from the UOC-Moscow Patriarchate, marking the onset of the as they rejected 's authority over Ukrainian dioceses. The schism culminated in the Unification Congress held June 25–26, 1992, where delegates from Filaret's faction—comprising around 10 bishops and numerous parishes—and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), a smaller body revived in 1989 tracing roots to 1921, merged to form the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP). The congress proclaimed autocephaly, elected UAOC Patriarch Mstyslav (Skrypnyk), who resided in the United States, as the new Primate of Kyiv and All Ukraine, and appointed Filaret as his deputy patriarch to lead operations in Ukraine. Moscow immediately condemned the UOC-KP as a schismatic entity for disregarding canonical deposition procedures and usurping titles without broader Orthodox consensus, while the new structure claimed continuity with Ukraine's historical Kyivan church tradition predating Moscow's influence. This formation split Ukraine's Orthodox faithful, with the UOC-Moscow Patriarchate retaining the majority of parishes under a new Metropolitan, Volodymyr (Sabodan), and the UOC-KP positioning itself as the national alternative amid post-Soviet national revival.

Leadership and Institutional Development (1992–2018)

Role and Controversies of Patriarch Filaret

Mykhailo Antonovych Denysenko, known as Patriarch Filaret, born on January 23, 1929, emerged as the central figure in the establishment and leadership of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) from 1992 to 2018. As Metropolitan of Kyiv and Halych under the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), he petitioned for autocephaly amid Ukraine's 1991 independence, but faced dismissal by an ROC synod in May 1992 for refusing to step down. On June 11, 1992, the ROC defrocked him, citing his orchestration of a schism and violation of an oath to resign if autocephaly was denied. Denysenko, supported by three bishops, then merged with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) on June 25, 1992, forming the UOC-KP and serving initially as deputy patriarch under Mstyslav Skrypnyk. Following Skrypnyk's death in 1993 and a brief leadership by Volodymyr Romaniuk, Filaret was elected at a UOC-KP sobor on October 20, 1995, securing 160 out of 165 votes. He led the church's institutional development, ordaining over 50 bishops and expanding parishes from a few dozen in 1992 to approximately 5,000 by 2018, positioning the UOC-KP as a key advocate for ecclesiastical independence from amid geopolitical tensions. Filaret's tenure emphasized Ukrainian liturgical language and , fostering growth despite lacking recognition from most Orthodox churches until 2018. Filaret's actions sparked major controversies, primarily centered on the schism with the ROC, which excommunicated him in 1997, declaring the UOC-KP graceless and its sacraments invalid—a stance upheld by -aligned bodies but rejected by Filaret as politically motivated retaliation. Critics, including ROC synods, accused him of canonical violations, such as coercing bishops to defect and ignoring ecumenical norms, leading to several initial supporters returning to Moscow under pressure. Allegations of Soviet-era KGB collaboration further fueled disputes; in 1992, Russian Orthodox priest and dissident Gleb Yakunin claimed access to files identifying Denysenko as agent "Antonov," alleging he informed on . Denysenko denied active collaboration, while UOC-KP representatives, like spokesman Eustratiy Zoria, argued any contacts served church preservation under repression, a common survival tactic in Soviet not unique to Filaret. Archival studies have questioned the specificity of such claims, noting widespread ROC-KGB ties but limited against Filaret beyond opponent testimonies. Personal scandals included charges of breaching monastic ; opponents alleged Filaret fathered a son, Andriy, during his episcopate in the , with the child later integrated into church roles, violating Orthodox canons for bishops. These 1992 accusations, amplified by ROC critics, were dismissed by UOC-KP faithful as unsubstantiated smears to discredit his independence drive, though they contributed to his rationale. Filaret's authoritative style, including threats against dissenters, drew internal critiques for prioritizing personal power over conciliarity.

