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Weimar Republic
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The Weimar Republic[d] was a historical period of the German state from 9 November 1918 to 23 March 1933, during which it was a constitutional republic for the first time in history. The state was officially named the German Reich;[e] it is also referred to, and unofficially proclaimed itself, as the German Republic.[f] The period's informal name is derived from the city of Weimar, where the republic's constituent assembly took place. In English, the republic was usually simply called "Germany", with "Weimar Republic" (a term introduced by Adolf Hitler in 1929) not commonly used until the 1930s. The Weimar Republic had a semi-presidential system.
Toward the end of the First World War (1914–1918), Germany was exhausted and sued for peace in desperate circumstances. Awareness of imminent defeat sparked a revolution, the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II, the proclamation of the Weimar Republic on 9 November 1918, and formal cessation of hostilities with the Allies by the Armistice of 11 November 1918.[8]
In its initial years, grave problems beset the Republic, such as hyperinflation and political extremism, including political murders and two attempted coups d'état by contending paramilitaries; internationally, it suffered isolation, reduced diplomatic standing and contentious relationships with the great powers. By 1924, a great deal of monetary and political stability was restored, and the republic enjoyed relative prosperity for the next five years; this period, sometimes known as the Golden Twenties, was characterized by significant cultural flourishing, social progress, and gradual improvement in foreign relations. Under the Locarno Treaties of 1925, Germany moved toward normalizing relations with its neighbors, recognizing most territorial changes under the 1919 Treaty of Versailles and committing never to go to war. The following year, it joined the League of Nations, which marked its reintegration into the international community.[g][9] Nevertheless, especially on the political right, there remained strong and widespread resentment against the treaty and those who had signed and supported it.
The Great Depression of October 1929 severely affected Germany's tenuous progress; high unemployment and subsequent social and political unrest led to the collapse of Chancellor Hermann Müller's grand coalition and the beginning of the presidential cabinets. From March 1930 onwards, President Paul von Hindenburg used emergency powers to back chancellors Heinrich Brüning, Franz von Papen and Kurt von Schleicher. The Great Depression, exacerbated by Brüning's policy of deflation, led to a surge in unemployment.[10] On 30 January 1933, Hindenburg appointed Adolf Hitler as chancellor to head a coalition government; his Nazi Party held two out of ten cabinet seats. Von Papen, as vice-chancellor and Hindenburg's confidant, was to serve as the éminence grise who would keep Hitler under control; these intentions severely underestimated Hitler's political ambitions. By the end of March 1933, the Reichstag Fire Decree and the Enabling Act of 1933 were used in the perceived state of emergency to effectively grant the new chancellor broad power to act outside parliamentary control. Hitler promptly used these powers to thwart constitutional governance and suspend civil liberties, which brought about the swift collapse of democracy at the federal and state level, and the creation of a one-party dictatorship under his leadership.
Until the end of World War II in Europe in 1945, the Nazis governed Germany under the pretense that all the extraordinary measures and laws they implemented were constitutional; notably, there was never an attempt to replace or substantially amend the Weimar Constitution. Nevertheless, Hitler's seizure of power (Machtergreifung) had effectively ended the republic, replacing its constitutional framework with Führerprinzip, the principle that "the Führer's word is above all written law".
Name and symbols
[edit]The Weimar Republic is so called because the Weimar National Assembly that adopted its constitution met in Weimar from 6 February to 11 August 1919.[11]
Terminology
[edit]Even though the National Assembly chose to retain the old name Deutsches Reich (Art. 1 of the Constitution),[12] hardly anyone used it during the Weimar period, and no single name for the new state gained widespread acceptance.[13] To the right of the spectrum, the politically engaged rejected the new democratic model and were appalled to see the honor of the traditional word Reich associated with it.[14] The Catholic Centre Party favored the term Deutscher Volksstaat (German People's State),[h] while on the moderate left, Chancellor Friedrich Ebert's Social Democratic Party of Germany preferred Deutsche Republik (German Republic).[14] By the mid-1920s, most Germans referred to their government informally as the Deutsche Republik, but for many, especially on the right, the word "Republik" was a painful reminder of a government structure that they believed had been imposed by foreign statesmen and of the expulsion of Emperor Wilhelm II in the wake of a massive national humiliation.[14]
The first recorded mention of the term Republik von Weimar (Republic of Weimar) came during a speech delivered by Adolf Hitler at a Nazi Party rally in Munich on 24 February 1929. A few weeks later, the term Weimarer Republik was first used, again by Hitler in a newspaper article.[13] Only during the 1930s did the term become mainstream, both within and outside Germany.
According to historian Richard J. Evans:[15]
The continued use of the term 'German Empire', Deutsches Reich, by the Weimar Republic ... conjured up an image among educated Germans that resonated far beyond the institutional structures Bismarck created: the successor to the Roman Empire; the vision of God's Empire here on earth; the universality of its claim to suzerainty; and a more prosaic but no less powerful sense, the concept of a German state that would include all German speakers in Central Europe – 'one People, one Reich, one Leader', as the Nazi slogan was to put it.
Flag and coat of arms
[edit]
The black-red-gold tricolour of the 1848 German revolutions was named as the national flag in the Weimar Constitution of 1919.[16] It was abolished after the entry into force of the Enabling Act of 1933 when the Nazi Party gained total power, in favour of two co-official national flags: the old black-white-red imperial tricolour and the flag of the Nazi Party. From 1935, the Nazi flag with the symbol offset became the sole national flag of the Third Reich, and after World War II, both the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic readopted the black-red-gold flag. The coat of arms was initially based on the Reichsadler ("imperial eagle") introduced by the Paulskirche Constitution of 1849, and announced in November 1919. In 1928, a new design by Karl-Tobias Schwab was adopted as national coat of arms, which was used until being replaced by the Nazi Reichsadler in 1935, and readopted by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1950.
Armed forces
[edit]
Following Germany's defeat in World War I, several million soldiers of the Imperial German Army either simply dispersed on their own or were formally demobilized. The provisional civilian government and the Supreme Army Command (OHL) planned to transfer the remaining units to a peacetime army. Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, the new army, the Reichswehr, was limited to 100,000 men and the Reichsmarine (navy), to 15,000. The treaty prohibited an air force, submarines, large warships and armored vehicles.[17]
The official formation of the Reichswehr took place on 1 January 1921, after the limitations had been met. The soldiers of the Reichswehr took their oath to the Weimar Constitution. The commander-in-chief was the Reich president, while the Reich minister of the armed forces exercised command authority. Military right of command (Kommandogewalt) was in the hands of the OHL. The resulting dualism between civilian power and military command was to become a heavy burden on the Republic. Whereas Reichswehr Minister Otto Gessler was content with limited political and administrative duties during his tenure (1920–1928), Colonel General Hans von Seeckt, Chief of Army Command from 1920 to 1926, succeeded in largely removing the Reichswehr from the control of the Reichstag. Under Seeckt the Reichswehr developed into what many historians consider a "state within the state".[18][19]
During the 1920 Kapp Putsch, Seeckt refused to deploy the Reichswehr against the Freikorps involved in the putsch,[20] but immediately afterwards had the Ruhr Red Army brutally suppressed during the Ruhr uprising. In 1921, the Reichswehr organized the Black Reichswehr, a secret reserve networked within the Reichswehr and organized as labor battalions (Arbeitskommandos) to circumvent the Treaty of Versailles' 100,000 man limit on the German army.[21] The Black Reichswehr was never involved in direct military action and was dissolved in 1923 after a group of its members attempted to overthrow the government in the Küstrin Putsch.[22] The Reichswehr also developed far-reaching cooperation with the Soviet Red Army, leading among other things to the secret training of German military pilots in clear violation of the Treaty of Versailles.[23]
With Seeckt's fall in 1926, the Reichswehr made a change in course for which Colonel (later General) Kurt von Schleicher was primarily responsible. The goal was to arouse broad social support for rearmament and to militarize society itself for the purpose of future warfare.[24] Under Paul von Hindenburg's Reich presidency, Reichswehr leadership gained increasing political influence and eventually helped determine the composition of the Reich governments. As a result, the Reichswehr contributed significantly to the development of an authoritarian presidential system during the final phase of the Weimar Republic.[25]
After Adolf Hitler announced the "regaining of military sovereignty" (reintroduction of conscription and other acts) in 1935, two years after his rise to power, the Reichswehr was absorbed into the new Wehrmacht. It was the unified armed forces of the Nazi regime.
History
[edit]Background
[edit]Germany and the Central Powers fought the Allies of WWI between 28 July 1914 and 11 November 1918. The war ended with 20 million military and civilian deaths,[26] including 2,037,000 German soldiers[27] and from 424,000[28] to 763,000[29][30] civilians, many of them from disease and starvation as a result of the Allied blockade of Germany.
After four years of war on multiple fronts in Europe and around the world, the final Allied offensive began in August 1918, and the position of Germany and the Central Powers deteriorated,[31][32] leading them to sue for peace. After initial offers were rejected by the Allied Powers, the hunger and privation of the war years came together with the awareness of an impending military defeat[33] to help spark the German Revolution. On 9 November 1918, a republic was proclaimed,[34] and the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II was announced,[35][36] marking the end of Imperial Germany and the beginning of the Weimar Republic. The armistice that ended the fighting was signed on 11 November.
Germany lost the war because its allies were facing defeat and its economic resources were running out, while by late summer 1918 fresh American troops were arriving in France at the rate of 10,000 per day. Support among the population had begun to crumble in 1916, and by mid-1918, many Germans wanted an end to the war. Increasing numbers of them began to associate with the political left, such as the Social Democratic Party and the more radical Independent Social Democratic Party, which demanded an end to the war. When it became obvious to the generals that defeat was at hand, General Erich Ludendorff convinced the Kaiser that Germany needed to pursue an armistice and that the majority parties in the Reichstag, not the OHL, had to take responsibility for it.[37] Although in retreat, the German armies were still on French and Belgian territory when the war ended on 11 November. Ludendorf and Paul von Hindenburg then began proclaiming that it was the defeatism of the civilian population – especially the socialists – that had made defeat inevitable. The stab-in-the-back myth was spread by the Right throughout the 1920s and ensured that many monarchists and conservatives would refuse to support the government of what they called the "November criminals".[38] The destabilizing effect of the stab-in-the-back myth on the Weimar democracy was an important factor in the rise of National Socialism.[39]
November Revolution (1918–1919)
[edit]
On 29 October 1918, a rebellion broke out among sailors at Wilhelmshaven; similar unrest then spread to become the Kiel mutiny on 3 November. Sailors, soldiers and workers began electing workers' and soldiers' councils (Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte) modelled after the soviets of the 1917 Russian Revolution. The revolution spread throughout Germany, and participants seized military and civil power in individual cities.[40] The power takeovers were achieved everywhere with little or no violence.[41]
At the time, the socialist movement, which represented mostly laborers, was split among two major left-wing parties: the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (USPD), which called for immediate peace negotiations and favored a soviet-style command economy, and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), also known as the Majority Social Democratic Party of Germany (MSPD), which had supported the war and favoured a parliamentary system. The rebellion caused great fear among supporters of the monarchy and in the middle classes because of the soviet-style aspirations of the councils. To centrist and conservative citizens, the country looked to be on the verge of a communist revolution.[42]
By 7 November, the revolution had reached Munich, resulting in the flight of King Ludwig III of Bavaria.[43] The MSPD decided to make use of their support at the grassroots level and put themselves at the front of the movement. They joined the calls for Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicate, and when he refused, Chancellor Maximilian of Baden made a public announcement that the Kaiser and Crown Prince Wilhelm had already done so.[44] Gustav Noske (MSPD) was sent to Kiel to prevent any further unrest and took on the task of controlling the mutinous sailors and their supporters in the Kiel barracks. The sailors and soldiers welcomed him, and he was able to defuse the situation.[45]
On 9 November 1918, the German Republic was proclaimed by MSPD member Philipp Scheidemann at the Reichstag building in Berlin, angering Friedrich Ebert, the leader of the MSPD, who thought that the question of monarchy or republic should be answered by a national assembly.[46] Two hours later, a Free Socialist Republic was proclaimed at the Berlin Palace. The proclamation was issued by Karl Liebknecht, co-leader with Rosa Luxemburg of the communist Spartakusbund (Spartacus League), a group of a few hundred supporters of the Russian Revolution that had allied itself with the USPD in 1917.[47] On the same day, in a move that was contrary to the constitution because only the Kaiser could appoint a chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, at Ebert's request, transferred his powers as chancellor to him.[48] In view of the mass support for more radical reforms among the workers' councils, a coalition government called the Council of the People's Deputies (Rat der Volksbeauftragten) was established, consisting of three MSPD and three USPD members. Led by Ebert for the MSPD and Hugo Haase for the USPD, it governed Germany from November 1918 to January 1919.[49] Although the new government was confirmed by the Berlin Workers' and Soldiers' Council, it was opposed by the Spartacus League.

On 11 November 1918, an armistice was signed at Compiègne by German representatives. It effectively ended military operations between the Allies and Germany. It amounted to a German capitulation, without any concessions by the Allies; the naval blockade was to continue until complete peace terms were agreed on.[50]
The Executive Council of the Workers' and Soldiers' Council of Greater Berlin called for a National Congress of Councils (Reichsrätekongress) which took place from 16 to 21 December 1918. Against the opposition of the more radical members who demanded a socialist republic, Ebert, backed by the large MSPD majority at the Congress, was able to schedule the election for a provisional National Assembly that would act as an interim parliament and be given the task of writing a democratic constitution for a parliamentary government.[51]
To ensure that the fledgling government maintained control over the country, Ebert and General Wilhelm Groener, Ludendorff's successor as leader of the Supreme Army Command (OHL), concluded the secret Ebert–Groener pact on 10 November. Over the telephone, Ebert promised that he would allow sole command of the troops to remain with the officer corps, while Groener pledged that the military would be loyal to the government and that it would help it in its fight against left-wing revolutionaries.[52] The agreement marked the acceptance of the new government by the military, but the new Reichswehr armed forces, limited by the Treaty of Versailles to 100,000 army soldiers and 15,000 sailors, remained fully under the control of the German officer class.[53]
A rift developed between the MSPD and USPD after Ebert called upon the OHL for troops to put down a mutiny by a leftist military unit on 23/24 December 1918 in which members of the Volksmarinedivision (People's Navy Division) captured the city's garrison commander Otto Wels of the MSPD and occupied the Reich Chancellery where the Council of the People's Deputies had its offices. The ensuing street fighting left 11 Volksmarinedivision members and 56 members of the regular army dead.[54] The USPD leaders were angered by what they believed was treachery by the MSPD, which in their view had joined with the anti-communist military to suppress the revolution. As a result, the USPD left the Council of the People's Deputies after only seven weeks. On 30 December, the split deepened when the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) was formed out of a number of radical left-wing groups, including the Spartacus League and the left wing of the USPD.[47]
In January, the Spartacus League, in what was known as the Spartacist uprising, took advantage of a large strike in Berlin and attempted to establish a communist government. The uprising was put down by paramilitary Freikorps units consisting of volunteer soldiers. Following bloody street fights, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were summarily killed after their arrests on 15 January.[55] With the affirmation of Ebert, those responsible were not tried before a court-martial, leading to lenient sentences, which made Ebert unpopular among radical leftists.[citation needed]


The National Assembly election, in which women were allowed to vote for the first time, took place on 19 January 1919.[56] The MSPD won the largest share of the votes at 37.9%, with the USPD fifth at 7.6%.[57] To avoid the ongoing fights in Berlin, the National Assembly convened in the city of Weimar, giving the future Republic its unofficial name. The Weimar Constitution created a parliamentary republic with the Reichstag elected by proportional representation.[58]
During the debates in Weimar, fighting continued sporadically across Germany. On 7 April 1919, the Bavarian Soviet Republic was declared in Munich but quickly put down by Freikorps and remnants of the regular army. The fall of the Munich Soviet Republic to these units, many of which were on the extreme right, resulted in the growth of far-right, anti-Semitic movements and organizations in Bavaria, including Organisation Consul, the Nazi Party, and societies of exiled Russian monarchists.[59] Revolutionary sentiment also arose in the eastern states where interethnic discontent between Germans and minority Poles led to the Silesian Uprisings and the Greater Poland uprising in the German Province of Posen, which became part of the Second Polish Republic under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles.[60]
Years of crisis (1919–1923)
[edit]Burden from the First World War
[edit]In the four years following the First World War, the situation of most German civilians remained dire. The post-war economic crisis was a result of lost pre-war industrial exports, the loss of imported raw materials and foodstuffs due to the continental blockade, the loss of Germany's overseas colonies and the worsening debt balances that had been exacerbated by Germany's heavy reliance on bonds to pay for the war. The economic losses can be attributed in part to the extension of the Allied blockade of Germany until the Treaty of Versailles was signed on 28 June 1919. It is estimated that between 100,000[61] and 250,000[62]: 166 German civilians died of disease or starvation between the end of the war and the signing of the treaty. Many German civilians expected life to return to pre-war normality after it was lifted, but the severe food shortages continued. In 1922, for example, meat consumption had not increased since the war years. At 22 kilograms per person per year, it was less than half of the 52 kilograms consumed in 1913. German citizens felt the food shortages more deeply than during the war because the reality contrasted so starkly with their expectations.[63]
Immediate post-war industrial production fell to the levels of the 1880s, or 57 percent of its value in 1913. The 1919 per capita GDP was only 73 percent of the comparable 1913 figure.[64] Controlled demobilization kept unemployment initially at around one million. By January 1922, the unemployment rate had sunk to just 0.9%,[65] but inflation caused most workers' real wages to be significantly lower than they were in 1913.[66] The hyperinflation that peaked in late 1923 had its worst effects on government workers, whose wages did not keep pace with private sector workers, and on middle class Germans who had invested in war bonds[67] or who relied on savings, investments or pensions for their living. What had once been substantial savings became essentially worthless due to the enormous fall in the Papiermark's value.[68]
After four years of war and famine, many German workers were disenchanted with the capitalist system and hoped for a new era under socialism or communism. Socialists dominated the new revolutionary government in Berlin, and numerous short-lived council republics were set up in cities across Germany.[69] Even after they were suppressed, ideological conflicts between the Left and supporters of the former empire led to political violence and extremism. The young republic found itself in a nearly constant economic and political crisis until 1924.
