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Goodluck Jonathan
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Goodluck Ebele Azikiwe Jonathan ⓘ GCFR GCON (born 20 November 1957)[1] is a Nigerian politician who served as the president of Nigeria from 2010 to 2015.[2] He lost the 2015 presidential election to former military head of state General Muhammadu Buhari and was the first incumbent president in Nigerian history to lose re-election.[3]
Key Information
Previously, Jonathan served as the vice president of Nigeria from 2007 to 2010 under the administration of Umaru Musa Yar'Adua;[4] and in oil-rich Bayelsa State as governor from 2005 to 2007, and deputy governor from 1999 to 2005.[5][2] In 2015, Jonathan became the first Nigerian president to concede election defeat. It allowed the transfer of power to the opposition party in Africa's biggest democracy—a country that had hitherto experienced vote-rigging and violence.[6]
Early life and education
[edit]Jonathan was born on 20 November 1957 in Ogbia to a Christian Ijaw family of canoe makers,[1][7] in Otuoke, Bayelsa State.[2] His father, Lawrence Ebele Jonathan, was a canoe maker and his mother, Eunice Ayi Ebele Jonathan, was a retired farmer.[8] He attended a Christian primary and secondary school.[2] Jonathan received a bachelor's degree in zoology (second-class honours), a master's degree in hydrobiology and fisheries biology; and a doctorate in zoology from the University of Port Harcourt.[9][2] During his time in the university, he taught at Rivers State College of Education from 1983 to 1993.[2]
Pre-presidency (1998–2010)
[edit]Before entering into politics in 1998, Jonathan worked as an education inspector, a lecturer and an environmental-protection officer.[10] His political career began when he became involved with the nascent People's Democratic Party (PDP) in the late 1990s.[2] Jonathan entered into politics when General Sani Abacha, who ruled as military head of state of Nigeria from 1993 to 1998, died in office. In the 1999 Bayelsa State gubernatorial election, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha ran for governor under the platform of the Peoples Democratic Party and chose Jonathan as his running mate. Alamieyeseigha won the election and became the first civilian governor of Bayelsa State in May 1999. They were reelected in 2003 and Jonathan's diligence and loyalty to him earned him the recognition as Nigeria's most hardworking deputy governor.[citation needed]
Governorship
[edit]On 29 May 1999, Jonathan was sworn in as deputy governor of Bayelsa alongside Diepreye Alamieyeseigha who came in as the governor of the state on the platform of PDP. Jonathan served as Deputy Governor until December 2005.[11] On 9 December 2005, Jonathan, who was the deputy governor at the time, was sworn in as the governor of Bayelsa State upon the removal of governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha by the Bayelsa State House of Assembly after being charged with money laundering in the United Kingdom.[citation needed]
Vice-presidency (2007–2010)
[edit]As Vice President, Jonathan took a very low profile. While recognising the constitutional limits of the Vice President's office, he participated in cabinet meetings and, by statute, was a member of the National Security Council, the National Defence Council, the Federal Executive Council and chairman of the National Economic Council.
Order of succession
[edit]Jonathan was named Acting President of Nigeria on 9 February 2010, following a controversial doctrine of necessity from the Senate of Nigeria due to President Yar'Adua's trip to Saudi Arabia in November 2009 for medical treatment.[12] On 10 February 2010, his first day as acting president, Jonathan announced a minor cabinet reshuffle.[13]
In accordance with the order of succession in the Nigerian constitution, following President Yar'Adua's death on 5 May 2010, Jonathan, as Acting President, was sworn in as the substantive president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on 6 May 2010.[14] On 18 May 2010, the National Assembly approved Jonathan's nomination of Kaduna State Governor Namadi Sambo, to replace him as vice president.[15][16] For the general election in 2011, Jonathan and Vice President Sambo attended political events and travelled the country to campaign for the nation's highest office.[17]
On 29 May 2011, he was sworn in as the President of Nigeria and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, becoming Nigeria's 14th Head of State.[18] He gave his inauguration address where he declared his government was to focus on a Transformation Agenda and promised to continue implementing the seven-point agenda policy framework of President Yar'Adua.[19] He cited anti-corruption, power and electoral reforms as focuses of his administration. He stated that he came to office under "very sad and unusual circumstances".[20]
Presidency (2010–2015)
[edit]Economics
[edit]Under Jonathan's administration, Nigeria rebased its gross domestic product for the first time in over a decade, becoming the largest economy in Africa by overtaking South Africa and Egypt.[1] The Jonathan administration accrued over US$454 billion while in office from oil revenue.[21] Jonathan previously served as an assistant director at the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development commission between 1993 and 1998.[2]
The Jonathan administration oversaw the construction of new railways in the country, including the Abuja-Kaduna railway, and conceptualized high-speed rail projects. It also managed the construction and beautification of several federal roads, including the Lagos-Benin Expressway, Abuja-Lokoja Expressway, Enugu-Abakiliki Expressway, Onitsha-Owerri Highway, and most parts of the Enugu-Port Harcourt Expressway.[3] His administration also oversaw the construction of the second Niger Bridge between Onitsha and Asaba, which helped relieve the pressure on the old 1965 Niger Bridge, as well as the construction of airports across the country. The Akanu Ibiam Airport in Enugu was upgraded to an international airport, directly connecting the South-East region to the outside world for the first time since independence.[citation needed]
On 2 August 2010, Jonathan launched his 'Roadmap for Power Sector Reform'.[22] Its primary goal was to achieve stable electricity supply in Nigeria. The Power Holding Company of Nigeria, which acted as the nation's electricity provider, was broken up into 15 firms, with Nigeria handing over control of state electricity assets to 15 private bidding companies.[23] The Nigerian government contracted for the services of CPCS Transcom Limited, a Canada-based consulting firm specialising in transportation and energy infrastructure projects, to act as the transaction adviser for the handover of state electricity assets.[24]
Historically, the Nigerian power sector has been plagued by blackouts, mainly due to poor maintenance, theft, and a lack of government oversight rooted in corruption. Economists estimate that power outages have cost Nigeria, Africa's biggest economy, billions of dollars in imported diesel for generators and lost output. In a study conducted by the World Bank, a lack of access to financing and electricity were cited as Nigeria's main obstacles to development, surpassing corruption.[25]
Finances
[edit]Jonathan suspended Sanusi Lamido Sanusi as governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria[26][27] after a series of public investigations and raising the alarm on the US$20 billion NNPC scandal in a leaked letter which revealed that the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation failed to account for US$48.9 billion of government oil revenue to the central bank[28][29] – the NNPC has a history of financial irregularities and oversees the corrupt petroleum industry in Nigeria. Sanusi would go on to reveal the extent of financial recklessness that Nigeria lost a billion dollars a month to diversion of public funds under the Jonathan administration, with oil minister Diezani Alison-Madueke diverting $6 billion (₦1.2 trillion) from the Nigerian treasury.