Expansion and Conflicts with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) expanded gradually from its 1992 inception, initially comprising a modest number of parishes primarily drawn from dissenting clergy and communities within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (UOC-MP) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. By the mid-1990s, it had established around 1,000 parishes, concentrated in central and western Ukraine, reflecting appeals to national independence amid post-Soviet transitions. This growth relied on voluntary affiliations, bolstered by Patriarch Filaret's emphasis on Ukrainian sovereignty, though it remained significantly smaller than the UOC-MP's network of over 10,000 parishes at the time. Expansion accelerated after the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, Russia's annexation of Crimea, and the outbreak of conflict in , as perceptions of the UOC-MP's alignment with —evidenced by its leadership's reluctance to unequivocally condemn Russian actions—prompted defections. The UOC-KP's count rose to approximately 4,877 by 2016, with notable increases in where pro-independence sentiments were strongest; surveys indicated shifting lay support, with UOC-KP affiliation growing amid broader religiosity spikes post-Maidan. By 2018, it claimed over 5,000 parishes and 3,500 priests, still dwarfed by the UOC-MP's 12,000+ but representing a tripling since the early through organic recruitment and parish transitions. Conflicts with the UOC-MP intensified over canonical authority, with the Moscow Patriarchate declaring the UOC-KP schismatic and anathematizing Filaret in , framing its expansion as illegitimate poaching. Parish transfers often sparked disputes: communities voting to join the UOC-KP faced UOC-MP resistance, leading to legal battles under Ukrainian allowing majority decisions on affiliation, though enforcement sometimes involved local authorities or standoffs. Pre-2014 incidents were sporadic, mostly in the when initial schisms caused claims, but post-2014 tensions escalated with over 100 reported transition attempts annually in western oblasts, occasionally resulting in blocked access or minor violence, as UOC-MP alleged while UOC-KP proponents cited democratic processes. The UOC-MP maintained administrative control over most disputed sites via courts, limiting UOC-KP gains to about 10-15% of attempted switches, underscoring deeper geopolitical divides where viewed Kyiv's tolerance of the UOC-KP as state-sponsored .

Path to Autocephaly and 2018 Unification Efforts

Engagement with the Ecumenical Patriarchate

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP), established in 1992 following Metropolitan Filaret Denisenko's schism from the , repeatedly appealed to the for recognition and as an alternative to subordination to . These efforts, spanning from the mid-1990s onward, initially met with rejection; for instance, after Filaret's deposition by the Moscow Patriarchate in 1992 and subsequent in 1997, Constantinople upheld the anathema in 1998, deeming it valid under Orthodox norms and refusing to reinstate him or recognize the UOC-KP's structures. Similar appeals during President Viktor Yushchenko's tenure (2005–2010), including direct lobbying for UOC-KP recognition, yielded no substantive progress, as the Ecumenical Patriarchate maintained its non-intervention stance amid broader jurisdictional claims over as historically territory dating to the 10th–17th centuries. Engagement intensified in the mid-2010s amid Ukraine's post-Maidan political shifts and appeals from the , with Filaret discussing recognition with hierarchs as early as November 2016. By 2018, under President Petro Poroshenko's active diplomacy—including multiple visits to Bartholomew—the UOC-KP submitted formal appeals for lifting its leaders' excommunications. On October 11, 2018, the Ecumenical Patriarchate's responded affirmatively, announcing its intent to grant to a unified Ukrainian Orthodox Church; it accepted and reviewed Filaret's and Makariy Maletych's petitions, effectively lifting the 1997 anathemas and prior declarations against their followers, while establishing an in to oversee the process. This decision, justified by as reclaiming historical jurisdictional rights and addressing schismatics' appeals under canons 9 and 17 of the Fourth , enabled UOC-KP participation in unification efforts but sparked immediate rupture with the Patriarchate, which condemned it as invalid interference. The 2018 actions marked a pivotal shift, transitioning from decades of rebuffed petitions to provisional rehabilitation of UOC-KP clergy for the process, though full status hinged on the subsequent unification and issuance. Filaret publicly hailed the October decision as restoring UOC-KP's legitimacy, positioning it as a key beneficiary, yet underlying tensions persisted, with critics from Moscow-aligned sources arguing the move disregarded prior synodal condemnations and lacked broader Orthodox consensus. This engagement underscored Constantinople's asserted primatial role in resolving Orthodox disputes, contrasting with the UOC-KP's prior isolation from mainstream communion.

