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Anatoly Borisovich Chubais (Russian: Анатолий Борисович Чубайс; born 16 June 1955) is a Russian-Israeli politician and economist who was responsible for privatization in Russia as an influential member of Boris Yeltsin's administration in the early 1990s.[1] During this period, he was a key figure in introducing a market economy and the principles of private ownership to Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union. He has the federal state civilian service rank of 1st class Active State Councillor of the Russian Federation.[2] He fled to Israel in 2022 and subsequently obtained Israeli citizenship.[3][4][5][6]

Key Information

From 1998 to 2008, he headed the state-owned electrical power monopoly RAO UES. A 2004 survey conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers and the Financial Times named Chubais the world's 54th most respected business leader.[7] He was the head of the Russian Nanotechnology Corporation (RUSNANO) from 2008 to 2020.[8][9]

In December 2020, he was appointed a special representative of the Russian president for relations with international organisations to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.[10] He resigned from this position in March 2022 and left Russia after opposing the Russian invasion of Ukraine, according to media reports.[11][12] He is the highest ranked Russian figure to have resigned due to the invasion.[13][14]

Chubais was a member of the Advisory Council for JPMorgan Chase from September 2008 until 2013.[15][16] He is a long-time participant and speaker of the Bilderberg Club. On 30 May 2024, he took part in the club's 70th anniversary meeting in Madrid, Spain.[17][18] That same year, he founded the Center for Russian Studies (CRS) at the Faculty of Social Sciences at Tel Aviv University.[19] He is currently an acting member of The Global Board of Advisors of the Council on Foreign Relations.[20]

Early life

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Chubais was born on 16 June 1955 in the town of Borisov, Belarus, which was then part of the Soviet Union, the son of Raisa Efimovna (Sagal) and Boris Matveyevich Chubais.[21] Though his mother received a degree in economics at university, she opted to stay home to care for their children on the military bases where her husband was regularly assigned.[22] Anatoly Chubais has an older brother, Igor Chubais (born 1947), a philosopher.[22] Chubais is Jewish.[3][23]

In 1977, Chubais graduated from the Leningrad Institute of Engineering and Economics (LEEI) in present-day St. Petersburg and joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union until 1991 when he left it.[24]

Career

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Early career (1977–1991)

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While later working at LEEI, Chubais started a club called Reforma, which helped turn the city of Leningrad into a model of political reform by constructing platforms for both local and national elections. Reforma also engaged in drafting reformist legislation, an important step down the road when Chubais would work in the city government.[25] In 1982, he attained the rank of associate professor (доцент) at LEEI, while in 1983, he received his Candidate of Sciences (Ph.D.) degree in Economics for the dissertation entitled "Исследование и разработка методов планирования совершенствования управления в отраслевых научно-технических организациях" (Research and Development of Methods for the Planned Improvement of Management in Industrial Research and Development Organizations).[22]

Starting in the early 1980s, Chubais became a leader of an informal circle of market-oriented economists in Leningrad. In 1982, together with economists Yury Yarmagayev and Grigory Glazkov, he published an article titled "Вопросы расширения хозяйственной самостоятельности предприятий в условиях научно-технического прогресса" (Questions of Expanding the Autonomy of Business Enterprises under the conditions of Scientific and Technological Progress) in which the authors argue that no amount of central planning can predict the end-demand for products. In 1982, Chubais was introduced to the future Prime Minister of Russia Yegor Gaidar, who was invited to and attended seminars led by Chubais.[22]

By 1987, Chubais had become the organiser of the Leningrad chapter of the club Perestroyka, whose mission was to promote and discuss democratic ideas among the local intelligentsia. Among the people involved were his brother, Igor, who had founded the Moscow-based chapter of the Perestroyka and Perestroyka-88 clubs, future Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Kudrin, future Chubais associates Pyotr Mostovoy and Alexander Kazakov, the future President of Saint Petersburg bank Vladimir Kogan, future Minister of Anti-Monopoly Policy and Entrepreneurship Support Ilya Yuzhanov, and future Deputy Governor of Saint Petersburg Mikhail Manevich.[22]

The dissident economists organized a tulip farm to finance their seminars. In the four days before the International Women's Day (8 March), they managed to get income equivalent to the price of several Lada cars. The tulip money was used to finance the elections of Anatoly Sobchak, Yury Boldyrev and many other democratic candidates. As a result, 2/3 of the deputies winning the 1990 elections to Leningrad Soviet were from the opposition. Chubais himself later stated that he personally did not participate in growing or selling of the flowers.[22]

At the end of 1990, the economist Vitaly Nayshul proposed the idea of using vouchers to facilitate mass privatization in order to transform the Soviet Union into a market economy. Chubais strongly criticized the scheme at the time, citing the inevitable inequality and social tensions that would result if implemented as proposed. Ironically, Chubais would later become the champion of the same concept just several years later.[22]

Privatization chief in Leningrad (1990–1994)

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See also: Privatization in Russia

In 1990, upon the election of Anatoly Sobchak as Chairman of the Leningrad City Council, Chubais assumed the position of his Deputy. He was trying to implement Sobchak's idea of creating a Free Economic Zone in Leningrad. In 1991, Chubais declined the offer to become the Chairman of the Leningrad Executive Committee to instead become an advisor to the mayoral administration in Leningrad (by now renamed St. Petersburg) where Sobchak had just been elected mayor. At the same time, Chubais worked as the president of newly established Wassily Leontief Center for Research in Economics.