In addition, Jonathan was alleged to have personally ordered over ₦3 trillion ($15 billion) from the Central Bank of Nigeria to support his election and other self-serving projects under the guise of an intervention fund for national security. Charles Soludo, a professor of economics and former governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, equated Jonathan's financial recklessness to that of former Ugandan president Idi Amin.[30] Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, an economist and former Finance Minister of Nigeria, pegged Jonathan's administration as the main cause of Nigeria's economic woes in a lecture at George Washington University,[31] although she later denied it.[32]
Corruption
[edit]Jonathan's government has largely been described as corrupt. According to The Economist, corruption flourished under the Jonathan administration, "who let politicians and their cronies fill their pockets with impunity."[33] Large sums of money have been used improperly multiple times, with ₦3.98 trillion (US$20 billion) allegedly going missing[34] and ₦398 billion ($2 billion) of military funds allegedly dispersed amongst high-ranking officials.[35] In 2006, reports released by Wikileaks claimed that Jonathan's wife, Patience Jonathan, was indicted for money-laundering by Nigeria's anti-crime agency, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC).[36]
Foreign affairs
[edit]
During Jonathan's administration, Nigeria's foreign policy was reviewed to reflect a "citizen-focused" approach, designed to "accord this vision of defending the dignity of humanity the highest priority" and connect foreign policy to domestic policy, while placing a greater emphasis on economic diplomacy.[38]
National issues
[edit]2010 Nigerian lead poisoning incident
[edit]In January 2013, Jonathan reportedly promised $4 million to assist in cleaning up villages that have been affected by a lead poisoning incident.[39][40] Over 400 children died and Human Rights Watch said that releasing the funds "could be lifesaving for countless children."[41]
2012 Occupy Nigeria protests
[edit]On 1 January 2012, the Jonathan administration announced the start of a controversial plan to end fuel subsidies.[42] Following the Nigeria Labour Congress' warning that the country faces many strikes, the country unions followed up with strikes that were matched with civil protests from 9–13 January 2012.[43][44] Protesters and groups called for Jonathan to resign over the removal of fuel subsidies.[45][46] After five days of national protests and strikes, on 16 January, Jonathan announced that the pump price of petroleum would be 97 naira per litre compared to a post-subsidy level of 147 naira.[47]
In 2012, upon the partial removal of petrol subsidies, the Jonathan administration instituted a subsidy re-investment programme designed to spend the money saved from partial petrol price deregulation on physical infrastructure such as roads, bridges, etc., across the country. The Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Program (SURE-P) was also intended to improve maternal health and reduce maternal mortality. The government followed the advice of international experts who claimed the fuel subsidy (which cost $8 billion per year, or 25% of the annual government budget)[48] was unsustainable. The Brookings Institution, a think tank, praised the government's move, arguing that the subsidy crowded out other development spending, such as education, and discouraged investment in the country's economic lifeblood: the oil sector.[49] In his book My Transition Hours, Goodluck Jonathan stated that the subsidy was consuming too much of the nations revenues and that the public believed the sector was highly corrupt. He mentioned that the Minister of Finance Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, briefed him on the corrupt practices uncovered by a technical committee she has assembled. Jonathan expressed alarm that billions of naira were being lost by the nation due to the subsidy regime.[50]
Many prominent Nigerians spoke out against the removal of the subsidy. Former Petroleum Minister Professor Tam David-West expressed concern that the planned removal of the fuel subsidy will squeeze the economy, increase inflation, and hurt both businesses and the public.[51] A former military Head of State who was also a former Minister for Petroleum & Natural Resources, General Muhammadu Buhari, urged Jonathan not to remove the fuel subsidy and to tackle corruption.[52] Yakubu Gowon, another former military Head of State, warned the government that the country's infrastructure should be revived before fuel subsidy removal steps were taken.[53] Former military president Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, joined millions of Nigerians protesting against the removal of the fuel subsidy by the Jonathan administration, saying that the action is ill-timed.[54]
2014 National Conference
[edit]In March 2014, President Jonathan inaugurated the 2014 National Conference. The conference was the first of its kind since the 2005 political reform conference,[55] it had 492 delegates that debated on key socio-political national issues impeding national development.[56]
2014 Ebola outbreak
[edit]On 20 July 2014, Patrick Sawyer, a Liberian-American, flew from Monrovia to Murtala Muhammed International Airport in Lagos, with a stopover at Lomé, Togo.[57][58][59] He was subsequently described as having appeared to be "terribly ill" when he left Monrovia. Sawyer became violently ill upon arriving at the airport and died five days later. In response, the Nigerian government observed all of Sawyer's contacts for signs of infection and increased surveillance at all entry points to the country.[60]
On 6 August 2014, the Nigerian health minister told reporters: "Yesterday, the first known Nigerian to die of Ebola was recorded.[61][62] This was one of the nurses that attended to the Liberian. The other five newly confirmed cases are being treated at an isolation ward." The doctor who treated Sawyer, Ameyo Adadevoh, subsequently also died of Ebola. On 22 September 2014, the Nigeria ministry of health announced: "As of today, there is no case of Ebola in Nigeria. All listed contacts who were under surveillance have been followed up for 21 days.[63][64] "According to the WHO, 20 cases and 8 deaths had been confirmed, along with the imported case, who also died. Four of the dead were health care workers who had cared for Sawyer. In all, 529 contacts had been followed and of that date they had all completed a 21-day mandatory period of surveillance.[65][66]
2014 Same Sex Marriage Prohibition Act
[edit]In January 2014, Jonathan signed into law the Same Sex Marriage Prohibition Act after it was passed by the Senate and House of Representatives.[citation needed] The law prohibits gay relationships, membership and other involvement in gay societies and organisations and gay marriages. The bill came after international polls showed that 98% of Nigerians did not think homosexuality should be accepted by society, the highest percentage of any country surveyed.[67] Penalties can be up to 14 years in prison for gay marriages and up to 10 years for other violations of the law.[68] Within a short period, the federal police department compiled a list of 168 gay people who would subsequently be jailed. Within days 38 lesbian and gay people had been jailed, with arrests beginning during Christmas. The anti-LGBT bill stipulates that those who withhold the details of LGBT individuals face prison terms of up to five years.[69] His decision and the law itself have been described as controversial,[70] but according to a poll, 92% of Nigerians supported the ban.[67]
Security issues
[edit]This section of a biography of a living person needs additional citations for verification. (April 2025) |
Jonathan's administration was heavily criticized for its failure to tackle insecurity. The first major challenge was the October 2010 Independence Day bombing. Okah told the court that President Jonathan and his aides organised the attacks in Abuja in a desperate political strategy to demonise political opponents, including former military head of state General Ibrahim Babangida, and to win popular sympathy ahead of the elections.[71]
2011
[edit]On 29 May 2011, a few hours after Goodluck Jonathan was sworn in as president, several bombings purportedly by Boko Haram killed 15 and injured 55.[citation needed] On 16 June 2011, Boko Haram claimed to have conducted the Abuja police headquarters bombing, the first known suicide attack in Nigeria.[citation needed] Two months later the United Nations building in Abuja was bombed, signifying the first time that Boko Haram attacked an international organisation.[72] In December 2011, it carried out attacks in Damaturu killing over a hundred people, subsequently clashing with security forces in December, resulting in at least 68 deaths.[citation needed] Two days later on Christmas Day, Boko Haram attacked several Christian churches with bomb blasts and shootings.[73]
2012
[edit]Following the January 2012 Northern Nigeria attacks, which left over hundreds of casualties, Abubakar Shekau, a former deputy of Mohammed Yusuf, appeared in a video posted on YouTube.[citation needed] According to Reuters, Shekau took control of the group after the death of Yusuf in 2009.[74][75][76] Authorities had previously believed that Shekau died during the violence in 2009.[citation needed] By early 2012, the group was responsible for over 900 deaths. On 8 March 2012, a small Special Boat Service team and the Nigerian Army attempted to rescue two hostages, Chris McManus and Franco Lamolinara, being held in Nigeria by members of the Boko Haram terrorist organisation loyal to al-Qaeda.[citation needed] The two hostages were killed before or during the rescue attempt. All the hostage takers were reportedly killed.[77][78]
2013
[edit]On 18 March, a bus station was bombed in Kano, with several casualties.[citation needed] In May 2013, Nigerian government forces launched an offensive in the Borno region in an attempt to dislodge Boko Haram fighters after a state of emergency was called on 14 May 2013.[citation needed] The state of emergency, applied to the states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa in northeastern Nigeria.[79] The offensive had initial success, but the Boko Haram rebels were able to regain their strength. Although initially offering amnesty, by June 2013 he ordered a 20-year jail term for anyone found to be in support of Boko Haram.[80] In July 2013, Boko Haram massacred 42 students in Yobe, bringing the school year to an early end in the state.[citation needed] On 5 August 2013, Boko Haram launched dual attacks on Bama and Malam Fatori, leaving 35 dead.[81]
