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Paswan
ReligionsHinduism
Languages
CountryIndia
Populated states
RegionEastern India
Population6,943,000 (5.3111% of the population of Bihar)

The Paswan, also known as Dusadh, are a Dalit community from eastern India.[1] They are found mainly in the states of Bihar,[2] Uttar Pradesh and Jharkhand. The Urdu word Paswan means bodyguard or "one who defends". The origin of the word, per the belief of the community, lies in their participation in the battle against Siraj-ud-daulah, the Nawab of Bengal at the behest of British East India Company, after which they were rewarded with the post of Chowkidars and lathi-(baton) wielding tax collector for the Zamindars. They follow certain rituals such as walking on fire to assert their valour.[3]

Etymology

[edit]

The Paswans claim their origin from a number of folk and epic characters in order to seek upliftment in their social status. Some Paswan believe that they have originated from Rahu, a superhuman and one of the planets in Hindu mythology, while others claim their origin from Dushasana, one of the Kaurava princes. Claims regarding origin from "Gahlot Kshatriya" are also persistent among some members of the community, but others view such claims with disdain, as they do not like to be associated with Rajputs.[4]

It has also been argued by some Bhumihars, that the Paswan are hybrid scions of cross marriages between two different castes. The Paswan community rejects these theories, and argues the origin of the name 'Dusadh' lies in Dusadhya, meaning "who is difficult to be defeated".[4]

History

[edit]
Portrait of a Dusadh man in Bengal from 1860 CE

They have been considered to be an untouchable community.[5] In Bihar, they are primarily landless, agricultural labourers and have historically been village watchmen and messengers.[6] They are one of the most discriminated caste group in the feudal society of rural Bihar. Reports indicates that the Dusadh landless women were often subjected to undignified teasings like "pinching on breast" by their landlords who were primarily Rajputs. The landlords also raped these women frequently in order to keep their men in submissive position.[7]

Prior to 1900, they also used to rear pigs particularly in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The Paswans defend the occupation of rearing of pigs by stating it as a strategy to counter the Muslims. They assert that, in order to protect themselves from Muslims, Paswan girls used to wear amulets made from bones of pigs and kept pigs at their doors, given the animosity of Muslims with pigs. Since Rajputs of Rajasthan also reared as well as hunted wild pigs, this fact is used by them to defend this occupation which is corroborated by the fact that after the end of Zamindari system, the traditional occupation of serving as guards couldn't provide subsistence to them.[4]

The Paswans have also been historically associated with martial pursuits[8] and many fought on behalf of the East India Company during the 18th century in the Bengal Army.[9] The 2011 Census of India for Uttar Pradesh showed the Paswan population, which is classified as a Scheduled Caste, as being 230,593.[10] The same census showed a population of 4,945,165 in Bihar.[11]

The folk hero of the Paswans is Chauharmal. Within Paswan folklore, the tale of Chauharmal and Reshma is well known. Reshma, the daughter of a powerful Bhumihar landlord, persuades Chauharmal to marry her against her father's wishes. Eventually Chauharmal confronts his beloved's father and defeats him, symbolizing the victory of the community over their Bhumihar oppressors.[12] Other versions of the tale reject this empowering message by claiming Chauharmal was born in a Brahmin family in previous birth while Reshma was born as his wife.[13][8]

Apart from Chauharmal Baba, some Dusadh also worship Gauriya Baba.This folk hero as per their oral traditions is contemporary of Mughal rule in India. According to the folklores he used to ride a horse and protected not only his own castemen but also the other Hindus including the Rajputs from the onslaught of Mughal soldiers and forcible conversions to Islam. Baba used to bury the head of pig in front of his house which was located at the fringe of village. Since pigs were anathema for Muslims, it protected the village from the incursions of Mughal soldiers who were predominantly Muslim.[14]

Politics

[edit]

In 1900, caste association became the dominant method to pitch for the social and political rights. Hence, a number of caste association of politically aware castes were formed in the meantime. Like Koeri, Kurmi and Yadav community, Paswans also formed their own Paswan Sabha in 1911 to make claims to Kshatriya status. They were first among Dalits to achieve this feat.[15]

The Paswans emerged as a political force in Bihar, primarily after the resurgence of socialist leader Ram Vilas Paswan. Paswan floated the Lok Janshakti Party, which became an ally of Lalu Prasad Yadav-led Rashtriya Janata Dal. Earlier, the Dalits including the Paswan community voted for Congress but during RJD-LJP alliance they became a supporter of a bloc which included their earlier preference Congress as well as the new choice LJP. It is difficult to predict the actual data regarding the population of various caste groups but according to political analysts, this new bloc of RJD-Congress aided by LJP commanded huge support from Yadav, Muslim as well as Paswan community. This social axis remained successful to offset the JDU-BJP alliance in 2004 Lok Sabha elections of Bihar.[16]

Earlier, the attempts to woo Paswans in his favour was also made by RJD chief Laloo Yadav (then Chief Minister of Bihar), who portrayed Chauharmal as an iconic figure and attempted to reconcile them with his politics of social justice. He also organised a Chauharmal Mela in 1995. Ram Vilas Paswan was too in this fray, who aimed both to champion himself as the real face of this community as well as to gather the support for his newly formed organisation, Dalit Sena.[17]

