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Interstate Bridge
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Interstate Bridge
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Key Information

The Interstate Bridge (also Columbia River Interstate Bridge, I-5 Bridge, Portland-Vancouver Interstate Bridge, Vancouver-Portland Bridge) is a pair of nearly identical steel vertical-lift, Parker through-truss bridges that carry Interstate 5 traffic over the Columbia River between Vancouver, Washington and Portland, Oregon in the United States.

The present-day northbound bridge opened to traffic in 1917 as a single bridge carrying two-way traffic. A second twin bridge, which carries southbound traffic, opened in 1958.[2] The twin bridges are each over 3,500 feet (1,067 m) long and carry three lanes of traffic. The bridges handle a combined 130,000 vehicles daily.[2] It was added to the National Register of Historic Places in 1982, as the "Portland–Vancouver Highway Bridge".[4]

Since 2005, several proposals for replacing the bridge have been produced and debated. The bridge is considered responsible for traffic congestion of both road and river vehicles. Plans for a replacement bridge, known as the Columbia River Crossing (CRC) project, estimated to cost at least $3.4 billion, had come together by 2012 after many delays, but were very controversial, with both strong support and strong opposition.[8] In late June 2013, the CRC project was canceled, after the Washington state legislature declined to authorize funding for the project.[8] The Interstate Bridge Replacement Program, a joint effort between ODOT, WSDOT, Federal Highway Administration, Federal Transit Administration, Metro, Southwest Washington Regional Transportation Council, the cities of Portland and Vancouver, the Port of Portland, and the Port of Vancouver USA, was relaunched in 2017.

First bridge

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Interstate Bridge looking north from Oregon, 1917
Postcard showing streetcar tracks, period autos

Before a permanent crossing existed between Portland and Vancouver, there was an overcrowded ferry system operated by Pacific Railway, Light & Power Co.

Plans for the original bridge began as early as 1912, with local efforts leading to an initial survey and bond measures totaling $2,000,000; $1.5 million contributed from Portland, and $500,000 from Vancouver. Waddell & Harrington were retained as the project's consulting engineers.[9] Construction on the bridge began in March 1915,[10] and the structure opened on February 14, 1917 at a final cost of $1.75 million (equivalent to $43 million in 2024[11]), which was shared between Clark and Multnomah counties.[12] Clark County paid $500,000 and Multnomah County paid $1.25 million—probably proportional to population.[13]

The first bridge has a total of 13 steel spans, with three measuring 275 feet (84 m) in length and the remaining ten spans 265 ft (81 m) each.[13] Piers sit atop pile caps on wooden pilings approximately 70 feet deep.[14] One of the 275-foot (84 m) spans is the lift span for allowing river traffic under the bridge.[13] The lift span is capable of moving 136 ft (41 m) vertically,[6] and provides 176 ft (53.6 m) of clearance below when fully raised.[2] The towers are 190 ft (57.9 m) tall, above the roadway.[6]

The original paved roadway was 38 ft (11.6 m) wide and had a 5 ft (1.52 m) wide sidewalk.[13] It was the first automobile bridge across the river between Washington and Oregon,[13] and the second to span the river at all, after the Wenatchee Bridge of 1908.[15] It was originally a toll bridge costing 5¢ per vehicle or per horse and rider,[6] equivalent to $1.23 in 2024. In 1928 the states of Washington and Oregon jointly purchased the bridge from the counties and discontinued tolling the following year.[2] The Oregon Department of Transportation became the lead agency responsible for the maintenance and operations of the structure.[16]

Electric streetcars operated across the bridge from opening day in 1917[3] until 1940. The bridge's deck carried dual gauge track,[6] to accommodate both Vancouver's standard gauge cars and Portland's 3 ft 6 in (1,067 mm) gauge cars. Before the bridge, Portland had had a Vancouver streetcar line since 1893, but it ran to Hayden Island, where passengers transferred to a ferry owned by the street railway company to continue across the river to Vancouver.[17] Streetcar service across the Interstate Bridge ended on September 3, 1940.[17]

The bridge became part of then-new Interstate 5 in 1957.[2] It was previously part of U.S. Route 99 when that route was established in 1926.[18]

Second bridge and renovations

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Interstate Bridge in 1973 as seen from the now demolished Thunderbird Hotel on the Oregon side

Plans to address congestion on the first Interstate Bridge, which carried over 30,000 vehicles per day by 1948, were drawn after World War II by highway officials in Oregon. The chief highway engineer, R. H. Baldock, proposed a second span over the Columbia River after it was determined that expanding the existing bridge was not feasible. Several sites were proposed and surveyed, but ultimately a twinned span west of the original bridge was chosen in September 1950 by Oregon and Washington. The proposed reinstatement of the toll led to a lawsuit that was heard by the Washington Supreme Court in September 1953 and decided in the states' favor.[19]

In 1958, a $14.5 million ($158 million in 2024 dollars) project created a second, almost identical span and doubled the capacity of the bridge. The new bridge was built with a "humpback" that provides 72 ft (21.9 m) of vertical clearance and minimizes bridge openings.[12] Construction began in summer 1956,[20][21] and the new, parallel bridge opened to traffic on July 1, 1958.[22]

At the time the new bridge was opened, the old one was temporarily closed for rebuilding to give it a matching humpback section. When both bridges were first open concurrently, on January 8, 1960,[23] each bridge became one-way (the new bridge for southbound traffic and the old one for northbound traffic) and tolls were reinstated at $0.20 for cars, $0.40 for light trucks, and $0.60 for heavy trucks and buses. The tolls were removed in 1966 after the construction expenses were paid off.[2][24]

A $3 million ($7.2 million in 2024 dollars) upgrade to the lift cables, expansion joints, and a deck repaving was completed in 1990. The diesel generator used to power the lift was replaced in 1995 at a cost of $150,000. In 1999, the bridge was repainted at a cost of $17 million. A $10.8 million electrical upgrade was completed in mid-May 2005.[25] The damaged trunnion on the northbound bridge was replaced in September 1997, requiring a full shutdown of I-5 for six days; the project was completed ahead of the original schedule, which anticipated a 21-day closure.[26] A temporary commuter train was operated by Amtrak from Union Station in Portland and Vancouver station during peak hours.[27] The free trains had ten round trips and drew an average of 1,335 passengers per day; the low ridership was attributed to the isolated location of Vancouver's station.[28][29] The northbound bridge's trunnion was replaced in 2020 with all traffic carried on the southbound bridge, arranged into two lanes in the peak direction controlled by a zipper machine.[30]

Vertical lift

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The bridge is 3,538 feet (1,078 m) long with a main span of 531 feet (162 m).[31] The vertical lift provides 176 feet (53.6 m) of river clearance when fully opened. Openings last about ten minutes and occur between 20 and 30 times per month,[32] or around 300 per year.[33]