2014
[edit]On 16 January 2014, it was reported that Jonathan had sacked his military high command in response to their inability to end the Islamist-led insurgency in Northern Nigeria.[82] On 14 April, over 200 schoolgirls in Chibok were kidnapped.[citation needed] A few weeks later in May, a terrorist offensive was launched against the military in Chibok. Many demonstrations called for the government to be more responsive; Jonathan asked that demonstrators focus on blaming Boko Haram itself for the abductions.[83] Jonathan initially denied that there had been any abduction at all, but then later signaled his government would do a prisoner release in exchange for the kidnapped girls. Discussions then took place in Paris with foreign ministers from France, Britain, the United States and Israel, where he agreed no deals should be struck with terrorists. He then called off the exchange at the last minute on 24 May 2014.[citation needed] This reportedly enraged Boko Haram leaders.[84]
In May 2014, two bombs exploded in Jos, resulting in the deaths of at least 118 people and the injury or over 56 others.[citation needed] During the June 2014 Northern Nigeria attacks, a plaza in the capital city was bombed and hundreds of villagers attacked in a two-day killing spree in Kaduna.[citation needed] In November, Boko Haram bombed the city of Kano, attempting to assassinate the Emir Muhammadu Sanusi II.[citation needed] Starting in late 2014, Boko Haram militants attacked several Nigerian towns in the North and captured them.[citation needed] This prompted the Nigerian government to launch an offensive, and with the help of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, they have recaptured many areas that were formerly under the control of Boko Haram. In late 2014, Boko Haram seized control of Bama, according to the town's residents.[citation needed] In December 2014, it was reported that "people too elderly to flee Gwoza Local Government Area were being rounded up and taken to two schools where the militants opened fire on them.[citation needed]" Over 50 elderly people in Bama were killed. A "gory" video was released of insurgents shooting over a hundred civilians in a school dormitory in the town of Bama.[85]
2015
[edit]Between 3 and 7 January 2015, Boko Haram attacked the town of Baga and killed up to 2,000 people, perhaps the largest massacre by Boko Haram.[citation needed] On 10 January 2015, a bomb attack took place at the Monday Market in Maiduguri, killing 19 people.[citation needed] The city is considered to be at the heart of the Boko Haram insurgency. In the early hours of 25 January 2015, Boko Haram launched a major assault on the city.[citation needed] On 26 January 2015 CNN reported that the attack on Maiduguri by "hundreds of gunmen" had been repelled, but the nearby town of Monguno was captured by Boko Haram.[citation needed] The Nigerian Army claimed to have successfully repelled another attack on Maiduguri on 31 January 2015.[citation needed] Starting in late January 2015, a coalition of military forces from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger began a counter-insurgency campaign against Boko Haram.[citation needed] On 4 February 2015, the Chad Army killed over 200 Boko Haram militants.[citation needed] Soon afterwards, Boko Haram launched an attack on the Cameroonian town of Fotokol, killing 81 civilians, 13 Chadian soldiers and 6 Cameroonian soldiers.[citation needed]
On 17 February 2015 the Nigerian military retook Monguno in a coordinated air and ground assault.[citation needed] On 7 March 2015, Boko Haram's leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) via an audio message posted on the organisation's Twitter account.[citation needed] Nigerian army spokesperson Sami Usman Kukasheka said the pledge was a sign of weakness and that Shekau was like a "drowning man". That same day, five suicide bomb blasts left 54 dead and 143 wounded. On 12 March 2015, ISIL's spokesman Abu Mohammad al-Adnani released an audiotape in which he welcomed the pledge of allegiance, and described it as an expansion of the group's caliphate to West Africa.[citation needed] Following its declaration of loyalty to ISIL, Boko Haram was designated as the group's "West Africa Province" (Islamic State West Africa Province, or ISWAP) while Shekau was appointed as its first vali (governor). Furthermore, ISIL started to support Boko Haram, but also began to interfere in its internal matters. For example, ISIL's central leadership attempted to reduce Boko Haram's brutality toward civilians and internal critics, as Shekau's ideology was "too extreme even for the Islamic State".[citation needed]
On 24 March 2015, residents of Damasak, Nigeria said that Boko Haram had taken more than 400 women and children from the town as they fled from coalition forces.[citation needed] On 27 March 2015, the Nigerian army captured Gwoza, which was believed to be the location of Boko Haram headquarters.[citation needed] On election day, 28 March 2015, Boko Haram extremists killed 41 people, including a legislator, to discourage hundreds from voting.[citation needed] Niger Army soldiers during counter-insurgency operations against Boko Haram in March 2015. In March 2015, Boko Haram lost control of the Northern Nigerian towns of Bama and Gwoza (believed to be their headquarters) to the Nigerian Army.[citation needed] The Nigerian authorities said that they had taken back 11 of the 14 districts previously controlled by Boko Haram.[citation needed] In April 2016, four Boko Haram camps in the Sambisa Forest were overrun by the Nigerian military who freed nearly 300 females.[citation needed] Boko Haram forces were believed to have retreated to the Mandara Mountains, along the Cameroon–Nigeria border. On 16 March 2015, the Nigerian army said that it had recaptured Bama.[citation needed] On 27 March 2015, the day before the Nigerian presidential election, the Nigerian Army announced that it had recaptured the town of Gwoza from Boko Haram.[citation needed]
By April 2015, the Nigerian military was reported to have retaken most of the areas previously controlled by Boko Haram in Northeastern Nigeria, except for the Sambisa Forest. In May 2015, the Nigerian military announced that they had released about 700 women from camps in Sambisa Forest.[citation needed]
2015 election
[edit]
Jonathan believed the APC's popularity was inflated, having made his view clear in an interview with The Cable, Nigeria's Independent Online Newspaper in 2015—just two days to the general elections. Jonathan said "I don't think Nigerians will make the mistake of voting for Buhari. Gen. Buhari, with due respect, is not the right option for Nigeria at this time. It is a gamble that is not worth taking. I may not be perfect as nobody is perfect. But I believe that come Saturday, the majority of Nigerian voters will choose me as the best candidate to lead the nation forward."[86] On 31 March 2015, Jonathan conceded the election to challenger Muhammadu Buhari, who was sworn in to succeed him on 29 May 2015.[87] Jonathan said in a statement he issued on 31 March 2015 that "Nobody's ambition is worth the blood of any Nigerian."[88]
Post-presidency (2015–present)
[edit]Since leaving office, Jonathan has continued to defend his administration. In 2019, he was appointed as the honorary special advisor to the Bayelsa Education Trust Fund board.[89] In June 2019, Goodluck Jonathan was named chairperson of the newly inaugurated International Summit Council for Peace.[90] In July 2020, Jonathan was appointed special envoy of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)[91] to lead mediation talks during the 2020 Malian protests.[92]
2023 election
[edit]It was alleged that Jonathan had expressed interest to stand for the 2023 Nigerian presidential election under the All Progressives Congress (APC). To achieve this, the APC primary nomination form was picked up for him by an unknown political group.[93] Nothing was later heard of it, as Jonathan never appeared for screening at the APC Secretariat. Former Lagos State governor, Bola Tinubu, emerged the APC candidate at a primary election conducted on 8 June 2022, defeating then-vice president Prof. Yemi Osinbajo and a host of other aspirants.[94]
2023 Zimbabwean general election
[edit]In 2023, Jonathan was appointed head of delegation for the African Union and COMESA in the 2023 Zimbabwean general election. On Friday, 25 August 2023, he addressed a press briefing giving Zimbabwe's electoral authority poor ratings.[95] This was in harmony with similar findings by the SADC and SEAM delivered earlier in the same press briefing.
Chancellorship
[edit]Effective April 27, 2021, H.E. Dr. Goodluck Ebele Azikiwe Jonathan serves as the 3rd Chancellor of Cavendish University Uganda. He replaces H.E. Benjamin Mkapa (former President of the United Republic of Tanzania and 2nd Chancellor) and H.E. Dr. Kenneth Kaunda (former President of the Republic of Zambia and 1st Chancellor).[96]
Personal life
[edit]Image
[edit]Jonathan is known for sporting his trademark fedora that is commonly worn by inhabitants of the Niger Delta.[97]
Family
[edit]Jonathan and his wife, Patience Jonathan, have two children.[98][99]
Wealth
[edit]In 2007, Jonathan declared his assets worth a total of ₦295,304,420 (then equivalent to US$8,569,662).[36]
Honours
[edit]National honours
[edit]
Nigeria:
Grand Commander of the Order of the Federal Republic (GCFR)
Grand Commander of the Order of the Niger (GCON)
Foreign honours
[edit]
Namibia:
First Class of the Order of the Welwitschia (22 March 2014)[100]
Other honours
[edit]- In 2013, Jonathan was awarded the chieftaincy title of the Se lolia I of Wakirike Bese. His wife, Patience Jonathan, also received a title of her own during the same ceremony.[101]
See also
[edit]References
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- ^ a b c d e f g h "Goodluck Jonathan". www.britannica.com. Retrieved 3 June 2023.
