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Key Information

Arab Liberation Front (ALF; Arabic: جبهة التحرير العربية Jabhet Al-Tahrir Al-'Arabiyah) is a minor Palestinian political party, previously controlled by the Iraqi Ba'ath Party, which founded the ALF in 1969 as its Palestinian military wing. It was based out of Iraq and trained by the Iraqi army. The ALF was from its foundation a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Its membership was not limited to Palestinians, as its senior leadership roles included several Lebanese and Jordanian volunteers.

History and background

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The ALF was founded in April 1969, announced official in August 1969, as a front of the Iraqi-led faction of the Ba'ath Party, then led by Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. The ALF has always followed Iraqi government policy on all matters. In line with the pan-Arab ideology of the Ba'ath Party, the ALF was initially opposed to "Palestinization" of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, preferring to argue in terms of the wider Arab world's war with Israel, which it regarded as under the natural leadership of Iraq.

The ALF was the main group active in Iraq's small Palestinian population of approximately 34,000, but a very minor group in all other Palestinian communities. It has maintained a small following in the refugee camps of Lebanon, and has a minuscule presence in the Palestinian territories. Samir Sanunu is the representative of ALF in Lebanon.[1]

The first leader of ALF was its secretary-general, Zeid Heidar. Heidar was born in Syria in the 1930s into a family of Arab nationalists. In 1956 he joined the Ba'ath Party in Syria. In 1968 he went to Iraq after the Iraqi Baath coup of 17 July 1968 and was a part of the Ba'ath Party in Iraq. In 1969, he was appointed by the government of Iraq secretary-general of the Ba'ath Party in Palestine, the ALF. In June 1969 the ALF became a member of the newly formed PLO, a device for Iraq to be able to influence the PLO and the events in Palestine. In 1974, the ALF joined the Rejectionist Front, initially strongly backed by Iraq, which was formed by hard-line Palestinian factions which rejected what they perceived as the increasing moderation of the PLO.

After the PLO entered into the Oslo Accords with Israel, the ALF opposed the accords, in line with Iraqi Ba'athist government policy. This brought about a split in the ALF in 1993, with a pro-Arafat Oslo faction becoming the Palestinian Arab Front and re-locating to the Palestinian territories;[2] while the remainder of the ALF remaining in the Rejectionist Front.

The ALF gained some significance during the al-Aqsa Intifada, which started in 2000, as a distributor of financial contributions from the Iraqi government to families of "martyrs" with extra grants for the families of suicide bombers.[3][4]

After the 2003 American invasion of Iraq, the fall of the Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist government, and dissolution of the Ba'ath Party, large numbers of the Palestinian refugees who had been living in Iraq were forced to flee Iraq, and many ALF members fled the country for security reasons for Lebanon and the West Bank.[2]

Leadership

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Other leaders of ALF have included Munif al-Razzaz, Abd al-Wahhab al-Kayyali and Abdel-Rahim Ahmed. al-Kayyali became secretary-general in at least 1972-74, and served on the PLO Executive Council from January 1973. He was assassinated in Beirut in 1981 by unidentified gunmen.[5] Ahmed was the secretary-general from 1975 (possibly 1974) until his death in 1991, and was a member of PLO Executive Council from 1977.[6] The present secretary-general is Rakad Salem (Abu Mahmoud) who was held in Israeli jail between 2001 and 2006.[7]

Present situation

[edit]

Today, the secretary-general of ALF continues to be Rakad Salem, who holds Iraqi citizenship. He was imprisoned by Israel in 2001 for distributing Iraqi funds to families of suicide bombers.[8] He was one of 57 Palestinians released in 2006 as a goodwill gesture.[7] The ALF continues to have a seat on the PLO Executive Committee, since 1993 held by Mahmoud Ismael. What the status and position of the ALF is since the 2003 end of Iraqi support is uncertain.

The headquarters of ALF are in Ramallah, West Bank. The ALF published a monthly newspaper, Sawt al-Jamahir (Arabic: Voice of the Masses), which was edited by Rakad Salem. The newspaper was financed by the Iraqi government until 2003, and it is uncertain whether the paper has continued to be published since then.

