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Patriarch Filaret (secular name Mykhailo Antonovych Denysenko Михайло Антонович Денисенко, born 23 January 1929) is a Ukrainian religious leader, currently serving as the primate and Patriarch of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate. The Orthodox Church of Ukraine, that he left in 2019, views him as the Honorary Patriarch emeritus, while the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople recognises him as former Metropolitan of Kyiv.[1][2]

Key Information

He was formerly the Metropolitan of Kiev and the Exarch of Ukraine in the Patriarchate of Moscow (1966–1992). After joining the Kyiv Patriarchate, he was defrocked and in 1997 excommunicated by the ROC. On 11 October 2018, the Patriarchate of Constantinople reinstated him in church communion.[3] However, while restored to the episcopate, the Ecumenical Patriarchate never recognised him as Patriarch and views him as the former Metropolitan of Kyiv.[1][4][5][6][7] On 15 December 2018, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate united with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church[8] and some members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (MP)[9] into the Orthodox Church of Ukraine; the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate thus ceased to exist.[10]

Early years

[edit]

Mykhailo Denysenko was born on 23 January 1929,[11] into a worker's family in the village of Blahodatne in the Amvrosiivsky Raion (district), now in the Donetsk Oblast (province) in Eastern Ukraine. His parents were Anton and Melania Denysenko.[12] He obtained his theological education at the Odesa Seminary (Moscow Patriarchate) and the Moscow Theological Academy where he became a close associate of Patriarch Alexius I of Moscow. He took monastic vows in 1950 assuming the monastic name Filaret and was ordained hierodeacon in January 1950 and priest in June 1951.[12] After his graduation he stayed at the Moscow Theological Academy as a professor (from 1952) and Senior Assistant to the Academy inspector.[12] In 1956 he was appointed Inspector of the Theological Seminary in Saratov and elevated to the rank of hegumen. In 1957 he was appointed Inspector of the Kyiv Theological Seminary.[12] In July 1958 he was further elevated to the rank of Archimandrite and appointed seminary rector.[12]

Hierarch of the Russian Orthodox Church

[edit]

In 1961, Filaret served in the mission of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria. In January 1962 Filaret was elected vicar Bishop of the Leningrad Eparchy and, in February, was ordained bishop in Leningrad by Metropolitan Pimen (later Moscow Patriarch) and other bishops. Filaret was appointed to several diplomatic missions of the Russian Orthodox Church and from 1962 to 1964 served as ROC Bishop of Vienna and Austria.[12] In 1964 he returned to Moscow as the Bishop of Dmitrov and rector of the Moscow Theological Academy and Seminary.

In 1966, he became archbishop of Kyiv and Halych, thus becoming one of the most influential hierarchs in the Russian Orthodox Church, where the office of the Kyiv Metropolitan is highly regarded. At that time he also became a permanent member of the Holy Synod, the highest collegiate body of the Russian Orthodox Church, which has the responsibility of electing the Moscow Patriarch. In 1968 Filaret became Metropolitan of Kyiv and Galicia.[13]

As late as October 1989, Filaret was still saying, "The Uniates will never be legalized in our country."[14]

On May 3, 1990, Patriarch Pimen of Moscow died and, the same day, Filaret became the locum tenens of the Russian Orthodox Church. Filaret was not elected Patriarch of Moscow.[11] Retrospectively, in 2019, Filaret declared "it was not by chance that I was not elected. The Lord prepared me for Ukraine"[15][16]

On 27 October 1990, in a ceremony at St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv, the newly elected Patriarch Alexei II handed to Metropolitan Filaret a tomos granting "independence in self government" (the tomos did not use either of the words "autonomy" or "autocephaly") to Metropolitan Filaret, and enthroned Filaret, heretofore "Metropolitan of Kyiv", as "Metropolitan of Kyiv and All-Ukraine".[12]

In 1992, the Russian Orthodox priest and Soviet dissident Fr. Gleb Yakunin accused Exarch Filaret of having been an informer for the KGB. Father Gleb stated that he had seen KGB files which listed Exarch Filaret's codename as Antonov.[17][18] The fact of cooperation with KGB was mentioned by people's deputies of Ukraine on 20 January 1992 when they came out with an official statement.[19] According to internal KGB documents, tasks the KGB assigned Filaret as an agent included promoting Soviet positions and candidates in the World Council of Churches (WCC), the Christian Peace Conference (CPC) and other international bodies, and, by the 1980s, backing the Soviet authorities' attempts to prevent the long-suppressed Ukrainian Catholic Church (disparagingly called 'Uniates') from regaining an open existence, and backing state attempts to prevent religious believers demanding their rights as glasnost and perestroika opened up the sphere of public debate.[20] In 2018, Filaret declared in an interview with Radio Liberty that he, like all bishops under communism, had to have contacts with the KGB.[21][22][23][24] In 2019, he declared every bishop of the Moscow Patriarchate had to have contact with the KGB, even when it came to appoint a bishop. He added that he had been trained by the Politburo and Patriarch Alexy by the KGB.[25][26][27]

Creation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Kyiv Patriarchate

[edit]
Main article: Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate

Following Ukraine's declaration of independence from the Soviet Union on 24 August 1991, a national sobor of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was held from November 1–3.[12] At the sobor, the voting delegates, (who included all UOC bishops, clergy and lay delegates from each diocese; a delegate from each monastery and seminary, and recognized lay brotherhood) unanimously passed a resolution stating that henceforth the UOC would operate as an autocephalous church.[12] A separate resolution, also unanimous, affirmed the church's desire for Metropolitan Filaret to become its Primate.

Filaret convened an assembly at the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra in January 1992 that adopted a request of autocephaly for Ukrainians to the Moscow Patriarch.[28]

In March–April 1992, the Hierarchical Council of the Russian Orthodox Church met with a single agenda item: to consider the resolution passed by the UOC Sobor four months earlier. Although the issue itself was not discussed, Filaret was asked to resign.[12] On the second day of the meeting, Metropolitan Filaret agreed to submit his resignation to the UOC Synod, and the ROC Synod passed a resolution which stated:

"The Council of Bishops took into account the statement of the Most Reverend Filaret, Metropolitan of Kyiv and of All-Ukraine, that for the sake of church peace, at the next Council of Bishops of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, he will submit a request to be relieved from the position of the Primate of the UOC. Understanding of the position of Metropolitan Filaret, the Council of Bishops expressed to him its gratitude for the long period of labour as Archbishop of the See of Kyiv and blessed him to carry out his episcopal service in another diocese of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church."[29][30]

However, after returning to Kyiv, Filaret recanted his resignation. On 14 April, Metropolitan Filaret held a press conference in which he alleged that undue pressure was exerted at the ROC Synod in Moscow, both directly and through threats made by FSK personnel who, he said, were present at the gathering. Filaret stated that he was retracting his resignation on the grounds that his resignation "would not bring peace to the Church, would contradict the will of the believers, and would be uncanonical."[citation needed]

Suspension and anathemization

[edit]

Shortly thereafter, the Russian Orthodox Church, unable to prevent the creation of what it, and all other orthodox churches within the global communion at the time, viewed as a "schismatic church" in independent Ukraine, helped to organize a rival synod which was held in Kharkiv in May 1992. These bishops elected a bishop of the Russian Orthodox Church, Bishop Volodymyr (Sabodan), Metropolitan of Kyiv, and received recognition from Moscow as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate).[31]

Filaret was suspended on 27 May 1992 by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate).[31][30] The bishops loyal to Metropolitan Filaret and a similar group from the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (another recently revived church in Ukraine) organized a unifying sobor which was held on 25 June 1992. The delegates agreed to form a combined church named the Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) under the patriarch they elected, Patriarch Mstyslav.[12][32]

Filaret was defrocked by the Russian Orthodox Church on 11 July 1992.[30][33] The UOC-KP was not recognized by other Orthodox churches and was considered schismatic.