The Unification Council and Dissolution into the Orthodox Church of Ukraine

The Unification Council, also known as the Council of the Local Orthodox Churches of Ukraine, convened on December 15, 2018, at Saint Sophia's Cathedral in Kyiv under the auspices of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. It brought together representatives from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC–KP), the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), and a limited number of bishops from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC–MP). Patriarch Filaret of the UOC–KP played a prominent role in organizing and opening the proceedings, though he declined to seek the position of primate to facilitate broader acceptance of the new structure. The council's primary decisions included the formal unification of the participating jurisdictions into a single autocephalous entity named the (OCU), the adoption of a aligned with norms as proposed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and the of Metropolitan Epiphanius (Serhiy Dumenko), a 39-year-old hierarch from the UOC–KP, as the first of the OCU. Approximately 83 bishops attended, predominantly from the UOC–KP and UAOC, with only two from the UOC–MP, whose participation led to their subsequent deposition by the Moscow-aligned . The event occurred amid heightened political support from Ukrainian authorities, including President , who advocated for ecclesiastical independence from . Following the council, the UOC–KP and UAOC initiated processes to dissolve their independent structures, transferring parishes, clergy, and assets to the newly formed OCU. OCU Primate Epiphanius later affirmed that the Kyiv Patriarchate no longer existed as a distinct entity, though some legal formalities regarding liquidation persisted due to administrative hurdles. This dissolution marked the effective end of the UOC–KP's separate canonical and administrative operations, integrating its network—estimated at over 4,000 parishes—into the OCU framework, subject to the tomos of autocephaly granted by Constantinople on January 6, 2019. Critics, including the Russian Orthodox Church, contested the council's legitimacy, citing insufficient representation and procedural irregularities, but the Ecumenical Patriarchate recognized the OCU as the canonical heir to Kyiv's metropolitanate.

Post-2018 Revival and Separation from the OCU

Filaret's Withdrawal of Support and Reestablishment Claims (2019–2020)

In May 2019, tensions escalated between Filaret (Denysenko) and the of the newly formed (OCU), with Filaret publicly asserting on May 9 that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC–KP) had not been liquidated and continued to exist as an independent entity. On May 13, Filaret warned of a potential split within the OCU, claiming to convene bodies that could address perceived leadership failures under Metropolitan Epiphanius. These statements culminated in Filaret convening a local of the UOC–KP on June 20, 2019, attended by two bishops and a dozen priests, which revoked the decisions of the December 15, 2018, Unification that had dissolved the UOC–KP into the OCU. The declared the 2018 dissolution invalid, effectively withdrawing Filaret's support from the OCU and reasserting the UOC–KP's autonomy under his patriarchate, though the OCU's immediately deemed these actions canonically invalid and stripped Filaret of administrative rights over the diocese. Filaret and his supporters formalized their departure from the OCU by June 24, 2019, with the OCU confirming the and refusing recognition of the 's resolutions. Filaret's reestablishment efforts persisted into 2020, marked by his formal withdrawal on January 10 of his signature from the 2018 dissolution decree, which he argued had been coerced and lacked canonical validity. This act, announced publicly on January 12, reinforced claims of the UOC–KP's revival, attracting a small number of OCU —reportedly several priests—who joined Filaret's structure amid ongoing disputes over authority and resources. The OCU maintained that these moves held no legal or ecclesiastical weight, viewing them as personal initiatives by Filaret rather than a restoration of a dissolved entity. In February 2022, the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) declared invalid all ordinations performed by Filaret Denisenko (Patriarch Filaret) since June 2019, when he announced the revival of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP), and resolved to defrock those clergy, citing violations of canonical order and the OCU's statutes following the 2018 unification. This decision stemmed from Filaret's rejection of the OCU's hierarchical structure, where Metropolitan Epiphanius serves as primate rather than Filaret as "patriarch," exacerbating tensions over ecclesiastical authority and clerical legitimacy within former UOC-KP communities. Legal efforts to restore the UOC-KP's state registration in have faltered, with the Ministry of Culture's 2019 cancellation of its statutes upheld administratively, though Filaret has contested this as unlawful, arguing that only a local council or could dissolve the entity. By 2021, the UOC-KP operated without formal registration, leading to claims of operating as a "persecuted and amid broader governmental scrutiny of Orthodox groups amid the Russia- , though specific challenges to its dissolution remained unresolved in Ukrainian courts as of 2023. disputes persisted, exemplified by the Ukrainian Supreme 's reversal of a lower 's decision to transfer the Sretensky Church in Konstantynivka from the to the UOC-KP, favoring OCU claims under post-unification re-registrations. Canonically, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has not recognized Filaret's 2019 revival of the UOC-KP, viewing it as contrary to the 2018 granting to the OCU, which incorporated the UOC-KP's statutes and assets; Filaret's actions, including forming a separate of five bishops, were deemed schismatic by OCU authorities, perpetuating invalidity of its sacraments in aligned jurisdictions. Filaret maintained operations through irregular s and ordinations, but by 2024, he publicly endorsed Ukraine's Law No. 8371 banning religious organizations linked to —targeting the Patriarchate affiliate—while calling for unification under his patriarchal claims, a stance rejected by the OCU as inconsistent with its established primacy. These positions highlight ongoing canonical fragmentation, with no broader Orthodox recognition of the UOC-KP's revived status, amid Ukraine's prioritization of OCU consolidation for national security.

