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Representation of the varna system hierarchy, depicting Brahmins (priests) at the highest level and Dalits (historically marginalized as untouchables, considered outside the varna system) at the lowest stratum.

Key Information

Dalit (English: /ˈdælɪt/ from Sanskrit: दलित meaning "broken/scattered") is a term used for untouchables and outcasts, who represent the lowest stratum of the castes in the Indian subcontinent.[7] They are also called Harijans.[8] Dalits were excluded from the fourfold varna of the caste hierarchy in Hinduism and were seen as forming a fifth varna, also known by the name of Panchama.

Several scholars have drawn parallels between Dalits and the Burakumin of Japan,[9] the Baekjeong of Korea[10] and the peasant class of the medieval European feudal system.[11] Dalits predominantly follow Hinduism with significant populations following Buddhism, Sikhism, Christianity, and Islam. The constitution of India includes Dalits as one of the Scheduled Castes; this gives Dalits the right to protection, affirmative action (known as reservation in India), and official development resources.

Terminology

[edit]

The term Dalit is for those called the "untouchables" and others that were outside of the traditional Hindu caste hierarchy.[12][13] Economist and reformer B. R. Ambedkar (1891–1956) said that untouchability came into Indian society around 400 CE, due to the struggle for supremacy between Buddhism and Brahmanism.[14] Some Hindu priests befriended untouchables and were demoted to low-caste ranks. Eknath, who was an excommunicated Brahmin, fought for the rights of untouchables during the Bhakti period.[15]

In the late 1880s, the Marathi word 'Dalit' was used by Jyotirao Phule for the outcasts and untouchables who were oppressed and broken in the Hindu society.[16] Dalit is a vernacular form of the Sanskrit दलित (dalita). In Classical Sanskrit, this means "divided, split, broken, scattered". This word was repurposed in 19th-century Sanskrit to mean "(a person) not belonging to one of the four Varnas".[17] It was perhaps first used in this sense by Pune-based social reformer Jyotirao Phule, in the context of the oppression faced by the erstwhile "untouchable" castes from other Hindus.[18] The term Dalits was in use as a translation for the Indian census classification of Depressed Classes prior to 1935. It was popularised by Ambedkar, himself a Dalit,[19] who included all depressed people irrespective of their caste into the definition of Dalits.[20] It covered people who were excluded from the fourfold varna system of Hinduism and thought of themselves as forming a fifth varna, describing themselves as Panchama.[21] In the 1970s its use was invigorated when it was adopted by the Dalit Panthers activist group.[12]

Socio-legal scholar Oliver Mendelsohn and political economist Marika Vicziany wrote in 1998 that the term had become "intensely political ... While the use of the term might seem to express appropriate solidarity with the contemporary face of Untouchable politics, there remain major problems in adopting it as a generic term. Although the word is now quite widespread, it still has deep roots in a tradition of political radicalism inspired by the figure of B. R. Ambedkar." They went on to suggest that its use risked erroneously labelling the entire population of untouchables in India as being united by a radical politics.[18] Anand Teltumbde also detects a trend towards denial of the politicised identity, for example among educated middle-class people who have converted to Buddhism and argue that, as Buddhists, they cannot be Dalits. This may be due to their improved circumstances giving rise to a desire not to be associated with what they perceive to be the demeaning Dalit masses.[22]

James Lochtefeld, a professor of religion and Asian studies, said in 2002 that the "adoption and popularization of [the term Dalit] reflects their growing awareness of the situation, and their greater assertiveness in demanding their legal and constitutional rights".[23]

Other terms

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Official term

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India's National Commission for Scheduled Castes considers official use of dalit as a label to be "unconstitutional" because modern legislation prefers Scheduled Castes; however, some sources say that Dalit has encompassed more communities than the official term of Scheduled Castes and is sometimes used to refer to all of India's oppressed peoples. A similar all-encompassing situation prevails in Nepal.[24][25]

Scheduled Castes is the official term for Dalits in the opinion of India's National Commissions for Scheduled Castes (NCSC), who took legal advice that indicated modern legislation does not refer to Dalit and that therefore, it says, it is "unconstitutional" for official documents to do so. In 2004, the NCSC noted that some state governments used Dalits rather than Scheduled Castes in documentation and asked them to desist.[26]

Some sources say that Dalit encompasses a broader range of communities than the official Scheduled Caste definition. It can include nomadic tribes and another official classification that also originated with the British Raj positive discrimination efforts in 1935, being the Scheduled Tribes.[27] It is also sometimes used to refer to the entirety of India's oppressed peoples,[12] which is the context that applies to its use in Nepalese society.[13] An example of the limitations of the Scheduled Caste category is that, under Indian law, such people can only be followers of Buddhism, Hinduism or Sikhism,[28] yet there are communities who claim to be Dalit Christians and Muslims,[29] and the tribal communities often practise folk religions.[30]

Harijan

[edit]

The term Harijan, or 'children of God', was coined by Narsinh Mehta, a Gujarati poet-saint of the Bhakti tradition, to refer to all devotees of Krishna irrespective of caste, class, or sex.[31] Mahatma Gandhi, an admirer of Mehta's work, first used the word in the context of identifying Dalits in 1933. Ambedkar disliked the name as it placed Dalits in relation to a greater Hindu nation rather than as in an independent community like Muslims. In addition, many Dalits found, and still find, the term patronizing and derogatory, with some even claiming that the term really refers to children of devadasis.[32][33][page needed] When untouchability was outlawed after Indian independence, the use of the word Harijan to describe ex-untouchables became more common among other castes than within Dalits themselves.[34]

Regional terms

[edit]

In Southern India, Dalits are sometimes known as Adi Dravida, Adi Karnataka, and Adi Andhra, which literally mean First Dravidians, Kannadigas, and Andhras, respectively. These terms were first used in 1917 by Southern Dalit leaders, who believed that they were the indigenous inhabitants of India.[35] The terms are used in the states of Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh/Telangana, respectively, as a generic term for anyone from a Dalit caste.[citation needed][clarification needed]

In Maharashtra, according to historian and women's studies academic Shailaja Paik, Dalit is a term mostly used by members of the Mahar caste, into which Ambedkar was born. Most other communities prefer to use their own caste name.[36]

In Nepal, aside from Harijan and, most commonly, Dalit, terms such as Haris (among Muslims), Achhoot, outcastes and neech jati are used.[19]

History

[edit]

Gopal Baba Walangkar (c. 1840–1900) is generally considered to be the pioneer of the Dalit movement, seeking a society in which they were not discriminated against. Another pioneer was Harichand Thakur (c. 1812–1878) with his Matua organisation that involved the Namasudra (Chandala) community in the Bengal Presidency. Ambedkar himself believed Walangkar to be the progenitor.[37] Another early social reformer who worked to improve conditions for Dalits was Jyotirao Phule (1827–1890).[38][39]

The present system has its origins in the 1932 Poona Pact between Ambedkar and Mahatma Gandhi, when Ambedkar conceded his demand that the Dalits should have an electorate separate from the caste Hindus in return for Gandhi accepting measures along these lines.[40] The notion of a separate electorate had been proposed in the Communal Award made by the British Raj authorities,[41] and the outcome of the Pact – the Government of India Act 1935 – introduced the new term of Scheduled Castes, as a replacement for the term Depressed Classes, and also reserved seats for them in the legislatures.[42]

Soon after its independence in 1947, India introduced a reservation system to enhance the ability of Dalits to have political representation and to obtain government jobs and education.[43] The 1950 Constitution of India included measures to improve the socio-economic conditions of Dalits. Aside from banning untouchability, these included the reservation system, a means of positive discrimination that created the classification of Scheduled Castes as Dalits. Communities that were categorised as being one of those groups were guaranteed a percentage of the seats in the national and state legislatures, as well as in government jobs and places of education.

By 1995, of all federal government jobs in India – 10.1 per cent of Class I, 12.7 per cent of Class II, 16.2 per cent of Class III, and 27.2 per cent of Class IV jobs were held by Dalits.[44] Of the most senior jobs in government agencies and government-controlled enterprises, only 1 per cent were held by Dalits, not much change in 40 years.[citation needed] In the 21st century, Dalits have been elected to India's highest judicial and political offices.[45][46] In 1997, India elected its first Dalit President, K. R. Narayanan. Many social organisations have promoted better conditions for Dalits through education, healthcare and employment. Nonetheless, while caste-based discrimination was prohibited and untouchability abolished by the Constitution of India, such practices are still widespread. To prevent harassment, assault, discrimination and similar acts against these groups, the Government of India enacted the Prevention of Atrocities Act, also called the SC/ST Act, on 31 March 1995.

In accordance with the order of the Bombay High Court, the Information and Broadcasting Ministry (I&B Ministry) of the Government of India issued an advisory to all media channels in September 2018, asking them to use "Scheduled Castes" instead of the word "Dalit".[47]

Demographics

[edit]
Scheduled Castes distribution in India by state and union territory according to the 2011 Census of India.[28] Punjab had the highest proportion of its population as SC (around 32%), while India's island territories and two northeastern states had approximately zero.[28]

Scheduled Caste communities exist across India and comprised 16.6% of the country's population, according to the 2011 Census of India.[48] Uttar Pradesh (21%), West Bengal (11%), Bihar (8%) and Tamil Nadu (7%) between them accounted for almost half the country's total Scheduled Caste population.[49] They were most prevalent as a proportion of the states' population in Punjab, at about 32 per cent,[50] while Mizoram had the lowest at approximately zero.[28]

Similar groups are found throughout the rest of the Indian subcontinent; less than 2 per cent of Pakistan's population are Hindu and 70–75 per cent of those Hindus are Dalits,[51] in Nepal,[13] Bangladesh had 5 million Dalits in 2010 with the majority being landless and in chronic poverty,[52] and Sri Lanka.[53] They are also found as part of the Indian diaspora in many countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, Singapore, and the Caribbean.[54][55][56][57] While discrimination against Dalits has declined in urban areas and in the public sphere,[58] it still exists in rural areas and in the private sphere, in everyday matters such as access to eating places, schools, temples and water sources.[59] Some Dalits successfully integrated into urban Indian society, where caste origins are less obvious. In rural India, however, caste origins are more readily apparent and Dalits often remain excluded from local religious life, though some qualitative evidence suggests that exclusion is diminishing.[60][61]

India is home to over 200 million Dalits.[62] According to Paul Diwakar, a Dalit activist from the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights, "India has 600,000 villages and almost every village a small pocket on the outskirts is meant for Dalits."[63]

Socioeconomic status and discrimination

[edit]

Discrimination against Dalits has been observed across South Asia and among the South Asian diaspora. In 2001, the quality of life of the Dalit population in India was worse than that of the overall Indian population on metrics such as access to health care, life expectancy, education attainability, access to drinking water and housing.[64][65][66] According to a 2007 report by Human Rights Watch (HRW), the treatment of Dalits has been like a "hidden apartheid" and that they "endure segregation in housing, schools, and access to public services". HRW noted that Manmohan Singh, then Prime Minister of India, saw a parallel between the apartheid system and untouchability.[67] Eleanor Zelliot also notes Singh's 2006 comment but says that, despite the obvious similarities, race prejudice and the situation of Dalits "have a different basis and perhaps a different solution".[27] Though the Indian Constitution abolished untouchability, the oppressed status of Dalits remains a reality. In rural India, stated Klaus Klostermaier in 2010, "they still live in secluded quarters, do the dirtiest work, and are not allowed to use the village well and other common facilities".[68] In the same year, Zelliot noted that "In spite of much progress over the last sixty years, Dalits are still at the social and economic bottom of society."[27]

According to the 2014 NCAER/University of Maryland survey, 27 per cent of the Indian population still practices untouchability; the figure may be higher because many people refuse to acknowledge doing so when questioned, although the methodology of the survey was also criticised for potentially inflating the figure.[69] Across India, Untouchability was practised among 52 per cent of Brahmins, 33 per cent of Other Backward Classes and 24 per cent of non-Brahmin forward castes.[70] Untouchability was also practised by people of minority religions – 23 per cent of Sikhs, 18 per cent of Muslims and 5 per cent of Christians.[71] According to statewide data, Untouchability is most commonly practised in Madhya Pradesh (53 per cent), followed by Himachal Pradesh (50 per cent), Chhattisgarh (48 per cent), Rajasthan and Bihar (47 per cent), Uttar Pradesh (43 per cent), and Uttarakhand (40 per cent).[72]

Examples of segregation have included the Madhya Pradesh village of Ghatwani, where the Scheduled Tribe population of Bhilala do not allow Dalit villagers to use the public borewell for fetching water and thus they are forced to drink dirty water.[73] In metropolitan areas around New Delhi and Bangalore, Dalits and Muslims face discrimination from upper caste landlords when seeking places to rent.[74][75]

In 1855, Mutka Salve, a 14-year-old student of Dalit leader Savitribai Phule, wrote that during the rule of Baji Rao of the Maratha Empire, the Dalit castes were chased away from their lands to build large buildings. They were also forced to drink oil mixed with red lead causing them to die, and then they were buried in the foundations of buildings, thus wiping out generations of Dalits. Under the rule of Baji Rao, if a Dalit crossed in front of a gym, they would cut off his head and play "bat and ball" on the ground, with their swords as bats and his head as a ball. Under these 17th century kings, human sacrifice of untouchable persons was not unusual. They also created intricate rules and operations to ensure that they stayed untouchables.[76] George Kunnath claims that there "is and has been an internal hierarchy between the various Dalit castes". According to Kunnath, the Dusadhs are considered the highest while the Musahars are considered the lowest within the Dalit groups.[77]: 38 

Education

[edit]

According to an analysis by The IndiaGoverns Research Institute, Dalits constituted nearly half of primary school drop-outs in Karnataka during the period 2012–14.[78][clarification needed] A sample survey in 2014, conducted by Dalit Adhikar Abhiyan and funded by ActionAid, found that among state schools in Madhya Pradesh, 88 per cent discriminated against Dalit children. In 79 per cent of the schools studied Dalit children are forbidden from touching mid-day meals. They are required to sit separately at lunch in 35 per cent of schools and are required to eat with specially marked plates in 28 per cent.[79]

There have been incidents and allegations of SC and ST teachers and professors being discriminated against and harassed by authorities, upper castes colleagues and upper caste students in different education institutes of India.[80][81][82][83][84][85] In some cases, such as in Gujarat, state governments have argued that, far from being discriminatory, their rejection when applying for jobs in education has been because there are no suitably qualified candidates from those classifications.[86]

Poverty

[edit]

According to a 2014 report to the Ministry of Minority Affairs, 33.8 per cent of Scheduled Caste (SC) populations in rural India were living below the poverty line in 2011–12. In urban areas, 21.8 per cent of SC populations were below the poverty line.[87][88] A 2012 survey by Mangalore University in Karnataka found that 93 per cent of Dalit families in the state of Karnataka live below the poverty line.[89]