A barge passing under the raised lift spans
Viewed from the northeast, in Vancouver

Outside peak commuting times (6:30 a.m. to 9 a.m. and from 2:30 p.m. to 6 p.m), marine traffic is granted right of way at the bridge by federal law (33 CFR 117.869).[34][35]

In 2006, the six total lanes of the bridges carried 130,000 vehicles daily.[2] Full traffic capacity occurs four hours every day.[32]

The Interstate Bridge's name is a simple descriptive one based on its location, as a bridge connecting two states.[2] In 1917, the new bridge gave its name to a Portland arterial street. Shortly before the bridge opened, a pair of streets through North Portland that were planned to be treated as the main route to and from the bridge, Maryland Avenue and Patton Avenue, were renamed Interstate Avenue.[36]

Replacement planning

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Columbia River Crossing (2005–2013)

[edit]
Main article: Columbia River Crossing

The bridge is frequently a bottleneck which impacts both traffic on the freeway, as well as on the river. The Oregon and Washington transportation departments are jointly studying how to replace the bridge. Both spans have been rated as "functionally obsolete," with sufficiency ratings of 18.3% and 49.4% for the original and second spans, respectively.[37][38] Initially, the estimated cost for a replacement bridge was around $2 billion,[39] but that number has climbed steadily to around $3.4 billion.[40] An independent study in 2010 estimated the full cost to be closer to $10 billion.[41]

Design of a replacement (especially a fixed-span bridge) is complicated by the existence of a railroad drawbridge crossing the Columbia a short distance downriver (on the Burlington Northern Railroad Bridge 9.6), which constrains the location of the shipping channel; and by approach paths to Portland International Airport in Portland and to Pearson Field in Vancouver, which limit the height of any new structure. Some have proposed replacing the bridge in a different location. There were originally 12 transportation plans that were being studied to improve and expand the Interstate 5 crossing of the Columbia River.[42] In late 2006, four of these plans were selected for a final proposal, along with a fifth no-build option.[43] The Columbia River Crossing project's six local partner agencies selected a replacement I-5 bridge and light rail extension to Clark College as the project's Locally Preferred Alternative (LPA) in 2008.[44]

There is also a longstanding debate as to whether or not a new bridge would include a MAX Light Rail line, express buses, or bus rapid transit. During his 2007 "State of the City" address, Vancouver mayor Royce Pollard stated

I've said it before, but it bears repeating – Vancouver and Clark County residents have the cheapest buy-in to one of the most successful light-rail systems in the world, the MAX system. There is over $5 billion invested in light rail across the river. We can tap into that system at a very minimal cost. We’d be foolish not to. The bi-state Columbia River Crossing initiative is making plans for the future of our community for 50 years and beyond. This project should not happen without integrating light rail that comes into downtown Vancouver. If the final alternative doesn’t have a light rail component, I will not support it.[45]

In December 2007, Oregon governor Ted Kulongoski advocated for a new bridge, publicly endorsing the Oregon Business Plan's proposal.[46]

In 2008, as fuel prices increased and project cost estimates soared, many in the area began questioning whether the project is worth the costs. In addition, many on the Portland side of the river fear that a 12-lane highway bridge to Vancouver, which many also believe has virtually no land use restrictions, will encourage suburban sprawl and development north of the river.[47]

Work Lights on Interstate Bridge
Interstate Bridge in 2016 with additional illumination for late-night work crews.

Further concerns over the 12-lane "Columbia River Crossing" (CRC) proposal include its failure to examine critical environmental impacts, such as damage to Clark County's drinking water supply, endangered fish habitat in the Columbia, and air pollution in North Portland.

In 2008, the Environmental Protection Agency found that the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the CRC had failed to adequately cover these issues, as well as the potential induced demand for suburban sprawl. In a letter to CRC planners, the EPA wrote that "There was no indication (in the CRC environmental impact statement) of how these vulnerable populations might be impacted by air pollution, noise, diesel construction vehicles and increased traffic", referring to minority communities in North Portland.[48]

In June 2013, the Washington Legislature voted against further funding of the CRC.[8] On June 29, Oregon Governor Kitzhaber directed the CRC to shut down operations.

Interstate Bridge Replacement Program (2019–present)

[edit]

The relaunched Interstate Bridge Replacement Program is a joint effort between ODOT, WSDOT, Federal Highway Administration, Federal Transit Administration, Metro, Southwest Washington Regional Transportation Council, the cities of Portland and Vancouver, the Port of Portland, and the Port of Vancouver USA.[49]

The Joint Oregon-Washington Legislative Action Committee was formed by the Washington legislature in 2017 to study a bridge replacement, but initially had no Oregon representation for a year.[50][51] The new committee was formed to prevent $140 million in federal funding allocated for the CRC from being recalled after a deadline, which was extended to 2025.[52] In April 2019, the Washington legislature approved $17.5 million to establish a project office to conduct pre-design and planning work, which was followed by a matching contribution from the Oregon Transportation Commission in August.[53][54]

A new timeline for the project, with the start of environmental review in 2020 and construction by 2025, was approved by the joint committee in late 2019.[55] The replacement bridge's design is unspecified, with discussions about the inclusion of light rail, lane configurations, and investigating a third crossing all under consideration.[53] Former Michigan Department of Transportation deputy director Greg Johnson was appointed as the bridge program administrator in June 2020.[56][57] Several alternative ideas have been proposed, including an immersed tube tunnel, a third bridge, and a bascule bridge favored by the U.S. Coast Guard, but have been rejected for their drawbacks and cost.[58]

As of December 2022, the project is estimated to cost $5.5 billion to $7.5 billion.[59] The locally preferred alternative selected in 2022 is an eight-lane bridge with a light rail guideway on the west side and several modified interchanges.[60] The U.S. Coast Guard requested an alternative design with a drawbridge to preserve the clearance for river traffic, which would be lowered by 60 feet (18 m) if the locally preferred alternative was built.[61] Construction is scheduled to begin in late 2025 or early 2026. Tolls will be implemented on the Oregon side of the existing bridge to help fund the new bridge as it is being built.[62]

The full bridge as seen from Hayden Island, showing the 1959-built "humped" section mid-span.

