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India and weapons of mass destruction
India and weapons of mass destruction
India and weapons of mass destruction
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Republic of India
Location of India
Location of India
Nuclear programme
start date		1967
(58 years ago) (1967)
First nuclear
weapon test		18 May 1974
(51 years ago) (1974-05-18)a
First fusion
weapon test		11 May 1998
(27 years ago) (1998-05-11)b
Most recent test13 May 1998
(27 years ago) (1998-05-13)
Largest-yield test45 kilotons of TNT (190 TJ);
Scale down of 200 kt model c
Number of tests
to date		4 (6 Devices fired)
Peak stockpile180 warheads (2025)[1]
Current stockpile180 warheads (2025)[1]
Maximum missile
range		Agni-V - 7,000 to 8,000 kilometres
4,300 to 5,000 miles
NPT PartyNo
Weapons of mass destruction
By type
By country
Non-state
Islamic State
Nuclear weapons by country
Proliferation
Treaties

India possesses nuclear weapons and previously developed chemical weapons. Although India has not released any official statements about the size of its nuclear arsenal, recent estimates suggest that India has 180 nuclear weapons.[10] India has conducted nuclear weapons tests in a pair of series namely Pokhran I and Pokhran II.[11]

India is a member of three multilateral export control regimes — the Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement and Australia Group. It has signed and ratified the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. India is also a subscribing state to the Hague Code of Conduct. India has signed neither the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty nor the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, considering both to be flawed and discriminatory.[12] India previously possessed chemical weapons, but voluntarily destroyed its entire stockpile in 2009 — one of the seven countries to meet the OPCW extended deadline.[13]

India maintains a "no first use" nuclear policy and has developed a nuclear triad capability as a part of its "credible minimum deterrence" doctrine.[14][15][16] Its no first use is qualified in that while India states it generally will not use nuclear weapons first, it may do so in the event of "a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons."

Biological weapons

[edit]
Further information: History of biological warfare

India has ratified the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and pledges to abide by its obligations. There is no clear evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, that directly points toward an offensive BW program. India does possess the scientific capability and infrastructure to launch an offensive BW program. In terms of delivery, India also possesses the capability to produce aerosols and has numerous potential delivery systems ranging from crop dusters to sophisticated ballistic missiles.[17] No information exists in the public domain suggesting interest by the Indian government in the delivery of biological agents by these or any other means. To reiterate the latter point, in October 2002, then-President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam asserted that "India will not make biological weapons. It is cruel to human beings".[17]

Chemical weapons

[edit]
Further information: Chemical weapon

In 1992, India signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), becoming one of the original signatories of the CWC in 1993,[18] and ratified it on 2 September 1996. According to India's ex-Army Chief General Sundarji, a country having the capability of making nuclear weapons does not need to have chemical weapons, since the dread of chemical weapons could be created only in those countries that do not have nuclear weapons. Others suggested that the fact that India has found chemical weapons dispensable highlighted its confidence in the conventional weapons system at its command.

In June 1997, India declared its stock of chemical weapons (1,045 tonnes of sulphur mustard).[19][20] By the end of 2006, India had destroyed more than 75 percent of its chemical weapons/material stockpile and was granted an extension for destroying the remaining stocks by April 2009 and was expected to achieve 100 percent destruction within that time frame.[19] India informed the United Nations in May 2009 that it had destroyed its stockpile of chemical weapons in compliance with the international Chemical Weapons Convention, making it the third country, after South Korea and Albania, to do so.[21][22] This was cross-checked by inspectors of the United Nations.

India has an advanced commercial chemical industry, and produces the bulk of its chemicals for domestic consumption. It is also widely acknowledged that India has an extensive civilian chemical and pharmaceutical industry and annually exports considerable quantities of chemicals to countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and Taiwan.[23]

Nuclear weapons

[edit]
See also: India–United States Civil Nuclear Agreement
Further information: Strategic Forces Command

As early as 26 June 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru, soon to be India's first Prime Minister, announced:

As long as the world is constituted as it is, every country will have to devise and use the latest devices for its protection. I have no doubt India will develop her scientific researches and I hope Indian scientists will use the atomic force for constructive purposes. But if India is threatened, she will inevitably try to defend herself by all means at her disposal.[24]

Nehru pursued a policy of formally foregoing nuclear weapons while at the same time constructing a civilian nuclear energy program and by extension the capability to make a nuclear bomb. This policy was motivated by a conventional weapons superiority over its rivals Pakistan and China.[25] India built its first research reactor in 1956 and its first plutonium reprocessing plant by 1964.[26][27][28] India's nuclear programme can trace its origins to March 1944 and its three-stage efforts in technology were established by Homi Jehangir Bhabha when he founded the nuclear research center, the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research.[29][30]

India's loss to China in a brief Himalayan border war in October 1962, provided the New Delhi government impetus for developing nuclear weapons as a means of deterring potential Chinese aggression.[31] By 1964 India was in a position to develop nuclear weapons.[32] Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri opposed developing nuclear weapons but fell under intense political pressure, including elements within the ruling Indian National Congress. India was also unable to obtain security guarantees from either the United States or the Soviet Union. As a result, Shastri announced that India would pursue the capability of what it called "peaceful nuclear explosions" that could be weaponized in the future.[25]

India first tested a nuclear device in 1974 (code-named "Smiling Buddha"), under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi as a peaceful nuclear explosion. The test used plutonium produced in the Canadian-supplied CIRUS reactor, and raised concerns that nuclear technology supplied for peaceful purposes could be diverted to weapons purposes. This also stimulated the early work of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.[33] During the 1970s and the 1980s Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi, Morarji Desai, and Rajiv Gandhi opposed weaponizing its nuclear program beyond PNE and theoretical research. In 1982, Indira Gandhi refused to allow the Defence Research and Development Organisation to develop active nuclear weapons but also approved the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme that would develop missiles to deliver a nuclear warhead if India developed one. India also supported international nuclear non-proliferation and arms control efforts.[25]

The situation changed again in the late 1980s after the 1987 Brasstacks crisis and the beginning of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. In 1989, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi gave Defense Secretary Naresh Chandra approval to develop the bomb. Chandra continued the program through successive governments in the 1990s after Gandhi lost power in the 1989 general election. India most likely completed weaponized nuclear warheads around 1994.[25] India performed further nuclear tests in 1998 (code-named "Operation Shakti") under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. In 1998, as a response to the continuing tests, the United States and Japan imposed sanctions on India, which have since been lifted.[34]

Neutron bombs

[edit]

R Chidambaram, who headed India's Pokhran-II nuclear tests, told the Press Trust of India in 1999 that India was capable of producing a neutron bomb.[35]

India's no-first-use policy

[edit]

India has a declared nuclear no-first-use policy and is in the process of developing a nuclear doctrine based on "credible minimum deterrence." In August 1999, the Indian government released a draft of the doctrine[36] which asserts that nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence and that India will pursue a policy of "retaliation only". The document also maintains that India "will not be the first to initiate a nuclear first strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail" and that decisions to authorize the use of nuclear weapons would be made by the Prime Minister or his 'designated successor(s)'.[36] According to the NRDC, despite the escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan in 2001–2002, India remained committed to its nuclear no-first-use policy.

India's Strategic Nuclear Command was formally established in 2003, with an Indian Air Force officer, Air Marshal Tej Mohan Asthana, as the Commander-in-Chief. The Joint Services SNC is the custodian of all of India's nuclear weapons, missiles and defense assets. It is also responsible for executing all aspects of India's nuclear policy. However, the civil leadership, in the form of the CCS (Cabinet Committee on Security) is the only body authorised to order a nuclear strike against another offending strike. The National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon reiterated a policy of "no first use" against nuclear weapon states and "non-use against non-nuclear weapon states" in a speech on the occasion of Golden Jubilee celebrations of National Defence College in New Delhi on 21 October 2010, a doctrine Menon said reflected India's "strategic culture, with its emphasis on minimal deterrence.[37][38] In April 2013 Shyam Saran, convener of the National Security Advisory Board, affirmed that regardless of the size of a nuclear attack against India, be it a miniaturised version or a "big" missile, India will retaliate massively to inflict unacceptable damage.[39]

In 2016, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar questioned the no-first-use policy, asking why India should "bind" itself when it is a "responsible nuclear power". Later he clarified that this was his personal opinion.[40] Defence Minister Rajnath Singh in 2019 said that in the future, India's no-first-use policy might change depending upon the "circumstances".[41][42] In a January 2022 statement, however, the Ministry of External Affairs reiterated India's doctrine of "maintaining a credible minimum deterrence based on a No First Use posture and non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states".[16][43]

As of 2025, India's no-first-use policy is qualified.[44]: 310  It states that it will not engage in first use of nuclear weapons except in the event of "a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons.[44]: 310 

Indian nuclear triad

[edit]
See also: Nuclear triad

India's nuclear triad is a military force structure that includes three parts:

  • Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs): Land-based nuclear missiles
  • Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs): Nuclear-missile-armed submarines
  • Strategic bombers: Aircraft with nuclear bombs and missiles

The purpose of India's nuclear triad is to increase nuclear deterrence by reducing the chance of an enemy destroying all of India's nuclear forces in a first-strike attack. This ensures that India can still launch a second strike.[45]

Air-launched nuclear weapons

[edit]
The Mirage 2000 of the Indian Air Force is believed to be assigned the nuclear strike role, operating from Maharajpur Air Force Station.