Some Dalits have achieved affluence, although most remain poor. Some Dalit intellectuals, such as Chandra Bhan Prasad, have argued that the living standards of many Dalits have improved since the economic system became more liberalised starting in 1991 and have supported their claims through large surveys.[90][91] According to the Socio Economic and Caste Census 2011, nearly 79 per cent of Adivasi households and 73 per cent of Dalit households were the most deprived among rural households in India. While 45 per cent of SC households are landless and earn a living by manual casual labour, the figure is 30 per cent for Adivasis.[92]

Occupations

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In the past, they were believed to be so impure that upper-caste Hindus considered their presence to be polluting. The "impure status" was related to their historic hereditary occupations that caste Hindus considered to be "polluting" or debased, such as working with leather, disposing of dead animals, manual scavenging, or sanitation work, which in much of India means collection & disposal of faeces from latrines.[93]

Forced by the circumstances of their birth and poverty, some Dalit communities in India continue to work as sanitation workers: manual scavengers, cleaners of drains and sewers, garbage collectors, and sweepers of roads.[94]: 4  As of 2019, an estimated 40 to 60 per cent of the 6 million Dalit households are engaged in sanitation work.[94]: 5  The most common Dalit caste performing sanitation work is Valmiki (also Balmiki) caste.[94]: 3  Others work as landless laborers, marginalized farmers, or continue in their traditional roles such as leathercraft, tanning, cobbling, and the disposal of dead animals.[95][96][97][98]

Healthcare and nutrition

[edit]

Discrimination against Dalits exists in access to healthcare and nutrition. A sample survey of Dalits, conducted over several months in Madhya Pradesh and funded by ActionAid in 2014, found that health field workers did not visit 65 per cent of Dalit settlements. 47 per cent of Dalits were not allowed entry into ration shops, and 64 per cent were given fewer grains than non-Dalits.[79] In Haryana state, 49 per cent of Dalit children under five years were underweight and malnourished while 80 per cent of those in the 6–59 months age group were anaemic in 2015.[99]

Crime

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Dalits comprise a slightly disproportionate number of India's prison inmates.[100] While Dalits (including both SCs and STs) constitute 25 per cent of the Indian population, they account for 33.2 per cent of prisoners.[101] About 24.5 per cent of death row inmates in India are from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes which is proportionate to their population. The percentage is highest in Maharashtra (50 per cent), Karnataka (36.4 per cent) and Madhya Pradesh (36 per cent).[102] Dalits have been arrested on false pretexts.[103] According to Human Rights Watch, politically motivated arrests of Dalit rights activists occur and those arrested can be detained for six months without charge.[104]

Caste-related violence between Dalit and non-Dalits stems from ongoing prejudice by upper caste members.[105] The Bhagana rape case, which arose out of a dispute of allocation of land, is an example of atrocities against Dalit girls and women.[106] In August 2015, due to continued alleged discrimination from upper castes of the village, about 100 Dalit inhabitants converted to Islam in a ceremony at Jantar Mantar, New Delhi.[107] Inter-caste marriage has been proposed as a remedy,[108] but according to a 2014 survey of 42,000 households by the New Delhi-based National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) and the University of Maryland, it was estimated that only 5 per cent of Indian marriages cross caste boundaries.[109]

The latest data available from India's National Crime Records Bureau is from the year 2000. In that year a total of 25,455 crimes against Dalits were committed; 2 Dalits were assaulted every hour, and in each day 3 Dalit women were raped, 2 Dalits were murdered, and 2 Dalit homes were set on fire.[110] Amnesty International documented a high number of sexual assaults against Dalit women, which were often committed by landlords, upper-caste villagers, and policemen, according to a study published in 2001.[111] According to the research, only about 5% of assaults are recorded, and police dismiss at least 30% of rape reports as false. The study also discovered that police often seek bribes, threaten witnesses, and conceal evidence. Victims of rape have also been killed.[110] There have been some reports of Dalits being forced to eat human faeces and drink urine by upper caste members in some villages.[112][113][114][115] In one such instance, a 17-year-old girl was set on fire by Yadav (an OBC) youth, allegedly because she was allowed school-education.[116] In September 2015, a 45-year-old Dalit woman was allegedly stripped naked and forced to drink urine by perpetrators in Madhya Pradesh.[117] In some villages of India, there have been allegations that Dalit grooms riding horses for wedding ceremonies have been beaten up and ostracised by upper caste people.[118][119][120] In August 2015, upper caste people burned houses and vehicles belonging to Dalit families and slaughtered their livestock in reaction to Dalits daring to hold a temple car procession at a village in Tamil Nadu.[121][122] In August 2015, it was claimed that a Jat Khap Panchayat ordered the rape of two Dalit sisters because their brother eloped with a married Jat girl of the same village.[123][124][125] In 2003, the higher caste Muslims in Bihar opposed the burials of lower caste Muslims in the same graveyard.[126] A Dalit activist was killed in 2020 for social media posts criticising Brahmins.[127] A Dalit was killed in 2019 for eating in front of upper-caste men.[128]

Prevention of Atrocities Act

[edit]

The Government of India has attempted on several occasions to legislate specifically to address the issue of caste-related violence that affects SCs and STs. Aside from the Constitutional abolition of untouchability, there has been the Untouchability (Offences) Act of 1955, which was amended in the same year to become the Protection of Civil Rights Act. It was determined that neither of those Acts were effective, so the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act of 1989 (POA) came into force.[129]

The POA designated specific crimes against SCs and STs as "atrocities" – a criminal act that has "the quality of being shockingly cruel and inhumane" – which should be prosecuted under its terms rather than existing criminal law.[129] It created corresponding punishments. Its purpose was to curb and punish violence against Dalits, including humiliations such as the forced consumption of noxious substances. Other atrocities included forced labour, denial of access to water and other public amenities, and sexual abuse. The Act permitted Special Courts exclusively to try POA cases. The Act called on states with high levels of caste violence (said to be "atrocity-prone") to appoint qualified officers to monitor and maintain law and order.[citation needed]

In 2015, the Parliament of India passed the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act to address issues regarding the implementation of the POA, including instances where the police put procedural obstacles in the way of alleged victims or indeed outright colluded with the accused. It also extended the number of acts that were deemed to be atrocities.[129][130] One of those remedies, in an attempt to address the slow process of cases, was to make it mandatory for states to set up the exclusive Special Courts that the POA had delineated. Progress in doing so, however, was reported in April 2017 to be unimpressive. P. L. Punia, a former chairman of the NCSC, said that the number of pending cases was high because most of the extant Special Courts were not exclusive but rather being used to process some non-POA cases, and because "The special prosecutors are not bothered and the cases filed under this Act are as neglected as the victims".[131] While Dalit rights organisations were cautiously optimistic that the amended Act would improve the situation, legal experts were pessimistic.[129]

Religion

[edit]

Discrimination is illegal under Indian law by the Removal of Civil Disabilities Act (Act 21 of 1938), the Temple Entry Authorization and Indemnity Act 1939 (Act XXII of 1939) and Article 17 of the Constitution which outlawed Untouchability.[132] After India's independence in 1947, secular nationalism based on a "composite culture" made all people equal citizens.

Hinduism

[edit]

Most Dalits in India are Hindu.[133] There have been incidents which showed that Dalits were restricted from entering temples by high-caste Hindus,[134][135][136] and participation in religious processions.[137][138]

A school of untouchables near Bangalore, by Lady Ottoline Morrell

In the 19th century, the Brahmo Samaj, Arya Samaj and the Ramakrishna Mission actively participated in the rights of Dalits. While Dalits had places to worship, the first upper-caste temple to openly welcome Dalits was the Laxminarayan Temple in Wardha in 1928.[139] It was followed by the Temple Entry Proclamation issued by the last King of Travancore in the Indian state of Kerala in 1936.[citation needed]

In the 1930s, Gandhi and Ambedkar disagreed regarding the retention of the Varna system. Whilst Ambedkar wanted to see it destroyed, Gandhi thought that it could be modified by reinterpreting Hindu texts so that the untouchables were absorbed into the Shudra varna. It was this disagreement that led to the Poona Pact.[40] Gandhi began the Harijan Yatra to help the Dalits, but ran into some opposition from Dalits that wanted a complete break from Hinduism.[140]

The declaration by princely states of Kerala between 1936 and 1947 that temples were open to all Hindus went a long way towards ending untouchability there.[citation needed] However, educational opportunities for Dalits in Kerala remain limited.[141]

Other Hindu groups attempted to reconcile with the Dalit community. Hindu temples are increasingly receptive to Dalit priests, a function formerly reserved for Brahmins. Brahmins such as Subramania Bharati passed Brahminhood onto a Dalit[citation needed], while in Shivaji's Maratha Empire Dalit warriors joined his forces.[142] However, in the 19th century, Dalits in the Mahar Regiment of British Bombay, defeated the oppressive rule of the Peshvas.[143]

The fight for temple entry rights for Dalits continues to cause controversy.[144] In a 2015 incident in Meerut, a Dalit belonging to the Valmiki caste was denied entry to a Hindu temple; he went on to convert to Islam.[145] In September 2015, four Dalit women were fined by the upper-caste Hindus for entering a temple in Karnataka.[146]

There have been allegations that Dalits in Nepal are denied entry to Hindu temples.[147][148] In at least one case, Dalits were reportedly beaten by upper-caste people while attempting to enter a local temple.[149]

Buddhism

[edit]

In 1956, the Dalit jurist Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (1891–1956) launched the Dalit Buddhist movement, leading several mass conversions of Dalits from Hinduism to Buddhism. Ambedkar's Buddhism is a new kind of Buddhism that focuses on social and political engagement.[150][151] About half a million Dalits joined Ambedkar in rejecting Hinduism and challenging its caste system.[152][153] The movement is centered in Maharashtra, and according to the 2011 census, there were 6.5 million Marathi Buddhists (mainly Dalit Buddhists) in Maharashtra.[154]

Another Dalit Buddhist leader and reformer was Pandit Iyothee Thass, founder of the Sakya Buddhist Society of Tamil Nadu.[155] The Scheduled Castes Order (Amendment) Act, 1990 granted reservation to Dalit Buddhists and recognized their Scheduled Caste status.[156]

Sikhism

[edit]

Guru Nanak in Guru Granth Sahib calls for everyone to treat each other equally. Subsequent Sikh Gurus, all of whom came from the Khatri caste, also denounced the hierarchy of the caste system.[157] Despite this, social stratification exists in the Sikh community. The bulk of the Sikhs of Punjab belong to the Jat caste;[158] there are also two Dalit Sikh castes in the state, called the Mazhabis and the Ramdasias.[159]

Surinder S. Jodhka says that, in practice, Sikhs belonging to the landowning dominant castes have not shed all their prejudices against the Dalit castes. While Dalits would be allowed entry into the village gurudwaras they would not be permitted to cook or serve langar (the communal meal). Therefore, wherever they could mobilise resources, the Sikh Dalits of Punjab have tried to construct their gurudwara and other local-level institutions to attain a certain degree of cultural autonomy.[160] In 1953, Sikh leader Master Tara Singh succeeded in winning the demands from the government to include Sikh castes of the converted untouchables in the list of scheduled castes. In the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC), 20 of the 140 seats are reserved for low-caste Sikhs.[161]

Sikh women are required to have the surname "Kaur", and men, the surname "Singh", to eradicate caste identities and discrimination.[162]

In 2003 the Talhan village Gurudwara endured a bitter dispute between Jat Sikhs and Chamars. The Chamars came out in force and confronted the Randhawa and Bains Jat Sikh landlords, who refused to give the Chamars a share on the governing committee of a shrine dedicated to Shaheed Baba Nihal Singh. The shrine earned 3–7 crore Indian Rupees, and the Jat Sikh landlord allegedly "gobbled up a substantial portion of the offerings". Though Dalits form more than 60 per cent of Talhan's 5,000-strong population, local traditions ensured that they were denied a place on the committee. The landlords, in league with radical Sikh organisations and the SGPC, attempted to keep out the Dalits by razing the shrine overnight and constructing a gurdwara on it, but the Dalit quest for a say in the governing committee did not end.[163]

Chamars fought a four-year court battle with the landlords and their allies, including the Punjab Police. In that time Jats conducted several boycotts against the Chamars. The Jat Sikhs and their allies cut off the power supply to their homes. In addition, various scuffles and fights set Chamar youths armed with lathis, rocks, bricks, soda bottles and anything they could find fought Jat Sikh landlords, youths and the Punjab police. Dalit youngsters painted their homes and motorcycles with the slogan, Putt Chamar De (proud sons of Chamars) in retaliation to the Jat slogan, Putt Jattan De.[163]

Jainism

[edit]

Historically Jainism was practised by many communities across India.[164] They are often conservative and are generally considered upper-caste.[165]

In 1958,[166] a Sthanakvasi Jain called Muni Sameer Muni[167][168] came into contact with members of the Khatik community in the Udaipur region, who decided to adopt Jainism. Their centre, Ahimsa Nagar, located about four miles from Chittorgarh, was inaugurated by Mohanlal Sukhadia in 1966. Sameer Muni termed them Veerwaal,[169] that is, belonging to Mahavira. A 22-year-old youth, Chandaram Meghwal, was initiated as a Jain monk in Ahore town in Jalore district in 2005.[170] In 2010 a Mahar engineer called Vishal Damodar was initiated as a Jain monk by Acharya Navaratna Sagar Suriji at Samet Shikhar.[171] Acharya Nanesh, the eighth Achayra of Sadhumargi Jain Shravak Sangha, had preached among the Balai community in 1963 near Ratlam.[172] His followers are called Dharmapal.[173] In 1984, some of the Bhangis of Jodhpur came under the influence of Acharya Shri Tulsi and adopted Jainism.[174][175]

Christianity

[edit]

Christian Dalits are found in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal.[176]

Mass conversions of lower caste Hindus to Christianity took place in order to escape the discrimination. The main Dalit groups that participated in these conversions were the Chuhras of Punjab, Chamars of North India (Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh), Vankars of Gujarat, and Pulayas of Kerala.[177] The first people converted to Christianity by Jesuits of the Madura Mission were members of Nadars, Maravars, and Pallar.[178] They believed that "Christianity is a true religion; a desire for protection from oppressors and, if possible, material aid; the desire for education for their children; and the knowledge that those who have become Christians had improved".[179]

Christianity was thought to be egalitarian and could provide mobility away from the caste. Sometimes the only change seen was their religious identity. Even after conversion, in some cases, Dalits were discriminated against due to the "residual leftover" practice of caste discrimination from their previous traditions. This is attributed to the predominantly Hindu society they lived in.[180] Discrimination against Dalit Christians also remained in interactions and mannerisms between castes; for example, during the earlier days, the 'lower caste Christians' had to [cover] their mouths when talking to a Syrian Christian.[177] In many cases they were still referred to by their Hindu caste names: For example Pulayans in Kerala, Pariah in Tamil Nadu, and Madigas in Andhra Pradesh, by members of all religious backgrounds.[181]

Even after conversion, to some extent segregation, restriction, hierarchy, and graded ritual purity remained. Data show that there is more discrimination and less class mobility among the people living in rural areas, where incidents of caste discrimination are higher among people from all religious backgrounds.[177] In many cases, the churches referred to the Dalits as 'New Christians'. It is alleged to be a derogatory term which classifies the Dalit Christians to be looked down upon by other Christians. During the earlier days of Christianity, in some churches in south India, the Dalits had either separate seating or had to attend the mass outside.[181] Dalit Christians are also said to be grossly underrepresented amongst the clergy in some places.[182]

Caste-based occupations held by Dalits also show a clear segregation which perpetuated even after becoming Christian. Occupational patterns (including manual scavenging) are prevalent among Dalit Christians in north-west India are said to be quite similar to those of Dalit Hindus.[183] Occupational discrimination for Dalit Christians goes so far as to restrict not only employment but in some cases for clean sanitation and water.[184]

Islam

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Most of India's 140 million Muslims are descended from local converts. Many of them converted to Islam to escape Hindu upper-caste oppression[citation needed]. 75% of the present Indian Muslim population are Dalits.[185][186]

Political involvement

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Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) is an Indian Dalit party.