Treaty of Versailles
[edit]The Treaty of Versailles ended the state of war between Germany and most of the Allied powers and set the conditions for peace. It was signed 28 June 1919 and can be divided into four main categories: territorial issues, disarmament, reparations and assignment of guilt.

Territorially, Germany had to renounce sovereignty over its colonies[70] and in Europe lost 65,000 km2 (25,000 sq mi) or about 13% of its former territory – including 48% of its iron and 10% of its coal resources – along with 7 million people, or 12% of its population.[71] The Saarland was put under the control of the League of Nations for 15 years, and the output of the area's coal mines went to France.[72] Alsace–Lorraine, which Prussia had annexed following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71, once again became French.[73] The northern part of Schleswig-Holstein went to Denmark following a plebiscite.[74] In the east, a significant amount of territory was lost to a restored Poland.[75] The Memel Territory was ceded to the Allied powers,[76] and Danzig went to the League of Nations as the Free City of Danzig.[77] The Polish Corridor left East Prussia physically separated from the rest of Germany.

Under the terms of both the Armistice of 1918 and of the Treaty of Versailles, French, British, Belgian and American troops occupied the Rhineland, the area of Germany on the west bank of the Rhine river, together with bridgeheads on the east bank near Cologne, Mainz and Koblenz. In addition, the Rhineland and an area stretching 50 kilometers east of the Rhine was to be demilitarized.[78] France had demanded the occupation both to protect itself from a renewed German attack and as collateral for German reparations. The occupation was to last 5 years in the British zone, 10 in the American and 15 years in the French and Belgian zones, until 1934, but the last foreign troops evacuated the Rhineland on 30 June 1930.[79]
The treaty's disarmament provisions were intended to make the future German army incapable of offensive action. It was limited to no more than 100,000 men with only 4,000 officers and no general staff; the navy could have at most 15,000 men and 1,500 officers. All fortifications in the Rhineland and 50 kilometers (31 miles) east of the river were to be demolished. Germany was prohibited from having an air force, tanks, poison gas, heavy artillery, submarines or dreadnoughts. A large number of its ships and all of its air-related armaments were to be surrendered.[74][17]
Germany had to compensate the Allied Powers for the losses and damages of the war, with the exact amount left to be determined at a later date (Article 233).[80] In the short term it was required to pay the equivalent of 20 billion gold marks in installments through April 1921 (Article 235).[80]
The most contentious article of the treaty, the so-called War Guilt Clause, did not use the word "guilt". It stated that Germany and its allies accepted responsibility for all the loss and damage from a war that was imposed on the Allies by the aggression of Germany and its allies (Article 231).[80]
The implications of Article 231 and the territorial losses especially angered the Germans. The treaty was reviled as a dictated rather than a negotiated peace. Philipp Scheidemann, then minister president of Germany, said to the Weimar National Assembly on 12 May 1919, "What hand should not wither that puts this fetter on itself and on us?"[81] He resigned rather than accept the terms, but after the Allies threatened to resume hostilities, the National Assembly voted to approve the treaty on 23 June.[82] It was signed in Paris five days later.
Explaining the rise of extreme nationalist movements in Germany shortly after the war, British historian Ian Kershaw pointed to the "national disgrace" that was "felt throughout Germany at the humiliating terms imposed by the victorious Allies and reflected in the Versailles Treaty...with its confiscation of territory on the eastern border and even more so its 'guilt clause'."[83] Adolf Hitler repeatedly blamed the Republic and its democracy for accepting the oppressive terms of the treaty.[84]
War guilt
[edit]Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty was widely perceived not only as a legal legitimization of reparations but also as a moral condemnation of Germany, and it triggered a storm of indignation among the German public.[85] The hostility towards it came from across the political spectrum, from the far right to the moderate governing parties to the KPD.
After the treaty came into force, the Foreign Office continued the state's control of the debate over war guilt. The War Guilt Department financed and directed the Centre for the Study of the Causes of the War, which was to provide "scientific" support for the "campaign of innocence" abroad. For war-innocence propaganda at home, a "Working Committee of German Associations" was founded with representatives of many groups considered "fit for good society".[86] In 1919, the Weimar National Assembly established a parliamentary committee to inquire into the events that had led to the "outbreak, prolongation and loss of the First World War". Its results were of questionable value due to a lack of cooperation from the civil service and military and to increasing interference from the government, which wanted to prevent a German admission of guilt before the world public.[87] The committee met until 1932.
During the course of World War I, war reporting was the responsibility of the German General Staff and after 1918, of the Potsdam Reich Archives founded by General Hans von Seeckt,[88] which dedicated itself to the task of "disproving" German war guilt and war crimes. As a result, it was the leadership of the Reichswehr with its largely anti-democratic civil service personnel that, along with the Foreign Office, determined the portrayal of the war in the Weimar Republic.
All in all, there was little objective and critical questioning of the causes of the war or of Germany's responsibility for it in academia, politics or the media during the Weimar period. The official view of history continued to follow the argument issued by the OHL in 1914 that Germany had been threatened by invasion and encirclement. Revising the conditions of the Versailles Treaty became the main goal of German foreign policy.[89]
The consensus opposing the "war guilt clause" did much to promote agitation against foreign countries and the Weimar Constitution. Both the DNVP and, in particular, the NSDAP questioned the entire post-war order and propagated a "war guilt lie". In line with national conservative and bourgeois right-wing parties, they accused the governing parties of having contributed to Germany's humiliation by signing the treaty and of denying it the right to self-determination.[90]
Political turmoil: Kapp Putsch and Ruhr uprising
[edit]The young republic was exposed from the beginning to attacks from both the extreme right and extreme left. The Left accused the Social Democrats of betraying the ideals of the labor movement because of their alliance with the old elites; the Right held the supporters of the Republic responsible for Germany's defeat in the First World War, denigrating them as "November criminals" and insinuating that the German army, which was still fighting on enemy soil when the war ended, had been stabbed in the back by them and the revolution (the stab-in-the-back myth).[91]

In the March 1920 Kapp Putsch, Freikorps units under General von Lüttwitz occupied the government quarter in Berlin. In an attempt to reverse the revolution and install an autocratic government, the former Prussian civil servant Wolfgang Kapp appointed himself Reich chancellor and Lüttwitz Reichswehr minister and commander-in-chief of the Reichswehr. The legal government fled Berlin and called for a general strike. The putsch quickly failed due in large part to the refusal of the ministerial bureaucracy to obey Kapp's orders.[92] The Reichswehr, however, proved itself to be unreliable. It adopted a wait-and-see attitude under General von Seeckt, the head of the Troop Office, who said that "Reichswehr do not fire on Reichswehr".[93]
Some among the working class did not limit themselves to passive resistance to the Kapp Putsch. Especially in the Ruhr, where dissatisfaction with the lack of nationalization of key industries was particularly high, councils were formed that sought to seize local power. In the Ruhr uprising, civil war-like fighting broke out when the Ruhr Red Army, made up of some 50,000 armed workers, mostly adherents of the KPD and USPD, used the disruption caused by the general strike to take control of the industrial district. After bloody battles in which an estimated 1,000 insurgents and 200 soldiers died, Reichswehr and Freikorps units suppressed the revolt in early April.[94]
In Bavaria, the Kapp Putsch led to an anti-republican government reshuffle that made the Free State a so-called "cell of order" (Ordnungszelle) within the Weimar state and a rallying point for right-wing conservative and reactionary forces.[95] The unstable political conditions in the early phase of the Weimar Republic were also evident in the Reichstag election of 1920, in which the centre-left Weimar Coalition, which until then had had a three-quarters majority, lost 125 seats to parties on both the left and right.[96]
Political assassinations
[edit]

The sharp political polarization that had occurred was visible in the assassinations of important representatives of the Republic by members of the right-wing extremist Organisation Consul. Finance Minister Matthias Erzberger was assassinated in August 1921 and Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau in June 1922. Both men had been defamed as compliant to Germany's former enemies in the matter of reparations payments. Erzberger was also attacked for signing the armistice agreement in 1918, and Rathenau had sought to break Germany's external isolation after the First World War through the Treaty of Rapallo, which opened diplomatic relations with the new Soviet Union, renounced all war claims and mutually cancelled pre-war debts. Rathenau also attracted right-wing extremist hatred because he was a Jew. The passing of the Law for the Protection of the Republic, which increased the punishments for politically motivated acts of violence, established a special court for the protection of the Republic and prohibited organizations, printed material and rallies that opposed the constitutional republican form of government, was intended to put a stop to the Republic's right-wing enemies. The conservative judiciary from the imperial era that still remained in place and passed lenient sentences against right-wing state criminals contributed to the fact that their activities could not be permanently deterred.[97]
Reparations and the occupation of the Ruhr
[edit]After a series of international conferences to determine the reparations for which Germany was liable, an amount of 132 billion Reichsmarks was presented in May 1921, to be paid either in gold or commodities such as iron, steel and coal.[98] Chancellor Joseph Wirth had no choice other than to accept, but in an attempt to have the amount lowered, he began the German policy of "fulfilment" (Erfüllungspolitik). By attempting to meet the payments, it intended to show the Allies that the demands were beyond Germany's economic means.[99] In May 1922, when the Reichsmark was rapidly losing value, Germany was granted a payment moratorium over strong French objections.[98]
In January 1923, France declared Germany in default. The French minister president Raymond Poincaré saw Germany's failure to pay reparations as a lever that he could use to achieve the separation of the Rhineland from the German Reich, a French demand that had been refused by the British at Versailles.[100] After the Reparation Commission determined that German coal deliveries were short, French and Belgian troops marched into the Rhineland on 11 January 1923,[99] Germany's most productive industrial region, and took control of most of its mining and manufacturing companies. The German government under Chancellor Wilhelm Cuno responded with a policy of non-violent passive resistance to the occupation. It underwrote the costs of idled factories and mines and paid the workers who were on strike. Unable to meet the enormous costs by any other means, it resorted to printing money. Along with the debts the state had incurred during the war, it was one of the major causes of the hyperinflation that followed.[101]
Realizing that continuing the course was untenable, the new Reich Chancellor Gustav Stresemann called off the passive resistance in September 1923.[102] The French and Belgian occupation ended in August 1925, following an agreement (the Dawes Plan) to restructure Germany's payments. The total reparations payout from 1920 to 1931 (when payments were suspended indefinitely) was 20 billion marks. 12.5 billion was cash that came mostly from loans provided by New York bankers. The rest was goods such as coal and chemicals, or from assets like railway equipment.