Nuclear-armed fighter-bombers were India's first and only nuclear-capable strike force until 2003 when the country's first land-based nuclear ballistic missiles were fielded.[46]

In addition to their ground-attack role, it is believed that the Dassault Mirage 2000s and SEPECAT Jaguars of the Indian Air Force are able to provide a secondary nuclear-strike role.[47] The SEPECAT Jaguar was designed to be able to carry and deploy nuclear weapons and the Indian Air Force has identified the jet as being capable of delivering Indian nuclear weapons.[48] The most likely delivery method would be the use of bombs that are free-falling and unguided.[49]

Three airbases with four squadrons of Mirage 2000H (about 16 aircraft with 16 bombs from 1st and 7th squadrons of the 40th Wing at Maharajpur Air Force Station) and Jaguar IS/IB (about 32 aircraft with 32 bombs from one squadron each at Ambala Air Force Station and Gorakhpur Air Force Station) aircraft are believed to be assigned the nuclear strike role.[46]

Land-based ballistic missiles

[edit]
Agni-V during its first test flight on 19 April 2012

The estimated 68 nuclear warheads[46] of land-based nuclear weapons of India are under the control of and deployed by the Strategic Forces Command,[50] using a variety of vehicles and launching silos. They currently consist of six different types of ballistic missiles, the Agni-I, the Agni-II, Agni-III, Agni-IV, Agni-V, Agni-P, and the Army's variant of the Prithvi missile family – the Prithvi-I. However, the Prithvi missiles are less useful for delivering nuclear weapons because they have a shorter range and must be deployed very close to the India–Pakistan border.[25] Additional variants of the Agni missile series have recently been inducted including the most recent, the Agni-IV[51] and the Agni-V, which is currently being deployed.[52] Agni-VI is also under development, with an estimated range of 10,000–12,000 km and features such as Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) or Maneuverable reentry vehicles (MARVs).[53][54]

The Agni-V ballistic missile at the Republic Day parade.
Land-based ballistic missiles
Name Type Range (km) Status
Prithvi-I   Short-range ballistic missile 150 Deployed
Prithvi-II   Short-range ballistic missile 250–350
Prithvi-III   Short-range ballistic missile 350–600
Agni-I Medium-range ballistic missile 700
Shaurya Medium-range ballistic missile 700–1900
Agni-P Medium-range ballistic missile 1,000–2,000
Agni-II Medium-range ballistic missile 2,000–3,000
Agni-III Intermediate-range ballistic missile 3,500–5,000
Agni-IV Intermediate-range ballistic missile 4000
Agni-V Intercontinental ballistic missile 7,000–8,000
Agni-VI Intercontinental ballistic missile 10,000–12,000 Under development
Surya Intercontinental ballistic missile ~16,000 Unconfirmed

Sea-based ballistic missiles

[edit]
K-15 Sagarika SLBM

The Indian Navy has developed two sea-based delivery systems for nuclear weapons, completing Indian ambitions for a nuclear triad, which may have been deployed in 2015.[55][56]

A conceptual drawing of INS Arihant

The first is a submarine-launched system consisting of at least four 6,000-tonne (nuclear-powered) ballistic missile submarines of the Arihant class. The first vessel, INS Arihant, was commissioned in August 2016. She is the first nuclear-powered submarine to be built by India.[57][58] A CIA report claimed that Russia provided technological aid to the naval nuclear propulsion program.[59][60] The submarines will be armed with up to 12 Sagarika (K-15) missiles armed with nuclear warheads. Sagarika is a submarine-launched ballistic missile with a range of 700 km. This missile has a length of 8.5 meters, weighs seven tonnes and can carry a pay load of up to 50 kg.[61] Sagarika has already been test-fired from an underwater pontoon, but now DRDO is planning a full-fledged test of the missile from a submarine and for this purpose may use the services of the Russian Navy.[62] India's DRDO is also working on a submarine-launched ballistic missile version of the Agni-III missile, known as the Agni-III SL. According to Indian defence sources, the Agni-III SL will have a range of 3,500 kilometres (2,200 mi).[63] The new missile will complement the older and less capable Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic missiles. However, the Arihant class ballistic missile submarines will be only capable of carrying a maximum of four Agni-III SL.

The second is a ship-launched system based around the short-range ship-launched Dhanush ballistic missile (a variant of the Prithvi missile). It has a range of around 300 km. In the year 2000, the short-range missile was test-fired from INS Subhadra (a Sukanya class patrol craft). INS Subhadra was modified for the test and the missile was launched from the reinforced helicopter deck. The results were considered partially successful.[64] In 2004, the missile was again tested from INS Subhadra and this time the results were reported successful.[65] In December 2005 the missile was tested again, but this time from the destroyer INS Rajput. The test was a success with the missile hitting the land based target.[66]

Sea-based ballistic missiles
Name Type Range (km) Status
Dhanush Short-range ballistic missile 350 Operational[67]
Sagarika (K-15)   Submarine-launched ballistic missile 700
K-4 Submarine-launched ballistic missile 3,500
K-5 Submarine-launched ballistic missile 5,000-6,000 Under Development[68]
K-6 Submarine-launched ballistic missile 8,000-10,000

Question over thermonuclear capability

[edit]
Shakti-1, India's alleged thermonuclear test device

There is not enough public information to determine if India possesses either multiple-stage thermonuclear weapons or boosted fission weapons.[69][70][71][72][73] On 11 May 1998, India announced that it had detonated a two-stage thermonuclear bomb with a yield of 45 kilotons in its Operation Shakti tests ("Shakti-I", specifically, in Sanskrit the word 'Shakti' means power).[74][75] However, due to subsequent statements by involved scientists, the low device yield, and the nature of underground testing, it remains unclear if Shakti-I had any thermonuclear yield. Based on this, it is unclear if India weaponized two-stage thermonuclear bombs for deployment.[69] These questions continue to affect Indian nuclear weapons policy with regard to the possibility of future testing.[71]

1998 test reactions

[edit]

In 1998, immediately after the test, Samar Mubarakmand, a Pakistani nuclear physicist, asserted that if Shakti-I had been a thermonuclear test, the device had failed to fire.[76] However, Harold M. Agnew, former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, said that India's assertion of having detonated a staged thermonuclear bomb was very much believable.[77] Rajagopala Chidambaram, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of India said that India has the capability to build thermonuclear bombs of any yield at will.[77] The test took place two years after the 1996 opening of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and following the test series India declared a voluntary testing moratorium,[71] believed to be maintained to this day.[citation needed]

2009 revelations

[edit]

Following the 2005 India–United States Civil Nuclear Agreement, and the 2009 inauguration of the Obama administration, there was increased concern in the Indian nuclear weapons community that India would be pressured to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, forbidding future underground tests.

At this time, Indian nuclear physicist and weapons program coordinator Krishnamurthy Santhanam claimed that the Shakti-I test saw a fizzle in the secondary thermonuclear stage, failing to achieve fusion ignition. The Washington Post reported:

Santhanam said that the hydrogen bomb tested in 1998 "completely failed to ignite" and that the shaft, the frame and the winches were found to be intact even after the tests. No crater was formed in the fusion test. "If the second H-bomb stage of the composite device had worked, the shaft would have been blown to smithereens," he told reporters.[78]

This statement was supported by former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of India, P. K. Iyengar who stated that "there is strong reason to believe the thermonuclear device had not fully burnt and, therefore, further testing was called for."[79]

In response, physicists Chidambaram, Anil Kakodkar, and former president A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, maintained that the test was a success and India can build thermonuclear weapons of various yields up to around 200 kt (840 TJ) based on the Shakti-1 test.[80][81]

In a subsequent interview, Santhanam said "I have maintained and will always maintain that the test was not more than 60 per cent successful in terms of the yield it generated. I have made this assessment based on the report of the instrumentation data that is available and also the programme coordinator." He also criticized former president Kalam's role in the Pokhran-II test series as he was "a missile scientist and he was not present there at that time".[82]

Possibility of resumption of testing

[edit]

In 2009, Iyengar and Bharat Karnad supported India maintaining its option for future nuclear testing by not joining the CTBT, in light of India potentially lacking verified thermonuclear weapons.