See also

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References

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Interstate Bridge

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from Grokipedia
The Interstate Bridge consists of two parallel vertical-lift truss bridges spanning the Columbia River, connecting Portland in Oregon to Vancouver in Washington and carrying Interstate 5 traffic as the primary highway crossing between the two states. The original northbound span, constructed as a riveted Parker truss with a vertical-lift mechanism, opened to traffic on February 14, 1917, marking the first permanent automobile bridge over the Columbia River in the Portland-Vancouver area and initially accommodating horse-drawn wagons alongside early motor vehicles. A second southbound span, nearly identical in design, was completed in 1958 to handle increasing vehicular demand, resulting in a four-lane configuration with each bridge dedicated to one direction of travel. These structures now support approximately 138,000 vehicles per day, contributing to chronic congestion during peak hours. Despite their historical significance, the bridges exhibit structural vulnerabilities, particularly to seismic activity from the nearby Cascadia Subduction Zone, prompting the Interstate Bridge Replacement Program—a joint effort by the Washington and Oregon Departments of Transportation—to develop a modern, seismically resilient, multimodal replacement that enhances safety, freight mobility, and transit options while addressing capacity constraints. The program, reinitiated in 2019 after prior planning efforts, continues to advance through environmental reviews and design phases as of 2025, amid debates over funding, environmental impacts, and regional growth projections.

History

Original Construction and Opening (1917–1918)

The Interstate Bridge, spanning the between , and , was conceived to replace ferry crossings that had long constrained regional connectivity. Jointly funded by ($1,250,000 in bonds) and ($500,000 in bonds), construction addressed the growing demand for reliable vehicular and streetcar access amid early 20th-century economic expansion. Preliminary surveys began on April 28, 1912, under engineer Ralph Modjeski, with the final design contracted to the firm Waddell & Harrington on January 6, 1914. Groundbreaking occurred on March 6, 1915, with the substructure built by Pacific Bridge Company using and timber piles, while Steel Products Company fabricated the superstructure of riveted spans, erected by Porter Brothers. The bridge comprises 14 main spans across the river—ten at 265 feet and three at 275 feet—plus approach structures, totaling approximately 3,538 feet in , with a vertical-lift span providing 150 feet of vertical clearance when raised. The 38-foot-wide roadway accommodated two vehicle lanes, dual streetcar tracks, and a five-foot sidewalk, reflecting its dual role in highway and rail transport. Construction concluded under the $1.75 million budget, finishing with a $56,000 surplus after less than two years of work. Pedestrians first crossed on December 30, 1916, followed by the official vehicular and ceremonial opening on February 14, 1917, drawing crowds estimated at up to 50,000—the largest in Vancouver's history at the time—and featuring addresses by Governor James Withycombe, Washington Governor Lister, and other dignitaries. Electric streetcars began service immediately, operating until 1940, underscoring the bridge's integration into regional transit networks. This engineering feat, leveraging steel trusses with curved top chords for aesthetic and structural efficiency, marked a pivotal infrastructure milestone, enabling seamless interstate commerce and mobility without the delays of prior ferry reliance.

Second Span Addition (1958)

By the mid-1940s, the original 1917 Interstate Bridge was overwhelmed by surging automotive traffic exceeding 30,000 vehicles daily and frequent vertical lift operations to accommodate river vessels, leading to significant delays and capacity constraints. In 1950, Oregon highway engineer R. H. Baldock formally proposed a parallel second span west of the original, with surveying commencing that May and design finalized by 1952 at an estimated cost of $11.2 million. Oregon and Washington legislatures authorized the project in 1953 through bond sales for funding, following resolution of legal challenges. Construction contract was awarded in 1956 to the , with work beginning that summer and completing on June 30, 1958, at a final cost of $14.5 million (equivalent to approximately $140 million in 2020 dollars), including expenses for the new spans and an Oregon Slough bridge. The second span featured a design nearly identical to the 1917 structure—a metal vertical lift bridge with an 11-panel rivet-connected Parker through truss and a 278.7-foot lift span—but included refinements such as a 40-foot-wide roadway (2 feet wider than the original), a total length of 3,538 feet across 16 sections (versus 14), riveted Warren truss floorbeams, and a raised "hump" section south of the lift span providing 72 feet of vertical clearance to minimize future liftings for smaller vessels. Two workers died during construction amid these efforts to double the crossing's vehicular capacity to 75,000–80,000 vehicles per day. The second span opened to southbound traffic on July 1, 1958, marked by a ribbon-cutting attended by dignitaries including descendants of early bridge supporters, though drawing a smaller crowd than the 1917 opening. Immediately following, the original span closed for an 18-month renovation costing about $3 million to install a matching hump for improved clearance, reopening on January 8, 1960, as the dedicated northbound structure and establishing a one-way pair configuration. Tolls, absent since 1929, were reinstated on January 10, 1960 (20 cents for cars, up to 60 cents for heavy vehicles), to service bonds and offset costs but discontinued on November 1, 1966, after payoff.

Post-1958 Renovations and Modifications

Following the opening of span in , the original northbound span underwent remodeling to align with the new , including raising span to the adjacent bridge's , with work commencing on , , and awarded for $2,993,995. This modification enabled the spans to operate in while accommodating increased interstate volumes under the newly designated I-5 corridor. In 1979, deck and reconstruction addressed from decades of heavy use, replacing standard surfacing with to improve and ride quality, completed in at a of $946,600. This upgrade targeted deterioration in the roadway surfaces but did not alter the structural or lift mechanisms. The replacement of lift-span cables and a sheave in the , costing $385,708 and completed that year, ensured continued reliable operation of the vertical lift on the original span, preventing potential failures in the hoisting apparatus amid rising demands. Subsequently, in , comprehensive deck restoration and repairs were performed across both spans, completed by at $2,432,385, focusing on resurfacing and sealing to mitigate and without substantive seismic or load-capacity enhancements. These interventions represent routine preservation efforts rather than transformative overhauls, with no documented major seismic or capacity expansions undertaken, leaving the bridges vulnerable to as noted in subsequent assessments. Ongoing has prioritized operational continuity over fundamental redesign, amid escalating exceeding original loads by factors of 5-10 times.

Design and Technical Specifications

Structural Composition and Materials


The Interstate Bridge comprises two parallel vertical-lift bridges, each characterized by a central Pratt through-truss lift span and flanking Parker through-truss approach spans, all fabricated from riveted steel. The original span, completed in 1917, utilized steel superstructure elements produced by the United States Steel Products Company, while the 1958 addition's steelwork was fabricated and erected by the Guy F. Atkinson Company. Substructure components incorporate , including a 5¼-inch-thick for the roadway deck on the bridge and T-beam spans for approaches. Piers on the original span are dumbbell-type , founded on timber piles driven into open timber caissons and sealed with . The 1958 span features piers assembled from hollow segments, filled with and supported on timber pilings, eliminating the need for cofferdams used in the initial construction. These materials reflect early 20th-century practices for long-span movable bridges, prioritizing steel's tensile strength for the framework and concrete's compressive for amid the Columbia River's challenging geotechnical conditions.