ALF has not been involved in armed attacks on Israel since at least the early 1990s,[2][9] and it is no longer believed to possess any significant military capabilities.

References

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Arab Liberation Front

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The Arab Liberation Front (ALF) is a minor Palestinian political faction established in 1969 as a proxy organization by the Iraqi to extend its influence among . Ideologically aligned with Ba'athism's emphasis on Arab unity, , and , the ALF has historically prioritized loyalty to Baghdad's regime over independent , receiving funding and direction from Iraqi leaders including , who later headed its oversight. As a member of the (PLO), it participated in rejectionist stances against early diplomatic initiatives, such as joining the 1974 Rejection Front opposing Fatah-led efforts, and engaged in activities during conflicts like the . The group's small size and unpopularity within broader Palestinian politics stemmed from its overt subservience to , which provided financial support for and operations but tied its fortunes to Saddam's authoritarian rule, leading to marginalization after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of diminished Ba'athist patronage. Controversies include its role in promoting Saddam's legacy, such as unveiling memorials to him in Palestinian areas as late as 2017, reflecting enduring ties despite the regime's fall. Despite these affiliations, the ALF has achieved little in terms of territorial or political gains, functioning primarily as an ideological outpost rather than a mass movement.

Origins and Formation

Founding and Initial Context

The Arab Liberation Front (ALF), known in Arabic as Jabhat al-Tahrir al-ʿArabiyya, was established in 1969 in by the Iraqi Baʿth Party as a Palestinian political organization to advance Iraq's influence within the Palestinian national movement. This founding was directly tied to the Baʿthist regime's ascent to power in via a July 1968 coup led by , which solidified the party's control and prompted efforts to project pan-Arab socialist ideology regionally. The ALF emerged as a deliberate to the Syrian Baʿth Party's al-Saʿiqa organization, founded in 1968 to similarly embed Syrian interests in Palestinian affairs, reflecting the deepening schism between the rival Baʿth factions after their 1966 split. The initial context for the ALF's creation stemmed from the post-1967 Six-Day War environment, where Arab states competed to shape the reinvigorated Palestinian resistance amid the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) growing autonomy under Yasser Arafat's Fatah faction. Iraq's sponsorship of the ALF positioned it as an alliance bridging Iraqi Baʿthism with select Palestinian groups, including early ties to Fatah and the PLO, to promote armed struggle against Israel while subordinating Palestinian goals to broader Baʿthist aims of Arab unity and socialism. Unlike more independent Palestinian factions, the ALF's origins emphasized state-directed proxy influence, with Iraqi funding and ideological oversight ensuring alignment with Baghdad's foreign policy, including opposition to Syrian and Egyptian dominance in Arab politics. This structure allowed the group to integrate into the PLO's framework shortly after inception, though its Baʿthist loyalty often marginalized it relative to mainstream factions.

Iraqi Sponsorship and Ba'athist Roots

The (ALF) originated as a direct initiative of the Iraqi , which seized power in through a coup on July 17, 1968, consolidating control under its pan-Arab socialist doctrine. In April 1969, Iraqi Ba'athists founded the ALF specifically to establish a pro-Iraq Palestinian faction within the (PLO), countering the Syrian Ba'ath regime's al-Sa'iqa group, which had been established earlier in 1968 to advance Damascus's interests. This creation reflected the deepening schism within the Ba'ath movement since its 1966 split, where the Iraqi faction, led by figures emphasizing militarized socialism and , sought to extend influence across Arab nationalist causes, including Palestinian militancy. Ba'athist roots of the ALF were embedded in the Iraqi variant's ideology, which prioritized Arab unity under Baghdad's leadership, state-controlled economies, and armed struggle against as extensions of Ba'athist revivalism. Unlike the more ideologically rigid Syrian branch, the Iraqi Ba'ath adapted to geopolitical rivalries, using the ALF as a vehicle to undermine Syrian proxies and align Palestinian elements with Iraq's regional ambitions, including opposition to Soviet-influenced groups. The group's initial cadre consisted of Palestinian Ba'ath sympathizers and Iraqi operatives, ensuring doctrinal fidelity to the Iraqi line, which viewed Palestinian liberation as integral to broader Ba'athist goals of Arab resurgence. Iraqi sponsorship was comprehensive, encompassing financial subsidies, training facilities, and operational directives from , transforming the ALF into a dependent proxy during the Ba'ath era under leaders like and later . By the 1970s, Iraq allocated resources from its oil revenues to sustain ALF activities, including recruitment drives and propaganda, while integrating the group into Iraqi diplomatic efforts within Arab forums. This backing persisted until the 2003 U.S. invasion dismantled the Ba'ath regime, severing the ALF's primary patron and diminishing its operational capacity.