A Washington-based Arms Control Association spokesperson criticized Santhanam's comments as being motivated by opposition to nuclear disarmament and the opportunity for future nuclear testing, stating resumed testing would provoke resumed nuclear testing by Pakistan and even CTBT-signatory China. Testing would also end the 2005 nuclear deal with the United States, jeopardizing India's supply of low-enriched uranium for its commercial nuclear reactors.[71]

In 2012, India began construction in Challakere of a facility related to thermonuclear weapons.[83]

As of 2025, neither India nor Pakistan have signed the CTBT.[citation needed]

Yield

[edit]

The yield of India's hydrogen bomb test remains highly debatable among the Indian science community and international scholars.[84] The question of politicisation and disputes between Indian scientists further complicated the matter.[85]

India claimed that their thermonuclear device was tested at a controlled yield of 45 kt (190 TJ) because of the proximity of the Khetolai village at about 5 kilometres (3.1 mi), to ensure that the houses in that village do not suffer significant damage.[80] Another cited reason was that radioactivity released from yields significantly more than 45 kilotons might not have been contained fully.[80]

In an interview in August 2009, the director for the 1998 test site preparations, K. Santhanam claimed that the yield of the thermonuclear explosion was lower than expected and that India should therefore not rush into signing the CTBT. Other Indian scientists involved in the test have disputed K. Santhanam's claim,[86] arguing that Santhanam's claims are unscientific.[75] British seismologist Roger Clarke argued that the magnitudes suggested a combined yield of up to 60 kilotonnes of TNT (250 TJ), consistent with the Indian announced total yield of 56 kilotonnes of TNT (230 TJ).[87] U.S. seismologist Jack Evernden has argued that for correct estimation of yields, one should 'account properly for geological and seismological differences between test sites.[80]

International response

[edit]

India is not a signatory to either the NPT or the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) but did accede to the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in October 1963. Journalist, conspiracy theorist,[88][89] and holocaust denier[90] Gregory Douglas claims CIA officer Robert Crowley told him in an interview in 1993 that India's pursuit of the programme disturbed the United States and that the CIA assassinated Prime Minister Shastri and Homi Bhabha in 1966.[91][92][93] India is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and four of its 17 nuclear reactors are subject to IAEA safeguards. India announced its lack of intention to accede to the NPT as late as 1997 by voting against the paragraph of a General Assembly Resolution[94] which urged all non-signatories of the treaty to accede to it at the earliest possible date.[95] India voted against the UN General Assembly resolution endorsing the CTBT, which was adopted on 10 September 1996. India objected to the lack of provision for universal nuclear disarmament "within a time-bound framework." India also demanded that the treaty ban laboratory simulations. In addition, India opposed the provision in Article XIV of the CTBT that requires India's ratification for the treaty to enter into force, which India argued was a violation of its sovereign right to choose whether it would sign the treaty. In early February 1997, Foreign Minister I. K. Gujral reiterated India's opposition to the treaty, saying that "India favors any step aimed at destroying nuclear weapons, but considers that the treaty in its current form is not comprehensive and bans only certain types of tests."

In August 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) approved a safeguards agreement with India under which the former will gradually gain access to India's civilian nuclear reactors.[96] In September 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group granted India a waiver to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other countries.[97] The implementation of this waiver makes India the only known country with nuclear weapons which is not a party to the NPT but is still allowed to carry out nuclear commerce with the rest of the world.[98][99]

Since the implementation of the NSG waiver, India has signed nuclear deals with several countries including France,[100] United States,[101] Mongolia, Namibia,[102] Kazakhstan[103] and Australia[104] while the framework for similar deals with Canada and the United Kingdom are also being prepared.[105][106][99]

Domestic legislation

[edit]

India has several laws in whole or partial measure that deal with the regulation of weapons of mass destruction.[107] They include the Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act of 2005.[107] In April 2022 a bill was tabled to amend the 2005 act to include the financing of proliferation.[108]

See also

[edit]
Weapons of mass destruction
Defense-related

References

[edit]

Sources

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

India and weapons of mass destruction

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from Grokipedia
India maintains a nuclear arsenal estimated at 180 warheads as of early 2025, developed through an indigenous program outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty framework, with delivery capabilities encompassing aircraft, land-based ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched systems in a maturing . The program originated with India's first nuclear test in 1974, dubbed "" and presented as a peaceful explosion, followed by five tests in 1998 under Operation that established its status as a nuclear weapons state. India adheres to a doctrine of and no-first-use of nuclear weapons, pledging retaliation only against nuclear attacks on its territory or forces, a policy reaffirmed in official statements as recently as October 2025. While India's weapons of mass destruction efforts focus predominantly on nuclear capabilities, it has ratified the , declaring and destroying its limited chemical stockpiles by 2009 in compliance with obligations, and the , with no evidence of offensive biological programs. The nuclear advancements, including canisterised missiles like with MIRV potential and ballistic missile submarines such as , aim to ensure survivable second-strike options amid regional tensions with and , though the program's opacity and tests have drawn and proliferation concerns historically. India's refusal to join the NPT stems from its view of the treaty as discriminatory, favoring instead voluntary moratoriums on testing and fissile material production for weapons, positioning it as a responsible nuclear actor in bilateral deals like the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement.

Historical Development

Early Atomic Research and Independence Era

India's atomic research originated in the pre-independence period through efforts led by Homi Jehangir Bhabha, who established the in Bombay in 1945 to pursue cosmic ray and nuclear physics studies. Following independence on August 15, 1947, the government prioritized scientific self-reliance, with Bhabha appointed chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), formed on August 10, 1948, under the Department of Scientific Research to oversee atomic energy development for peaceful purposes such as energy production and medical applications. In 1954, the (DAE) was created as an executive agency directly under the prime minister, granting Bhabha enhanced authority to expand research infrastructure, including the Atomic Energy Establishment, (AEET), which focused on multidisciplinary nuclear studies and later became the (BARC). This era emphasized indigenous capabilities amid limited foreign assistance, with early experiments in extraction and design laying groundwork for production, though officially framed within non-military objectives as per Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's policy of for development rather than armament. Key milestones included the commissioning of the Zerlina zero-power reactor in the mid-1950s for neutronics testing, followed by , India's first operational , which achieved criticality on August 4, 1956, at 3:45 PM, marking Asia's inaugural and enabling initial experiments in and isotope production. The , a 40 MW heavy-water moderated facility supplied by with U.S.-provided , became operational in 1960, producing that later supported weapons research, though its primary role was training and materials testing under international safeguards. These facilities, built with collaborations from the , , and the , fostered expertise in reactor technology and fuel cycles, positioning for advanced nuclear pursuits by the despite geopolitical constraints on proliferation.

Geopolitical Catalysts: China’s Tests and Regional Threats

The defeat of Indian forces in the of 1962, which lasted from October 20 to November 21 and resulted in capturing approximately 38,000 square kilometers of disputed territory before a unilateral , revealed critical asymmetries in conventional military capabilities and prompted Indian policymakers to reconsider deterrence strategies against . This conflict, rooted in border disputes over and , not only humiliated India militarily but also highlighted its dependence on external powers like the and for support, fostering a drive for strategic autonomy that included advanced indigenous technologies. China's inaugural nuclear test on October 16, 1964, at the site—a 15-kiloton fission device known as —delivered a profound strategic shock to , with explicitly intending it as a "head-on blow" to New Delhi's regional ambitions and security calculations. This event transformed into 's proximate nuclear adversary, accelerating debates within India's Commission and political leadership about shifting from civilian nuclear research—initiated under in the 1940s—to capabilities with military potential, despite international non-proliferation pressures. Indian intelligence assessments of Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation further amplified perceptions of encirclement, as 's assistance to Islamabad's program signaled a coordinated regional . Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, crystallized after India's 1971 victory in the Indo-Pakistani War—which led to Bangladesh's independence and the surrender of over 90,000 Pakistani troops—posed an evolving southern flank risk, with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's 1965 pledge to acquire nuclear weapons "even if we have to eat grass" gaining urgency amid fears of Indian dominance. By the late 1970s, Pakistan's covert uranium enrichment efforts, reportedly aided by , were viewed in as an existential counterbalance to India's superior conventional forces, compelling India to maintain ambiguity in its nuclear posture to deter both adversaries simultaneously. These dual threats—China's nuclear monopoly post-1964 and Pakistan's asymmetric pursuit—underpinned India's rationale for a minimum credible deterrent, prioritizing survivable second-strike options over first-use doctrines.

1974 Smiling Buddha Test

On May 18, 1974, conducted its first nuclear test, code-named Operation , at the Pokhran Test Range in Rajasthan's . The underground detonation involved an implosion-type fission device fueled by approximately 6 kilograms of , derived from the Canadian-supplied CIRUS and reprocessed at the in . The was directed by physicist , with oversight from Atomic Energy Commission chairman , under the authorization of Prime Minister , and maintained extreme secrecy, involving only a small team of about 75 and engineers. The device employed a core compressed by conventional high s to achieve supercriticality, marking India's demonstration of nuclear capability despite official designation as a "peaceful nuclear explosion" (PNE) for applications like or . Indian authorities reported a yield of 12-13 kilotons of , based on seismic and cratering data, though independent analyses, including those using seismic ratios from later tests, suggest a lower figure of around 8-10 kilotons, indicating potential inefficiencies in the implosion symmetry or initiator performance. The test shaft was drilled to a depth of approximately 107 meters, with the explosion generating a seismic signal detected internationally, confirming the event's nuclear nature despite the PNE framing, which blurred distinctions between civilian and military applications given the dual-use implosion technology. The operation's success validated India's indigenous plutonium production and reprocessing capabilities, developed amid geopolitical pressures including China's 1964 test and Pakistan's emerging threats, though the government emphasized non-weapon intent to evade . Post-test, the Ministry of External Affairs reiterated the peaceful purpose, but declassified documents and subsequent admissions revealed it as a foundational step in weapons development, prompting to terminate nuclear cooperation and the U.S. to impose export controls on . This event positioned outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty framework, highlighting the challenges in distinguishing PNEs from weapons tests under the era's verification limitations.