Vertical Lift System and Operational Mechanics

The Interstate Bridge features two parallel vertical-lift bridges spanning the , each with a 279-foot Pratt lift span designed to rise vertically while remaining parallel to the roadway. The employs a Waddell & Harrington-type mechanism, utilizing counterweights, wire ropes, cast sheaves, and operating drums to facilitate the lift. Reinforced concrete counterweights, positioned at each end of the lift span, balance the approximately 1,800-ton span, connected via cables that run over sheaves mounted on trunnions within the lift towers. Operation begins with bridge tenders in the main control room on Pier 2 signaling vessel passage requests, coordinated with the U.S. Coast Guard. Electric motors drive the operating ropes wound around drums, raising the span along guide rails at a controlled speed, achieving up to 176 feet of vertical clearance above mean high water to accommodate marine traffic. The counterweights offset most of the span's dead load, minimizing motor power requirements, while separate uphaul and downhaul rope systems ensure precise control and friction-based force transmission via sheaves. Modern monitoring systems enhance operational safety, with dataloggers, tiltmeters, and laser sensors tracking span tilt, displacement, , and position in real-time during lifts. Data is collected at 5-second intervals during operations and transmitted wirelessly to servers for analysis, allowing adjustments to maintain balance and detect misalignments early. The spans open an average of 250 times annually, varying with and levels, up to 480 in peak years. Maintenance includes periodic replacement of worn ropes, drums, and bearings to preserve alignment and functionality.

Clearance, Navigation, and Load Capacities

The features a vertical lift span that provides 178 feet (54.3 m) of clearance above Datum (CRD) when raised, enabling passage of large vessels and on the navigation channel. When lowered, the clearance under the lift span measures 39 feet (11.9 m) above 0.0 CRD in the primary channel. The horizontal clearance under the 542-foot (165 m) lift span is 263 feet (80 m), accommodating standard river traffic widths. Navigation through the bridge is regulated by the U.S. under 33 CFR 117.1041, requiring the lift span to open on signal except during weekday hours from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m., when openings are limited to vessels needing 140 feet (42.7 ) or greater clearance. Outside these periods, at least four hours' advance notice is required for openings. The system uses counterweights and electric motors to raise the span approximately 140 feet in about 4 minutes, minimizing disruptions to highway traffic while prioritizing commercial needs on this federal waterway. Load capacities adhere to federal Interstate Highway standards, permitting a maximum gross of pounds (36,287 kg), with single-axle limits of pounds (9,072 kg) and tandem-axle limits of 34,000 pounds (15,422 kg), calculated via the Federal Bridge Formula to distribute loads and prevent structural overload. No unique postings or specific to the bridge's age or were identified beyond these norms, reflecting periodic inspections and reinforcements maintaining sufficiency for HS-20 loading ratings typical of interstate spans.

Operational Performance

Daily Traffic Volumes and Patterns

The Interstate Bridge accommodates an average weekday volume of approximately 130,000 , with 2023 recording 133,737 per weekday. This represents a recovery from the 2020 pandemic low of 120,361 per weekday, though volumes remain about 5% below the 2019 peak of 138,700 per day. Historical growth has been substantial, rising from 33,537 per day in 1961 to over 130,000 by the 2020s, driven by regional population and economic expansion. Traffic patterns exhibit a strong commuter orientation, with directional imbalances during peak periods: southbound flows dominate mornings from 6 to 9 a.m., corresponding to travel from Vancouver, Washington, suburbs to Portland, Oregon, employment centers, while northbound volumes peak in the afternoon and evening. Weekday volumes exceed weekends by roughly 20-30%, with hourly data showing maximum throughput during rush hours but constrained by the bridge's capacity, leading to recurring bottlenecks. Trucks constitute about 8% of weekday traffic, primarily during off-peak times to avoid congestion. Overall, volumes reflect induced demand from limited crossings, with minimal long-term growth post-2019 despite regional development.

Congestion Metrics and Bottlenecks

The Interstate Bridge experiences recurrent congestion primarily during peak periods, with southbound queues forming in the morning and northbound in the afternoon and evening. In the 2019 baseline year, southbound congestion on the bridge spans approximately 3 hours from 6 to 9 a., extending about 3 miles, while northbound congestion persists for 8.75 hours from 11:15 a. to 8 p., backing up over 10 miles. These patterns reflect the bridge's limited capacity of roughly 5,000 vehicles per hour in the peak direction, which is frequently exceeded during high-demand hours. Level of service (LOS) on the bridge deteriorates to E or F—indicating unstable flow and forced operation at reduced speeds—during peaks. Southbound AM peak segments achieve LOS E with volume-to-capacity (V/C) ratios of 0.90–1.0 from 6–7 a.m., dropping to LOS F with V/C exceeding 1.1 by 8 a.m. Northbound PM peak conditions reach LOS F with V/C ratios of 1.0–1.1 from 3–5 p.m., following earlier LOS B–C in the morning off-peak. Average travel delays during these periods range from 24–38 minutes southbound in the AM peak (6–9 a.m.) and 31–40 minutes northbound in the PM peak (3–7 p.m.).
Direction and Peak PeriodCongestion DurationApproximate Queue LengthTypical Delay
Southbound AM (6–9 a.m.)3 hours3 miles24–38 minutes
Northbound PM/Evening (11:15 a.m.–8 p.m.)8.75 hours10+ miles31–40 minutes
The primary bottleneck is the bridge itself, constrained by its four-lane configuration (two per direction) and vertical lift span operations, which accommodate river an average of 250 times annually and contribute to intermittent . Secondary bottlenecks occur adjacent to the bridge, including the I-5/I-405 interchange southbound (congested 6.5 hours from 6:30 a.m.–1 p.m.) and the Rose Quarter area southbound (12.5 hours from 7:15 a.m.–7:45 p.m.), where merging and weaving exacerbate backups. Independent analyses have attributed some upstream congestion to off-bridge factors, such as merges at North Lombard in Portland during southbound AM peaks and Victory Boulevard in the PM, suggesting the bridge amplifies rather than solely originates regional queuing in certain scenarios. Post-2019 traffic volumes have declined, with average daily volumes at approximately 127,000 vehicles in recent years, potentially moderating peak severity compared to pre-pandemic levels, though capacity constraints persist.