Hyperinflation
[edit]
The hyperinflation fueled by the government's response to the occupation of the Ruhr caused the cost of a loaf of bread to rise from 3 Reichsmarks in 1922 to 80 billion Reichsmarks in November 1923. Prices were rising so rapidly that people rushed to spend their pay at lunch breaks before it lost any more of its value. Foreign trade became all but impossible, as did German ability to pay reparations.[103] While personal savings became virtually worthless, so did fixed debts. Middle class owners of land or houses often came out ahead because their debts lost value along with the currency. Large industrial concerns profited in the same manner, and wealth concentrated in fewer hands.[67] The classic example was Hugo Stinnes, who earned the title of Inflation King by taking advantage of its effects on debt to amass controlling interests in 1,535 businesses with 2,890 different plants by 1924.[104] Stinnes' empire collapsed after the government-sponsored inflation was stopped by the introduction of the Rentenmark on 15 November 1923. One U.S. dollar was equivalent to 4.20 Rentenmarks; the exchange rate was 1 Rentenmark to one trillion paper marks. The new money was backed by the Reich's gold reserves along with a 3.2 billion Rentenmark mortgage on the land holdings of agriculture, industry and trade. The introduction of the Rentenmark was successful at stabilizing German currency and the economy.[105]
Additional political violence and the Hitler putsch
[edit]With the proclamation on 21 October 1923 of the Rhenish Republic came a short-lived secessionist movement in the wake of which sections of the labor force became increasingly radicalized. In Saxony and Thuringia, the Communist Party (KPD) won enough seats to participate in governments under Social Democratic minister-presidents. In Saxony the Communists were expelled by a Reich execution (Reichsexekution) using Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, while in Thuringia the KPD ministers resigned voluntarily.[106] In the Reichstag, the Social Democrats withdrew their support from Cuno's government and entered a grand coalition under DVP Chancellor Gustav Stresemann.[107]
The nationalist right, especially in Bavaria, branded the breaking off of the Ruhr resistance as treason. In a breach of the Weimar constitution, Bavaria declared a state of emergency, and executive power was transferred to Gustav Ritter von Kahr as state commissioner general. The Reichswehr under the Chief of Army Command, General Hans von Seeckt, who had his own governmental ambitions directed against left-wing parties and Weimar parliamentary,[108] behaved loyally towards the Stresemann government only with respect to his own interests. In spite of the moves against the governments in Saxony and Thuringia, no action was taken against Bavaria, where Kahr was preparing a military coup aimed at overthrowing the Reich government in cooperation with the Bavarian military under district commander Otto von Lossow.[109]

In 1920, the German Workers' Party had become the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP), or Nazi Party, which would eventually become a driving force in the collapse of the Weimar Republic. Adolf Hitler named himself chairman of the party in July 1921. On 8 November 1923, in a pact with Erich Ludendorff, a league of nationalist fighting societies called the Kampfbund, took over a meeting that Kahr and Lossow were holding at a beer hall in Munich. Ludendorff and Hitler declared that the Weimar government was deposed and that they were planning to take control of Munich the following day. Kahr and Lossow organized the resistance to Hitler, with the result that the coup attempt was easily stopped.[110] Hitler was arrested and sentenced to five years in prison for high treason, the minimum sentence for the charge. He served less than eight months in a comfortable cell, receiving a daily stream of visitors until his release on 20 December 1924. While in jail Hitler dictated Mein Kampf, which laid out his ideas and future policies. Hitler decided to focus in the future on legal methods of gaining power.[111]
Golden Era (1924–1929)
[edit]From 1924 to 1929, the Weimar Republic was relatively stable. Known in Germany as the "Goldene Zwanziger" (Golden Twenties), its prominent features were internal consolidation and rapprochement in foreign affairs, along with a growing economy and a consequent decrease in civil unrest, although the improvements came about without establishing a sustainable foundation for the parliamentary democracy. While Germany's recognition of its reparations obligations promoted reintegration into the contemporary state system and world markets, it also developed a strong dependence on American capital. The stability was partly borrowed and, in the end, only superficial.[112]
Framework for economic policy
[edit]An essential basis for the relative stabilization was the restructuring of reparations through the Dawes Plan.[113] Without fixing a final total sum, the plan regulated the scope, composition and the security of transfers for future annual reparations payments. The latter was to be guaranteed by the American financial expert Parker Gilbert who, as reparations agent, could directly influence German fiscal and financial policy in order to secure monetary stability. The acceptance of the Dawes Plan in the Reichstag had long been uncertain – parts of the Right spoke of a "new enslavement of the German people" and the KPD of the enslavement of the German proletariat.[100] Once the plan had been passed, it brought the Weimar Republic a significant inflow of American loans from state funds as well as private investors. The money served as both start-up financing for reparations and as aid for an economic revival. German railways, the National Bank and many industries were mortgaged as security for the loans.[114]
The economic consolidation that occurred after the period of hyperinflation was largely at the expense of wage earners and the economic middle class. The eight-hour day, one of the main social achievements of the 1918/19 revolution, was in many cases watered down or abandoned; the civil service was affected by massive job cuts and salary reductions; and rationalization and concentration in large industries continued and deprived many small and medium-sized enterprises of their livelihoods. Savers and creditors who had been hurt by inflation were effectively left without any significant compensation.[115] Real wages, however, grew faster than the cost of living between 1924 and 1929. One study found that by 1928–29 they "had reached or exceeded their pre-war level".[116]
The declarations of social guarantees contained in the Weimar Constitution[117] had only a limited effect and stood in striking contrast to the many experiences of social decline. From 1924 onwards, small savers who had been impoverished or economically ruined by inflation were at least able to take advantage of the state-organized social welfare system, which replaced the former poor relief. The new system, however, was characterized by "petty means tests under an anonymous social bureaucracy" and by benefits that only secured existence at a subsistence level.[118] In the brief peak phase of overall economic recovery and economic optimism, unemployment insurance was introduced in 1927. In some respects it was the "high point of the Republic's social expansion", although it benefitted only a portion of the workforce and did not cover permanent unemployment.[119] In the meantime, the state had also introduced a new system of social security.

The parliamentary system of Weimar democracy was the expression of a party landscape that was strongly characterized and fragmented by class and social milieus. Reichstag members as representatives of the interests of their respective electorates often had narrow limits to their willingness to compromise. Such class and status consciousness was part of the legacy of the imperial era and continued to have an effect, although it was also partly reshaped by a consumer and leisure-oriented mass culture that emerged in the 1920s and was driven by the new media forms of records, film and radio. People of all classes and strata went to the cinema or sat in front of the radio. Mass culture pointed in the direction of democratisation and was interpreted by conservatives as intellectual flattening and a decline in values. The class fronts were gradually softened by mass culture, marking a "class society in transition".[120]
Unstable political system
[edit]After Reich President Ebert died at the beginning of 1925 at the age of 54, the candidate of the parties that supported the Republic, Wilhelm Marx of the Centre Party, was defeated in the second round of the 1925 Reich presidential election by the candidate of the nationalist right, Paul von Hindenburg, 48.3% to 45.3%. Despite the fact that Hindenburg had declared in advance that he intended to hold office in accordance with the Weimar Constitution,[121] his electoral success showed how far the country had shifted to the right since Weimar's beginnings with a socialist president.
The Reichstag elections in May 1924 and December 1924 were once again failures for the Weimar Coalition (SDP, DDP and Centre), which had started so comfortably in 1919 and which maintained its position as a "bulwark of democracy" only in Prussia.[122] In the May election, the Coalition partners lost a total of 13 seats, while the right wing DNVP and left wing KPD picked up 82 seats. After the SPD left Gustav Stresemann's cabinet in November 1923 in protest of its actions against Saxony and Thuringia, it did not take part in a government again until June 1928. From 1924 to 1928, there were three chancellors: Wilhelm Marx of the Centre party (twice), the non-partisan Hans Luther and Hermann Müller of the SPD. Altogether there were seven cabinets under the three men.
Foreign policy
[edit]
Despite the frequent changes of personnel in the Reich chancellery and in the government cabinets between 1923 and 1928, there was nevertheless an effective constant in Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann of the German People's Party. With his change from "monarchist of the heart" to "republican of reason",[123] as he himself expressed it, Stresemann exercised a stabilizing influence on the political development of the Republic not only as Reich chancellor in 1923 but throughout the entire period of his participation in government.
He sought a release from the restraints of the Treaty of Versailles exclusively by peaceful means and through mutual understanding, although without abandoning long-term revisionist intentions such as regaining the territory ceded to Poland. He took the initiative for the 1925 Locarno Treaties, which settled Germany's western borders but left the issue of the eastern ones open. Through reaching an understanding with France and securing Germany an equal position in the League of Nations in 1926, he led the Weimar Republic out of isolation. Germany signed arbitration conventions with France and Belgium and arbitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, undertaking to refer any future disputes to an arbitration tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice.[124] As a result of the Dawes Plan, foreign troops left the Ruhr in 1925.[125] In addition, the 1926 Treaty of Berlin ensured that relations with the Soviet Union remained unencumbered. Beginning in 1925 there was secret and illegal cooperation between the Reichswehr and the Red Army. Germany tested weapons in the Soviet Union that had been banned by the Treaty of Versailles, including aircraft, tanks and poison gas.[126]
The favourable effects expected from the Locarno Treaties were to a certain extent realized. The first Rhineland zone was vacated in 1925, Franco-German economic relations were expanded through agreements, and the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control, which monitored German disarmament, left Germany in 1927. In 1928 Stresemann played an important mediating role between the US and France in the negotiations on the Kellogg–Briand Pact, an international agreement on peace.[127]
After the full reparations schedule under the Dawes Plan was drawn up in 1928/29, new negotiations took place. In the resulting Young Plan, the question of possible relief was combined with a plan for the final settlement of the reparations question. Instead of the annual payment of 2.5 billion Reichsmarks envisaged in the Dawes Plan, an average of 2 billion – initially 1.7 billion – was to be paid over a period of 59 years. With the prospect of what was thought to be a final reparations plan, and in view of Germany's willingness to accept the liability until 1988, France in parallel negotiations conceded a withdrawal of troops from the occupied Rhineland five years earlier than under the Versailles Treaty. For the nationalist right in Germany, it was above all the reparations burden extending across generations that provided propaganda fuel for their agitation against the Weimar Republic. The DNVP and Nazi Party carried out a referendum against the Young Plan, which failed by a large margin due to the low turnout, but through it the National Socialists were able to use their propaganda to draw nationwide attention to themselves and to make their mark on the right-wing fringe of the party spectrum.[128]
Culture
[edit]The 1920s saw a remarkable cultural renaissance in Germany. During the worst phase of hyperinflation in 1923, the clubs and bars were full of speculators who spent their daily profits so they would not lose the value the following day. Berlin intellectuals responded by condemning the excesses of what they considered capitalism and demanding revolutionary changes on the cultural scenery.

Influenced by the cultural explosion in the Soviet Union, German literature, cinema, theatre and musical works entered a phase of great creativity. Innovative street theatre brought plays to the public, and the cabaret scene and jazz bands became very popular. According to the cliché, modern young women were Americanized, wearing makeup, short hair, smoking and breaking with traditional mores. The euphoria surrounding Josephine Baker in the metropolis of Berlin for instance, where she was declared an "erotic goddess" and in many ways admired and respected, kindled further "ultramodern" sensations in the minds of the German public.[129] Art and a new type of architecture taught at "Bauhaus" schools reflected the new ideas of the time, with artists such as George Grosz being fined for defaming the military and for blasphemy.

Artists in Berlin were influenced by other contemporary progressive cultural movements, such as the Impressionist and Expressionist painters in Paris, as well as the Cubists. Likewise, American progressive architects were admired. Many of the new buildings built during this era followed a straight-lined, geometrical style. Examples of the new architecture include the Bauhaus Building by Gropius, Grosses Schauspielhaus, and the Einstein Tower.[130]
Not everyone, however, was happy with the changes taking place in Weimar culture. Conservatives and reactionaries feared that Germany was betraying its traditional values by adopting popular styles from abroad, particularly those Hollywood was popularizing in American films, while New York became the global capital of fashion.
In 1929, three years after receiving the 1926 Nobel Peace Prize, Stresemann died of a heart attack at age 51. When the New York Stock Exchange crashed in October 1929, American loans dried up and the sharp decline of the German economy brought the "Golden Twenties" to an abrupt end.
Athletics
[edit]Initially after the First World War, Germany did not participate in the Olympic Games. Instead it hosted its own National Games which were similar to the Olympic Games. In 1928 Germany accepted the Netherlands' invitation to participate in the 1928 Summer Olympics Games in Amsterdam. Germany also participated in the 1932 Summer Olympics Games held in Los Angeles.[131]
Another athletic championship Germany participated in was the Women's World Games with athletes being sent to the 1926 Games and the 1930 Games. Germany won first place in 1930.[131]
Religion
[edit]
Under the Weimar Constitution, Germany was secular.[132] It was predominantly Protestant, with 64.1% adhering in 1925 and 62.7% in 1933. The other sizeable religion was Roman Catholicism, which made up 32.4% of the population in 1925 and 32.5% in 1933. Those who were not Christian were a minority, with 3.5% hailing from other religions in 1925 and 4.8% in 1933. Jews made up 0.9% of the population in 1925 and 0.8% in 1933.[133]
Social policy under Weimar
[edit]A wide range of progressive social reforms were carried out during and after the revolutionary period. The Executive Council of the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils – a coalition that included Majority Social Democrats, Independent Social Democrats, workers and soldiers – introduced the eight-hour work day, reinstated demobilized workers, released political prisoners, abolished press censorship, increased workers' old-age, sick and unemployment benefits, and gave labor the unrestricted right to organize into unions.[134] It was made harder for estates to sack workers and prevent them from leaving when they wanted to. Under the Provisional Act for Agricultural Labour of 23 November 1918, the normal period of notice for management and most resident laborer was set at six weeks. In addition, a supplementary directive of December 1918 specified that female and child workers were entitled to a fifteen-minute break if they worked between four and six hours, thirty minutes for workdays lasting six to eight hours, and one hour for longer days.[135] A decree on 23 December 1918 established committees (composed of workers' representatives "in their relation to the employer") to safeguard the rights of workers. The right to bargain collectively was also established, while it was made obligatory "to elect workers' committees on estates and establish conciliation committees". A decree on 3 February 1919 removed the right of employers to acquire exemption for domestic servants and agricultural workers.[136] In 1919, legislation provided for a maximum working 48-hour workweek, restrictions on night work, a half-holiday on Saturday, and a break of thirty-six hours of continuous rest during the week.[137]
With the decree of 3 February 1919, the Ebert government reintroduced the original structure of the health insurance boards according to an 1883 law, with one-third employers and two-thirds workers.[138] As of 28 June 1919, health insurance committees were elected by the workers themselves.[139] That same year, health insurance was extended to wives and daughters without their own income, people only partially capable of gainful employment, people employed in private cooperatives, and people employed in public cooperatives.[140]
The Provisional Order of January 1919 concerning agricultural labor conditions fixed 2,900 hours as a maximum per year, distributed as eight, ten, and eleven hours per day in four month periods.[141] A code of January 1919 bestowed on land laborer the same legal rights that industrial workers enjoyed, while a bill ratified the same year obligated the states to set up agricultural settlement associations which "were endowed with the priority right of purchase of farms beyond a specified size".[142] In October 1919, a law was enacted that provided various kinds of financial support in relation to pregnancy, childbirth, confinement compensation, and maternity care.[143] That same year, free legal representation to the poor was introduced.[144]
A series of progressive tax reforms were introduced under the auspices of Matthias Erzberger, including increases in taxes on capital[145] and an increase in the highest income tax rate from 4% to 60%.[146] Under a governmental decree of 3 February 1919, the German government met the demand of the veterans' associations that all aid for the disabled and their dependents be taken over by the central government[147] (thus assuming responsibility for this assistance) and extended into peacetime the nationwide network of state and district welfare bureaus that had been set up during the war to coordinate social services for war widows and orphans.[148]
The Youth Welfare Act of 1922 obliged all municipalities and states to set up youth offices in charge of child protection, and also codified a right to education for all children,[149] while laws were passed to regulate rents and increase protection for tenants in 1922 and 1923.[150] Health insurance coverage was extended to other categories of the population during the existence of the Weimar Republic, including seamen, people employed in the educational and social welfare sectors, and all primary dependents.[140] Various improvements were also made in unemployment benefits, although in June 1920 the maximum amount of unemployment benefit that a family of four could receive in Berlin, 90 marks, was well below the minimum cost of subsistence of 304 marks.[151]
In 1923, unemployment relief was consolidated into a regular programme of assistance following economic problems that year. In 1924, a modern public assistance programme was introduced, and in 1925 the accident insurance programme was reformed, allowing diseases that were linked to certain kinds of work to become insurable risks.[152] Other amendments to accident insurance in 1925 also introduced rehabilitation benefits, together with benefits for the dependent children of permanently disabled workers whose earning capacity had fallen by at least 50%.[153] In addition, paid maternity leave[154] and a national unemployment insurance programme were both introduced in 1927.[152] Housing construction was also greatly accelerated during the Weimar period, with over 2 million new homes constructed between 1924 and 1931 and a further 195,000 modernized.[155]
The Weimar years witnessed a major rise in overall public spending, which grew to an annual average of 13.7 billion Marks (in 1913 prices) from 1919 to 1929, compared with 6.8 billion Marks from 1909 to 1913. Government expenditure as a proportion of GNP also rose; standing at 25% in 1925, 30.6% in 1929, and 36.6% in 1932. According to one study, "This expansion was first and foremost a consequence of "social interventionism," the chief manifestation of which, apart from house building and job creation measures during the crisis of 1925–26, was the extension of social insurance."[156]

Renewed crisis and decline (1930–1933)
[edit]Onset of the Great Depression
[edit]

In 1929, the onset of the Great Depression produced a severe economic shock in Germany which was made worse by the European banking crisis of 1931. Germany's fragile economy had been sustained by the granting of loans through the Dawes Plan (1924) and the Young Plan (1929).[98] When American banks withdrew their line of credit to German companies, the rapid rise in unemployment could not be checked by conventional economic measures.[157] Unemployment thereafter grew dramatically, to 4 million in 1930,[158] and in the Reichstag election of September 1930, the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP, Nazi Party), until then a minor far-right party, increased its share of the votes to 19%, becoming Germany's second largest party, while the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) gained 23 seats.[159] The shift to the political extremes made the unstable coalition system by which every Weimar chancellor had governed increasingly unworkable. The last years of the Weimar Republic were marred by even more systemic political instability than previous years, and political violence increased. Four chancellors (Heinrich Brüning, Franz von Papen, Kurt von Schleicher and, from 30 January to 23 March 1933, Adolf Hitler) governed through presidential decree rather than parliamentary consultation.[98] It effectively rendered parliament powerless as a means of enforcing constitutional checks and balances.