In the Yeltsin government (1992–1999)

[edit]
Protesters insist Chubais ("the redhead"; рыжего) must be imprisoned for the privatization process, April 1998. Chubais became known as "Redheaded Tolik" (Russian: рыжий Толик, lit. 'Little Anatole the Redhead').[26]

In November 1991, Chubais became a minister in the Yeltsin Cabinet where he managed the portfolio of Rosimushchestvo (the Committee for the Management of State Property) which was handling privatization in Russia.[22]

Chubais originally advocated rapid privatization in order to raise revenue, similar to the model used in Hungary. However, the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia rejected this model. Eventually, Chubais developed a compromise in the form of a proposed voucher privatization program akin to the program used in the Czech Republic at the time. On 11 June 1991, the Supreme Soviet of Russia adopted this compromise and the massive program was officially initiated by decree of President Boris Yeltsin on 19 August 1991.[22] This privatization program later came under heavy criticism. While most Russian citizens lost their savings in only a few weeks, a few oligarchs rapidly became billionaires by arbitraging the vast difference between the old domestic prices for Russian commodities versus the prices prevailing on the world market. The people who benefited from this arbitrage became known as "kleptocrats"[27][need quotation to verify] because they stashed billions of dollars in Swiss bank accounts rather than investing in the Russian economy.

From November 1994 until January 1996, Chubais held the position of deputy prime minister for economic and financial policy in the Russian government.[28] Thanks to liberalizing reforms carried out in 1995, the Russian government was finally enjoying a measure of financial stability, something its politicians had been seeking ever since the resignation of Yegor Gaidar in 1993. By the end of 1995, the average annual inflation-rate had declined from 18% to 3%.[29]

From April 1995 until February 1996, Chubais also represented Russia in two international financial institutions – the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).[30]

After resigning as deputy prime minister in January 1996, Chubais agreed to manage Boris Yeltsin's reelection campaign. By this time, according to public opinion surveys, Yeltsin's approval rating had fallen to roughly 3%. Chubais established the Civil Society Foundation as well as Yeltsin's Campaign Analytical Group, which became one part of the Foundation. The group helped Yeltsin regain popularity and win re-election in the second round of the polls on 3 July 1996, capturing 53.82% of the popular vote.[31]

From July 1996 until March 1997, Chubais served as the chief of the Presidential Administration of Russia. During his tenure, his office grew increasingly influential.[32]

Chubais participated in the Bilderberg Club session at Turnberry, Scotland in 1998, and co-chaired the Round Table of Industrialists of Russia and the EU during the joint session of the Government Commission of the Russian Federation and the European Union.[33] He was also elected to the Board of Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in 2000.[28]

According to Yeltsin's daughter and chief-of-staff Tatyana Yumasheva, Chubais opposed the nomination of Vladimir Putin as Prime Minister of Russia and Yeltsin's successor in 1999. Although Chubais believed Putin was qualified for the position, he feared that his appointment would be rejected by the State Duma, allow the Communist Party of the Russian Federation to gain a large enough parliamentary majority to amend the constitution, and start a civil war.[34]

RAO Unified Energy System of Russia (1998–2008)

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In 1998, Chubais was elected to the chairman of the board of RAO UES of Russia, the state-owned electricity monopoly, at a special general meeting of shareholders; he soon was also appointed chairman of the board.[35]

Since 2000, Chubais consistently defended the need for further reform, which included dis-aggregating power generation, transmission, and distribution activities from the monopoly holding company in order to facilitate the subsequent sale of a majority of shares to private investors. Chubais was convinced that the un-bundling and privatization of the state monopoly were the only mechanisms able to raise the substantial funds needed to modernize Russia's electricity sector.[36]

He was elected president of the CIS Electric Power Council (2000), and later was repeatedly re-elected to that post from 2001 to 2004.[37]

In addition to reforms, Chubais and his team raised more than $30 billion in private investments for the Russian electric power sector. The funds were used to finance the construction of new facilities: 130 new units with a total capacity of about 29,000 MW, 10,000 kilometers of transmission lines, 60,000 kilometers of distribution network lines, and thousands of electrical sub-stations of all classes of voltage. His reforms also helped eliminate the use of barter payments and significantly reduced the number of payment defaults in the sector.[37]

On 17 March 2005, he survived an assassination attempt. Vladimir Kvachkov was charged for the crime, but was acquitted by a jury.[38]

In 2007, the Russian newspaper Vedomosti named Chubais the "Professional of the Year". The paper called him the only professional reformer in Russia because of his achievements in breaking of one monopoly into dozens of independent entities, introducing market forces into the electricity distribution system, and transforming a government institution structure into one attractive for private investment and management.[39]

In July 2008, RAO UES of Russia ceased to exist as a legal entity.[40]

RUSNANO (2008–2020)

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Anatoly Chubais with Dmitry Medvedev and Xi Jinping, 28 September 2010

Since September 2008, Chubais has been General Manager of the State Corporation Rosnanotech.[8]

The official business of the corporation is to promote innovation and modernization in Russia's economy in several areas. For example, RUSNANO forms an important part of the government's strategy to find economic alternatives to fossil fuels. The corporation has set a target of 900 billions rubles in sales by 2015.[41] In the past, Chubais has compared RUSNANO to a garden in which the corporation cultivates innovative business ventures. Over its eight years of operation (2007–2015), RUSNANO has completed over 100 investment projects which resulted in the opening of 68 new plants and 28 R&D centers. As stated in the annual RUSNANO groups' financial report, the value of RUSNANO's portfolio was estimated in 2015 at 227.7 billion rubles and its net income at 17 billion rubles.[42]

Chubais has been a member of the Skolkovo Foundation Council since 2010, and in 2011 was elected chairman of the board of LTD RUSNANO.[43]

He left the organization in December 2020.[9]

Resignation (2022)

[edit]

On 22 March 2022, after Russia launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine, Chubais quit his official positions, including that as special representative, stating that he was opposed to the invasion, according to media reports. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed that Chubais had resigned, but did not specify why, stating: "Whether he left or not is his personal matter".[11] Chubais left Russia, arriving in Istanbul, Turkey, on the same day, planning to remain abroad.[11][12][44][45] Alexei Navalny's spokesperson, Kira Yarmysh, suggested that Chubais had "left Russia only out of fear for his own skin and his own money".[46] He was the highest ranked Kremlin official to resign following the start of the invasion,[13] though he is not a member of Putin's inner circle.[47] He now lives in Israel.[48]

Independent researcher (2023)