Inter-caste conflicts

[edit]

Belchi massacre

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Main article: Belchhi massacre

In 1970s, the Belchi village in Bihar witnessed one of the severest massacres of Bihar's history. The root cause of the massacre was caste conflict between Paswan landless peasants and Kurmi landlords. This massacre parted the way between Kurmis and Paswans and made them skeptical of each other's activities in all spheres of life.[18]

Bhojpur rebellion

[edit]

Bhojpur Rebellion is the term used to describe the internecine conflict between upper caste landlords & landless Dalits led by poor peasants from middle peasant castes during the 1960s. The cause of caste wars in Bhojpur was not only the economical issues but also the unrestricted access of upper castes to Dalit women . Here, the spark of rebellion emerged from Ekwaari village, under the leadership of Koeri militant, Jagdish Mahto aided by his lieutenants Ramnaresh Ram (Ramnaresh Paswan) and Rameswar Ahir "Sadhuji." The trio organised murders of a number of upper-caste landlords under the banner of Maoism. After the encounter of its core commanders, the Maoist resurgence in Bhojpur faded away.[19][20] It was believed that the forcing of lower caste women into adultery and the frequent rapes of these disadvantaged women by the Rajput landlords was one of the cause of the Bhojpur rebellion, which continued though at low scale, after the death of Jagdish Mahto. Those who took it forward include people like Fagu Mahto who were disgusted with the prevalent feudal dominance of the Rajput landlords.[21]

Senari massacre

[edit]

In the 1990s in Senari, Jahanabad district, a Maoist communist centre (MCC) unit composed primarily of Paswans and Yadavs assassinated 34 Bhumihars. A 'session Court' of Bihar awarded death penalty to ten perpetrators in 2016.[22][23]

Paswans in Nepal

[edit]

The Central Bureau of Statistics of Nepal classifies the Paswan as a subgroup within the broader social group of Madheshi Dalits.[24] At the time of the 2011 Nepal census, 208,910 people (0.8% of the population of Nepal) were Paswan. The frequency of Paswans by province was as follows:

The frequency of Paswans was higher than national average (0.8%) in the following districts:[25]

See also

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References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Paswan

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from Grokipedia
The Paswan, also known as Dusadh, is a Scheduled Caste community primarily concentrated in the Indian states of , , and . Constituting approximately 5.3% of Bihar's population—or around 6.94 million individuals according to the 2023 state caste survey—they rank as the second-largest group in the state after the Chamars. Historically, Paswans served as village watchmen (chowkidars), messengers, and performers of tasks like capturing wild animals and extracting , roles that positioned them within the lower echelons of the traditional hierarchy. In contemporary times, most are landless agricultural laborers, though the community has demonstrated upward mobility through education, migration, and political engagement, producing influential figures such as the late , who held multiple Union Cabinet positions and founded the . This political clout has made Paswans a pivotal in elections, often courted by major alliances despite internal factionalism.

Origins and Identity

Etymology and Mythological Claims

The term "Paswan" derives from the Persian "pāsbān," denoting a sentinel, defender, or , a designation tied to the community's traditional functions in safeguarding villages and estates, particularly under Muslim rulers in . This etymological root aligns with empirical occupational roles rather than speculative ancient lineages, as evidenced by historical associations with watchmanship in regional dialects and administrative records. Mythological claims within Paswan oral traditions include assertions of descent from the demon , a planetary figure in , or from , a prince in the , purportedly positioning the community as ancient warriors or Kshatriyas displaced by social hierarchies. Other narratives invoke unbreakable valor, deriving "Dusadh" (a synonymous ) from "Dusadhya," meaning "difficult to defeat," or linkages to Rajput clans like the Gehlots of . These stories, while culturally persistent, function as post-hoc rationalizations for upward mobility, unsupported by primary archaeological, textual, or epigraphic evidence predating colonial-era documentation; they mirror broader patterns among marginalized groups seeking parity with varna ideals amid exclusion. British colonial censuses from the late , including preparations for the enumeration, contributed to codifying "Paswan" as a fixed category by aggregating self-reported identities, occupations, and regional variants like Dusadh, thereby institutionalizing fluid pre-colonial affiliations into rigid administrative units. This process prioritized ethnographic classifications over indigenous dynamism, often amplifying occupational labels like guardianship while sidelining unsubstantiated mythic overlays in official records.

Traditional Occupations and Social Structure

The Paswan community, also known as Dusadh, traditionally occupied roles as village watchmen, referred to as chaukidars or pahsawans, and messengers serving landlords in rural eastern India. These positions arose from economic necessities in agrarian societies, where landless groups provided security and labor in exchange for patronage, rather than from arbitrary oppression. They also engaged in agricultural labor and cattle rearing, reinforcing their status as dependents of higher castes who controlled land resources. Socially, Paswans practiced strict , marrying within the to maintain distinct identity amid hierarchical structures. Their rituals centered on worship of local deities such as Garaya, Baghat, and Garam , often involving animal sacrifices and offerings of fruits, with members officiating as priests. Interactions with upper castes were typically subservient, limited to service roles that ensured economic survival in a where access to land and resources depended on such alliances. Paswans exhibited martial traditions, employing lathis—long wooden staffs—for , a practice rooted in their watchman duties and need to protect against threats in peripheral village settlements. This capability persisted due to practical requirements for safeguarding and in unsecured rural environments, without reliance on formal militias.