Brüning and the first presidential cabinet (1930–1932)
[edit]On 29 March 1930, at the instigation of General Kurt von Schleicher, President Paul von Hindenburg appointed finance expert Heinrich Brüning as successor to Hermann Müller (SPD),[160] whose five-party coalition had broken down on 27 March over how to finance the increased costs of unemployment compensation.[161] The new government was expected to lead a political shift towards conservatism.
As Brüning had no majority support in the Reichstag, he became, through the use of the emergency powers granted to the Reich president by Article 48 of the constitution, the first Weimar chancellor to operate independently of parliament.[6] After a bill to reform Germany's finances was opposed by the Reichstag, it was made into an emergency decree by Hindenburg. On 18 July, as a result of opposition from the SPD, KPD, DNVP and the small contingent of NSDAP members, the Reichstag again rejected the bill by a slim margin. Immediately afterward, Brüning submitted a decree from the President to dissolve the Reichstag.[162] The consequent general election on 14 September resulted in an enormous political shift within the Reichstag: 18.3% of the vote went to the NSDAP, five times the percentage it had won in 1928.[163] As a result, it was no longer possible, even with a grand coalition, to form a pro-republican majority that excluded the KPD, DNVP and NSDAP. The situation led an increase in the number of public demonstrations and instances of paramilitary violence organized by the NSDAP.
Between 1930 and 1932, Brüning enacted a policy of austerity including drastic cuts in state expenditures, tax increases, mandated wage reductions in both the public and private sectors, and credit restrictions.[6] Among other measures, he completely halted all obligatory public payments to the unemployment insurance program introduced in 1927, resulting in higher contributions from the workers and fewer benefits for the unemployed. Benefits for the sick, invalids and pensioners were also sharply reduced.[164] Since the Young Plan did not allow the Reichsmark to be devalued, he triggered an internal devaluation by forcing the economy to reduce prices, rents, salaries and wages by 20%.[10]
By late 1931, Hindenburg and Schleicher had begun to contemplate dropping Brüning in favor of accommodating Alfred Hugenberg of the DNVP and Adolf Hitler. On 30 May 1932, Brüning finally lost Hindenburg's support over the question of Eastern Aid and resigned as chancellor.[165]
The consensus today is that Brüning's policies exacerbated the German economic crisis and the population's growing frustration with democracy, contributing considerably to the increase in support for Hitler's NSDAP.[6]
Papen cabinet
[edit]
Hindenburg then appointed Franz von Papen as the new chancellor. He was closely associated with the industrialist and land-owning classes and the military. General Kurt von Schleicher – who became Reichswehr minister – handpicked the members of the Papen cabinet, which came to be known as the "Cabinet of Barons".[166] It continued to govern by presidential decree as had the Brüning cabinets.
On 16 June, Papen lifted the ban on the Nazi Sturmabteilung (SA) and Schutzstaffel (SS)[167] that had been imposed on 13 April under the Brüning government.[168] Using the political violence that took place during the Reichstag election campaign as a pretext, he ousted the SPD-led coalition government of Prussia in the Prussian coup d'état (Preußenschlag) of 20 July. By emergency decree, he declared himself Reich Commissioner (Reichskommissar) of Prussia, a step that further weakened the democracy of the Weimar Republic.[169]
Election of July 1932
[edit]
Per a prior agreement with Hindenburg and Hitler, Papen dissolved the Reichstag on 4 June 1932 and called for a new election in the hope that the Nazi Party would win the most seats and allow him to set up an authoritarian government.[170] The general election on 31 July 1932 yielded major gains for the Communist Party and the Nazis, who won 37.3% of the vote, their high-water mark in a free election. The Nazi party supplanted the Social Democrats as the largest party in the Reichstag, although it did not gain a majority.
The immediate question was what part the Nazi Party would play in the government of the country. Hitler refused a ministry under Papen and demanded the chancellorship for himself but was rejected by Hindenburg on 13 August 1932. Since there was still no majority in the Reichstag for any government, the Reichstag was again dissolved, and an election was scheduled in the hope that a stable majority would result.[98][171]
Schleicher cabinet
[edit]
In the 6 November 1932 election, the Nazis received two million fewer votes than in the previous election.[172] Kurt von Schleicher, a retired army general who for many years had worked politically behind the scenes to further the interests of Germany's military,[173] maneuvered Papen out of office and was appointed chancellor by Hindenburg on 3 December.[174] He tried to cause a split within the Nazi Party that would force Hitler to support his government but failed in the attempt.[175]
One of the main initiatives of Schleicher's government was a public works program intended to counter the effects of the Great Depression. The various projects, which are often wrongly attributed to Hitler, created 2 million jobs for unemployed Germans by July 1933.[176] In foreign policy, Schleicher's main interest was in winning Gleichberechtigung ("equality of status") for Germany at the World Disarmament Conference by doing away with Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, which had disarmed Germany.[177]
Schleicher's relations with his cabinet were poor because of his secretiveness and open contempt for his ministers.[178] Papen had become Schleicher's bitter enemy when he was forced out of office but retained Hindenburg's confidence. He advised him to sack Schleicher and appoint Hitler chancellor in a coalition with the German National People's Party (DNVP) which, together with Papen, would work to rein in Hitler. On 28 January 1933, Schleicher told his cabinet that he needed a decree from the President to dissolve the Reichstag in order to keep his government from being defeated in a no-confidence vote, but Hindenburg refused the request.[179]
Knowing that his government was about to fall and fearing that Papen would get the chancellorship, Schleicher began to favor Hitler.[180] Hitler was initially willing to support Schleicher as his minister of Defense but was convinced by an associate of Schleicher that he was about to launch a putsch to keep Hitler out of power. Amid rumors that Schleicher was moving troops into Berlin to depose Hindenburg, Papen convinced him to appoint Hitler chancellor. The President dismissed Schleicher and appointed Hitler on 30 January 1933.[181]
End of the Weimar Republic
[edit]Hitler's chancellorship (1933)
[edit]Hitler was sworn in as chancellor on the morning of 30 January 1933. By early February, the government had begun to clamp down on the opposition. Meetings of the left-wing parties were banned and even some of the moderate parties found their members threatened and assaulted. Measures with an appearance of legality suppressed the Communist Party in mid-February[182][183] and included the plainly illegal arrests of Reichstag deputies.
On 27 February 1933 the Reichstag was gutted by a fire which was blamed on an act of arson by Marinus van der Lubbe, a Dutch council communist. Hitler blamed the fire on the KPD (although Van der Lubbe was not a member of the party) and convinced Hindenburg to issue the Reichstag Fire Decree the following day. The decree invoked Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution and "suspended until further notice" a number of constitutional protections of civil liberties, allowing the Nazi government to take swift action against political meetings and to arrest both socialists and communists.[184]
In the Reichstag election which took place on 5 March 1933, the NSDAP obtained 17 million votes and a scant majority of 16 seats for the NSDAP-DNVP coalition. The Communist, Social Democrat and Catholic Centre votes changed little.[185] It was the last multi-party election of the Weimar Republic and the last in a united Germany for 57 years.
Enabling Act
[edit]In March Hitler submitted a proposal to the Reichstag for an enabling act that granted all legislative powers to the cabinet and by extension to Hitler. It in effect allowed Hitler's government to act without regard for the constitution.[186] Since it formally amended the Weimar Constitution, it required a two-thirds majority to pass, which it obtained (68%) on 23 March, with only the SPD voting against (the KPD had been banned).[187] The combined effect of the Enabling Act and the Reichstag Fire Decree transformed Hitler's government into a legal dictatorship and laid the groundwork for his totalitarian regime. Since July 1933, the NSDAP was the only legally permitted party in Germany. The Reichstag from 1933 onward effectively became the rubber stamp parliament that Hitler had desired.[188]
The passage of the Enabling Act of 1933 is widely considered to mark the end of the Weimar Republic and the beginning of Nazi Germany. It effectively destroyed the checks and balances of the democratic system, concentrating all the power in the hands of Hitler and his inner circle. The Enabling Act played a significant role in the establishment of Hitler's dictatorship and the subsequent events that unfolded during the Nazi era.
Nazification
[edit]In the months following the passage of the Enabling Act, all German parties aside from the NSDAP were banned or forced to disband themselves, all trade unions were dissolved[187] and all media were brought under the control of the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda.[189] The Reichstag was then dissolved by Hindenburg and a snap one-party election was called in November 1933. It gave the NSDAP 100% of the seats in the chamber.[190] In February 1934, the Law on the Reconstruction of the Reich abolished all state parliaments and passed state sovereignty to the Reich government.[187]
The constitution of 1919 was never formally repealed,[191] but the Enabling Act meant that it was a dead letter. The Reichstag was effectively eliminated as an active player in German politics. It met only sporadically until the end of World War II, held no debates and enacted only a few laws; for all purposes, it was reduced to a mere stage for Hitler's speeches.[192] The other chamber of the German parliament (the Reichsrat) was officially abolished on 14 February 1934 by the Law on the Abolition of the Reichsrat.[193] It was in clear violation of the Enabling Act, which stipulated (Article 2) that any laws passed under its authority could not affect the institutions of either chamber.[194] By then, however, the Nazis had become law unto themselves, and the actions were never challenged in court.
Hindenburg's death on 2 August 1934 eliminated any remaining obstacle to full Nazi dominance. The day before he died, the Hitler cabinet passed the Law Concerning the Head of State of the German Reich, the final major part in the Nazification process called Gleichschaltung ("coordination"). It transferred the president's powers upon his death, including as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, to the new post of "Führer and Reich Chancellor",[195] giving Hitler complete power over the entire Reich without any possibility of checks and balances. The action was later ratified by a highly non-democratic referendum[196] which shed the last remains of the Weimar Republic.
Reasons for failure
[edit]The reasons for the Weimar Republic's collapse are the subject of continuing debate. It may have been doomed from the beginning since even some moderates disliked it and extremists on both the left and right loathed it, a situation often referred to as a "democracy without democrats".[197] Germany had limited democratic traditions, and Weimar democracy was widely seen as chaotic. Since Weimar's early left of center politicians had been blamed for the Dolchstoß ("stab-in-the-back"), a widely believed theory that Germany's surrender in the First World War had been unnecessary and the act of traitors, the popular legitimacy of the government was on shaky ground from the start. As normal parliamentary lawmaking broke down and was replaced around 1930 by a series of emergency decrees, the decreasing popular legitimacy of the government further drove voters to extremist parties.[198]
No single reason can explain the failure of the Weimar Republic. The most commonly asserted causes can be grouped into three categories: economic problems, institutional problems, and the roles of specific individuals.[199]
Economic problems
[edit]The Weimar Republic had some of the most serious economic problems ever experienced by any Western democracy. It experienced a period of rampant hyperinflation, sometimes high unemployment, and a large drop in living standards. From 1923 to 1929, there was a period of economic recovery, but the Great Depression of the 1930s led to a worldwide recession. Germany was particularly affected because it depended heavily on American loans.
The Weimar Republic was severely affected by the Great Depression. In 1926, about two million Germans were unemployed, which rose to around six million in 1932, with many blaming the Weimar Republic. As the Weimar Republic was very fragile throughout its existence, the depression was devastating and played a major role in the Nazi takeover.
Most Germans thought the Treaty of Versailles was a punishing and degrading document because it forced them to surrender resource-rich areas and pay massive amounts of compensation. The punitive reparations caused consternation and resentment, but the actual economic damage resulting from the Treaty of Versailles is difficult to determine. While the official reparations were considerable, Germany ended up paying only a fraction of them. However, the reparations damaged Germany's economy by discouraging market loans. A number of factors came together in 1923, including printing currency to finance the costs of passive resistance to the occupation of the Ruhr, to cause rampant hyperinflation. At the beginning of 1920, one US dollar was equivalent to fifty marks. By the end of 1923, one US dollar was equal to 4,200,000,000,000 marks.[200] Princeton historian Harold James argues that there was a clear link between economic decline and people turning to extremist politics.[201] That was made apparent when political parties on both the far right and far left wanted to disband the Republic altogether, making any democratic majority in Parliament impossible.[199]
Institutional problems
[edit]It is widely believed that the 1919 constitution had several weaknesses, making the eventual establishment of a dictatorship likely, but it is impossible to know whether a different constitution could have prevented the rise of the Nazi party.[198] The 1949 West German constitution (the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany) is generally viewed as a strong response to these flaws.
- The Weimar presidency was frequently considered an Ersatzkaiser ("substitute emperor"), an attempt to replace the emperors with a similarly strong institution meant to diminish party politics. Article 48 of the Constitution gave the president power to "take all necessary steps" if "public order and security are seriously disturbed or endangered". Although it was intended as an emergency clause, it was often used before 1933 to issue decrees without the support of Parliament and also made Hitler's Gleichschaltung easier.
- During the Weimar Republic, it was accepted that a law did not have to conform to the constitution as long as it had the support of two-thirds of Parliament, the same majority needed to change the constitution. That was a precedent for the Enabling Act of 1933. The Basic Law of 1949 requires an explicit change of the wording, and it prohibits abolishing the basic rights or the federal structure of the republic.
- The use of a proportional representation without large thresholds meant a party with a small amount of support could gain entry into the Reichstag. That led to many small parties, some extremist, building political bases within the system, and made it difficult to form and maintain a stable coalition government, further contributing to instability. To counter the problem, the modern German Bundestag introduced a 5% threshold limit for a party to gain parliamentary representation. However, the Reichstag of the monarchy was fractioned to a similar degree even if it was elected by majority vote (under a two-round system).
- The Reichstag could remove the chancellor from office even if it was unable to agree on a successor. With the Reichstag increasingly fractured, President Hindenburg rather than the Reichstag chose the Republic's last four chancellors (Brüning, Papen, Schleicher and Hitler). They all governed by presidential decree. The 1949 Basic Law stipulates that a chancellor may not be removed by Parliament unless a successor is elected at the same time, a procedure known as a "constructive vote of no confidence".
- The fundamental rights of habeas corpus, sanctity of the home, inviolability of the mail, freedom of speech and the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of association (including religious associations) and the inviolability of property – Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153 of the Weimar Constitution – could be suspended under Article 48.[202] The Basic Law lists them as basic rights that cannot legally be nullified and in Article 20 (4) includes the right to resist attempts to abolish the constitutional order.[203]
Role of individuals and parties
[edit]Chancellor Heinrich Brüning's deflationary economic policy from 1930 to 1932 has been the subject of much debate. It caused many Germans to identify the Republic with cuts in social spending.
Franz von Papen, who was chancellor of Germany from 30 May to 17 November 1932, ousted the elected government of the Free State of Prussia in the 1932 Prussian coup d'état, which eliminated one of the last potential bastions of resistance to Hitler's seizure of power. Prussia was led by the Social Democratic Party, was home to the federal capital Berlin and had 61% of the Weimar Republic's population. Papen also pressured Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as chancellor and himself as vice chancellor in 1933 in a cabinet ostensibly not under Nazi Party domination. Papen and his allies were quickly marginalized by Hitler.