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In the summer of 2023, Chubais published an article in the Russian academic journal Voprosy Ekonomiki on the problem of non-payments in the Russian economy in the early 1990s. The author positions himself as an independent researcher from the UK.[49][50]

Center for Russian Studies (2024)

[edit]

On 16 April 2024, there was a presentation of the launch report of the new Center for Russian Studies (CRS) - Russian Future Initiative founded by Anatoly Chubays at the Faculty of Social Sciences at Tel Aviv University. The mission of the Center is a “comprehensive study of Russia's possible future based on the analysis of the events of its recent past.”[51][19]

Anatoly Chubays commented on the opening of the Center that “Russia is changing the direction of its development for the second time in the last 35 years. It is crucial now to rise above emotions, personal destinies, and political preferences and attempt to re-understand our recent history. Only in this way can we gain lessons that will truly be relevant in the future.”[52]

Personal life

[edit]

Chubais is married to Dunya Smirnova (a screenwriter and TV presenter) and has two children from his first marriage: a son, Aleksey, and a daughter, Olga.[citation needed]

On 1 August 2022, Chubais told Russian journalist Ksenia Sobchak that he had been hospitalised with the neurological disorder Guillain–Barré syndrome, though Sardinian newspaper L’Unione Sarda reported that Italian authorities had not yet ruled out poisoning, and Italian intelligence services are awaiting his blood toxicology results in order to make sure he was not poisoned.[53][54][55]

Involvement in political parties

[edit]

In June 1993, Anatoly Chubais co-founded the "Russia's Choice" electoral bloc (Vybor Rossii), which was headed by Yegor Gaidar. In December 1993, running under this bloc, Chubais was elected as a deputy to the Russian State Duma in its first convocation.[56]

On 12–13 July 1994, Chubais was elected to the governing council of the party "Democratic Choice of Russia", which had been built off the electoral bloc "Russia's Choice". In December 1998, Chubais became a member of the Organizing Committee of Right Cause coalition and was elected to the Steering Committee of the Organizing Committee of this coalition.[citation needed]

In July 1996, Chubais founded the "Center for Protection of Private Property" Foundation.[57]

In May 2000, Chubais was elected co-chairman of the Coordinating Council of the Russian National Political Organization "Union of Right Forces" at its founding congress. He was also later elected co-president and a member of the Federal Political Council on 26 May 2001, during the founding congress of the "Union of Right Forces" Party (SPS).[56]

On 24 January 2004, he resigned from his post as co-chair of the party but remained on the Federal Political Council of the SPS party.[56]

In May 2010, Chubais became the chairman of the board of trustees of the Gaidar Foundation, jointly established by the Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy and Maria Strugatsky.[58]

Assassination attempts

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In November 2004, in an interview with Financial Times, Chubais said: "I know of at least three orders for my murder. I know all the details, the names of those who were supposed to carry them out. The last such order was made a year and a half ago. It had purely political motives: hatred because I "sold Russia." When every day, returning home, you assume that a killer with an anti-tank grenade launcher could be around the corner, then your perception of political risks changes. Yes, perhaps today, the risk is several percent higher than in 2000. But in 1992-1999, the risk was several times greater."[59]

Six months later, in March 2005, an attempt was made on Chubais. On the route of his car near the village of Zhavoronki, Odintsovsky District, Moscow Oblast, an explosive device with a capacity of 3 to 12 kg of TNT was detonated, followed by machine gun fire. Chubais and his companions were saved by the fact that the car they were in was armored.

The president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Arkady Volsky, said that the people behind the attempt on Chubais were "those whom we often see on TV, whose names appear in the media." Nikolay Kovalyov, then the former head of the Federal Security Service and chairman of the State Duma Committee on Veterans Affairs, expressed the opinion that they did not want to kill Chubais, but to intimidate him, and the attack was ordered by the heads of energy companies who were dissatisfied with Chubais's activities at RAO UES. On the contrary, Boris Nemtsov argued that the attempt on Chubais's life was not related to his work at RAO, but "was of a political nature," especially since the death threats repeatedly received by Chubais "came from his political enemies." Vyacheslav Volodin, then Vice-Speaker of the State Duma from the United Russia faction, suggested that the people behind the assassination attempt were "new candidates for the role of sponsors of the right": Boris Berezovsky and Leonid Nevzlin.

Charges for the assassination attempt were brought against retired GRU colonel Vladimir Kvachkov, former officers of the 45th Airborne Regiment R. P. Yashin and A. I. Naidenov, as well as member of the executive committee of the Congress of Russian Communities Ivan Mironov, the son of the former Chairman of the Press Committee Boris Mironov. The investigation was conducted by the Department for Investigation of Particularly Important Cases of the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation. According to investigators, the crime was committed on the basis of extremist views and hostility towards Chubais. In March 2006, the Moscow Regional Court began to consider the criminal case against Kvachkov, Yashin, and Naydenov with the participation of a jury. The criminal case against Ivan Mironov was separated into separate proceedings. The defendants were charged under five articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation: encroachment on the life of a statesman or public figure (Article 277); attempted murder (Art. 30, Part 3; Art. 105, Part 2); illegal acquisition and storage of weapons and explosives (Art. 222, Part 3); intentional destruction and damage to property (Art. 167, Part 2).