Demographics and Geographic Distribution

Population Estimates in India

The Paswan community, synonymous with the Dusadh Scheduled Caste, is predominantly concentrated in eastern , with serving as the demographic core. The 2023 Bihar caste-based survey, conducted by the state government, enumerated 6,943,000 Paswans, representing 5.31% of Bihar's total population of 130,725,310. This figure marks Paswans as the second-largest subcaste in the state after Chamars, underscoring their electoral weight in regions like the Magadh and Seemanchal divisions where densities exceed state averages. Outside Bihar, populations are smaller but notable in adjacent states. Joshua Project estimates approximate 432,000 Paswans in (about 1.3% of the state's population) and 235,000 in , with negligible numbers elsewhere such as 61,000 in . These distributions reflect historical migration patterns tied to agrarian labor, resulting in clustered settlements that amplify local influence in Jharkhand's Santhal Pargana and Uttar Pradesh's belt. National extrapolations, drawing from such state-level data and ethnographic surveys, suggest a total Indian population of roughly 7-8 million, though variances arise from the absence of sub-caste breakdowns in the 2011 Census and reliance on non-official approximations like those from PeopleGroups.org (6.85 million).
StateEstimated PopulationPercentage of State PopulationSource
Bihar6,943,0005.31%2023 Bihar Caste Survey
432,000~1.3%Joshua Project
235,000<0.1%Joshua Project
Undercounting remains a concern in official data, particularly for rural Paswan-majority villages where self-reporting of identities may be inconsistent due to stigma or administrative gaps, as noted in broader critiques of methodologies. Demographic trends, including elevated rates among Scheduled Castes (Bihar's overall TFR at 3.41 in ) and levels hovering around 60% for the community per indicators, sustain growth amid pressures. These factors, combined with Bihar's high (1,106 persons per sq km per 2011 projections), position Paswans as a pivotal bloc in state , capable of mobilizing in key assembly segments.

Presence in Nepal and Beyond

The Paswan community, also referred to as Dusadh or Paswan Pasi, exhibits a limited but documented presence in , primarily in the eastern Tarai districts bordering and in . The National Population and Housing Census 2021 records 250,977 individuals identifying as Dusadh/Pasawan/Pasi, representing 0.86% of 's total of approximately 29.2 million. This figure marks an increase from the 2011 census estimate of around 209,000, reflecting modest growth amid broader Madhesi demographics in the lowland region. These pockets are characterized by shared cultural practices and occasional intermarriages with Indian Paswan kin, enabled by the open - border and historical cross-border mobility in the . Cross-border interactions remain informal, driven by familial, economic, and seasonal ties rather than organized migration or settlement. Nepal's Paswans, like their Indian counterparts, face similar socio-economic challenges as a Scheduled equivalent, with limited upward mobility and reliance on or low-skilled labor, but no evidence of distinct political mobilization beyond local advocacy groups. Empirical data on Paswan diaspora beyond is negligible, with no significant communities reported in the Gulf states, , or . Broader studies of Indian migration emphasize labor outflows from to Gulf sectors, yet Paswan-specific participation appears minimal, overshadowed by patterns among other castes and lacking dedicated ethnographic or documentation of overseas enclaves. This contrasts with more visible diasporas from higher castes or urban migrants, underscoring the community's constrained global footprint.

Historical Evolution

Pre-Colonial and Colonial Era

In the feudal village economies of pre-Mughal and Mughal-era , the Paswan community—also known as Dusadh—functioned primarily as low-status guardians, serving as watchmen (goraits or chaukidars) and messengers for landowning upper castes. These roles involved patrolling fields to deter theft, delivering messages, and occasionally capturing wild animals or extracting honey, providing essential security for agricultural production in exchange for subsistence-level payments or tenancy rights on marginal lands. This occupational niche enabled economic survival amid rigid hierarchies, as Paswans leveraged physical prowess and local knowledge for utility in protecting surplus, rather than relying on land ownership which was monopolized by dominant groups. Such functions persisted into the colonial period, where British administrators documented Paswans' traditional duties in ethnographic surveys and censuses, classifying them among depressed or untouchable castes due to associations with pig-rearing and menial labor. The 1901 Census of India, for instance, enumerated Dusadhs in Bihar as a significant Scheduled Caste precursor group, highlighting their landlessness and reliance on service occupations, which exposed them to exploitation but also positioned them as intermediaries in rural policing. Stereotypes of criminal propensity arose from their watchman roles occasionally overlapping with petty theft or soldierly traditions, though formal designation under the Criminal Tribes Act of 1871 was not uniformly applied to the community. Early resistance manifested in localized assertions, including Dusadh participation as soldiers on both British and opposing sides during the Battle of Plassey in 1757, demonstrating martial capabilities honed from guardian duties rather than organized rebellion. These instances reflected pragmatic alliances for advancement amid power shifts, with communities enduring feudal impositions through adaptive labor strategies that prioritized immediate economic viability over ideological confrontation.