Canonical Status and International Recognition

Perspective of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and Tomos Grant

The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, invoking its canonical authority as the historical mother church of the Kyivan Rus' metropolia, affirmed its right to grant autocephaly to Orthodox churches in Ukraine independent of the Russian Orthodox Church's jurisdiction. On October 11, 2018, the Patriarchal Synod lifted the 1997 anathemas imposed by Moscow on Filaret Denisenko and Makariy Maliarchuk, former leaders of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC–KP) and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), respectively, to enable their participation in unification efforts without reinstating prior titles or structures. This decision facilitated the dissolution of the UOC–KP and UAOC into a single entity, as the Ecumenical Patriarchate conditioned autocephaly on canonical unity rather than perpetuating schismatic bodies. Following the Unification Council of December 15, 2018, where delegates from the UOC–KP, UAOC, and select bishops from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Moscow Patriarchate elected Metropolitan Epiphanius I as primate, Patriarch Bartholomew I signed the Tomos of autocephaly on January 5, 2019, formally bestowing ecclesiastical independence on the resulting Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). The Tomos explicitly recognizes the OCU as the canonical successor to the ancient Metropolis of Kyiv, free from subordination to any external patriarchate, and mandates its primate as "Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Ukraine" with authority over dioceses within Ukraine's 1991 borders, while requiring appeals in disputes to be directed to Constantinople. It makes no provision for the continued existence of the UOC–KP as a distinct jurisdiction, viewing the unification as the resolution of prior divisions. From the Ecumenical Patriarchate's standpoint, the irrevocably establishes the OCU's canonical status, rendering parallel entities like a revived UOC–KP invalid, as was granted to the unified body alone to consolidate in under one autocephalous church. Filaret Denisenko's June 20, 2019, "Local Council" declaration reestablishing the UOC–KP—citing grievances over OCU governance, rights, and his demotion to honorary patriarch—received no endorsement from , which has consistently upheld the unification's finality and Epiphanius's primacy without altering the 's terms. The Patriarchate has reiterated that deviations from this structure lack canonical validity, prioritizing the OCU's integrity amid ongoing internal tensions.

Russian Orthodox Church's View and Declarations of Schism

The (ROC) has viewed the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP), established in June 1992 by the defrocked Metropolitan Filaret (Denisenko), as a schismatic entity from its inception, arising from Denisenko's violation of canonical oaths and refusal to submit to ROC hierarchical decisions. On May 27, 1992, the ROC suspended Denisenko for defying instructions to convene a council for electing his successor as Metropolitan of and inciting division; this was followed by the Bishops' Council on June 11, 1992, which formally defrocked him, citing his perjury, schismatic agitation, and threats against bishops. The ROC emphasized that Denisenko's actions undermined the unity of the Ukrainian Exarchate under Moscow, which it regarded as the sole canonical Orthodox jurisdiction in . Denisenko's persistence in leading the UOC-KP prompted further ROC measures, culminating in an pronounced by the Bishops' Council in February 1997 for grave offenses including , immorality, false accusations against hierarchs, and public defiance of ecclesiastical authority. This sanction, endorsed contemporaneously by the Ecumenical Patriarchate via a letter from Bartholomew on April 7, 1997, rendered Denisenko and his followers outside the Orthodox communion, with the ROC declaring UOC-KP ordinations and sacraments invalid due to their origin in rupture. The ROC has consistently argued that the UOC-KP's self-proclaimed status lacks recognition from any autocephalous Orthodox church, positioning it as a nationalist-driven faction rather than a legitimate ecclesial body. The 2018 Ecumenical Patriarchate decisions to reinstate Denisenko, absorb UOC-KP structures into the , and grant prompted the ROC to sever Eucharistic communion with on , 2018, labeling these interventions as encroachments on Moscow's canonical territory and invalidations of prior anathemas. The ROC declared the unified Ukrainian entity schismatic by association, reiterating that Filaret's leadership perpetuated uncanonical activity. Following Filaret's 2019 withdrawal from the and revival of UOC-KP claims, the ROC upholds its original declarations, viewing the entity as an ongoing without grace or authority, and urges repentance for reintegration.