Paul von Hindenburg became president of Germany in 1925. As he was an old-style monarchist conservative, he had little love for the Republic, but for the most part, he acted formally within the bounds of the constitution.[204] However, he ultimately — on the advice of his son and others close to him — appointed Hitler chancellor, thereby effectively ending the Republic after the passage of the Enabling Act of 1933. Additionally, Hindenburg's death in 1934 ended the last obstacle for Hitler to assume full power in the Weimar Republic.
The German National People's Party (DNVP) has also been blamed as responsible for the downfall of the Weimar Republic because of its ultranationalist positions and its unwillingness to accept the Republic because of its monarchist ideology. In his book, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, journalist and historian William L. Shirer wrote that the DNVP's status as a far-right party rather than a mainstream conservative party was one of the main reasons for the Weimar Republic's downfall. In Shirer's view, the DNVP's refusal to "take a responsible position either in the government or in the opposition" during most of Weimar's existence denied Weimar "that stability provided in many other countries by a truly conservative party."[205] Similarly, conservative British historian Sir John Wheeler-Bennett blamed the DNVP for failing to reconcile with the Republic, stating that "Under the cloak of loyalty to the Monarchy, they either held aloof or sabotaged the efforts of successive Chancellors to give a stable government to the Republic. The truth is that after 1918 many German Nationalists were more influenced by feelings of disloyalty to the Republic than of loyalty to the Kaiser, and it was this motive which led them to make their fatal contribution to bringing Hitler to power."[206]
Legacy
[edit]Nazi propaganda tended to describe the Weimar Republic as a period of treason, degeneration, and corruption. The whole period from 1918 to 1933 was described in propaganda as "The time of the System" (Systemzeit), while the Republic itself was known as "The System" (Das System), a term that was adopted into everyday use after 1933.[207] Another Nazi phrase used for the republic and its politicians was "the November criminals" or "the regime of the November criminals" (German: November-Verbrecher), referring to the month the republic was founded in (November 1918).[208]
According to Foreign Policy, the Weimar Republic is seen as "the best-known historical example of a 'failed' democracy that ceded to fascism".[209]
Government
[edit]Constitution of 1919
[edit]The constitution created a federal semi-presidential republic[210] with a parliament whose lower house, the Reichstag, was elected by universal suffrage using proportional representation. The appointed upper house, the Reichsrat, represented the interests of the federal states. The president of Germany had supreme command over the military, extensive emergency powers, and appointed and removed the chancellor, who was responsible to the Reichstag.[211]
Federal
[edit]Reichsrat
[edit]The Reichsrat was the upper chamber of parliament. Its powers were relatively limited, making it weaker than its predecessor, the Bundesrat of the German Empire (1871–1918). Members were appointed by the German state governments to represent their interests in legislation and in administration of the nation at the federal level. The Reichsrat could introduce legislation for the Reichstag to consider and veto laws that it passed, but the vetoes could be overridden.[212]
Reichstag
[edit]The Reichstag voted on the laws of the Reich and was responsible for the budget, questions of war and peace, and confirmation of state treaties. Oversight of the Reich government (the ministers responsible for executing the laws) also resided with the Reichstag. It could force individual ministers or the entire government to resign by means of a vote of no confidence, and under Article 48 of the constitution[213] it could rescind emergency decrees issued by the Reich president. The Reich president could dissolve the Reichstag under Article 25 of the constitution, but only once for the same reason.[213]
President and chancellor
[edit]The president appointed the chancellor and, at his recommendation, appointed and dismissed members of the cabinet as well. It was also necessary for the cabinet to have the confidence of the Reichstag (parliament) because it could be removed by a vote of no confidence.[214] All bills had to receive the signature of the president to become law and, although he did not have an absolute veto on legislation, he could insist that a law be submitted for the approval of voters in a referendum. The president had the authority to dissolve the Reichstag, conduct foreign affairs, and had command the armed forces. Article 48 of the constitution provided the president sweeping powers in the event of a crisis. If there was a threat to "public order and security", he could, with the co-signature of the chancellor (per article 50), suspend civil rights and legislate by decree.[215]
The chancellor had the prerogative to determine the policy direction of government. In reality this power was limited by the needs of coalition governments of the major political parties (and numerous smaller minor ones) plus the powers of the Reich president. Cabinet decisions were taken by majority vote.
Voting
[edit]Voting was by universal, equal, secret and direct suffrage, using a system of party-list proportional representation. All citizens who had reached the age of 20 were allowed to vote, including women for the first time, but excluding soldiers on active duty.[216]
States
[edit]Prior to the First World War, the constituent states of the German Empire were 22 monarchies, three republican city-states, and the Imperial Territory of Alsace–Lorraine. As a result of the Treaty of Versailles, Alsace–Lorraine was returned to France. All the other states continued as federal states of the new Republic. The Thuringian states merged to form the state of Thuringia in 1920, except for Saxe-Coburg, which became part of Bavaria.
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The states were gradually abolished under the Nazi regime via the Gleichschaltung process, whereby they were effectively replaced by Gaue. There were two notable de jure changes, however. At the end of 1933, Mecklenburg-Strelitz was merged with Mecklenburg-Schwerin to form a united Mecklenburg. Second, in April 1937, the city-state of Lübeck was formally incorporated into Prussia by the Greater Hamburg Act. Most of the remaining states, notably Prussia (see Abolition of Prussia) were formally dissolved by the Allies at the end of the Second World War and ultimately reorganized into the modern states of Germany.
See also
[edit]References
[edit]Explanatory notes
[edit]- ^ Kaliningrad Oblast
- ^ Parts of Klaipėda County and Tauragė County
- ^ Duivelsberg
- ^ German: Weimarer Republik, [ˈvaɪmaʁɐ ʁepuˈbliːk] ⓘ
- ^ German: Deutsches Reich, lit. 'German Realm'
- ^ German: Deutsche Republik
- ^ While Germany fulfilled most of its treaty obligations, it never completely disarmed, and paid only a small portion of war reparations (by twice restructuring its debt through the Dawes Plan and the Young Plan).
- ^ During the time of the Weimar Republic, terms such as People's Republic and People's State were used by republican movements across the political spectrum. It was only during and after World War II that such terminology became more specifically associated with socialist and Communist regimes.
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- ^ "The Treaties". Time. 2 November 1925. Retrieved 20 May 2023.
- ^ "Dawes Plan". encyclopedia.com. 8 June 2018. Retrieved 22 May 2023.
- ^ Whiting, Kenneth R. (1978). The Development of the Soviet Armed Forces, 1917–1977. Montgomery, AL: Air University. pp. 21 f.
- ^ Kolb, Eberhard (2009). Die Weimarer Republik (in German) (7 ed.). Munich: Oldenbourg. pp. 70 f.
- ^ Kolb 2009, p. 122.
- ^ "Josephine Baker in Berlin". Cabaret Berlin – Exploring the entertainment of the Weimar era. 8 December 2010. Archived from the original on 30 May 2020. Retrieved 11 June 2011.
- ^ Delmer, Sefton (1972). Weimar Germany: Democracy on Trial. London: Macdonald. pp. 82–93.
- ^ a b Durick, William Gerard (1984). TO THE BERLIN GAMES: THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT IN GERMANY FROM 1896-1936 (PDF). University of Northern Texas.
- ^ Fisk, Otis H. (1924). Germany's Constitutions of 1871 and 1919: Texts. Cincinnati: Court index Press. pp. 177–178.
- ^ "Volume 6. Weimar Germany, 1918/19–1933: Population by Religious Denomination (1910-1939)" (PDF). German History in Documents and Images. Retrieved 24 August 2025.
- ^ Toland, John (1976). Adolf Hitler. New York: Ballantine. p. 101. ISBN 0-345-25899-1.
- ^ Linder, Marc; Nygaard, Ingrid (1 January 1998). "Rest in the Rest of the World". Iowa Research Online (PDF). College of Law Publications, University of Iowa. p. 117. Archived from the original on 23 June 2020. Retrieved 22 June 2020.
- ^ Wunderlich, Frieda (1961). Farm Labor in Germany, 1810–1945. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. p. 126. ISBN 978-0-691-04126-1.
{{cite book}}: ISBN / Date incompatibility (help) - ^ Full text of "Labour Under Nazi Rule". Oxford At The Clarendon Press.
- ^ Companje, Karel-Peter; Veraghtert, Karel; Widdershoven, Brigitte (2009). Two Centuries of Solidarity. Amsterdam University Press. ISBN 978-90-5260-344-5.
- ^ Constantine, Simon (2007). Social Relations in the Estate Villages of Mecklenburg c. 1880–1924. Ashgate Publishing. ISBN 978-0-7546-5503-9.
- ^ a b Bärnighausen, Till; Sauerborn, Rainer (2002). "One hundred and eighteen years of the German health insurance system: are there any lessons for middle- and low-income countries?". Social Science & Medicine. 54 (10): 1559–1587. doi:10.1016/s0277-9536(01)00137-x. PMID 12061488. Archived from the original (PDF) on 15 May 2020. Retrieved 30 June 2014.
- ^ Industrial and Labour Information, Volume 20, International Labour Office, 1926
- ^ Modern Germany: society, economy and politics in the twentieth century by Volker R. Berghahn
- ^ Hagemann, Gro, ed. (2007). Reciprocity and Redistribution Work and Welfare Reconsidered. Pisa, Italy: Plus-Pisa University Press. pp. 94–95. ISBN 978-8-884-92465-0.
- ^ Yuthayotin, Sutatip (2014). Access to Justice in Transnational B2C E-Commerce. A Multidimensional Analysis of Consumer Protection Mechanisms. New York: Springer International Publishing. p. 41. ISBN 978-3-319-11131-5.
- ^ Parsson, Jens O. (2011). Dying of Money. Indianapolis, Indiana: Dog Ear Publishing, LLC. p. 39. ISBN 978-1-4575-0266-8.
- ^ Berghoff, Hartmut; Spiekermann, Uwe, eds. (2012). Decoding Modern Consumer Societies. London, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 132. ISBN 978-1-137-01300-2.
- ^ American Journal of Care for Cripples, Volume 8, Douglas C. McMurtrie, 1919
- ^ Hong, Young-Sun (1998). Welfare, Modernity, and the Weimar State, 1919–1933. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-05793-1.
- ^ Wollmann, Hellmut; Marcou, Gérard (2010). The Provision of Public Services in Europe. Edward Elgar. ISBN 978-1-84980-722-7.
- ^ Flora, Peter (1986). Growth to Limits: Germany, United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy. Walter de Gruyter. ISBN 978-3-11-011131-6. Archived from the original on 2 February 2023. Retrieved 21 October 2020.
- ^ Feldman, Gerald D. (1997). The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics, and Society in the German Inflation, 1914–1924. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-988019-5. Archived from the original on 2 February 2023. Retrieved 21 October 2020.
- ^ a b AQA History: The Development of Germany, 1871–1925 by Sally Waller
- ^ Social Security Policies in Industrial Countries A Comparative Analysis By Margaret S. Gordon, 1988, P.136
- ^ Cornelissen, Christoph (2024). Europe in the Long Twentieth Century. A Transnational History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 112. ISBN 978-0-192-69923-7.
- ^ Henig 2002, p. 48.
- ^ A Brief History of the German Trade Unions by Michael Schneider, Translated by Barrie Selman, Verlag J.H.W. Dietz Nachf. GmbH, English Translation 1991, P.165
- ^ Llewellyn, Jennifer; Thompson, Steve (9 October 2019). "The Great Depression in Germany". Alpha History. Retrieved 15 June 2023.
- ^ "Unemployment in Nazi Germany". Spartacus Educational. Archived from the original on 1 May 2017. Retrieved 1 March 2017.
- ^ "Reichstagswahl 1930" [Reichstag Election 1930]. gonschior.de (in German). Retrieved 8 July 2024.
- ^ "The end of the Weimar Republic". Britannica online. 21 June 2024. Retrieved 8 July 2024.
- ^ Vogt, Martin (1997). "Müller (-Franken), Hermann". Neue Deutsche Biographie 18 (1997), [Online-Version]. pp. 410–414. Retrieved 8 July 2024.
- ^ Morsey, Rudolf (26 October 2010). "Heinrich Brüning". Internet-Portal Westfälische Geschichte (in German). Retrieved 15 June 2023.
- ^ "Reichstagswahl 1930" [Reichstag Election 1930]. gonschior.de (in German). Retrieved 15 June 2023.
- ^ Wisch, Fritz-Helmut; Martin, Paul; Martinson, Marianne; Schruth, Peter (2006). Europäische Probleme und Sozialpolitik [European Problems and Social Policies] (in German). Berlin: Frank & Timme. p. 151. ISBN 978-3-86596-031-3.
- ^ Grevelhörster, Ludger (2000). Kleine Geschichte der Weimarer Republik 1918–1933 [A Brief History of the Weimar Republic 1918–1933] (in German). Münster: Aschendorff. p. 172. ISBN 978-3-402-05363-8.
- ^ Sturm, Reinhard (23 December 2011). "Zerstörung der Demokratie 1930–1932: Regierung von Papen" [Destruction of the Democracy 1930–1932: The von Papen Government]. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (in German). Retrieved 12 July 2023.
- ^ "Franz von Papen". Britannica online. 12 January 2000. Retrieved 1 July 2023.
- ^ Hauner, Milan (2005). Hitler. A Chronology of His Life and Time. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. p. 81. ISBN 978-0230584495.
- ^ Schulze, Hagen (2001). Germany: A New History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. pp. 241–243. ISBN 978-0674005457.
- ^ Turner, Henry Ashby (1996). Hitler's Thirty Days to Power: January 1933. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley. p. 8. ISBN 9780201407143.
- ^ Dorpalen, Andreas [in German] (1964). Hindenburg and the Weimar Republic. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. p. 362. ISBN 978-0-691-05126-0.
{{cite book}}: ISBN / Date incompatibility (help) - ^ Evans, Richard J. (2004). The Coming of the Third Reich. New York: The Penguin Press. p. 446. ISBN 1-59420-004-1.
- ^ Pyta, Wolfram (2007). "Schleicher, Kurt von". Neue Deutsche Biographie 23. pp. 50–52 [Online-Version]. Retrieved 10 July 2024.
- ^ Neumann, Klaus (1991). "Franz von Papen". Internet-Portal Westfälische Geschichte (in German). Retrieved 17 July 2023.
- ^ Turner 1996, p. 28.
- ^ Turner 1996, p. 133.
- ^ Turner 1996, p. 103.
- ^ Turner 1996, p. 94.
- ^ Turner 1996, pp. 131–132.
- ^ Turner 1996, p. 148.
- ^ Turner 1996, pp. 148–150.
- ^ Scriba, Arnulf (8 September 2014). "Die Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD)" [The Communist Party of Germany]. Deutsches Historisches Museum (in German). Retrieved 12 July 2024.
- ^ Mommsen, Hans (1996). The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy. Translated by Forster, Elborg; Jones, Larry Eugene. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. p. 542. ISBN 978-0-807-82249-4.
- ^ "Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of the People and State ("Reichstag Fire Decree") (February 28, 1933)". German History in Documents and Images (GHDI). Retrieved 12 July 2024.
- ^ "Das Deutsche Reich. Reichstagswahl 1933" [The German Reich. Election Results 1933]. gonschior.de (in German). Retrieved 14 July 2024.
- ^ Pinfield, Nick (2015). A/AS Level History for AQA Democracy and Nazism: Germany, 1918–1945 Student Book. Oxford: Cambridge University Press. p. 98.
- ^ a b c "The Reichstag fire and the Enabling Act". Encyclopedia Britannica. 26 April 2024. Retrieved 15 July 2024.