Filaret was then anathemized by the Russian Orthodox Church in 1997.[34][30] ROC officials stated that the anathematization of Filaret was "recognized by all the Local Orthodox Churches including the Church of Constantinople"[35][36][37][32] The synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate did indeed recognize, in a July 1992 letter to Patriarch Alexy II, the defrocking of Filaret by the ROC,[38][39][30] and the Ecumenical Patriarch recognized the anathemization of Filaret in a letter of April 1997 to Patriarch Alexy II.[40][41][42] Filaret was also accused by the ROC of having a wife and three children, but it was "never proved".[43]

Leadership of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Kyiv Patriarchate

[edit]
Main article: Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate
See also: 2018 Moscow–Constantinople schism
Filaret and Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, Kyiv, 2007

After the death of Patriarch Mstyslav in 1993, the church was headed by Patriarch Volodymyr, and in July 1995, upon the death of Volodymyr, Filaret was elected head of the UOC-KP by a vote of 160–5.[12]

Metropolitan Filaret consecrated at least 85 bishops.

Filaret with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, 21 October 2018

On 11 October 2018, the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople announced that Filaret Denisenko, along with the Primate of UAOC, had been "restored to communion with the Church."[44] The decision of the Ecumenical Patriarchate also abolished the Moscow Patriarchate's jurisdiction over the diocese of Kyiv and hence all the bishops concerned were viewed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate as being under its jurisdiction.[45]

On 20 October 2018, the UOC-KP changed the title of its head, to "His Holiness and Beatitude (name), Archbishop and Metropolitan of Kyiv – Mother of the Rus Cities and of Galicia, Patriarch of All Rus-Ukraine, Holy Archimandrite of the Holy Assumption Kyiv-Pechersk and Pochaev Lavras".[46][47][48] The abridged form is "His Holiness (name), Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus'-Ukraine" and the form for interchurch relations "Archbishop, Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Rus'-Ukraine".[46][47][49][50][51][52] The fact the full title and the version for interchurch relations mention the titles of "archbishop" and "metropolitan" and not the title of "patriarch", but that the abridged form mentioned only the title of "patriarch" has been confusing for some.[47][48] The Russian Orthodox Church reacted by commenting that this new title was a "farce" and that for them Filaret "was and remains a schismatic".[53]

In the OCU

[edit]

On 15 December 2018, the hierarchs of the UAOC decided to dissolve the UAOC, and the hierarchs of the UOC-KP decided to dissolve the UOC-KP. This was done because on the same day the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate, and some members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) were going to merge to form the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) after a unification council.[54] Filaret was given the title of the "honorary patriarch" of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.[55][56] Volodymyr Burega, Professor and Vice-Rector of the Kyiv Theological Academy, explains this title this way: "in December [2018], no one wanted to aggravate relationships with Patriarch Filaret, since holding the council and receiving the Tomos were at stake. That is why the council, which took place on 15 December, did not clarify the new status of Patriarch Filaret. After the unification council of the OCU, they stated that Filaret was henceforth "honorary patriarch", but what this phrase meant was difficult to understand. Indeed, such status is not stipulated in the Charter of the OCU, adopted on 15 December."[57]

On 18 December 2018, Filaret's 90th birthday, 23 January 2019, was voted by the Ukrainian parliament as a day of national celebration for the year 2019.[58][59]

On 16 January 2019, Filaret asked to be commemorated before Epiphanius, the primate of the OCU, during Divine Liturgies. He signed the document asking for it with "Filaret, Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus'-Ukraine".[60][61] On 20 January 2019, Filaret declared in an interview when asked about his role in the Orthodox Church of Ukraine: "I am a patriarch, I have been and I remain a patriarch. Today, the Head of the Local Church is Metropolitan Epifaniy, but I do not refuse to participate in the development of the Ukrainian Church. I am an unrecognized patriarch for world Orthodoxy, but for Ukraine I am a patriarch and I remain a patriarch".[26][27]

On 5 February 2019, the Holy Synod of the OCU appointed Filaret the diocesan bishop of Kyiv, except for the St. Michael's Golden-Domed Monastery.[62]

In an interview published by BBC Ukraine on 1 March 2019, Epiphanius explained the situation around Filaret as follows:[63]

"We are in a special situation because we united three branches of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. And His Holiness Patriarch Filaret built the Kyiv Patriarchate for more than a quarter of a century, and thanks to his work, we succeeded. Moscow has especially emphasized that Patriarch Filaret worked throughout his life for the sake of the koukoulion [i.e. to become Patriarch], that he did not become the Moscow Patriarch, became Patriarch of Kyiv, and would never give up power. We see the opposite, that the patriarch refused, went to the unification council. But nobody brought him to the patriarch's seat. Some want to completely eliminate him so that Patriarch Filaret did not exist at all, but that's wrong. He remains a diocesan bishop, and he will continue to work towards the building of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. There is a leader, but he (Filaret) remains honorary Patriarch. He will continue to have his diocese - the city of Kyiv, but will not generally manage the whole church."

Conflict

[edit]
Main article: Conflict between Filaret and Epiphanius

A conflict erupted between Filaret and Epiphanius because of disagreements concerning the model of governance, the management of the diaspora, the name and the statute of the OCU.

According to Filaret, the agreement reached at the unification council was as follows: "the primate is responsible for the external representation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), and the patriarch is responsible for the internal church life in Ukraine, but in cooperation with the primate. The primate shall do nothing in the church without the consent of the patriarch. The patriarch chairs the meetings of the Holy Synod and the UOC meetings for the sake of preserving unity, its growth, and affirmation." Filaret considers this agreement has not been fulfilled.[64][65]

Political views

[edit]

In March 2014, Filaret publicly opposed the annexation of Crimea by Russia.[66]

On 5 September 2014, amidst the 2014 Russian military intervention in Ukraine,[67] Filaret held a service to consecrate a memorial cross to the Heavenly Hundred.[68] Filaret declared during his service that in the Orthodox church had appeared "among the rulers of this world [...] a real new Cain" who "calls himself a brother to the Ukrainian people, but in fact according to his deeds [...] really became the new Cain, shedding the brotherly blood and entangling the whole world with lies"[69] and that "Satan went into him, as into Judas Iscariot".[70] The statement was published on the official website of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate in English,[71] Russian[72] and Ukrainian.[73] Publications such as Church Times, Cogwriter, and Ecumenical News identified Filaret's "new Cain" with Russian President Vladimir Putin.[68][74][75]

Filaret said that the local population in Donbas "must pay for their guilt [in rejecting Kyiv's authority] through suffering and blood".[76]

COVID-19

[edit]

In March 2020, during a TV interview, Filaret called the COVID-19 pandemic a "divine punishment" for same-sex marriage.[77][78] He was later sued by Kyiv-based LGBT-rights group InSight for his remarks.[79] Early September 2020, it was announced that Filaret himself had been tested positive for COVID-19 and admitted to hospital.[80][81][82]

In an interview released in March 2020 to the Ukraine Channel 4, he declared that the Holy Eucharist could be administrated from one spoon, because it is impossible to get viruses from the gloriously resurrected Body of Jesus Christ God.[83]

Awards

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  • Order "For intellectual courage" of the independent cultural magazine I (2018)[84]

State awards

[edit]

Ukraine

[edit]

USSR

[edit]

List of bishop ordinations

[edit]

full list until 2010[87]

As a supporting archiereus

[edit]
  • Vladimir (Kotlyarov) on 30 December 1962 as Bishop of Zvenigorod
  • Antonius (Vakaryk) on 12 February 1965 as Bishop of Smolensk and Dorogobuzh
  • Boris (Skvortsov) on 21 February 1965 as Bishop of Ryazan and Kasimov
  • Melchizedek (Lebedev) on 17 June 1965 as Bishop of Vologda and Velikiy Ustyug
  • Philaret (Vakhromeyev) on 24 October 1965 as Bishop of Tikhvin
  • Joanathan (Kopylovych) on 28 November 1965 as Bishop of Tegel
  • John (Snychov) on 12 December 1965 as Bishop of Syzran
  • Juvenal (Poyarkov) on 26 December 1965 as Bishop of Zaraisk
  • Irenaeus (Susemihl) on 30 January 1966 as Bishop of Munich
  • Dionysius (Lukin) on 20 March 1966 as Bishop of Rotterdam
  • Volodymyr (Sabodan) on 9 July 1966 as Bishop of Zvenigorod
  • Hermogenes (Orekhov) on 25 November 1966 as Bishop of Podolsk
  • Theodosius (Dykun) on 4 June 1967 as Bishop of Pereyaslav-Khmelnytskyi
  • Sabbas (Babynets) on 30 March 1969 as Bishop of Pereyaslav-Khmelnytskyi
  • Macarius (Svystun) on 7 June 1970 as Bishop of Uman
  • Maximus (Krokha) on 26 March 1972 as Bishop of Argentina and South America
  • Victorinus (Belyaev) on 3 June 1973 as Bishop of Perm and Solikamsk
  • Platon (Udovenko) on 16 December 1973 as Bishop of Argentina and South America
  • Job (Tivonyuk) on 3 January 1975 as Bishop of Zaraisk
  • Kirill (Gundyayev) on 14 March 1976 as Bishop of Vyborg
  • Gleb (Smirnov) on 9 May 1976 as Bishop of Oryol and Bryansk
  • Valentine (Mishchuk) on 25 July 1976 as Bishop of Ufa and Sterlitamak
  • Nicanor (Yukhymyuk) on 30 November 1979 as Bishop of Podolsk