Dalit-led political parties include:

National Dalit-led political parties in India

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Dalit leaders at Bahujan Samaj Party head office

Other recognized state political parties

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Nepali Dalit-led parties

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Dalit-led political parties in Pakistan

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Other dalit groups

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Anti-Dalit prejudices exist in groups such as the extremist militia Ranvir Sena, largely run by upper-caste landlords in Bihar. They oppose equal treatment of Dalits and have resorted to violence. The Ranvir Sena is considered a terrorist organisation by the government of India.[195] In 2015, Cobrapost exposed many leaders especially like C. P. Thakur alongside former PM Chandra Shekhar associated with Ranvir Sena in Bihar Dalit massacres[196] while governments of Nitish Kumar (under pressure from BJP), Lalu Prasad Yadav and Rabri Devi did nothing to get justice for Dalits.[197]

The rise of Hindutva's (Hindu nationalism) role in Indian politics has accompanied allegations that religious conversions of Dalits are due to allurements like education and jobs rather than faith. Critics[who?] argue that laws banning conversion and limiting social relief for converts mean that conversion impedes economic success. However, Bangaru Laxman, a Dalit politician, was a prominent member of the Hindutva movement.[citation needed]

Another political issue is Dalit affirmative-action quotas in government jobs and university admissions. About 8 per cent of the seats in the National and State Parliaments are reserved for Scheduled Caste and Tribe candidates.[citation needed]

Jagjivan Ram (1908–1986) was the first scheduled caste leader to emerge at the national level from Bihar.[198] He was member of the Constituent assembly that drafted India's constitution.[199] Ram also served in the interim national government of 1946[200] He served in the cabinets of Congress party Prime ministers Jawaharlal Nehru,[201] Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi.[202] His last position in government was as Deputy Prime Minister of India in the Janata Party government of 1977–1979,[203][204][205]

In modern times several Bharatiya Janata Party leaders were Dalits, including Dinanath Bhaskar, Ramchandra Veerappa and Suraj Bhan.[citation needed]

In India's most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, Dalits have had a major political impact.[206] The Dalit-led Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) had previously run the government and that party's leader, Mayawati, served several times as chief minister.[207] Regarding her election in 2007, some reports claimed her victory was due to her ability to win support from both 17 per cent of Muslims and nearly 17 per cent Brahmins[208] alongside 80 per cent of Dalits.[209] However, surveys of voters on the eve of elections, indicated that caste loyalties were not the voters' principal concern. Instead, inflation and other issues of social and economic development dictated the outcome.[210][211][212][213] Mayawati's success in reaching across castes has led to speculation about her as a potential future Prime Minister of India.[214]

Aside from Mayawati in Uttar Pradesh, Damodaram Sanjivayya was chief minister of Andhra Pradesh from 11 January 1960 to 12 March 1962, and Jitan Ram Manjhi was chief minister of Bihar for just under a year.[citation needed] In 1997, K. R. Narayanan, who was a Dalit, was elected as President of India.[44] In 2017, Ramnath Kovind was elected as the President of India, becoming the second dalit president of the country.[215]

Votebank

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Votebank politics are common in India, usually based on religion or caste. Indeed, the term itself was coined by the Indian sociologist M. N. Srinivas.[216] Dalits are often used as a votebank.[217][218][219] There have been instances where it has been alleged that an election-winning party reneged on promises made to the Dalits made during the election campaign[220] or have excluded them from party affairs.[221]

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Sub-Plan

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The SC, ST Sub-Plan, or Indiramma Kalalu, is a budget allocation by the Government of Andhra Pradesh for the welfare of Dalits. The law was enacted in May 2013. SCs and STs have separate panels for spending. The plan was meant to prevent the government from diverting funds meant for SCs and STs to other programs, which was historically the case. As of 2013, no equivalent national plan existed.[222] Scheduled Castes Sub Plan and Tribal Sub-Plan funds are often diverted by state governments to other purposes.[223]

While the Indian Constitution has provisions for the social and economic uplift of Dalits to support their upward social mobility, these concessions are limited to Hindus. Dalits who have converted to other religions have asked that benefits be extended to them.[224]

Beyond the Indian subcontinent

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United Kingdom

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After World War II, immigration from the former British Empire was largely driven by labour shortages.[225] Like the rest of the Indian subcontinent diaspora, Dalits immigrated and established their own communities.[citation needed]

A 2009 report alleged that caste discrimination is "rife" in the United Kingdom.[226] The report alleged that casteism persists in the workplace and within the National Health Service[227] and at doctor's offices.[226][228]

Some claim that caste discrimination is non-existent.[229] Some have rejected the government's right to interfere in the community. The Hindu Forum of Britain conducted their own research, concluding that caste discrimination was "not endemic in British society", reports to the contrary aimed to increase discrimination by legislating expression and behaviour and that barriers should instead be removed through education.[230]

A 2010 study found that caste discrimination occurs in Britain at work and in service provision. While not ruling out the possibility of discrimination in education, no such incidents were uncovered. The report found favourable results from educational activities. However, non-legislative approaches were claimed to be less effective in the workplace and would not help when the authorities were discriminating. One criticism of discrimination law was the difficulty in obtaining proof of violations. Perceived benefits of legislation were that it provides redress, leads to greater understanding and reduces the social acceptance of such discrimination.[231]

More recent studies in Britain were inconclusive and found that discrimination was "not religion specific and is subscribed to by members of any or no religion".[232] Equalities Minister Helen Grant found insufficient evidence to justify specific legislation, while Shadow Equalities minister Kate Green said that the impact is on a relatively small number of people.[232] Religious studies professor Gavin Flood of the Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies concluded that the Hindu community in Britain is particularly well integrated, loosening caste ties.[233] Casteist beliefs were prevalent mainly among first-generation immigrants, with such prejudices declining with each successive generation due to greater assimilation.[232]

From September 2013 to February 2014, Indian philosopher Meena Dhanda led a project on 'Caste in Britain' for the UK Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), which focused on the proposed inclusion of a provision in the Equality Act 2010 to protect British citizens against caste discrimination.[234] In 2018 the UK government decided not to include caste as a "protected characteristic" within the terms of the Act, and to rely instead on case law to identify tests for caste-based discrimination.[235]

Supporters of anti-caste legislation include Lord Avebury and Lady Thornton.[236]

Sikh diaspora in Britain

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A Sikh gurdwara in Smethwick. The majority of gurdwaras in Britain are caste-based [237] and one can indirectly inquire about a person's caste based upon which gurdwara the person attends.

Sikhs in the United Kingdom are affected by caste. Gurdwaras such as those of the Ramgarhia Sikhs are organised along caste lines and most are controlled by a single caste.[237] In most British towns and cities with a significant Sikh population, rival gurdwaras can be found with caste-specific management committees.[238] The caste system and caste identity is entrenched and reinforced.[237][239]

The few gurdwaras that accept inter-caste marriages do so reluctantly. Gurdwaras may insist on the presence of Singh and Kaur in the names of the bridegroom and bride, or deny them access to gurdwara-based religious services and community centres.[240]

In the Caribbean

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It is estimated that in 1883, about one-third of the immigrants who arrived in the Caribbean were Dalits. The shared experience of being exploited in a foreign land gradually broke down caste barriers in the Caribbean Hindu communities.[57]

In Continental Europe

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The Romani people, originating in northern India, are said to be of Dalit ancestry.[241][242] Between 1001 and 1026, the Romani fought under their Hindu rulers to fight the Ghaznavids.[241]

In the United States

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Many Dalits first came to the United States to flee caste-based oppression in South Asia. After the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the demand for labourers brought in many caste-diverse South Asian immigrants, many of whom were Dalit.[citation needed] After the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act, immigrants from India were primarily professionals and students, largely from upper caste or dominant caste families. However, from the 1990s onwards, many more of the skilled professionals arriving from India have been Dalit, due to multiple generations of affirmative action policies in India, as well as ongoing efforts of organised resistance against caste discrimination.[243][244]

In 2018, Equality Labs released a report on "Caste in the United States". This report found that one in two Dalit Americans live in fear of their caste being "outed". In addition, 60% have experienced caste-based discriminatory jokes, and 25% have suffered verbal or physical assault because of their caste.[243][245]

In late June 2020, the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing filed a lawsuit against Cisco Systems, alleging that a Dalit engineer at the company faced discrimination from two of his upper-caste supervisors for his Dalit background.[246] The lawsuit claims that "higher caste supervisors and co-workers imported the discriminatory system's practices into their team and Cisco's workplace".[247] In 2023, the California Civil Rights Department voluntarily dismissed its case alleging caste discrimination against two Cisco engineers, while still keeping alive its litigation against Cisco Systems.[14] The CRD was later symbolically fined $2000 for their case against the two engineers and CISCO.[248]

Literature

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Dalit literature encompasses writings by Dalits about their lived experiences, and it has emerged as a significant literary movement and forms a distinct part of Indian literature.[249] It has formed an identity across various Indian languages, including Marathi, Bangla, Hindi, Kannada, Punjabi, Sindhi, Odia, Tamil, and others. The earliest identifiably Dalit writers were Madara Chennaiah, an 11th-century cobbler-saint who lived in the reign of Western Chalukyas and who is regarded by some scholars as the "father of Vachana poetry" and Dohara Kakkaiah, a Dalit by birth, six of whose confessional poems survive.[250] The origins of modern Dalit writing can be traced back to the works of Marathi Dalit Bhakti poets and Tamil Siddhas, suggesting a long-standing tradition of marginalized voices.[251][252] This literary movement gained momentum in the mid-20th century, challenging the prevailing portrayals of life in mainstream literature. The publication of Jyotirao Phule's Gulamgiri in 1873 marked a seminal moment in Dalit literature, shedding light on the plight of the Untouchables.[253]

Dalit literature in India has flourished in various regional languages, reflecting the diverse experiences and struggles of Dalit communities across the country. In Maharashtra, Baburao Bagul's collection of stories, "Jevha Mi Jat Chorali" (When I had Concealed My Caste), published in 1963, marked a significant turning point, portraying the harsh realities of Dalit lives and garnering critical acclaim.[254][255][256] Writers like Namdeo Dhasal and Daya Pawar further strengthened the Dalit movement in Maharashtra introducing the seminal "Dalit Panther" as part of the little magazine movement.[257] Baburao Bagul, Bandhu Madhav[258] and Shankar Rao Kharat, worked in the 1960s. Later the little magazine movement became popular.[259] In Bengal, the Dalit literary movement began in 1992 after the suicide of Chuni Kotal, leading to the formation of the Bangla Dalit Sahitya Sanstha and the launch of the magazine "Chaturtha Duniya".[260][261] Prominent Dalit authors in Bengal include Manoranjan Byapari, Jatin Bala, and Kalyani Charal. Tamil Nadu has a long history of Dalit literature, starting from the efforts of Parayars in the late 19th century.[262] The Tamil Dalit literary movement gained momentum in the 1990s, influenced by the Mandal Commission report and Ambedkar centenary celebrations.[263][264] Writers like Bama, Joseph Macwan, and Gogu Shyamala have made significant contributions to Tamil Dalit literature. In Telugu literature, Dalit voices gained prominence through the activism of leaders like Kathi Padma Rao and Bojja Tarakam, addressing issues of caste discrimination and social injustice.[265][266] Gujarati Dalit literature emerged in the 1970s with magazines like Puma and Panther, inspired by the Dalit Panthers movement in Maharashtra. Writers such as Rameshchandra Parmar and Sahil Parmar played vital roles in its development.[267][268][269] Odia Dalit literature has a rich history dating back to the fifteenth century, with significant contributions from Sudramuni Sarala Dasa and Bhima Bhoi.[270][271] Writers like Basudeb Sunani and Pitambar Tarai have furthered the Dalit literary movement in Odisha. Additionally, Dalit literature encompasses various forms such as poetry, autobiographies, and oral history narratives, with notable works including "Karukku" by Bama and "The Weave of My Life" by Urmila Pawar. The Indian author Rajesh Talwar has written a play titled 'Gandhi, Ambedkar, and the Four-Legged Scorpion' in which the personal experiences of Ambedkar and the sufferings of the community have been highlighted.[272]

In Sri Lanka, writers such as K. Daniel[273] and Dominic Jeeva gained mainstream popularity.

