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Michael Polanyi
Michael Polanyi
Michael Polanyi
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Michael Polanyi FRS[1] (/poʊˈlænji/ poh-LAN-yee; Hungarian: Polányi Mihály; 11 March 1891 – 22 February 1976) was a Hungarian-British[2] polymath, who made important theoretical contributions to physical chemistry, economics, and philosophy. He argued that positivism is a false account of knowing.

Key Information

His wide-ranging research in physical science included chemical kinetics, x-ray diffraction, and adsorption of gases. He pioneered the theory of fibre diffraction analysis in 1921, and the dislocation theory of plastic deformation of ductile metals and other materials in 1934. He emigrated to Germany, in 1926 becoming a chemistry professor at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin, and then in 1933 to England, becoming first a chemistry professor, and then a social sciences professor at the University of Manchester. Two of his students won the Nobel Prize, as did his son. In 1944 Polanyi was elected to the Royal Society.

The contributions which Polanyi made to the social sciences include the concept of a polycentric spontaneous order and his rejection of a value neutral conception of liberty. They were developed in the context of his opposition to central planning.[3]

Life

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Early life

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Polanyi, born Mihály Pollacsek in Budapest, was the fifth child of Mihály and Cecília Pollacsek (born as Cecília Wohl), secular Jews from Ungvár (then in Hungary but now in Ukraine) and Wilno, then Russian Empire, respectively. His father's family were entrepreneurs, while his mother's father, Osher Leyzerovich Vol, was the senior teacher of Jewish history at the Vilna rabbinic seminary.[citation needed] The family moved to Budapest and Magyarized their surname to Polányi. His father built much of the Hungarian railway system, but lost most of his fortune in 1899 when bad weather caused a railway building project to go over budget. He died in 1905. Cecília Polányi established a salon that was well known among Budapest's intellectuals, and which continued until her death in 1939. His older brother was Karl Polanyi, the political economist and anthropologist, and his niece was Eva Zeisel, a world-renowned ceramist.[4]

Education

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In 1908, Polanyi graduated the teacher-training secondary school, the Minta Gymnasium. He then studied medicine at the University of Budapest, obtaining his medical diploma in 1914.[5] He was an active member of the Galileo Circle. With the support of Ignác Pfeifer [de; hu], professor of chemistry at the Royal Joseph University of Budapest, he obtained a scholarship to study chemistry at the Technische Hochschule in Karlsruhe, Germany. In the First World War, he served in the Austro-Hungarian army as a medical officer, and was sent to the Serbian front. While on sick-leave in 1916, he wrote a PhD thesis on adsorption. His research was encouraged by Albert Einstein and supervised by Gusztáv Buchböck [hu], and in 1919 the Royal University of Pest awarded him a doctorate.

Career

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In October 1918, Mihály Károlyi established the Hungarian Democratic Republic, and Polanyi became Secretary to the Minister of Health. When the Communists seized power in March 1919, he returned to medicine. When the Hungarian Soviet Republic was overthrown, Polanyi emigrated to Karlsruhe in Germany, and was invited by Fritz Haber to join the Kaiser Wilhelm Institut für Faserstoffchemie (fiber chemistry) in Berlin. A Christian since 1913, in a Roman Catholic ceremony he married Magda Elizabeth Kemeny.[6] In 1926 he became the professorial head of department of the Institut für Physikalische Chemie und Elektrochemie (now the Fritz Haber Institute). In 1929, Magda gave birth to their son John, who was awarded a Nobel Prize in chemistry in 1986. Their other son, George Polanyi, who predeceased him, became a well-known economist.

His experience of runaway inflation and high unemployment in Weimar Germany led Polanyi to become interested in economics. With the coming to power in 1933 of the Nazi party, he accepted a chair in physical chemistry at the University of Manchester. Whilst there he was elected to membership of the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society in 1934.[7] Two of his pupils, Eugene Wigner and Melvin Calvin, went on to win the Nobel Prize. Because of his increasing interest in the social sciences, Manchester University created a new chair in Social Science (1948–58) for him.

Polanyi was among the 2,300 names of prominent persons listed on the Nazis' Special Search List, of those who were to be arrested on the invasion of Great Britain and turned over to the Gestapo.

From June 1944 to 1947, Polanyi participated in the activities of The Moot, a Christian discussion circle concerned with shaping the post-war society, at the invitation of Karl Mannheim and J. H. Oldham.[8]

In 1944 Polanyi was elected a member of the Royal Society,[1] and on his retirement from the University of Manchester in 1958 he was elected a senior research fellow at Merton College, Oxford.[9] In 1962 he was elected a foreign honorary member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.[10]

Work

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Physical chemistry

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Polanyi's scientific interests were extremely diverse, including work in chemical kinetics, x-ray diffraction, and the adsorption of gases at solid surfaces. He is also well known for the potential theory of adsorption, which was disputed for quite some time. In 1921, he laid the mathematical foundation of fibre diffraction analysis. In 1934, Polanyi, at about the same time as G. I. Taylor and Egon Orowan, realised that the plastic deformation of ductile materials could be explained in terms of the theory of dislocations developed by Vito Volterra in 1905. The insight was critical in developing the field of solid mechanics.

Freedom and community

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In 1936, as a consequence of an invitation to give lectures for the Ministry of Heavy Industry in the USSR, Polanyi met Bukharin, who told him that in socialist societies all scientific research is directed to accord with the needs of the latest Five Year Plan. Polanyi noted what had happened to the study of genetics in the Soviet Union once the doctrines of Trofim Lysenko had gained the backing of the State. Demands in Britain, for example by the Marxist John Desmond Bernal, for centrally planned scientific research led Polanyi to defend the claim that science requires free debate. Together with John Baker, he founded the influential Society for Freedom in Science.