1998 Pokhran-II Tests and Overt Nuclearization

India conducted Operation Shakti, also known as , consisting of five underground nuclear tests at the Pokhran Test Range in on May 11 and May 13, 1998. The tests were executed under the direction of Atal Bihari Vajpayee's government, involving collaboration between the (BARC) and the (DRDO), with stringent secrecy measures that evaded detection by U.S. intelligence satellites through deceptive tactics like using civilian trucks for transport and conducting preparations at night. On , three devices were detonated simultaneously in a shaft: Shakti-I, a two-stage thermonuclear device with a claimed yield of 45 kilotons; Shakti-II, a lightweight linear implosion fission device with a yield of 15 kilotons intended for warheads; and Shakti-III, a sub-kiloton fission device yielding 0.3 kilotons for validating computer simulations. On May 13, two additional low-yield experimental devices were tested, with yields of 0.5 and 0.2 kilotons, aimed at gathering data for sub-critical diagnostics and improved safety features in weapons. Indian officials reported a combined yield exceeding 50 kilotons, asserting successful demonstration of thermonuclear capability, though seismic analyses by U.S. and international experts estimated the May 11 explosions at 9-17 kilotons total, suggesting the thermonuclear secondary may have underperformed or fizzled, with most yield from the fission primary. The tests prompted to conduct its own nuclear tests on May 28 and 30, 1998, escalating South Asian nuclear tensions. Internationally, the detonations drew widespread condemnation; the passed Resolution 1172 on June 6, 1998, deploring the tests by both nations and calling for restraint, while the U.S. imposed sanctions under the Glenn Amendment, including restrictions on foreign aid, military sales, and opposition to loans to India. Similar measures followed from , , and other nations, though economic impacts were moderated by India's domestic resilience and selective waivers for . These tests ended India's policy of nuclear ambiguity, with Vajpayee declaring on May 12, 1998, that India had become a nuclear weapons state, shifting to overt nuclearization to bolster deterrence against perceived threats from and . This overt posture facilitated the development of a and doctrine emphasizing , though debates persist over the thermonuclear device's efficacy, with critics like former BARC director arguing in 2009 that the fusion stage failed based on yield discrepancies and lack of confirmatory diagnostics. Indian officials, including R. , have rebutted such claims, maintaining the tests validated advanced designs despite seismic underestimations.

Nuclear Weapons Capabilities

Fissile Material Production and Stockpile Estimates

India's primary fissile material for nuclear weapons is weapons-grade , produced through dedicated research reactors and reprocessing facilities at the (BARC) in . The , operational from 1960 until its decommissioning in 2010 under IAEA safeguards as part of the 2008 civil nuclear deal, yielded approximately 6.3 kilograms of for the 1974 test device and contributed to early stockpiles through reprocessing of spent fuel. Its successor, the 100 MWt , commissioned in 1985 and unsafeguarded, has been the mainstay for weapons-grade production, generating an estimated 20-25 kilograms annually from fuel via reprocessing at facilities like the Plutonium Extraction Plant and Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant. As of early 2024, estimates place India's military at approximately 0.7 ± 0.16 metric tons, sufficient for 130 to 210 warheads assuming 4-6 kilograms per implosion device, though analysts assess actual production closer to supporting 172 warheads due to allocation priorities and yield efficiencies. This derives exclusively from unsafeguarded reactors, excluding from power reactors (estimated at over 10 tons total but largely under safeguards or allocated non-militarily). India maintains opacity on exact figures, with production continuing unabated; the upcoming (PFBR) at , expected operational by 2025, could enable thorium-uranium breeding but is not yet contributing to weapons . Highly enriched uranium (HEU) plays a secondary role, primarily for naval propulsion in submarines like rather than core weapons , given India's plutonium-centric arsenal. Enrichment occurs at the Rare Materials Plant (RMP) in Rattehalli, , using technology scaled up since the , with capacity estimated at 10-15 separative work units per year as of recent assessments. India's HEU is estimated at 5.7 ± 2 tons as of early 2024, enriched to around 30% U-235 for reactor fuel, below weapons-grade levels (>90%), though potential exists for further enrichment if militarized. These fissile stocks underpin estimates of India's operational nuclear at 180 as of 2025, up from 172 in 2024, per (SIPRI) analysis, reflecting incremental buildup amid regional tensions without official disclosure. Independent assessments from the align, noting sufficient for this scale but highlighting uncertainties in assembled warheads versus latent capability, as emphasizes "" without transparency. Production expansions, including Dhruva's sustained output and enrichment growth, suggest potential for further increases, though constrained by imports and domestic mining limitations.

Fission and Boosted Devices

India's nuclear arsenal relies primarily on plutonium-based implosion-type fission devices, derived from designs in 1974 and refined through subsequent simulations following the 1998 tests. The 1974 "" device utilized approximately 6 kilograms of plutonium-239 from the , achieving an estimated yield of 10-15 kilotons through conventional spherical implosion, though official claims described it as a peaceful with yields of 8-10 kilotons. Seismic analyses of the event, corroborated by detection, support yields in the 12-15 kiloton range, indicating a functional but unboosted fission primary suitable for basic weaponization. In the 1998 Pokhran-II series, tested advanced fission configurations, including the Shakti-II device on , described as a linear implosion design intended for miniaturized warheads with yields below 1 kiloton, aimed at tactical applications and artillery delivery. Official announcements claimed a yield of 0.3 kilotons for this sub-critical experimental shot, but independent seismic assessments of the combined detonations (Shakti-I, II, and III) estimate total yields of 10-15 kilotons, suggesting the fission components underperformed relative to stated goals of 12-45 kilotons for the primary stages. These tests demonstrated progress in compact implosion physics, essential for integrating fission warheads onto missiles like the and series, though limitations in verifiable yields highlight reliance on computer modeling for post-test enhancements. Boosted fission devices, which incorporate deuterium-tritium fusion gas to enhance fission efficiency and yield without full thermonuclear staging, represent an evolutionary step in India's program. Theoretical work on boosting began in the , with the Shakti-I thermonuclear test on purportedly featuring a fusion-boosted fission primary as its trigger, claimed to yield up to 45 kilotons in the overall device but likely contributing 10-20 kilotons in the boosted stage alone based on seismic data. Such designs allow for reduced requirements—potentially 4-5 kilograms of per device—enabling higher yields (20-40 kilotons) and miniaturization for multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on systems like . However, the absence of dedicated boosted-only tests post-1998 and discrepancies in yield verification raise questions about full operational maturity, with estimates suggesting India's includes 50-100 such devices optimized for boosted primaries rather than pure fission.
Current arsenal projections indicate fission and boosted devices form the backbone of India's estimated 160-172 warheads, with yields tailored to needs, prioritizing reliability over megaton-class escalation. Production at facilities like continues to emphasize plutonium pits from and other reactors, yielding devices compatible with yields of 15-30 kilotons for strategic stability against regional adversaries. Controversies persist, as seismic and data from international monitoring stations consistently report lower yields than Indian claims, underscoring potential gaps in design validation amid the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty's constraints.

Thermonuclear Design Debates and Yield Controversies

During the Pokhran-II tests on May 11, 1998, India detonated Shakti-I, described by the (BARC) as a two-stage thermonuclear device featuring a boosted fission primary and a fusion secondary, with a claimed yield of 45 kilotons (kt) and an actual yield contributing to a total of approximately 58 kt for the three simultaneous explosions. The aimed to achieve thermonuclear ignition through , leveraging deuterium-tritium fusion boosted by deuteride, as per official Indian disclosures, positioning it as a step toward scalable high-yield weapons for deterrence against larger adversaries. Debates over the device's design efficacy emerged from discrepancies in post-test diagnostics, with critics arguing that the fusion stage likely experienced a "fizzle"—partial ignition yielding far below design specifications—based on the absence of expected cratering and radiochemical signatures indicating insufficient for full secondary burn-up. In 2009, , the Defense Research and Development Organisation's (DRDO) coordinator for the tests, publicly asserted that the thermonuclear yield was under 10 kt, citing ground shock and cavity that failed to match predictions, and no visible crater formation, which he attributed to inadequate fusion output; this claim, echoed in analyses questioning BARC's hydrodynamic simulations, suggested the primary functioned as a boosted fission device but the secondary underperformed due to potential instabilities in the Teller-Ulam configuration adapted for India's limited production. Yield controversies intensified through independent seismic analyses, which estimated the May 11 event's total magnitude at mb 5.0-5.2, corresponding to 10-25 kt overall—implying the thermonuclear component yielded 5-15 kt at most—contrasting sharply with India's 43 kt claim for Shakti-I derived from internal barium/strontium radiochemical ratios and hydrodynamic code validations. Seismic experts, including those from the U.S. Geological Survey and prototype International Data Centre, calibrated against the site's granite geology and prior 1974 test (6-10 kt yield at mb 4.9), consistently derived lower bounds, attributing overestimations in Indian figures to unaccounted decoupling effects or optimistic scaling from subcritical experiments; multiple studies, such as those in the Chinese Journal of Geophysics, reinforced yields around 12-20 kt total using waveform modeling. Indian authorities rebutted these assessments, emphasizing that seismic methods undervalue yields in due to variable and that true validation came from canister analysis and post-shot rubble sampling, which confirmed fusion reactions albeit at reduced efficiency; former Atomic Energy Commission chairman R. Chidambaram dismissed seismic-based critiques as "absurd," arguing they ignore site-specific path corrections calibrated by India's own arrays. This reliance on proprietary data versus open seismic teleseismics highlights broader tensions in verification, with some analysts noting potential incentives for yield inflation to project parity with and , though India's subsequent missile advancements (e.g., ) imply iterative design refinements without further tests under its voluntary moratorium. The unresolved debate underscores challenges in India's thermonuclear maturation, with stockpile estimates assuming retrofit boosts rather than full multi-stage reliability until validated upgrades.