- ^ Edinger, Lewis J. (April 1953). "German Social Democracy and Hitler's 'National Revolution' of 1933: A Study in Democratic Leadership". World Politics. 5 (3): 330–367. doi:10.2307/2009137. ISSN 1086-3338. JSTOR 2009137. S2CID 153745010.
- ^ "Ministry of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment". Holocaust Encyclopedia. Retrieved 16 July 2024.
- ^ "National Socialism (1933 – 1945)". Deutscher Bundestag. Retrieved 16 July 2024.
- ^ Wiik, Astrid (June 2017). "Weimar Constitution (1919)". Oxford Constitutional Law. Retrieved 16 July 2024.
- ^ ""Scheinparlamentarismus" in der NS-Zeit" [Pseudo-Parliamentarism in the Nazi Era] (PDF). Deutscher Bundestag (in German). Retrieved 16 July 2024.
- ^ "Vor 75 Jahren wurde der Reichsrat aufgelöst" [75 Years Ago the Reichsrat Was Dissolved]. Der Bundesrat (in German). 3 March 2009. Retrieved 16 July 2024.
- ^ "The "Enabling Act" (March 24, 1933)". German History in Documents and Images (GHDI). Retrieved 16 July 2024.
- ^ "Gesetz über das Staatsoberhaupt des Deutschen Reichs. Vom 1. August 1934" [Law Concerning the Head of State of the German Reich. From 1 August 1934]. documentArchiv.de (in German). Retrieved 16 July 2024.
- ^ "Gesetz über das Staatsoberhaupt des Deutschen Reichs und Erlaß des Reichskanzlers zum Vollzug des Gesetzes über das Staatsoberhaupt des Deutschen Reichs vom 1. August 1934, 1. und 2. August 1934" [Law on the Head of State of the German Empire and Decree of the Chancellor on the Implementation of the Law on the Head of State of the German Empire of 1 August 1934, 1 and 2 August 1934]. 100(0) Schlüsseldokumente zur deutschen Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert (in German). Retrieved 17 July 2024.
- ^ Primoratz, Igor (2008). Patriotism: Philosophical and Political Perspectives. Routledge. p. 98. ISBN 978-0-7546-7122-0. Archived from the original on 2 February 2023. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
- ^ a b Ziblatt, Daniel (2017). Conservative Parties and the Birth of Democracy. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521172998.
- ^ a b Weitz, Eric D. (2018). Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy, Weimar Centennial Edition. Princeton University Press.
- ^ "German Vampire Notes". PMGNotes.com. 16 April 2019. Archived from the original on 14 January 2023. Retrieved 1 May 2019.
- ^ James, Harold, "Economic Reasons for the Collapse of the Weimar Republic", in Kershaw 1990, pp. 30–57
- ^ Thompson, Carol (June 1944). "Weimar in Retrospect". Current History. 6 (34): 499. doi:10.1525/curh.1944.6.34.497.
- ^ – via Wikisource.
- ^ Barth, Rüdiger; Friederichs, Hauke (2020). The Last Winter of the Weimar Republic: The Rise of the Third Reich. Pegasus Books.
- ^ Shirer, William L. (1960). The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. Simon & Schuster. p. 186. ISBN 9780795317002.
{{cite book}}: ISBN / Date incompatibility (help) - ^ Wheeler-Bennett, Sir John (1964). The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics, 1918–1945. Viking Press. p. 208. Archived from the original on 2 February 2023. Retrieved 19 June 2022.
- ^ Schmitz-Berning, Cornelia (2010). Vokabular des Nationalsozialismus (in German). De Gruyter. pp. 597–598. ISBN 978-3-11-092864-8. Archived from the original on 2 February 2023. Retrieved 14 October 2022.
- ^ Wires, Richard (1985). Terminology of the Third Reich. Ball State University. p. 44. LCCN 85047938.
- ^ Robert, Gerwarth (6 February 2021). "Weimar's Lessons for Biden's America". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 14 August 2023.
- ^ Shen, Yu-Chung (2011). "Semi- Presidentialism in the Weimar Republic: A Failed Attempt at Democracy". In Moestrup, Sophia; Elgie, Robert; Wu, Yu-shan (eds.). Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 229. ISBN 978-0-230-24292-0.
- ^ Berentsen, William H. (18 September 1998). "The Weimar constitution". Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved 25 August 2025.
- ^ "Vor 90 Jahren: Auflösung des Reichsrates" [90 Years Ago: Dissolution of the Reichsrat]. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (in German). 14 February 2024. Retrieved 25 August 2025.
- ^ a b – via Wikisource.
- ^ Poll, Robert (May 2020). "The Weimar Constitution". Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Retrieved 6 November 2024.
- ^ "Article 48". Holocaust Encyclopedia. Retrieved 6 November 2024.
- ^ "Weimarer Republik: Parteien, Wahlen und Wahlrecht" [Weimar Republic: Parties, Elections and Suffrage]. Lebendiges Museum Online (in German). Retrieved 2 October 2022.
General and cited sources
[edit]- Henig, Ruth (2002). The Weimar Republic 1919–1933 (eBook ed.). Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203046234. ISBN 978-0-203-04623-4.
- Kershaw, Ian (1990). Weimar: Why Did German Democracy Fail?. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ISBN 0-312-04470-4.
- Kershaw, Ian (1998). Hitler 1889–1936: Hubris. London: Allen Lane. ISBN 0-393-04671-0.
- Thoss, Bruno (1994). "Der Erste Weltkrieg als Ereignis und Erlebnis. Paradigmenwechsel in der westdeutschen Weltkriegsforschung seit der Fischer-Kontroverse" [The First World War as event and experience. Paradigm Shift in West German World War Research since the Fischer Controversy]. In Michalka, Wolfgang (ed.). Der Erste Weltkrieg: Wirkung, Wahrnehmung, Analyse [The First World War: impact, awareness, analysis]. Piper Series (in German). Munich: Piper. ISBN 978-3-492-11927-6. OCLC 906656746.
- Traverso, Enzo (7 February 2017) [1st pub. Stock (2007)]. Fire and Blood: The European Civil War, 1914–1945. London: Verso. ISBN 978-1-78478-136-1. OCLC 999636811.
Further reading
[edit]- Allen, William Sheridan (1984). The Nazi seizure of Power: the experience of a single German town, 1922–1945. New York, Toronto: F. Watts. ISBN 0-531-09935-0.
- Bennett, Edward W. Germany and the diplomacy of the financial crisis, 1931 (1962) Online free to borrow.
- Berghahn, V. R. (1982). Modern Germany. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-34748-3.
- Bingham, John (2014). Weimar Cities: The Challenge of Urban Modernity in Germany, 1919–1933. London: Routledge.
- Bookbinder, Paul (1996). Weimar Germany: the Republic of the Reasonable. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. ISBN 0-7190-4286-0.
- Broszat, Martin (1987). Hitler and the Collapse of Weimar Germany. Leamington Spa, New York: Berg and St. Martin's Press. ISBN 0-85496-509-2.
- Childers, Thomas (1983). The Nazi Voter: The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919–1933. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. ISBN 0-8078-1570-5.
- Craig, Gordon A. (1980). Germany 1866–1945 (Oxford History of Modern Europe). Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-502724-8.
- Dorpalen, Andreas [in German] (1964). Hindenburg and the Weimar Republic. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. online free to borrow
- Eschenburg, Theodor (1972). Holborn, Hajo (ed.). The Role of the Personality in the Crisis of the Weimar Republic: Hindenburg, Brüning, Groener, Schleicher. New York:=: Pantheon Books. pp. 3–50, Republic to Reich The Making of the Nazi Revolution.
- Evans, Richard J. The Coming of the Third Reich (2003), a standard scholarly survey; part of three volume history 1919–1945.
- Eyck, Erich. A history of the Weimar Republic: v. 1. From the collapse of the Empire to Hindenburg's election. (1962)online free to borrow
- Feuchtwanger, Edgar (1993). From Weimar to Hitler: Germany, 1918–1933. London: Macmillan. ISBN 0-333-27466-0.
- Gay, Peter (1968). Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider. New York: Harper & Row.
- Gordon, Mel (2000). Voluptuous Panic: The Erotic World of Weimar Berlin. New York: Feral House.
- Halperin, S. William. Germany Tried Democracy: A Political History of the Reich from 1918 to 1933 (1946) online.
- Hamilton, Richard F. (1982). Who Voted for Hitler?. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-09395-4.
- Harman, Chris (1982). The Lost Revolution: Germany 1918–1923. Bookmarks. ISBN 0-906224-08-X.
- Hett, Benjamin Carter (2018). The Death of Democracy: Hitler's Rise to Power and the Downfall of the Weimar Republic. Henry Holt & Company.
- James, Harold (1986). The German Slump: Politics and Economics, 1924–1936. Oxford, Oxfordshire: Clarendon Press. ISBN 0-19-821972-5.
- Kaes, Anton; Jay, Martin; Dimendberg, Edward, eds. (1994). The Weimar Republic Sourcebook. Berkeley: University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-06774-6.
- Kolb, Eberhard (1988). The Weimar Republic. P.S. Falla (translator). London: Unwin Hyman.
- Lee, Stephen J. (1998). The Weimar Republic. Routledge. p. 144.
- McDonough, Frank (2023). The Weimar Years: Rise and Fall 1918–1933. London: Apollo. ISBN 9781803284781.
- McElligott, Anthony, ed. (2009). Weimar Germany. Oxford University Press.
- Mommsen, Hans (1991). From Weimar to Auschwitz. Philip O'Connor (translator). Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-03198-3.
- Nicholls, Anthony James (2000). Weimar and the Rise of Hitler. New York: St. Martin's Press. ISBN 0-312-23350-7.
- Niewyk, Donald L. (1980). The Jews in Weimar Germany. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press. ISBN 9780807106617.
- Peukert, Detlev (1992). The Weimar Republic: the Crisis of Classical Modernity. New York: Hill and Wang. ISBN 0-8090-9674-9.
- Rosenberg, Arthur. A History of the German Republic (1936) 370pp online
- Smith, Helmut Walser, ed. (2011). The Oxford Handbook of Modern German History. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-872891-7. ch 18–25.
- Turner, Henry Ashby (1996). Hitler's Thirty Days To Power: January 1933. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. ISBN 0-201-40714-0.
- Turner, Henry Ashby (1985). German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-503492-9.
- Weitz, Eric D. (2007). Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-01695-5.
- Wheeler-Bennett, John (2005). The Nemesis of Power: German Army in Politics, 1918–1945. New York: Palgrave Macmillan Publishing Company. ISBN 1-4039-1812-0.
- Wheeler-Bennett, Sir John (1967) [1936]. Hindenburg: the Wooden Titan. London: Macmillan.
- Widdig, Bernd (2001). Culture and Inflation in Weimar Germany. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-22290-8.
- Willett, John (1978). The New Sobriety 1917–1933: Art and Politics in the Weimar Period. London: Thames & Hudson. ISBN 978-0-500-27172-8.
Primary sources
[edit]- Boyd, Julia (2018). Travelers in the Third Reich: The Rise of Fascism: 1919–1945. Pegasus Books. ISBN 978-1-68177-782-5.
- Kaes, Anton, Martin Jay and Edward Dimendberg, eds. The Weimar Republic Sourcebook,(U of California Press, 1994).
- Price, Morgan Philips. Dispatches from the Weimar Republic: Versailles and German Fascism (1999), reporting by an English journalist
Historiography
[edit]- Bryden, Eric Jefferson. "In search of founding fathers: Republican historical narratives in Weimar Germany, 1918–1933" (PhD thesis. University of California, Davis, 2008).
- Fritzsche, Peter (1996). "Did Weimar Fail?". The Journal of Modern History. 68 (3): 629–656. doi:10.1086/245345. JSTOR 2946770. S2CID 39454890.