Ideology and Objectives

Core Ba'athist Ideology

The Arab Liberation Front (ALF), founded in 1969 as the Palestinian affiliate of the Iraqi shortly after the Ba'athists' rise to power in on July 17, 1968, espouses as its foundational ideology. , originating from the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party established in 1947 by and , centers on three interlocking principles encapsulated in its slogan: wahda (Arab unity), hurriya (freedom from and ), and ishtirakiyya ( tailored to Arab societal structures). This doctrine envisions the "resurrection" (ba'ath) of a unified Arab nation-state, rejecting fragmentation along ethnic, sectarian, or strictly national lines in favor of pan-Arab solidarity against external threats. At its core, Ba'athist ideology combines secular with , advocating state-directed development, , and industrialization to achieve without Marxist emphasis on or atheistic materialism. It promotes as a tool for national defense and liberation, viewing armed struggle as essential to reclaiming Arab sovereignty, particularly in opposition to Western imperialism and , which are framed as twin forces of division and domination. , in Ba'athist terms, entails not only political but also cultural revival through and rejection of feudal or clerical influences that hinder progress. For the ALF, these principles manifest in subordinating Palestinian-specific grievances to the overarching goal of Arab unity, positioning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a pan-Arab battlefront requiring coordinated action across Arab states rather than isolated guerrilla operations. The Iraqi variant of , which shaped the ALF, emphasized pragmatic alliances and state power to enforce ideological conformity, diverging from the Syrian Ba'athist branch in its rejection of confederalism with and prioritization of Baghdad's leadership in Arab affairs. While professing , the ideology in practice tolerated capitalist elements under state oversight, focusing on anti-imperialist mobilization over doctrinal purity. This framework guided the ALF's integration into the (PLO) in 1969, where it advocated for Ba'athist influence amid competing factions.

Stance on Palestinian Nationalism and Armed Struggle

The Arab Liberation Front (ALF) framed within the broader Ba'athist ideology of pan-Arab unity and socialist revolution, viewing the liberation of as inseparable from the overarching Arab struggle against , , and reactionary Arab regimes. In its 1969 political , the ALF asserted that "Palestine is the road of unity and unity is the road of Palestine," rejecting any isolation of the Palestinian cause from the Arab masses and emphasizing its role as the of regional liberation. This perspective subordinated purely to a unified Arab nationalist framework, aligning with Iraq's sponsorship, which established the ALF in 1969 to advance Baghdad's influence within Palestinian politics and counter Syrian-backed factions like al-Sa'iqa. Regarding armed struggle, the ALF explicitly endorsed "popular armed struggle" as the exclusive path to Palestinian liberation, describing it as endowed with nationalist, socialist, and democratic qualities capable of mobilizing revolutionary forces across the . The group's 1969 manifesto declared this confrontation the "only way of salvation," calling for the scientific and popular mobilization of Arab resources against Zionist expansion, while its 1971 statements reinforced "" as the sole effective strategy, citing historical precedents and dismissing reliance on Arab governments or diplomatic initiatives like the . Within the (PLO), the ALF upheld armed resistance as a core principle, though its practical military engagements remained limited, serving more as a conduit for Iraqi and funding to sustain anti-Israel operations aligned with Baghdad's geopolitical aims. This stance reflected causal ties to Iraqi Ba'athist priorities, where support for Palestinian armed actions bolstered Saddam Hussein's regime image as a champion of Arab resistance, including financial incentives like payments to families of militants in later years, without yielding independent operational autonomy for the ALF. The group's rejection of compromise extended to opposing intra-Arab negotiations that threatened revolutionary purity, positioning armed struggle not merely as tactical but as an enduring strategy until full liberation.