Nuclear Delivery Systems and Triad

Land-Based Ballistic Missiles

India's land-based ballistic missiles, developed by the (DRDO), constitute the primary ground component of its , emphasizing road-mobile launchers for survivability and rapid response. These include the short-range series and the longer-range family, with capabilities spanning from tactical to intercontinental strikes. Deployment focuses on canisterized systems for the Agni variants to enable quick deployment and reduce vulnerability. The Prithvi-I, India's first indigenous surface-to-surface , has a range of 150 km and a payload capacity of 1,000 kg, suitable for conventional or nuclear warheads. Developed under the starting in the 1980s, it underwent its first successful test in 1988 and was inducted into the by 1994. While phased out for some tactical roles in favor of precision-guided munitions, variants remain in limited service for training and potential nuclear missions. The Agni series builds on technology demonstrators from the late 1980s, evolving into operational systems. , a single-stage solid-fueled , achieves 700 km range with a 1,000 kg ; first tested in 2002, it entered service with the around 2007 for medium-range deterrence against . , two-stage with 2,000 km range, was first tested in 1999 and inducted by 2011, capable of targeting deeper into adversarial territory. Longer-range variants include (3,000+ km, first test 2007, inducted 2014), (4,000 km, first test 2011, operational since 2014), and (5,500 km declared, potentially up to 7,000+ km, first test 2012). Agni-V, a three-stage solid-propellant IRBM, supports multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) as demonstrated in a successful test on March 11, 2024, enhancing penetration against missile defenses; further flight trials occurred in 2025. An extended-range Agni-V variant targeting 7,500-8,000 km is under development. Agni-Prime, an advanced canister-launched MRBM with 1,000-2,000 km range, incorporates composite materials for lighter weight and improved maneuverability; first tested in June 2021, it underwent a rail-mobile launch trial on September 24, 2025, from Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam Island, advancing India's survivable second-strike posture through integrated road-rail mobility. Exact inventory numbers remain classified, but estimates suggest dozens of launchers across these types, paired with India's estimated 160-180 nuclear warheads as of 2024.
MissileRange (km)StagesFuelStatusFirst Test
Prithvi-I150SingleLiquidLimited service1988
Agni-I700SingleSolidOperational2002
2,000TwoSolidOperational1999
3,000+TwoSolidOperational2007
4,000TwoSolidOperational2011
5,500+ThreeSolidOperational (MIRV tested)2012
Agni-Prime1,000-2,000TwoSolidTesting/Development2021

Air-Launched Nuclear Platforms

India's air-delivered nuclear capabilities constitute the foundational component of its , primarily utilizing fighter-bomber to deploy gravity bombs in a retaliatory role under the no-first-use policy. Assessments indicate that approximately 48 nuclear warheads are allocated for air delivery, supported by dedicated squadrons of dual-capable . These platforms enable flexible, rapid response options but face vulnerabilities from advanced air defenses, prompting ongoing modernization efforts. The Dassault Mirage 2000H, inducted into the in 1985 with around 50 units in service, serves as a primary nuclear delivery vehicle. This French-origin multirole fighter, originally equipped for nuclear missions in the French arsenal until 2018, has been adapted for gravity bomb drops in . Recent upgrades, including enhanced , , and weapon integration under the DARIN III program completed by 2020, aim to extend its operational life into the 2030s while improving survivability against enemy intercepts. Two squadrons are reportedly earmarked for nuclear tasks, emphasizing precision strikes over contested airspace. The SEPECAT Jaguar IS, operational since 1979 with approximately 120 aircraft across six squadrons, provides a complementary tactical nuclear delivery option. Designed from inception for nuclear ground-attack roles in its Anglo-French service, the Indian variant underwent modifications for payload compatibility, including free-fall bombs. DARIN II upgrades, incorporating glass cockpits and new navigation systems by 2018, have mitigated obsolescence, though fleet retirement is projected post-2030 absent further enhancements. Its low-level penetration capability suits short-range nuclear scenarios against regional threats. Emerging platforms like the , with 36 units delivered starting 2020, offer potential expansion of the air leg through superior stealth and range, though nuclear certification remains unconfirmed. The multirole fighter has been cited in analyses for possible adaptation to nuclear roles via air-launched munitions, but it primarily supports conventional missions. India lacks deployed air-launched nuclear cruise or ballistic missiles, relying instead on unguided gravity weapons; subsonic developments like , tested since 2013, could eventually provide standoff options if nuclear-armed. This configuration underscores a transition toward more survivable delivery amid evolving threats from and .

Sea-Based Deterrence and Submarine Developments

India's sea-based nuclear deterrence forms the underwater leg of its , designed to provide a survivable second-strike capability against adversaries. The program centers on the Arihant-class nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs), developed indigenously under the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project initiated in the . As of August 2024, only two SSBNs— and INS Arighat—were operational, each displacing approximately 6,000 tons submerged and powered by an 83 MW . These submarines enhance India's ability to maintain continuous deterrent patrols, though limited numbers and initial short missile ranges constrain full operational maturity. INS Arihant, the lead boat, was commissioned into the on August 23, 2016, after sea trials confirming its reactor and systems. It features four launch tubes capable of carrying 12 K-15 Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic s (SLBMs) with a range of about 700 kilometers, or alternatively four longer-range K-4 missiles. The K-15, a two-stage solid-fuel derived from the land-based , underwent successful underwater ejection tests by 2013, enabling nuclear warhead delivery from submerged platforms. conducted its first deterrence patrol in November 2018, validating India's sea-based second-strike posture. INS Arighat, commissioned on August 29, 2024, represents an advanced variant with improved sensors, endurance, and reliability derived from operational lessons of its predecessor. Like Arihant, it can deploy 12 K-15 SLBMs or four K-4 missiles, the latter tested successfully from submerged pontoons in 2018 and 2020 with a range exceeding 3,000 kilometers, significantly extending India's strike envelope from the or . The K-4's canisterized design facilitates cold-launch from tubes, addressing early miniaturization challenges in India's SLBM program. Future Arihant-class submarines include INS Aridhaman (S4), launched in November 2021 and slated for commissioning by late 2025, incorporating enhanced stealth and auxiliary systems while retaining the 83 MW reactor. A follow-on S4* variant, under construction, will integrate the longer-range K-5 SLBM, whose development was completed in July 2025 with a projected range of 5,000-6,000 kilometers. The K-5, a three-stage , aims to arm larger S5-class SSBNs planned for the late , featuring 190 MW reactors and up to 16 missile tubes for K-5 or future K-6 MIRV-capable variants, thereby bolstering patrol endurance to over 90 days. These developments reflect India's strategic imperative to counter regional threats, particularly from China's expanding SSBN fleet, though persistent hurdles like reactor compactness and missile reliability underscore the program's evolutionary nature. By 2025, India plans at least five Arihant-class boats to achieve persistent sea-based deterrence, with ongoing tests prioritizing integration of MIRV technology for enhanced penetration against defended targets.

Policy and Doctrine

No First Use Stance and Qualifications

India's nuclear doctrine, formally articulated on January 4, 2003, by the Cabinet Committee on Security, enshrines a "No First Use" (NFU) policy, committing the country to refraining from initiating nuclear strikes against nuclear-armed states or non-nuclear weapon states, with nuclear weapons reserved solely for retaliation against nuclear aggression. This stance underscores India's emphasis on credible minimum deterrence, where survivable second-strike capabilities ensure punitive response to any nuclear attack on Indian territory or forces, anywhere, described as "massive" in scale to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor. The NFU pledge carries specific qualifications regarding non-nuclear threats of mass destruction. The 2003 doctrine explicitly reserves 's right to employ nuclear weapons in response to a "major attack" using biological or chemical weapons, treating such an assault as equivalent to nuclear aggression for retaliatory purposes, thereby extending the policy's deterrent umbrella beyond purely nuclear scenarios while maintaining the no-initiation principle against nuclear use. This exception reflects strategic concerns over asymmetric threats from adversaries potentially employing chemical or biological agents to evade nuclear thresholds, though has ratified the and , pledging non-possession of such arms. Debates over the NFU's rigidity have surfaced periodically, including a 2019 statement by then-Defence Minister hinting at future evolution amid changing security dynamics, particularly vis-à-vis and , yet official reaffirmations persisted, with India restating its NFU commitment at the on October 4, 2025, during discussions on . No formal doctrinal revision has occurred as of October 2025, preserving the policy's core amid critiques from strategic analysts questioning its compatibility with rapid-response needs in subconventional conflicts or against states without declared nuclear arsenals allied with nuclear powers. This continuity aligns with 's broader rejection of first-strike postures, prioritizing restraint to bolster global non-proliferation narratives while hedging against doctrinal ambiguity in regional rivals.