As a leading archiereus

[edit]
  • Nicholas (Bychkovsky) on 28 July 1971 as Bishop of Kursk and Belgorod
  • Barlaam (Ilyuschenko) on 22 October 1972 as Bishop of Pereyaslav-Khmelnytskyi
  • Agathangelos (Savvin) on 16 November 1975 as Bishop of Vinnytsia and Bratslav
  • Sebastian (Pylypchuk) on 16 October 1978 as Bishop of Kirovohrad and Mykolaiv
  • Ioann (Bodnarchuk) on 23 October 1978 as Bishop of Zhytomyr and Ovruch
  • Lazar (Shvets) on 18 April 1980 as Bishop of Argentina and South America
  • Antonius (Moskalenko) on 13 October 1986 as Bishop of Pereyaslav-Khmelnytskyi
  • Palladius (Shyman) on 8 February 1987 as Bishop of Pereyaslav-Khmelnytskyi
  • Marcus (Petrovtsy) on 28 July 1988 as Bishop of Kremenets
  • Joannicius (Kobzyev) on 13 December 1988 as Bishop of Slovyansk
  • Joanathan (Yeletskikh) on 22 April 1989 as Bishop of Pereyaslav-Khmelnytskyi
  • Euthymius (Shutak) on 28 July 1989 as Bishop of Mukachevo and Uzhhorod
  • Basilius (Vasyltsev) on 1 October 1989 as Bishop of Kirovohrad and Mykolaiv
  • Bartholomeus (Vashchuk) on 24 February 1990 as Bishop of Volhynia and Rivne
  • Niphont (Solodukha) on 31 March 1990 as Bishop of Khmelnytskyi and Kamianets-Podilskyi
  • Andrew (Horak) on 18 April 1990 as Bishop of Lviv and Drohobych
  • Gleb (Savin) on 2 August 1990 as Bishop of Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia
  • Basilius (Zlatolinsky) on 2 December 1990 as Bishop of Simferopol and Crimea
  • Onuphrius (Berezovsky) on 9 December 1990 as Bishop of Chernivtsi and Bucovina
  • Jacob (Panchuk) on 14 December 1990 as Bishop of Pochaiv
  • Sergius (Hensytsky) on 17 February 1991 as Bishop of Kremenets
  • Hilarion (Shukalo) on 29 September 1991 as Bishop of Ivano-Frankivsk and Kolomyia
  • Alypius (Pohribnyak) on 6 October 1991 as Bishop of Donetsk and Luhansk
  • Spyrydon (Babskyi) on 7 June 1992 as Bishop of Pereyaslav-Khmelnytskyi
  • Barsanuphius (Mazurak) on 8 June 1992 as Bishop of Ivano-Frankivsk and Kolomyia
  • Antonius (Masendych) on 9 September 1992 as Bishop of Pereyaslav and Sicheslav
  • Volodymyr (Romaniuk) on 10 September 1992 as Bishop of Bila Tserkva
  • Sophronius (Vlasov) on 15 September 1992 as Bishop of Vinnytsia and Bratslav
  • Roman (Blashchuk) on 16 September 1992 as Bishop of Rivne and Ostroh
  • Seraphim (Verzun) on 25 September 1992 as Bishop of Zhytomyr and Ovruch
  • Nestor (Kulish) on 15 November 1992 as Bishop of Cherkasy and Chyhyryn
  • Polycarp (Huts) on 10 April 1993 as Bishop of Donetsk and Luhansk
  • Alexius (Tsaruk) on 7 July 1993 as Bishop of Mykolaiv
  • Volodymyr (Ladyka) on 13 March 1993 as Bishop of Vinnytsia and Bratslav
  • Alexander (Reshetnyak) on 16 January 1994 as Bishop of Bila Tserkva
  • Daniel (Chokalyuk) on 23 January 1994 as Bishop of Vyshhorod
  • Hadrian (Staryna) on 6 February 1994 as Bishop of Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk
  • Izyaslav (Karha) on 11 September 1994 as Bishop of Nikopol
  • Theodosius (Petsyna) on 4 December 1994 as Bishop of Drohobych and Sambir
  • Barlaam (Pylypyshyn) on 14 December 1994 as Bishop of Chernihiv and Sumy
  • Joasaph (Shibayev) on 19 February 1995 as Bishop of Belgorod and Oboyan
  • Baruch (Tischenkov) on 23 February 1994 as Bishop of Tobolsk and Yeniseysk
  • Job (Pavlyshyn) on 11 May 1995 as Bishop of Kremenets and Zbarazh
  • Gregorius (Kachan) on 10 October 1995 as Bishop of Melitopol
  • Gerontius (Khovansky) on 24 March 1996 as Bishop of Sumy and Okhtyrka
  • Ioann (Zinovyev) on 18 July 1996 as Bishop of Donetsk and Luhansk
  • Antonius (Makhota) on 21 July 1996 as Bishop of Simferopol and Crimea
  • Volodymyr (Polishchuk) on 23 February 1997 as Bishop of Ivano-Frankivsk and Kolomyia
  • Joasaph (Vasylykiv) on 6 April 1997 as Bishop of Donetsk and Luhansk
  • Pancratius (Tarnavsky) on 27 July 1997 as Bishop of Vinnytsia and Bratslav
  • Christophorus (Sitas) on 2 October 1997 as Bishop of Surozh
  • Nikon (Kalember) on 12 October 1997 as Bishop of Kitsman and Zastavna
  • Damian (Zamarayev) on 19 October 1997 as Bishop of Kherson and Taurida
  • Peter (Petrus) on 30 October 1997 as Bishop of Lviv and Yavoriv
  • Yuriy Yurchyk on 14 May 1999 as George, Bishop of Donetsk and Luhansk
  • Timotheus (Koutalianos) on 26 March 2000 as Bishop of Korsun
  • Demetrius (Rudyuk) on 16 July 2000 as Bishop of Pereyaslav-Khmelnytskyi
  • Clemence (Kushch) on 23 July 2000 as Bishop of Simferopol and Crimea
  • Michael (Zinkevych) on 22 October 2000 as Bishop of Sumy and Okhtyrka
  • Flavian (Pasichnyk) on 5 November 2000 as Bishop of Kharkiv and Bohodukhiv
  • Paisius (Dmokhovsky) on 30 September 2001 as Bishop of Odesa and Balta
  • Stephan (Bilyak) on 19 May 2002 as Bishop of Boryspil
  • Eusebius (Politylo) on 7 July 2002 as Bishop of Poltava and Kremenchuk
  • Sergius (Horobtsov) on 14 December 2002 as Bishop of Slovyansk
  • Vsevolod (Matviyevsky) on 28 March 2003 as Bishop of Luhansk and Starobilsk
  • Ioann (Yaremenko) on 30 March 2003 as Bishop of Cherkasy and Chyhyryn
  • Cyril (Mykhailyuk) on 3 August 2003 as Bishop of Uzhhorod and Zakarpattia
  • Methodius (Sribnyak) on 6 June 2004 as Bishop of Sumy and Okhtyrka
  • Theodosius (Paikush) on 28 July 2004 as Bishop of Chernihiv and Nizhyn
  • Chrysostom (Bakomitros) on 14 May 2005 as Bishop of Chersonesus
  • Philaret (Pancu) on 31 July 2005 as Bishop of Făleşti and Eastern Moldova
  • Onuphrius (Khavruk) on 30 October 2005 as Bishop of Derman
  • Michael (Bondarchuk) on 1 January 2006 as Bishop of Poltava and Kremenchuk
  • Nestor (Pysyk) on 5 March 2006 as Bishop of Ternopil and Buchach
  • Theodore (Bubnyuk) on 12 November 2006 as Bishop of Poltava and Kremenchuk
  • Sebastian (Voznyak) on 14 December 2006 as Bishop of Chernihiv and Nizhyn
  • Matheus (Shevchuk) on 17 December 2006 as Bishop of Drohobych and Sambir
  • Hilarion (Protsyk) on 14 May 2008 as Bishop of Chernihiv and Nizhyn
  • Eustratius (Zorya) on 25 May 2008 as Bishop of Vasylkiv
  • Peter (Moskalyov) on 13 December 2008 as Bishop of Valuiky
  • Marcus (Levkiv) on 1 February 2009 as Bishop of Kirovohrad and Holovanivsk
  • Paul (Kravchuk) on 30 March 2009 as Bishop of Ternopil and Terebovlia
  • Epiphanius (Dumenko) on 15 November 2009 as Bishop of Vyshhorod
  • Simeon (Zinkevych) on 21 November 2009 as Bishop of Dnipropetrovsk and Pavlohrad
  • Tycho (Petranyuk) on 22 November 2009 as Bishop of Luhansk and Starobilsk

