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Cox Report
The Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, commonly known as the Cox Report after Representative Christopher Cox, is a classified U.S. government document reporting on the People's Republic of China's espionage operations within the United States during the 1980s and 1990s. The redacted version of the report was released to the public on May 25, 1999. The release of the redacted report was preceded by an intelligence community report which was more conservative in its allegations.
The Chinese government responded that the allegations were "groundless" and that it had already developed the necessary technologies prior to the alleged thefts. As part of its rebuttal, the Chinese government revealed that it had developed a neutron bomb in the 1980s.
Various academic critiques of the Cox Report exist. A group of Stanford University scientists analyzed the report, concluding that it was inflammatory, groundless in some instances, and had some important relevant facts wrong. Other academic analyses have noted that the chronology of China's development of comparable warheads contributes to refuting the Cox Report allegations or that alleged stolen secrets were in fact fairly basic information.
The report was the work product of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China. This special committee, created by a 409–10 vote of the U.S. House of Representatives on June 18, 1998, was tasked with the responsibility of investigating whether technology or information was transferred to the People's Republic of China that may have contributed to the enhancement of the nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles or to the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction.
The committee released a classified version of its report in January 1999.
In anticipation of the forthcoming unclassified version of the Cox Report, United States President Bill Clinton ordered the United States intelligence bodies to review potential Chinese nuclear espionage. In April 1999, the USA released an unclassified version of the intelligence bodies' Damage Assessment Report. As academic Hui Zhang writes, the intelligence report was more cautious and nuanced than the Cox Report. Unlike the Cox Report, which alleged that China had stolen "weapons design information," the Damage Assessment Report asserted that China had taken "weapons design concepts", but acknowledged that the intelligence bodies "cannot determine the full extent of weapon information obtained. For example, we do not know whether any weapon design documentation or blueprints were acquired."
A similar investigation had already begun in the U.S. Senate under the leadership of Senator Fred Thompson (Republican-Tennessee). Thompson had opened his hearings on China's influence in America's 1996 presidential and congressional elections 11 months earlier (on July 8, 1997).
The Chairman of the committee was Republican Rep. Christopher Cox of California, whose name became synonymous with the committee's final report. Four other Republicans and Democrats served on the panel, including Representative Norm Dicks, who served as the ranking Democratic member. The committee's final report was approved unanimously by all 9 members. The redacted version of the report was released to the public May 25, 1999.
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Cox Report
The Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, commonly known as the Cox Report after Representative Christopher Cox, is a classified U.S. government document reporting on the People's Republic of China's espionage operations within the United States during the 1980s and 1990s. The redacted version of the report was released to the public on May 25, 1999. The release of the redacted report was preceded by an intelligence community report which was more conservative in its allegations.
The Chinese government responded that the allegations were "groundless" and that it had already developed the necessary technologies prior to the alleged thefts. As part of its rebuttal, the Chinese government revealed that it had developed a neutron bomb in the 1980s.
Various academic critiques of the Cox Report exist. A group of Stanford University scientists analyzed the report, concluding that it was inflammatory, groundless in some instances, and had some important relevant facts wrong. Other academic analyses have noted that the chronology of China's development of comparable warheads contributes to refuting the Cox Report allegations or that alleged stolen secrets were in fact fairly basic information.
The report was the work product of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China. This special committee, created by a 409–10 vote of the U.S. House of Representatives on June 18, 1998, was tasked with the responsibility of investigating whether technology or information was transferred to the People's Republic of China that may have contributed to the enhancement of the nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles or to the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction.
The committee released a classified version of its report in January 1999.
In anticipation of the forthcoming unclassified version of the Cox Report, United States President Bill Clinton ordered the United States intelligence bodies to review potential Chinese nuclear espionage. In April 1999, the USA released an unclassified version of the intelligence bodies' Damage Assessment Report. As academic Hui Zhang writes, the intelligence report was more cautious and nuanced than the Cox Report. Unlike the Cox Report, which alleged that China had stolen "weapons design information," the Damage Assessment Report asserted that China had taken "weapons design concepts", but acknowledged that the intelligence bodies "cannot determine the full extent of weapon information obtained. For example, we do not know whether any weapon design documentation or blueprints were acquired."
A similar investigation had already begun in the U.S. Senate under the leadership of Senator Fred Thompson (Republican-Tennessee). Thompson had opened his hearings on China's influence in America's 1996 presidential and congressional elections 11 months earlier (on July 8, 1997).
The Chairman of the committee was Republican Rep. Christopher Cox of California, whose name became synonymous with the committee's final report. Four other Republicans and Democrats served on the panel, including Representative Norm Dicks, who served as the ranking Democratic member. The committee's final report was approved unanimously by all 9 members. The redacted version of the report was released to the public May 25, 1999.