- ^ a b Siollun, Max (1 April 2015). "How Goodluck Jonathan lost the Nigerian election". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 22 October 2016. Retrieved 11 December 2016.
- ^ "Goodluck Jonathan: from poor boy to accidental president". The Guardian. 18 January 2015. Retrieved 18 March 2022.
- ^ "Nigeria's Goodluck Jonathan, profile of a defeated president". BBC News. 31 March 2015. Retrieved 27 February 2022.
- ^ "BBC Audio | Witness History | Goodluck Jonathan's phone call that changed Nigeria".
- ^ Profile: Goodluck Jonathan Archived 18 March 2010 at the Wayback Machine. Al Jazeera.net.
- ^ "Biography". Archived from the original on 16 March 2023. Retrieved 13 October 2022.
- ^ Buari, Jasmine (22 January 2015). "Obasanjo Speaks On Buhari's Certificate Saga". Legit.ng. Retrieved 29 August 2024.
- ^ "Profile: Goodluck Jonathan". BBC News. 6 May 2010. Archived from the original on 6 May 2010. Retrieved 6 May 2010.
- ^ "The man Goodluck Ebele Jonathan". Archived from the original on 13 May 2013.
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- ^ Uwugiaren, Iyobosa; Timothy, Golu (10 February 2010). "Jonathan Redeploys Aondoakaa". AllAfrica.
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- ^ "NASS confirms Sambo as vice president". Punch Newspaper
- ^ "National Assembly confirms Sambo as Vice President" Archived 27 April 2011 at the Wayback Machine, Liberty News
- ^ Jide, Ajani; Dayo, Benson (2010). "Nigeria: Sambo, Anenih to Head Jonathan's Campaign" – via allAfrica.
- ^ "Goodluck Jonathan Inaugurated as Nigerian President English". Voice of America. Archived from the original on 5 August 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2020.
- ^ "Seven-point agenda alive – Jonathan". Archived from the original on 11 April 2013.
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- ^ Udo, Bassey (14 May 2015). "Nigeria: Missing U.S.$20 Billion - Sanusi Faults Alison-Madueke, Says Audit Report Proves At Least U.S.$18.5 Billion Lost". Premium Times. Retrieved 29 August 2024 – via allAfrica.
- ^ "$2.1 billion DasukiGate: Key questions Jonathan must answer – SERAP". Premium Times. 10 January 2016. Retrieved 29 August 2024.
- ^ a b "Profiles". Archived from the original on 30 March 2013. Retrieved 12 April 2013.
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- ^ "FAQ: The fuel subsidy protests in Nigeria". One. 8 February 2012. Archived from the original on 6 February 2015.
- ^ "Removal of Fuel Subsidies in Nigeria: An Economic Necessity and a Political Dilemma". Brookings. 10 January 2012. Archived from the original on 6 February 2015.
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Further reading
[edit]- Ayoade, John A., and Adeoye A. Akinsanya, eds. Nigeria's Critical Election, 2011 (Lexington Books; 2012)
External links
[edit]- Official website at the Wayback Machine (archived 11 February 2015)
- Goodluck4President
- Goodluck Jonathan
Goodluck Jonathan
View on GrokipediaEarly life and education
Childhood and family background
Goodluck Jonathan was born on November 20, 1957, in Otuoke, a remote riverine village in Ogbia Local Government Area, then part of the Rivers State (now Bayelsa State), Nigeria.[13][14] He belonged to the Ijaw ethnic group, a minority community in the Niger Delta whose livelihoods traditionally centered on fishing and canoe construction amid mangrove swamps and waterways.[13][15] His family adhered to Christianity, common among Ijaw populations in the region, and exemplified the socioeconomic challenges of the oil-bearing Delta, where petroleum extraction since the 1950s generated national revenue but left local communities in persistent poverty due to inadequate infrastructure investment, environmental damage from spills, and unequal resource distribution.[14][16] Jonathan's parents, Lawrence Ebele Jonathan and Eunice Ayi Ebele Jonathan, raised their children in extreme hardship; his father earned a subsistence living as a canoe carver, crafting wooden vessels essential for local transport and fishing, while his mother supplemented income through small-scale farming.[17][14] The family resided in a rudimentary thatched house built on stilts over the river, a necessity driven by their inability to purchase dry land amid the watery terrain and economic constraints typical of Delta subsistence households.[14][16] This environment instilled early resilience against isolation and scarcity, with the Jonathan household reflecting broader patterns of illiteracy and limited opportunities in pre-oil boom Ijaw villages, where formal schooling was rare and self-reliance in basic trades prevailed.[18]Academic and early professional career
Jonathan completed his secondary education at Mater Dei High School in Imiringi, where he obtained his West African School Certificate in 1975 with distinction.[4][19] He enrolled at the University of Port Harcourt, earning a Bachelor of Science degree in zoology in 1981.[2] In 1985, he received a Master of Science in hydrobiology and fisheries biology from the same institution.[2] Jonathan later obtained a PhD in zoology in 1995, fulfilling the university's academic requirements after completing prescribed coursework and programs.[20][4] Prior to entering politics in 1998, Jonathan held positions as a science inspector of education, a lecturer, and an environmental protection officer.[15][21] He also served as assistant director in a directorate focused on environmental matters.[22] These roles involved civil service duties in education and environmental sectors.[15]Entry into politics
Early political roles in Bayelsa
Goodluck Jonathan's political career began in 1998 when he was selected as the running mate to Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) candidate in Bayelsa's inaugural gubernatorial election on January 9, 1999. The PDP ticket secured victory amid the competitive landscape of Nigeria's return to civilian rule, with Alamieyeseigha and Jonathan sworn in as governor and deputy governor, respectively, on May 29, 1999.[23][19] This marked Jonathan's entry into elective office in the newly established oil-producing state, formed in 1996 from Rivers State, where PDP dominance reflected alignments with federal power structures and local Ijaw interests in resource control.[19] As deputy governor from 1999 to 2005, Jonathan handled administrative responsibilities in a state grappling with foundational governance issues, including limited infrastructure, heavy reliance on federal oil allocations, and escalating Niger Delta unrest over environmental damage and revenue derivation. Bayelsa's economy, centered on crude oil from fields like those operated by multinational firms, generated tensions with emerging militant groups demanding greater local benefits, though Jonathan's specific interventions in militancy or spills during this period were secondary to his supportive role under Alamieyeseigha.[13] His technocratic background as a former civil servant in environmental protection positioned him within PDP's strategy to balance elite oil politics with grassroots appeals in a resource-conflict zone.[24] In late 2005, the deputy governorship thrust Jonathan into prominence amid Alamieyeseigha's corruption scandal. Alamieyeseigha was arrested in London on September 15, 2005, on money laundering charges involving over £1 million in unexplained assets; he jumped bail in November, disguising himself as a woman to flee back to Nigeria.[25] Jonathan assumed acting governorship duties during the governor's absence, navigating assembly resistance and federal pressure from the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). The Bayelsa House of Assembly impeached Alamieyeseigha on December 9, 2005, after serving him notice in November, enabling Jonathan's transition to substantive governor.[26][27] This episode highlighted Jonathan's endurance in Bayelsa's volatile politics, where PDP internal dynamics and anti-corruption enforcement intersected with local power struggles.[28]Governorship of Bayelsa State (1999–2007)
Goodluck Jonathan served as deputy governor of Bayelsa State from May 29, 1999, under Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, before assuming the governorship on December 9, 2005, following Alamieyeseigha's resignation amid federal corruption charges and impeachment proceedings in the UK for money laundering.[13] His initial months as acting governor focused on stabilizing administration in the oil-rich but underdeveloped Niger Delta state, where militancy and resource conflicts prevailed, laying groundwork for dialogue with local groups that presaged later national amnesty efforts.[22] As substantive governor, Jonathan prioritized infrastructure to address Bayelsa's chronic underdevelopment, including initiation of the Nembe to Brass road project, a significant bridge-linked route aimed at improving connectivity in remote creek areas.[29] Efforts extended to basic social services, with allocations for roads, schools, and health centers in Yenagoa and other locales, though his brief tenure—ending in May 2007—limited completion rates amid fiscal dependence on federal oil allocations.[30] These initiatives reflected a patronage-oriented approach typical of Nigerian state governance, emphasizing visible projects to build political support in an ethnically homogeneous Ijaw-dominated state, but empirical outcomes showed minimal dent in entrenched poverty, as Bayelsa's resource curse persisted with low human development indicators unchanged from pre-1999 baselines.[31] Critics noted uneven project distribution favoring core Ijaw communities and kin networks, exacerbating intra-state tensions in a patronage system where contracts often rewarded loyalists over merit, though direct evidence of systemic cronyism during Jonathan's short governorship remains anecdotal rather than quantified.[32] Bayelsa's GDP per capita stagnated below national averages despite oil revenues, highlighting causal failures in translating rents into broad-based growth, a pattern attributable to weak institutions and elite capture rather than isolated policy errors.[33] Jonathan contested and won the April 14, 2007, gubernatorial election under the People's Democratic Party, securing re-election, but upon his selection as vice-presidential running mate to Umaru Yar'Adua, he transitioned to national office on May 29, 2007, with deputy Timipre Sylva assuming the governorship.[34] Subsequent administrations abandoned many initiated projects, such as tourism hotels, underscoring discontinuity in state development.[35] His tenure is assessed as administratively competent in crisis management but enabling entrenched networks over transformative reform.Vice Presidency (2007–2010)