Notes

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See also

[edit]
Wikimedia Commons has media related to Philaret.

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Filaret Denysenko

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from Grokipedia
Filaret Denysenko (secular name Mykhailo Antonovych Denysenko; born 23 January 1929) is a Ukrainian Orthodox cleric serving as the self-proclaimed Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus'-Ukraine and primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate (UOC-KP), a jurisdiction he established in 1992 amid efforts to achieve ecclesiastical independence from the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). Born in the village of Blahodatne in the Donetsk region to a working-class , Denysenko entered monastic life as Filaret and advanced within the ROC, becoming Metropolitan of and in 1966 and playing a key administrative in Soviet-era . Following in 1991, he led initiatives for from , but after refusing demands to resign his see, he was defrocked by the ROC in 1992 and anathematized in 1997, charges he and his followers reject as politically motivated. This schism resulted in the formation of the UOC-KP through union with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, positioning Filaret as a central figure in Ukrainian national religious identity, though his actions have drawn accusations of canonical irregularity from Moscow-aligned and some other Orthodox bodies. In , the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople rehabilitated Filaret by lifting the prior anathemas and facilitated the unifying council that created the (OCU), granting it a tomos of ; Filaret initially served as Honorary Patriarch of the OCU but withdrew in , reconvening a sobor to revive the UOC-KP and criticizing the new structure's subordination to Constantinople. As of 2025, at age 96 and amid reported health challenges, Filaret maintains his claim to patriarchal authority over the UOC-KP, issuing statements such as a recent spiritual testament affirming its independence and rejecting affiliation with the OCU. His persistent advocacy for a fully Ukrainian church without external primate oversight underscores ongoing tensions in Orthodox ecclesiology, particularly amid geopolitical conflicts involving Ukraine and Russia.

Early Life and Formation

Birth and Family Background

Mykhailo Antonovych Denysenko, the future Filaret, was born on 23 January 1929 in the village of Blahodatne in Amvrosiivsky , (then part of the ), though some accounts cite 1930 or 1933 as the year. He was born into a working-class in this rural, industrial-adjacent area of . In his early childhood, Denysenko survived the famine of 1932–1933, a man-made starvation event that killed millions in ; during this period, his grandfather perished. Limited details exist on other family members, with no verified records of siblings or parental occupations beyond the proletarian context typical of Soviet-era workers in the region.

Education and Entry into Clergy

Mykhailo Antonovych Denysenko, born into a working-class family, completed secondary education before pursuing theological training amid the post-World War II revival of Orthodox institutions in the Soviet Union. In 1946, he enrolled in the third year of the Odessa Orthodox Theological Seminary under the Moscow Patriarchate, graduating with honors two years later. Following his completion in , Denysenko advanced to the , the higher for Orthodox , where he deepened his studies and formed connections within the church . During this period at the academy in the early 1950s, he committed to monastic life by taking vows in 1950, adopting the name Filaret in honor of historical church figures. Filaret's formal entry into the clergy occurred through ordinations at the Moscow institutions: he was tonsured as a and ordained hierodeacon on 15 January 1950, followed by elevation to (priest) on 18 June 1951. These steps positioned him for subsequent roles as and professor at seminaries, reflecting his rapid ascent within the Soviet-constrained structure.

Service in the Soviet-Era Russian Orthodox Church

Ordinations and Early Positions

Mykhailo Denysenko, born in 1929, took monastic on 1 January 1950 at the Holy Trinity-Saint Sergius Lavra in , , adopting the name Filaret. He was ordained as a hierodeacon on 15 January 1950 at the attached to the lavra. On 18 June 1951, he received ordination to the priesthood, also at the lavra's . Following his priestly , Filaret served in academic and administrative roles within the Russian Orthodox Church's theological institutions during the 1950s. In 1952, he became a professor of the at the Theological Academy. By 1954, he had been elevated to igumen and appointed inspector of the Theological . In 1957, he transferred to the role of inspector at the Theological , and in July 1958, he was raised to while assuming the rectorship there. Filaret's early episcopal career began amid the constraints of Soviet ecclesiastical oversight. In January 1962, the of the elected him as vicar bishop of the . His episcopal ordination occurred on 4 February 1962 at the Holy Trinity Cathedral in the , Leningrad, performed by Metropolitan Pimen (later Patriarch of Moscow) and other hierarchs. This marked his transition from seminary leadership to higher administrative duties within the church structure subservient to Moscow during the Khrushchev-era suppression of religion.

Alleged Ties to Soviet Authorities

Declassified KGB documents from Ukrainian archives identify Filaret Denysenko, then a rising figure in the Russian Orthodox Church, as a recruited agent under the codename "Antonov" starting in the early 1960s. These files detail his cooperation in tasks such as surveilling fellow clergy, providing intelligence on church activities, and advancing Soviet foreign policy objectives within international Orthodox forums like the World Council of Churches, including the promotion of Kremlin-approved candidates for ecclesiastical positions. In May 1968, as Metropolitan of Kiev and of , Denysenko authored a confidential report to Ukrainian Communist Party officials outlining church matters and aligning ecclesiastical administration with state directives, reflecting the era's required "symphony" between Soviet authorities and the Moscow Patriarchate. He also publicly expressed in speeches, such as one recounted by contemporaries where he attributed his rapid ascent from to to the benevolence of Soviet power, stating, "I am the son of a coal and I became an and rector. Under Soviet authority, everyone receives according to his abilities." Such collaboration was commonplace among Soviet-era Orthodox hierarchs, necessitated by the regime's control over church appointments and operations, though Denysenko's extensive involvement drew particular scrutiny after Ukraine's 1991 independence. Denysenko has consistently denied KGB affiliation, dismissing the archival evidence as fabricated propaganda from Russian Orthodox sources opposed to Ukrainian autocephaly, while asserting that accusations emerged only amid his 1990s push for ecclesiastical independence from Moscow. Independent researchers, drawing on Mitrokhin Archive parallels and declassified files, maintain the documents' authenticity, noting patterns of agent recruitment across the hierarchy without implying unique culpability.

Rise as Hierarch Under Moscow Patriarchate

Appointment as Metropolitan of Kiev

In May 1966, Mykhailo Denysenko, known in monasticism as Filaret, was transferred to the and appointed of and by the Moscow Patriarchate, marking his assumption of leadership over the Ukrainian Exarchate of the . This position placed him as the primary hierarch responsible for Orthodox affairs in under Soviet oversight, amid ongoing state-imposed restrictions on religious institutions, including seminary closures such as that of the Theological in 1960. On February 6, 1968, Archbishop Filaret was elevated to the rank of metropolitan by the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, with his title formally changed to Metropolitan of Kyiv and Galicia. This promotion, occurring under Patriarch Alexy I, recognized his administrative influence and prior roles, including rectorships at theological seminaries and vicar bishoprics in Leningrad and Moscow. As the first ethnic Ukrainian to hold the metropolitan see of Kyiv in approximately 150 years, Filaret's appointment signified a limited concession to national composition within the hierarchate, though it remained firmly subordinated to Moscow's central authority. The elevation consolidated Filaret's role as , overseeing diocesan bishops and church administration in during a period of Khrushchev-era thaw followed by renewed controls, where hierarchs navigated cooperation with Soviet authorities to sustain institutional survival. By May 1968, as head of the , he had submitted reports to officials on church matters, reflecting the intertwined and state dynamics of the era.