Post-Independence Socio-Economic Shifts

Following the adoption of the on January 26, 1950, the Dusadh community—predominantly identified as Paswan in regions like —was officially classified as a , granting access to reservations in , public , and legislative seats aimed at rectifying historical disadvantages. This framework reserved 15% of jobs and educational seats for Scheduled Castes, facilitating entry into formal sectors previously inaccessible due to caste-based exclusion. By the 1980s, Scheduled Castes, including Dusadhs, began registering modest gains in employment, with representation rising to approximately 12-15% in central services, though disproportionately concentrated in lower-grade positions such as and D roles. Educational access similarly expanded through quotas, contributing to improved literacy rates among Scheduled Castes from under 10% in 1951 to around 66% by 2011 nationally, with Dusadhs occupying a middling position relative to other Scheduled subgroups in based on attainment metrics. Government initiatives like scholarships and reserved admissions enabled some upward mobility, particularly in state-level services where Paswans gained visibility in police and administrative roles. However, asset ownership metrics reveal limited transformation; National Family Health Surveys indicate that Scheduled Castes in , including landless Dusadhs, hold minimal agricultural land, with most households remaining dependent on wage labor rather than proprietorship, contrasting with upper castes' dominance in holdings. Persistent challenges underscore uneven progress, with approximately 43% of Scheduled Castes in classified as impoverished in recent socio-economic assessments, far exceeding state averages and linked to failed land reforms post-independence that left Dalits, including Paswans, largely asset-poor despite constitutional mandates for redistribution. Rural poverty rates among these groups hover around 40% thresholds, exacerbated by governance lapses in implementation rather than itself. Critics of the quota system contend that over-reliance on reservations fosters dependency, confining beneficiaries to protected public niches and stunting merit-driven skills for competitive private enterprise, as evidenced by underperformance in higher-grade jobs where preparation gaps persist despite quotas. This dynamic has arguably perpetuated a cycle where short-term access trumps sustainable economic independence, with Scheduled Castes underrepresented in despite decades of intervention.

Political Mobilization and Influence

Emergence of Political Leadership

Bhola Paswan Shastri, born into the Paswan (Dusadh) community in , rose through independence activism to become the state's first Scheduled Caste , serving three brief terms between February 1968 and July 1971. His initial appointment in 1968 followed the fragmented 1967 elections, where no single party secured a majority, enabling opposition coalitions to install him for about four months amid political instability. Shastri's ascent, achieved via alliances rather than dominance, exemplified individual agency in navigating 's fractious politics to elevate a historically marginalized group's representation, though his governments focused on administrative continuity over sweeping reforms. Ram Vilas Paswan, another Paswan leader from , entered electoral politics in 1969 by winning a seat in the while simultaneously qualifying as a , opting instead for to address inequities. His early career emphasized for Scheduled Castes, drawing on personal background as the son of a small farmer to connect with rural voters. Paswan's resolve manifested in sustained campaigning, which intersected with broader unrest in , positioning him as a symbol of community self-advancement through persistent grassroots efforts. The imposition of rule from June 1975 to March 1977 catalyzed political mobilization among Paswans, as leaders like Paswan faced arrest for dissent, aligning with the Jayaprakash Narayan-led movement against perceived and . This period of repression and resistance forged organizational networks and heightened consciousness, directly enabling Paswan's 1977 Lok Sabha victory from with a margin exceeding 200,000 votes—the largest globally at the time—reflecting causal gains from anti- sentiment in consolidating Paswan voter bases for future influence. Retained in 1980, this foothold underscored how targeted opposition to central overreach translated individual leadership into communal political capital.

Formation of Political Parties

The Lok Janshakti Party (LJP) was established on 15 October 2000 by Ram Vilas Paswan, a prominent Paswan leader, following his resignation from the Janata Dal (United) amid disagreements over leadership and ideological direction. The formation served as a vehicle for asserting Paswan and broader Dalit interests within coalitions that included Other Backward Classes (OBCs), emphasizing social justice and economic empowerment for marginalized groups rather than solely caste-based mobilization. Party manifestos highlighted development initiatives, such as infrastructure and employment schemes, to appeal beyond narrow caste rhetoric while maintaining a core focus on uplifting Dalit-OBC alliances in Bihar's fragmented political landscape. Following Ram Vilas Paswan's death on 6 October 2020, internal tensions escalated, culminating in a split on 13 June 2021 when five of the party's six Lok Sabha members, led by his brother Pashupati Kumar Paras, rebelled against Chirag Paswan's leadership. Paras, citing strategic imperatives for greater influence within ruling coalitions, formed the Rashtriya Lok Janshakti Party (RLJP) as a faction aligned with the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), reflecting pragmatic family and power dynamics over unified caste representation. Chirag Paswan retained control of the renamed Lok Janshakti Party (Ram Vilas) (LJP(RV)), positioning it as the legitimate heir to his father's legacy with continued emphasis on inter-caste coalitions and developmental agendas. These divisions underscored how party formations and fractures among Paswan leaders responded to opportunities for bargaining power in Bihar's alliance-driven politics, prioritizing electoral viability and ministerial access.