Appointment and initial role
In December 2006, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) nominated Umaru Yar'Adua, governor of Katsina State, as its presidential candidate following an endorsement by outgoing President Olusegun Obasanjo; Yar'Adua then selected Goodluck Jonathan, the incumbent governor of Bayelsa State, as his running mate to ensure representation from the South-South geopolitical zone, aligning with the party's informal zoning and rotation principles aimed at balancing ethnic and regional interests in Nigeria's diverse federation.[36][37] This choice emphasized political expediency over prior national prominence, as Jonathan's selection addressed demands for inclusion of the oil-producing Niger Delta minorities, who had long agitated for greater federal attention to regional development.[38] The Yar'Adua-Jonathan ticket won the presidential election on April 21, 2007, with Yar'Adua securing 24,638,063 votes (69.84 percent) against main rival Muhammadu Buhari's 6,605,099 (18.72 percent), amid widespread allegations of vote rigging, ballot stuffing, and intimidation reported by international observers including the European Union and Human Rights Watch.[39][40][41] The Independent National Electoral Commission declared the results valid, and Nigeria's Supreme Court upheld the victory in February 2008, rejecting petitions from opposition candidates despite evidence of irregularities exceeding 1 million votes in key areas.[42] They were inaugurated on May 29, 2007, marking Jonathan's transition from state to national executive office. As vice president, Jonathan assumed oversight of Niger Delta affairs, leveraging his regional background to chair committees on development and peace-building, including the push toward the federal amnesty program announced by Yar'Adua on June 25, 2009, which offered unconditional pardons, monthly stipends of about 65,000 naira (roughly $400), vocational training, and reintegration support to militants surrendering arms by October 2009.[43] Over 26,000 ex-combatants participated, leading to a sharp initial drop in kidnappings, pipeline sabotage, and oil theft that boosted production from under 1 million to over 2 million barrels per day temporarily.[44] However, the cash-based incentives were criticized as palliatives that incentivized temporary compliance without tackling causal factors like environmental degradation from oil extraction, inadequate infrastructure investment, and unequal revenue sharing, fostering dependency rather than sustainable resolution.[45] Jonathan's authority remained circumscribed by a presidential inner circle—often termed the "cabal" comprising Yar'Adua's family and northern aides—which restricted his access to decision-making and exemplified the vice presidency's constitutionally subordinate role, with no independent executive powers beyond ceremonial duties, exposing structural frailties in Nigeria's presidential system reliant on personal trust between leaders.[46][47]Constitutional crisis and ascension to presidency
President Umaru Yar'Adua departed Nigeria on November 23, 2009, for medical treatment in Saudi Arabia addressing acute pericarditis, an inflammation of the heart's lining, leaving Vice President Goodluck Jonathan to manage state affairs without formal power transfer.[48][49] Yar'Adua's prolonged absence, exceeding 90 days without notifying the National Assembly as required by Section 145 of the 1999 Constitution, precipitated a constitutional vacuum, as he failed to transmit a letter delegating executive authority to Jonathan, intensifying political tensions and fears of governance paralysis.[50][51] To resolve the impasse, the National Assembly invoked the doctrine of necessity on February 9, 2010, passing a resolution that empowered Jonathan as Acting President, bypassing the absent president's formal handover amid debates over constitutional fidelity versus pragmatic necessity.[52] This extraordinary measure, rooted in common law precedents for unavoidable exigencies, faced criticism from Yar'Adua loyalists who questioned its legality and accused Jonathan's supporters of exploiting the situation opportunistically to consolidate influence, though it averted immediate state collapse.[53][54] Yar'Adua died on May 5, 2010, at age 58 after months of incapacitation, triggering Jonathan's automatic succession under Article 146 of the Constitution, with the Chief Justice administering his oath as substantive President the following day, May 6, 2010.[55][56][57] The transition stabilized executive functions but amplified regional anxieties, particularly among northern elites adhering to an informal power-rotation accord, who viewed Jonathan's ascent—bypassing the vice-presidential slot for a southerner—as eroding zoning conventions and inviting godfatherism by unelected cabals.[54][58] Despite these critiques, the process demonstrated institutional resilience, as Jonathan refrained from declaring emergency rule in volatile regions during the interim, prioritizing constitutional continuity over abrupt interventions.[59]Presidency (2010–2015)
Economic policies and performance
Nigeria's economy under President Goodluck Jonathan grew at an average annual rate of 6-7% from 2010 to 2014, primarily fueled by elevated global oil prices above $100 per barrel, which amplified revenues from petroleum exports that constituted over 80% of federal income and exposed the economy's vulnerability to commodity price fluctuations rather than diversified productivity gains.[60][61] This oil-driven expansion, while boosting nominal GDP by roughly 54% in USD terms over the period, failed to mitigate structural issues like the Dutch disease effect, where resource rents crowded out non-oil sectors and perpetuated inequality despite headline figures.[61][62] A 2014 GDP rebasing updated the base year from 1990 to 2008, inflating measured output by 89% to $510 billion and briefly crowning Nigeria Africa's largest economy; however, this statistical revision, which reweighted services and informal activities, was critiqued as cosmetic enhancement that overstated transformation without corresponding improvements in per capita welfare or export diversification, as evidenced by persistent poverty rates exceeding 60%.[63][64][65] The administration's Agricultural Transformation Agenda, initiated in 2011, emphasized commercial value chains for crops like rice and cassava to reduce import reliance, achieving a reported 40% drop in food imports by 2013 through input subsidies and anchor borrower schemes; yet, outcomes were hampered by escalating agricultural labor costs and limited scalability beyond pilot commodities, yielding negligible shifts in overall sectoral GDP contribution.[66][67] Power sector privatization in September 2013 divested 11 distribution and six generation companies, raising $750 million for grid upgrades, but neglected transmission infrastructure privatization left the system gridlocked, sustaining chronic shortages despite trillions in subsequent spending.[68][69][70] Fuel subsidy removal on January 1, 2012, which doubled petrol prices to ₦141 per liter, ignited widespread protests and was hastily partially reversed amid fuel queues and scarcity, driving inflation to 12.6% that month and eroding public trust in reformist intent without fiscal savings materializing.[71][72][73] Naira devaluation by 8% in February 2014 aimed to curb reserve depletion but proved insufficient against oil price crashes, precipitating further depreciation and import cost surges.[74][75] Unemployment escalated to approximately 24% by 2015, reflecting jobless growth amid youth disenfranchisement, while lingering benefits from the 2005 banking recapitalization—stronger capital buffers and credit expansion—were undermined by rising non-performing loans tied to lax oversight.[76][77][78]Security challenges and counter-insurgency efforts
