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2018 Sunjuwan attack
2018 Sunjuwan attack
2018 Sunjuwan attack
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2018 Sunjuwan attack
Location of Sunjuwan in Jammu city
Location32°42′5.0″N 74°55′19.2″E / 32.701389°N 74.922000°E / 32.701389; 74.922000
Sunjuwan Military Station, Jammu, Jammu and Kashmir, India
Date10 February 2018 (2018-02-10)-
11 February 2018 (2018-02-11)
Deaths10 (6 soldiers, 1 civilian and 3 militants)
Injured11
PerpetratorsJaish-e-Mohammed

On 10 February 2018, at predawn, 3 Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorists[1] attacked Sunjuwan Military Station, in the city of Jammu, in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Along with the attackers, 6 soldiers and 1 civilian were killed, while 20 were injured including 14 soldiers, and five women and children.[2][3][4] Notably, this attack coincided with the anniversary of the death of Afzal Guru,[5] convicted in the 2001 Indian parliament attack.[6] The attack was described as one of the worst since the 2016 Uri attack.

The man described by the Indian Army as the mastermind of the attack, Mufti Waqas, a commander in Jaish-e-Mohammed, was killed in an army operation on 5 March 2018 in Awantipora.[7][8][9]

Attack

[edit]

In the early hours of Saturday 10 February 2018, at around 4:10 am IST, three heavily armed militants infiltrated into the military station, which served as the HQ of 36th Brigade which housed army personnel as well as their families. The attackers were armed with AK-47 assault rifles and grenades. They entered the residential quarters and opened fire, killing four soldiers and injuring at least nine others including women and children.[10][11][12]

The militants were cornered in a residential complex and special forces were deployed in a battle that lasted over 24 hours, at the end of which all the militants were killed.[10] The army camp consisting of 150 buildings was cleared out. Subsequently, flushing operations were carried out to neutralise the remaining attackers.[11][12]

Five soldiers, all serving in the 1st battalion, Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry, were killed in the attack: Sub. Madan Lal Choudhary, Sub. Mohammad Ashraf Mir, Hav. Habibullah Qurashi, Nk. Manzoor Ahmed and L/Nk. Mohammad Iqbal. L/Nk. Mohammad Iqbal's father, a civilian, was also killed.[13][14]

The dead attackers were identified as Kari Mushtaq, Mohammad Khalid Khan, and Mohammad Adil, all of whom were Pakistani nationals.[15][2]

There were reports that some of the illegal Rohingya migrants living in Jammu might have provided logistical assistance to these terrorists.[16]

Aftermath

[edit]

The attack happened at a distance of six kilometers from the University of Jammu. Schools in the region were shut and a high alert was sounded in the entire region following the attack.[17] Anti-Pakistan slogans were raised in the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly following the attack.[18][19] Local residents of Jammu chanted anti-Pakistan slogans.[20][21]

The pregnant wife of a soldier, Rfn. Nazir Ahmed, was shot in the back during the attack. She was immediately taken to a military hospital and soon afterwards delivered her baby successfully.[22][2][23][3]

Indian defense minister Nirmala Sitharaman visited the injured victims. She blamed Pakistan for the attack and said "Pakistan will pay" for the "misadventure".[24][25][26] Pakistan responded the next day rejecting the allegations and accusing India of generating "war hysteria".[27] The US Director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats, said in his testimony to Senate Select Committee, that Pakistan-supported terrorist groups would continue to carry out attacks in India. He added that Pakistan's perception of its "eroding position" relative to India in economic and domestic security spheres drove it towards goals counter to those of the United States.[28]

Controversial Indian parliamentarian Asaduddin Owaisi highlighted the fact that five out of the seven killed in the attack were Kashmiri Muslims. The BJP replied to his statement as giving a "communal angle" to the sacrifices made by the Army.[29] The Indian Army said that it was above religion and would not "communalise [the] martyrs".[30][31][32]

Thousands of local residents gathered to mourn the deaths of the slain soldiers in their home towns of Kupwara, Reshipora in Tral, Kewa village in Anantnag. Army soldiers were also present to give a guard of honour.[33]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