Positions of Other Orthodox Jurisdictions

No autocephalous Orthodox Church outside the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the has recognized the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate, either in its original form prior to or following its claimed reestablishment by Filaret Denisenko on June 20, 2019, through a self-convened "Local Council." This non-recognition stems from the UOC-KP's origins in the 1992 schism, which involved defiance of canonical hierarchies, and its post-2019 separation from the (OCU), which itself enjoys limited acknowledgment among the 14 universally recognized autocephalous churches. Jurisdictions aligned with the Ecumenical Patriarchate's 2019 for the OCU, such as the —which formally recognized the OCU on October 12, 2019—have not commented on or validated the UOC-KP revival, implicitly treating Filaret's unilateral dissolution claims as invalid and exacerbating fragmentation. Churches maintaining neutrality or opposition to the OCU's autocephaly, including the Serbian, Polish, Romanian, Bulgarian, Georgian, and Antiochian Orthodox Churches, view the UOC-KP as persistently schismatic and without jurisdictional legitimacy. For example, the Holy Synod of the Polish Orthodox Church declared on November 16, 2018, that it would not enter eucharistic communion with new Ukrainian church structures emerging from the Constantinople-Moscow dispute, a stance extending to schisms like the UOC-KP due to their perceived violation of conciliar norms and oaths of obedience. The Serbian Orthodox Church, in statements from 2018–2019, affirmed support for the canonical order under the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine and urged reconsideration of Constantinople's interventions, framing figures like Filaret as contributors to disorder rather than legitimate primates. This uniform lack of recognition underscores the UOC-KP's isolation within global , where even pro-OCU churches prioritize the 2018 unification's framework over subsequent splintering, while anti-OCU jurisdictions cite historical anathemas against Filaret (upheld by in 1997 and echoed in broader critiques) as disqualifying. Sources from jurisdictions withholding OCU recognition, such as Serbian and Polish synodal communiqués, often emphasize fidelity to pre-2018 territories, highlighting the UOC-KP's formation as a politically motivated break from the Ukrainian of the . No inter-Orthodox or bilateral dialogue has reversed this consensus as of 2025, rendering the UOC-KP's claims to patriarchal authority ineffective beyond its limited Ukrainian adherents.

Administrative Structure

Primates and Succession

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) has had three recognized since its formation in 1990, selected through elections by the church's or local sobors (councils) comprising bishops, clergy, and lay delegates, in line with Eastern Orthodox traditions for filling patriarchal sees upon vacancy. This elective process emphasizes consensus among hierarchs, often amid internal and external pressures from canonical disputes with the . The first primate was Patriarch Mstyslav (Stepan Skrypnyk), enthroned on November 6, 1990, in , following the church's proclamation of . Born in 1898, Skrypnyk had previously led the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the USA and was elected to unify and domestic efforts for independence from . His tenure, marked by limited presence in Ukraine due to age and exile, ended with his death on June 14, 1993, in . Succession passed to Patriarch Volodymyr (Vasyl Romaniuk), elected on October 14, 1993, by a sobor in . A former priest imprisoned by Soviet authorities, Romaniuk focused on and church autonomy, serving until his sudden death on July 14, 1995. His funeral drew large crowds but also clashes, highlighting tensions. Patriarch Filaret (Mykhailo Denysenko) was elected on October 20, 1995, assuming leadership after serving as a key organizer since 1990 and as Metropolitan of . Born in 1929, Denysenko's long tenure, extending beyond the UOC-KP's formal dissolution into the in 2018, has centered on advocating Ukrainian ecclesiastical independence, though contested by as schismatic. He continues to claim the patriarchal title in post-2018 revival efforts.
PrimateSecular NameTenureKey Events
Mstyslav IStepan Skrypnyk1990–1993 1990; died 1993
Volodymyr IVasyl Romaniuk1993–1995Elected 1993; died 1995
FilaretMykhailo Denysenko1995–present (claimed)Elected 1995; ongoing leadership claims
No formal deputy or automatic succession exists; vacancies trigger sobor elections, which have occasionally involved rival candidacies amid factional divides.