In a series of articles, re-published in The Contempt of Freedom (1940) and The Logic of Liberty (1951), Polanyi claimed that co-operation amongst scientists is analogous to the way agents co-ordinate themselves within a free market. Just as consumers in a free market determine the value of products, science is a spontaneous order that arises as a consequence of open debate amongst specialists. Science (contrary to the claims of Bukharin) flourishes when scientists have the liberty to pursue truth as an end in itself:[11]

[S]cientists, freely making their own choice of problems and pursuing them in the light of their own personal judgment, are in fact co-operating as members of a closely knit organization.

Such self-co-ordination of independent initiatives leads to a joint result which is unpremeditated by any of those who bring it about.

Any attempt to organize the group ... under a single authority would eliminate their independent initiatives, and thus reduce their joint effectiveness to that of the single person directing them from the centre. It would, in effect, paralyse their co-operation.

He derived the phrase spontaneous order from Gestalt psychology, and it was adopted by the classical liberal economist Friederich Hayek, although the concept can be traced back to at least Adam Smith. Polanyi unlike Hayek argued that there are higher and lower forms of spontaneous order, and he asserted that defending scientific inquiry on utilitarian or sceptical grounds undermined the practice of science. He extends this into a general claim about free societies. Polanyi defends a free society not on the negative grounds that we ought to respect "private liberties", but on the positive grounds that "public liberties" facilitate our pursuit of spiritual ends.

According to Polanyi, a free society that strives to be value-neutral undermines its own justification. But it is not enough for the members of a free society to believe that ideals such as truth, justice, and beauty, are not simply subjective, they also have to accept that they transcend our ability to wholly capture them. The non-subjectivity of values must be combined with acceptance that all knowing is fallible.

In Full Employment and Free Trade (1948) Polanyi analyses the way money circulates around an economy, and in a monetarist analysis that, according to Paul Craig Roberts, was thirty years ahead of its time, he argues that a free market economy should not be left to be wholly self-adjusting. A central bank should attempt to moderate economic booms/busts via a strict/loose monetary policy.

In 1940, he produced a film, "Unemployment and money. The principles involved", perhaps the first film about economics.[12] The film defended a version of Keynesianism, neutral Keynesianism, that advised the State to use budget deficit and tax reductions to increase the amount of money in the circulation in times of economic hardship but did not seek direct investment or engage in public works.[13]

All knowing is personal

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Main article: Post-critical

In his book Science, Faith and Society (1946), Polanyi set out his opposition to a positivist account of science, noting that among other things it ignores the role personal commitments play in the practice of science. Polanyi gave the Gifford Lectures in 1951–52 at Aberdeen, and a revised version of his lectures were later published as Personal Knowledge (1958). In this book Polanyi claims that all knowledge claims (including those that derive from rules) rely on personal judgments.[14] He denies that a scientific method can yield truth mechanically. All knowing, no matter how formalised, relies upon commitments. Polanyi argued that the assumptions that underlie critical philosophy are not only false, they undermine the commitments that motivate our highest achievements. He advocates a fiduciary post-critical approach, in which we recognise that we believe more than we can know, and know more than we can say.

A knower does not stand apart from the universe, but participates personally within it. Our intellectual skills are driven by passionate commitments that motivate discovery and validation. According to Polanyi, a great scientist not only identifies patterns, but also asks significant questions likely to lead to a successful resolution. Innovators risk their reputation by committing to a hypothesis. Polanyi cites the example of Copernicus, who declared that the Earth revolves around the Sun. He claims that Copernicus arrived at the Earth's true relation to the Sun not as a consequence of following a method, but via "the greater intellectual satisfaction he derived from the celestial panorama as seen from the Sun instead of the Earth."[15] His writings on the practice of science influenced Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend.

Polanyi rejected the claim by British Empiricists that experience can be reduced into sense data, but he also rejects the notion that "indwelling" within (sometimes incompatible) interpretative frameworks traps us within them. Our tacit awareness connects us, albeit fallibly, with reality. It supplies us with the context within which our articulations have meaning. Contrary to the views of his colleague and friend Alan Turing, whose work at the Victoria University of Manchester prepared the way for the first modern computer, he denied that minds are reducible to collections of rules. His work influenced the critique by Hubert Dreyfus of "First Generation" artificial intelligence.

It was while writing Personal Knowledge that he identified the "structure of tacit knowing". He viewed it as his most important discovery. He claimed that we experience the world by integrating our subsidiary awareness into a focal awareness. In his later work, for example his Terry Lectures, later published as The Tacit Dimension (1966), he distinguishes between the phenomenological, instrumental, semantic, and ontological aspects of tacit knowing, as discussed (but not necessarily identified as such) in his previous writing.

Critique of reductionism

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In "Life's irreducible structure" (1968),[16] Polanyi argues that the information contained in the DNA molecule is not reducible to the laws of physics and chemistry. Although a DNA molecule cannot exist without physical properties, these properties are constrained by higher-level ordering principles. In "Transcendence and Self-transcendence" (1970),[17] Polanyi criticises the mechanistic world view that modern science inherited from Galileo.

Polanyi advocates emergence i.e. the claim that there are several levels of reality and of causality. He relies on the assumption that boundary conditions supply degrees of freedom that, instead of being random, are determined by higher-level realities, whose properties are dependent on but distinct from the lower level from which they emerge. An example of a higher-level reality functioning as a downward causal force is consciousness – intentionality – generating meanings – intensionality.