On 20 December 2006, the jury was dismissed after a prosecution witness recanted his testimony given during the investigation that he had heard the defendants talking about their intention to commit an attempt on Chubais. The defendants' lawyers believed that the witness testified during the investigation under pressure. Representatives of Chubais believed that unprecedented pressure was exerted by the defense on the jury. On December 6, the second jury was dissolved: it turned out that one of the jurors could not serve as a jury by law, since she was registered in a drug dispensary.[60] On 5 June 2008, the third jury returned a not guilty verdict to all three defendants, recognizing the charges against them as unproven.[61][62]

In an interview with Echo of Moscow on the first day after his release, Kvachkov said that he considered himself a Russian nationalist and stated: "I did not want to kill Anatoly Borisovich Chubais, but I would like him to stand trial and be hanged." Kvachkov explained: "the destruction of Chubais is not a crime for me," since "Chubais is a national traitor," and "Russia is occupied by the Jewish mafia."[63]

On 25 June 2008, the Prosecutor General's Office appealed the acquittal in the case of the attempt on Chubais.[64] On 26 August 2008, the Supreme Court overturned the acquittal and sent the case for a new trial to the Moscow Regional Court.[65] The charges against Ivan Mironov were combined with the charges against the other defendants.[66][67] On 29 September 2010, the jury again acquitted the defendants. On 22 December 2010, the Supreme Court rejected the cassation appeal of the Prosecutor General's Office against the acquittal. Thus, the accused were finally acquitted.[68][69]

On 23 December 2010, Kvachkov was detained on charges of organizing rebellion and terrorism. On 8 February 2013, the Moscow City Court sentenced him to 13 years in prison for preparing to organize an armed rebellion. Later, the Supreme Court of Russia reduced the sentence to eight years in prison.

Sanctions

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In November 2023, Chubais was added to Ukraine's sanctions list.[70]

Awards

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In 1997, the British magazine Euromoney named him the world's best Minister of Finance.[71]

In December 2001, Chubais was awarded an honorary diploma of International Award by the International Union of Economists for his significant contributions to the Russian Federation, specifically his work applying advanced international experience to introduce contemporary methods of organizing administration, economics, finances and production processes.[28]

In 2008, Chubais was awarded a Presidential Commendation for helping draft part of the Russian Constitution as well as his overall contributions to democracy in Russia.[citation needed]

In 2010, Chubais was honored by with IV degree Order For Merit to the Fatherland "for outstanding contribution to the implementation of state policy in the field of nanotechnology and many years of favorable work".[72]

Chubais received three presidential commendations (awarded in 1995, 1997 and 1998) and as well as one honorary Ph.D. from the St. Petersburg State Engineering and Economic University.[28]

References

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Anatoly Chubais

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Anatoly Borisovich Chubais (born 1955) is a Russian economist and politician renowned for orchestrating the large-scale privatization of state-owned enterprises during Russia's post-Soviet economic transition in the 1990s. As chairman of the State Committee on the Management of State Property from 1991, Chubais implemented voucher-based privatization, distributing ownership certificates to over 140 million citizens to rapidly transfer assets from state control to private hands, thereby undermining the remnants of central planning and fostering initial market mechanisms. However, the process, including the subsequent loans-for-shares auctions, enabled a narrow cadre of insiders and emerging oligarchs to acquire vast industrial holdings at undervalued prices, concentrating economic power and fueling accusations of cronyism and systemic graft that intensified social disparities and public discontent. Chubais advanced through senior roles such as deputy prime minister for privatization in 1992 and first deputy prime minister in multiple stints through the late 1990s, later steering energy sector reforms as CEO of RAO United Energy Systems from 1998 and heading Rosnano from 2008, before serving as President Vladimir Putin's special representative on sustainable development until resigning in March 2022 amid opposition to the invasion of Ukraine, after which he relocated abroad. His tenure symbolizes the trade-offs of shock therapy reforms—accelerating decommunization at the cost of equitable wealth distribution and institutional integrity.

Early Life and Education

Family Background and Childhood

Anatoly Borisovich Chubais was born on 16 June 1955 in Borisov, (now ), into a military family. His father, Boris Matveyevich Chubais (1918–2000), served as a in the , participated in as a political instructor from the war's outset, and later worked as a lecturer in philosophy and Marxist-Leninist theory at a . His mother, Raisa Efimovna (née Sagal or Khamovna), possessed a degree in but functioned primarily as a homemaker. Chubais had an older brother, Igor Borisovich Chubais (born 1947), who pursued a career in . Little is documented about his specific childhood experiences beyond the family's military-oriented environment, which influenced his early aspirations toward managerial roles in industry.

Higher Education and Early Academic Work

Chubais graduated from the Leningrad Institute of Engineering and Economics (now of Economics) in 1977, earning a degree in economic engineering. He pursued postgraduate studies at the same institution, defending his candidate's dissertation in economics in 1983 on the organization of in branch-specific industrial enterprises. From 1977 to 1982, Chubais worked as a junior researcher and engineer-economist at the institute's research laboratory, focusing on and efficiency in Soviet industry. In 1982, he advanced to the position of (dotsent), delivering lectures on economic theory and while continuing research into enterprise-level and under central . He held this role until 1990, during which time he contributed to academic discussions on improving industrial amid systemic constraints. In the early , Chubais led an informal group of young Leningrad economists, where participants analyzed Western economic models and critiqued inefficiencies in the Soviet command economy, laying groundwork for later perestroika-era reforms. This work, conducted outside official channels, marked his initial foray into advocating market-oriented adjustments within a planned system, though it remained marginal to mainstream Soviet academia at the time.

Career in Saint Petersburg

Local Government Reforms and Advisory Roles

In 1990, following the first competitive elections to the Leningrad City Council, Anatoly Chubais was appointed deputy chairman of the executive committee, later promoted to first deputy chairman, and served as chief economic adviser to Mayor . In this capacity, he focused on transitioning the city's command economy toward market mechanisms, chairing a special committee on economic reform established by the Leningrad Soviet to develop strategies for liberalization. Chubais assembled a team of like-minded economists from his academic networks to analyze and propose reforms, emphasizing rapid de-statization and incentives amid the Soviet Union's dissolution. A key initiative under Chubais's advisory oversight was the development of a free economic zone around Leningrad (renamed St. Petersburg in September 1991), aimed at attracting foreign investment through reduced taxes, simplified customs, and trade; the project received approval from the city council and Russian government authorities. He projected that these measures, combined with broader local , could elevate the city's by the end of 1992, though implementation faced central government resistance and was not fully realized. Chubais also spearheaded early efforts, organizing auctions for small state-owned enterprises to transfer assets to private hands, marking one of Russia's initial municipal-scale denationalization programs and serving as a testing ground for national policies. These roles positioned Chubais as Sobchak's primary economic strategist, bridging local administration with emerging federal reform agendas, until his departure for in late 1991 to lead nationwide . His advisory work emphasized empirical market incentives over , prioritizing causal links between property rights and productivity gains despite criticisms of uneven outcomes in .