Administrative Role in Ukrainian Exarchate

In 1966, Filaret (Denysenko) was appointed Archbishop of Kiev and and named Patriarchal of All by the Holy Synod of the , marking his elevation to lead the church's administration in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This position, which he had effectively influenced from as early as through administrative oversight, made him the of the Patriarchate in , responsible for coordinating ecclesiastical affairs across the region's dioceses. In 1968, he was further elevated to the rank of Metropolitan, becoming the first ethnic Ukrainian to hold the metropolitan see of Kiev in over a century. As , Filaret's duties encompassed the day-to-day governance of the Ukrainian Exarchate, including supervision of episcopal elections, ordinations of , management of church property, and enforcement of canonical discipline among the approximately 7,000 parishes and 6,000 priests operating under Soviet restrictions by the late . He chaired local synods, resolved jurisdictional disputes between dioceses, and ensured alignment with Moscow's directives while navigating interactions with Soviet state authorities, such as reporting on church activities to maintain operational permissions amid atheistic policies. This role required balancing fidelity to the with pragmatic compliance, as demonstrated by his report to Ukrainian officials detailing church compliance and internal matters. Filaret's administration focused on sustaining Orthodox presence in Ukraine through seminary expansions and clergy training, contributing to modest institutional growth despite regime suppression of religious activity. He also oversaw the Exarchate's limited , including publications and liturgical , while suppressing non-Moscow-aligned groups, such as unregistered Ukrainian nationalist parishes, in coordination with state security organs. These efforts preserved the Exarchate's structure as the sole canonical Orthodox entity in until the late Soviet reforms, when calls for broader began to emerge under his leadership.

Drive for Ukrainian Ecclesiastical Independence

Initial Petitions for Autocephaly

In the late 1980s, amid Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms and rising Ukrainian national consciousness, Metropolitan Filaret (Denysenko), as head of the Ukrainian Exarchate of the , began addressing internal challenges within the Ukrainian dioceses, including calls for greater autonomy. At the Bishops' Council of the held in from January 29 to February 7, 1990, Filaret delivered a report titled "On the Situation in the Ukrainian Exarchate of the ," in which he outlined growing demands from and for enhanced , foreshadowing formal appeals for while emphasizing loyalty to Moscow. By 1991, following Ukraine's on August 24, petitions intensified as numerous letters from Ukrainian Orthodox faithful, clergy, and bishops reached both Filaret and , explicitly requesting the granting of to the Kyiv to align the church's structure with the new sovereign state. These appeals reflected widespread sentiment that the exarchate's subordinate status to hindered pastoral effectiveness amid political transformations, though Moscow Patriarchate officials later characterized them as influenced by nationalist pressures rather than canonical necessity. On November 1–3, 1991, Filaret convened an All-Ukrainian Orthodox in , attended by over 200 bishops, clergy, and lay representatives, which adopted a resolution formally petitioning the Patriarchate for , arguing that it would preserve Orthodoxy's integrity in independent without severing historical ties. Alexy II responded ambiguously, acknowledging the request in a December 1991 letter but deferring substantive action pending further review, a stance that Filaret and supporters interpreted as provisional support but which sources described as a tactical delay amid internal Russian church debates. This marked the culmination of initial organized petitions, setting the stage for escalated negotiations in early 1992.

Escalation and Break from Moscow in 1992

In early 1992, following Ukraine's in December 1991, Metropolitan Filaret Denysenko intensified efforts for of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Patriarchate. On January 22, 1992, a group of Ukrainian Orthodox bishops in formally appealed to Patriarch Alexy II for canonical independence, though support wavered as three bishops later withdrew their endorsement. This petition built on an earlier resolution from a November 1991 local council convened by Filaret at Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra. Tensions escalated at the Russian Orthodox Church's meeting from April 1 to 4, 1992, where the request was denied, and Filaret was pressed to resign as of the Ukrainian . Although Filaret initially agreed during the session, he retracted the commitment upon returning to on April 7, refusing to step down and citing the need for Ukrainian amid the nation's political . In response, the removed him from leadership on May 6-7, 1992, and on May 21, a of Ukrainian bishops loyal to elected Metropolitan Volodymyr (Sabodan) as the new Metropolitan of , securing 16 of 18 votes. Filaret's defiance prompted a special Council of Bishops in on June 11, 1992, which deposed and defrocked him, reducing him to lay status and accusing him of violating canonical oaths and fomenting . The deposition catalyzed Filaret's break from Moscow. On June 25-26, 1992, he convened the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Council in at his residence, attended by representatives from his faction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the (UAOC). The council proclaimed the formation of the (UOC-KP) as an independent entity, electing émigré hierarch Mstyslav (Skrypnyk) of the UAOC as its first and appointing Filaret as patriarchal administrator and deputy. This act severed ties with the Patriarchate, prioritizing national over subordination, though it was immediately condemned by Moscow as uncanonical and schismatic. The UOC-KP's establishment marked a pivotal , reflecting broader post-Soviet realignments but lacking recognition from other Orthodox churches at the time.

Establishment and Leadership of the Kyiv Patriarchate

Founding of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Kyiv Patriarchate

Following the refusal of the Russian Orthodox Church's Holy Synod to grant autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the subsequent demand for Filaret Denysenko's resignation as Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Ukraine, Denysenko convened a forum in Kyiv on June 25–26, 1992. This gathering, attended by representatives from the breakaway faction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church loyal to Denysenko, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), and various public organizations, proclaimed the establishment of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) as an independent entity. The participants declared the UOC-KP's autocephaly, severing canonical ties with the Moscow Patriarchate, and positioned the new structure as a continuation of the historic Kyivan church tradition predating Moscow's influence. The sobor elected Mstyslav Skrypnyk, the of the UAOC in exile in the United States, as the honorary of and all -Rus', while appointing Denysenko as Deputy Patriarch and administrator of the church in . This arrangement aimed to facilitate unification with the UAOC, though full merger occurred later in June 1993 after Skrypnyk's arrival and formal . The UOC-KP initially comprised approximately 10 bishops, thousands of parishes, and significant lay support, particularly in , drawing from Denysenko's network within the former Ukrainian . The founding act was immediately contested by the Moscow Patriarchate, which viewed it as schismatic, leading to Denysenko's on July 11, 1992. Despite lacking recognition from other Orthodox churches, the UOC-KP positioned itself as the legitimate heir to Ukraine's , supported by the newly independent Ukrainian state's aspirations for national religious institutions. This establishment marked the first major post-Soviet attempt to create a unified, independent Ukrainian Orthodox , though it faced ongoing isolation until the 2018 unification processes.

Growth, Structure, and Canonical Challenges

The (UOC-KP), founded in June 1992 through the union of dissident clergy from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Patriarchate and the , initially comprised around 2,000 parishes by the mid-1990s, drawing from approximately 1,000 parishes of the Autocephalous Church and defections amid Ukraine's post-independence push for ecclesiastical autonomy. By 2018, prior to its formal dissolution into the , the UOC-KP had expanded to 35 dioceses and roughly 5,000 parishes, reflecting sustained appeal among Ukrainian nationalists and those seeking independence from Moscow's influence, though it remained smaller than the Moscow-aligned Ukrainian Orthodox Church with its 12,000 parishes. This growth was uneven, concentrated in western and , and supported by state registration of new communities, but faced competition and legal disputes over church properties with the Moscow Patriarchate branch. Organizationally, the UOC-KP adopted a patriarchal model, with Filaret Denysenko enthroned as in 1995 following the death of initial co-leader Metropolitan Antoniy Melnyk, exercising through a of bishops elected from diocesan hierarchs and responsible to periodic local councils of clergy and laity. Dioceses were administered by metropolitans and bishops appointed by the , overseeing parish priests and monastic communities, while the in served as the patriarchal seat; this structure mirrored traditional Eastern Orthodox governance but lacked inter-church validation, leading to internal reliance on Filaret's personal leadership amid disputes over succession and . The UOC-KP encountered profound canonical obstacles, as its 1992 self-proclamation of —without the consent of the , from which most founding clergy originated, or endorsement from other autocephalous Orthodox churches—resulted in universal non-recognition, with bodies like the Moscow Patriarchate, Antiochian Orthodox Church, and deeming it schismatic and its sacraments irregular due to the involvement of deposed hierarchs like Filaret, whose 1992 and 1997 anathematization were upheld as valid under Orthodox by most jurisdictions. This isolation barred eucharistic communion and liturgical concelebration with canonical Orthodox entities, prompting diplomatic efforts by Ukrainian governments (e.g., under Presidents Kravchuk and Yushchenko) to secure recognition from the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which repeatedly declined until 2018, citing violations of canons 9 and 17 of the Fourth prohibiting unauthorized jurisdictional shifts. Efforts to legitimize the structure through appeals to or bilateral recognitions failed, exacerbating internal fractures and external pressures from Moscow-aligned churches, which viewed the UOC-KP as a politically motivated rupture rather than a legitimate canonical evolution.