Leadership and Organization

Key Historical Leaders

The Arab Liberation Front (ALF) was established in 1969 under the direct sponsorship of the Iraqi Ba'athist regime, with its initial leadership drawn from pro-Iraqi Ba'athists to serve as a Palestinian front for Baghdad's interests within the (PLO). Zayd Haydar, a Jordanian Ba'athist, served as the first Secretary General around , overseeing early organizational efforts including the establishment of training camps outside . Haydar's role emphasized the ALF's alignment with Iraqi , prioritizing pan-Arab Ba'athist goals over independent . Munif al-Razzaz, a Jordanian-Syrian physician and former General of the unified Ba'ath Party's National Command until 1965, assumed leadership in the ALF during the late 1960s and 1970s, bridging the group's Ba'athist ideological roots with its Palestinian operational facade. Razzaz's involvement reflected Iraq's strategy of recruiting exiled Ba'athists to extend influence, though his tenure was marked by internal PLO tensions due to the ALF's perceived subservience to Saddam Hussein's regime. Abd al-Wahhab al-Kayyali emerged as a prominent figure in the early , leading militant operations such as claimed attacks aligned with Iraqi directives, including a 1975 raid for which the ALF took responsibility under his command. Kayyali's highlighted the ALF's as an Iraqi proxy, with decisions often mirroring Baghdad's anti-Israel and anti-Syrian stances, subordinating Palestinian to . Abd al-Rahim succeeded as a key leader from at least 1975 through the and into the early 1990s, commanding an estimated 300-500 members and maintaining the ALF's PLO integration while enforcing loyalty to , including during the Iran-Iraq War. Under , the group numbered around 400 fighters by the late , focusing on and limited engagements that amplified Iraqi geopolitical aims rather than advancing broad Palestinian objectives. His prolonged tenure underscored the ALF's structural dependence on Iraqi funding and oversight, limiting independent decision-making.

Internal Structure and PLO Integration

The Arab Liberation Front (ALF) adopted an internal organizational framework reflective of its Ba'athist origins, featuring a general secretary as the primary executive leader, supported by a for strategic decision-making and subordinate regional commands or branches to coordinate activities among members. This hierarchy emphasized loyalty to Iraqi directives, with key positions often filled by individuals vetted or appointed through Baghdad's influence, limiting autonomous operational flexibility. Early leadership included Zayd Haydar as general secretary in 1970, followed by figures such as Munif al-Razzaz, a Jordanian Ba'athist, underscoring the group's pan-Arab composition beyond exclusively Palestinian membership. Integration into the (PLO) occurred immediately upon the ALF's establishment in April 1969, positioning it as one of the smaller constituent factions within the umbrella structure. The ALF secured seats on the PLO Executive Committee and representation in the , enabling participation in key deliberations, though its influence remained marginal due to modest membership numbers—typically in the low thousands—and dependence on Iraqi funding and guidance. This role served Iraqi strategic interests, allowing the ALF to advocate positions aligned with , such as unwavering commitment to armed struggle and opposition to Syrian-backed PLO elements like Sa'iqa, while occasionally aligning with rejectionist coalitions against compromise initiatives. Within the PLO's federated framework, the ALF contributed to political and military committees but prioritized efforts and over independent operations, reflecting its function as an extension of Iraqi rather than a fully indigenous Palestinian entity. Tensions arose periodically, as the ALF's fidelity to —evident in its abstention or opposition to PLO votes diverging from Baghdad's line—highlighted fractures in the organization's unity, particularly during intra-Arab rivalries in the . By the , internal schisms, including a 1983 split leading to the formation of the Palestinian Arab Front under Jameel Shehadeh, further underscored the ALF's vulnerability to external pressures and leadership disputes.