Federal Government Roles

Leadership in Privatization

Anatoly Chubais was appointed head of the State Committee on the Management of State Property (GKI) in October 1991, shortly after the Soviet Union's dissolution, with the mandate to oversee the transfer of state-owned enterprises to private ownership amid and . Under his leadership, the GKI prioritized rapid to dismantle the command economy, rejecting gradual approaches in favor of mass distribution of ownership to prevent renationalization by communist forces or bureaucratic entrenchment. By 1992, Chubais had consolidated authority over policy, navigating opposition from industrial lobbies and regional governments that sought to retain control over assets. The cornerstone of Chubais's strategy was the program, initiated with distribution to approximately 144 million eligible Russian citizens beginning October 1, 1992, and continuing through January 1993, with each nominally valued at 10,000 rubles. Vouchers, tradable on secondary markets, were redeemable for shares in auctions starting December 1992, expiring at the end of 1993, and applied to small and medium enterprises through three variants allowing insider (worker and manager) stakes ranging from 25% to 51% of voting shares. By June 1993, 2,418 firms had been auctioned via vouchers, corporatizing 6,477 enterprises as joint-stock companies by July, employing 3.6 million workers or 18% of the manufacturing labor force; overall, by 1994, roughly 70% of Russia's large and medium-sized enterprises—representing over 20% of industrial workers—had transitioned to private hands. As First from 1994, Chubais extended through the loans-for-shares scheme in , whereby banks provided loans to the government collateralized by stakes in strategic state assets like oil and metals firms, with non-repayment triggering auctions of those shares. Approved by President Yeltsin and implemented via 12 auctions from November onward, the program transferred control of major companies—such as , , and Sibneft—to a small group of financiers at undervalued prices, generating short-term budget revenue ahead of the 1996 elections but yielding minimal proceeds relative to asset values (e.g., shares auctioned for $159 million despite later valuations exceeding $10 billion). Outcomes included the swift de-statization of an estimated 70% of the by 1996, fostering private incentives amid macroeconomic turmoil, though trading often resulted in low prices (e.g., $10–20 per ) due to weak property rights and , concentrating ownership among insiders and emerging financial groups rather than broad citizen holdings. Critics, including later Russian officials and Western analysts, attributed the rise of politically connected oligarchs and to rigged auctions and , with Chubais accused of favoritism; he defended the process as essential for locking in market reforms against reversal, arguing delays would have preserved Soviet-era monopolies. showed limited immediate , with privatized firms often retaining subsidized operations and high insider control impeding gains, though the program arguably prevented total by creating vested private interests in .

Deputy Prime Minister and Ministerial Positions

Chubais served as of the Russian Federation from June 1992 to November 1994, focusing on implementation during the early post-Soviet transition. In November 1994, he was promoted to First Deputy Chairman, a role he held until January 1996, where he continued to advocate for rapid market-oriented reforms amid growing political resistance from conservative factions in the legislature. His dismissal in early 1996 stemmed from intensified opposition to policies, which had accelerated asset transfers from state to private hands but fueled accusations of and inequality. Following Boris Yeltsin's re-election in July 1996, Chubais briefly headed the presidential administration until March 1997, after which Yeltsin reappointed him as First Deputy Prime Minister under , concurrently naming him Minister of Finance on March 17, 1997. In this dual capacity, Chubais prioritized fiscal stabilization, tax collection enforcement, and preparations for international financial assistance, including negotiations with the for loans totaling approximately $10 billion in 1996-1997 to avert default. His finance ministry tenure ended abruptly on November 20, 1997, amid a involving advance payments from a publishing house to Chubais and other officials for unwritten books on economic reforms, which critics alleged violated conflict-of-interest rules and amounted to disguised compensation for policy favors. Chubais retained the First position without the finance portfolio until March 23, 1998, during which he coordinated broader economic strategy, including utility sector restructuring and measures in revenue agencies that reportedly increased federal receipts by over 20% year-on-year in 1997. His repeated appointments reflected Yeltsin's reliance on Chubais as a technocratic reformer to counterbalance entrenched interests, though they also intensified conflicts with regional governors and Duma communists who viewed his agenda as excessively pro-Western and disruptive to social stability.

State Corporation Leadership

RAO Unified Energy System Reforms

Anatoly Chubais was appointed chairman and CEO of RAO Unified Energy System (RAO UES), Russia's state-controlled electricity monopoly, in 1998. Under his leadership, the company pursued stabilization measures from 1998 to 2003, including a January 2001 ban on non-cash settlements that increased cash payment shares from 35% in 1999 to 92% in 2001, reducing and that had plagued the sector. The core reform strategy, dubbed the "5+5" plan, encompassed five years of preparation followed by five years of to unbundle the vertically integrated into competitive and segments while retaining state oversight of transmission and system operations. Enabling legislation passed the on February 14, 2003, was signed into law on March 31, 2003, and received shareholder approval on May 30, 2003, facilitating the separation of assets into wholesale generating companies (WGCs), territorial generating companies (TGCs), and the state-owned Federal Grid Company (FGC UES) for transmission. Implementation involved privatizing stakes in the new generating entities, with initial market-based sales allowing WGCs to offer up to 15% of output at competitive prices starting in 2003, alongside gradual deregulation to fund modernization and narrow cross-subsidies between industrial and residential users. Electricity tariffs rose significantly from 1998 onward—reaching 48.77 kopecks per kWh for households and 64.85 kopecks per kWh for industry by 2002—to support investments, though full for non-domestic consumers was mandated for January 1, 2011. Full ownership unbundling was completed by July 1, 2008, when RAO UES was liquidated, dissolving the and establishing a wholesale market based on and competitive principles, which attracted foreign investments such as General Electric's projected $3 billion in equipment sales by 2010. The reforms encountered resistance from regional governors, Communist lawmakers, and critics alleging mismanagement, but they dismantled regional monopolies and transitioned the sector from Soviet-era inefficiencies to market-oriented operations.