During Goodluck Jonathan's presidency, the Boko Haram insurgency intensified dramatically from 2011 to 2014, evolving from sporadic attacks into widespread territorial control and mass casualties in northeastern Nigeria. The group, which had been active since 2009, escalated operations following the death of its founder Mohammed Yusuf, launching suicide bombings, ambushes, and village raids that resulted in thousands of civilian and military deaths annually during the peak years. In 2014, Nigeria recorded 22,873 violent deaths nationwide, with Borno State—the insurgency's epicenter—bearing the brunt, as Boko Haram's tactics included the abduction of over 276 schoolgirls from Chibok on April 14, 2014, highlighting intelligence and rapid-response failures.[79][80][81] Jonathan's administration responded with a state of emergency declared on May 14, 2013, in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states, authorizing troop surges and curfews to dismantle militant strongholds under the Joint Task Force (JTF). Despite allocating billions to defense, counter-insurgency efforts yielded limited results, hampered by strategic shortcomings such as under-resourced JTF units, poor coordination, and initial reluctance to accept foreign intelligence or logistical aid—exemplified by refusals of international assistance in the Chibok search due to sovereignty priorities. Military spending ballooned without proportional gains, as Boko Haram seized towns like Mubi and controlled swathes of rural northeast territory by late 2014, displacing over a million people and straining regional security.[82][83][84] Compounding operational lapses was the $2 billion arms procurement scandal, where funds earmarked for weapons and equipment were diverted through opaque channels under National Security Adviser Sambo Dasuki, leaving troops underequipped against a foe employing improvised explosives and hit-and-run tactics. This graft, exposed post-tenure, directly eroded battlefield effectiveness, as soldiers often lacked ammunition and vehicles amid JTF desertions and morale collapses. Jonathan's government contrasted this hardline northern approach with the ongoing amnesty program for Niger Delta militants—initiated under his predecessor but expanded during his term—which reintegrated thousands of southern ex-fighters with stipends and training, prompting critiques of uneven policy favoring ethnic kin from the president's Ijaw background over northern threats. Efforts to extend amnesty to Boko Haram faltered, as the group rejected negotiations and failed to demobilize, unlike Delta insurgents.[85][86] By the May 2015 handover, modest territorial recoveries had occurred through intensified JTF offensives, but Boko Haram retained control over key enclaves in Borno and surrounding areas, with cross-border incursions into Cameroon, Chad, and Niger underscoring unresolved vulnerabilities. The administration's causal oversights—prioritizing domestic procurement marred by corruption over agile foreign partnerships—left a legacy of unchecked expansion, with over 10,000 deaths linked to the group during Jonathan's tenure per contemporaneous estimates, setting the stage for multinational interventions under his successor.[87][81]Corruption scandals and governance failures
The Jonathan administration was marred by multiple large-scale corruption scandals, particularly in the oil sector and military procurement, which exposed deep patronage networks and inadequate oversight mechanisms. In 2014, Central Bank Governor Lamido Sanusi alleged that the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) failed to remit approximately $20 billion in oil revenues to the federal account between 2012 and 2013, prompting a probe that attributed much of the shortfall to legitimate expenditures but recommended remitting at least $700 million while criticizing NNPC's opacity.[88] This incident underscored systemic accountability lapses in Nigeria's dominant oil industry, where state-owned entities operated with limited transparency.[89] Petroleum Resources Minister Diezani Alison-Madueke became central to allegations of graft, including receiving bribes in luxury goods, cash exceeding £100,000, and private jet flights, as charged in UK courts in 2023; she was arrested in 2015 amid probes into billions in diverted funds.[90][91] Nigerian court filings accused her and Jonathan of accepting bribes in a $1.3 billion illegal oil deal involving the OPL 245 block with ENI and Shell, breaching anti-corruption laws to favor cronies.[92][93] These cases illustrated how ministerial influence enabled rent-seeking, with post-administration asset forfeitures—such as the US agreement in 2025 to return $52.88 million linked to her—validating recovery efforts tied to Jonathan-era diversions.[94] The $2 billion arms procurement scandal further exemplified governance breakdowns, as funds earmarked in 2014–2015 for countering Boko Haram were allegedly misappropriated through phantom contracts awarded by National Security Adviser Sambo Dasuki, including for undelivered helicopters and aircraft.[95][96] Investigations revealed diversions totaling billions of naira to political allies and campaigns, weakening military capacity and contributing to insurgent gains; Dasuki and associates faced charges, with convictions underscoring the fraud's scale.[97] Separately, $31.4 million in frozen bank accounts linked to Patience Jonathan, the former first lady, drew scrutiny in 2016, as she claimed ownership but EFCC probes tied the funds to unexplained proceeds amid broader family asset inquiries.[98][99] Institutionally, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) under Jonathan pursued cases but was hampered by political interference, resulting in protracted trials, selective targeting of opponents, and few convictions against elite figures despite mounting petitions.[100] Nigeria's Corruption Perceptions Index score stagnated at low levels—2.4/10 in 2010 (equivalent to 24/100 on the post-2012 scale) and around 25–28/100 through 2015—reflecting entrenched perceptions of impunity.[101][102] Critics, citing post-2015 recoveries of Jonathan-linked assets, argued these validated systemic looting, while supporters dismissed prosecutions as politically motivated witch-hunts lacking due process; however, international forfeitures and court outcomes provided empirical substantiation for accountability deficits.[94] Governance failures manifested in patronage-driven appointments and repeated cabinet sackings—such as the 2013 dismissal of aviation and petroleum ministers amid scandals—revealing instability from unchecked cronyism rather than robust reforms.[100]Foreign policy and international relations
Goodluck Jonathan's foreign policy during his presidency adopted an Africa-centric orientation, prioritizing regional stability through ECOWAS and AU frameworks while advancing Nigeria's national interests in economic cooperation and security interventions.[103] This approach reflected a citizen-focused strategy aimed at enhancing Nigeria's influence in West Africa and attracting foreign investment to bolster domestic development.[1] A key example was Nigeria's robust support for the intervention in Mali in 2013, where the administration deployed 900 combat troops and 300 Air Force personnel as part of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), committing approximately N7 billion (about $34 million) for troops, logistics, and humanitarian aid.[104] President Jonathan emphasized sustained commitment until the crisis resolution, underscoring Nigeria's stake in countering Islamist threats with links to groups like Boko Haram.[105] Nigeria also hosted the World Economic Forum on Africa in Abuja from May 7-9, 2014, the first time in the country, with Jonathan delivering the opening address to promote intra-African trade and investment amid projected continental growth exceeding 5%.[106] Bilateral relations saw a pivot toward China, with Jonathan's administration securing loans such as one for the Abuja-Kaduna railway project, part of broader infrastructure financing that increased Nigeria's exposure to Chinese credit lines.[107] Ties with the United States and United Kingdom, however, experienced strains, exemplified by the U.S. cancellation of military training programs in 2014 under the Leahy Law due to concerns over Nigerian forces' human rights practices in counter-terrorism operations, compounded by perceptions of entrenched corruption hindering effective partnerships.[108] Nigeria maintained active roles in AU initiatives, advocating for African-led solutions to continental challenges, though critics argued this masked limited proactive diplomacy on transnational security threats.[103] Critiques of Jonathan's policy highlighted an overreliance on oil diplomacy, which prioritized hydrocarbon exports and loans over economic diversification, fostering aid dependency and vulnerability to global price fluctuations.[109] Furthermore, insufficient emphasis on Boko Haram's cross-border affiliations with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb failed to galvanize robust multinational responses early, exacerbating refugee outflows to neighboring states like Cameroon and Chad, with empirical data showing over 200,000 displacements by 2014 tied to unchecked insurgent spillovers.[110] These shortcomings, per analyses from policy think tanks, reflected causal priorities favoring short-term regional mediation over comprehensive threat mitigation.[111]Domestic social issues and reforms
In 2010, a severe lead poisoning outbreak linked to artisanal gold ore processing afflicted villages in Zamfara State, resulting in an estimated 400 child deaths under age five and widespread neurologic damage among survivors due to contaminated soil and homes.[112] [113] The federal response, coordinated with international aid from organizations like Médecins Sans Frontières and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, involved chelation therapy and site remediation, but delays in comprehensive clean-up—extending into 2013—exacerbated ongoing exposures, highlighting enforcement gaps in regulating informal mining despite identified causal pathways from ore grinding to environmental contamination.[114] [115] The Occupy Nigeria protests, erupting in January 2012 against government fuel price policies, saw nationwide demonstrations that turned violent in several locations, with clashes between protesters and security forces resulting in at least 16 deaths and 205 injuries reported by early January.[116] Additional incidents included at least three fatalities from police confrontations and two more from protest-related violence, straining public trust in governance amid perceptions of inadequate dialogue on socioeconomic grievances.[117] [118] Nigeria's handling of the 2014 Ebola virus disease outbreak, introduced via a single imported case in Lagos, limited secondary transmissions to 19 confirmed infections and eight deaths through rapid contact tracing and isolation, earning commendation from the World Health Organization for leveraging existing polio eradication infrastructure effectively.[119] [120] However, the episode underscored persistent weaknesses in broader public health infrastructure, such as surveillance and laboratory capacity outside urban centers, which constrained proactive prevention despite the containment success.[121] In March 2014, Jonathan inaugurated the National Conference with 492 delegates to address constitutional restructuring and national unity, yielding over 600 resolutions in a 10,000-page report submitted that August, including proposals for fiscal federalism and resource control.[122] The process, costing at least N3.5 billion, faced criticism as a political diversion ahead of elections, with Jonathan later citing resistance from entrenched interests and timing constraints as reasons for non-implementation, leaving recommendations unimplemented and debates on causal reforms unresolved.[123] [124] The Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act, signed into law on January 7, 2014, criminalized same-sex marriages, civil unions, and related advocacy with penalties up to 14 years' imprisonment, reflecting alignment with predominant Nigerian cultural and religious opposition to homosexuality as antithetical to traditional family structures.[125] [126] The legislation provoked sanctions threats and condemnation from Western governments, including the United States, which viewed it as infringing rights, though proponents argued it preserved indigenous moral frameworks against external secular impositions.[127] Enforcement outcomes remained inconsistent, with reports of heightened stigma but limited prosecutions data to assess broader social impacts.[128]2015 presidential election and transition