Disciplinary Measures by the Russian Orthodox Church

Suspension and Deposition

In response to Filaret Denysenko's refusal to resign as Metropolitan of Kyiv following the of the 's request on 1–4 April 1992, the Synod removed him from leadership of the [Ukrainian Orthodox Church](/page/Ukrainian_Orthodox Church) on 6–7 May 1992, effectively suspending him from his hierarchical duties. This action stemmed from his reversal of an initial agreement to step down, made during discussions in amid petitions for Ukrainian autocephaly, which the Patriarchate viewed as a violation of canonical obedience and an encouragement of . A bishops' council convened in , with dates reported as either 21 May or 27–28 May 1992, formalized his deposition by electing Metropolitan Volodymyr (Sabodan) as the new of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and citing Filaret's "sins and schismatic activity," including alleged breaches of monastic vows such as moral lapses. Filaret rejected the council's legitimacy, asserting it was illicitly organized under the influence of post-Soviet security services, which coerced bishops and bypassed procedures requiring convocation by the church's . On 11 June 1992, a broader of the deposed Filaret from , reducing him to lay status and prohibiting clerical functions, as a disciplinary measure against his persistent defiance and establishment of parallel structures. Denysenko and his adherents maintained that these measures were politically motivated to preserve 's jurisdictional control over Ukraine's Orthodox faithful, rather than purely canonical, especially given the timing after Ukraine's . The Patriarchate, however, upheld the actions as necessary to uphold unity and discipline under its canonical authority.

Anathematization and Its Canonical Implications

The Bishops' Council of the , convened from 31 January to 7 February 1997, decreed the anathematization of Filaret (Denysenko), then self-proclaimed patriarch of , citing his persistent , refusal to heed prior depositions and suspensions, and establishment of a parallel ecclesiastical structure in defiance of Moscow's authority. This measure followed his as Metropolitan of and All on 11 June 1992 by the ROC for disobedience and related infractions, including pressure tactics against clergy and laity during 's post-Soviet independence transition. The 1997 decree explicitly barred Filaret from receiving sacraments and invoked Orthodox against heresiarchs and schismatics, as outlined in synodal acts referencing historical precedents like the anathemas against or . In Orthodox canon law, anathema represents the ultimate ecclesiastical penalty, entailing formal excommunication and spiritual isolation from the Church as the mystical Body of Christ, rendering the subject anathema maranatha—cursed at the Lord's coming—until repentance. For Filaret, this nullified his clerical status ab initio in the eyes of the issuing synod, invalidating all subsequent ordinations, consecrations, and sacramental ministrations he performed, as episcopal grace presupposes unbroken canonical communion and valid hierarchy per canons such as Apostolic Canon 2 and Chalcedon Canon 9. Adherents remaining under his jurisdiction faced similar risks of invalid sacraments, with the ROC viewing the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate as a schismatic entity devoid of apostolic succession post-deposition. The decree's reach extended beyond , with initial recognition by most autocephalous Orthodox churches, including the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which in a letter to Patriarch Alexy II affirmed the anathema's validity and urged avoidance of communion with Filaret's group. This consensus underscored the implications for inter-Orthodox relations: schismatics under an anathema disrupt eucharistic unity, prompting barriers to shared liturgical life and potential contagion of invalidity to downstream ordinations, as debated in canonical texts emphasizing the indelible yet forfeitable nature of upon grave . Critics from Ukrainian perspectives, however, contested the decree's legitimacy as politically motivated by Moscow's imperial interests rather than pure rigor, though empirical adherence by global until affirmed its operative force.

Involvement in the Orthodox Church of Ukraine

Participation in the 2018 Unification Council

Filaret Denysenko, as Patriarch of the (UOC-KP), actively participated in the Unification Council convened on December 15, 2018, at Saint Sophia's Cathedral in . The council aimed to consolidate Ukrainian Orthodox factions—including the UOC-KP, the (UAOC), and a contingent of bishops defecting from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP)—to form a single autocephalous entity eligible for recognition by the . Denysenko's UOC-KP supplied the largest delegation, with 81 hierarchs and clergy among the council's approximately 199 participants, reflecting its dominant position among non-Moscow-aligned Ukrainian Orthodox groups. As leader of the proceedings, he contributed to the adoption of the new church's statutes, which emphasized internal while reserving certain decisions, such as election, for conciliar approval. The statutes also provided for the dissolution of the UOC-KP and UAOC, with their assets and communities transferring to the nascent (OCU). A pivotal moment involved the election of the OCU's : Denysenko refrained from candidacy, endorsing instead Metropolitan Epiphanius (Dumenko), his long-time from the UOC-KP, who secured 88 votes in a secret . Denysenko later attributed this decision to strategic necessity, arguing that his election risked derailing the of , given lingering canonical objections tied to his 1997 by the —a penalty lifted by in October 2018 but potentially contentious in broader Orthodox circles. Denysenko affixed his signature to the council's key acts, formalizing the OCU's creation and his church's , actions that enabled the subsequent issuance of the on January 6, 2019. His involvement underscored the UOC-KP's instrumental role in achieving unification, though the event's legitimacy remains contested by the Patriarchate, which deems the council irregular due to the non-participation of its canonical UOC-MP majority and procedural irregularities.

Initial Role and Subsequent Marginalization

Following the Unification Council on December 15, 2018, which established the (OCU), Filaret Denysenko was granted the title of Honorary Patriarch, a symbolic recognition of his longstanding leadership in the (UOC–KP). This status positioned him as a revered elder statesman without executive authority, as the council elected Metropolitan Epiphanius as the primate (Metropolitan of and All ), subordinating Filaret's role to advisory and ceremonial functions under the OCU's new statutes. The Ecumenical Patriarchate's of , granted on January 6, 2019, further affirmed Epiphanius's primacy, implicitly limiting Filaret's influence to honorific precedence among senior bishops. Tensions surfaced by early 2019 as Filaret publicly expressed dissatisfaction with Epiphanius's leadership, accusing him of infrequent communication and susceptibility to "anti-Ukrainian forces" allegedly infiltrating the OCU from former Moscow-aligned structures. Filaret asserted that his patriarchal dignity entitled him to co-govern the church alongside Epiphanius, convening unauthorized meetings and distributing documents claiming the OCU statutes were provisional and subordinate to UOC–KP precedents. These actions, including a press conference on May 24, 2019, where he declared Epiphanius's governance failures necessitated his intervention, escalated internal divisions, prompting the OCU to reaffirm Filaret's honorary title as non-administrative. By June 20, 2019, Filaret's Local Council declaration effectively severed his formal ties to the OCU, leading to his departure alongside two bishops and approximately a dozen priests who rejected Epiphanius's sole authority. This marginalization intensified as the OCU proceeded with institutional consolidation under Epiphanius, excluding Filaret from synodal decisions and processes; subsequent OCU synods, such as in February 2022, moved to defrock ordained by Filaret post-June 2019, viewing his actions as schismatic. Filaret's influence waned to a factional remnant, with his claims to head the UOC–KP dismissed by the OCU as incompatible with the tomos's emphasis on unified leadership, though he retained control over a small network of loyal parishes.