Activities and Militant Operations

Early Militant Engagements

The Arab Liberation Front (ALF), established in April 1969 by the Iraqi Ba'ath Party as a Palestinian affiliate, maintained a subdued profile in direct combat during its formative period, prioritizing political alignment within the (PLO) over autonomous guerrilla raids. Unlike more operationally aggressive factions such as or the for the Liberation of Palestine, the ALF functioned principally as an Iraqi instrument for channeling resources to broader efforts, including recruitment of Palestinian youth for ideological indoctrination and basic training in . This support extended to approximately 200-300 early members, many drawn from Palestinian communities in and , who were integrated into PLO structures but subordinated to Baghdad's directives. By the early 1970s, amid escalating PLO-Jordanian tensions culminating in (1970), the ALF aligned with Iraqi opposition to , whom it viewed as a Western-aligned reactionary, but records indicate no independent ALF combat units participated in the clashes; its contributions were confined to propaganda amplification of Palestinian resistance and covert facilitation of arms transfers from to allied groups. The organization's militant footprint remained ancillary, with Iraqi intelligence leveraging ALF networks for sabotage against shared enemies in the , such as operatives or disseminating Ba'athist agitation among camps. A rare attribution of occurred in 1973, when the ALF publicly claimed a in , executed under explicit Iraqi oversight to eliminate perceived collaborators, underscoring its role as a proxy rather than an originator of violence. This pattern of auxiliary involvement persisted through the mid-1970s, as the ALF avoided high-profile cross-border incursions into —claiming fewer than a dozen such attempts, mostly symbolic or aborted—focusing instead on sustaining Iraqi influence within the PLO's fractious Executive Committee. Declassified assessments highlight that deployed ALF cadres, numbering under 500 active fighters by 1975, primarily for internal security tasks in Palestinian camps and low-intensity disruptions rather than sustained warfare, reflecting the group's structural dependence on state patronage over tactical autonomy.

Political and Propaganda Efforts

The Arab Liberation Front (ALF) engaged in political activities primarily as a faction within the (PLO), where it sought to advance Iraqi Ba'athist interests among Palestinian groups. Founded in 1969 under direct Iraqi sponsorship, the ALF joined the PLO shortly thereafter to provide a platform for influencing Palestinian decision-making and countering rival Arab states like . Within the PLO's structures, such as the Palestine National Council, the ALF advocated positions aligned with Iraq's foreign policy, including opposition to Syrian-backed factions and support for pan-Arab unity under Ba'athist principles. Propaganda efforts by the ALF focused on disseminating Ba'athist ideology through materials and public events, often at both elite political levels and Palestinian communities. These included the distribution of leaflets, posters, and publications promoting anti-Zionist narratives intertwined with Iraqi leadership's role in the Arab struggle, as well as organizing demonstrations to rally support for Saddam Hussein's regime. For instance, ALF leaders orchestrated rallies in Gaza and the , where participants waved Iraqi flags and chanted slogans endorsing Iraq's stance against Western and Israeli actions. A notable example occurred during periods of heightened Iraqi-Palestinian alignment, such as in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War, when the ALF mobilized crowds for pro-Saddam demonstrations and publicly distributed cash payments—$10,000 checks—to families of Palestinian militants , framing these as solidarity gestures from to bolster loyalty and propagate the image of as the vanguard of resistance. Such events served dual purposes: reinforcing the ALF's role as an Iraqi conduit for influence and generating media coverage to amplify Ba'athist messaging on Palestinian liberation as part of a broader Arab front. Earlier instances, including a 1980 rally attended by PLO chairman , highlighted the group's efforts to blend its propaganda with mainstream Palestinian politics. These activities, however, often positioned the ALF as marginal within the PLO, prioritizing Iraqi directives over independent Palestinian agendas.