Dioceses, Exarchates, and Organizational Reach

The – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP), prior to its dissolution in , maintained an administrative structure comprising approximately 35 (eparchies) throughout , overseeing around 5,000 parishes. These were led by metropolitan bishops and archbishops subordinate to Filaret (Denisenko), with the central serving as the patriarchal seat at . Following the 2018 Unification Council and the transfer of most clergy and parishes to the (OCU), the revived UOC-KP proclaimed by Filaret in 2019 operates with a significantly diminished domestic footprint. It primarily retains control over the eparchy and a handful of parishes loyal to Filaret, amid ongoing legal challenges to property and registration. Bishops' councils, such as the one held on December 13, 2021, have continued to convene to assert administrative continuity and rename certain dioceses, though effective remains confined largely to and scattered individual communities rather than full regional eparchies. Exarchates and vicariates extend the UOC-KP's claimed reach beyond Ukraine, particularly among Ukrainian diaspora communities. A vicariate exists in the United States and Canada, coordinating parishes affiliated with the Kyiv Patriarchate. In Europe, a deanery under Filaret's jurisdiction operates in countries including Germany, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Austria, and the Netherlands, reportedly encompassing up to 20 parishes as of recent claims by supporters. These overseas structures emphasize loyalty to Filaret amid splits from OCU-aligned groups. Overall, the UOC-KP's organizational reach post-revival is limited and symbolic, lacking the extensive territorial diocesan network of its pre-2018 iteration due to the transition to the OCU and disputes. Filaret has maintained that the structure constitutes a distinct third Orthodox in , separate from both the OCU and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), with global aspirations for Ukrainian faithful rejecting the OCU's leadership. However, practical influence is constrained by internal schisms, such as the 2024 of bishops attempting independent formations, and absence of broad institutional recognition.

Theological Positions and Liturgical Practices

Doctrinal Alignment with Eastern Orthodoxy

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate professes the core doctrines of , including adherence to the seven Ecumenical Councils, the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed (reciting "who proceedeth from the Father" without the addition), and the traditional understanding of the , , and sacraments as mysteries. Its theological framework emphasizes theosis (deification), icon veneration, and theosis through participation in the divine energies, consistent with patristic sources such as the and hesychast tradition. No innovations in , such as alterations to Christological definitions or sacramental , have been introduced by its leadership or synodal declarations. While the church's canonical irregularities—stemming from its 1992 formation outside recognized Orthodox hierarchies—have led to accusations of schism from bodies like the , these critiques focus on violations of ecclesiological principles (e.g., unilateral autocephaly claims and episcopal ordinations without broader conciliar consent) rather than heretical deviations in dogma. The , for instance, describes the related (into which the UOC-KP largely merged in 2018) as an "uncanonical formation" that distorts the Orthodox doctrine of the Church through schismatic acts, but does not charge it with introducing false teachings akin to or . Independent analyses similarly identify no substantive theological rifts, attributing tensions to jurisdictional overreach rather than confessional divergence. In practice, the UOC-KP's alignment manifests in shared liturgical texts, such as the of St. , and ethical teachings on , , and , mirroring those of recognized Orthodox jurisdictions. , the church's longtime primate, has repeatedly affirmed fidelity to Orthodox dogmas in public addresses, rejecting Western influences like or Protestant . However, its post-2019 reestablishment under has amplified ecclesiological disputes, with critics arguing that persistent claims to patriarchal status undermine conciliar —a doctrinal pillar emphasizing eucharistic interdependence among autocephalous churches—without altering credal formulas or sacramental validity.

Distinct Ukrainian Elements and Reforms

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) emphasized the vernacular in its liturgical practices as a core reform to foster national identity, contrasting with the predominant use of in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. This shift involved translating service books and conducting divine liturgies, , and other rites primarily in Ukrainian, a practice supported since the church's formation in 1992 to align worship with contemporary Ukrainian speech and reduce perceived . Patriarch Filaret Denysenko, leader from 1995 to 2018, explicitly championed this Ukrainianization, asserting that "without the , there is no Ukrainian Orthodox church as such," thereby positioning linguistic reform as essential to the church's autocephalous aspirations. These reforms extended to incorporating Ukrainian cultural motifs into ecclesiastical life, such as prioritizing feasts of native saints like Volodymyr the Great in homilies and calendars, while maintaining core Eastern Orthodox doctrines like the without alteration. The UOC-KP's statutes, adopted in 1990 and reaffirmed in subsequent councils, mandated Ukrainian as the for administration, , and preaching, aiming to cultivate a distinct Ukrainian Orthodox tradition amid post-Soviet independence. Unlike more conservative jurisdictions adhering strictly to Slavonic texts, the UOC-KP permitted flexible vernacular adaptations in parish services, though it retained the and traditional rubrics to preserve continuity with broader . This approach, while enhancing accessibility for Ukrainian speakers, drew criticism from canonical Orthodox bodies for deviating from standardized liturgical norms.