RUSNANO Management and Challenges

In September 2008, Anatoly Chubais was appointed of the Russian Corporation of Nanotechnologies (), a state-owned established to foster Russia's sector through investments in , development, and . The entity received initial capitalization of approximately $5 billion from the federal budget to fund high-tech projects aimed at technological and economic diversification. Under Chubais's , pursued an investment strategy emphasizing in , equipment manufacturing, and applied nanotechnologies, managing a portfolio that grew to include dozens of projects by the early 2010s. Chubais transitioned to chairman of the in 2011 while retaining oversight of , a role he held until December 2020, when President directed his replacement amid calls for restructuring the corporation's operations. During this period, RUSNANO disbursed over 405 billion rubles (about $4.8 billion) in state funding across investments, but audits highlighted systemic inefficiencies, including prolonged financing of unprofitable ventures without repayment or tangible technological outputs. By the end of 2012, the corporation had accumulated losses of 24.3 billion rubles, with further reports indicating an $80 million deficit that year and expenditures nearing half a billion dollars on projects yielding negligible results. Criticism intensified following public rebukes from Putin, prompting Chubais to acknowledge errors in project selection and management in mid-2013, after which he proposed reforms such as establishing a private to mitigate state exposure. Independent audits by Russia's Accounting Chamber documented widespread mismanagement, including inadequate and failure to achieve commercialization milestones, contributing to a total estimated damage of 200 billion rubles from operations under Chubais's tenure as reported by itself in subsequent disclosures. Post-2020, ongoing probes revealed alleged accounting manipulations in 2017 to conceal financial distress, leading to arrests of former executives and a 2025 Moscow Arbitration Court seizure of $66.4 million in assets linked to Chubais and associates for purported abuse of office. These developments underscored persistent challenges in governance, transparency, and return on public investment, with no verified evidence of scaled nanotech breakthroughs offsetting the fiscal shortfalls.

Political Affiliations

Ties to Reformist Movements and Parties

Chubais participated in Leningrad's informal reformist circles during the late Soviet era, including the Perestroika Club established in 1987 to convene economists advocating market-oriented changes amid Gorbachev's policies. These groups emphasized economic liberalization, drawing on Western models to critique central planning, though Chubais retained Communist Party membership until August 1991. In June 1993, Chubais co-founded the Russia's Choice electoral bloc, a of pro-reform figures supporting Yeltsin's economic agenda, including rapid and reduced state intervention; the bloc secured 15% of the vote in December 1993 elections, positioning it as a vehicle for liberal reformers against communist resurgence. This evolved into the party by 1994, where Chubais served in leadership roles until 1995, advocating fiscal austerity and property rights amid exceeding 2,000% annually in 1992. Chubais maintained influence in liberal politics through the (SPS), formed in 1999 from mergers of prior reformist groups; in May 2000, he was elected co-chairman of its Coordinating Council, guiding the party's platform toward market deregulation and anti-corruption measures. The SPS, under his informal sway, polled around 8% in the 2003 elections, reflecting sustained but marginal support for pro-Western amid rising state centralization. By 2008, Chubais backed efforts to restructure SPS leadership, aligning it closer to priorities while preserving reformist rhetoric on and private enterprise. These affiliations underscored Chubais's role in Russia's "systemic liberal" faction, which pursued incremental reforms within state structures rather than outright opposition, contrasting with more adversarial democrats; critics from both left and right accused such ties of compromising ideological purity for access to power.

Resignation and Exile

2022 Departure and Immediate Aftermath

Anatoly Chubais resigned from his position as special representative to President Vladimir Putin on sustainable development and relations with international organizations on March 23, 2022, shortly after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24. According to two sources familiar with the matter who spoke anonymously to Reuters, Chubais opposed the military operation and subsequently left Russia with no intention of returning. This departure positioned him as the highest-ranking Russian official to quit in protest against the invasion, distinguishing his action from lower-profile resignations among cultural figures and mid-level bureaucrats. Kremlin spokesman confirmed the resignation later that day, describing it as voluntary and stating that Chubais's decision to leave the country was "his personal affair." Peskov's remarks avoided direct acknowledgment of any policy disagreement, framing the exit amid Russia's broader crackdown on dissent, which included arrests of anti-war protesters and criminalizing descriptions of the conflict as "." Chubais himself issued no immediate public statement, maintaining silence in the days following his exit, which contrasted with his prior visibility in reformist circles. In the ensuing weeks, Russian state media downplayed the event, with limited coverage emphasizing Chubais's long service under Putin while omitting the as a factor. International observers noted the resignation's rarity among Putin's inner circle, given Chubais's decades-long loyalty, including roles in and state corporations, but speculated it reflected unease without evidence of broader defections at that stage. No immediate legal actions or asset freezes targeted Chubais in during this period, though his departure preceded subsequent investigations into his past affiliations.

Post-Exile Activities and Initiatives

Following his resignation from official positions on March 22, 2022, Anatoly Chubais relocated abroad, establishing a base in while engaging in research activities in the . He has described himself as an independent researcher focused on scientific work, maintaining a low public profile amid ongoing Russian legal scrutiny related to his prior roles. In April 2024, Chubais founded the Center for Russian Studies (CRS) at University's Faculty of Social Sciences, providing partial funding for its establishment. The center, presented publicly on April 16, 2024, conducts multidisciplinary research on Russia's future, encompassing economic, political, social, and cultural dimensions through workshops, reports, and collaborations with institutions like and the International Institute for Applied . In January 2025, Chubais introduced the CRS's objectives and ongoing projects during a workshop at , highlighting team-based analyses of post-Soviet trajectories. Chubais has continued international engagements, participating as a long-time attendee in the Bilderberg Meetings' 70th anniversary conference in , , from May 30 to June 2, 2024. Since 2024, he has served as an acting member of the ' Global Board of Advisors, contributing to discussions on global policy. These activities reflect a shift toward academic and advisory roles outside Russian state structures, with no verified return to domestic political or economic involvement.