Electoral Strategies and Alliances

The Paswan community has pursued electoral strategies emphasizing strategic pacts within the (NDA), leveraging their estimated 5.3% share of Bihar's population to secure outsized representation. This approach, spearheaded by the (LJP) founded by in 2000, focuses on vote consolidation in Scheduled Caste-dominated constituencies, where the community's cohesive support—translating to roughly 5-6% statewide—avoids fragmentation against rivals like the (RJD). Alliances prevent direct competition with larger NDA partners such as the (BJP) and Janata Dal (United) (JD(U)), enabling Paswan-backed candidates to dominate specific seats without diluting anti-RJD votes. In the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, LJP's alignment with the BJP-led NDA yielded 6 wins from 7 contested seats in , contributing to the alliance's near-sweep of the state's 40 constituencies and amplifying Paswan influence beyond their vote proportion. Similarly, in , LJP captured all 6 allocated seats, bolstering NDA's hold on 39 seats through targeted seat-sharing that capitalized on Paswan loyalty in key areas. These outcomes demonstrate how pacts convert modest vote blocs into decisive leverage, prioritizing national-level gains over standalone contests that historically underperformed. The shift from earlier ties with Janata Dal factions and the United Progressive Alliance (UPA)—which Ram Vilas Paswan joined post-2002—to the BJP orbit in 2014 stemmed from alignments on economic revitalization and internal security, contrasting UPA's perceived policy stagnation and graft with NDA's emphasis on growth and law enforcement amid Bihar's prior caste unrest. Paswan leaders justified the pivot as safeguarding community interests against Yadav-centric dominance under RJD-led regimes, favoring NDA's development-oriented governance. However, state assembly polls have drawn criticism for "friendly fights," where LJP's independent runs against fellow NDA allies risked vote splits, as seen in suboptimal coordination that limited gains despite national successes.

Recent Developments (Post-2020)

, the veteran leader and founder of the , died on October 8, 2020, at age 74 following complications from heart surgery, marking a pivotal leadership transition for the Paswan community within Bihar's political landscape. His son, , assumed control of the renamed (Ram Vilas) in 2021 amid a party split, consolidating Paswan voter support through targeted campaigns emphasizing development and . This shift demonstrated community resilience, as LJP(RV) secured all five contested seats in the 2024 elections, including Chirag's victory in by over 170,000 votes, reflecting sustained consolidation despite internal rivalries. Chirag Paswan was inducted as Union Processing Industries on June 11, 2024, in the third Modi cabinet, where he prioritized agro-industrial growth and youth employment initiatives to bolster among Paswan and allied groups. In policy positions, he endorsed enumeration for internal government use to inform welfare schemes but opposed public disclosure of data, arguing it risks societal division, as evidenced by Bihar's 2023 survey outcomes that fueled quota demands without proportional benefits for Paswans. He similarly critiqued sub-categorization of Scheduled Castes, favoring merit-based reservations to prevent dilution of existing benefits, a stance aligned with Paswan interests as a relatively advanced subcaste commanding over 5% of Bihar's population. Ahead of the 2025 Bihar assembly elections, LJP(RV)'s allocation of 30 seats within the NDA underscored Paswan bargaining power, with pre-poll surveys projecting the alliance to retain power through consolidated upper-caste, , and EBC votes, potentially yielding 10-15 seats for Chirag's party based on 2024 momentum. Countering dynasty accusations, Chirag emphasized performance metrics, including enrollment drives that expanded LJP(RV)'s base beyond traditional Paswan strongholds, redefining voter equations from Muslim-Yadav dominance to include women and programs. This outreach, evidenced by increased rally attendance and engagement among under-35 demographics, positioned the community for sustained influence irrespective of Nitish Kumar's leadership dynamics.