Ties to Iraq and External Backing

Funding Mechanisms from Saddam's Regime

The Arab Liberation Front (ALF) was established in 1969 by the Iraqi branch of the Ba'ath Party as a Palestinian proxy, receiving its primary operational funding directly from Saddam Hussein's regime through the Iraqi Ba'athist apparatus. This support encompassed monthly stipends for ALF cadres, logistical aid for recruitment and training, and allocations for propaganda activities aligned with Iraqi foreign policy objectives. Funds were channeled via Ba'ath Party channels in Iraq and disbursed to ALF leadership in Palestinian territories, ensuring organizational loyalty and integration into the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) structure without independent revenue streams. A key funding mechanism involved Iraq's use of the ALF to distribute financial incentives to families of Palestinian militants, particularly during the Second Intifada (2000–2005), framing such payments as rewards for "martyrdom operations." The ALF's local branches in areas like and facilitated the handover of checks, with initially providing $10,000 per family, raised to $25,000 in 2002 to amplify recruitment. ALF representatives publicly acknowledged handling these distributions, with the group claiming had supplied approximately $20 million overall for such stipends by early 2002. These transfers were documented through receipts attached to checks, confirming receipt by beneficiaries and tying payments explicitly to Iraqi policy directives. Saddam's regime coordinated this via ALF's Ba'ath-affiliated networks, bypassing direct PLO channels to maintain deniability while advancing anti-Israel agitation. Post-2003 invasion analyses of captured Iraqi documents corroborated the systematic nature of this proxy funding, revealing it as part of broader state-sponsored support exceeding operational costs for ALF's limited militant engagements.

Alignment During Major Iraqi Conflicts

The Arab Liberation Front (ALF), as a political arm established and funded by Iraq's Ba'athist regime, demonstrated unwavering alignment with Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). Early in the conflict, Iranian authorities accused the ALF of orchestrating attacks against Iranian interests, reflecting the group's role in supporting Iraq's military objectives amid the broader Arab-Persian rivalry. This stance aligned with the Ba'athist ideology's emphasis on Arab unity against perceived Persian expansionism, though ALF's activities remained secondary to its Palestinian focus. During the 1990–1991 , following Iraq's invasion of on August 2, 1990, the ALF actively mobilized in support of Saddam Hussein's regime against the U.S.-led coalition. On January 26, 1991, ALF leaders in announced the activation of approximately 5,000 Palestinian guerrillas tasked with targeting U.S. interests globally, framing the conflict as an anti-imperialist struggle. ALF members, alongside other pro-Iraqi Palestinian factions, were reportedly integrated into Iraqi forces for policing duties in occupied , underscoring the group's operational loyalty to its patron state. This position contrasted with broader Palestinian sentiments but reinforced ALF's dependence on Iraqi backing, which included financial aid and ideological direction. In the lead-up to and during the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of , launched on March 20, 2003, the ALF maintained its pro-Saddam alignment, condemning the coalition's actions as aggression against Arab sovereignty. However, with 's Ba'athist government collapsing by April 9, 2003, the ALF's influence waned rapidly, as its funding and organizational ties dissolved, leading to significant member defections and marginalization within Palestinian politics. This final conflict highlighted the ALF's structural vulnerability as an Iraqi proxy, unable to sustain independent operations post-regime fall.