Controversies and Criticisms

Economic Impacts of Privatization

The program, spearheaded by Anatoly Chubais as head of the State Property Committee from 1991 to 1994, distributed certificates to approximately 144 million Russian citizens, enabling them to acquire shares in over 140,000 enterprises through auctions and funds. This rapid transfer of state assets to private hands—privatizing about 70% of large and medium-sized firms by 1994—marked a shift where the private sector's share of GDP reached roughly 70% by the mid-1990s. However, the program's design, which allowed vouchers to be traded and concentrated via funds often controlled by insiders, facilitated ownership consolidation among a small elite rather than broad-based distribution, contributing to wealth inequality as most citizens sold their vouchers at nominal values amid economic turmoil. Short-term economic impacts were predominantly negative, coinciding with a severe contraction: Russia's GDP declined by approximately 50% between 1990 and 1995, exacerbated by , disrupted trade links from the Soviet collapse, and enterprise disruptions during ownership transitions. Privatized firms often experienced and weak , with insiders (managers and workers) retaining significant control but lacking incentives for restructuring, leading to persistent inefficiencies and rising . Poverty rates surged from under 2% in 1989 to over 30% by 1996, while income inequality sharpened, as measured by a that rose from around 0.26 in 1989 to 0.40 by 1995, reflecting the capture of valuable assets by a nascent at undervalued prices. The subsequent loans-for-shares scheme in 1995–1996, which Chubais supported as First Deputy Prime Minister, allowed banks to lend to the in exchange for collateral in major state enterprises (e.g., , ), resulting in auctions where these assets were acquired at fractions of their market value—totaling under $1 billion for stakes later worth tens of billions. This accelerated oligarch formation but generated minimal fiscal revenue for the state, estimated at just $800 million overall, while entrenching crony networks that hindered broad-based investment and . Critics, including IMF assessments, attribute part of the 1998 financial crisis to these failures, though proponents argue the scheme created politically autonomous leaders who bolstered market-oriented reforms. Longer-term effects remain debated among economists: privatized enterprises showed modest gains in some sectors post-1998 recovery, with GDP growth averaging 7% annually from 1999 to 2008 partly enabled by private flexibility, countering claims that the process irreparably stunted development. Yet, the absence of antitrust measures and judicial during fostered monopolistic structures and , sustaining high inequality (Gini around 0.41 by 2000) and constraining , as state recapture under later regimes partially reversed incentives. Empirical analyses indicate that while transfer prevented a return to central , the rushed implementation without institutional safeguards amplified transitional costs, with net welfare losses from outweighing static benefits in many privatized entities.

Allegations of Corruption and Cronyism

During the 1990s privatization under Chubais's oversight as , critics alleged through the loans-for-shares scheme, where state enterprises were collateralized for loans to the government, enabling select banks to acquire assets at undervalued prices via insider auctions. For instance, Vladimir Potanin's Oneksimbank benefited from such deals, securing control of major companies like for fractions of their worth, a process Chubais authorized that concentrated wealth among a small group of oligarchs allied with reformers. This mechanism, intended to generate quick revenue and prevent asset renationalization, resulted in the transfer of an estimated 70% of Russia's industrial assets to private hands by 1996, but allegations persist that it favored Chubais's inner circle, dubbed the "Chubais clan," over broad distribution via vouchers, which largely failed due to insider buyouts. A prominent 1997 scandal further fueled corruption claims when Chubais and four aides received advances totaling over $1 million from a publishing firm owned by Oneksimbank for an unwritten book on , with Chubais personally pocketing $90,000, interpreted as a for prior favorable rulings. The deal, signed in May 1997, came amid ongoing loans-for-shares auctions benefiting the publisher's parent bank, leading to the dismissal of three aides but no charges against Chubais, whom President Yeltsin retained despite the damage to his image. U.S. advisors from Harvard's Institute for , collaborating closely with Chubais's team on USAID-funded reforms, faced parallel accusations of conflicts, including personal investments in privatized assets they helped evaluate, prompting a U.S. Department probe in 1997 and the cancellation of Harvard's contract. At , which Chubais headed from 2008 to 2020, recent investigations have spotlighted alleged during his tenure, including the January 2025 arrests of former executives like Andrei Suchkov and others for involving over 9 billion rubles in misappropriated project funds. Despite reporting cumulative losses exceeding 100 billion rubles by 2020 amid inefficiencies, Chubais's leadership drew criticism for opaque dealings and favoritism toward connected firms, though some cases portray him as a victim of subordinates' actions. Post-exile, Russian officials like Speaker have renewed calls for his , citing privatization-era graft as evidence of systemic abuse by Chubais and associates, though these claims intensified amid political tensions after his 2022 departure.

Security Threats

On March 17, 2005, Anatoly Chubais, then head of Russia's state-controlled electricity monopoly United Energy Systems, survived an armed ambush near . As his armored convoy traveled from his in the Zhavoronki area toward the city, assailants detonated a roadside estimated at 1 kilogram of , followed by automatic gunfire from two attackers dressed in camouflage fatigues. The vehicle's armor plating and rapid acceleration prevented injuries, though the blast damaged the road and surrounding area. Russian authorities investigated the incident as a deliberate attempt, arresting several suspects including retired army colonel , but a acquitted the primary defendants in 2008, citing insufficient evidence of intent or coordination. In July 2022, following Chubais's resignation from advisory roles and departure from amid his public opposition to the invasion of , he was hospitalized in , , with acute neurological symptoms including partial and inability to close his eyes. Initial reports from Russian media and Telegram channels speculated poisoning, drawing parallels to cases like Alexei Navalny's exposure, with unverified claims of involvement or an plot. However, Italian medical examinations diagnosed Guillain-Barré syndrome, a rare autoimmune disorder often triggered by infections, and toxicology tests progressively ruled out deliberate poisoning as unlikely, though not entirely excluded pending further analysis. Chubais received life-support treatment initially but was later observed recovering in a , with no confirmed perpetrators or motive beyond contextual suspicions tied to his status. These events occurred against a backdrop of heightened personal measures for Chubais, reflecting his prominence in Russia's and reforms, which generated enduring enmities among affected stakeholders. No additional verified physical threats have been publicly documented post-2022, though his associates faced arrests in in January 2025 on embezzlement charges potentially linked to his prior RUSNANO tenure. Investigations into both incidents underscore challenges in attributing motives amid Russia's opaque apparatus, with acquittals and inconclusive diagnostics limiting definitive attributions to state or non-state actors.