Conflicts Within and Beyond the OCU

Dispute with Metropolitan Epiphanius

The dispute between Filaret Denysenko and Metropolitan Epiphanius arose primarily from unfulfilled expectations regarding Filaret's role in the newly formed (OCU) and perceived limitations in the issued by the Ecumenical on January 6, 2019. Filaret, who had led the (UOC-KP) since its founding in 1990, anticipated retaining substantive patriarchal authority, including governance over the and full ecclesiastical independence; however, the OCU statutes, approved by , designated him as "patriarch emeritus" with honorary status only, while subordinating diaspora parishes and appellate matters to the Ecumenical Throne. Filaret publicly contested these provisions as contrary to pre-unification agreements and insufficient for true sovereignty, arguing they preserved undue influence from external patriarchates. Tensions peaked on May 14, 2019, when Filaret convened an unauthorized "Local Council" of the UOC-KP at in , declaring the 2018 unification invalid and the UOC-KP's self-liquidation incomplete. In an appeal issued that day, he criticized the OCU for failing to convene a follow-up council to address governance flaws and diaspora control, claiming this breached norms and Ukrainian national interests; attendance was minimal, with reports indicating only four hierarchs responded positively to invitations extended to approximately 70 OCU bishops. Epiphanius, as OCU , responded on May 16, affirming willingness to consider Filaret's counsel as an elder but rejecting any "ultimatums" that undermined the and OCU unity, framing the council as an act of division. Filaret further intensified accusations on May 24, 2019, during an OCU session, alleging that "anti-Ukrainian and Moscow-oriented forces" were manipulating Epiphanius to dismantle the UOC-KP entirely, while reiterating objections to the tomos's subordination clauses—accepting but not the jurisdictional limits. Epiphanius and the OCU Synod countered on June 14, issuing a formal warning that Filaret lacked authority to summon councils or synods outside OCU structures, deeming such moves schismatic and harmful to the church's canonical standing with global . Filaret's subsequent legal appeals to Ukraine's in July 2019 sought to reinstate UOC-KP registration, resulting in a District ruling on September 12, 2019, that froze the liquidation commission's asset management pending review, allowing limited operational continuity for the UOC-KP despite its canonical marginalization within the OCU. The reflected broader tensions over centralized versus patriarchal models of church administration, with Filaret positioning his stance as a defense of Ukrainian against perceived concessions to , while Epiphanius emphasized to the as essential for international recognition; by late , several parishes aligned with Filaret defected from the OCU, though the majority remained loyal to Epiphanius amid ongoing Synod oversight.

Efforts to Revive the Kyiv Patriarchate Post-2019

Following the formation of the (OCU) on January 15, 2019, and the issuance of the of on January 6, 2019, which designated the OCU as an autocephalous church led by a metropolitan rather than a , Filaret Denysenko publicly contested the dissolution of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP). On May 14, 2019, he convened a gathering at in , declaring that the UOC-KP persisted as a distinct entity because the failed to grant patriarchal dignity, thereby invalidating the prior unification decisions in his view. This event, framed by Filaret as a local council, attracted limited support, with only four former UOC-KP hierarchs attending positively, while the OCU leadership rejected it as unauthorized. Subsequent activities centered on maintaining operational continuity for the UOC-KP remnant. Filaret continued to conduct services at , asserting his role as patriarch, and resumed ordinations of starting in June 2019, actions the OCU later deemed invalid and responded to by the ordinands on February 2, 2022. In August 2020, Filaret addressed a letter to U.S. President , identifying himself explicitly as "the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) of the Kyiv Patriarchate," seeking international recognition for the structure as independent from both the and the OCU. These efforts yielded a small factional following, estimated in the dozens of parishes, but lacked broader ecclesiastical endorsement from or the OCU, which viewed the UOC-KP's persistence as a schismatic holdover. By 2025, Filaret reaffirmed the UOC-KP's separate existence amid ongoing tensions. On October 20, 2025, he issued a "spiritual testament" declaring no affiliation with the OCU, reiterating his patriarchal authority over the UOC-KP, and outlining succession plans within that framework, while criticizing the OCU's leadership for deviating from unification goals. This document underscored persistent grievances over status and but did not spur measurable revival, as the group remained marginal, with legal registration challenges and minimal institutional growth reported. The OCU, in response, maintained its stance that Filaret's titles post-dissolution held no canonical weight, prioritizing unity under Metropolitan Epiphanius.

Political Positions and Public Influence

Advocacy for Ukrainian Sovereignty

Filaret Denysenko has positioned the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) as a bulwark against Russian influence, equating ecclesiastical autocephaly with national sovereignty. Since the 1990s, he has advanced the cause of an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church, arguing that subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate undermines Ukraine's statehood. In a September 2018 discussion, Denysenko stated that autocephaly would strengthen the Ukrainian Orthodox Church's position domestically and facilitate its emergence as a unified national institution free from Moscow's control. Denysenko's advocacy intensified following Russia's 2014 annexation of and support for separatists in , which he described as direct aggression against . The UOC-KP under his leadership supported Ukraine's armed forces by for equipment, framing the conflict as a defense of against imperial overreach. He has consistently called for halting Russian advances in to preserve , emphasizing in discussions that aggression in threatens the nation's existence. Amid the 2022 Russian invasion, Denysenko likened Ukraine's resistance to the biblical confronting , portraying the conflict as a moral struggle where divine favor rests with the defender of rather than the aggressor. He criticized Russian Orthodox for endorsing the , accusing him of pursuing untruth and aligning with political aggression over spiritual principles. Denysenko has also tied church to geopolitical orientation, championing as a step toward Ukraine's integration with Western institutions while rejecting Moscow's canonical authority as a vestige of neo-imperialism.

Stances on Russian Aggression and Internal Policies

Filaret Denysenko has consistently condemned Russian military actions against Ukraine as acts of aggression, framing them within a narrative of imperial overreach and spiritual conflict. In a January 2015 interview, he described Russia's intervention in eastern Ukraine as an "act of aggression against Ukraine," emphasizing the Ukrainian Orthodox Church's duty to support the nation's defense under such conditions. Following the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, Denysenko likened the conflict to the biblical story of David versus Goliath, asserting that "God is with David, not Goliath" and portraying Ukraine's resistance as divinely favored against a larger aggressor. He has also criticized Patriarch Kirill of Moscow for endorsing the invasion, accusing him of complicity in Vladimir Putin's policies and urging Orthodox faithful to reject such alignment. Regarding Ukrainian internal policies, Denysenko has advocated for measures strengthening national sovereignty and reducing Russian ecclesiastical influence, including support for transitioning parishes from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) to independent structures. In March 2017, he highlighted how the Donbas conflict accelerated such shifts, with over 50 parishes reportedly moving to the Kyiv Patriarchate amid perceptions of Moscow's complicity in aggression. He has endorsed state initiatives promoting a unified Ukrainian Orthodox Church, viewing them as essential for cultural and spiritual independence. In August 2024, Denysenko welcomed Ukraine's Law No. 8371, which prohibits religious organizations affiliated with centers of influence in Russia, calling it a step toward unifying Orthodox communities under non-Moscow jurisdiction and protecting against security threats. While affirming general support for the Ukrainian government provided it adheres to lawfulness, he has prioritized policies fostering autocephaly and national identity over accommodation of pro-Russian elements within domestic religious institutions.