Accident Statistics and Safety Data

The Interstate Bridge and its immediate approaches register crash rates significantly above averages for comparable urban interstate facilities, primarily attributable to chronic congestion inducing abrupt braking and rear-end collisions. Between and , the bridge itself (spanning approximately 0.67 miles) experienced an average of 108 crashes ly, based on data from the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT) and (WSDOT). In the broader 5-mile corridor encompassing the bridge and key approach segments, crashes averaged around 409 during the same period, with rear-end impacts comprising 66% of incidents and sideswipe collisions 14%, patterns exacerbated by bottlenecks and merging traffic. Crash density in the vicinity remains elevated, with approaches to the bridge exhibiting rates over three times higher than statewide norms for similar roadways, particularly during peak hours when volume-to-capacity ratios exceed 1.0. A 2011 analysis of the Columbia River Crossing area reported a collision rate of 1.58 per million vehicle miles traveled (MVMT), compared to an urban interstate benchmark of 0.55 per MVMT, underscoring the safety premium from substandard geometry, narrow lanes, and lift-span operations that periodically halt traffic. From 2015 to 2019, the program study area recorded 7 fatal crashes and 33 serious injury crashes, reflecting persistent vulnerabilities tied to high daily volumes exceeding 140,000 vehicles.
MetricValuePeriod/Source
Crashes on bridge structure~108/year2002–2006 (ODOT/WSDOT)
Crashes in 5-mile corridor~409/year2002–2006 (ODOT/WSDOT)
Collision rate (corridor)1.58/MVMTPre-2011 (WSDOT)
Fatal crashes (study area)72015–2019
Serious injury crashes (study area)332015–2019
These figures highlight causal links between undercapacity infrastructure and incident frequency, though direct attribution requires accounting for variables like and driver behavior; replacement proposals project a 13–17% crash reduction by 2045 through added and modern design.

Engineering Challenges and Vulnerabilities

Seismic Risks and Earthquake Preparedness

The Interstate Bridge, constructed in 1917 and renovated in the 1950s, predates modern seismic design standards and exhibits significant vulnerabilities to earthquakes characteristic of the . The structure spans the in a region influenced by the (CSZ), capable of generating magnitude 9.0 events with prolonged shaking exceeding one minute and peak ground accelerations of 0.1-0.2g, alongside crustal faults like the Portland Hills Fault producing magnitude 6.8 quakes with higher accelerations of 0.4-0.7g. Probabilities for a CSZ magnitude 9.0 earthquake within the next 50 years range from 7-15% according to state resilience assessments, though some models estimate up to 37% for magnitude 8.0 or greater. Engineering evaluations identify as the primary hazard, exacerbated by the bridge's soft soil foundations, leading to potential differential settlements and loss of support. Structural deficiencies include inadequate bearings prone to unseating, overloaded timber and piles, weak columns susceptible to shear , and overstressed lift span towers. A 2006 expert panel assessment, convened for the Columbia River Crossing project by Washington and transportation departments, concluded that without , the bridges (north and south spans) would likely experience or severe rendering them unusable in a full CSZ subduction event or major crustal quake. The panel noted the bridges' survival of the 2001 Nisqually magnitude 6.8 earthquake but emphasized that event's lower intensity and shorter duration do not predict performance against CSZ-scale shaking. Retrofitting to achieve no-collapse in a 1,000-year event (encompassing CSZ risks) was deemed technically feasible by the 2006 panel, involving measures such as foundation improvements with drilled shafts, jacketing for , bearing replacements, and superstructure bracing, at an estimated of $88-190 million in 2006 dollars. However, no comprehensive seismic retrofits have been implemented on the Interstate Bridge to date, as evidenced by ongoing replacement advocacy citing persistent deficiencies. Oregon-specific highway bridge vulnerability studies severe mobility disruptions across the network, including the Interstate Bridge, post-CSZ event due to widespread failures and span drops. Current earthquake preparedness centers on the Interstate Bridge Replacement Program (2019-present), which prioritizes a new structure designed for seismic resiliency against magnitude 8+ CSZ events, incorporating advanced damping and isolation systems absent in the existing spans. In the interim, regional strategies rely on emergency response planning, such as rapid damage assessment protocols by state departments of transportation, though the bridge's age and unretrofitted state limit proactive mitigation beyond monitoring. Critics, including some local analyses, argue that replacement claims overstate immediate collapse risks given the bridge's endurance of prior seismic events, advocating updated studies over full reconstruction. Nonetheless, engineering consensus from peer-reviewed and governmental assessments underscores the structure's non-compliance with contemporary no-collapse criteria for rare, high-magnitude events.

Aging Infrastructure and Maintenance History

The Interstate Bridge comprises two parallel spans across the : the original northbound span, constructed from 1915 to 1917 and opened to traffic on February 14, 1917, and a southbound span completed in 1958. The original structure, a steel cantilever truss with a vertical lift span, was built on timber piles driven into sandy, liquefiable soil, while the 1958 span uses precast concrete pier segments but shares similar foundational vulnerabilities. By 2025, the primary span exceeds 107 years of service, subjecting its steel components to prolonged exposure to corrosive marine conditions and cyclic loading from increasing traffic volumes, which accelerate fatigue in unreinforced elements. Maintenance efforts have focused on routine inspections, deck preservation, and operational upkeep rather than structural overhauls, with joint bi-state agreements covering day-to-day costs shared between Washington and Oregon. No comprehensive seismic retrofitting has been implemented on either span, despite a 2006 Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) assessment deeming upgrades technically feasible, as the projected expense—potentially rivaling replacement costs—has deterred investment in preservation over full reconstruction. This omission leaves the bridge susceptible to Cascadia Subduction Zone events, where soil liquefaction could undermine pile foundations, as highlighted in program evaluations prioritizing resilience. Historical interventions include periodic lift span adjustments and painting to mitigate corrosion, but these have not addressed foundational or truss deficiencies exacerbated by the bridge's age and design limitations from early 20th-century standards. Engineering reports note that without intervention, progressive deterioration from fatigue cracking and environmental degradation risks operational restrictions, underscoring the shift toward the Interstate Bridge Replacement Program as the primary strategy for sustaining functionality.

Freight and Oversize Load Constraints

The Interstate Bridge supports standard freight traffic under federal Interstate System regulations, allowing single-axle weights up to 20,000 pounds, tandem-axle weights up to 34,000 pounds, and gross weights up to pounds in accordance with the federal bridge formula. These limits apply without additional posted restrictions specific to the bridge, routine passage of heavy trucks as part of the I-5 corridor, which handles significant freight volumes including intermodal containers and bulk between ports and inland destinations. and Washington permit overweight operations beyond these thresholds via single-trip or permits, provided axle configurations comply with state formulas allowing up to 105,500 pounds gross under certain conditions, though such loads require route approvals that include the Interstate Bridge absent structural prohibitions. Oversize loads face geometric constraints due to the bridge's narrow 10-foot lane widths, lack of shoulders, and total deck width of approximately 42 feet across four lanes, necessitating escorts, lane closures, or off-peak timing for widths exceeding 8.5 feet to mitigate collision risks in high-volume conditions. Height limits align with state standards of 13.5 feet for legal loads, but taller oversize vehicles (up to 16 feet with permits) must coordinate with lift span operations, as raising the 232-foot movable span for river navigation halts all road traffic for 3-5 minutes per event, potentially disrupting timed hauls. Length restrictions follow federal maxima of 53 feet for semitrailers, with longer combinations prohibited on the Interstate System, though permits for divisible oversize loads require verification of the bridge's vertical alignment and approach grades to prevent instability. These constraints reflect the bridge's 1917-1958 origins, where and designs met era-specific load standards but now prioritize maintenance over enhanced capacities for modern oversize freight, such as specialized equipment or components common in regional supply chains. While no structural deficiency postings limit routine freight, the configuration elevates vulnerability to overload incidents, with state agencies monitoring via biennial inspections to ensure compliance without routine reductions in permissible loads.