Mind is a higher-level expression of the capacity of living organisms for discrimination. Our pursuit of self-set ideals such as truth and justice transform our understanding of the world. The reductionistic attempt to reduce higher-level realities into lower-level realities generates what Polanyi calls a moral inversion, in which the higher is rejected with moral passion. Polanyi identifies it as a pathology of the modern mind and traces its origins to a false conception of knowledge; although it is relatively harmless in the formal sciences, that pathology generates nihilism in the humanities. Polanyi considered Marxism an example of moral inversion. The State, on the grounds of an appeal to the logic of history, uses its coercive powers in ways that disregard any appeals to morality.[18]

Tacit knowledge

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Tacit knowledge, as distinct from explicit knowledge, is an influential term developed by Polanyi in The Tacit Dimension[19] to describe among other things the ability to do something without necessarily being able to articulate it: for example, being able to ride a bicycle or play a musical instrument without being able to fully explain the details of how it happens. He claims that not only do practical skills rely upon tacit awareness, all perception and meaning is rendered possible by agents relying upon their tacit awareness. Every consciousness has a subsidiary and a focal awareness, and this distinction also has an ontological dimension, because a lower and a higher dimension is how emergence takes place.

Bibliography

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See also

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Notes

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Michael Polanyi

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Michael Polanyi (1891–1976) was a Hungarian-British polymath whose career spanned physical chemistry, economics, and philosophy, with pioneering work in adsorption theory and the epistemology of science. Born in Budapest to a Jewish family, he earned an M.D. in 1913 and a Ph.D. in physical chemistry in 1917 from the University of Budapest, later serving as a medical officer in World War I before advancing research at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin. In physical chemistry, Polanyi contributed to understanding gas adsorption forces through collaboration with Fritz London in 1930, proposed hypotheses on long-chain molecules in 1921, introduced the concept of dislocations in crystal lattices in 1932, and co-developed semi-empirical methods for activation energies with Henry Eyring in 1929. His career shifted amid Nazi persecution, leading him to Manchester in 1933 and eventually to philosophy, where he critiqued the reduction of scientific method to explicit rules, arguing instead for tacit knowing rooted in personal commitment and apprenticeship within scientific communities. Polanyi's philosophical oeuvre, including Personal Knowledge (1958) and The Tacit Dimension (1966), emphasized that all knowing involves subsidiary awareness and focal integration, challenging objectivist positivism and highlighting science's reliance on tradition, authority, and fiduciary frameworks rather than mechanical verification. He opposed central planning in science and economy, informed by observations of Soviet Lysenkoism and totalitarian distortions, advocating a "republic of science" governed by decentralized pursuit of truth. Elected Fellow of the Royal Society in 1944, Polanyi retired to Oxford in 1959, leaving a legacy influencing critiques of scientism and paradigms in knowledge production.

Biography

Early Life and Family Background

Michael Polanyi was born Mihály Pollacsek on March 11, 1891, in Budapest, Hungary, to Mihály Pollacsek, a civil engineer, and Cecília Pollacsek (née Wohl), into a family of secular Jews who later adopted the Magyarized surname Polányi to facilitate integration into Hungarian society. His father, descended from prosperous Jewish mill-owners, had trained in civil engineering in Switzerland and Germany before working for the Swiss National Railways and establishing himself as a railroad financier in Budapest. Polanyi's mother, daughter of Andreas Wohl—a liberal Jewish scholar from Vilna who rejected a chief rabbinate—hosted an intellectual salon that attracted progressive thinkers, reflecting the family's non-traditional Jewish heritage and emphasis on cultural liberalism. The Polányi household initially enjoyed upper-middle-class affluence, residing in an elegant Budapest apartment with private tutors for the children, amid the city's vibrant fin-de-siècle intellectual and economic milieu. Polanyi was the fifth of six siblings: older sister Laura (born 1882), brothers Adolf (1883) and Karl (1886, later an economist), sister Sophie (1888), and younger brother Paul, who was later institutionalized. The family environment fostered intellectual curiosity, with Mihály encouraging ambition and Cecília promoting engagement with literature, arts, and reformist ideas, though religious observance remained minimal. Financial stability eroded after Mihály's railroad ventures collapsed in 1900, leading to bankruptcy and a downgrade to modest living quarters. Mihály's death from pneumonia in 1905 further strained resources, prompting Cecília and eldest daughter Laura—whose husband Sándor Striker provided support—to sustain the family through translations, teaching, and salon activities. These hardships instilled resilience in Polanyi, who, despite the upheaval, benefited from the enduring emphasis on education and self-reliance within the family.

Education and Formative Influences

Michael Polanyi was born Mihály Pollacsek on March 11, 1891, in Budapest, then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, to Mihály Pollacsek, a civil engineer and railway entrepreneur, and Cecília Wohl, into a secular Jewish family of six children. His family's liberal intellectual environment, marked by his mother's ambition and cultural interests, fostered early exposure to diverse ideas, including literature and science, shaping his interdisciplinary curiosity. Polanyi attended the prestigious Minta Gymnasium in Budapest, a rigorous classical school emphasizing mathematics, sciences, and humanities, graduating around 1908. This education, shaped by Budapest's mathematical tradition of problem-solving and discovery—including his friendship with George Pólya—instilled a foundation in heuristic inquiry and discovery-based approaches, influencing his later synthesis of scientific and philosophical thought. He enrolled in medicine at the University of Budapest in 1909, earning his M.D. in 1913 amid growing interest in physical chemistry, prompted by family expectations and personal aptitude for experimental work. During World War I, he served as a medical officer in the Austro-Hungarian army from 1914 to 1917, an experience that reinforced his skepticism toward mechanistic views of life and society while exposing him to human suffering's complexity. Concurrently, he pursued advanced studies in physical chemistry, completing a Ph.D. in 1917 under professors at Budapest, focusing on adsorption and reaction kinetics, which marked his pivot from medicine to scientific research. Formative influences included Budapest's vibrant fin-de-siècle intellectual scene and emerging critiques of scientism, as well as personal interactions with mentors who emphasized theoretical innovation over rote application. His family's economic setbacks after 1900, including his father's business failures, instilled resilience and a practical realism, evident in Polanyi's later emphasis on the embeddedness of knowledge in personal commitment.