2018 Sunjuwan attack

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The 2018 Sunjuwan attack was a fidayeen-style terrorist on the Indian Army's Sunjuwan military station in , Jammu and Kashmir, executed by three militants of the Pakistan-based group on 10 February 2018, resulting in the deaths of six soldiers and one civilian, with at least 17 others wounded. The predawn infiltration involved scaling perimeter walls and firing grenades and automatic weapons at family quarters and administrative areas, exposing lapses in base defenses despite prior alerts. responded with a prolonged counter-operation spanning over 36 hours, neutralizing all three attackers and recovering arms caches, though the incident underscored persistent challenges in countering cross-border incursions in the region. The attack's mastermind, JeM commander Mufti Waqas—a Pakistani national—was later eliminated in a separate operation in . Notable for occurring outside the proper, it reflected the southward extension of Islamist militancy tactics, prompting Indian officials to attribute it to from and vow retaliation for such provocations.

Background

Militancy in Jammu and Kashmir

The militancy in Jammu and Kashmir originated in the late 1980s and intensified during the 1990s, characterized by armed insurgent groups launching guerrilla operations against Indian security forces, with a significant portion involving infiltrations across the from Pakistan-administered territories. In the region—encompassing districts such as , , , and —militants exploited the mountainous border terrain to target army camps, convoys, and installations, aiming to disrupt and inflict casualties on personnel. This pattern persisted into the , with attacks often employing small, heavily armed squads attempting surprise assaults on forward bases near the frontier. Jaish-e-Mohammed emerged as a key perpetrator of such operations, conducting fidayeen-style raids on military sites. In the region, the group executed the November 29, 2016, attack on the Corps headquarters near city, where three militants infiltrated the perimeter, engaged troops in close-quarters combat, and killed seven soldiers before being neutralized. This followed the September 18, 2016, Uri brigade headquarters assault in northern Jammu and Kashmir, where four JeM operatives killed 19 soldiers using grenades and automatic weapons, highlighting a tactical emphasis on high-value military targets. Additional JeM-linked incidents in 2017, including ambushes on patrols in Jammu's border areas, contributed to heightened vigilance along the . Empirical data from the Terrorism Portal records 4,322 terrorist-related incidents in Jammu and Kashmir from 2010 to 2017, resulting in 570 security force fatalities, many attributable to direct assaults on camps and bases in the Jammu sector. Infiltration bids in this region averaged 50-70 annually during 2016-2017, per Indian defense assessments, with successful crossings enabling attacks like those at . Up to early , such incursions had caused over 100 security personnel deaths in alone since 2014, underscoring the sustained threat to installations from cross-border militant flows.

Jaish-e-Mohammed's Operations

(JeM) was established in early 2000 by , a Pakistani cleric and militant, immediately following his release from Indian imprisonment as part of the hostage exchange for Flight IC-814, hijacked on December 24, 1999, and resolved in , . The group maintains its headquarters and training facilities in , particularly in and surrounding areas in province, where it operates with relative impunity despite periodic crackdowns. Verifiable intelligence from captured operatives and UN monitoring indicates that these -based safe havens enable recruitment, ideological indoctrination, and logistical preparation for cross-border operations, underscoring the causal role of territorial sanctuary in sustaining JeM's capabilities. JeM's ideology is grounded in Deobandi Sunni , advocating violent to "liberate" Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir and integrate it into , framed as a religious duty against perceived Indian occupation. This worldview rejects negotiations, viewing military targets—such as army bases and convoys—as optimal for inflicting symbolic and psychological damage to erode Indian resolve and incite escalatory responses that could draw international intervention. The group's publications and statements emphasize martyrdom and divine reward, aligning with broader Salafi-jihadist networks while prioritizing anti- operations over global ambitions. JeM's modus operandi centers on fidayeen squads—small teams of commandos trained in guerrilla tactics, explosives handling, and close-quarters combat—who infiltrate via the for sustained assaults rather than hit-and-run raids. These operations, often involving automatic weapons, grenades, and vests, aim to prolong engagements for maximum casualties and media amplification, as seen in prior claims of responsibility for the December 13, 2001, attack on India's in , which killed nine and nearly triggered war. Indian authorities attributed the January 2, 2016, airbase assault—resulting in seven security personnel deaths—to JeM direction, with forensic evidence linking assailants to Pakistani training sites. This pattern positions Sunjuwan within JeM's strategy of sequential, high-impact strikes on military assets to sustain pressure on Indian forces.