Credible Minimum Deterrence Framework

India's nuclear doctrine, as approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security on January 4, 2003, centers on the principle of credible minimum deterrence, which seeks to maintain a nuclear arsenal sufficient to deter aggression from adversaries while avoiding an arms race. This framework emphasizes a posture of retaliation only, underpinned by a no-first-use policy, ensuring that any nuclear attack on India or its forces would trigger a response inflicting unacceptable damage on the aggressor. The doctrine prioritizes survivability and second-strike capability, requiring forces that can endure a first strike and retaliate effectively, tailored to perceived threats primarily from Pakistan and China rather than matching their exact stockpiles. The "credible minimum" aspect is deliberately ambiguous regarding exact numbers of warheads or delivery vehicles, allowing flexibility in response to evolving threats without public disclosure of force levels; estimates from independent assessments place India's arsenal at approximately 160-170 warheads as of 2023, produced primarily from stocks. This restraint is intended to signal responsibility, with official statements reaffirming commitment to non-escalatory deterrence and opposition to fissile material cut-off treaties unless universalized, as India continues limited production for credibility. The framework evolved from a 1999 draft doctrine that first articulated "credible minimum nuclear deterrence" as retaliation-focused with assured survivability, refined in 2003 to incorporate against nuclear threats to territory or forces anywhere. Implementation of has driven investments in a —land, air, and sea-based systems—to enhance redundancy and penetration against defenses, ensuring deterrence against both regional foes and potential great-power coercion. For instance, development of canisterized missiles like and submarine-launched ballistic missiles supports rapid response and dispersal, countering risks of preemptive strikes. Government reaffirmations, such as in 2022 and 2023 parliamentary responses, confirm no doctrinal shifts, maintaining the balance between sufficiency and despite critiques that rising threats may necessitate expansion beyond strict minimums. This approach aligns with India's rejection of arms racing, positioning deterrence as punitive and restorative rather than warfighting-oriented.

Nuclear Command and Control Mechanisms

India's nuclear command and control mechanisms are centralized under the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), a body established on January 4, 2003, to exercise political oversight and authorize the use of nuclear weapons in retaliation. The NCA ensures civilian supremacy, with the holding ultimate authority to order a , or designated successors in cases of incapacity. This structure reflects India's nuclear doctrine of and , emphasizing punitive retaliation only after confirming an adversary's nuclear attack. The NCA operates through a two-tiered framework: the Political Council, chaired by the Prime Minister and comprising key cabinet ministers, which deliberates and authorizes nuclear policy decisions and retaliatory actions; and the Executive Council, headed by the National Security Advisor and including senior officials from defense, foreign affairs, and atomic energy departments, which provides strategic inputs, coordinates implementation, and executes directives from the Political Council. Meetings of the Political Council are convened as needed, typically in response to crises, while the Executive Council handles routine operational planning and readiness assessments. This division maintains a clear chain of accountability, preventing unauthorized escalation. Operational execution falls to the (SFC), a unified tri-service entity formed on January 4, 2003, under the NCA's direct control and reporting through the Chief of Defence Staff. The SFC, commanded by a three-star , manages the custody, deployment, and launch of land-, air-, and sea-based nuclear delivery systems, including ballistic missiles like the series and submarine-launched variants. It maintains peacetime control over assets but requires explicit NCA authentication—via secure codes and communication links—for arming and firing, ensuring no pre-delegated launch authority to field commanders. The system incorporates redundant communication channels and hardened infrastructure to enhance survivability against preemptive strikes, though specific technical details remain classified. India's C2 architecture prioritizes of assets for second-strike capability while centralizing decision-making to avoid accidental use, with physical separation of warheads from delivery vehicles in storage under civilian-military joint custody. Recent enhancements include investments in satellite-based early warning systems sought by the SFC to improve and reduce response times, as of 2025. Public disclosures on procedures are limited to maintain deterrence credibility, with no evidence of systemic flaws despite opacity concerns raised in strategic analyses.

Biological Weapons

Ratification of Conventions and Non-Possession Pledge

India signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC) on 15 January 1973 and ratified it on 15 July 1974, making it a state party upon the treaty's on 26 March 1975. The ratification incorporated the BWC's core obligations, including the prohibition on developing, producing, stockpiling, or otherwise acquiring microbial or other biological agents or toxins in quantities or types that have no justification for peaceful purposes, as well as weapons, equipment, or delivery means designed to use such agents for hostile purposes. ratified without reservations, affirming its intent to comply fully as the first multilateral treaty banning an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. To implement BWC obligations domestically, enacted the Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act in 2005, which explicitly prohibits the manufacture, acquisition, possession, development, or transport of biological weapons or related materials for non-peaceful purposes, with penalties including imprisonment up to life terms. This legislation aligns with Article IV of the BWC, requiring states parties to adopt national measures to prevent prohibited activities, and underscores 's pledge of by criminalizing any offensive biological weapons program. Indian officials have repeatedly affirmed adherence, stating that the country maintains no offensive biological weapons capabilities and focuses solely on defensive research permitted under the convention, such as vaccine development and . India actively participates in BWC mechanisms, including submission of annual (CBMs) to the Office for Affairs, detailing relevant laboratories, production facilities, and activities to enhance transparency. In official statements, such as at the 45th anniversary of the BWC's in 2020, India emphasized strict compliance and called for universal adherence to prevent proliferation risks from non-state actors, while advocating for strengthened verification protocols absent in the treaty's current framework. This commitment reflects a policy of restraint, with no verified evidence of violations despite regional security concerns, distinguishing India's approach from states with historical offensive programs.

Defensive Biological Research Programs

India's defensive biological research programs, overseen by the (DRDO), emphasize the development of detection systems, protective measures, decontamination techniques, and medical countermeasures against biological agents, consistent with its accession to the on July 15, 1974, which permits such protective activities while prohibiting offensive programs. These efforts address potential threats and naturally occurring outbreaks, with heightened focus following events like the 2001 U.S. attacks and India's historical experiences with endemic pathogens such as plague and . The Defence Research and Development Establishment (DRDE) in , , serves as the cornerstone of these programs, conducting research on , biochemical , and defense against hazardous biological agents, including sensors for early detection and . Complementing DRDE, the Institute of Nuclear Medicine and Allied Sciences (INMAS) contributes to integrated , biological, and chemical () defense, including studies on exposure effects and countermeasures. DRDO's Life Sciences cluster further supports biodefense through specialized labs like the Defence Bio-Engineering and Electro Medical Laboratory (DEBEL), which develops bio-engineered solutions for protection and sustainment in contaminated environments. A key advancement occurred on November 11, 2024, when DRDE inaugurated its second 4 (BSL-4) laboratory at , enabling safe handling of high-containment pathogens for advanced defensive research and enhancing India's biosecurity posture against emerging viral threats. This facility supports vaccine development, antiviral testing, and , aligning with broader national infrastructure that includes a networked system of over 20 BSL-3 laboratories across ministries. In 2020, former DRDO chief urged renewed emphasis on bio-defense, calling for expanded life sciences investments to counter evolving threats. routinely conduct NBC defense exercises to validate these technologies in operational scenarios. No open-source evidence indicates deviation from defensive mandates, with programs managed under oversight to ensure BWC compliance.

Chemical Weapons

Pre-Convention Stockpiles and Destruction Efforts

India maintained limited stockpiles of chemical weapons prior to its ratification of the (CWC) in 1996, primarily consisting of mustard agent filled into munitions. Upon entry into force of the CWC in 1997, India declared a total stockpile of 1,044 metric tons of mustard agent in June 1997, along with three chemical weapon production facilities and two chemical weapon storage facilities. These stockpiles were not operationally integrated into India's , reflecting a restrained approach to chemical armaments amid regional security concerns. Destruction efforts commenced immediately after declaration, adhering to the CWC's phased timelines under OPCW verification. By 1999, India had destroyed over 1% of its Category 1 chemical weapons to fulfill the initial destruction phase. Phase two required 20% destruction by April 2002, which India exceeded, reaching 45% by November 2003. By March 2006, over 53% of the stockpile, including all filled munitions, had been eliminated, with more than 75% destroyed by the end of 2006, prompting an OPCW extension for the remainder due to technical challenges in safe disposal. Full destruction was achieved by May 2009, making India the second possessor state after to verifiably eliminate its entire declared chemical weapons arsenal under CWC oversight. The process involved specialized and neutralization at designated facilities, with no reported major incidents or environmental violations, underscoring India's compliance commitment despite the absence of external mandates pre-CWC. Post-destruction, India enacted the Act in 2000 to prohibit future production or retention, reinforcing non-possession status.

Compliance with CWC and Prohibitive Legislation

signed the on 14 January 1993 and ratified it on 3 September 1996, with the treaty entering into force on 29 April 1997. Upon ratification, declared that it possessed no chemical weapons stockpiles, production facilities, or other prohibited items under the convention, a position verified through ongoing OPCW inspections and declarations. The country has maintained full compliance with CWC verification regimes, including routine inspections of declared chemical facilities and submissions of annual declarations on relevant chemicals and activities. To domesticate CWC obligations, India enacted the , which prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer, or use of chemical weapons by any person or entity. The Act, assented to by the President on 6 September 2000 and brought into force on 1 July 2005, also regulates the handling, export, import, and domestic transfer of toxic chemicals and precursors listed in Schedules 1 through 3 of the CWC Annex on Chemicals, with penalties including imprisonment up to life for violations. It establishes licensing requirements for scheduled chemicals and mandates record-keeping to prevent diversion for prohibited purposes. The Act created the National Authority Chemical Weapons Convention (NACWC), headquartered in , as the primary body for implementing CWC provisions, coordinating with industry, and liaising with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The NACWC oversees compliance monitoring, facilitates OPCW challenge inspections if required, and ensures against chemical threats through industry engagement and training programs. India has demonstrated sustained adherence by participating in OPCW Executive Council meetings, contributing €10,000 to OPCW assistance activities in 2024, and advocating for universal adherence to the convention without reported breaches.