Controversies and Criticisms

Accusations of Political Nationalism and State Interference

Critics, primarily from the (), have accused the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) of prioritizing political nationalism over canonical Orthodox traditions since its formation in 1992. The has characterized the UOC-KP's from the Patriarchate as a politically motivated effort to sever spiritual ties between Russians and , aligning the church with Ukrainian independence movements rather than theological disputes. This view posits that Patriarch Filaret Denisenko's refusal to step down as demanded by in 1990 was influenced by emerging Ukrainian sovereignty aspirations following the Soviet Union's dissolution, rather than purely concerns. State interference allegations intensified under President (2014–2019), who actively championed the UOC-KP's bid as a imperative amid Russia's annexation of and invasion of in 2014. Poroshenko personally lobbied Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, traveling to in 2018 to secure support for Ukrainian Orthodox independence, framing it as a counter to Russian influence. His administration facilitated the 2018 unification council that merged the UOC-KP with the into the (OCU), providing logistical and political backing while critics argued this blurred church-state separation. Poroshenko's campaign slogan—"He will build the church, and you pray for "—explicitly linked the process to his reelection efforts, tainting the UOC-KP's legacy with accusations of instrumentalization for electoral gain. Nationalist elements within bolstered these claims, as the UOC-KP received support from radical groups that seized parishes from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), often with tacit approval. By 2014, heightened transfers of parishes from UOC-MP to UOC-KP accelerated post-Crimea , reflecting geopolitical tensions rather than religious shifts. Detractors, including some canonical Orthodox voices, contend that Filaret's emphasis on a "" subordinated Orthodox unity to ethnophyletism, a condemned by the 1872 Constantinople for elevating national identity above universal faith. While UOC-KP advocates maintain these actions restored historical Ukrainian ecclesiastical autonomy, the interplay of state pressure and nationalist rhetoric has fueled persistent charges of politicization.

Internal Authoritarianism and Property Disputes

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP), under Patriarch Filaret (Denysenko)'s leadership from its founding in until its nominal dissolution in , exhibited a model characterized by strong centralization and personal authority. Filaret governed as a within the church structure, centralizing decision-making and maintaining tight control over bishops and , often bypassing synodal processes for unilateral actions. This approach included frequent defrockings of dissenting hierarchs, such as those opposing his strategic maneuvers toward or internal alignments, fostering an environment of limited . Property disputes intensified both externally and internally during the UOC-KP's existence. Externally, UOC-KP affiliates engaged in campaigns to seize parishes from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Patriarchate (UOC-MP), employing legal challenges, public pressure, and occasional forceful takeovers, which critics attributed to nationalist motivations amid Ukraine's post-Soviet struggles. Internally, following the 2018 unification council that merged the UOC-KP into the (OCU), Filaret revived the UOC-KP in May 2019, sparking conflicts with OCU primate Metropolitan Epiphanius over governance and assets. These disputes centered on control of key properties, including in , where Filaret convened a rival "Local Council" on June 20, 2019, declaring OCU statutes invalid and asserting continued KP authority. The rift led to mutual accusations of violations, with Filaret appealing to officials for protection of KP properties against OCU encroachments, highlighting the interplay of authority and national politics. While Filaret's supporters viewed these actions as defending the church's founding legacy, detractors, including OCU elements, criticized them as disruptive to unity efforts post-autocephaly. Such internal authoritarian tendencies and asset contests underscored the UOC-KP's challenges in transitioning from a schismatic entity to a stable autocephalous structure.

Canonical Irregularities and Moral Allegations Against Leadership

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) operated without recognition from the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople or other major Orthodox jurisdictions from its formation in 1992 until its dissolution in 2018, rendering its hierarchical ordinations and sacraments canonically irregular in the eyes of those bodies. Metropolitan Filaret (Denysenko), who led the schism from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate, unilaterally declared autocephaly and merged with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church without a canonical release or tomos of independence, violating canons requiring maternal church approval for such separations (e.g., Canon 34 of the Apostolic Canons and Canon 8 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council). The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) Holy Synod defrocked Filaret in 1992 for this insubordination and for refusing to resign his see as demanded, a decision upheld by subsequent ROC councils. In February 1997, the ROC Bishops' Council anathematized Filaret and his followers for persisting in , usurping the patriarchal title without authority, and organizing parallel structures, actions deemed heretical under Canon 15 of the First-Second . This was initially affirmed by in correspondence with , though later lifted in 2018 amid the granting of to the successor (OCU), a move contested by the ROC and several other churches as violating norms against rehabilitating schismatics without repentance. The UOC-KP maintained that these measures were politically motivated by to suppress Ukrainian independence, but the lack of broader Orthodox communion underscored the irregular status, with ordinations by Filaret's often requiring re-ordination or for validity in churches. Moral allegations against Filaret, primarily leveled by the ROC during his 1992 deposition, centered on violations of monastic celibacy vows taken upon his episcopal consecration in 1962, including claims of cohabitation with a woman and fathering at least one child (Andriy Denysenko, born circa 1970) post-vows. These charges, substantiated in ROC synodal acts as grave moral turpitude warranting laicization, were rejected by Filaret and UOC-KP adherents as KGB-orchestrated fabrications to discredit him amid his push for autocephaly, with no secular legal corroboration or independent verification emerging. Filaret's prior service as a Soviet-era hierarch, including alleged KGB collaboration documented in declassified files, further fueled accusations of ethical compromise, though he denied active informant status and attributed such claims to anti-Ukrainian propaganda. These personal controversies, intertwined with canonical disputes, contributed to the UOC-KP's isolation, as jurisdictions wary of rehabilitating figures under moral clouds withheld recognition until the 2018 OCU formation, where Filaret's role was honorary and his past anathemas conditionally overlooked.