The Attack

Infiltration and Initial Engagement

The assault began at approximately 4:45 a.m. on 10 2018, when three heavily armed militants infiltrated the Sunjuwan Military Station in by breaching two outer perimeter walls, each 10-12 feet high, exploiting vulnerabilities in the camp's boundary security. The perpetrators, attired in combat uniforms to blend with the surroundings, advanced undetected toward the residential quarters occupied by soldiers and their families. Upon reaching the family barracks, the militants unleashed initial bursts of gunfire and lobbed grenades into the structures, targeting occupants who were asleep in the predawn hours and thereby leveraging the element of surprise for maximum initial impact. This sudden onslaught killed several soldiers and one civilian porter in the opening moments, as the attackers focused on the vulnerable living areas rather than fortified positions.

Tactics and Weapons Used

The attackers executed a fidayeen-style assault, infiltrating the Sunjuwan military station by breaching perimeter walls under cover of predawn darkness on February 10, 2018, to enable surprise entry and prolonged close-quarters engagement with . This method exemplified Jaish-e-Mohammed's preference for high-commitment operations where assailants fight to the death, forgoing escape plans to sustain pressure on defenders. Primary tactics centered on targeting soft internal sites, such as family residential quarters, to exploit vulnerabilities among populations and amplify demoralization effects on . Grenades were lobbed into buildings to create chaos and disorient responders, facilitating movement through the camp's layout during the initial phase. The group wielded assault rifles for in confined spaces, alongside grenades for area denial, weaponry traced to Pakistani supply lines via infiltration corridors. Site recoveries included at least one rifle, underscoring reliance on small-arms dominance suited to JeM's training regimens. Operational precision, including familiarity with sentry positions and internal routes, evidenced months-long efforts, with attackers active in the region for up to 10 months beforehand. Preliminary probes indicated potential with local overground networks for or logistical aid, though forensic linkages remained under NIA scrutiny.

Response and Neutralization

Indian Military Counteroffensive

Upon detecting the intrusion around 4:20 a.m. on February 10, 2018, quick reaction teams swiftly activated a cordon-and-search operation at the Sunjuwan military station, sealing off the accommodation complex where the militants had infiltrated and taken cover in residential buildings. This containment prevented further spread within the 150-acre camp housing over 2,000 personnel and families. Army units, primarily from the 36th Infantry Brigade of the , coordinated with (CRPF) and Jammu police to secure the perimeter, blocking external access and managing crowds while armored vehicles facilitated the evacuation of more than 100 civilian families from adjacent quarters under covering fire. Small-arms engagements ensued as troops methodically cleared buildings, isolating and confronting the assailants in close-quarters scenarios to minimize collateral risks in the densely populated area. Para commandos were deployed to support the neutralization efforts, enhancing the tactical response against the fortified positions held by the militants armed with assault rifles and grenades. By morning, with primary threats contained, a sanitization phase commenced, involving mortar barrages on vacated structures to destroy potential militant caches and ensure operational security. The counteroffensive persisted for roughly 36 hours, adapting to intermittent firing until full control was reestablished.

Casualties and Site Clearance

The attack resulted in the deaths of six soldiers and one civilian porter, with initial reports confirming five soldiers and the civilian killed before the recovery of a sixth soldier's body during subsequent searches. Approximately 14 to 18 Indian personnel, including soldiers and civilians, sustained injuries from gunfire and grenade blasts. Three militants were confirmed killed on site by Indian forces during the counteroffensive, though some reports indicated a possible fourth based on initial exchanges; their bodies were recovered alongside weapons caches. Grenade explosions inflicted localized damage to , residential quarters, and military vehicles within the Sunjuwan Military Station, but the infrastructure sustained no critical hits that disrupted long-term operations, allowing the base to resume functionality post-clearance. The initiated a systematic site clearance operation immediately after neutralizing the intruders, involving searches of buildings, perimeter sweeps, and mortar fire on suspected hideouts in vacated areas to eliminate any residual threats. Clearance efforts yielded the recovery of militant weaponry, including rifles, grenades, and , as well as personal documents and gear on the deceased that indicated Pakistani origin, such as Urdu-script materials and non-local attire inconsistent with indigenous militants. These findings corroborated assessments of cross-border infiltration, with forensic examination of the site confirming the use of and improvised explosives in the assault. No or hidden militants were reported after the operation concluded on February 11, 2018.