In September 2014, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) endorsed incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan as its presidential candidate for the 2015 election, effectively shutting out potential challengers within the party ahead of the formal primary.[129] On December 10, 2014, Jonathan secured the PDP nomination at the party's primary in Abuja with unanimous delegate support, as no viable opponents emerged.[130] The general election occurred on March 28, 2015, amid widespread voter dissatisfaction driven by ongoing insecurity from Boko Haram insurgency and perceptions of entrenched corruption under Jonathan's administration, which contributed to a decline in voter turnout from 54% in 2011 to approximately 44% in 2015.[131] Official results announced by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) showed Muhammadu Buhari of the All Progressives Congress (APC) defeating Jonathan with 15,424,921 votes (53.1%) to Jonathan's 12,853,162 votes (44.3%), a margin exceeding 2.5 million votes across 21 states where Buhari prevailed decisively.[132] While some PDP supporters alleged vote rigging and irregularities, empirical INEC data—including state-level breakdowns and card reader usage to curb fraud—indicated a genuine electoral backlash against PDP governance failures rather than systemic manipulation, as Buhari's victory aligned with regional strongholds and turnout patterns reflecting apathy in PDP bastions.[133] On March 31, 2015, before INEC's formal declaration, Jonathan telephoned Buhari to concede defeat, a move credited with averting potential post-election violence amid heightened tensions from insecurity and partisan rhetoric.[134] This concession, described by Jonathan in later reflections as a collective decision to preserve national stability, contrasted with claims from critics that it stemmed partly from implicit military pressures to ensure a smooth transfer, though no verified evidence of direct threats materialized.[135] The transition culminated in a peaceful power handover on May 29, 2015, during Buhari's inauguration in Abuja, marking the first defeat of an incumbent president and the end of PDP's 16-year dominance since 1999.[136] Globally praised for its civility, the process underscored causal realism in Jonathan's prioritization of democratic continuity over contestation, despite domestic critiques attributing the outcome to authentic voter repudiation of policy shortcomings rather than coerced capitulation.[137]Post-presidency (2015–present)
International mediation and diplomatic roles
Following his presidency, Goodluck Jonathan assumed several international mediation and diplomatic roles, primarily through regional bodies like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African Elders Forum (WAEF). In 2020, he served as ECOWAS special envoy to Mali amid political unrest, arriving in Bamako on July 15 to facilitate dialogue between President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta and opposition groups, though the effort preceded a military coup in August that ousted Keïta.[138][139] He continued this role into 2021, engaging the post-coup junta in Bamako to promote transition to civilian rule, as outlined in ECOWAS summit communiqués.[140][141] In Liberia, Jonathan led WAEF mediation missions ahead of the 2023 general elections, deploying observer teams on October 8 to monitor polling and advocate for democratic processes, contributing to the opposition's victory and a peaceful power transfer on January 22, 2024.[142][143] Similar efforts extended to The Gambia in January 2023, where he mediated disputes over a rejected draft constitution, engaging stakeholders during a two-day visit to Banjul to foster consensus on governance reforms.[144] Between 2015 and 2023, he headed international election observation missions in countries including Tanzania, Zambia, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, emphasizing peaceful resolutions modeled on his 2015 concession in Nigeria.[145] On July 19, 2025, Jonathan was appointed United Nations Global Crisis Envoy, the first African former head of state in the role, tasked with mediating conflicts, advancing peace initiatives, and advising on crisis management worldwide; the appointment, endorsed by major powers, leverages his prior regional experience but operates amid Nigeria's reduced pan-African clout post-2015 due to domestic security and economic setbacks during his tenure.[146][147] Through his foundation, he hosted the 2025 Democracy Dialogue in Accra, Ghana, on September 17, themed "Why Democracies Die," warning of authoritarian drifts and governance erosion in Africa, with participants including former presidents Olusegun Obasanjo and John Dramani Mahama.[148][149] These engagements have empirically facilitated short-term dialogues and observer validations leading to accepted electoral outcomes in cases like Liberia, yet causal analysis reveals limited enduring impact on root causes such as entrenched corruption and institutional weaknesses; for instance, Mali's mediation yielded transitional pacts but failed to avert recurrent coups, underscoring how external elder-statesman interventions often overlook structural governance deficits without domestic buy-in.[139][141] Critiques from regional analysts note a pattern of selective focus on West African crises amenable to quick diplomatic wins, potentially influenced by affiliations with figures from Jonathan's Peoples Democratic Party era, though no direct evidence ties interventions to partisan favoritism abroad.[150]Domestic political involvement and commentary
Following his departure from office, Goodluck Jonathan has maintained involvement in Nigeria's domestic political landscape primarily through election-related commentary and speculation surrounding potential future candidacy. In February 2023, as a member of the African Union Election Observation Mission for Nigeria's general elections, Jonathan joined former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta in visiting President-elect Bola Tinubu to discuss the electoral process, emphasizing the need for politicians to avoid seeking power "at all cost" and to consolidate democracy.[151][152] He has critiqued persistent electoral manipulation as a major threat to Nigerian democracy, attributing it to broader African challenges during a September 2025 address.[153] Jonathan has offered pointed commentary on Nigeria's political structures, arguing in April 2025 that the four-year presidential term limit—shared with countries like Ghana—is inadequate for achieving meaningful national development, as it constrains long-term planning and implementation.[154] At the Goodluck Jonathan Foundation's 2025 Annual Democracy Dialogue in Accra, he challenged young Nigerians to participate more actively in politics ahead of 2027, while highlighting betrayals and lies as endemic to the system, drawing from his 2015 election experience.[155][156] In 2025, Jonathan proposed establishing two large buildings in Abuja to display photographs of individuals, dead or alive, who have harmed Nigeria, with the aim of informing their grandchildren about their forefathers' roles in the nation's problems.[157][158] These statements have been interpreted variably: supporters view them as statesmanlike guidance toward democratic renewal, while critics, including elements within his former People's Democratic Party (PDP), see them as veiled efforts to rehabilitate his image and the party's prospects amid internal divisions.[155] Speculation about Jonathan's potential 2027 presidential run intensified in 2025, prompting cautions and pressures from political actors. In September 2025, the presidency dismissed rumors of his PDP candidacy as welcome but highlighted his past governance record as a likely obstacle, while PDP stakeholders urged him to support incumbent Bola Tinubu instead.[159] By October 2025, Niger Delta leaders, including former militant commander Government Ekpemupolo (Tompolo), met with Jonathan in Otuoke to press him against pursuing the bid, citing regional stability and the two-term constitutional limit he has already approached during his prior tenure.[160][161] Jonathan has not publicly confirmed intentions, but these developments underscore ongoing PDP factionalism and his enduring ties to Niger Delta advocacy for peace and resource equity, though without direct post-presidency initiatives documented beyond informal consultations.[162] Critics have faulted Jonathan's relative silence on ongoing probes into corruption allegations from his administration, such as those pursued by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) under successors, interpreting it as selective engagement that prioritizes personal political rehabilitation over accountability.[163] This reticence contrasts with his vocal critiques of electoral and systemic issues, fueling debates on his post-presidency impartiality versus perceived partisanship aligned with PDP interests.[164]Recent activities and appointments (2023–2025)