Controversies and Criticisms

Role as Iraqi Proxy and Loss of Autonomy

The Arab Liberation Front (ALF) was established in April 1969 by the Iraqi as its official Palestinian branch, functioning from inception as a direct instrument of Baghdad's rather than an independent Palestinian nationalist entity. This foundational tie ensured that ALF leadership and operations remained subordinate to Iraqi directives, with key decisions aligned to Saddam Hussein's regime priorities, including opposition to rival Syrian-backed Palestinian factions like Sa'iqa. Iraqi control manifested through appointed leaders loyal to Ba'athist ideology and the suppression of internal dissent, rendering ALF a proxy for extending Iraq's influence within the (PLO) without genuine operational autonomy. Financial dependence further eroded ALF's independence, as Iraq provided substantial that dictated its activities, including , recruitment, and militant support. Saddam's government channeled millions through ALF to Palestinian causes, notably increasing payments to families of bombers from $10,000 to $25,000 per attack in April 2002, positioning the group as a conduit for state-sponsored incentives to escalate violence against . This model tied ALF's survival to Baghdad's largesse, compelling it to prioritize Iraqi strategic goals—such as countering U.S. influence or bolstering anti-Western narratives—over broader Palestinian consensus, as evidenced by its marginal status within the PLO compared to larger factions. Critics, including analysts of , have described ALF as a "puppet" organization, lacking ideological or tactical flexibility due to Baghdad's veto power over major initiatives. A stark illustration of this loss of autonomy occurred during Iraq's 1990 invasion of , where ALF publicly endorsed the action despite widespread Arab condemnation, deploying members to legitimize the occupation and intimidate local . This alignment with Saddam's aggression isolated ALF from mainstream Palestinian leadership, including Arafat's initial support that later fractured PLO unity, and contributed to the expulsion of over 300,000 from , many affiliated with pro-Iraq groups like ALF. Such subservience highlighted how proxy status subordinated Palestinian interests to Iraqi adventurism, fostering criticisms of ALF as an extension of Ba'athist authoritarianism rather than a legitimate liberation force. The Arab Liberation Front (ALF) functioned as a proxy for the Iraqi regime under , enabling Baghdad's sponsorship of Palestinian terrorist operations targeting and its allies. Iraq provided the group with direct financial support, military training, weapons, and operational safe havens, integrating ALF into a network of state-backed militancy that violated UN Security Council Resolution 687, which prohibited Iraq from supporting . This backing extended to ALF's role in facilitating attacks, including rocket launches and kidnappings, as part of Iraq's strategy to export instability through allied factions. A key mechanism of this state sponsorship involved ALF's distribution of Iraqi funds to incentivize suicide bombings during the Second Intifada. In March 2002, Saddam Hussein publicly pledged $25,000 to the families of each Palestinian "" who carried out attacks against , with ALF and affiliated Ba'ath networks in the Palestinian territories serving as primary conduits for these payments, totaling millions of dollars funneled through bank transfers and cash deliveries. By 2003, had disbursed over $10 million via such channels, explicitly rewarding acts classified as by Israeli and U.S. authorities, thereby embedding ALF in 's "terror industry" aimed at prolonging conflict. These links exemplified Iraq's broader pattern of , where ALF's autonomy was subordinated to Baghdad's directives, including alignment during the 1991 when the group endorsed Iraqi strikes on . Post-2003, the collapse of Saddam's regime severed this pipeline, rendering ALF's prior operations a vestige of Iraqi-orchestrated violence rather than independent Palestinian initiative.

Decline and Contemporary Status

Impact of 2003 Iraq Invasion

The United States-led of , commencing on March 20, 2003, resulted in the rapid overthrow of Saddam Hussein's , with falling on April 9, 2003. This collapse directly undermined the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), a Palestinian faction founded in 1969 by the Iraqi branch of the and maintained as a proxy for Baghdad's interests in the Palestinian arena. The ALF had functioned primarily as a for channeling Iraqi funds—estimated in the tens of millions of dollars—to families of killed or involved in attacks against , including $25,000 payments to relatives of bombers starting in April 2002. With Hussein's ouster, this state-sponsored funding stream terminated, stripping the group of its core operational resources and political leverage. The severance of Iraqi patronage exacerbated the ALF's pre-existing marginality, as its leadership—historically aligned with Hussein's inner circle, including his half-brother —lacked independent viability. By December 2003, ALF offices in Palestinian territories retained outdated Ba'athist and Husseinite iconography, symbolizing operational paralysis amid the abrupt geopolitical shift. The group's efforts, such as its Baghdad-financed newspaper, ceased reliably post-invasion due to the loss of subsidies, further eroding its influence within the (PLO). In the ensuing years, the ALF's activities dwindled to negligible levels, confined to sporadic nominal representation in PLO bodies without substantive militant, financial, or electoral impact. The end of Hussein's regime not only halted direct aid but also discredited the ALF's ideological tether to Iraqi , accelerating its irrelevance in Palestinian politics amid rising dominance of other factions like and . This dependency on a single authoritarian patron rendered the group vulnerable to exogenous shocks, underscoring the fragility of externally backed proxies in regional conflicts.