Scientific Career in Physical Chemistry

Polanyi earned his Ph.D. in physical chemistry from the University of Budapest in 1917, with a dissertation on adsorption theory that laid the foundation for his later potential theory of adsorption. His early research, beginning around 1910 in Ferenc Tangl's laboratory, focused on colloid chemistry and adsorption, including a 1910 paper on brain fluid properties. Influenced by figures such as Ignác Pfeiffer and George de Hevesy, Polanyi shifted toward quantum theory and thermodynamics during World War I, while assisting Hevesy in 1919. In 1920, Polanyi joined the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Fiber Chemistry in Berlin-Dahlem, where he conducted pioneering X-ray diffraction studies on cellulose fibers, solving their four-point diffraction pattern and proposing a long-chain structure in collaboration with Richard Herzog and others. From 1920 to 1923, he advanced crystallographic techniques, including the rotating crystal method with Hermann Mark and Karl Weissenberg, and determined the structure of white tin; he also explored crystal hardening by cold working, presenting findings at the 1921 Bunsen Gesellschaft meeting. In 1923, he became director of the chemical kinetics research group at Fritz Haber's Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry, expanding into reaction mechanisms, including a 1919 radiation hypothesis for kinetics and semi-empirical methods. Polanyi's adsorption work culminated in a 1930 collaboration with Fritz London, applying quantum mechanics to explain dispersion forces in surface adsorption via a potential theory independently proposed with Arnold Eucken. In 1932, he introduced the concept of dislocations in crystals to account for plastic deformation, influencing solid-state physics. With Henry Eyring, he developed potential energy surfaces for reactions in 1931 and contributed to the 1935 transition state theory paper, advancing understanding of reaction rates. Facing Nazi persecution as a Jewish scientist, Polanyi emigrated in 1933 to the University of Manchester, where he assumed the chair of physical chemistry, holding it until 1948 while continuing research on X-ray diffraction, kinetics, and polymers such as polymerization processes. Over his physical chemistry career, he published more than 200 papers, establishing key experimental and theoretical foundations in adsorption, crystallography, and chemical dynamics before transitioning toward broader scientific inquiry.

Emigration, Later Career, and Shift to Philosophy

In 1933, following the Nazi seizure of power and the implementation of anti-Jewish policies, Michael Polanyi, who was of Jewish descent, resigned from his position at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry in Berlin and emigrated to England. He accepted an appointment as professor of physical chemistry at the University of Manchester, where he established and led a research laboratory focused on chemical kinetics and related fields. At Manchester, Polanyi continued his experimental and theoretical work in physical chemistry for over a decade, mentoring students and collaborators while adapting to the challenges of wartime conditions during World War II. By the mid-1930s, Polanyi's intellectual interests began shifting toward broader questions in economics, political philosophy, and the foundations of scientific inquiry, influenced by his observations of totalitarian regimes and central planning's threats to liberty. This transition intensified during the war years, when he devoted time to writing on the liberty essential for scientific progress and critiqued mechanistic views of society and science. In 1944, he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society in recognition of his scientific contributions. In 1948, Polanyi relinquished his chair in physical chemistry to assume the newly created position of professor of social studies at Manchester, marking a formal pivot to interdisciplinary exploration of science, society, and knowledge. He delivered the prestigious Gifford Lectures at the University of Aberdeen in 1951–1952, which formed the basis for his seminal work Personal Knowledge (1958), articulating a post-critical philosophy emphasizing personal commitment in knowing. Upon retiring from his Manchester chair in 1958, Polanyi relocated to Oxford as a senior research fellow at Merton College, where he continued refining his philosophical ideas until his death in 1976, engaging with but often challenging the dominant logical positivism and analytic philosophy prevalent there.

Scientific Contributions

Advances in Chemical Kinetics and Adsorption

Polanyi's doctoral dissertation, completed in 1917 at the University of Budapest, focused on the adsorption of gases and vapors on non-volatile solid adsorbents, laying foundational experimental groundwork for his subsequent theoretical developments. Between 1914 and 1916, he formulated the potential theory of adsorption, positing that gas molecules adsorb onto solid surfaces due to a spatially fixed potential field dependent solely on the molecule's position relative to the surface, independent of interactions with other adsorbed molecules; this model treated the gas as obeying its normal equation of state while the adsorption potential ee varied with the enclosed volume qq. Experimental verification supported an inverse third-power law for the potential's decrease with distance, later corroborated by Fritz London's 1930 quantum mechanical explanation of dispersion forces as underlying adsorption. Despite empirical backing, the theory faced rejection amid prevailing paradigms favoring electrical forces and Irving Langmuir's monomolecular layer model (1916–1918), which emphasized chemisorption over physical adsorption; Polanyi's multimolecular adsorption concept proved prescient but was not widely accepted until the 1950s, following advances in quantum resonance and porous material studies, representing a premature insight delayed by orthodox resistance. Shifting focus during his Berlin tenure (1920–1923), Polanyi advanced chemical kinetics, beginning with experimental and theoretical studies from 1919 onward, including arguments for potential energy surfaces governing atomic reactions. In 1925 and 1928, he collaborated with Eugene Wigner on papers elucidating chemical reaction rates, introducing assumptions about energy barriers later validated in quantum mechanics. A pivotal 1929 collaboration with Henry Eyring developed a semi-empirical method to construct the first potential energy surface for a reaction (H + H₂ → H₂ + H), enabling quantitative predictions of reaction paths and barriers. This work culminated in his 1932 book Atomic Reactions, synthesizing dynamics of elementary gas-phase reactions, and a 1935 paper formalizing the transition state method for calculating reaction velocities via an activated complex at the energy saddle point. From 1935 to 1937 at Manchester, Polanyi supervised Melvin Calvin in studies of reaction mechanisms, including hydrogen activation on platinum catalysts, further refining transition state applications to heterogeneous catalysis; separately, with Juro Horiuti, he investigated isotope effects using heavy water. These contributions established core tenets of transition state theory, influencing modern chemical dynamics by linking molecular potentials to observable rates without full quantum solutions.