- Gerwarth, Robert. "The past in Weimar History" Contemporary European History 15#1 (2006), pp. 1–22 online
- Graf, Rüdiger. "Either-or: The narrative of 'crisis' in Weimar Germany and in historiography." Central European History 43.4 (2010): 592–615. online
- Haffert, Lukas, Nils Redeker, and Tobias Rommel. "Misremembering Weimar: Hyperinflation, the Great Depression, and German collective economic memory." Economics & Politics 33.3 (2021): 664–686. online
- Von der Goltz, Anna. Hindenburg: Power, Myth, and the Rise of the Nazis (Oxford University Press, 2009)
External links
[edit]Weimar Republic
View on GrokipediaThe Weimar Republic was the parliamentary democracy governing Germany from 1919 to 1933, established after the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II amid the German Revolution of 1918–1919 and defeat in World War I, with its constitution drafted by a national assembly convened in the city of Weimar to avoid unrest in Berlin.[1][2] The Weimar Constitution of 11 August 1919 created a federal republic with a directly elected president, bicameral legislature, and proportional representation for the Reichstag, granting universal suffrage to men and women over age 20 while including emergency provisions like Article 48 that allowed the president to rule by decree in crises.[3][4] This system faced immediate challenges from the punitive Treaty of Versailles, which imposed territorial losses, military restrictions, and reparations totaling 132 billion gold marks, straining the economy and fueling resentment among nationalists who viewed the republican leaders as traitors for accepting the terms without resistance.[5] Economic mismanagement compounded these pressures, culminating in hyperinflation during 1922–1923 when the government printed excessive currency to finance deficits, war debts, and passive resistance against the French-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr industrial region, eroding savings and middle-class stability as prices doubled every few days by late 1923.[6][5] Political fragmentation arose from the proportional electoral system, producing dozens of parties and unstable coalitions prone to collapse, alongside paramilitary violence from both communist groups seeking Soviet-style revolution and right-wing nationalists opposing the republic's perceived weakness.[2][7] A brief stabilization occurred in the mid-1920s through currency reform introducing the Rentenmark, U.S. loans via the Dawes Plan, and diplomatic efforts like the Locarno Treaties, fostering cultural innovation in arts and sciences amid urban decadence in Berlin.[1] However, the Wall Street Crash of 1929 triggered mass unemployment exceeding 30 percent by 1932, radicalizing voters toward extremes and enabling the Nazi Party's electoral gains from under 3 percent in 1928 to over 37 percent in 1932, as conservative elites, including President Paul von Hindenburg, appointed Adolf Hitler chancellor on 30 January 1933 to harness nationalist momentum against left-wing threats, marking the republic's effective end through subsequent dictatorial consolidation.[1][7][8]
Origins and Establishment
Pre-Weimar Context and Armistice
The German Empire, established in 1871 under Kaiser Wilhelm II, entered World War I in August 1914 following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, mobilizing its forces for a two-front war against France and Russia. Initial advances, including the Schlieffen Plan's near-capture of Paris, stalled into trench warfare by late 1914, with the Western Front marked by attrition battles like Verdun (1916) and the Somme (1916), resulting in over 2 million German casualties by mid-1918.[9] The British naval blockade, enforced since 1914, severely restricted food and raw material imports, leading to widespread malnutrition; by winter 1916–1917, known as the "Turnip Winter," civilian rations fell to about 1,000 calories daily, exacerbated by a poor harvest and Allied submarine countermeasures.[10] Labor shortages from conscription forced reliance on women and prisoners, while inflation eroded wages, fueling strikes such as the January 1918 Berlin walkout involving 400,000 workers demanding peace.[9] Militarily, Germany's Spring Offensive in March 1918, aimed at defeating France before anticipated U.S. reinforcements arrived, initially gained 40 miles but collapsed by July due to exhausted reserves and Allied counterattacks; the Hundred Days Offensive, starting August 8, saw British, French, and American forces advance rapidly, capturing 140,000 German prisoners and shattering morale, with desertions reaching 1 million by November.[11] The High Command, led by Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, admitted defeat on September 29, 1918, urging civilian leaders to seek an armistice based on U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points to avoid blame for the loss.[12] Prince Max von Baden formed a parliamentary government on October 3, 1918, including Social Democrats, to negotiate peace, but naval mutinies in Kiel from October 29 sparked widespread unrest.[13] Facing revolutionary pressure, Max von Baden announced Kaiser Wilhelm II's abdication on November 9, 1918, though the emperor initially resisted from army headquarters in Spa, Belgium; Wilhelm formally abdicated the Prussian and imperial thrones on November 28, fleeing to neutral Netherlands.[14] Armistice talks began October 8, with German delegates, including Matthias Erzberger, meeting Allied Supreme Commander Ferdinand Foch in Compiègne Forest; terms demanded immediate evacuation of Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine within 15 days, surrender of 5,000 guns, 25,000 machine guns, 1,700 aircraft, all submarines, and 10 battleships, plus Allied occupation of Rhine bridgeheads.[15] The armistice was signed at 5:00 a.m. on November 11, 1918, effective at 11:00 a.m., halting hostilities but imposing harsh conditions that preserved German military capacity short-term while exposing the empire's collapse.[16]November Revolution and Socialist Uprisings
The November Revolution commenced on October 29, 1918, when sailors of the German High Seas Fleet in Kiel refused orders from the Admiralty to sortie for a final, likely suicidal confrontation with the British Royal Navy, amid widespread war fatigue, food shortages, and awareness of the impending defeat.[17] The mutiny rapidly escalated as soldiers and workers joined, forming soldiers' and workers' councils modeled after Russian soviets; by November 3, revolutionary councils controlled Kiel and several northern ports, with strikes paralyzing major cities including Hamburg, Bremen, and Brunswick.[18] General strikes spread across industrial centers, demanding the end of the war, demobilization, and political reforms, effectively undermining the Imperial government's authority.[19] On November 9, 1918, amid revolutionary fervor in Berlin, Social Democratic Party (SPD) leader Philipp Scheidemann proclaimed the establishment of a German Republic from a Reichstag balcony to forestall a more radical takeover by communists, who two hours later saw Karl Liebknecht declare a "free socialist republic" from the Berlin Palace.[20] Concurrently, Chancellor Prince Max von Baden announced Kaiser Wilhelm II's abdication—without the monarch's consent—and resigned, handing power to SPD chairman Friedrich Ebert, who formed a provisional Council of People's Deputies comprising SPD and Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD) members to govern and organize elections.[21] Wilhelm II fled to exile in the Netherlands that day, marking the collapse of the German Empire after 47 years.[19] The revolution's spontaneous nature, driven by military collapse rather than coordinated ideology, resulted in a fragile parliamentary framework, as Ebert prioritized stability by cooperating with the old officer corps against radical elements.[21] Subsequent socialist uprisings challenged the provisional government's authority, reflecting divisions between moderate socialists favoring democracy and radicals seeking a soviet-style dictatorship of the proletariat. In late December 1918, the "Christmas Crisis" erupted over disputes regarding demobilized sailors' pay, culminating in clashes that killed 67 people and highlighted tensions between the People's Navy Division and government forces.[21] The most prominent radical action was the Spartacist Uprising from January 5 to 12, 1919, when the Spartacus League—led by Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg—called for a general strike in Berlin after the dismissal of leftist police chief Emil Eichhorn, mobilizing around 100,000 demonstrators and seizing buildings in an attempt to overthrow the Ebert government.[22] Defense Minister Gustav Noske deployed Freikorps paramilitary units, which crushed the poorly organized revolt within a week, resulting in hundreds of deaths; on January 15, Freikorps troops arrested and murdered Liebknecht and Luxemburg, disposing of their bodies in a canal.[23] These suppressions, while restoring order, deepened left-wing grievances and contributed to the polarization that undermined the nascent republic's legitimacy among workers.[22]National Assembly and Constitution Drafting
Elections for the National Assembly, tasked with drafting a new constitution, occurred on January 19, 1919, with voting rights extended to women for the first time and members of the standing army in the east participating on February 2.[24] The Social Democratic Party (SPD) secured the largest share with 37.9% of the vote, translating to 165 seats, while the Centre Party obtained 19.7% and 91 seats, and the German Democratic Party (DDP) 5.6% and 75 seats; these three parties, often viewed as supportive of the war effort, formed a majority committed to parliamentary democracy over radical socialist upheaval.[24][25] Owing to ongoing political instability and violence in Berlin from the November Revolution, including Spartacist uprisings, the Assembly convened instead in the quieter city of Weimar on February 6, 1919, where it functioned as an interim legislature to enact urgent laws alongside its constitutional mandate.[26][27] Provisional President Friedrich Ebert opened the session, emphasizing the need for a stable democratic framework to restore order and negotiate the Treaty of Versailles.[25] The drafting process began with an initial proposal by Hugo Preuss, a liberal jurist appointed by Ebert in November 1918, who envisioned a federal parliamentary republic modeled partly on the U.S. system, incorporating proportional representation, universal suffrage, and fundamental rights while centralizing authority to prevent fragmentation amid Bavaria's separatist tendencies.[28][29] A 28-member constitutional committee, dominated by SPD, Centre, and DDP delegates, revised Preuss's draft through debates that addressed federalism, executive powers, and civil liberties, though sessions in July 1919 proceeded rapidly with limited public input and concessions to conservative demands for a strong presidency via Article 48 emergency provisions.[27] The Assembly approved the final constitution on July 31, 1919, after incorporating amendments to balance democratic ideals with mechanisms for stability, such as the Reichstag's legislative primacy subject to presidential veto and dissolution powers.[30] Ebert signed it into law on August 11, 1919, effective from August 14, establishing the Weimar Republic's framework despite criticisms from both radical leftists, who decried insufficient socialization of industry, and nationalists, who opposed its perceived weakness against Versailles impositions.[32] The document's 181 articles enshrined principles like equality before the law and freedom of expression but sowed seeds of instability through proportional representation's fragmentation and the president's outsized authority, as later exploited in crises.[29]Governmental Institutions
Executive Powers and Presidential Role
The executive branch of the Weimar Republic operated under a semi-presidential framework established by the Weimar Constitution of 1919, featuring a president as head of state and a chancellor as head of government responsible to the Reichstag.[29] The president, titled Reichspräsident, was directly elected by universal suffrage for a seven-year term, serving as a stabilizing figure above party politics with authority to represent the Reich in foreign affairs, command the armed forces as supreme commander, and promulgate laws passed by the Reichstag.[33] [34] The president's powers extended to appointing and dismissing the chancellor and cabinet ministers without Reichstag approval, dissolving the Reichstag and calling new elections up to twice per term if no stable government formed, and vetoing legislation subject to Reichstag override by a two-thirds majority.[33] These provisions aimed to counterbalance parliamentary fragmentation but often resulted in presidential intervention during crises, as seen when President Paul von Hindenburg appointed chancellors like Heinrich Brüning in 1930 without majority support, leading to "presidential cabinets" that governed via decree rather than legislation. Article 48 granted the president sweeping emergency authority: if "public security and order within the territory of the Reich are seriously disturbed or endangered," the president could enact measures to restore order, including suspending civil liberties such as freedom of speech, assembly, and habeas corpus, deploying armed forces domestically, and issuing decrees with the force of law that bypassed the Reichstag, though the assembly retained the right to demand review and repeal by majority vote.[35] Invoked over 250 times between 1919 and 1933—136 by Friedrich Ebert against communist uprisings and right-wing putsches, and extensively by Hindenburg from 1930 onward to enact austerity amid economic collapse—this clause eroded democratic norms by enabling rule by fiat, with the Reichstag unable to consistently check abuses due to its internal divisions. [36] The chancellor's role, while nominally executive head, depended on presidential confidence and Reichstag investiture, rendering the system prone to instability when coalitions failed, as proportional representation amplified fragmentation and empowered the president's discretionary powers.[29] This structure, intended as a republican adaptation of monarchical stability, instead facilitated authoritarian drift, culminating in Hindenburg's use of Article 48 to appoint Adolf Hitler as chancellor on January 30, 1933, after which emergency powers were consolidated under Nazi control.Reichstag and Proportional Representation
The Reichstag constituted the primary legislative body of the Weimar Republic, responsible for passing legislation, approving the national budget, and holding the chancellor accountable through votes of confidence.[33] Elected for a four-year term under Article 23 of the Weimar Constitution, its sessions could be prematurely terminated by presidential decree, resulting in 11 elections between 1919 and 1932 amid recurrent political crises.[37] [33] Article 20 of the constitution mandated that Reichstag delegates be chosen through universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage by all German citizens aged 20 and older, applying the principle of proportional representation to ensure seats mirrored national vote shares.[38] The 1920 electoral law formalized a party-list system divided into 35 multi-member constituencies, where seats were allocated via the largest remainder method without a minimum vote threshold, allowing even fringe groups to gain representation if they surpassed local vote quotas.[39] [33] This system, intended to maximize democratic fidelity to voter preferences, instead fostered extreme fragmentation, with the number of represented parties ranging from 10 in early elections to over 30 by the early 1930s, as small ideological splinters routinely secured seats.[39] For instance, the January 1919 election produced 423 seats distributed among six major parties but also accommodated minor delegations, while the 1930 election yielded 577 seats across 14 parties, none holding a majority and compelling reliance on fragile coalitions.[33] [39] The lack of barriers to entry under proportional representation incentivized party proliferation, as evidenced by the splintering of centrist and left-wing blocs, which diluted moderate influence and prolonged negotiations for governing majorities—often exceeding months and averaging cabinet durations of under a year.[39] [33] Such instability, rooted in the system's mechanical encouragement of veto players over decisive action, eroded public confidence in parliamentary governance and facilitated the ascent of extremist movements capable of exploiting deadlock.[39]Federal Structure and State Autonomy
The Weimar Constitution of August 11, 1919, established the German Reich as a federal republic comprising seventeen states (Länder), including the dominant Free State of Prussia, the Kingdom of Bavaria, and smaller entities such as Saxony and Württemberg, each with their own constitutions, parliaments (Landtage), and governments.[29] This structure preserved regional identities and administrative autonomy, contrasting with proposals for full centralization while granting the Reich broader legislative authority than under the German Empire. Article 1 defined the Reich as an indivisible democratic federal state, with sovereignty residing in the people, while Article 3 affirmed the Länder' rights and obligations within the federation, allowing them to handle residual powers such as education, policing, municipal administration, and cultural affairs independently unless overridden by federal law (Article 5).[40] Powers were divided explicitly: the Reich held exclusive jurisdiction over foreign affairs, defense, citizenship, maritime and rail transport, postal services, and currency (Article 7), alongside concurrent authority in civil, criminal, and economic legislation, where federal uniformity superseded state variations (Article 8). The Länder executed Reich laws through their officials unless otherwise specified (Article 15), fostering a cooperative federalism but enabling central dominance in practice. Representation occurred via the Reichsrat, where states delegated envoys proportional to population—Prussia commanding about one-third of votes—requiring its involvement in bills affecting Länder competencies and granting suspensive vetoes, overridable by a two-thirds Reichstag majority (Article 60). This chamber ensured state input but highlighted Prussia's outsized influence, as it encompassed roughly 62 percent of the population (38 million of 62 million in 1925).[40][41] Autonomy faced limits during instability; Article 48 empowered the Reich President to compel state compliance with federal duties through administrative or military intervention (Reichsexekution) if a Land neglected constitutional obligations, as in October 1923 when federal forces ousted Saxony's Social Democratic-Communist coalition amid Ruhr crisis unrest and armed proletarian formations. Similar mechanisms applied to threats against public order, allowing temporary suspension of state authority. Bavaria exemplified resistance to erosion of autonomy, rejecting full republican symbols and central fiscal controls, while Prussia's Social Democratic-led governments bolstered national democratic stability despite its hegemonic position. Overall, the framework balanced decentralization with centralized safeguards, yet recurrent crises amplified federal incursions, straining state sovereignty.[40][42]Military Apparatus
Reichswehr Constraints under Versailles
The Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28, 1919, imposed stringent limitations on Germany's armed forces through Part V (Articles 159–213), aiming to prevent future aggression by capping personnel, prohibiting conscription, and restricting weaponry to defensive capabilities only.[43] These clauses transformed the Imperial German Army into the Reichswehr, a professional volunteer force reorganized under the Weimar Republic's Ministry of the Reichswehr, with total strength fixed at no more than 100,000 effectives by March 31, 1920, comprising seven infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions, including 4,000 officers and 86,000 other ranks.[44] Conscription was banned, requiring 12-year enlistments for other ranks and 25-year commissions for officers to maintain a long-service cadre without mass mobilization potential.[45] Equipment constraints further emasculated the Reichswehr's offensive capacity: heavy artillery exceeding 210mm caliber was prohibited, along with tanks, armored cars, military aircraft, submarines, and chemical or poison gas weapons, while infantry divisions were limited to 2,000 machine guns, 81mm trench mortars, and minimal field guns per unit.[45] The General Staff was formally dissolved to eliminate centralized war planning, replaced by ostensibly administrative "Truppenamt" structures that evaded the intent through covert coordination.[46] Ammunition stockpiles were capped at 8,000 rounds per heavy gun and 30,000 per field gun, with excess to be surrendered or destroyed under supervision.[44] Naval forces faced parallel disarmament, restricted to 15,000 personnel (1,500 officers) with no conscription and a fleet of six obsolete pre-dreadnought battleships (displacing no more than 10,000 tons each), six light cruisers under 6,000 tons, twelve 800-ton destroyers, and twelve torpedo boats, explicitly barring submarines and capital ship replacements beyond scrapping old vessels.[45] Aviation was outright banned for military or naval use, permitting only 100 unarmed seaplanes or flying boats until October 1, 1919, for coastal rescue operations, after which all air forces were to be dismantled.[43] The Rhineland and a 50-kilometer buffer zone were demilitarized, forbidding fortifications or troop concentrations west of the Rhine River.[47] Enforcement relied on the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission, which inspected German facilities from 1920 onward to verify compliance, though systematic violations emerged, such as clandestine training and equipment development disguised as civilian or foreign collaborations.[47] These constraints, justified by Allied powers as necessary for European security given Germany's pre-war militarism, nonetheless fostered perceptions of national humiliation, contributing to political instability in the Weimar era by undermining the Reichswehr's role as a unifying institution while incentivizing covert rearmament efforts.[45][46]Paramilitary Groups and Street Violence