In July 2025, former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan was appointed as the United Nations Global Crisis Envoy, a role endorsed by major powers including the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and China, marking the first time an African has held the position previously occupied by figures such as Tony Blair.[165][147] This appointment underscores his ongoing involvement in international crisis resolution, building on prior mediation efforts in African conflicts. In August 2025, Jonathan, serving as Chancellor of Cavendish University Uganda since 2021, officiated the institution's 14th graduation ceremony in Kampala, where he engaged with students, faculty, and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni on educational priorities and bilateral issues.[166][167] The event highlighted his commitment to higher education in East Africa, emphasizing marketable skills and quality training amid regional development challenges. The Goodluck Jonathan Foundation organized its 2025 Democracy Dialogue on September 17 in Accra, Ghana, in partnership with the Ghanaian government and support from Côte d'Ivoire, convening African statesmen including former presidents Olusegun Obasanjo and John Mahama to address threats to democratic resilience and strategies for sustaining governance reforms across the continent.[168][169] Participants, including ECOWAS Commission President Omar Alieu Touray, consensus-built on promoting inclusive institutions to counter democratic erosion, reflecting Jonathan's advocacy for pragmatic African-led solutions over external impositions. On October 1, 2025, coinciding with Nigeria's 65th independence anniversary, Jonathan publicly urged citizens to maintain hope despite economic hardships, attributing progress to sustained national effort rather than quick fixes.[170] This statement aligns with his broader commentary on development timelines, cautioning against unrealistic expectations for rapid transformation in resource-constrained contexts like Nigeria.Personal life
Family and relationships
Goodluck Jonathan married Patience Faka Jonathan, née Oba, a fellow Niger Delta native from the Wiwa community in Rivers State; the couple has two children, a son and a daughter.[13][171] Patience Jonathan held the position of Permanent Secretary in the Bayelsa State civil service, appointed on July 12, 2012, by Governor Henry Seriake Dickson, though she stated she would serve in absentia without drawing a salary due to her role as First Lady.[172][171] Jonathan hails from a Christian family of canoe makers in the rural village of Otuoke, Ogbia Local Government Area, Bayelsa State, reflecting modest origins in the Niger Delta's riverine environment.[13] His ethnic ties to the Ogbia people, often associated with the broader Ijaw ethnic group dominant in Bayelsa and Delta State politics, facilitated his early rise through local governance in the oil-rich region, where Ijaw kinship networks played a key role in mobilizing support among minority communities.[173][15] No prior marriages or children from other relationships are documented in official records.[13] The Jonathan family's increased public visibility during his vice presidency and presidency contrasted sharply with their rural, subsistence-based upbringing, highlighting the transition from Niger Delta village life to national prominence without evident prior elite connections.[15][13]Public image and wealth allegations
Goodluck Jonathan ascended to the presidency in May 2010 following the death of Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, earning the moniker "accidental president" due to his unexpected rise from vice president, a position he assumed in 2007 after serving as Bayelsa State governor.[14][3] Originating from humble beginnings as a zoology lecturer in the Niger Delta, Jonathan's image initially evoked a narrative of an unassuming, scholarly figure thrust into power, contrasting with Nigeria's often bombastic political elite.[14] However, during his tenure, critics portrayed him as indecisive and ineffective, particularly in addressing insecurity from Boko Haram and economic mismanagement, with observers describing his leadership as rudderless and overly conciliatory toward entrenched interests.[174] Jonathan's public stature improved significantly after conceding defeat to Muhammadu Buhari on March 31, 2015, before official results were fully tallied, a move credited with averting potential post-election violence in Africa's most populous nation and establishing him as a statesman committed to democratic norms.[3][175][176] This early concession, announced via a phone call to Buhari, contrasted with historical Nigerian incumbents' reluctance to relinquish power and enhanced his international reputation, positioning him as a model for peaceful transitions in Africa.[3][177] Supporters highlight this act as evidence of personal integrity, while detractors argue it masked deeper governance failures rather than redeeming them. Regarding wealth, Jonathan declared assets worth approximately 170 million naira (around $1.1 million at 2007 exchange rates) in real estate, shares, and household items upon becoming vice president in 2007, a figure deemed modest relative to other officials.[178] He resisted public disclosure of assets as president, citing it as a matter of principle rather than legal obligation, a stance defended by his People's Democratic Party amid demands for transparency.[179][180] Post-presidency, he rejected claims estimating his net worth at $100 million, threatening legal action and asserting all holdings stemmed from legitimate earnings without foreign investments.[181][182] Allegations of unexplained wealth intensified with probes into his administration, including 2019 accusations by the Nigerian government that Jonathan accepted bribes in the Malabu Oil OPL 245 deal alongside former oil minister Diezani Alison-Madueke, involving secret profits from a $1.1 billion settlement.[183][184] Jonathan denied receiving any bribes, noting no formal charges were filed and attributing such claims to political motivations following his role in South African elections.[185][186] While billions in funds were recovered from associates and Alison-Madueke faced separate charges, including over frozen accounts linked to his wife Patience totaling $31 million, Jonathan maintained these did not implicate him personally, with supporters emphasizing the absence of convictions against him amid probes targeting over 25 former aides.[98][187] Critics, however, point to lifestyle discrepancies and the scale of recovered assets—estimated at trillions of naira looted during his term—as suggestive of indirect enrichment, though empirical evidence of direct personal gain remains unproven.[188][189]Honours and awards
National honours
Goodluck Jonathan was conferred the Grand Commander of the Order of the Niger (GCON) on 27 May 2007 by outgoing President Olusegun Obasanjo, following his election as vice president alongside Umaru Musa Yar'Adua.[190] This honour, the second-highest national award, is customarily bestowed on vice presidents and other senior public officials for distinguished service.[191] Upon assuming the presidency on 6 May 2010 after Yar'Adua's death, Jonathan was awarded the Grand Commander of the Order of the Federal Republic (GCFR) in June 2010, Nigeria's highest national honour reserved exclusively for the president.[192] The conferral, approved shortly after his inauguration, drew criticism from some legal groups for its perceived haste, though it aligned with precedent for heads of state.[192] Jonathan remains the only Nigerian to hold both the GCFR and GCON simultaneously.[193] These awards are tied to his constitutional roles rather than specific achievements, as per the National Honours Act framework.[191] No additional federal honours beyond these have been publicly recorded.Foreign and international honours
Goodluck Jonathan has been conferred with notable foreign honors, primarily recognizing his diplomatic engagements and efforts in promoting peace and democracy in Africa. These awards include Namibia's highest civilian decoration during his presidency and post-presidency recognitions from U.S.-based civil rights organizations and international peace foundations.[194][195][196] The following table lists key foreign and international honors received by Jonathan:| Honor | Conferring Entity | Year | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Order of the Most Ancient Welwitschia Mirabilis (First Class) | Republic of Namibia | 2014 | Namibia's highest national honor, awarded by President Hifikepunye Pohamba during a state visit in Windhoek on March 21, in recognition of Nigeria's contributions to Namibian independence and bilateral ties.[194][197] |
| SCLC Presidential Award | Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), United States | 2016 | Presented in Atlanta, Georgia, on January 14 for leadership in advancing human rights in Nigeria; Jonathan was the first African head of state to receive it from the organization co-founded by Martin Luther King Jr.[195][198] |
| Founders' Sunhak Peace Prize | Sunhak Peace Prize Foundation | 2025 | Awarded on March 24 for consistent mediation in African conflicts, including elections in Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, and promotion of peaceful power transitions; first recipient in the Founders' category from Africa, carrying a $1 million prize.[196][199] |