Theoretical Work on Reaction Rates and Crystal Structure

In the early 1930s, Polanyi collaborated with Henry Eyring in Berlin to advance the theoretical understanding of chemical reaction rates through semiempirical calculations of potential energy surfaces (PES). Their approach integrated quantum mechanical principles, such as London's valence-bond model for the triatomic H₃ system, with empirical spectroscopic data from Morse potentials to construct three-dimensional PES representations of bimolecular reactions. For the prototypical reaction H + H₂ → H₂ + H, they identified a saddle point on the PES at approximately 19 kcal/mol, which, after zero-point energy corrections, yielded activation energies aligning with experimental observations. This work, detailed in joint publications in Die Naturwissenschaften (1930) and Zeitschrift für physikalische Chemie (1931), laid foundational elements for transition state theory by visualizing reaction paths as valleys leading to saddle-point transition states, enabling predictions of rate constants beyond purely empirical kinetics. Polanyi extended these methods to other systems, such as the para- to ortho-hydrogen conversion (calculated activation energy of 13 kcal/mol, consistent with experimental ranges of 4–11 kcal/mol) and sodium vapor reactions with halogens, emphasizing the role of atomic interactions in determining reactivity. Polanyi's theoretical contributions to crystal structure focused on diffraction analysis and deformation mechanisms, particularly during his time at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin (1920–1923). He pioneered fiber diffraction theory in 1921, interpreting four-point X-ray patterns from cellulose fibers as arising from parallel micellar crystals randomly oriented around a fiber axis, which supported models of straight-chain giant molecules or hexobiose anhydrides for cellulose structure. Collaborating with Karl Weissenberg and Hermann Mark, Polanyi co-developed the rotating crystal method using an elongated Debye camera, generalizing layer-line relationships for structure determination; this technique was first applied in 1923 to resolve the atomic arrangement in white tin and to investigate plastic flow in zinc crystals. These innovations facilitated the evaluation of unit cells from hyperbolic diffraction patterns, advancing the quantitative analysis of fibrous and polycrystalline materials. A key theoretical insight emerged in Polanyi's explanation of crystal plasticity and weakness under stress. In 1932, he presented the dislocation concept at a Leningrad meeting, positing that imperfections—linear defects within the lattice—enable shear slip at low stresses, resolving the discrepancy between theoretically high ideal crystal strengths and observed material ductility. Independently in 1934, alongside Egon Orowan and G.I. Taylor, Polanyi formalized dislocation theory, attributing plastic deformation to the motion of these edge or screw dislocations along slip planes, rather than uniform lattice breakage. This model, building on his earlier 1921 studies of cold-working hardening, predicted that dislocation multiplication during deformation increases resistance to further slip, quantitatively accounting for work-hardening phenomena in metals. Polanyi's framework refuted rival perfect-lattice theories by emphasizing topological defects as causal agents of macroscopic mechanical behavior, influencing subsequent materials science.

Philosophical Ideas

Critique of Objectivism and Reductionism

Polanyi articulated his critique of objectivism in Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (1958), targeting the positivist ideal that scientific knowledge must consist of impersonal, detached propositions verifiable solely through empirical observation, free from the knower's subjective involvement. He maintained that this framework misrepresents science by denying the indispensable role of personal judgment and intellectual passion, which integrate subsidiary particulars—such as sensory data or instrumental readings—into focal wholes via inarticulate, tacit processes. For instance, Polanyi noted that "into every act of knowing there enters a passionate contribution of the person knowing what is being known," rendering complete detachment not only unattainable but antithetical to discovery, as evidenced by historical advances like the Copernican revolution, where theoretical coherence trumped raw sensory evidence. This objectivist posture, Polanyi argued, engenders skepticism by absolving individuals of fiduciary responsibility for their beliefs, portraying science as a mechanical aggregation of facts rather than a commitment to coherent visions sustained by communal appraisal and heuristic anticipation. He illustrated the fallacy through examples like pattern recognition in probabilistic data (e.g., the Abergele pebbles arranged by the station master into the message "Welcome to Wales by British Railways," which is not believed to have arisen randomly because of the tacit assumption that no such semantically meaningful message is the product of chance, even though any particular but random arrangement of scattered pebbles is no less improbable) or skilled performances (e.g., a pianist's touch), which rely on unspecifiable integrations that formal rules cannot supplant, as confirmed by limitations in Gödel's incompleteness theorems and empirical studies of child cognition. Consequently, objectivism distorts the ontology of mind, reducing it to passive reception and undermining the stability of scientific paradigms, which persist through epicyclical adjustments despite apparent contradictions, as in Arrhenius's 1887 theory of ionic dissociation enduring over three decades of conflicting data. Polanyi's opposition to reductionism complemented this analysis, positing that higher-level phenomena, particularly in biology, harbor irreducible principles not derivable from lower-level physical or chemical laws. In "Life's Irreducible Structure" (1968), he demonstrated that life's functional organization imposes boundary conditions—such as morphogenetic constraints on molecular assemblies—that cannot be exhaustively explained by atomic interactions, as the statistical regularities of physics yield only probabilistic outcomes insufficient for the deterministic achievements of organisms. For DNA, Polanyi emphasized that its informational content operates through a hierarchical structure transcending particulate forces, where "the higher principles function by virtue of lower ones, but cannot be derived from them," rendering reductionist derivations circular or incomplete. He rejected mechanistic accounts of emergence, arguing that no configuration of physical events can produce consciousness or vital functions without invoking irreducible Gestalt-like wholes, as attempts to reduce living beings to physicochemical terms fail to capture their teleonomic successes or failures, akin to interpreting a clock's timekeeping via atomic vibrations alone. This anti-reductionist stance extended to critiques of neo-Darwinian hyper-reductionism, which Polanyi viewed as overemphasizing chance mutations while neglecting the organizing principles enabling evolutionary complexity, thereby echoing objectivism's neglect of comprehensive entities. Together, these critiques affirmed a holistic epistemology where knowledge and reality respect emergent levels, with personal commitment bridging particulars to irreducible wholes.