International Relations and Non-Proliferation Dynamics

Rejection of NPT and Responses to Sanctions

has refused to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), opened for signature in , primarily because it institutionalizes a division between nuclear-weapon states—defined as those that manufactured and detonated a nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967—and non-nuclear-weapon states, thereby legitimizing the former's arsenals without enforceable obligations for their elimination. The treaty's structure permits vertical proliferation by the five recognized nuclear powers while prohibiting horizontal spread, a framework has critiqued as inequitable and failing to address the security dilemmas faced by non-signatories amid existing nuclear threats, such as China's 1964 test. This stance reflects India's prioritization of and deterrence needs over accession, informed by historical rebuffs to its proposals for universal and the treaty's inability to prevent regional proliferation risks from adversaries. Indian leaders, including Atal Bihari following the tests, have reiterated that the NPT perpetuates global inequalities without advancing genuine non-proliferation or . Archival evidence from India's decision-making process underscores that rejection was driven by imperatives and self-reliance considerations rather than abstract orthodoxy. India's 1974 "peaceful nuclear explosion" prompted initial international restrictions, such as Canada's suspension of heavy water supplies and U.S. denial of fuel for the Tarapur reactor, but the 1998 Pokhran-II series—five detonations on May 11 and 13—elicited broader sanctions. The United States invoked the Glenn Amendment on May 13, 1998, imposing measures including termination of non-humanitarian foreign assistance, opposition to new loans from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, export controls on dual-use technologies, and prohibitions on nuclear-related transfers or military sales. Additional penalties from entities like Japan and the European Union involved aid freezes and trade restrictions, alongside United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172, which condemned the tests and called for restraint. In response, India under Vajpayee's administration defended the tests as essential for against existential threats, rejecting calls to dismantle its program and instead declaring a voluntary moratorium on further explosive testing. Economically, the sanctions contributed to a sharp drop in net foreign capital inflows—from $4.5 billion in the first quarter of 1998 to under $1 billion in the second—yet India countered through accelerated liberalization, fiscal prudence, and diversification of partnerships with non-sanctioning suppliers like for energy and technology. These measures underscored India's resilience, fostering indigenous capabilities in nuclear and technologies to mitigate external dependencies, while diplomatic outreach emphasized the NPT's flaws in preventing proliferation by states like .

NSG Waiver and Civil Nuclear Deals

In July 2005, India and the United States announced a framework for civil nuclear cooperation through a joint statement by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush, initiating negotiations for a bilateral "123 Agreement" under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which would enable transfers of nuclear material, equipment, and technology for peaceful purposes. This agreement required India to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities, placing civilian reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, while allowing continued development of its military program outside international oversight. The deal faced international hurdles due to India's non-signatory status to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its possession of nuclear weapons, prompting the need for an India-specific exemption from Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines, which prohibit nuclear trade with non-NPT states lacking full-scope safeguards. On August 1, 2008, the IAEA Board of Governors approved India's safeguards agreement covering 14 civilian reactors, paving the way for NSG consideration. On September 6, 2008, the 48-member NSG granted India a clean waiver by consensus, lifting a 34-year de facto embargo on nuclear exports imposed after India's 1974 nuclear test, and permitting members to engage in civil nuclear trade with India subject to annual reporting on transfers and consultations if concerns arose. The U.S. Congress approved the 123 Agreement on October 1, 2008, with President Bush signing it into law on October 8, and it entered into force on December 6, 2008, after diplomatic notes were exchanged. The NSG waiver facilitated India's civil nuclear agreements with multiple countries, enhancing and technology access amid growing demand; by 2019, India had inked pacts with over a dozen nations. signed the first post-waiver deal on September 30, 2008, leading to construction of two 1650 MW reactors at Jaitapur by (now ), though delayed by liability concerns and the 2011 Fukushima incident. expanded cooperation via a 2010 agreement for units at , where four VVER-1000 reactors (each 1000 MW) were operationalized by 2024, with two more under construction. The operationalized fuel supply in 2011, covering 2100 tonnes of by 2014, extended indefinitely in 2013. Other key deals included (2013, uranium supply), (2014, uranium exports starting 2017), and the (2015), collectively enabling imports of over 800 tonnes of annually by the mid-2010s to India's 22 operational reactors. Critics, including non-proliferation advocates, argued the waiver undermined global norms by legitimizing nuclear commerce with a non-NPT weapons state without requiring a fissile material cutoff or Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ratification, potentially encouraging proliferation elsewhere, though proponents cited India's impeccable non-export record and voluntary moratorium on testing as mitigating factors. By 2025, these deals had boosted India's installed nuclear capacity to approximately 7.5 GW, with plans for 15 GW more by 2030, though domestic liability laws under the 2010 Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act have slowed foreign investment.

Strategic Interactions with Neighbors and Global Powers

India's nuclear posture vis-à-vis its neighbors, primarily and , centers on supported by a no-first-use (NFU) policy formalized in January 2003, which pledges retaliation only in response to nuclear attack on Indian territory or forces anywhere. This doctrine has been reaffirmed by government statements as recently as 2023, despite occasional ambiguities from strategic analysts questioning its flexibility against tactical threats. The policy underpins interactions by prioritizing survivable second-strike capabilities, including the with a range over 5,000 kilometers tested successfully in April 2012, designed to reach targets in . Relations with exhibit mutual deterrence amid asymmetries, where India's conservative arsenal growth—estimated at around 160 warheads in 2023—contrasts with 's expansion to approximately 170 warheads and development of tactical nuclear weapons to offset conventional disparities. Crises like the 1999 intrusion and 2019 airstrikes tested escalation thresholds, yet India's restraint in avoiding nuclear signaling preserved stability, as both sides recognized the risks of crossing into nuclear territory despite 's first-use posture. No formal bilateral exists, but de facto through hotlines has prevented inadvertent escalation, though 's full-spectrum deterrence doctrine heightens India's need for robust air defenses and countermeasures. Interactions with China involve a triadic dynamic influenced by Beijing's support for Pakistan's program and its own arsenal modernization, prompting India to diversify delivery systems like submarine-launched ballistic missiles for sea-based deterrence. The June 2020 Galwan Valley clash, resulting in over 20 Indian and an undisclosed number of Chinese casualties, underscored conventional tensions without nuclear overtones, but India's subsequent hypersonic and MIRV advancements aim to counter China's numerical superiority in launchers and warheads. Track-II dialogues have explored confidence-building measures, yet absent official channels, deterrence relies on India's perceived ability to inflict unacceptable damage, complicated by China's no-first-use adherence but expanding silo-based forces. With global powers, India pursues partnerships that enhance deterrence without compromising autonomy. The 2008 U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement, operationalized via the waiver in September 2008, separated civilian and military facilities, enabling imports of fuel that freed domestic stocks—previously restricted by safeguards—for potential weapons-grade production, thus indirectly supporting arsenal . In January 2025, the U.S. announced steps to lift remaining restrictions on Indian nuclear entities, deepening energy ties and strategic alignment against shared concerns over . Russia remains a key collaborator, providing leased Akula-class nuclear-powered attack since 2012 to bolster India's underwater capabilities, with a upgraded variant featuring 1,500 km-range Kalibr missiles slated for delivery by under a intergovernmental pact. Joint ventures like the supersonic , operational since 2010 and capable of nuclear arming, extend deterrence across land, sea, and air platforms. These ties, rooted in Cold War-era transfers, sustain India's triad amid regional imbalances, though diversification to Western suppliers reflects pragmatic hedging.

Weapons of Mass Destruction Act and Prohibitions

The Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act, 2005, prohibits unlawful activities related to nuclear, biological, chemical weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), as well as their delivery systems, with the primary aim of preventing proliferation to non-state actors and terrorists in alignment with resolutions. The Act defines WMDs to include biological weapons (microbial or other biological agents or toxins produced for hostile purposes), chemical weapons (toxic chemicals and munitions or devices designed to cause harm through such properties), and nuclear weapons (as notified by the ). It extends to the entirety of , including its , applies to Indian citizens for acts committed abroad, and holds foreigners liable for offenses committed on Indian territory. Under Section 8, no person may unlawfully manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, or transfer a nuclear, biological, or , or any other WMD or . Section 9 prohibits the transfer of any notified substance, equipment, or technology to entities or individuals associated with non-state actors or terrorists involved in WMD proliferation. Section 10 bans the transfer or acquisition of fissile or radioactive material, or related equipment, intended for producing nuclear weapons or for , , or damage. Parallel prohibitions apply to delivery systems under Section 9, including missiles or other means designed or adapted for WMD deployment, with the empowered to notify specific items and regulate their handling. The Act also criminalizes attempts, abetment, conspiracy, and preparation for these offenses. Penalties for violations of Sections 8 and 10 include rigorous imprisonment for a minimum of five years, extendable to , accompanied by a fine. Offenses under Section 9 carry similar penalties, with aiding transfers to non-state actors punishable by up to ten years' and fine. Unauthorized exports or related contraventions under Section 13 attract fines ranging from ₹300,000 to ₹2,000,000, with repeat offenses leading to six months to five years' plus fine; other regulatory breaches under Section 17 are punishable by six months to five years' and fine, escalating to one to seven years for repeats. In 2022, the Act was amended via the Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Amendment Act, which received presidential assent on December 14, 2022, expanding prohibitions to include unlawful transport or transfer of WMDs or delivery systems from to any foreign country, along with attempts at such acts. This amendment strengthens extraterritorial controls on proliferation without altering core domestic prohibitions. The holds authority to notify lists of prohibited items, establish advisory committees for licensing sensitive materials, and delegate enforcement powers, ensuring targeted regulation while exempting authorized state activities.