Replacement Initiatives

Columbia River Crossing Project (2005–2013)

The Crossing (CRC) originated from a 2005 bi-state agreement between the (ODOT) and (WSDOT) to modernize the corridor across the , targeting the Interstate Bridge's capacity constraints, seismic deficiencies, and multimodal shortcomings. Daily volumes on the bridge routinely surpassed 130,000 by the mid-2000s, contributing to severe congestion and reliability issues for freight and commuter flows. The initiative emphasized replacing the 1917 and 1920 lift-span structures with seismically resilient designs while expanding capacity and integrating transit options. Core elements of the proposed plan included two new parallel bridge spans for vehicular traffic, each accommodating four general-purpose lanes plus auxiliary shoulders, alongside widened I-5 approaches, upgraded interchanges at Hayden Island and Marine Drive, and an extension of light rail from Portland's Metro system into Vancouver, Washington, via a dedicated guideway. The design aimed to enhance freight mobility for the Pacific Northwest's primary north-south corridor, incorporate pedestrian and bicycle facilities, and meet federal standards for navigation clearance under the spans. Preliminary engineering and alternatives analysis began in 2006, with public involvement processes documenting preferences for options balancing highway expansion and transit investments. Development progressed through environmental compliance, including a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) released in 2008 and a Final EIS (FEIS) in August 2011, which evaluated impacts on air quality, water resources, and induced traffic demand while selecting a preferred alternative. The FEIS projected construction starting in 2015, with completion by 2020, but highlighted challenges like greenhouse gas emissions from added capacity and reliance on toll revenues for funding. Oregon approved $450 million in toll-backed bonds in 2013, contingent on matching Washington contributions, reflecting state-level commitment amid regional economic stakes. The project collapsed in mid-2013 due to Washington's failure to enact , as costs escalated beyond estimates—reaching approximately $3.5 billion by final assessments—driven by scope expansions, prolonged timelines, and disputed toll projections. Political resistance in Washington centered on the $850 million segment, viewed by legislators and stakeholders as an unwarranted extension of Oregon's transit model without sufficient intrastate benefits or voter support, alongside broader fiscal skepticism toward overruns. Environmental critics argued the plan would induce additional miles traveled, exacerbating emissions despite measures, while fiscal analyses questioned the return on given alternatives like bridge-only rehabilitation at lower . Governors and formally declared the CRC defunct in 2013, suspending all activities by 2014 after $25 million in sunk expenditures across both states. The underscored interstate coordination hurdles and the causal link between ambitious multimodal scopes and volatility in recessionary fiscal environments.

Interstate Bridge Replacement Program (2019–Present)

The Interstate Bridge Replacement Program (IBR), initiated in 2019 by the Oregon and Washington Departments of Transportation, seeks to replace the existing Interstate 5 (I-5) spans over the Columbia River with a modern, seismically resilient, multimodal structure comprising two side-by-side bridges to enhance safety, alleviate congestion, and improve connectivity for vehicles, transit, freight, cyclists, and pedestrians. The program addresses the original 1917 bridge's vulnerabilities, including its lift-span mechanism and inadequate seismic standards, while incorporating broader corridor improvements over a 5-mile stretch in Portland, Oregon, and Vancouver, Washington. Planning efforts have emphasized environmental reviews, with a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) underway to evaluate impacts and alternatives following the termination of the prior Columbia River Crossing project in 2013. Design visualizations and workshops have focused on architectural elements, grade reductions (from the current 4.7% maximum), and multimodal accommodations, including light rail extensions and active transportation paths. Partner agencies, including the Federal Highway Administration and local jurisdictions, collaborate on compliance with federal permitting timelines, though the process has encountered delays, pushing the project at least 2.5 years behind initial schedules as of September 2025. The program's projects total costs between $5 billion and $7.5 billion, with a likely midpoint of $6 billion, funded through a mix of state commitments, federal , and toll revenues estimated at $1.1 billion to $1.6 billion. Both states have confirmed toll contributions of approximately $1.24 billion under base-case scenarios, supplemented by diverse to cover the balance. Recent analyses indicate potential escalation to $10 billion due to permitting delays and added scope, including $1.9 billion in ancillary projects like highway widenings and transit enhancements. As of late 2025, the program remains in pre-construction phases, with anticipated to advance into mid-2025 or later, pending SEIS completion and permitting approvals originally targeted for late 2024 but now extended. Bi-state tolling subcommittees have convened through July 2025 to refine models, while a update is scheduled for late 2025; major sequencing will prioritize the river bridges and approaches once initiated. The effort builds on lessons from prior initiatives by prioritizing resilience against seismic events and freight demands, though fiscal pressures from rising estimates have prompted ongoing scrutiny of scope and efficiencies.

Controversies and Policy Debates

Cost Escalations and Fiscal Critiques

The Interstate Bridge Replacement Program's initial cost estimate, established in 2023, ranged from $5 billion to $7.5 billion, encompassing bridge replacement, highway improvements, and multimodal enhancements across a four-mile corridor. By early 2024, project managers acknowledged escalating expenses due to inflation, supply chain disruptions, and design refinements, prompting a commitment to release an updated quantitative risk assessment later that year. However, as of September 2025, the revised estimate—delayed for nearly two years—has not been publicly disclosed, with state legislators anticipating a total approaching $10 billion amid a reported 30% average cost increase across regional transportation initiatives. These escalations echo the predecessor Columbia River Crossing project (2005–2013), which ballooned from an initial $3.4 billion projection to potential overruns nearing $10 billion before cancellation, after expending $182 million—including $17 million in questioned administrative and consultant fees. A 2023 quantitative risk assessment for the current program incorporated escalation rates derived from Washington State Department of Transportation data, projecting potential variances of 20-40% based on historical megaproject trends, yet critics argue such models underestimate systemic delays in permitting and stakeholder consultations. Fiscal critiques have intensified, with Washington and lawmakers highlighting funding shortfalls: the program's financial plan relies on $1.24 billion from tolls, supplemented by federal and state bonds, but recent transportation audits reveal $4.8 billion in statewide overruns unaccounted for in planning. Delays in federal environmental reviews and tolling implementation—now pushed beyond 2025—exacerbate costs through prolonged inflation exposure and interim maintenance, prompting calls for independent audits and scaled-back scopes to prioritize seismic over expansive capacity additions. observers, including officials, contend that opaque reporting erodes and risks repeating the CRC's fate, where political opposition to tolls and perceived fiscal irresponsibility halted . Proponents counter that unaddressed congestion imposes annual economic losses exceeding $400 million regionally, justifying investment despite variances, though skeptics demand verifiable return-on-investment recalculations incorporating effects.