Controversies and Opposing Perspectives

Criticisms from Moscow-Aligned Orthodoxy

The (ROC) defrocked Filaret Denysenko as Metropolitan of on June 11, 1992, citing his disobedience to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church's Bishops' decision of May 27, 1992, which had denied requests for and called for his resignation; the ROC accused him of violating his episcopal oath, fostering , and administrative abuses that undermined church unity. This deposition was upheld by the ROC Bishops' , which emphasized that Denysenko's refusal to relinquish control over parishes and his push for independence constituted canonical violations warranting removal from all clerical ranks. In 1997, the ROC Bishops' Council anathematized Denysenko on for persisting in after his , self-proclaiming as " of and All Rus'-Ukraine" in 1995, and ordaining bishops without canonical authority, actions deemed to fracture Orthodox unity and contravene ecclesiastic canons such as those prohibiting self-elevation to patriarchal status outside recognized synodal processes. The ROC maintained that these steps reflected personal ambition over fidelity to canonical tradition, with Denysenko's establishment of the (UOC-KP) portrayed as an illicit parallel structure that sowed division among the faithful. Moscow-aligned Orthodoxy has consistently labeled Denysenko the primary architect of Ukraine's ecclesiastical , arguing his nationalist-driven separatism prioritized ethnic politics over spiritual communion, including alleged ties to ultranationalist groups that exacerbated inter-church tensions. and ROC spokesmen, such as Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev), have reiterated that Denysenko "was and remains a schismatic," rejecting the Ecumenical Patriarchate's lifting of his as canonically void due to lack of and the gravity of his original offenses, which included persistent hostility toward the church. The ROC declared in October that rehabilitating Denysenko legitimizes without repentance, rendering subsequent structures like the (OCU) invalid in their eyes, as they derive from anathematized roots. Critics from this perspective further contend that Denysenko's ordinations lack apostolic validity, producing a of uncanonical , and that his post-2018 efforts to reassert influence within the OCU demonstrate ongoing defiance of Orthodox norms, perpetuating fragmentation rather than reconciliation. The ROC has portrayed his legacy as one of "aggressive schismatics" who remain unrepentant, with no substantive change in disposition despite external recognitions.

Ukrainian Nationalist Defenses and Counter-Criticisms

Ukrainian nationalists and supporters of ecclesiastical independence have portrayed Filaret Denysenko as a foundational figure in resisting Russian Orthodox influence, emphasizing his decades-long advocacy for as a defense of national rather than . On January 22, 2019, President awarded him the title of , citing his "outstanding historical role in the formation of the independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church" and contributions to obtaining the of from the Ecumenical Patriarchate. This honor, Ukraine's highest civilian distinction, underscored perceptions among pro-independence factions that Filaret's persistence—despite Moscow's 1992 defrocking attempts and 1997 —catalyzed the 2018 unification process leading to the (OCU). Countering accusations of schism from the (ROC), defenders argue that Filaret's actions restored canonical order disrupted by Moscow's post-Soviet jurisdictional overreach, invoking the historical precedence of Kyiv's metropolitanate under before Moscow's rise. The Ecumenical Patriarchate's reinstated Filaret's episcopal dignity on October 11, 2018, explicitly nullifying the ROC's prior sanctions and designating him of , which Ukrainian Orthodox leaders cited as vindication against claims of illegitimacy. Filaret himself dismissed ROC overtures for reconciliation as "deceptive," asserting in December 2017 that the Ukrainian church would "never go back" to Moscow's subordination, framing separation as a moral imperative amid Russia's 2014 annexation of and support for separatists in . These defenses often highlight the ROC's alignment with Russian state aggression as evidence of politicized canonical critiques, with Filaret invoking biblical imagery in May 2022 to describe Ukraine's church struggle as "David against ," implying divine favor for the independent path over imperial dominance. Nationalist commentators, including those in pro-autocephaly outlets, contend that Moscow's schism labels serve neo-imperial aims, ignoring unanimous Ukrainian episcopal support for Filaret's 1990s petitions and the broader context of post-independence , where church autonomy parallels linguistic and cultural de-Russification efforts. Such counter-narratives prioritize empirical outcomes—like the OCU's rapid growth to over 7,000 parishes by 2019—as proof of grassroots legitimacy over ROC jurisdictional protests, which lost force after Constantinople's 2018 revocation of Moscow's exclusivity over .

Ecclesiastical Legacy and Honors

Ordinations and Institutional Impact

Denysenko's ordinations formed the backbone of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate's (UOC-KP) after his 1995 as patriarch. He personally consecrated 85 bishops and participated in additional episcopal ordinations, enabling the rapid establishment of dioceses and parishes across . These actions, grounded in his pre-schism from the , allowed the UOC-KP to develop an independent institutional framework despite contestation from , which anathematized him in 1997 and deemed subsequent ordinations invalid. The bishops ordained by Denysenko staffed key eparchies and provided continuity during the UOC-KP's growth phase, influencing the 2018 Unification Council where numerous such hierarchs joined the nascent (OCU). His role in these ordinations supported the institutional push for , as the resulting network lobbied Ukrainian authorities and the Ecumenical , contributing to the issuance on January 6, 2019. This legacy bolstered Ukrainian Orthodoxy's structural autonomy from Moscow, though it entrenched divisions, with pro-independence sources crediting him for fostering national ecclesiastical resilience while Moscow-aligned perspectives highlight canonical disruptions. Post-2018 tensions led Denysenko to revive UOC-KP activities, including ordaining two in June 2019 amid disputes with OCU Epiphanius, actions the OCU later declared violations of its and canons. The OCU resolved on February 2, 2022, to defrock all persons ordained by Denysenko as a "" since June 2019, underscoring the ongoing institutional fragmentation his ordinations perpetuated by sustaining parallel hierarchies. Despite this, the Ecumenical Patriarchate's 2018 lifting of his validated prior ordinations for OCU purposes, affirming their role in Ukraine's Orthodox institutional evolution.

Awards from Ukrainian and International Sources

Filaret Denysenko received the , 's highest civilian award, in 2009. He was also decorated with all five classes of the between 1999 and 2008, recognizing contributions to national culture and humanitarian efforts. In 2019, President conferred upon him the title of along with the Order of the State on January 22, 's Day of Unity, honoring his pivotal role in securing for the . The award acknowledged his decades-long struggle for ecclesiastical independence from . No major awards from international governmental sources have been documented, though Filaret's efforts garnered recognition within communities and aligned Orthodox groups abroad.

Later Years and Health Decline

Recent Activities and Statements

In August 2024, Filaret Denysenko, as head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv (UOC-KP), issued a statement endorsing Ukraine's Law No. 8371, which prohibits religious organizations affiliated with , including the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) under Moscow's influence. He described the law as a necessary measure to eliminate "Moscow's influence" in Ukrainian Orthodoxy and urged unification of Ukrainian churches under a single autocephalous structure, while cautioning against forcible transfers of UOC parishes to other jurisdictions. By August 26, 2025, Denysenko's health had deteriorated markedly at age 96, prompting hospitalization for treatment and medical examination, as reported by both the (OCU)—which retains him as honorary patriarch—and his own UOC-KP, which described his condition as satisfactory despite the intervention. On October 20, 2025, amid ongoing health challenges, Denysenko published a "spiritual testament" reaffirming his exclusive leadership of the UOC-KP and explicitly denying any ongoing ties to the OCU, rejecting its designation of him as honorary as invalid. In the document, he outlined succession plans for the UOC-KP, emphasizing continuity of his patriarchal independent of the 2018 unification efforts led by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew.

Current Status as of 2025

As of October 2025, Filaret Denysenko, born Mykhailo Antonovych Denysenko on January 23, 1929, remains alive at age 96 and continues to claim the position of lifelong of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate (UOC-KP), rejecting any subordination to the (OCU). In a "spiritual testament" published on October 20, 2025, he reaffirmed his status as the elected of the UOC-KP, declared no affiliation with the OCU, and urged convening a council to establish a truly unified Ukrainian church independent of both and , emphasizing canonical independence from external patriarchates. Denysenko's health drew concern in August 2025, when the OCU issued a statement on August 26 citing an "obvious deterioration" and calling for prayers from its faithful, attributing this to his advanced age. The UOC-KP countered that he was undergoing routine medical examinations and treatment, describing his condition as satisfactory, and he personally led services for the Dormition of the Theotokos on August 28, 2025, at Kyiv's St. Volodymyr Cathedral, demonstrating ongoing liturgical involvement despite the reports. These conflicting assessments reflect persistent tensions between the UOC-KP and OCU, with the former maintaining Denysenko's active leadership role amid his frail health. Institutionally, the UOC-KP persists as a separate entity under Denysenko's claimed authority, though unrecognized by most Orthodox churches, including the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which granted to the OCU in 2019 while designating him merely an honorary figure. His recent testament explicitly annuls prior involvement with the OCU's formation and prioritizes restoring a Moscow-independent structure on his terms, underscoring unresolved schisms in Ukrainian Orthodoxy. No major shifts or excommunications have altered this stance in 2025, with Denysenko's influence limited primarily to UOC-KP loyalists amid broader Ukrainian societal focus on the ongoing with .

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