Personal Knowledge and Commitment

In his 1958 book Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy, Michael Polanyi articulated the foundational role of personal involvement in all acts of knowing, positing that knowledge cannot be reduced to impersonal observation or formalized rules but requires the knower's active intellectual commitment. This commitment entails a fiduciary act of believing certain things to be true, grounded in personal judgment, skills, and passions, which guide the pursuit of truth despite inherent risks of error. Polanyi argued that such commitments are essential because pure skepticism or detached objectivism leads to intellectual paralysis, as every assertion relies on unprovable presuppositions and tacit integrations of subsidiary particulars into a coherent whole. Polanyi critiqued objectivist ideals prevalent in positivism and logical empiricism, which demand that knowledge be fully explicit, verifiable, and free from subjective appraisal, asserting instead that this denatures reality by ignoring the personal coefficients—such as intuition, heuristic vision, and evaluative standards—that scientists employ in discovery and validation. Intellectual commitment, for Polanyi, bridges the subjective and the universal: it involves passionate guesses and trust in a "vision of reality" that signals potential truth, validated not by exhaustive proof but by responsible submission to communal standards and self-correcting inquiry. He emphasized that affirmations gain meaning only insofar as they could be false, rendering commitment hazardous yet indispensable for conveying conviction and advancing understanding. This framework extends to a fiduciary structure of knowledge, where beliefs rest on layers of trust in authorities, traditions, and cultural heritage, enabling the integration of tacit knowledge—unarticulated skills and perceptions—into explicit claims. Polanyi viewed commitment as driving scientific creativity and moral responsibility, countering scientistic reductions that undermine human freedom by portraying mind as a mere mechanism; instead, it affirms the knower's capacity for transcendent aspirations, such as the pursuit of intellectual beauty and coherence. By advocating a post-critical philosophy, Polanyi sought to restore confidence in personal faculties against skeptical doubt, positioning commitment as the dynamic force sustaining both epistemological progress and societal values.

Tacit Knowledge and Its Dimensions

Polanyi's concept of tacit knowledge posits that much of human cognition operates through unspoken processes that integrate particulars into coherent wholes without full explicit articulation. In The Tacit Dimension (1966), he famously declared, "we can know more than we can tell," challenging the positivist ideal of reducing all knowledge to objective, verifiable propositions. This builds on Personal Knowledge (1958), where Polanyi argued that "all knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowing," emphasizing personal participation over detached observation. Tacit knowing thus underpins skills, perceptions, and judgments that resist complete verbalization, such as balancing on a bicycle or diagnosing a medical condition intuitively. The core structure of tacit knowing follows a "from-to" dynamic, involving subsidiary awareness of particulars that are relied upon to achieve focal awareness of a comprehensive entity. Subsidiary awareness attends to clues—like a hammer's grip or facial features—unconsciously and proximally, without explicit scrutiny, while focal awareness distally integrates these into the object of attention, such as the act of hammering or face recognition. This integration is irreversible: shifting focus to subsidiaries fragments the whole, as in dissecting a tool's use, which dissolves its functional coherence. Polanyi described this as a fusion, not deduction, where "we attend from the subsidiary particulars to their joint focus." Tacit knowledge exhibits multiple dimensions, including functional, semantic, and phenomenal aspects. Functionally, subsidiaries serve as tools or probes revealing the focal entity, as when bodily movements enable external action. Semantically, they cohere into joint meanings transcending isolated parts, akin to interpreting language through contextual cues. Phenomenally, integration yields emergent qualities, such as the stereoscopic depth from two flat images, irreducible to mechanical summation. Polanyi further distinguished two theses: a Gestalt version, where unspecifiable particulars (e.g., bike-riding adjustments) can be articulated post hoc or by experts, and a stronger ontological claim, rooting all cognition in biologically embedded, in principle inarticulable capacities. These dimensions manifest in practical skills, requiring embodied indwelling and trial-and-error, and connoisseurship, involving trained judgment shaped by tradition and intellectual passions. Acquisition demands fiduciary commitment—accepting unprovable frameworks via apprenticeship—rather than skeptical doubt, as explicit rules alone fail to convey tacit mastery. This underscores tacit knowing's dynamic, personal nature, embedded in action and resistant to reductionist analysis.