In the film industry

[edit]

Until the 1980s, Dalits had little involvement in Bollywood or other film industries of India[274] and the community were rarely depicted at the heart of storylines.[275] Chirag Paswan (son of Dalit leader Ram Vilas Paswan) launched his career in Bollywood with his debut film Miley Naa Miley Hum in 2011. Despite political connections and the financial ability to struggle against ingrained prejudices, Chirag was not able to "bag" any other movie project in the following years. Chirag, in his early days, described Bollywood as his "childhood dream", but eventually entered politics instead. When the media tried to talk to him about "Caste in Bollywood", he refused to talk about the matter.[276] A recent Hindi film to portray a Dalit character in the leading role, although it was not acted by a Dalit, was Eklavya: The Royal Guard (2007).[277] The continued use of caste based references to Dalit sub-castes in South Indian films (typecast and pigeonholed in their main socio-economic sub-group) angers many Dalit fans.[278]

A Brazilian telenovela India: A Love Story was broadcast in 2009 where the main female character Maya, who is of upper class, falls in love with a Dalit person.[279][280]

Internal conflicts

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Several Dalit groups are rivals and sometimes communal tensions are evident. A study found more than 900 Dalit sub-castes throughout India, with internal divisions.[281] Emphasising any one caste threatens what is claimed to be an emerging Dalit identity and fostering rivalry among SCs.[282]

A DLM (Dalit Liberation Movement) party leader said in the early 2000s that it is easier to organise Dalits on a caste basis than to fight caste prejudice itself.[282]

Balmikis and Pasis in the 1990s boycotted the BSP, claiming it was a Jatav party.[283] [209]

Many converted Dalit Sikhs claim a superior status over the Hindu Raigars, Joatia Chamars and Ravidasis and sometimes refuse to intermarry with them.[284] They are divided into gotras that regulate their marriage alliances. In Andhra Pradesh, Mala and Madiga were constantly in conflict with each other[285] but as of 2015 Mala and Madiga students work for common dalit cause at university level.[286]

Although the Khateek (butchers) are generally viewed as a higher caste than Bhangis, the latter refuses to offer cleaning services to Khateeks, believing that their profession renders them unclean. They also consider the Balai, Dholi and Mogya as unclean and do not associate with them.[287]

Notable people

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See also

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Similarly discriminated groups

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References

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Sources

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Further reading

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia

Dalit is a modern self-designation commonly used for communities classified as Scheduled Castes under the Indian . The term derives from a Marathi word meaning “broken” or “oppressed” and came into political use in the late 19th and 20th centuries. Historically, these communities were generally positioned outside the four-varna framework and experienced forms of social exclusion and untouchability in different regions and periods. Under colonial rule, British census and administrative practices standardized and rigidified these diverse local identities into the category of “Depressed Classes,” which later formed the basis of the Scheduled Castes lists.
Under the of India, Scheduled Castes are entitled to affirmative action measures in , public , and political representation to redress systemic exclusion, and they accounted for 16.6 percent of the national population—over 201 million individuals—in the 2011 census.
Although untouchability was constitutionally prohibited in 1950, empirical surveys reveal that while upper-caste respondents often acknowledge caste-based bias, lower-caste individuals report limited personal experiences of , suggesting a complex interplay of formal equality and residual social norms.
Pioneered by , a Dalit who drafted the and orchestrated a 1956 mass conversion to for over 500,000 followers to reject Hindu caste doctrines, Dalit assertion has evolved into organized political vehicles like the , founded in 1984 to champion broader "bahujan" interests including Scheduled Castes.

Terminology

Etymology and primary usage

The term Dalit derives from the root dal, signifying "broken," "crushed," "oppressed," or "scattered," evoking a state of fragmentation or subjugation. In pre-modern contexts, it carried broader connotations of or destitution applicable across castes, such as daridra for impoverished Brahmins, without specific ties to hereditary . Its contemporary caste-specific usage emerged in the , when Marathi reformer (1827–1890) applied it to denote those enduring , marking a shift toward self-identification rooted in shared victimhood rather than ritual impurity. The term gained political salience in the mid-20th century amid anti-caste activism, though (1891–1956), a key architect of Dalit emancipation, infrequently employed Dalit himself, preferring descriptors like "Untouchables," "Depressed Classes," or "boycotted community" to highlight exclusionary practices. It proliferated through Ambedkarite movements and the 1970s , who adopted it as a unifying emblem of resistance against hierarchical structures, extending its scope to any marginalized group while retaining focus on hereditary disadvantage. This evolution reflects a deliberate reclamation, supplanting colonial-era labels like "untouchable" with one emphasizing agency and collective grievance. Primarily, Dalit denotes members of India's Scheduled Castes—enumerated groups constitutionally recognized for historical and outside the four-varna framework, with status and occupations varying significantly by region and period; colonial census and administrative practices standardized diverse local identities into the category of “Depressed Classes,” which later formed the basis of the Scheduled Castes lists—comprising occupations like or leatherwork deemed polluting under traditional norms. Usage is concentrated in - and Marathi-speaking regions but extends pan-Indianly via and , often self-applied to underscore ongoing socioeconomic disparities rather than fixed jati identities; externally, it sometimes conflates with "Harijan" (Gandhi's paternalistic coinage meaning "children of God"), which many reject as condescending. In diaspora contexts or , analogous terms arise for similar strata, but Indian Dalit retains primacy as a marker of caste-endured distinct from class or tribal marginality.

Alternative and regional terms

The term Harijan, meaning "children of God," was popularized by following the 1932 , as a replacement for derogatory labels like "untouchable," but it has been widely rejected by Dalit activists for implying paternalistic divine benevolence rather than addressing structural oppression. and subsequent Dalit leaders criticized it as condescending, favoring self-identifying terms that emphasize agency over charity, leading to its decline in usage post-independence. Officially, the Indian Constitution designates these groups as Scheduled Castes (SC), a legal category established in 1950 to list specific castes eligible for , encompassing over 1,200 jatis historically subjected to and ritual exclusion from the fourfold varna system. This term, derived from the British-era "Depressed Classes" and formalized via the , prioritizes administrative precision over social nomenclature, though it is often seen as bureaucratic and detached from lived experiences of discrimination. Regional variation in terminology reflects linguistic, cultural, and administrative diversity, with different communities using locally specific names that predate or exist alongside the pan-Indian term “Dalit.” In Tamil Nadu and Kerala, designations such as Adi Dravida and Arunthathiyar are used, while in Maharashtra, Mahar has historical prominence, including through the political mobilization associated with B. R. Ambedkar. In Punjab and Uttar Pradesh, Chamar remains a common community name, and in Bihar and eastern India, terms such as Bauri and Bantar are used. These jati-specific names function in everyday usage as community identifiers and, in some contexts, as proxies for the broader Scheduled Caste category. While some of these names historically corresponded to particular occupations or service roles, their social meaning and status varied widely by region and period, and many communities were reclassified or standardized under colonial census and administrative practices. Contemporary usage is shaped by constitutional recognition under the Scheduled Castes lists, regional political movements, and processes of self-identification, rather than by occupational role alone.

Historical Origins

Roots in ancient Indian social structures

The fourfold varna schema is first articulated in the Purusha Sukta (Rigveda 10.90), a hymn generally regarded as a late addition to the Rigveda and often dated to the late Vedic period (c. 1200–1000 BCE). It symbolically depicts four social categories emerging from the primordial sacrifice of the cosmic Purusha: Brahmins from the mouth, Kshatriyas from the arms, Vaishyas from the thighs, and Shudras from the feet. This formulation reflects an early ritual-ideological model of social differentiation within the Vedic tradition, emphasizing functional roles rather than a rigid, birth-based hierarchy. The earliest Vedic texts do not clearly attest to later concepts of untouchability or systematically defined avarna groups, which become more explicit in post-Vedic literature. Untouchability developed gradually in the post-Vedic period through processes of social differentiation, occupational specialization, and the incorporation of diverse communities into expanding agrarian and urban societies. Concepts of ritual purity and impurity, which became more elaborated in later normative literature, contributed to the marginalization of groups associated with activities considered polluting, such as handling corpses or waste. The earliest Vedic and Dharmasutra texts do not articulate a formal doctrine of untouchability; more rigid frameworks of exclusion and genealogical origin narratives, including associations with mixed varna unions, appear in later Dharmashastra literature and are generally understood by modern scholarship as normative constructs rather than historical accounts of social origin. The (c. 200 BCE–200 CE), an influential Dharmashastra text, contains prescriptive classifications of certain communities such as the and Pulkasas, placing them outside the four-varna framework rather than within the Shudra category. It associates these groups with marginal residence, specific occupational roles, distinctive material markers, and regulated forms of social interaction within its normative social order. The text also explains such classifications through its varnasankara (mixed-union) schema. These passages reflect the Manusmriti’s attempt to define and regulate social boundaries in prescriptive terms and should not be conflated with the position of Shudras, who are included within the varna system. Forms of impurity-based social exclusion and occupational stigma are documented in multiple ancient civilizations. The Hebrew Bible prescribes exclusion or separation for those deemed ritually impure due to contact with corpses, bodily emissions, or skin diseases (e.g., Leviticus 11–15; Numbers 19). In ancient Greece, the concept of miasma associated pollution with death, childbirth, and certain crimes, requiring ritual purification before re-entry into civic life (e.g., Homeric and Athenian sources). Roman law and social practice similarly stigmatized occupations such as executioners, undertakers, and tanners. In East Asia, groups such as the Japanese Eta and Hinin were segregated due to associations with death and animal processing, while in medieval Christian Europe, lepers and certain occupational groups were excluded from settlements. The development of untouchability in South Asia should therefore be understood within this broader cross-cultural context of ritual boundary-making and social stratification, rather than as a phenomenon unique to Hindu tradition.

Evolution through medieval and colonial eras

Historical evidence indicates that political authority in the medieval Indian subcontinent was not confined to a single social group. Several ruling dynasties and kings emerged from non-elite and non-Kshatriya backgrounds, including communities later classified as Shudra or avarna in normative literature. Examples include the Kakatiya rulers of Telangana (12th–14th centuries), the Hoysalas of Karnataka (11th–14th centuries), the Nayaka dynasties that succeeded Vijayanagara in the Tamil region, and the Rashtrakutas of the Deccan. In these cases, political power was established through military organization, land control, and regional alliances, with royal genealogies and Kshatriya status often constructed after the consolidation of power rather than inherited by birth. At the same time, social hierarchy in many regions became more rigid, with increasing endogamy and occupational confinement documented in historical and epigraphic sources. Communities later identified as Dalits or avarna groups were, in several areas, restricted to stigmatized and labor-intensive occupations such as leatherworking, carcass disposal, sweeping, and other forms of service labor. In under rule (14th–16th centuries), inscriptions record Madiga and Holeya communities residing in segregated settlements and functioning as bonded laborers, including instances in which Holeyas were transferred or purchased along with land grants. These arrangements formed part of regional agrarian and service systems. Under the (1206–1526) and the (1526–1857), governance operated through Islamic legal and administrative frameworks, while caste distinctions continued to structure social relations within Hindu communities. Untouchable groups in many areas performed menial and service tasks within village economies, including sweeping, watch duties, and other labor roles, and were frequently landless within agrarian systems. These conditions reflected the interaction of caste practice, revenue arrangements, and local power structures rather than the direct application of Dharmashastra texts as state law. Alongside political authority and agrarian structures, a range of religious and social movements within Hindu society shaped social experience in the medieval period in uneven and regionally specific ways. The Bhakti movement (c. 7th–17th centuries) developed in diverse regional forms across the subcontinent and produced devotional traditions that emphasized spiritual equality, including figures from socially marginalized backgrounds such as Chokhamela and Ravidas. Bhakti literature articulated critiques of ritual exclusivity and social hierarchy and, in some regions, broadened religious participation and social interaction. However, the movement was not uniform in character or impact, and its influence on social practice varied considerably across regions and communities. Other Hindu reform traditions also engaged with questions of hierarchy and religious authority. Vīraśaiva (Lingayat) communities in the Deccan rejected certain ritual intermediaries and emphasized devotional identity over birth status, while later Sikh traditions emerging in the Punjab from the 15th century stressed the spiritual equality of believers and communal participation. These movements differed significantly in doctrine and social effect and did not produce uniform transformations of social hierarchy, but they contributed to plural religious cultures and alternative forms of community affiliation. Historical sources also record context-specific occupational change and administrative inclusion in certain political settings. Under the Mughal emperor Akbar (r. 1556–1605), individuals from marginalized communities were employed in imperial service, and occupational groups such as sweepers were administratively redesignated (e.g., as halalkhor) within the court system. These instances reflect localized court policy and administrative practice rather than a standardized or subcontinent-wide restructuring of social hierarchy. ![A school of untouchables near Bangalore by Lady Ottoline Morrell 2.jpg][float-right] During the colonial period (c. 1757–1947), British administrators introduced large-scale classification practices, including decennial censuses from 1871, which standardized and fixed diverse local social identities for purposes of governance and revenue administration. Census officials such as H.H. Risley explicitly treated caste as a tool of social classification, and colonial correspondence acknowledged the political utility of emphasizing social divisions as part of imperial governance. Ethnographic surveys frequently assigned or standardized caste identities for communities that had previously identified by occupation, locality, or clan, contributing to the reification of social boundaries. Christian missionary activity expanded under colonial rule and operated in close association with imperial structures. Mission records and official reports document the use of material incentives such as food relief, employment, and access to education during famine and crisis conditions, as well as the establishment of segregated “Depressed Classes” missions. These practices reflected both religious objectives and colonial administrative contexts rather than purely humanitarian engagement.

Modern reforms and Ambedkar's influence

, as chairman of the drafting committee for the adopted on January 26, 1950, incorporated provisions to eradicate and promote Dalit upliftment, including Article 17's explicit abolition of untouchability and Articles 15, 16, and 46 mandating non-discrimination and affirmative action in public employment, , and economic opportunities for Scheduled Castes, the constitutional category encompassing Dalits. These reforms built on Ambedkar's pre-independence advocacy for , such as reserved seats in legislatures, which he secured through negotiations leading to the of 1932, influencing the post-1947 reservation system allocating 15% quotas for Scheduled Castes in government jobs and educational institutions to address historical exclusion from land ownership and skilled labor. Ambedkar's emphasis on as a tool for emancipation prompted initiatives like post-matric scholarships for Dalit students, reflecting his view that literacy and professional training could dismantle caste-based occupational barriers entrenched since ancient times. Ambedkar's influence extended to political mobilization, founding the Scheduled Castes Federation in 1942, which evolved into platforms for Dalit assertion, inspiring post-independence parties focused on caste-based equity rather than broader socialist appeals. His resignation as India's first Law Minister in 1951 over stalled Hindu Code Bill reforms underscored his push for uniform civil laws to override caste customs, though partial adoption occurred later; this critique highlighted how entrenched Hindu orthodoxies resisted reforms favoring Dalit women's . Economically, Ambedkar critiqued land reforms for neglecting landless Dalit laborers, advocating redistribution to tenants over mere abolition of zamindari systems, a stance that shaped limited successes in states like but widespread failures elsewhere in empowering Dalit agriculturalists. In 1956, Ambedkar led a mass conversion to on October 14 at Nagpur's , where approximately 380,000 Dalits renounced , framing as a rational, egalitarian alternative free from hierarchies, which he argued originated from Brahmanical dominance over egalitarian principles around 400 CE. This , reinterpreted by Ambedkar to emphasize over ritualism, catalyzed a , with estimates of 40-50 million conversions by the late , fostering cultural identity and resistance to Hindu reformist efforts like those of Gandhi, whom Ambedkar viewed as insufficiently radical against 's . The conversion's legacy persists in annual commemorations and political rhetoric, reinforcing Ambedkar's vision of through collective exit from rather than internal purification.