Statistics, Influence, and Societal Impact

Membership and Institutional Metrics

As of December 2018, prior to its dissolution and merger into the , the [Ukrainian Orthodox Church](/page/Ukrainian_Orthodox Church) – Kyiv Patriarchate operated 35 dioceses and approximately 5,000 parishes within . Official registration data from 's Department of Religious Affairs recorded 5,167 parishes for the UOC-KP in early 2018. These figures reflected steady institutional growth since the church's formation in 1992, driven by schisms from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Patriarchate and appeals from independent parishes, though the UOC-KP remained unrecognized by most Orthodox bodies. Clergy numbers expanded alongside parishes; in 1999, the UOC-KP reported 1,743 and deacons. By the mid-2010s, estimates placed active at several thousand, concentrated in western and where the church held stronger regional influence compared to the Moscow-affiliated branch, which maintained more parishes overall but lower per-parish attendance in some surveys. Membership estimates relied on self-identification surveys rather than baptismal records, as the UOC-KP did not publish comprehensive baptized adherent figures and Orthodox statistics often diverged between institutional claims and public affiliation. A Razumkov Centre poll, referenced in U.S. State Department reporting, indicated 28.7% of Ukrainians identified as UOC-KP faithful, up from lower shares in earlier years amid rising . This equated to roughly 10-12 million potential adherents given Ukraine's population of about 42 million at the time, though active participation rates were lower, with surveys showing the UOC-KP drawing higher weekly attendance than its Moscow-oriented rival despite fewer parishes. Razumkov data tracked UOC-KP affiliation rising inversely to Patriarchate loyalty, from around 10-15% in to over 25% by , reflecting geopolitical shifts post-Euromaidan.

Role in Ukrainian Independence Movements and Cultural Identity

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) emerged in the immediate aftermath of Ukraine's from the on August 24, 1991, when Metropolitan Filaret (Denysenko) led a faction of the Ukrainian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church in breaking away to form an independent structure. On June 25, 1992, the UOC-KP was established through the merger of Filaret's group with the , explicitly aiming to create a free from Moscow's and mirroring the country's political . This formation represented a pivotal step in the broader Ukrainian independence movement, as proponents viewed ecclesiastical autonomy as essential to severing centuries of Russian spiritual dominance and consolidating national . Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the UOC-KP aligned with pro-independence and pro-Western political forces, backing initiatives against corruption and Russian influence, which contrasted with the more -oriented stance of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate. During the Revolution of 2013–2014, UOC-KP clergy actively supported protesters demanding closer ties with Europe and the ouster of pro-Russian President , providing spiritual endorsement to the movement that ultimately reinforced Ukraine's westward orientation and rejection of Russian imperial claims. Filaret's leadership symbolized resistance to , with the church's push for —formally requested from in 1992 but denied, leading to his —framing Orthodox faith as a cornerstone of Ukrainian statehood rather than a tool of external control. In fostering , the UOC-KP emphasized a narrative of rooted in Kyivan Rus' as distinctly Ukrainian heritage, promoting spiritual independence to unify the nation against historical subjugation. Filaret articulated that such would strengthen Ukrainian national by preserving indigenous religious traditions and countering Moscow's doctrinal . This positioning elevated the church as a cultural bulwark, where liturgical and historical emphases on Ukraine's pre-imperial legacy helped delineate a separate ethnic and spiritual identity, influencing public discourse on amid ongoing tensions with . The UOC-KP's efforts culminated in its role as a precursor to the 2018 unification into the , which received a of , thereby institutionalizing these independence aspirations.

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