Capacity Expansion vs. Transit Prioritization Disputes

The Crossing (CRC) , initiated in , proposed replacing the Interstate Bridge with a including six general-purpose , auxiliary , and transit (LRT) extension from Portland into , but faced significant opposition from Clark County residents and voters who rejected funding measures for LRT due to concerns over costs, property taxes, and perceived imposition of Portland-style urban policies. The was suspended in 2013 after Washington state lawmakers withheld funding, with critics arguing that LRT would serve only a 15-20% of cross-river trips while diverting resources from capacity needed for the 95%+ of users traveling by personal vehicle or freight truck. The subsequent Interstate Bridge Replacement (IBR) Program, launched in 2019, aimed to balance these tensions by initially exploring (BRT) as a less controversial alternative to LRT, but in 2022 selected LRT—along with three through lanes per direction, shoulders, auxiliary lanes, and multimodal paths—as the modified locally preferred alternative (LPA), projecting LRT to carry up to 13,000 daily boardings by 2040 while adding highway capacity to handle 150,000+ vehicles per day. Proponents, including Metro and , contend this multimodal approach reduces long-term congestion through mode shift, citing traffic models showing LRT diverting 10-15% of auto trips and aligning with federal emphases on . However, independent analyses question these projections, noting current transit mode share across the bridge is under 2% and historical data from similar corridors indicate induced demand fills added highway capacity within years, potentially exacerbating bottlenecks without sufficient general-purpose lanes. Capacity expansion advocates, particularly in Washington, argue for prioritizing additional vehicle lanes—potentially 10-12 total—to accommodate freight (20% of peak-hour ) and commuter growth, as the bridge ranks as the region's worst bottleneck with exceeding 50 hours per traveler annually, and view LRT as inefficient given Clark County's thrice-rejected sales tax measures for rail extensions in 2006, 2012, and 2016. Cities like Camas and Battle Ground passed resolutions in 2025 opposing LRT inclusion, citing voter sovereignty and fiscal risks, with C-TRAN deferring funding commitments amid board divisions. Transit prioritization supporters counter that highway-only expansions ignore equity and emissions, but skeptics highlight systemic overestimation of rail ridership in U.S. projects—often 50-70% below forecasts—while underemphasizing that 84% of current bridge width is vehicle-dedicated, shrinking to 46% under the LPA, constraining seismic-resilient capacity for essential auto and flows. These tensions persist into 2025, with the IBR's $7-10 billion estimates fueling debates over tolling and federal , as Washington Republicans block LRT operations funding and demand BRT or lane additions instead.

Environmental Impact Assessments and Induced Demand Arguments

The Interstate Bridge Replacement Program (IBRP) initiated a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) process in 2023 to evaluate the Modified Locally Preferred Alternative (LPA), which includes replacing the existing bridge with two side-by-side structures, adding auxiliary lanes, and incorporating light rail transit, against a no-build scenario. The draft SEIS, released on September 20, 2024, spans approximately 10,000 pages and assesses impacts on air quality, greenhouse gas emissions, water resources, and cultural sites under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), incorporating updated traffic modeling and mitigation measures such as emissions reductions from improved transit access. Federal and state agencies, including the Federal Highway Administration and Oregon Department of Transportation, have emphasized compliance with Clean Air Act standards, projecting net decreases in regional vehicle miles traveled (VMT) per capita through induced transit demand offsetting some highway usage. The preceding Columbia River Crossing (CRC) project (2005–2013) produced a Final Environmental Impact Statement in 2011, analyzing alternatives with highway expansions up to 12 lanes alongside transit, which forecasted temporary air quality improvements but raised concerns over long-term cumulative emissions from increased capacity. That EIS incorporated baseline data from 2005 showing 280,000 daily vehicle trips across the corridor, with modeling that accounted for regional growth but faced criticism for underestimating post-construction traffic volumes. The CRC's cancellation in 2013, partly due to cost overruns and environmental litigation, highlighted tensions in balancing infrastructure needs with NEPA requirements, influencing the IBRP's more focused LPA design. Induced demand arguments have featured prominently in opposition to both projects, positing that expanded highway capacity lowers travel times, drawing latent trips and increasing overall VMT, thereby elevating emissions and undermining climate goals. Critics, including analysts, contend that the IBRP's traffic models fail to fully capture this elasticity—estimated in broader studies at 0.3 to 1.0 for capacity additions—leading to optimistic projections of congestion relief while ignoring spillover demand from surrounding arterials. For instance, public comments on the draft SEIS reference induced travel effects documented in CRC-era analyses, arguing that without stringent land-use controls, the project could generate additional freight and commuter trips, exacerbating regional CO2 outputs despite efficiency gains. These critiques often draw from environmental advocacy sources, which systematic reviews indicate may amplify the phenomenon's universality to prioritize non-auto modes, though empirical evidence for isolated bottlenecks like the Interstate Bridge shows partial rather than complete demand rebound, with time savings yielding net economic benefits. Proponents counter that is overstated as a barrier to replacement, noting the bridge's seismically vulnerable status necessitates action, and that integrated modeling in the SEIS projects a 20-30% capacity increase yielding reliability improvements without proportional VMT growth, as transit enhancements capture 10-15% mode shift from single-occupancy . Benefit-cost analyses for the IBRP incorporate projections adjusted for policy scenarios, estimating avoided emissions from smoother freight flows outweighing any induced trips, a view supported by transportation economists who argue the theory conflates correlation with causation in dense corridors where pent-up reflects underlying economic activity rather than capacity creation alone. This debate underscores broader tensions in EIS processes, where modeling assumptions—often critiqued for conservatism in environmentalist literature—must reconcile observed post-expansion outcomes, such as modest VMT increases in similar Pacific Northwest projects, with causal factors like population growth.