Demographics and Distribution

Population estimates and census data

The 2011 enumerated the Scheduled Castes population at 201,378,372 individuals, comprising 16.63 percent of the national total of 1,210,854,977. This figure reflects a decadal increase of 20.81 percent from the 166,630,200 Scheduled Castes recorded in the 2001 , exceeding the overall population growth rate of 17.70 percent during the same period. Uttar Pradesh accounted for the largest absolute Scheduled Castes population, with over 41 million individuals, while had the highest proportional share at 31.9 percent of its state population. Other states with significant numbers include , , , and , together representing a substantial portion of the national total. No comprehensive census has been conducted since 2011 due to delays, with the next enumeration scheduled to begin in 2027 and include detailed caste data beyond Scheduled Castes. Unofficial projections, based on demographic trends, suggest the Scheduled Castes population may exceed 230 million as of 2021, assuming continued growth patterns similar to the 2001-2011 decade. However, such estimates lack official verification and vary by source, with fertility and migration factors influencing actual figures.
Census YearScheduled Castes PopulationPercentage of Total PopulationDecadal Growth Rate
2001166,630,20016.20%-
2011201,378,37216.63%20.81%
Dalits, synonymous with Scheduled Castes in the Indian context, are predominantly within , though analogous groups exist in neighboring countries like , where they constitute approximately 13 percent of the (around 3.6 million as of Nepal's 2011 ). Global diaspora communities remain small and are not captured in Indian data.

Geographic and urban-rural divides

Dalits, officially designated as Scheduled Castes in , exhibit significant geographic concentration primarily in the northern and central regions of the country. According to the , hosts the largest absolute Scheduled Caste population at 41,357,608 individuals, constituting 20.7% of the state's total population, followed by with 21,463,270 (23.5%), with 16,567,325 (15.9%), and with 14,438,445 (20.0%). In terms of , records the highest share at 31.9% of its population (8,860,179 individuals), followed by at 25.2% and at 20.7%, reflecting historical agrarian ties in the Indo-Gangetic plains and Punjab's fertile regions where Dalit communities have long been integrated as landless laborers or marginal farmers. Northeastern states, such as and , show negligible presence, with Scheduled Caste percentages below 1%, underscoring a north-south and east-west divide influenced by migration patterns and historical social structures. The urban-rural divide among Dalits remains pronounced, with approximately 80% residing in rural areas as of recent estimates, compared to about 68% for the general , indicating slower rates driven by limited access to and skilled . The 2011 Census data reveals that of the total Scheduled of 201,378,086, roughly 82.7% (166.6 million) live in rural settings, while urban dwellers number about 17.3% (34.8 million), often concentrated in slums or informal settlements in cities like , , and due to economic migration for low-wage labor. This disparity has narrowed slightly since 2001, with urban Dalit populations growing by 40% amid broader rural-to-urban shifts, yet rural Dalits continue to dominate numerically, perpetuating divides in access and occupational opportunities. States like and amplify this pattern, where rural Dalit majorities (over 85% in some districts) contrast with emerging urban pockets influenced by industrial growth.

Socioeconomic Conditions

Poverty rates and occupational patterns

Dalits, classified as Scheduled Castes, face elevated poverty rates relative to other social groups in . The National Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) 2023, prepared by using National Family Health Survey-5 (NFHS-5) data from 2019-21, reports a multidimensional poverty headcount ratio of 27.9% for Scheduled Castes, compared to 14.96% for the general . This marks a reduction from 38.1% in NFHS-4 (2015-16), though the intensity of poverty among poor Scheduled Caste households remains high at 44.7%. Earlier consumption-based estimates, such as those from the 68th National Sample Survey (2011-12), indicated poverty rates around 33% for Scheduled Castes, underscoring persistent disparities driven by limited asset ownership and wage gaps. Occupational patterns among Dalits reflect historical constraints, with overrepresentation in low-wage, manual roles despite . Analyses of 2011 Census data show Scheduled Castes comprising a disproportionate share of agricultural laborers, particularly in rural areas where such work accounts for a significant portion of their —often exceeding 40% of main workers in agrarian states. Traditional occupations like tanning, , and persist, though officially banned, contributing to ; for instance, Scheduled Castes dominate sanitation roles due to entrenched social norms. Recent studies indicate slow structural shifts, with transitions to non-agricultural jobs occurring at lower rates for Scheduled Caste sub-groups compared to others, limiting intergenerational mobility. Urban Dalits fare slightly better but remain concentrated in casual labor and informal sectors, with limited entry into skilled professions.

Education attainment and barriers

![A school of untouchables near Bangalore by Lady Ottoline Morrell][float-right] Educational attainment among Scheduled Castes (SCs), commonly referred to as Dalits, lags behind the national average and other social groups in India. According to the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5, 2019-21), literacy rates for SC adults aged 15-49 stand at approximately 66-69% for women and 81% for men, compared to 78% and 88% respectively for non-SC groups. In terms of schooling completed, SC women aged 15-49 are more likely to have no education (up to 27%) than others (12-17%), with only 14-25% achieving higher secondary or above, versus 18-30% for others. For children aged 6-17, school attendance rates for SCs reach 94%, slightly below the 96% for others, though net attendance ratios in secondary education remain lower due to higher dropouts. In higher education, the Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) for SCs in the 18-23 age group was 25.9% in 2021-22, trailing the national GER of about 28%, despite reservations allocating 15% of seats to SCs.
Education IndicatorSC (%)National/Other (%)Source
Literacy (Women 15-49)66-6978NFHS-5
Literacy (Men 15-49)8188NFHS-5
No Education (Women 15-49)Up to 2712-17NFHS-5
Higher Secondary+ (Women 15-49)14-2518-30NFHS-5
GER Higher Ed (18-23)25.9~28AISHE 2021-22
Dropout rates exacerbate these gaps, with SC students facing 51% dropout in primary to secondary levels in documented cases from states like and , compared to 37% for non-SCs. In central universities, over 2,400 SC students dropped out between 2018 and recent years, often linked to academic and social pressures. Persistent barriers include caste-based in schools, where Dalit children endure segregation, like being called "dirty," and unequal treatment from teachers and peers, leading to and withdrawal. Economic constraints force many into child labor or family support roles, particularly in rural areas where school distances and poor compound access issues. For Dalit girls, early marriage and gender norms double these challenges, with 32% by secondary level in some estimates. In higher education, lack of proficiency in English, subtle biases undermining reservation-based achievements, and inadequate support systems hinder completion, despite enrollment gains from . These factors, rooted in historical exclusion rather than policy failure alone, sustain lower outcomes, as evidenced by slower progress in learning metrics compared to upper castes.

Health, nutrition, and access to services

Dalits, classified as Scheduled Castes, face elevated risks of adverse health outcomes relative to other social groups in , driven by socioeconomic disadvantages including and limited access to quality care. at birth for Dalits is estimated to be about three years lower than for upper-caste , based on of mortality from 2011-2015, reflecting persistent gaps in overall rates. rates among Scheduled Caste children stand at 59.7 per 1,000 live births, exceeding the national average, with neonatal vulnerabilities persisting even after controlling for socioeconomic factors. Nutritional deficiencies are prevalent, contributing to higher rates of child undernutrition. Among Dalit boys, 32.6% are , compared to lower figures in non-Dalit groups, per data from the Comprehensive National Nutrition Survey (2016-2018). Stunting affects a significant proportion of Dalit ren, with caste-based disparities linked to intergenerational and inadequate dietary intake rather than solely genetic factors, as evidenced by comparative studies across social strata. and low are more severe among Scheduled Caste women, correlating with broader patterns of chronic undernutrition observed in (NFHS-5) indicators for marginalized groups. Access to remains constrained, exacerbating vulnerabilities. Only 76.9% of Scheduled households possess facilities, compared to 87.3% among other castes, limiting and increasing disease exposure in rural settings. Healthcare utilization is lowest for Dalits due to financial, cultural, and geographic barriers, with Scheduled Castes reporting reduced institutional deliveries and preventive care compared to general categories, as documented in surveys. These disparities persist despite programs, underscoring enforcement gaps in equitable service delivery.

Crime victimization and atrocity statistics

In 2023, India's National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) recorded 57,789 cases of crimes against Scheduled Castes (SCs), representing a 0.4% increase from 57,582 cases in 2022. This equates to a crime rate of 28.7 incidents per 100,000 SC individuals, with Uttar Pradesh registering the highest absolute number of cases, followed by Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. State-level rates varied significantly, with Madhya Pradesh reporting 72.6 cases per 100,000 SC population, Rajasthan at 69.1, and Bihar at 42.6, reflecting concentrations in northern and central India where SC populations are substantial but enforcement mechanisms face resource constraints. These figures encompass offenses under the (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 ( Act), as well as cognizable crimes like , , , and targeting SC victims on grounds. In , NCRB data showed 50,900 such cases, indicating a rising trend over the early amid improved reporting mechanisms, though underreporting persists due to victim intimidation, police , and , as noted in government and independent analyses. Dalit women face compounded vulnerability, comprising a disproportionate share of cases under the Act, often linked to inter- marriages or perceived transgressions.
YearReported Cases Against SCsCrime Rate (per 100,000 SC Population)Key States with High Incidence
202150,900Not specified in aggregate,
202257,582Not specified in aggregate,
202357,78928.7 (72.6), (69.1)
Urban areas like and Bengaluru have seen spikes, with Jaipur's cases against rising 35% from 2021 to 2023, attributed to migration-related caste tensions and inadequate policing in growing cities. Conviction rates under the PoA Act remain low at around 30-35% historically, per NCRB trends, due to evidentiary challenges and witness hostility, exacerbating perceptions of for perpetrators, who are predominantly from non-SC castes.

Forms of contemporary discrimination

Dalits, officially classified as Scheduled Castes in , continue to experience caste-based , including murders, assaults, and sexual offenses, with the (NCRB) reporting 57,789 cases of atrocities against them in 2023, marking the highest figure in three decades and a 1.7% increase from 56,872 cases in 2022. This equates to approximately one crime against a Dalit every 18 minutes, including 13 murders per week and 27 reported atrocities daily, concentrated in states like (12,287 cases), (8,651), and (7,732). Recent incidents include a Dalit man in beaten and forced to drink urine in October 2025 for refusing to resume a driver's job under exploitative conditions, highlighting ongoing physical humiliation tied to perceived caste subservience. Sexual violence disproportionately targets Dalit women, who face intersecting and ; NCRB data for 2023 recorded a spike in cases against Scheduled Caste women, contributing to the overall atrocity surge, with such offenses often linked to upper-caste assertions of dominance in rural and semi-urban areas. persists in access to public resources, where Dalits are frequently denied entry to temples, wells, or housing in upper-caste neighborhoods, as documented in ongoing reports of "" practices despite legal prohibitions. In urban settings, confines many Dalits to and roles, with determining city cleaning jobs as of 2025; despite mechanization efforts, handling remains disproportionately assigned to Dalit workers, exposing them to health hazards and reinforcing hereditary labor stigma. Educational and includes of Dalit students and faculty, such as or exclusion from academic spaces, as reported in incidents through 2025. These forms reflect entrenched social hierarchies, with NCRB trends indicating both persistent underreporting due to fear of reprisal and an actual rise in overt acts amid socioeconomic tensions.

The Scheduled Castes and Prevention of Atrocities Act

The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, commonly known as the PoA Act, was enacted by the on September 11, 1989, and came into force on January 30, 1990. The legislation aims to prevent offences of atrocities against members of Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs), defined as acts involving , social humiliations, economic boycotts, or violence intended to insult or intimidate these groups, building on earlier laws like the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955. It establishes mechanisms for special courts, victim relief, and rehabilitation, with offences classified as cognizable and non-bailable to expedite justice. Key provisions include enhanced punishments for crimes under the when committed against or STs, such as imprisonment from six months to life for acts like forcing victims to eat inedible substances, parading them naked, or denying access to public places on grounds. The Act mandates exclusive Special Courts for speedy trials, presided over by sessions judges, and prohibits for accused persons, a feature reinforced by the 2018 amendment to override a ruling requiring preliminary inquiries. It also requires state governments to appoint officers for investigation, set up monitoring committees at and state levels, and provide immediate relief like financial aid up to ₹8.5 for victims in severe cases, alongside and . The Act has undergone amendments, including in to clarify procedures, 2015 for better enforcement, and notably , which expanded atrocity definitions to include garlanding with shoes or tonsuring, criminalized dereliction by public servants in case registration, and reinstated automatic arrests without preliminary verification. These changes responded to protests following the Supreme Court's 2018 Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India decision, which aimed to curb potential misuse but was criticized for diluting protections. The 1995 Rules further detail implementation, mandating district-level vigilance committees and annual reporting to on cases registered and disposed. While designed to deter caste-based violence through stringent measures, the Act's provisions have sparked debate over their stringency, with some analyses attributing low conviction rates not to inherent flaws but to evidentiary challenges in proving intent, though government data from the (NCRB) records over 50,000 annual cases against alone in recent years, indicating persistent application.

Enforcement challenges and outcomes

Enforcement of the (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, has been hampered by persistently low conviction rates, which stood at 5.3% in 2016, 6% in 2017, and 19.9% in 2018 according to an evaluation study of protection cells. More recent data from 2017-2019 indicate rates as low as 27%, reflecting systemic delays in investigations and trials that undermine the Act's deterrent effect. By 2022, approximately 96% of cases against Scheduled Castes remained pending trial, exacerbating victim disillusionment and perpetuating . Key challenges include witnesses turning hostile or withdrawing due to , social pressures, or loss of interest, which weakens prosecution cases. Inappropriate application of Act provisions during initial registration often dilutes charges, while inadequate training and -based reluctance among police personnel lead to under-investigation or outright refusal to file first-information reports. Special courts mandated for expedited trials suffer from shortages of personnel and , contributing to prolonged pendency; for instance, a parliamentary panel in 2021 highlighted rising crimes against Scheduled women and children alongside dismal convictions of 0-2 cases annually in some regions like . High rates, often exceeding convictions by wide margins, stem from evidentiary gaps rather than proven misuse, though perceptions of the latter arise from enforcement failures. Outcomes reflect limited efficacy in curbing atrocities, with registered cases against rising 13% to 51,656 in 2022, concentrated in 13 states accounting for 97.7% of incidents, and exceeding 57,000 in 2023. Despite increased awareness driving higher reporting, the Act's failure to deliver timely justice has not demonstrably reduced overall violence, as evidenced by a 15% uptick in crimes against women and children noted in 2021 parliamentary reviews. Isolated state-level claims, such as a 6% case drop in in 2024 attributed to publicity efforts, contrast with national trends of escalation, underscoring uneven implementation and the need for structural reforms in judicial capacity and victim support.