Inter-Caste Dynamics and Conflicts

Patterns of Caste Violence

Caste violence involving the Paswan community in has historically manifested as recurring clashes between groups, including Paswans (also known as Dusadhs), and upper-caste landlords over land control, social assertion, and economic resources, intensifying from the early 1970s onward. These frictions escalated amid the broader socio-political upheaval of the JP Movement (1974–1975), which advocated for decentralization and panchayat elections, enabling lower-caste mobilization but triggering backlash from entrenched upper-caste dominance. Naxalite groups, emerging in central districts like Bhojpur around 1970–1972, capitalized on Paswan grievances by organizing armed peasant resistance against exploitative landlords, framing conflicts in class terms while overlaying caste antagonisms; this led to a timeline of retaliatory killings, with Naxalite actions peaking in the late 1970s and 1980s as they recruited heavily from Paswan-dominated areas. In response to upper-caste private armies and state-backed suppression, Paswans formed countermeasures such as the Lorik Sena in the late 1970s, alongside other outfits like the Shoshit Mukti Sena, to defend against perceived existential threats and assert territorial control. This period marked a shift from sporadic disputes to organized confrontations, with violence surging post-1977 panchayat polls that empowered backward castes but ignited turf wars; by the , Naxalite-Paswan alliances had drawn in thousands, perpetuating a cycle where initial land grabs by radicals provoked upper-caste reprisals, further radicalizing youth. State records and documentation indicate thousands affected across , with estimates of hundreds of deaths in caste-related incidents annually during peak escalation phases from 1977 to the early 1990s, though comprehensive pre-1989 data is limited due to underreporting and the absence of the (Prevention of Atrocities) Act until that year. Left-leaning academic and activist narratives, often aligned with Naxalite perspectives, tend to depict these patterns as unidirectional by upper castes, downplaying the proactive and retaliatory roles of Paswan militias and Naxalite cadres in initiating attacks on landlords and intermediaries; this selective framing overlooks causal evidence of mutual escalation, where assertions via violence invited counter-mobilization, as evidenced in cross-cited police and survivor accounts from the . Such biases in sources like CPI(ML)-affiliated reports stem from commitments to portraying lower castes solely as victims, contrasting with balanced analyses highlighting the armed symmetry that prolonged the strife. Empirical patterns thus reveal not mere reaction but a strategic of offense and defense, with Paswan groups leveraging Naxalite for empowerment amid failing state arbitration.

Belchi Massacre (1977)

On May 27, 1977, in Belchhi village of , , a group of landowners led by Mahavir Mahto and associates killed 11 individuals, including eight Dalits from the Paswan community and three from the backward caste, by shooting and burning their bodies in a field. The immediate trigger stemmed from disputes over land possession and agricultural wages, where a Paswan laborer named Singhwa had challenged dominance by demanding fair pay for field workers, escalating longstanding economic tensions into lethal violence that included a 12-year-old boy among the victims. The incident drew national scrutiny after then-opposition leader visited the site on August 13, 1977, traveling by elephant across floodwaters to reach the remote village, where she expressed solidarity with the survivors and criticized the government for inaction. This high-profile intervention, combined with parliamentary pressure from MPs including —who displayed victims' skeletal remains in the —forced a retraction from Agriculture Minister , who had initially downplayed the caste angle as mere criminal rivalry. Legally, the case marked an early assertion of caste-based accountability, with the in 1982 and in 1983 upholding death sentences for two perpetrators, setting a for recognizing atrocities against Scheduled Castes despite initial framing as apolitical feuds. Politically, the massacre amplified Paswan community demands for protection and representation, heightening awareness of vulnerabilities tied to land and labor disputes without romanticizing the deaths, and contributing to broader mobilization that influenced subsequent electoral shifts in .

Bhojpur Rebellion and Naxalite Involvement

In the 1970s, Bhojpur district in Bihar emerged as a major center of Naxalite activity under the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) [CPI(ML)], where Paswans, a Dusadh subcaste of Dalits, formed a significant portion of recruits due to acute economic grievances including landlessness, bonded labor, and exploitation by upper-caste landlords who controlled vast holdings while paying laborers in inferior grains like khesari. Paswan leaders such as Ram Naresh Ram, who joined the CPI(ML) in 1970, organized underground guerrilla squads to target tyrannical landlords through assassinations and grain looting from hoarders, framing the uprising as a response to feudal oppression rather than broader class warfare. Paswan participation yielded short-term gains, including the seizure and redistribution of approximately 10,000 acres of fallow land to landless Dalits by the late , alongside demands for fair wages that disrupted traditional arrangements in central . These actions addressed immediate survival needs but often failed to institutionalize reforms, as redistributed plots remained vulnerable to reclamation amid ongoing conflict. However, the perpetuated a , with Naxalite squads responsible for killings of upper-caste individuals—such as the 1987 Dalelchak Baghaura incident where 54 Rajputs died—prompting retaliatory massacres by landlord-backed militias like , including the 1997 Ekwari killings of 10 Dalits, many Paswans. While rooted in legitimate grievances, the reliance on armed confrontation exploited Paswan foot soldiers, resulting in heavy casualties—evidenced by events like the 1973 Chauri clash killing Dusadhs Lal Mohar and Ganeshi—and diverted resources from sustainable economic upliftment. The movement's armed phase declined post-1990s due to intensified state crackdowns, including police camps, deployments, and tacit support for anti-Naxalite senas, which imposed federal rule in on February 12, 1999, and fragmented CPI(ML) groups through arrests and encounters. Concurrent factors like the Mandal Commission's OBC empowerment and CPI(ML)'s pivot to electoral politics further eroded rural guerrilla bases, leaving Paswan communities with partial land gains but entrenched divisions.