Economic and Regional Significance

Freight Corridor Role and Supply Chain Dependencies

The Interstate Bridge constitutes a pivotal chokepoint within Interstate 5 (I-5), designated as the principal north-south freight artery spanning the U.S. West Coast and linking economies from Mexico through California, Oregon, Washington, and into Canada, as well as Pacific Rim trade routes. This corridor underpins regional logistics by channeling truck-borne commodities from inland production centers to coastal export hubs and vice versa, with the bridge serving as the direct I-5 traversal over the Columbia River between Portland, Oregon, and Vancouver, Washington. In 2020, freight value transiting the bridge exceeded $132 million daily, reflecting its in moving high-volume such as electronics, machinery, agricultural products, and forest materials integral to national supply chains. The Ports of Portland and USA, key nodes for handling, , and intermodal transfers, depend on unimpeded I-5 access via the bridge to distribute imports southward to markets and northward to Seattle-Tacoma gateways, thereby sustaining just-in-time and retail inventories across the Pacific Northwest. Supply chain dependencies amplify the bridge's criticality, as its aging infrastructure—prone to seismic failure, frequent lift openings for river navigation (averaging 200-300 annually), and peak-hour congestion—imposes delays that cascade through logistics networks, elevating fuel costs, driver hours, and inventory holding expenses for carriers. Alternative crossings, such as the I-205 Glenn Jackson Bridge approximately 10 miles east, necessitate detours adding 20-30 minutes and increased emissions, rendering them suboptimal for time-sensitive freight and exacerbating vulnerabilities during maintenance closures or emergencies. These constraints heighten risks to supply chain resilience, particularly for industries reliant on the corridor's 24/7 throughput, where even brief disruptions mirror broader national precedents of infrastructure-induced bottlenecks inflating regional economic losses.

Quantified Congestion Costs and Productivity Losses

The Interstate Bridge corridor on experiences chronic congestion, resulting in measurable economic costs through traveler delay, elevated vehicle operating expenses, and freight inefficiencies. The Interstate Bridge Replacement Program's Benefit-Cost Analysis (BCA) quantifies the value of projected time savings from addressing these issues at $2.51 billion in (2021 dollars) over a 30-year period (2033–2062), primarily driven by reduced person-hours of delay for autos ($2.09 billion), trucks ($283 million), and transit users ($136 million). These figures derive from regional modeling and microsimulation, applying U.S. value-of-time estimates of $18.80 per person-hour for auto and $32.40 per truck-hour, encompassing both and non-business trips. Additional congestion-related costs include $240 million in present-value vehicle operating savings (e.g., fuel and maintenance at $0.46 per vehicle-mile for light-duty vehicles) and $80 million in external highway use costs (e.g., and non-crash externalities at $0.13–$0.32 per vehicle-mile). Freight productivity losses amplify these impacts, as the bridge handles trucks transporting approximately $133 million in daily value ( ), with congestion and approximately 146 bridge lifts imposing of 5–110 minutes per incident. Without , no-build scenarios escalating truck vehicle-miles traveled by 155,751 annually by 2045, alongside load restrictions by 2050 and potential full closure by 2060 due to seismic risks, further eroding reliability in a corridor vital to Pacific Northwest . An economic development analysis cited in program reports estimates unaddressed congestion could yield up to $844 million in regional value losses, reflecting broader threats to profitability and growth from unreliable transit times. In 2019, peak-period delays reached up to 10 hours daily in both directions, compared to 4–6 hours in 2005, underscoring worsening bottlenecks ranked as Oregon's worst and 33rd nationally. However, independent critiques, such as those from urban analyst Joe Cortright at , contend that official models inflate congestion benefits by overlooking traffic diversion to the parallel I-205 bridge (affecting 220,000 daily users), applying overstated vehicle occupancy (1.67 vs. federal 1.48, boosting figures by 13%), and excluding induced demand or external costs beyond the study area, potentially reducing net benefits to half and yielding a benefit-cost ratio below 1.0. These analyses draw on observed declining traffic volumes—lower than two decades prior—raising questions about the persistence of claimed delays amid remote work trends and underutilized capacity. Official projections from state transportation agencies, while grounded in federal guidelines, may incorporate optimistic growth assumptions to support expansion, whereas critics prioritize empirical traffic data over modeled forecasts.

Projected Benefits and Return-on-Investment Analyses

The Crossing (CRC) featured economic analyses emphasizing benefits from multimodal capacity, including reduced landside traveler and efficiencies. A TREDIS software-based assessment quantified these through comparisons of the locally preferred alternative against a no-build , incorporating improved regional and connectivity impacts on jobs and , though specific benefit-cost ratios were not publicly detailed in financial documents. costs for the CRC ranged from $3.4 billion to $3.76 billion in year-of-expenditure dollars, with anticipated revenues blending federal grants, state contributions, and tolls, but the absence of robust monetized benefit projections contributed to fiscal leading to the 's termination in 2013. The Interstate Bridge Replacement Program (IBRP) produced a formal benefit-cost analysis in August 2023, monetizing benefits over a 2033–2062 horizon discounted at a 7% real rate to 2021 dollars. Total present-value benefits were estimated at $4.13 billion, dominated by $2.70 billion in mobility and economic competitiveness gains from congestion relief, $0.90 billion in climate resiliency and environmental improvements (primarily seismic upgrades), $0.14 billion in quality-of-life enhancements, $0.13 billion in state-of-good-repair savings, and $0.05 billion in safety reductions. Capital and operations/maintenance costs totaled $2.74 billion in present value, yielding a benefit-cost ratio (BCR) of 1.51 under U.S. Department of Transportation guidance, predicated on regional travel demand modeling that assumes no-build deterioration of existing spans and build-case delivery of seismically resilient infrastructure with light rail integration. Construction-phase economic impacts for the IBRP, based on $5.94 billion in total expenditures through 2034, project gross effects of 43,300 person-year jobs, $3.30 billion in labor income, and $11.6 billion in GDP output, with net regional additions (after leakages) of at least 13,460 jobs, $1.02 billion in income, and $3.6 billion in GDP; these derive from 75% local assumptions for and . Ongoing operational benefits are tied to reliability gains, though unmonetized elements like —where added capacity attracts more vehicles, potentially eroding time savings—were not fully incorporated, a methodological gap noted in transportation economics . Critiques of the IBRP analysis, including from urban economist Joe Cortright, argue that benefits are overstated by inflating vehicle occupancy rates (1.67 versus USDOT's 1.48 standard), relying on unverified crash models, and assuming improbable seismic events without probabilistic , while omitting toll diversion costs to parallel I-205 (projected 33,000 daily vehicles) and full lifecycle expenses exceeding $7.5 billion. Adjusted calculations incorporating these factors yield a BCR below 0.4, failing federal thresholds for viability and highlighting potential overreliance on optimistic demand forecasts from agency models that undervalue alternatives like transit . Government-led projections thus warrant scrutiny for incentives, as historical precedents like the CRC underscore how initial BCRs can falter amid cost escalations and unmodeled externalities.

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  96. https://www.opb.org/article/2022/05/06/fights-over-lanes-light-rail-and-cost-loom-as-interstate-5-bridge-talks-turn-serious/
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  98. https://www.clarkcountytoday.com/news/opposition-to-ibr-light-rail-and-tolling-follows-two-meetings-of-bridge-leadership/
  99. https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2021I1/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/255181
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  128. https://rtc.wa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/FreightMobilityStudy-Draft.pdf
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