Affirmative Action Policies

Reservation system's design and scope

The reservation system for Scheduled Castes (SCs), encompassing Dalits, was enshrined in the upon its adoption on January 26, 1950, as a form of to address historical disadvantages arising from caste-based . It operates primarily through fixed quotas, allocating a proportion of opportunities in public institutions to eligible SC candidates, with selection within reserved categories based on merit relative to applicants from the same group, though overall thresholds may be lower than general category cutoffs to ensure filling of seats. Article 15(4) empowers the state to make special provisions for the advancement of SCs, while Article 16(4) permits reservations in public employment for backward classes, including SCs, to secure adequate representation. Article 335 mandates consideration of SC claims in services and posts, balanced against administrative efficiency. Initially intended as a temporary measure for ten years under Articles 330 and 334, provisions for political reservations have been extended multiple times through constitutional amendments, most recently via the 104th Amendment in , perpetuating the system indefinitely absent further legislative change. In employment and higher education institutions funded or controlled by the Union, SCs receive a 15% quota, reflecting their approximate 15-17% share of India's population as per the 2011 Census, though state-level variations adjust percentages based on local demographics—e.g., up to 18% in or 16% in . These quotas apply to direct recruitment in Group A, B, C, and D posts, with provisions for carry-forward of unfilled vacancies to subsequent years, and extend to promotions following the 77th, 81st, 82nd, and 85th Constitutional Amendments (1995-2001), which overrode earlier restrictions on post-reservation advancement. Unlike Other Backward Classes (OBCs), SC reservations lack a "" exclusion, applying irrespective of economic status to prioritize identity as the proxy for disadvantage. Educational reservations mirror employment quotas, reserving 15% of seats in central universities, IITs, IIMs, and medical colleges for SC students, often accompanied by relaxed eligibility criteria, fee waivers, and stipends under schemes like the Post-Matric Scholarship for SCs administered by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment. Scope excludes most private institutions unless state laws mandate otherwise, such as in Maharashtra's partial extension to unaided private colleges post-2019 amendments. Politically, Articles 330 and 332 reserve constituencies in the and state legislative assemblies proportional to SC population—currently 84 seats in the 543-member as of the 2019 delimitation—requiring SC candidates to contest only in these delimited areas, with general voters electing them to ensure representation without altering overall electoral merit. Local bodies under Articles 243D and 243T similarly allocate one-third of seats to , including positions for women within quotas. The system does not extend to the , appointments beyond initial quotas, or economic criteria alone, focusing instead on caste enumeration via the official SC list maintained under Article 341, which comprises 1,241 communities as of 2023 and excludes those who have converted out of unless specifically reinstated by . Total central reservations, including at 15%, STs at 7.5%, and OBCs at 27%, cap at 49.5% per the Indra Sawhney judgment (1992), though some states exceed this via local amendments.

Empirical impacts on mobility

Affirmative action through reservations has facilitated improved access to higher education for Scheduled Castes, with enrollment ratios in higher educational institutions rising significantly since the , attributed partly to quota policies reserving 15% of seats. Studies indicate that reserved category students admitted to colleges under these quotas experience monthly gains of 3,500 to 6,200 rupees compared to non-attendees, driven by enhanced employability in technical fields. Attendance at top-tier colleges via reservations also correlates with better academic performance and higher long-term earnings for Dalit students, mitigating mismatch concerns where beneficiaries underperform due to inadequate preparation. In government employment, reservations have elevated Dalit representation, particularly in units where quotas apply, contributing to intergenerational shifts from manual labor to salaried positions. Data from the Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS) show mean household and consumption for Scheduled Castes grew faster than for forward castes between survey rounds, narrowing relative gaps from 30% in 2004–05 to 18% by 2011–12, with and accounting for about 15% of gap reduction. Districts with higher Scheduled Caste populations registered a 39% decline in multidimensional between 2015–16 and 2019–21, outpacing non-Scheduled Caste areas, suggesting localized benefits from targeted interventions including reservations. Despite these gains, overall remains constrained, as reservations primarily affect the , which constitutes a shrinking share of total amid . Dalits exhibit low penetration in private sector jobs, where quotas do not apply and hiring persists, limiting spillover effects from public sector advancements. Intergenerational occupational mobility for Dalits is limited, with persistence in lower-status roles across generations in regions like , and only 3.4% of Scheduled Caste households reporting high-skilled members per 2015 IHDS data. Absolute income disparities with non-Scheduled Castes have widened, accompanied by rising within-group inequality among Dalits as measured by the , indicating uneven distribution of reservation benefits favoring urban or educated subsets. Presence in professions remains minimal, underscoring structural barriers beyond quota access.

Critiques: Benefits vs. perpetuation of divisions

The reservation system has demonstrably expanded access to education and public sector employment for Scheduled Castes (SCs), facilitating measurable upward mobility for a subset of beneficiaries. For instance, SC enrollment in higher education institutions rose from approximately 5% in the early 1990s to over 14% by 2019, largely attributable to quota provisions under the Central Educational Institutions Act of 2006. Intergenerational studies indicate that reservations have boosted SC household incomes and occupational status, with children of reserved-job holders showing 20-30% higher mobility rates compared to non-reserved SC peers, based on analysis of National Sample Survey data from 1983-2011. These gains, however, primarily accrue to urban, educated "creamy layer" segments within SC communities, leaving rural and landless Dalits with limited trickle-down effects, as evidenced by persistent intra-SC wealth gaps where the top quintile captures over 40% of quota benefits. Critics contend that such policies, while mitigating historical exclusion, inadvertently entrench divisions by institutionalizing group-based entitlements over individual merit or economic need. By tying benefits explicitly to markers—unchanged since the Constitution's schedules—reservations sustain as a salient social and political category, fostering identity-based mobilization rather than erosion of hierarchies. Empirical analyses of voting patterns show heightened loyalty in quota-dependent regions, with SC voters exhibiting 15-20% stronger bloc voting in elections post-reservation expansions, per district-level data from 2004-2019, which impedes cross-caste coalitions and class-based reforms. This reinforcement is compounded by the absence of time limits or economic criteria for SC quotas (unlike Other Backward Classes), allowing perpetual renewal through caste censuses, as seen in demands for a nationwide caste survey in 2023, which opponents argue revives primordial affiliations amid declining everyday caste enforcement. Proponents of highlight that reservations' design overlooks causal drivers of persistent disadvantage, such as private-sector and skill gaps, prioritizing symbolic representation over targeted interventions like vocational training. A 2024 observation in the sub-classification case underscored empirical disparities within SCs, noting that uniform quotas exacerbate inequities by benefiting dominant sub-castes (e.g., Chamars over smaller groups like Valmikis), without addressing root barriers like landlessness affecting 70% of rural Dalits. Economists argue this perpetuates a zero-sum dynamic, where quota breeds —manifest in upper-caste protests like the 2018 Patidar agitation—and diverts focus from universal poverty alleviation, as SC poverty rates fell only marginally faster than general trends from 2004-2011 despite quotas. Ultimately, while delivering targeted gains, the system's caste-centric frame risks ossifying divisions, as longitudinal data reveal slower convergence in rates (under 10% for SCs in 2011) and occupational integration compared to class-based models elsewhere.

Religious Affiliations

Retention in Hinduism and reform movements

Despite opportunities for conversion to religions like , the overwhelming majority of Dalits, enumerated as Scheduled Castes comprising 16.6% of India's population or approximately 201 million individuals in the 2011 census, have retained as their primary religious affiliation, with SC status constitutionally limited to adherents of , , and , thereby linking retention to access to reservations and legal protections. This persistence reflects deep cultural embeddedness, including devotional practices that historically bypassed ritual exclusions, as exemplified by the (7th–17th centuries), which prioritized ecstatic personal devotion (bhakti) to deities over Brahmin-mediated rituals and caste purity, enabling Dalit participation through poet-saints like , a leatherworker whose hymns critiqued hierarchy while affirming Hindu theistic frameworks. Bhakti's egalitarian ethos, propagated across regions like and , fostered spiritual inclusion without necessitating exit from , contributing to long-term retention amid social marginalization. In the colonial era, explicitly targeted to integrate Dalits while preserving Hindu unity against missionary proselytization. The , founded in 1875 by , promoted Vedic monotheism and shuddhi (purification) rituals to reconvert lower castes, including Dalits, into a reformed that rejected idol worship and emphasized scriptural equality, though implementation often reinforced upper-caste norms. Neo-Vedantic initiatives by figures like similarly sought to uplift "depressed classes" through and moral reform, framing as a distortion of essential Hindu spirituality rather than inherent doctrine. These efforts, peaking in the late , aimed at internal purification but yielded mixed results, with limited empirical gains in as and occupational segregation endured. Mahatma Gandhi's anti-untouchability campaign, intensified from 1932, represented a pivotal modern reform drive for retention, reterminating Dalits as Harijans ("children of God") to underscore their divine equality and founding the that year to eradicate pollution-based exclusions through drives, temple access advocacy, and economic . Gandhi's 1932 fast unto death against separate electorates for Dalits under the , followed by the 1933–1934 nationwide Harijan tour and weekly publication of the same name, mobilized Hindu conscience for reforms like well-sharing and admission, achieving partial temple entries in and by 1934. However, Gandhi's insistence on varna harmony without immediate abolition of hereditary castes drew criticism from Dalit leaders like for perpetuating subordination, though it arguably stemmed conversions by promising intra-Hindu equity. Temple entry satyagrahas further exemplified reformist retention strategies, with the Vaikom agitation (1924–1925) in demanding road access near a temple for lower castes, evolving into broader Dalit inclusion efforts, and culminating in Travancore's by Chithira Thirunal, which opened 1,200 temples to "backward" and untouchable castes, serving over 6 million people and inspiring similar proclamations elsewhere. These non-violent protests, backed by nationalists, symbolized Hinduism's capacity for self-correction, boosting retention by validating Dalit claims within sacred spaces, though enforcement lagged and violence persisted, as in the 1930s . Post-independence, such reforms informed Article 17 of the 1950 banning , yet surveys indicate ongoing temple exclusions in rural areas, underscoring incomplete causal impact on discrimination despite nominal retention.

Conversions to Buddhism, Christianity, and others

In 1956, , a prominent Dalit leader and architect of India's constitution, publicly converted to on at in , , citing its emphasis on equality and rationality as a rejection of Hindu hierarchies. Approximately 500,000 Dalits followed him in this mass ceremony, taking 22 vows that included renouncing Hindu gods and practices while committing to Buddhist precepts. This event marked the launch of the , or , primarily among Mahars and other Scheduled Castes seeking social emancipation from . Subsequent conversions continued, though at a decelerating pace; the 1961 recorded a 1,697% surge in India's Buddhist population attributable to these Dalit shifts, concentrated in . By the 2011 , Buddhists numbered about 8.4 million (0.7% of India's population), with roughly 87-90% being Ambedkarite converts from Dalit backgrounds rather than traditional Buddhists. Empirical data indicate that Buddhist growth slowed to 6.13% between 2001 and 2011, compared to 16.76% for , with recent mass events—like 180 Dalit families converting after caste clashes in , , in 2017—often triggered by ongoing discrimination rather than doctrinal appeal alone. Conversions to among Dalits trace to 19th-century Protestant missions, which attracted mass movements in regions like , , and through promises of equality and education, leading to significant lower-caste adherence. Today, Dalits comprise an estimated 70% of India's 28 million (about 2.3% of the national population per 2011 data), with 57% of identifying as Scheduled Castes or Tribes. However, such converts forfeit Scheduled reservation benefits under Indian law, as these are tied to (or, post-1956, ), prompting debates on whether conversions fully alleviate socioeconomic barriers or merely relocate caste-based exclusion within Christian communities. Smaller-scale shifts to occurred mainly among Punjab's Dalits during British rule, with about 40% of Hindu Chuhras converting to or related sects like for perceived , though caste distinctions persisted post-conversion. Conversions to have been episodic, such as the 1981 Meenakshipuram event involving around 200 Dalit families in , driven by local grievances but not yielding widespread demographic change; overall, Dalit remain underenumerated, estimated at under 3 million without reservation eligibility. These patterns reflect pragmatic responses to , yet data show limited aggregate escape from , with converted groups often facing intra-religious hierarchies mirroring Hindu norms.

Implications for identity and reservations

The eligibility for Scheduled Caste (SC) reservations in is governed by the (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, which restricts benefits to individuals professing , with extensions to via a 1956 amendment and via a 1990 presidential order recognizing neo-Buddhist converts. Converts to or forfeit SC status, as these religions are deemed to erase caste-based backwardness under the policy's rationale of addressing historical Hindu social disabilities. This exclusion persists despite ongoing demands for inclusion of Dalit Christians and Muslims, who number approximately 10 million and face compounded discrimination without quota access in , , and political seats. Religious conversion thus poses a direct trade-off for Dalit identity: it offers symbolic emancipation from caste stigma rooted in , as exemplified by B.R. Ambedkar's 1956 mass conversion to , which preserved SC benefits and framed as a rational rejection of ritual inequality while retaining affirmative action safeguards. However, for Christian or Muslim converts, the loss of reservations—estimated to affect eligibility for 15% of jobs and seats—intensifies economic marginalization, prompting some to maintain nominal Hindu affiliation or reconvert strategically, though rulings, such as the November 27, 2024, decision in Anand Teltumbade v. State of , deem conversions lacking "actual belief" as fraudulent and ineligible for restored benefits. This framework reinforces caste as a persistent identity marker, even post-conversion, by linking material upliftment to rather than socioeconomic need alone, fueling critiques that it perpetuates divisions while undermining religious freedom under Article 25 of the . Empirical data from the 2011 Census indicate that while Buddhist Dalits (primarily Ambedkarites) comprise about 0.7% of India's population and retain full SC quotas, Christian Dalits often navigate parallel but inferior "backward class" categories, highlighting identity fragmentation where spiritual autonomy clashes with pragmatic dependence on state . Debates persist on reforming eligibility to economic criteria, yet entrenched political resistance—citing fears of mass conversions for quotas—has stalled changes, as evidenced by repeated parliamentary commissions rejecting extensions since the 1980s.