Senari Massacre and Aftermath

On March 18, 1999, armed cadres of the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), a Naxalite insurgent group with significant support from communities including Paswans, attacked Senari village in , , killing 34 upper-caste Bhumihars, primarily men, in a nighttime assault using rifles and bombs. The perpetrators distributed leaflets claiming the attack as vengeance for Ranvir Sena's earlier massacres of Dalits, such as the 1997 Laxmanpur-Bathe killings of 58 Dalits (many Paswans among them) and the 1999 Shankarbigha massacre of 22 Dalits. This event exemplified a pattern of retaliatory caste violence in Bihar's rural areas during the , where initial Naxalite assaults on upper-caste landlords—often framed ideologically as class struggle but rooted in land disputes and local power rivalries—prompted the formation of upper-caste militias like , leading to counter-killings of Dalits. Prior MCC-led attacks, including the 1996 Balthi Tola massacre of 21 Bhumihars and other strikes on upper-caste targets, had escalated tensions, fostering a cycle of revenge that transcended pure ideological motives and devolved into communal vendettas. In legal proceedings, a court in 2016 convicted 15 MCC suspects, sentencing 10 to death and 5 to while acquitting 23 others for lack of evidence; however, the in May 2021 overturned the convictions, acquitting all 13 surviving convicts due to insufficient prosecutorial evidence and unreliable witness testimonies, highlighting systemic failures in and investigation amid caste pressures. The later admitted the Bihar government's appeal against these acquittals in July 2021, but no further convictions resulted, underscoring enforcement weaknesses in prosecuting insurgent-linked violence. The massacre's aftermath deepened Paswan community resolve, accelerating the formation and arming of self-defense groups such as the Lorik Sena—named after a revered by Dusadhs (Paswans)—to counter perceived threats from upper-caste senas, shifting from reliance on Naxalite proxies toward localized armed vigilance amid ongoing reprisals. This consolidation reflected a pragmatic response to state inaction, though it perpetuated the in Bihar's conflicts rather than resolving underlying land and economic grievances.

Achievements and Contributions

Socio-Political Empowerment

The Paswan community, primarily classified as a in , has achieved notable gains in legislative representation, evolving from negligible presence in the pre-independence era to influencing electoral outcomes through community-aligned parties. The formation of the (LJP) in 2000 by marked a shift toward autonomous political mobilization, enabling the community to secure assembly seats independently rather than relying solely on broader or upper-caste alliances. In 's legislative assemblies post-1970s, Paswan candidates have contributed to a collective representation that underscores this upward trajectory, with the LJP contesting and winning seats in key elections that amplified community voices in state governance. Ram Vilas Paswan's multiple tenures in Union cabinets exemplified this empowerment, providing platforms to advocate for policies addressing Scheduled Caste vulnerabilities. Serving as Minister of Labour and Welfare from 1989 to 1990, Minister of Railways from 1996 to 1998, and Minister of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution from 2014 until his death in 2020, Paswan held positions across seven governments, leveraging them to prioritize welfare measures for marginalized groups. These roles facilitated direct input into national policy frameworks, reducing the community's historical subordination to patron-client dynamics in Bihar politics. A key instance of legislative influence was the LJP's role in the 2018 amendment to the , prompted by the party's ultimatum to the government following a ruling that introduced safeguards against arrests. The amendment, cleared by the Union cabinet on August 1, 2018, reinstated stringent provisions like immediate arrests without preliminary inquiry, directly countering perceived dilutions of protections for Dalits including Paswans. This outcome highlighted the community's capacity to shape federal laws, as affirmed by subsequent validation in 2020.

Economic Upward Mobility

The Paswan community, historically associated with occupations such as rearing, , and village watchmanship, has demonstrated economic progress through occupational diversification into urban services, , and small-scale . Analyses indicate a shift away from agriculture-dependent roles, with increasing involvement in non-farm activities like transportation, retail, and informal sector work, reflecting broader patterns of mobility in where lower castes have moved toward wage labor in cities. This transition counters narratives of persistent stagnation, as evidenced by the community's designation as upwardly mobile relative to other Scheduled Caste groups. Urban migration has been a primary driver, with Bihar recording 74.54 out-migrants as of recent surveys, 30% citing as the reason, and villages—home to significant Paswan populations—showing migration rates rising from 28% to 49% over a 17-year period ending around 2003, a trend that has persisted amid ongoing labor demand in sectors like and services. While caste-specific figures are sparse, Paswans' concentration in migrant-sending districts aligns with this pattern, enabling remittances that support household wealth accumulation and local investments. Approximately 20% of Paswan households in exhibit urban linkages per localized studies, facilitating access to higher-wage opportunities outside traditional rural constraints. Entrepreneurial ventures have emerged in industrial hubs like , a Paswan-majority area in , where food processing, manufacturing, and consumer goods sectors have expanded since the establishment of industrial parks in the . Examples include local startups securing contracts for specialized production, such as footwear exports, alongside employment in facilities operated by firms like and Godrej, which have boosted regional output and skilled labor demand. Literacy improvements among younger cohorts, with Scheduled Caste youth in approaching 70% rates in recent estimates, have underpinned this shift by enhancing employability in technical and business roles.