Oversight by Atomic Energy Commission and DRDO

The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), established on 10 August 1948 under the chairmanship of , functions as India's apex policy-making authority for atomic energy matters, advising the government on the development and utilization of nuclear technologies for both civilian and strategic purposes. The AEC operates within the framework of the , formed on 3 August 1954 as an executive department directly under the Prime Minister's office, which centralizes control over nuclear research, fuel cycle activities, and associated infrastructure. Through DAE-affiliated entities like the , established in 1954, the AEC/DAE has overseen key advancements in production, reactor design, and device engineering, including the plutonium-based implosion device tested on 18 May 1974 at and subsequent thermonuclear efforts validated in 1998 tests. This oversight extends to ensuring strategic autonomy in nuclear R&D, with BARC maintaining facilities for weapons-grade reprocessing at sites like and Tarapur, producing an estimated 0.6-0.8 tons annually as of the early . While the AEC/DAE's mandate emphasizes comprehensive atomic energy policy, including safeguards against proliferation risks, nuclear weapons-related activities fall under a bifurcated structure where warhead development remains a DAE responsibility, distinct from civilian regulatory oversight by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), which was restructured in 2018 to exclude direct authority over strategic programs' safety protocols. The DAE's export control mechanisms, aligned with international norms, further regulate dual-use nuclear items to prevent WMD proliferation, as outlined in guidelines prohibiting transfers that could aid non-peaceful uses. Ultimate command and control resides with the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), established in January 2003 and chaired by the Prime Minister, but AEC/DAE provides the institutional backbone for sustaining fissile stockpiles—estimated at 160-170 warheads as of 2024—through ongoing production at Dhruva and CIRUS-derived reactors. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), founded on 1 April 1958, complements AEC/DAE oversight by directing the development of delivery systems integral to India's , including land-based ballistic missiles, submarine-launched variants, and air-delivered munitions. Under programs like the (IGMDP), launched in 1983 and concluded in 2008, DRDO has engineered systems such as the (tested successfully on 19 April 2012 with a 5,000+ km range) and short-range missiles, capable of carrying nuclear payloads up to 1,000 kg. DRDO's role extends to defensive countermeasures, including ballistic missile defense interceptors like the Defence (AAD) system, validated in endo-atmospheric tests since 2006, ensuring robust oversight of technologies that enhance credible minimum deterrence without first-use intent. In coordination with the (SFC), activated in 2003 under the NCA, DRDO maintains operational readiness of delivery vectors, with recent advancements like the (tested 2021) incorporating canisterization for rapid deployment. For non-nuclear WMD elements, DRDO leads defensive biological and chemical research programs, focusing on detection and protection rather than offensive capabilities, in compliance with international treaties. This joint AEC-DAE and DRDO framework underscores a civilian-led, indigenously driven approach to WMD-related capabilities, with an estimated annual R&D budget allocation of ₹10,000-15,000 (as of 2023) supporting integration of MIRV technologies and hypersonic glide vehicles by the mid-2020s.

Recent and Projected Developments

Arsenal Growth and Modernization (2020s)

India's nuclear arsenal experienced modest expansion in the 2020s, with the (SIPRI) estimating an increase from 172 stored warheads as of January 2024 to 180 as of January 2025. This growth reflects ongoing production of , primarily from reactors like the at , sufficient to support yields in the 12-40 kiloton range for boosted fission and thermonuclear designs. The corroborated similar inventory levels, noting India's capacity for approximately 180 warheads based on stocks exceeding 0.6 tons dedicated to weapons. Land-based delivery systems saw sustained testing and integration to enhance reliability and reach. In July 2025, the (DRDO) conducted successful user trials of the (range: 700 km) and Prithvi-II surface-to-surface (range: 350 km) from the Integrated Test Range at , validating propulsion, guidance, and terminal accuracy under simulated combat conditions. These tests, part of routine validation for units, underscore maintenance of operational readiness for shorter-range nuclear-capable vectors amid border tensions. Parallel developments included canister-launched Agni variants for rapid deployment, with infrastructure upgrades at missile bases in to support increased mobility and survivability. The sea-based leg advanced through Arihant-class submarine expansions, bolstering second-strike assurance. INS Arighat, the second nuclear-powered (SSBN), underwent commissioning trials in 2024, featuring enhanced endurance over INS Arihant and compatibility with K-15 Sagarika (750 km range) and K-4 (3,500 km) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). INS Aridhaman (S4), launched in November 2021, completed initial sea trials by 2022 and advanced toward induction by late 2024, with lengthened hulls (111 meters) for up to 12 missile tubes. A fourth SSBN, designated S4*, was launched on October 16, 2024, at the Shipbuilding Centre in , incorporating higher indigenous content and further extending submerged patrol durations beyond 20 days. These additions aim to operationalize a continuous at-sea deterrent, with fleet projections targeting three to five SSBNs by decade's end. Air-delivered capabilities integrated with ongoing fighter modernizations, though specific nuclear roles remained opaque. Su-30MKI squadrons received upgrades for bombs and potential air-launched cruise missiles, while Rafale inductions from provided dual-capable platforms with extended range for standoff delivery. Overall, these efforts prioritized triad diversification over rapid warhead proliferation, driven by regional threats from and , with constraints limiting explosive yield growth absent new production reactors.

Advances in MIRV and Hypersonic Capabilities

India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) achieved a milestone in MIRV technology with the successful flight test of the Agni-5 intercontinental ballistic missile on March 11, 2024, under Mission Divyastra, demonstrating indigenous multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle capabilities for delivering multiple warheads to distinct targets. The Agni-5 MIRV configuration reportedly supports a three-warhead payload, enhancing penetration against missile defenses and bolstering second-strike deterrence. A follow-on test on August 20, 2025, from the Integrated Test Range at Chandipur, Odisha, validated the MIRV system's reliability and trajectory accuracy. Full operational deployment of the Agni-5 MIRV is anticipated after additional validation trials, potentially within a few years. In parallel, DRDO has pursued hypersonic advancements to counter evolving regional threats, including from China and Pakistan. The Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV) program validated scramjet engine performance in flight tests, with an initial demonstration in 2020 achieving sustained hypersonic speeds and design refinements revealed in updated prototypes by August 2025. India conducted its first long-range hypersonic missile test in November 2024, marking entry into operational hypersonic strike capabilities. Subsequent reports in July 2025 detailed the ET-LDHCM (Externally-Tube-Launched Dual-Headed Cruise Missile) variant, capable of Mach 8 speeds over 1,500 km, developed under Project Vishnu as part of a broader family of 12 hypersonic systems for land, air, and sea platforms. The BrahMos-II, a joint Indo-Russian hypersonic cruise missile using scramjet propulsion for speeds exceeding Mach 7, remains in development, building on earlier Shaurya missile tests that reached Mach 7.5 in 2020. DRDO plans further hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) tests, such as the Dhvani system, by late 2025 to integrate maneuverable warheads evading ballistic missile defenses. These efforts aim to equip platforms like the Agni series and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, such as the prospective K-6 SLBM with hypersonic MIRV features reaching Mach 7.5.

Potential Policy Shifts Amid Regional Tensions

India's adherence to a no-first-use (NFU) nuclear doctrine, formalized in 2003, faces scrutiny amid persistent border disputes with and cross-border from Pakistan-sponsored groups. The 2020 Galwan Valley clash, which killed 20 Indian soldiers and an undisclosed number of Chinese troops, exposed operational gaps along the (LAC) and accelerated India's deployment of advanced missile systems and troop reinforcements in . While no doctrinal overhaul ensued, the incident fueled internal debates on whether NFU constrains India's deterrence against 's rapidly expanding arsenal, estimated to approach 1,000 warheads by the late 2020s, prompting calls for calibrated ambiguity or selective first-use options in extreme scenarios. Parallel tensions with Pakistan, including the May 2025 Pahalgam terror attack and subsequent Operation Sindoor, elevated risks of nuclear escalation, as Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapons like the Nasr missile aim to counter India's conventional superiority under its Cold Start framework. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's assertion that India would "retaliate on its own terms" and reject "nuclear blackmail" signaled a firmer resolve, though official policy reiterated NFU at the UN First Committee in October 2025. Analysts argue that such crises could erode NFU's credibility if perceived as inflexible against low-yield threats, potentially leading to doctrinal revisions emphasizing pre-emptive conventional strikes integrated with nuclear signaling to restore strategic balance. Broader regional dynamics, including China's support for Pakistan's nuclear program and silo-based expansions, may compel India to expand its fissile material stockpile beyond current estimates of 160-170 warheads, prioritizing MIRV-equipped development for survivable second-strike capabilities. However, Indian officials, including Defense Minister , have historically downplayed NFU alterations as personal musings rather than policy intent, maintaining emphasis on "" to avoid an . No verified shifts in chemical or biological prohibitions under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Act have emerged, with focus remaining on completion via SSBN expansions. These pressures underscore a cautious evolution, where empirical threat assessments could drive incremental adaptations without formal abandonment of restraint.

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