Political Participation

Dalit-led parties and alliances

Dalit-led political parties in trace their origins to B.R. Ambedkar's efforts to secure representation for Scheduled Castes, culminating in the formation of the (RPI) in 1957 after his death, intended as a vehicle for Dalit emancipation and . The RPI initially contested elections independently but fragmented into numerous factions due to internal disputes, limiting its national impact; by the , it had split into groups like the RPI (Khobragade) and others, with vote shares rarely exceeding 2-3% in and . One prominent faction, the or RPI(A), led by , allied with the (BJP) in the (NDA) from 2014 onward, securing cabinet berths for Athawale as Minister of and Empowerment in 2016 and 2019 governments. The (BSP), established on April 14, 1984, by , emerged as the most successful Dalit-led party by broadening its appeal to "Bahujans"—Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes, and minorities—through Ambedkarite ideology emphasizing self-reliance and proportional representation. Under , who succeeded as leader in 2001, the BSP achieved its peak in , forming a in 1995, a majority-supported one in 1997, and a single-party majority in 2007 with 206 seats and 30.43% vote share in the state assembly elections. Nationally, the BSP secured 10 seats in 2009 with 6.54% vote share, but its influence waned post-2010 due to allegations of corruption, failure to expand beyond core Dalit voters (primarily subcaste), and competition from BJP's outreach to non- Dalits. In the 2022 assembly elections, the BSP's seats dropped to one with 12.88% votes, reflecting a shift of Dalit support toward the BJP. Dalit parties frequently form tactical alliances to amplify electoral leverage, often trading seat adjustments for policy concessions on reservations and atrocity prevention laws. The BSP allied with the (SP) in the 1993 Uttar Pradesh assembly polls, winning 67 seats and forming government, and again in the 2019 elections under the PiSP (Pragatisheel Samajwadi Party-BSP) alliance, securing 15 seats combined but failing to dent BJP dominance. RPI factions have variably partnered with , BJP, or regional outfits; for instance, multiple RPI groups joined the 1977 coalition against . Smaller Dalit-led entities, such as the Azad Samaj Party (Kanshi Ram founded by Chandrashekhar Azad in 2020, focus on radical and have contested independently or in loose coalitions, winning one seat in 2024 from , , by consolidating non-Jatav Dalit votes against BJP. These alliances underscore Dalit parties' strategy of leveraging caste arithmetic amid fragmentation, though empirical data shows limited long-term gains without broader ideological appeal beyond .

Vote bank strategies and electoral influence

Dalits, comprising about 16.6% of India's population as per the 2011 census, represent a substantial vote bank that political parties target through caste-specific mobilization in states like , where Scheduled Castes account for roughly 21% of voters. Strategies often involve appeals to Ambedkarite ideology, commitments to preserve reservation quotas, and symbolic representations of Dalit empowerment, such as the 's (BSP) use of the elephant emblem to signify strength and unity among marginalized groups. The BSP, founded in 1984 by to consolidate Dalit votes under a "" banner encompassing Scheduled Castes, Tribes, and Other Backward Classes, exemplifies dedicated vote bank tactics by prioritizing Dalit candidates in reserved constituencies and forging tactical alliances. In the 2007 assembly elections, the BSP achieved a landmark victory, winning 206 of 403 seats with a 30.4% vote share by expanding beyond its core Jatav Dalit base (about 50% of UP Dalits) to include Brahmins and , demonstrating how can translate into governance through calculated arithmetic. However, the party's vote share plummeted to 10% by 2019 elections, reflecting Dalit disillusionment with governance failures and leading to fragmentation, where non-Jatav Dalits shifted to the (BJP) for welfare benefits like housing under . Mainstream parties adapt by integrating Dalit outreach into broader coalitions; the BJP, for instance, has captured up to 40% of Dalit votes in some northern states since 2014 by emphasizing constitutional protections against opposition narratives of "endangering" reservations and providing targeted schemes, while the has allied with Dalit sub-groups like the Azad Samaj Party to reclaim votes through promises of . This electoral influence is structurally amplified by 84 Lok Sabha seats for Scheduled Castes, ensuring Dalit representation but often resulting in bloc voting patterns that prioritize loyalty over policy evaluation, as evidenced by higher Dalit ethnic party vote shares in states without strong social movements. In Uttar Pradesh's 2022 assembly polls, Dalit votes split across BJP (winning 255 seats), SP, and BSP (just 1 seat), underscoring how parties exploit sub-caste divisions—Jatavs remaining BSP-loyal while others respond to economic incentives—to sway outcomes in India's patronage-driven democracy.

Role in broader Indian politics

Dalits, representing Scheduled Castes who constitute 16.6% of India's according to the , function as a critical bloc in national elections due to their numerical concentration in key states like , , and . This demographic weight compels major parties, including the and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), to prioritize Dalit outreach through targeted welfare schemes, leadership nominations, and rhetorical appeals to , often beyond alliances with Dalit-specific outfits like the (BSP). In coalition dynamics, Dalit support has shaped outcomes in pivotal regions; for example, in , where Dalits form about 20% of voters, the () under BJP has leveraged sub-caste leaders such as of the Lok Janshakti Party (Ram Vilas) and of the Hindustani Awam Morcha to consolidate votes, contributing to victories in the 2020 assembly polls and influencing national seat-sharing in 2024 contests. Similarly, the BJP's expansion of Dalit representation in cabinets and its promotion of figures like has facilitated cross-caste mobilization under frameworks, evidenced by increased SC support for candidates in during the 2014 and 2019 general elections. Electoral data underscores fluctuating allegiances: garnered 20.8% of votes in SC-reserved seats in the 2024 elections, up from 16.7% in 2019, partly attributed to campaigns emphasizing threats to constitutional reservations amid opposition narratives. This shift highlights Dalits' role in countering BJP dominance, as fragmented voting—spanning loyalty to BSP remnants and non- drifts to NDA or INDIA bloc—has forced adaptive strategies, including sub-caste enumeration promises in manifestos. Constitutional reservations allocate 84 seats in the exclusively for Scheduled Castes, mandating Dalit candidates from major parties and embedding their priorities—such as extensions of beyond —into broader legislative debates, though intra-Dalit divisions often dilute unified policy influence. In national discourse, Dalit mobilization has amplified demands for atrocity prevention laws, with events like the case spurring cross-party scrutiny and temporary vote realignments against perceived upper-caste impunity. Overall, while Dalit agency challenges entrenched hierarchies, bloc fragmentation and co-optation by dominant parties underscore causal limits to transformative impact without sustained intra-community cohesion.

Economic Agency and Entrepreneurship

Rise of Dalit businesses and DICCI

The Dalit Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (DICCI) was established in 2005 by , a and entrepreneur from , with the aim of fostering business enterprises among Dalits and Scheduled Castes (SCs) to promote and economic empowerment. DICCI's founding responded to the perceived limitations of reservation policies, emphasizing as a means to build independently of government quotas, through , networking, and for access to credit and markets. DICCI has expanded to include 29 state chapters and has impacted over 100,000 existing and aspiring SC-ST entrepreneurs via training programs, mentorship, and partnerships that facilitate business setup and scaling. Its efforts have contributed to a measurable uptick in Dalit-owned enterprises, with states like reporting 18.12% of enterprises as Dalit-led by 2016, and ranking third nationally in such ventures. The organization advocates for policies like assured markets for Dalit products, which have yielded marginal but positive effects on business viability, though systemic barriers such as limited access to and social networks persist. This rise aligns with broader trends in Dalit , where the top 1,000 Dalit owners were valued at approximately 15,000 rupees as of recent surveys, signaling emerging wealth creation despite representing a small fraction of India's corporate landscape. However, data indicates Dalit owners earn 15-18% less than non-Dalit counterparts, even after controlling for factors like and , underscoring ongoing -based disadvantages in and pricing power. DICCI's vision projects Dalit entrepreneurs eventually contributing 10% to India's GDP and generating over 10 million jobs, prioritizing growth over welfare dependencies.

Case studies of successful ventures

Ashok Khade, originating from a Dalit cobbler family in , overcame extreme poverty—including sleeping on streets and earning an initial salary of Rs 90 per month—to found DAS Offshore Engineering Pvt Ltd in 1992 with his brothers, using personal savings. The company specializes in offshore engineering, maintenance, and construction for the oil and gas sector, growing to employ over 4,500 people by 2018 and achieving revenues exceeding Rs 500 crore. Khade's venture exemplifies self-reliant , as he acquired technical skills through before scaling operations without initial reliance on caste-based quotas. Kalpana Saroj, a Dalit from rural who endured at age 12, domestic abuse, and manual labor earning Rs 2 per day in the 1970s, revived the near-bankrupt Kamani Tubes Ltd in 2000 by acquiring its distressed assets for a nominal sum. Under her leadership as chairperson, the copper tube manufacturing firm expanded into and other sectors, reaching an annual turnover of approximately $112 million by 2018 and employing hundreds. Saroj received the award in 2013 for her contributions to trade and industry, highlighting how entrepreneurial turnaround of failing enterprises can generate wealth independently of government subsidies. Santosh Kamble, a Dalit entrepreneur from , transformed a pest control service—often stigmatized as low-caste work—into a million-dollar enterprise by 2011, supplying services to corporate clients across . Starting small in the early , his firm capitalized on urban demand for hygiene services, demonstrating how niche markets underserved by upper-caste competitors enable Dalit entry and growth through market competition rather than . These cases, supported by networks like the Dalit Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (DICCI), illustrate that targeted entrepreneurial mentoring and access to private capital can yield scalable ventures, though persistent social biases limit broader replication without cultural shifts toward merit-based evaluation.

Barriers and policy alternatives to reservations

Despite reservations providing quotas in and since 1950, Dalit entrepreneurship remains limited, with Scheduled Castes comprising only about 5-10% of enterprise owners in urban areas as of 2013 surveys, far below their 16.6% share per the 2011 Census. Key barriers include restricted access to credit due to informal caste-based lending networks dominated by upper castes, leading to higher interest rates or outright denial for Dalit borrowers; empirical studies show this explains up to 30-40% of wealth and income disparities across castes. Social discrimination manifests in supplier boycotts, customer —Dalit-owned businesses often sell products at 10-20% discounts to compete—and exclusion from business associations, as documented in field studies from and where Dalit entrepreneurs reported non-cooperation from dominant caste stakeholders. Educational deficits compound these issues, with Dalit students facing lower quality schooling in segregated or under-resourced institutions, resulting in skill gaps that hinder managerial and technical competencies needed for scaling businesses; a 2020 review identified monetary constraints and lack of as primary hurdles, limiting venture survival rates to under 20% in the first five years. Reservations, while increasing Dalit representation in government jobs to around 15-20% of allocated seats by 2023, primarily benefit an urban "creamy layer"—economically advanced Dalits who capture 50-70% of quota benefits—leaving rural and poorer Dalits underserved and fostering intra-caste resentment without addressing market . Critics, including Dalit entrepreneurs, argue this system reinforces identities and dependency rather than promoting , as quotas in secure jobs discourage risk-taking in private enterprise where biases persist unchecked. Policy alternatives emphasize tailored to economic agency over quotas. The Dalit Indian and Industry (DICCI), founded in 2005, advocates prioritizing entrepreneurship through subsidized low-interest loans, venture capital funds, and training programs for Dalit startups, claiming erodes barriers faster than reservations by enabling job creation within communities—evidenced by DICCI members growing from a handful to over 1,000 businesses by 2022, employing thousands of Dalits. Sub-categorization within Scheduled Castes, upheld by the in 2024, redirects benefits to the most disadvantaged sub-groups based on intra- disparities in benefit uptake, potentially increasing equity without expanding overall quotas. Broader reforms include income-based exclusions from reservations—such as barring families above ₹8 annual income—and shifting to economic criteria for aid, as proposed in multidimensional frameworks that allocate support via a points system weighing , assets, and regional backwardness over rigid lists. These approaches aim to foster merit-driven growth while mitigating biases, with evidence from Gujarat's economic reservation experiments showing improved targeting without exacerbating divisions.

Cultural and Intellectual Contributions

Literature and intellectual traditions

Dalit literature originated in in the , emerging as a response to persistent caste-based and drawing from oral traditions and early reformist writings. It gained formal recognition through autobiographical narratives and poetry that depicted lived experiences of , poverty, and resistance, distinct from mainstream which often romanticized or ignored Dalit realities. The Dalit Panthers movement, established in 1972 by activists and poets such as , catalyzed the genre's expansion by blending literary expression with militant activism inspired by ideals. Dhasal's poetry collections, including Golpitha (1972), portrayed urban Dalit struggles with raw intensity, establishing Dalit writing as a tool for social mobilization. This period marked the term "Dalit"—meaning "oppressed"—as a self-claimed identity for literary and political assertion, spreading the movement across Marathi, , and other regional languages by the 1980s. Intellectual traditions among Dalits trace primarily to B.R. Ambedkar's corpus, which emphasized rational critique of as a hierarchical rooted in Hindu scriptures, advocating annihilation through constitutional and educational reforms. Ambedkar's 1956 mass conversion of nearly 500,000 Dalits to rejected ritual impurity and promoted egalitarian ethics, influencing subsequent thinkers to frame Dalit identity in terms of historical subjugation rather than divine sanction. His works, such as analyses of untouchability's economic underpinnings, inspired Dalit scholars to prioritize of discrimination over mythological narratives. Post-Ambedkar, Dalit intellectuals developed traditions of "organic" theorizing from lived caste experiences, critiquing both Brahmanical dominance and upper-caste for overlooking Dalit agency. Writers like Omprakash Valmiki in extended this by documenting personal of exclusion, fostering a corpus that prioritizes testimony over abstraction. By the 1990s, these traditions intersected with pan-Indian Dalit studies, emphasizing and cultural reclamation amid ongoing debates over sub-caste fragmentation within Dalit communities.

Representation in film and media

Dalits have historically been underrepresented in Indian cinema, with portrayals limited to stereotypical depictions emphasizing submissiveness, physical uncleanliness, and lack of agency, often relegated to comedic or villainous side roles that reinforce caste hierarchies. In films since , such representations have focused predominantly on Dalit victimhood, precarious socioeconomic conditions, and bodily violations, while neglecting broader historical agency or aspirational narratives. Regional cinemas, particularly Marathi and Tamil, have seen more substantive engagement through Dalit filmmakers addressing oppression directly. Nagraj Manjule's (2013) portrays a young Dalit boy's amid systemic in rural , highlighting everyday humiliations like segregated water access. Similarly, Pa Ranjith's films such as Kaala (2018) integrate Dalit resistance themes, drawing from Ambedkarite ideology to depict empowered communities challenging land grabs and upper- dominance. Tamil works like Mari Selvaraj's Karnan (2021) and Vetrimaaran's Asuran (2018) feature Dalit protagonists engaging in violent against atrocities, shifting from passive victimhood to assertive agency. In Bollywood, early attempts like Shyam Benegal's Ankur (1974), which explores a Dalit woman's exploitation by a landlord, and Shekhar Kapur's Bandit Queen (1994), based on Phoolan Devi's life as a lower-caste outlaw, introduced caste themes but often through an upper-caste directorial lens emphasizing tragedy over empowerment. Recent Hindi films such as Anubhav Sinha's Article 15 (2019), inspired by real caste-based crimes like the 2014 Badaun incident, critique police complicity in Dalit atrocities, though critics note its reliance on a Brahmin savior figure. T.J. Gnanavel's Jai Bhim (2021) spotlights custodial torture of an Adivasi-Dalit man, garnering praise for exposing judicial biases but facing backlash for factual inaccuracies in tribal representation. Television and broader media have mirrored cinema's shortcomings, with Dalits frequently typecast as servants or laborers in urban soaps and news coverage prioritizing upper-caste perspectives on caste issues. A nascent wave of Dalit-led content, including documentaries and web series, seeks to counter this by foregrounding self-representation, though mainstream platforms remain dominated by upper-caste narratives that risk tokenism.