Western Sanctions Post-2022

In response to Russia's invasion of beginning February 24, 2022, Anatoly Chubais was designated for sanctions by the Department of the Treasury's (OFAC) under its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, subjecting him to comprehensive asset freezes and prohibitions on U.S. persons conducting transactions with him. Similar measures were imposed by the , , and other aligned nations, including travel bans and financial restrictions, as part of coordinated efforts to target Russian government insiders and executives of state-linked entities. These actions followed Chubais's from his as Special Presidential Representative for on March 23, 2022, and his subsequent departure from . The sanctions cited Chubais's extensive history in Russian state institutions, including his leadership of —a state corporation focused on development that has been separately sanctioned for ties to the Russian defense sector—and his advisory roles under President , which authorities deemed as materially supporting the regime's policies. U.S. and rationales emphasized his influence in and sectors critical to 's economy, such as nuclear projects via affiliations, arguing these contributed to the Kremlin's capacity to sustain military operations. Canadian regulations under the Special Economic Measures (Russia) explicitly listed Chubais for his prior promotion of Putin into key administrative roles and oversight of state assets, with updates reinforcing these designations into 2025. Post-exile, the sanctions have restricted Chubais's access to Western financial systems despite his reported residence in , freezing any assets held in sanctioning jurisdictions and complicating or . No delistings have occurred as of October 2025, and the measures persist amid ongoing reviews of Russia's actions in , though Chubais has not publicly commented on their personal impact.

Russian Investigations and Asset Seizures

In January 2025, Russian law enforcement authorities launched a into alleged at , the state corporation where Anatoly Chubais served as CEO from 2008 to 2017, resulting in the arrests of several former executives who reported to him, including deputies involved in projects such as tablet production. The case accuses the suspects of misappropriating approximately 45 billion rubles (about $457.7 million) in state funds, though Chubais himself has not been formally charged, arrested, or added to Russia's wanted list. On April 6, 2025, the Arbitration Court ordered the seizure of cash and other property valued at 5.6 billion rubles (equivalent to $66.4 million) belonging to Chubais and seven other individuals linked to the probe, as a measure to secure potential claims in the ongoing case. This action followed searches and preliminary findings of financial irregularities during Chubais's leadership at the firm, which President had publicly referenced in September 2023 as a "huge financial hole" without active prosecutions at that time. By August 2025, a court issued a verdict in a related case concerning Chubais's personal estate, investigated by the Russian Interior Ministry's economic security directorate, though specific outcomes remain tied to the broader scrutiny. Russian and officials have framed these developments as accountability for mismanagement, but independent outlets note the timing aligns with Chubais's following Russia's 2022 of , raising questions about political motivations amid his prior high-level roles under Putin. No requests have been confirmed, and Chubais, residing abroad, has not publicly commented on the proceedings.

Personal Life

Family Dynamics and Private Interests

Chubais was born on June 16, 1955, in Borisov, Byelorussian SSR, into a . His father, Boris Matveyevich Chubais, served in the , shaping an upbringing marked by frequent relocations typical of military households. Chubais has entered three marriages. His second union was to Maria Vishnevskaya, an economist, around 1990. He later married Avdotya Smirnova, a , , , and , in 2012; Smirnova publicly opposed Russia's 2022 invasion of by signing an to President . From his first marriage, Chubais has two children: a son, Aleksey, and a , Olga. Limited public details exist on interactions or conflicts, reflecting Chubais's preference for in personal matters amid his high-profile career. Public records reveal few specifics on Chubais's private interests beyond professional pursuits in and ; he has not disclosed hobbies or leisure activities in verifiable interviews or biographies. In , following his resignation from advisory roles, Chubais and Smirnova briefly resided in , though he denied reports of seeking Israeli citizenship.

Awards and Recognitions

Official Honors and Professional Accolades

Chubais received the Order "For Merit to the Fatherland" of the fourth degree on June 16, 2010, via Presidential Decree No. 752 issued by , recognizing his "significant contribution to the implementation of state policy in the field of and many years of conscientious work." This decoration, one of Russia's highest civilian honors, acknowledges sustained contributions. He was granted three commendations from the President of the Russian Federation, dated 1995, 1997, and 1998, for economic reform efforts during his governmental roles. Additionally, in 2008, he received a presidential commendation for his role in drafting Russia's 1993 and advancing democratic processes. Chubais holds the Medal "For Merits to the Chechen Republic" and the Medal "For Special Contribution to the Development of Kuzbass" of the first degree, regional honors tied to his oversight of energy and economic projects in those areas. In professional recognitions, Chubais was named Finance Minister of the Year in September 1997 by Emerging Markets magazine at a ceremony in , citing his fiscal stabilization measures amid Russia's 1990s economic crisis. The same year, Euromoney magazine designated him the world's best finance minister for budget deficit reduction and achievements. In December 2001, he received an honorary diploma from the International Union of Economists for contributions to economic theory and policy. A 2004 and PricewaterhouseCoopers survey ranked him the 54th most respected global business leader, based on peer executive evaluations of his privatization leadership.

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  95. https://www.thefamouspeople.com/profiles/anatoly-chubais-5972.php
  96. https://www.rferl.org/a/1086465.html
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