Attribution and Evidence

Claim of Responsibility

(JeM) publicly claimed responsibility for the 10 February 2018 attack on the Sunjuwan military station, attributing it to a fidayeen squad that targeted army personnel and families. The group's statement emerged shortly after the assault, framing the operation as retaliation against Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir and vowing continued strikes. This claim aligned with JeM's pattern of acknowledging high-profile infiltrations into military installations, distinguishing it from sporadic local insurgent actions. Indian security agencies corroborated JeM's involvement through communications intercepts linking the assailants to handlers across the in . Forensic examination of the three neutralized militants revealed profiles consistent with JeM recruits, including foreign-sourced weaponry and tactics typical of the group's cross-border modules, rather than indigenous separatist networks. No evidence emerged implicating local Kashmiri groups like , underscoring the attack's orchestration by an externally directed jihadist outfit. Indian investigations determined that two of the three (JeM) terrorists responsible for the attack were Pakistani nationals who had infiltrated Jammu and Kashmir from approximately seven months prior to the incident, entering via a dug under the International Border fence. This infiltration path underscored the cross-border facilitation required for the operation, with the militants maintaining contact with handlers across the border. Cell phone intercepts recovered during the probe directly linked the attackers to JeM commanders operating from , including directives issued from locations in province such as , JeM's primary base. These communications revealed real-time guidance on tactics, consistent with JeM's pattern of directing operations from safe havens in , where the group conducts training in camps along the Afghanistan- border region. The National Investigation Agency's chargesheet further implicated JeM chief , based in , and other operatives in orchestrating the assault. Indian authorities, including the and military intelligence, attributed the attack to state-tolerated terrorism enabled by Pakistan's , citing JeM's reliance on cross-border logistics and sanctuary unavailable without implicit official acquiescence. Pakistan rejected these claims, denying any official involvement and framing the perpetrators as independent non-state actors, while alleging Indian orchestration of " hysteria." This denial aligns with Pakistan's historical stance on JeM-linked incidents, despite the Security Council's designation of JeM as a terrorist organization operating primarily from Pakistani soil, and U.S. assessments highlighting Pakistan's failure to dismantle such groups' .

Security Implications

Identified Lapses

The infiltration of three militants into the Sunjuwan military station on February 10, 2018, exposed deficiencies in perimeter defenses, as the attackers breached outer barriers undetected and advanced to residential quarters housing families of soldiers. Many camps in the region, including Sunjuwan, relied on basic measures such as and manual patrols rather than multi-layered electronic fencing or intrusion detection systems, with implementation of post-2016 recommendations—outlined by the Campose Committee—remaining incomplete despite identified vulnerabilities in and night-vision . The station's proximity to National Highway 44 and encroaching civilian settlements, including new residential constructions, generated frequent false alarms from motion sensors triggered by traffic and local movement, undermining effective monitoring and facilitating covert entry possibly with local assistance under probe. Intelligence gaps compounded the breach, with silos between local police, units, and central agencies preventing timely fusion of prior chatter on JeM fidayeen operations targeting Jammu bases, despite general alerts on imminent strikes. A court of inquiry was instituted post-attack to examine these coordination shortfalls, revealing persistent disconnects that allowed operatives to exploit undetected pathways. Complacency in the sector, often viewed as lower-threat compared to the , contributed to relaxed vigilance, as evidenced by the recurrence of camp assaults following in 2016, without full adoption of hardened protocols like segregated civilian-military . This perception overlooked the tactical shift by groups like JeM toward hinterland targets, enabling the predawn undetected scaling of outer fencing amid routine patrols.