Internal cultural conflicts and sub-caste dynamics

The , officially designated as in , comprises over 1,200 sub-castes or jatis, each with distinct occupational histories, regional concentrations, and internal status gradations that replicate broader hierarchies. These sub-castes, such as (leather workers), (toddy tappers), and (sweepers), often maintain endogamous practices and competing claims to purity or historical precedence, fostering tensions over shared resources like quotas. For instance, in , the Pallars have asserted dominance over Paraiyars and Arunthathiyars through and political mobilization, leading to segregated settlements and disputes over . Resource competition exacerbates these divisions, particularly in access to the 15% reservation quota for in and government jobs. In and , —traditionally leather tanners comprising about 59% of the state's —have long alleged that Malas (weavers, around 28%) have captured disproportionate benefits due to early political patronage from the Congress party, prompting the Madiga Reservation Porata Samiti's agitations since the 1990s. This rivalry intensified with demands for sub-quotas, culminating in the Supreme Court's August 1, 2024, ruling permitting intra- categorization to address such imbalances, though critics argue it entrenches fragmentation by formalizing "class within class" dynamics. Cultural practices further highlight sub-caste fault lines, with variations in rituals, deities, and symbols reinforcing separation. Madigas in preserve the Chindu folk dance as a marker of resistance, yet face opposition from Malas who associate it with historical narratives of inter-sub-caste shame; similarly, Madiga drum-beating traditions have clashed with Mala communities, particularly Christian converts who view them as incompatible with church decorum. In , Jatavs (a Chamar sub-group forming over half of the state's Dalits) dominate politics, venerating figures like , which marginalizes non-Jatav groups like Pasis and fosters resentment over perceived monopolization of Dalit symbolism and seats. These dynamics undermine pan-Dalit solidarity, as sub-caste associations prioritize narrow interests, often aligning with upper-caste parties to counter rivals—e.g., Madigas backing the against Mala-supported in elections. While Ambedkarite ideology promotes unity against oppression, empirical disparities in and (e.g., Malas outperforming Madigas in quota utilization) sustain psycho-social strains, including identity conflicts among . Such internal hierarchies, rooted in pre-colonial occupational gradations, persist despite constitutional equality, complicating collective mobilization.

Global Diaspora

Communities in the UK, US, and elsewhere

Dalit migrants to the , primarily from , have formed communities estimated at around 250,000 individuals, though exact figures remain uncertain due to lack of official census data on . These communities often trace their presence to post-World War II labor migration and family reunifications, with many arriving via skilled worker visas or student pathways, carrying Ambedkarite ideologies that emphasize anti- . Organizations such as the Dalit Solidarity Network , established in 2005, advocate against -based affecting South Asian diaspora members, including workplace exclusion and social segregation. The Anti Caste Discrimination Alliance campaigns for legal recognition of as a protected characteristic, highlighting persistent informal within temples, businesses, and marriages despite the 's not explicitly addressing until partial amendments in 2013. In the United States, the Dalit diaspora remains small and undercounted, comprising a fraction of the roughly 4.5 million , with surveys indicating only about 1% identifying as Dalit amid dominant upper-caste migration patterns post-1965 Immigration and Nationality Act changes that prioritized skilled professionals. Migration drivers include pursuit of higher education and professional opportunities, as Dalits leverage affirmative action-inspired mobility from , though hierarchies persist in social networks, , and . A 2020 survey of found 67% of Dalit respondents experienced workplace unfair treatment due to , including denial of promotions and social ostracism. Advocacy groups like the International Dalit Solidarity Network's U.S. affiliates and the Ambedkar International Center push for anti-caste policies, such as Seattle's 2023 ordinance recognizing as a protected category in public sectors. Elsewhere, Dalit communities in face similar marginalization, with activists reporting exclusion from upper-caste dominated social and religious spaces, prompting calls for federal recognition of discrimination amid growing South Asian immigration. In , where Dalits number in the thousands among Indian migrants, subtler forms of bias occur in professional settings and community events, though less overtly than in origin countries, with groups like the Dalit Rights Advocacy Network organizing against it. Scattered Dalit populations in countries like Nepal's extensions and Gulf states endure compounded vulnerabilities, including labor exploitation tied to informal networks, underscoring how migration for economic escape often replicates hereditary hierarchies abroad.

Discrimination abroad and adaptations

Dalit migrants to countries like the and the have encountered caste-based discrimination imported from South Asian social structures, manifesting in , workplace harassment, and educational barriers. In the , where an estimated 200,000 Dalits reside primarily among the South Asian diaspora, individuals report denial of access to community temples, segregated seating at events, and tied to caste status, with no explicit legal prohibition despite a dormant provision in the intended to address it. A 2010 government inquiry documented these patterns, noting that South Asian immigrants have transferred hierarchical practices, leaving Dalits vulnerable without recourse. In universities, Dalit students have faced harassment for raising caste issues, exacerbating isolation within academic environments. In the US, caste discrimination affects housing, employment, and education among the roughly 5.7 million South Asians, with Dalits experiencing dehumanization through slurs, exclusion from professional networks, and wage disparities. A 2018 Equality Labs survey of South Asian Americans found that 40% of Dalit respondents reported caste-based discrimination in educational institutions, compared to negligible rates among upper-caste groups, often involving social ostracism or biased evaluations. Incidents in tech sectors, where Indian-origin workers dominate, include Dalits concealing surnames to avoid bias from upper-caste colleagues, perpetuating a meritocracy myth that overlooks inherited hierarchies. Legislative responses include Seattle's 2023 ordinance banning caste as a protected category—the first outside South Asia—and California's 2023 assembly bill attempting similar protections, though facing opposition from diaspora groups arguing it conflates culture with race. To adapt, many Dalits abroad suppress caste identities, passing as upper-caste or avoiding ethnic enclaves to mitigate , a strategy rooted in internalized hierarchies that limits community cohesion but enables individual advancement. Others form advocacy networks, such as the Dalit Solidarity Network in the UK or Equality Labs in the , which document abuses and lobby for policy changes, leveraging resources for awareness campaigns. These efforts parallel domestic movements but contend with resistance from established upper-caste networks that influence civic organizations and frame anti-caste measures as anti-Indian. Digital tools have aided adaptations, with platforms enabling Dalit connections for mutual support and counter-narratives against exclusion.

Comparisons to other marginalized groups

Dalits, as a group subjected to hereditary and descent-based exclusion, exhibit parallels with other communities facing on work-and-descent (DWD) grounds, including the Roma in and in , where stigma persists despite formal legal prohibitions. Both Dalits and trace origins to occupations deemed impure, such as those involving death or waste handling, resulting in spatial segregation, barriers, and intergenerational poverty; for instance, neighborhoods in mirror Dalit settlements in as sites of concentrated disadvantage. Similarly, Roma communities, like Dalits, experience widespread social , informal sector dominance, and routine violence, with both groups comprising significant portions of their populations in low-wage, precarious labor—Roma at over 80% informal in parts of , akin to Dalits' overrepresentation in and landless labor in . These affinities have spurred transnational solidarity, as seen in joint Dalit-Roma initiatives addressing shared exclusion from and . Comparisons to African Americans underscore both convergent and divergent trajectories of oppression. Untouchability, enforced through ritual pollution and , parallels the chattel slavery and segregation imposed on Blacks, with equating the former to an "indirect slavery" worse than the American variant due to its psychological internalization and lack of escape via . Both groups faced lynchings, barred access to public resources, and economic bondage—Dalit laborers tied to upper-caste landlords much as sharecroppers were post-1865—but caste's rigidity, prohibiting intermarriage and social mixing more stringently than U.S. (struck down in 1967), has perpetuated Dalit isolation to a greater degree. Empirical outcomes reflect this: while African American median household income rose from $23,800 in 1967 to $45,870 in 2019 (adjusted), Dalit in hovered around 40% below national averages as of 2011-12 surveys, with literacy gaps narrowing slower for Dalits (66% vs. 74% national in 2011) than for Blacks relative to whites. Affirmative action policies further illuminate distinctions in remedial efficacy. India's reservation system mandates quotas—15% in and jobs for Scheduled Castes (Dalits)—addressing as a fixed marker, yielding gains like increased Dalit enrollment in higher education from 1.6% in 1950 to 14% by 2018, yet yielding uneven mobility due to sub-caste hierarchies and exclusion debates. In contrast, U.S. for s emphasized holistic racial redress without rigid quotas (until challenged in 2023's v. Harvard), fostering broader integration but facing backlash for perceived reverse ; college enrollment surged from 10% in 1960 to 33% by 2010, outpacing Dalit proportional gains amid persistent gaps ( median at 13% of in 2019). Critics, including empirical analyses, note reservations' role in entrenching identities, unlike AA's focus on individual merit, though both systems grapple with stigma and limited trickle-down to the poorest within groups. Unlike historical Jewish experiences of pogroms and exclusion, which spurred high achievement through portable skills and weak enforcement post-Enlightenment, Dalit progress remains hampered by cultural norms reinforcing , as evidenced by lower intra-group mobility compared to Jewish upward trajectories in early 20th-century U.S. (from 10% in immigrant waves to under 10% by 1960). These variances highlight causal factors: descent-based pollution taboos in sustain Dalit marginalization more enduringly than racial or ethnic prejudices, which and migration have eroded elsewhere, underscoring the need for policies targeting behavioral and network barriers over quota reliance alone.

Notable Figures and Achievements

Political and social reformers

Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (1891–1956), born into a Dalit family, emerged as the foremost advocate for Dalit emancipation through legal, political, and social means. Educated at and the London School of Economics, he challenged discrimination by founding organizations such as the in 1924 to promote education and socio-economic upliftment among untouchables. As chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Indian Constitution in 1947–1950, Ambedkar ensured Article 17 abolished untouchability and Articles 15, 16, and 46 mandated , including reservations for Scheduled Castes comprising about 15–16% of India's population, to counter historical exclusion from public services and education. His advocacy extended to labor rights and women's equality, though he critiqued Hindu scriptures like the for perpetuating hierarchies, leading to his public burning of the text in 1927. In 1956, Ambedkar led the conversion of over 500,000 Dalits to in , rejecting Hinduism's ritual impurities and promoting equality based on rational ethics, an act that influenced subsequent Dalit Buddhist movements. Kanshi Ram (1934–2006), from a Ramdasi Sikh family of Valmiki Dalits in , shifted from government service to full-time in 1971, founding the All India Backward and Minority Communities Employees Federation (BAMCEF) in 1978 to unite educated Dalits, OBCs, and minorities against upper-caste dominance in . He established the (DS-4) in 1984 as a pressure group before launching the (BSP) on April 14, 1984—Ambedkar's birth anniversary—to politically empower the "Bahujans," whom he estimated at 85% of India's population including Dalits and OBCs, through grassroots mobilization and symbols like the blue flag representing labor. 's slogan "Jodo, Jago, Ladho" (Unite, Awake, Struggle) emphasized self-assertion over dependency on upper-caste alliances, enabling BSP's breakthrough in elections by 1993, where it formed coalitions securing Dalit representation in governance. His approach critiqued Congress-led , prioritizing economic via land reforms and education quotas. Earlier reformers included (1863–1941), a Pulaya Dalit from who, facing bonded labor and exclusion, organized the Pulaya Mahajana Sabha in 1907 to demand access to public roads, wells, and schools for untouchables. His campaigns led to the 1936 allowing Dalits into temples, challenging feudal landlord control over resources. (1845–1914), a Tamil intellectual, revived Buddhist identity for Dalits in the , arguing they were ancient Dravidian Buddhists oppressed by Brahmins, and founded the Dravida Mahajana Sabha in 1891 to promote temperance, , and anti-Brahmin self-reliance. These figures laid groundwork for Ambedkar's by fostering community consciousness amid resistance from orthodox Hindus. ![Flags of Bahujan Samaj Party at Shivaji Park][float-right] The BSP's emphasis on Dalit icons like Ambedkar and Kanshi Ram continues to shape political strategies, though electoral gains have fluctuated, with Uttar Pradesh remaining a stronghold where Dalit voters constitute around 21% of the electorate. Reform efforts persist against ongoing atrocities, with National Crime Records Bureau data reporting over 50,000 cases against Scheduled Castes annually as of 2022, underscoring the unfinished agenda of social equality.

Business leaders and innovators

Kalpana Saroj, born in 1961 in , , to a Dalit family, rose from poverty and an abusive to become chairperson of Kamani Tubes, a Mumbai-based manufacturer of and products established in 1959. In 2006, she acquired the near-bankrupt company for a nominal sum and implemented a revival strategy that included settling debts, modernizing operations, and expanding market reach, transforming it into a profitable entity with annual revenues exceeding ₹100 by the early . Her efforts earned her the award in 2013 for contributions to trade and industry. Ashok Khade, originating from a cobbler's family in , , founded DAS Offshore Engineering Private Limited in 1995 alongside his brothers Datta and , starting with ₹90 monthly wages from dockyard training. The company specializes in offshore fabrication for oil platforms, growing to employ over 4,500 workers and achieve annual turnover of approximately ₹500 by serving global clients. Khade's self-taught skills and persistence in securing contracts despite caste-based barriers exemplify Dalit entry into capital-intensive sectors. Ravi Kumar Narra, from a Dalit background in rural Andhra Pradesh, established CueLearn in 2011, an edtech startup focused on interactive mobile learning for K-12 students using gamification and multimedia. The platform secured $1.2 million in funding from investors including Endiya Partners and expanded to serve over 1 million users across India by addressing accessibility gaps in education technology. Narra's innovation in vernacular content delivery highlights Dalit contributions to India's startup ecosystem, though such successes remain outliers amid broader access challenges.

References

  1. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2011_Census_Scheduled_Caste_caste_distribution_map_India_by_state_and_union_territory.svg
  2. https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/[op-ed](/page/Op-ed)/the-need-to-address-caste-based-atrocities/article70159373.ece
  3. https://www.[researchgate](/page/ResearchGate).net/publication/395452257_A_CRITICAL_REVIEW_OF_THE_SCST_ACT%27S_PERFORMANCE_IN_PREVENTING_ATROCITIES_AGAINST_MARGINALIZED_COMMUNITIES
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