Current Marginal Role in Palestinian Politics

Following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of and the subsequent collapse of Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime, the Arab Liberation Front (ALF) lost its primary financial and political patron, leading to a sharp decline in its organizational capacity and influence within Palestinian politics. Previously sustained by Iraqi funding that supported operations, recruitment, and propaganda, the group saw many members flee or disband amid the regime's fall and the Ba'ath Party's dissolution, rendering it largely inactive in militant or grassroots activities. By the mid-2000s, the ALF had minimal presence in Palestinian territories, with no viable military wing or independent funding mechanisms to sustain relevance. Today, the ALF persists as a nominal faction within the (PLO), retaining a small cadre of leaders, including Secretary-General Rakad Salem, but exerting negligible impact on decision-making or public discourse. It occasionally participates in peripheral PLO consultations or meetings of minor groups, such as a 2024 gathering of lesser factions discussing unity efforts, yet holds no seats on the PLO Executive Committee and commands no representation in the Legislative Council or major negotiations. In the broader landscape dominated by Fatah's control of the Palestinian Authority and Hamas's governance in Gaza, the ALF lacks electoral base, membership numbers estimated in the low thousands at best, and visibility in key events like post-2023 Gaza conflict dynamics, underscoring its irrelevance amid factional polarization. This marginal status reflects the ALF's historical dependence on external state sponsorship rather than endogenous Palestinian support, a vulnerability exposed by Iraq's regime change and unmitigated by diversification into domestic politics or alliances with ascendant Islamist groups. Absent renewed backing or internal revitalization, the organization functions more as a vestigial Ba'athist remnant than a contributory force, with no documented involvement in recent resistance operations, governance, or international advocacy as of 2025.

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  28. https://yplus.ps/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Tuastad-Dag-Democratizing-the-PLO-Prospects-and-Obstacles.pdf
  29. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00608R000200010018-1.pdf
  30. https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/38187
  31. https://www.all4palestine.org/ModelDetails.aspx?gid=13&mid=2597
  32. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-180904/
  33. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01731R002300100002-8.pdf
  34. https://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing3/witness_yaphe.htm
  35. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/palestinians-stage-pro-iraq-rally/
  36. https://www.foxnews.com/story/palestinians-rally-in-gaza-to-express-support-for-saddam
  37. https://www.theintelligencer.com/news/article/Palestinians-Rally-to-Support-Saddam-10535356.php
  38. https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=aFjKbMI0uRk
  39. https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/iraqterror1.pdf
  40. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/isrl-pa/ISRAELPA1002-06.htm
  41. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/iraq-iraqi-ties-terrorism
  42. https://www.nytimes.com/1980/10/03/archives/iraq-says-its-forces-achieve-main-goals-but-iran-sees-a-ploy.html
  43. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1991/01/26/Terrorism-opens-new-front-in-gulf-war/7178664866000/
  44. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/iraq0706/3.htm
  45. https://www.osenlaw.com/case/palestine-investment-bank-case
  46. https://badil.org/publications/al-majdal/issues/items/1355.html
  47. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/iraq/decade/sect5.html
  48. https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/General/iraq-s-involvement-in-the-palestinian-terrorist-activity-against-israel
  49. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/terrorist-links-iraqi-regime
  50. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/iraq/part1.html
  51. http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/12/15/sprj.irq.saddam.palestinians/index.html
  52. https://institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-security/palestinian-politics-crisis-urgent-call-action-international-community
  53. https://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/ps%257Dalf.html
  54. https://www.jewishsocialist.org.uk/news/item/the-plo-a-new-era-of-unity
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