Reforms and Lessons Learned

Following the 2018 Sunjuwan attack, Indian military authorities identified key vulnerabilities in perimeter security and intelligence coordination at forward bases, prompting targeted enhancements to prevent similar infiltrations. A post-incident review emphasized the inadequacy of existing barriers, such as the partially breached wall at the Sunjuwan camp, leading to recommendations for smart, multi-layered integrated with intrusion detection systems. The Defence Ministry had already sanctioned approximately ₹1,487 following earlier audits (e.g., post-Pathankot 2016) to bolster sensitive installations, with delegated financial powers to the armed services accelerating upgrades like reinforced and sensor-based monitoring at army bases in . Quick-response teams were reinforced at vulnerable sites to enable faster neutralization of intruders, addressing delays observed during the initial breach. Efforts also focused on bolstering (HUMINT) networks in border villages, where proximity to civilian areas had facilitated undetected militant movements. Recommendations from panels like the Campose Committee stressed quality local intelligence gathering to plug gaps exploited by groups such as , including better coordination through inter-agency fusion centers for real-time threat sharing. While specific post-Sunjuwan expansions of these centers are not publicly detailed, broader border management initiatives enhanced community-level surveillance in , training village defence committees to report suspicious activities and reducing reliance on remote outposts. Debates emerged on balancing technological solutions (e.g., CCTV and sensors) against manpower-intensive patrolling, given terrain challenges and the risk of over-reliance on unproven systems amid persistent lapses. indicate a decline in terrorist attacks targeting army personnel and installations in Jammu and Kashmir from 2017 to 2021, suggesting partial efficacy of these measures in deterring camp assaults, though sporadic incidents underscore ongoing needs for adaptive strategies over fixes.

Aftermath

Elimination of Key Operatives

In March , Indian security forces eliminated Mohammad Mujeeb, a (JeM) commander identified as a key planner of the Sunjuwan attack, during an encounter in district's area on March 5. The operation recovered explosives and materials linked to the Sunjuwan assault, including IED components consistent with those used in the February incursion, disrupting JeM's immediate operational capacity in the region. In November 2023, the beheaded body of Khwaja Shahid (also known as Quaja Shahid or Mia Mujahid), a Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) commander accused of masterminding the Sunjuwan plot alongside JeM elements, was discovered near the Line of Control in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Pakistani sources attributed his death to unknown assailants, potentially internal rivalries or inter-group conflicts, though Indian intelligence linked him directly to coordinating infiltration and logistics for the 2018 attack. This discovery highlighted fractures within Pakistan-based terror networks but did not stem from Indian operations. Indian forces have since conducted sustained strikes against JeM infrastructure in , neutralizing over a dozen operatives tied to post-Sunjuwan plots through precision encounters and intelligence-led raids, including bounties on remaining planners like those handling cross-border arms smuggling. These efforts, coordinated by the Indian Army's battalions, focused on dismantling JeM's recruitment and training modules in south , reducing the group's attack frequency by targeting mid-level handlers responsible for explosive procurement.

Broader Geopolitical Ramifications

The 2018 Sunjuwan attack intensified - tensions, with summoning the Pakistani High Commissioner to protest the assault, attributing it to (JeM) operatives trained in , and demanding dismantle terror infrastructure. rejected the accusations, denying state involvement and portraying the incident as an internal n matter, consistent with its longstanding objections to 's designation of groups like JeM as -sponsored terrorists. This exchange underscored the bilateral deadlock, as maintained that no composite dialogue could resume without ceasing cross-border , a precondition reinforced by the attack amid already suspended peace talks since 2016. While no large-scale military retaliation occurred, Indian officials escalated rhetoric on pre-emptive actions, with Defence Minister warning of consequences "in a time and place of our choosing," echoing the 2016 surgical strikes following the Uri attack. Analysts noted this heightened verbal posturing signaled India's shift toward proactive deterrence but stopped short of kinetic escalation, amid concerns from international observers over nuclear risks between the adversaries. Pakistani perspectives framed such threats as aggressive posturing aimed at domestic political gains, potentially destabilizing the region without addressing alleged Indian issues in . The incident highlighted persistent cross-border militancy's influence on India's governance, contributing to the August 2019 abrogation of Article 370, intended to integrate the region fully and curb separatism. However, empirical data from the Terrorism Portal indicates sustained violence post-abrogation, with 277 terrorist-related incidents in 2020 compared to 420 in 2019 and 614 in 2018, alongside 61 security force fatalities in 2020 versus 80 in 2019, demonstrating that militancy endured despite policy changes. Indian official assessments claim overall declines in infiltrations and attacks since 2018, attributing them to enhanced operations, though critics argue the persistence reflects unresolved Pakistan-supported networks. Views on escalation risks diverged: Indian strategists emphasized calibrated responses to deter future attacks without full war, while Pakistani and some Western analysts warned that repeated rhetoric could inadvertently lower thresholds for miscalculation in a nuclear dyad.

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  58. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/sr_473-indias_kashmir_conundrum_before_and_after_the_abrogation_of_article_370-sr.pdf
  59. https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1776816
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