Criticisms and Challenges

Dependence on Caste-Based Politics

The Paswan community, classified as a , has exhibited strong dependence on caste-based reservations for socioeconomic advancement, with political leaders framing quotas as essential to counter ongoing . , a prominent Paswan figure and founder of the , advocated extending reservations to the private sector, reiterating in 2018 that government efforts alone could not ensure job creation without such measures. His son and successor, , has maintained this position, emphasizing in 2020 that reservations must persist amid social inequalities. This reliance manifests in opposition to reforms limiting quota access, as seen in Chirag Paswan's August 2024 rejection of the Supreme Court's observations on exclusion for during sub-classification rulings; he argued that applying income-based criteria to Dalits would defeat reservation objectives, prompting his party's intent to file a . Economic research portrays quota dependence as potentially counterproductive, fostering reliance on state allocations that may perpetuate identities rather than incentivizing merit-based or skill acquisition. Intergenerational mobility studies in reveal persistent low rates, with strongly correlating to occupational persistence—SCs showing minimal regression to the mean despite affirmative action since 1950. For Paswans and other SCs, this translates to stagnation outside reserved domains; private sector formal employment data indicate SC representation below 10% in many industries, far under their 16% population share, reflecting without mandated preferences. Comparatively, select OBC castes like Yadavs have pursued upward mobility via non-quota avenues, leveraging post-independence land reforms and gains in agriculture to build economic bases in and , often transitioning to trade and local enterprises. This diversification contrasts with SC patterns, suggesting that while quotas provide targeted uplift, over-reliance may hinder broader entrepreneurial adaptation observed in less reservation-dependent groups.

Associations with Violence and Criminality

The Paswan (Dusadh) community has been linked to caste-based militias like the Lorik Sena, formed in the 1980s amid escalating rural conflicts in , where it participated in retaliatory killings against upper-caste groups and their private armies. Named after the Lorik, revered in Dusadh lore, the Sena engaged in violent reprisals during the , contributing to a cycle of massacres and assassinations that claimed dozens of lives across central districts. Significant involvement of Paswans in Naxalite outfits, particularly the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), marked the 1970s–1990s, with community members forming a core cadre base for armed actions including targeted killings of landlords and extortion rackets to fund operations. These activities stemmed from land disputes and economic exclusion, leading to alumni from such groups later entering electoral politics, often leveraging militant networks for mobilization. National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) statistics highlight Bihar's elevated rates of violent crimes, including murder (3,912 cases in 2022) and , with qualitative reports indicating Paswan-linked gangs in rural and inter-gang clashes, particularly in districts like Gaya and . These patterns reflect causal factors like entrenched —Bihar's remains among India's lowest at ₹47,000 (2022–23)—combined with selective impunity in caste-polarized policing, fostering criminal entrepreneurship over innate predisposition. Mainstream accounts often underemphasize perpetrator roles among Scheduled Castes due to prevailing narratives prioritizing victimhood, potentially skewing analysis of bidirectional violence.

Internal Community Divisions

Following the death of Ram Vilas Paswan on October 8, 2020, the Lok Janshakti Party (LJP), long the primary political vehicle for Paswan community interests in Bihar, fractured along familial lines. His younger brother, Pashupati Kumar Paras, orchestrated a rebellion against Paras's nephew and heir apparent, Chirag Paswan, culminating in a party split on June 13, 2021, when five of LJP's six national executive members, led by Paras, ousted Chirag from leadership. Paras subsequently formed the Rashtriya Lok Janshakti Party (RLJP), securing initial backing from Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar, while Chirag retained the LJP (Ram Vilas) banner and aligned with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA). This intra-family schism, rooted in disputes over succession and influence, diluted the community's centralized political leverage, as rival factions competed for the same Paswan voter base estimated at 5-6% of Bihar's electorate. The split exacerbated vote fragmentation among Paswans, who had previously consolidated behind Ram Vilas Paswan's LJP. In the 2020 Bihar Assembly elections, held shortly after Ram Vilas's death, Chirag's LJP contested independently, securing 5.97% of the vote share and one seat but acting as a de facto splitter of anti-incumbent Paswan votes traditionally favoring Nitish Kumar's Janata Dal (United), thereby aiding the NDA's victory while exposing early fissures. Post-split, this division persisted: in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, Chirag's LJP(RV) won all five contested seats in Bihar, capturing a significant share of Paswan support, while Paras's RLJP failed to secure any, highlighting uneven but persistent fragmentation that prevented unified bloc voting. Analysts attribute this to localized loyalties, with Paras retaining pockets of rural influence through cabinet berths until his RLJP's exit from the NDA in April 2025 amid perceived slights, further eroding collective bargaining power. Subtler internal tensions manifest in diverging aspirations between rural and urbanizing Paswan segments, though empirical data remains sparse. Rural Paswans, comprising the community's core in Bihar's agrarian belts, often prioritize patronage networks and stability, aligning with Paras's alliance-driven approach, whereas urban migrants and youth in cities like and gravitate toward Chirag's narrative of assertive, development-focused appealing to upward mobility. This urban-rural , fueled by migration patterns where Paswans seek non-traditional occupations beyond historical Dusadh roles in weaving and guarding, fosters competing visions of —collective solidarity versus individualistic ambition—weakening overarching unity without formal sub-caste demarcations. Ongoing family barbs, such as Chirag's October 2025 public jabs at Paras over power plays, underscore how personal rivalries perpetuate these divides, hindering cohesive advancement.

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