Political and Economic Thought

Anti-Totalitarian Critiques

Polanyi's anti-totalitarian thought emerged from direct encounters with authoritarian regimes, including his departure from Hungary in the aftermath of the 1919 Bolshevik upheaval under Béla Kun, when the Horthy regime that overthrew it pursued anti-Semitic policies and he was removed from his university position, prompting him to seek better career opportunities in Weimar Germany where Fritz Haber talent-spotted and recruited him to the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin in 1920 and he became a professor there in 1926, and his emigration from Nazi Germany in 1933 following the regime's purge of Jewish scientists. He characterized totalitarianism as a system wielding planning authority to coordinate all societal actions within a singular, fixed scheme, supplanting liberal civilization's commitment to spiritual ideals such as truth, justice, and tolerance with instrumental goals and moral inversion. Unlike liberalism's reliance on autonomous, dynamic orders fostering unpredictable intellectual progress, totalitarianism enforces comprehensive control, as exemplified by the Soviet Union's Five-Year Plans (observed by Polanyi during visits from 1928 to 1936) and Nazi Germany's ideological dictates on historical and scientific truths. In works like "Collectivist Planning" (1940) and "The Growth of Thought in Society" (1941), Polanyi critiqued central planning as inherently totalitarian, arguing it paralyzes self-coordinating systems in economy and science by overriding dispersed, tacit judgments with top-down directives. He viewed Soviet Communism as a "coherent process" of oppression rooted in Marxism's positivist claims to explicit, universal knowledge, enabling Lysenkoism's suppression of genetics in favor of ideologically aligned agronomy, which led to the imprisonment of scientists like Nikolai Vavilov. Nazi totalitarianism, while driven by "technical enthusiasm" and racial pseudoscience, represented a less philosophically totalizing but equally destructive force, purging intellectual autonomy in 1933. Polanyi warned that such regimes deny academic freedom by subordinating inquiry to pragmatic utility, contrasting this with science's intrinsic pursuit of truth through personal commitment and tradition-bound evaluation. Polanyi's broader analysis in "Perils of Inconsistency" (1951) traced totalitarianism's rise to Enlightenment-derived nihilism, which undermines moral universals and invites authoritarian substitutes, a theme echoed in The Logic of Liberty (1951). His anti-positivist epistemology underpinned these critiques, positing that objectivist pretensions to fully explicit knowledge facilitate totalitarian control by dismissing the indispensable tacit dimensions of human understanding and judgment. This framework rejected both fascist and communist variants as antithetical to liberty, emphasizing that planned uniformity stifles the mutual adjustments essential for societal and scientific advance.

Defense of Scientific and Economic Liberty

Polanyi articulated a robust defense of liberty in both scientific and economic spheres, emphasizing that centralized control undermines the tacit, personal judgments indispensable for progress in these fields. In The Logic of Liberty (1951), he argued that scientific freedom operates through a self-governing community where scientists exercise authority over their pursuits based on shared but unspecifiable standards, rejecting any imposition of uniform priorities that would distort inquiry. This structure, he contended, mirrors the moral and intellectual commitments that sustain discovery, as pure science faces pressures from utilitarian demands yet thrives only under autonomous judgment free from political or bureaucratic override. Extending these principles to economics, Polanyi critiqued collectivist planning as inherently flawed due to its inability to harness dispersed knowledge, advocating instead for market mechanisms that enable spontaneous coordination among individuals. He viewed economic liberty as essential for allocating resources via voluntary exchanges, where prices and competition aggregate tacit insights more effectively than directives from a central authority. This parallel drew from his observation that both science and markets rely on polycentric orders, where innovation emerges from overlapping authorities rather than hierarchical commands, preventing the totalitarianism he witnessed in interwar Europe. Polanyi's arguments underscored the epistemic limits of planning: no planner can replicate the integrative judgments of participants whose skills and contexts remain inarticulable. In economic terms, this manifests as the superiority of decentralized entrepreneurship over state monopolies, as markets reward adaptive responses to unforeseen opportunities. He warned that eroding these liberties invites not mere inefficiency but the suppression of truth and enterprise, as authority claims override subsidiary awareness in favor of abstract ideologies. Thus, his defense framed liberty as a logical prerequisite for advancing human capabilities, grounded in the causal dynamics of knowledge production rather than egalitarian redistribution.

The Republic of Science and Market Principles

In his 1962 essay "The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory," published in Minerva, Michael Polanyi portrayed the scientific community as a self-governing republic of independent inquirers whose efforts coordinate spontaneously through mutual adjustment, mirroring the dynamics of a free market economy. He emphasized that scientific progress emerges not from centralized directives but from scientists freely selecting problems they deem promising, pursuing them with available resources, and integrating findings via overlapping competences and peer scrutiny. This structure, Polanyi argued, leverages the dispersed, tacit judgments of specialists far more effectively than any imposed plan, as "the co-ordinating functions of the market are but a special case of co-ordination by mutual adjustment." Polanyi drew explicit parallels between scientific discovery and economic production, viewing both as processes of allocating scarce resources—talent, equipment, and time—to maximize yield amid uncertainty. In science, researchers function akin to entrepreneurs, balancing the challenge of unsolved problems against their skills and the field's "growing points," where incremental advances compound into major breakthroughs. The division of labor operates through networks of partially overlapping expertise, enabling specialists to appraise and build upon each other's work without a hierarchical overseer; for instance, apprenticeships transmit not just explicit techniques but the tacit art of inquiry, fostering a tradition of judgment that sustains the enterprise. Competition manifests in rigorous mutual criticism, where claims face testing by replication and debate, establishing fluid authority based on demonstrated competence rather than formal rank. Central to Polanyi's framework was a staunch opposition to planning science along collectivist lines, which he contended would paralyze creativity by subordinating intrinsic professional standards to extrinsic political or utilitarian goals. He cited historical failures, such as the Soviet Union's halt to genetic research under ideologically driven directives, as evidence that suppressing independent initiative disrupts the spontaneous order essential for advancing knowledge. Resource distribution, including grants and facilities, should thus defer to scientists' collective appraisal, channeling support toward fertile domains while allowing exhausted fields to contract naturally, much as market prices signal investment opportunities. This market-like mechanism, Polanyi maintained, harnesses personal commitment and rivalry to generate unpredictable yet superior outcomes, underscoring the interdependence of liberty in scientific and economic realms.

Legacy and Reception

Influence on Epistemology and Science Studies

Polanyi's seminal work Personal Knowledge (1958) advanced an epistemology that rejected the objectivist ideal of value-free, detached observation in favor of a "post-critical" framework integrating personal commitment and fiduciary elements into the pursuit of truth. He argued that scientific validation requires scientists' subjective participation, where doubt serves truth-seeking rather than skepticism for its own sake, countering positivist reductions of knowledge to explicit, verifiable propositions. This perspective influenced subsequent epistemological realism by positing a triadic structure of knowing—subsidiary particulars integrated into a focal whole via indwelling—distinguishing it from both strict objectivism and subjectivism. Central to this influence was Polanyi's articulation of tacit knowledge, the unspecifiable "knowing more than we can tell" underlying skills and judgments, such as recognizing a hammer's balance or scientific patterns. In epistemology, this concept underscored the limits of formalization, challenging reductionist accounts that prioritize explicit rules over embodied, heuristic processes, and paving pathways toward scientific realism beyond Enlightenment positivism and scientism. Scholars have drawn on it to explain intellectual passions as integrators in tacit cognition, linking personal judgment to objective validation through communal traditions of trust and apprenticeship. In science studies, Polanyi's ideas reshaped analyses of scientific practice by emphasizing tacit dimensions in discovery, validation, and transmission, where explicit methods alone fail to capture the heuristic, passionate commitments driving innovation. His 1966 The Tacit Dimension prompted reflections on how tacit elements underpin scientific communities, influencing debates on whether such knowledge serves as a topic for or method of inquiry in the field. This framework highlighted the role of intellectual passions and tradition in fostering creativity, with implications for understanding science as a self-governing republic reliant on personal judgments rather than centralized planning. Applications extended to critiques of over-rationalized models, affirming tacit processes in empirical problem-solving across disciplines.

Impact on Economics and Political Philosophy

Polanyi's concept of tacit knowledge, introduced in his 1958 work Personal Knowledge, extended to economic analysis by highlighting the limitations of centralized planning, as much consumer demand and entrepreneurial judgment relies on inarticulate, subsidiary awareness that cannot be fully codified or aggregated by planners. This critique paralleled arguments against socialism, emphasizing that economic coordination emerges from dispersed, personal commitments rather than top-down directives. In The Logic of Liberty (1951), Polanyi defended market mechanisms as enabling liberty through spontaneous order, where individual pursuits align without coercion, influencing later Austrian economists who viewed knowledge as inherently subjective and local. In his 1962 essay "The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory," Polanyi analogized the scientific community to a free market, portraying scientists as independent explorers whose competitive pursuit of truth generates collective progress, much like entrepreneurs in an economy allocate resources via price signals and dispersed decisions. This framework underscored the inefficiency of state control over either domain, arguing that hierarchical oversight stifles innovation by overriding tacit judgments essential to both discovery and production. Polanyi's involvement in founding the Mont Pelerin Society in 1947 alongside Friedrich Hayek reflected shared anti-totalitarian commitments, though he later diverged from Hayek on policy details, rejecting the classical liberal claim that freedom is an end in itself and therefore the state ought to be morally neutral, with what justifies a free society being the claim that freedom facilitates the pursuit of ideals such as truth, the content of which is constantly being revised in a process of discovery. Polanyi's ideas resonated in political philosophy through endorsements of constitutional limits on power to preserve liberty in both science and markets, influencing thinkers who saw parallels between epistemic humility and economic realism. His correspondence with Hayek over three decades, spanning from the 1930s to the 1960s, exchanged views on spontaneous order, with Polanyi stressing the fiduciary duties in scientific guilds as a counterbalance to unchecked competition, yet affirming markets' role in fostering creativity over planning. This synthesis contributed to critiques of scientism in economics, where overreliance on explicit models ignores the tacit dimensions of human action, a point echoed in subsequent debates on innovation policy and the knowledge economy.

Criticisms, Debates, and Contemporary Relevance

Polanyi's post-critical epistemology, which posits personal commitment as integral to all knowing, has faced critiques for insufficiently scrutinizing its foundational concepts. Philosopher Alan White, in a 1960 review, contended that Personal Knowledge (1958) evades rigorous analysis of terms like "fiduciary" and "indwelling," rendering the framework vulnerable to charges of dogmatism despite Polanyi's avowed fallibilism. Similarly, a Kantian analysis argues that Polanyi's rejection of critical doubt inadvertently erodes the rational grounds for belief, transforming his defense of faith into a form of uncritical reliance that mirrors the skepticism he opposes. These objections highlight tensions between Polanyi's anti-objectivist stance and demands for logical precision in philosophical inquiry. Debates over tacit knowledge, Polanyi's core contribution articulated in works like The Tacit Dimension (1966), center on its resistance to explicit articulation and implications for scientific practice. Critics in knowledge management literature have identified a "tacit knowledge dilemma," where Polanyi's claim that "we know more than we can tell" complicates efforts to document expertise for open science and collaborative innovation, potentially hindering reproducibility in fields reliant on codified protocols. In philosophy of science, comparisons with Thomas Kuhn's paradigm shifts reveal Polanyi's earlier emphasis on subsidiary awareness influencing but being overshadowed by Kuhn's more accessible narrative; reviewers noted Polanyi's denser prose and expansive scope in Personal Knowledge diluted its reception, despite anticipating similar themes of incommensurability. Proponents counter that such debates affirm tacit knowing's irreducible role in skills and discovery, as Polanyi illustrated through examples like facial recognition or tool use, where focal attention presupposes unarticulated bodily integration. Polanyi's framework retains relevance in contemporary epistemology and policy, particularly amid challenges to explicit, data-driven systems. His critique of central planning, rooted in the tacit dimensions of consumer preferences and entrepreneurial judgment, underscores limitations of algorithmic governance in economics; a 2023 analysis applies this to AI supercomputing, arguing that tacit integrative powers evade full computation, echoing Polanyi's 1940s warnings against Soviet-style scientific direction. In natural sciences, his notions of personal and objective knowledge intersect with quantum interpretations and complexity theory, where emergent phenomena resist reductionist modeling. Educationally, tacit knowing informs advocacy for skill-based pedagogies over rote empiricism, aligning with classical methods that cultivate subsidiary awareness through practice. These applications affirm Polanyi's enduring caution against overreliance on verifiable facts alone, privileging the fiduciary structure of human cognition in an era of automated intelligence.

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