The Freikorps, volunteer paramilitary units composed primarily of World War I veterans and demobilized soldiers, played a pivotal role in the early Weimar Republic by suppressing leftist uprisings on behalf of the provisional government. Formed in late 1918 amid revolutionary chaos, these groups numbered in the tens of thousands and were deployed against Spartacist revolts in Berlin and other cities, including the January 1919 clashes where at least 1,200 fatalities occurred over nine days of street fighting.[48] [49] While effective in restoring order—such as quelling the Bavarian Soviet Republic in April-May 1919—the Freikorps harbored strong nationalist and anti-republican sentiments, leading to their involvement in right-wing coups like the March 1920 Kapp Putsch, where Marine Brigade Ehrhardt marched on Berlin to overthrow the government.[50] Beyond the Freikorps, right-wing paramilitaries proliferated, including the Stahlhelm Bund der Frontsoldaten, a veterans' league that evolved into the largest such organization with approximately 500,000 members by 1930, often aligning with the German National People's Party and providing manpower for anti-republican agitation.[51] The Nazi Sturmabteilung (SA), or Brownshirts, emerged as a street-fighting force starting in 1921, growing to hundreds of thousands by the early 1930s and targeting perceived enemies through provocative marches and brawls. On the left, the Communist Party's Roter Frontkämpferbund (Red Front Fighters League), founded in 1924, mobilized workers for confrontations, escalating mutual hostilities with SA units in urban centers like Berlin and Hamburg.[52] Street violence intensified as economic distress deepened, with paramilitaries from both extremes clashing in daily skirmishes that eroded public order and the state's monopoly on force. From 1929 to mid-1931 alone, political altercations resulted in 155 deaths and 426 injuries, a sharp rise fueled by Nazi expansion and communist countermeasures in industrial areas.[53] In Prussia, the largest state, at least 105 individuals perished in such violence during the republic's final years, often amid rallies that devolved into baton charges, shootings, and ambushes by groups like the SA and Roter Frontkämpferbund.[54] This pattern of tit-for-tat aggression, unchecked by a constrained Reichswehr limited to 100,000 troops under the Treaty of Versailles, highlighted the republic's fragility, as paramilitaries not only defended ideological flanks but also intimidated opponents and voters, contributing to polarization without decisive state intervention.[55]Economic Trajectory
Reparations, War Debts, and Fiscal Strain
The Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28, 1919, obligated Germany to make reparations for civilian damages inflicted during World War I, as stipulated in Article 231, which attributed responsibility for the war's losses and costs to Germany and its allies.[56] In April 1921, the Inter-Allied Reparation Commission fixed the total liability at 132 billion gold Reichsmarks, equivalent to approximately $33 billion in contemporary United States dollars.[57] This figure encompassed not only direct war damages but also Allied veteran pensions and other obligations, divided into A and B bonds totaling 50 billion marks payable unconditionally, with the remainder (C bonds) contingent on economic recovery.[57] The London Schedule of Payments, agreed upon in May 1921, outlined the repayment terms, requiring an initial delivery of 20 billion gold marks within two years, including 5 billion by May 1921, followed by escalating annual installments funded through exports, taxes, and asset transfers.[58] Germany financed early payments partly through cash reserves, ship and train deliveries, and coal shipments, but these strained foreign exchange reserves and industrial output, as reparations demanded stable gold or foreign currencies amid domestic currency depreciation.[59] Compounding this, Germany's internal war debts had surged from 5.2 billion paper marks in 1914 to 105.3 billion by November 1918, primarily via war bonds and monetary expansion, leaving the new republic with massive domestic liabilities including pensions for war wounded, widows, and orphans.[60] Fiscal pressures intensified as reparations absorbed a significant portion of the budget without corresponding revenue increases, given territorial losses and export disruptions under Versailles restrictions.[59] By March 1921, the Reich faced an operating deficit of 6 billion gold marks, equivalent to about one-sixth of annual national income, prompting reliance on central bank advances that fueled inflation.[59] Germany's default on a 1 billion gold mark coal-equivalent installment in late 1922 triggered the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr on January 11, 1923, aimed at extracting industrial output directly.[61] The Cuno government's policy of passive resistance—subsidizing striking workers and idled industries—escalated expenditures by an estimated 40 million marks daily, deepening the budget crisis and accelerating money printing to cover deficits.[61] This interplay of external reparations demands and internal debt servicing eroded fiscal stability, setting the stage for monetary collapse.[62]Hyperinflation Mechanisms and Consequences
The hyperinflation crisis in the Weimar Republic stemmed primarily from the government's persistent monetization of fiscal deficits, exacerbated by the economic fallout from World War I reparations and the 1923 Ruhr occupation. Following the Treaty of Versailles, Germany faced substantial reparations payments, which strained the budget and led to deficits financed through Reichsbank note issuance rather than taxation or borrowing. This policy accelerated after January 1923, when France and Belgium occupied the Ruhr industrial region in response to delayed coal deliveries, prompting the Cuno government to fund worker strikes and passive resistance via printed currency, causing the money supply to surge exponentially.[63][64][65] By mid-1923, the annual inflation rate had escalated dramatically, with monthly rates reaching triple digits; in October 1923, state tax revenues covered only 1% of expenditures, the remainder funded by money creation. The peak occurred in November 1923, when the exchange rate hit approximately 4.2 trillion paper marks per U.S. dollar, rendering the Papiermark worthless and necessitating wheelbarrows of cash for basic transactions. This velocity of money circulation intensified the spiral, as public anticipation of further devaluation prompted rapid spending, outpacing production capacity constrained by wartime destruction and reparations-induced resource outflows.[66][6] Economically, hyperinflation obliterated private savings, particularly devastating fixed-income groups like pensioners and the middle class, while debtors benefited from nominal debt erosion; unemployment in regions like Prussia climbed from 3% in January to 27% by October 1923, reflecting disrupted production and wage chaos. Socially, it fueled widespread barter economies, malnutrition from price volatility, and a loss of trust in institutions, with urban families queuing for bread amid prices doubling daily. Politically, the crisis undermined the Weimar government's legitimacy, amplifying extremist appeals by portraying the republic as incompetent in managing fiscal discipline, though stabilization via the Rentenmark in late 1923 under Finance Minister Hans Luther halted the immediate spiral by tying currency to land assets.[67][6][63]Dawes Plan Stabilization and Fragile Prosperity
The Dawes Plan, formulated by a committee under American banker Charles G. Dawes and adopted in August 1924, restructured Germany's World War I reparations obligations to alleviate fiscal pressures following the hyperinflation crisis. It established a schedule of annual payments starting at 1 billion Reichsmarks in the first year, rising gradually to 2.5 billion by 1928 and beyond, with amounts tied to Germany's export performance to ensure feasibility. The plan also secured a foreign loan of approximately 800 million Reichsmarks (equivalent to $200 million), primarily from the United States, to stabilize the currency and fund budget balancing.[68][69] Implementation of the Dawes Plan facilitated the withdrawal of French and Belgian troops from the Ruhr industrial region by 1925, ending passive resistance and occupation-related disruptions that had exacerbated economic collapse. Under Chancellor Gustav Stresemann, the German government introduced fiscal reforms, including tax increases and expenditure cuts, complemented by the loan influx, which restored confidence in the Reichsmark and curbed residual inflationary tendencies after the Rentenmark's introduction in November 1923. Industrial production surged, reaching pre-war levels by 1927, while unemployment dropped from over 20% in 1923 to around 1.3 million by 1928, fostering a period of apparent recovery.[70][71] This stabilization ushered in the "Golden Twenties," marked by economic expansion, with gross national product growing by about 40% between 1924 and 1929, driven by foreign investment in infrastructure and industry. Cultural and artistic flourishing occurred alongside rising living standards for urban workers, though rural areas and small businesses lagged, with agricultural prices remaining depressed. However, prosperity proved fragile, reliant on short-term American loans totaling over 20 billion Reichsmarks by 1929, which financed consumption and speculation rather than sustainable investment, leaving the economy vulnerable to external shocks.[72][73] Underlying structural weaknesses persisted, including high welfare expenditures from the war and inflation era, chronic budget deficits, and uneven sectoral recovery, with heavy industry benefiting disproportionately while unemployment benefits strained public finances. The plan's success in resuming reparations—Germany paid 7.5 billion Reichsmarks by 1930—masked dependencies that unraveled with the 1929 Wall Street Crash, triggering capital flight and exposing the artificiality of the boom. Critics, including German nationalists, viewed the plan as a temporary capitulation that postponed rather than resolved reparations' causal burdens on the economy.[74][75]Depression Onset and Policy Responses
The Wall Street Crash of October 1929 triggered the Great Depression, which rapidly engulfed the Weimar Republic due to its heavy reliance on short-term foreign loans facilitated by the Dawes Plan.[76] American capital withdrawals led to a contraction in credit availability, causing German exports to plummet by approximately 8.3% of GDP and industrial production to fall sharply.[77] Overall GDP declined by 15.7% between 1929 and 1932, exacerbating fiscal strains from reparations and war debts.[78] Unemployment surged from around 1.3 to 1.5 million at the end of 1929 to 5 to 6 million by late 1932, representing nearly 30% of the workforce and overwhelming social welfare systems.[79][80] This crisis dismantled the fragile prosperity of the mid-1920s, as banks failed, businesses collapsed, and consumer demand evaporated, creating a vicious cycle of deflation and reduced investment.[76] Heinrich Brüning, appointed chancellor on March 30, 1930, responded with deflationary austerity measures enacted through presidential emergency decrees, bypassing a polarized Reichstag.[81] These included tax increases, sharp cuts to wages, pensions, and public spending—totaling reductions of up to 30% in civil servant salaries—and balanced budget mandates to demonstrate fiscal responsibility internationally.[82][83] Brüning's strategy aimed to induce deflation severe enough to compel Allied powers to suspend reparations payments under the Young Plan, while avoiding monetary expansion that risked reigniting hyperinflation.[84] However, these policies intensified the downturn: by prioritizing budget balancing over stimulus, they deepened deflation, further eroded purchasing power, and doubled unemployment in some estimates, alienating moderate support and fueling political extremism.[85][86] Brüning's reliance on Article 48 decrees—issuing five major ones between 1930 and 1932—undermined parliamentary legitimacy without resolving the crisis, as foreign loans did not materialize and domestic opposition grew.[82] Subsequent chancellors Franz von Papen (June 1932) and Kurt von Schleicher (December 1932) maintained similar orthodox approaches, including work creation schemes that proved inadequate, paving the way for the regime's collapse.[76][79]Political Dynamics
Coalition Fragility and Party Fragmentation
The Weimar Republic's electoral system, based on proportional representation as stipulated in the Weimar Constitution enacted on 11 August 1919, allocated Reichstag seats in direct proportion to parties' national vote shares, with a low threshold that facilitated the entry of numerous splinter groups.[33] [7] This mechanism, intended to reflect diverse voter preferences, instead produced chronic fragmentation, as no party ever secured an absolute majority of seats across the eight Reichstag elections held between 1919 and 1932.[39] In the January 1919 National Assembly election, for instance, the largest bloc—the Social Democratic Party (SPD) with 165 seats—still required alliances with the Catholic Centre Party and German Democratic Party (DDP) to form the initial "Weimar Coalition," which commanded 55.2% of votes but proved ideologically brittle over treaty ratification and economic policy disputes.[87] Subsequent elections exacerbated this division, with the proliferation of parties—often exceeding a dozen per contest—undermining stable majorities and compelling frequent, precarious coalitions.[7] The June 1920 election saw the SPD's share drop to 21.7% amid the rise of the Independent Social Democrats (USPD) and nationalists, forcing reliance on minority governments or ad hoc pacts that collapsed under pressure from reparations enforcement and inflation.[87] By the late 1920s, economic stabilization under the Dawes Plan temporarily bolstered centrist groupings, yet the SPD-led Grand Coalition under Hermann Müller (June 1928–March 1930) fractured over unemployment insurance amid the onset of depression, marking the last parliamentary majority cabinet.[88] Overall, the Republic endured 20 cabinets in 14 years, averaging under nine months each, as ideological rifts—spanning socialist-nationalist divides and agrarian-industrial conflicts—prompted repeated withdrawals and dissolutions.[89] The 1930 September election epitomized this volatility, yielding a Reichstag where the SPD held 143 seats (24.5% of votes), Nazis surged to 107 (18.3%), Communists to 77 (13.1%), and centrists splintered further, rendering coalition-building mathematically feasible only through untenable compromises that excluded extremists.[87] Presidential cabinets under Article 48 emergency powers, initiated by Heinrich Brüning from March 1930, bypassed Reichstag paralysis but eroded democratic legitimacy, as fragmented parties withheld support amid rising polarization.[90] This structural instability, rooted in the constitution's permissive list PR without effective thresholds until 1930 reforms proved too late, amplified governance paralysis during crises, as small parties wielded veto power disproportionate to their size.[39]| Election Date | Major Parties' Vote Shares (%) | Notes on Fragmentation |
|---|---|---|
| Jan 1919 | SPD: 37.9; Centre: 19.7; DNVP: 10.3 | Initial Weimar Coalition majority, but USPD split from SPD.[87] |
| Jun 1920 | SPD: 21.7; USPD: 17.9; Centre: 13.6 | Loss of SPD dominance; rise of extremes.[87] |
| May 1924 | SPD: 20.5; DNVP: 19.5; Centre: 13.4 | Hyperinflation aftermath; multiple bourgeois splinters.[87] |
| Sep 1930 | SPD: 24.5; NSDAP: 18.3; KPD: 13.1 | No viable center coalition; 14 parties represented.[87] |
Communist Threats and Spartacist Revolt
The Spartacus League, a radical socialist group opposing World War I and the Social Democratic Party's (SPD) war support, emerged from the International Group founded in August 1914 by Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, and others, evolving into the league by 1916 with goals of mass strikes to dismantle the capitalist state and establish workers' councils akin to Bolshevik models.[91] [92] Following the November 1918 German Revolution, the league agitated for a soviet republic, rejecting the SPD-led Council of People's Deputies under Friedrich Ebert, whom they viewed as betraying proletarian interests by compromising with monarchist elements and the military.[93] The Spartacist Revolt erupted on January 5, 1919, in Berlin, sparked by the Ebert government's dismissal of communist-leaning Police Chief Emil Eichhorn, prompting approximately 100,000 workers to strike and demonstrate, with Spartacist leaders seizing key buildings and proclaiming a revolutionary committee to depose Ebert and install a dictatorship of the proletariat.[94] [23] Liebknecht and Luxemburg directed the uprising, distributing arms to radicals and calling for nationwide soviets, though lacking broad military support and facing internal divisions over tactics like armed seizure versus mass action.[95] The government, prioritizing stability amid the National Assembly elections scheduled for January 19, authorized Freikorps units—volunteer paramilitary forces composed of demobilized soldiers—to counter the insurgents, resulting in street fighting that killed around 150-200 people by January 12.[96] [97] Suppression was decisive and brutal: Freikorps retook Berlin by January 12, capturing Liebknecht and Luxemburg on January 15; Liebknecht was shot while attempting escape, and Luxemburg was beaten, shot, and her body dumped in a canal, acts later investigated as extrajudicial murders ordered by military officers to eliminate revolutionary figureheads.[96] [97] The revolt's failure stemmed from the Spartacists' inability to rally the army or majority workers, who largely backed the SPD's moderate path, and their tactical errors in provoking confrontation without secured proletarian militias; it nonetheless radicalized survivors, leading to the Communist Party of Germany (KPD)'s formal founding on December 31, 1918, from the league's merger with other leftists.[95] [93] Beyond the Spartacist episode, the KPD posed persistent threats through subsequent uprisings, including the March-April 1919 Bavarian Soviet Republic in Munich, where communists briefly seized power before Freikorps intervention killed over 1,000; the March 1920 Ruhr Red Army revolt against Kapp Putsch forces; and the 1923 Hamburg Uprising and broader "German October" push for revolution amid hyperinflation, all aimed at emulating Soviet Russia's model but thwarted by government alliances with right-wing militias and the KPD's Moscow-directed strategies alienating potential SPD allies.[98] [99] These actions, numbering several dozen localized strikes and seizures from 1919-1923, underscored the communists' commitment to violent overthrow, garnering 300,000-600,000 votes by 1924 but failing due to fragmented left-wing unity and the republic's defensive use of Article 48 emergency powers.[100][101]Nationalist Backlash and Right-Wing Agitation
The nationalist backlash to the Weimar Republic stemmed from widespread resentment over the Treaty of Versailles, which imposed severe territorial losses, military restrictions, and reparations totaling 132 billion gold marks on Germany, conditions viewed by many as a Diktat rather than a negotiated peace. This humiliation intersected with the Dolchstoßlegende, a conspiracy theory asserting that Germany's 1918 armistice and defeat resulted from betrayal by domestic elements—primarily socialists, pacifists, and Jews—rather than battlefield losses, a narrative endorsed by former military leaders like Erich Ludendorff and Paul von Hindenburg during Reichstag inquiries in 1919–1920.[102][103] The myth eroded legitimacy for the republican government, framing its founders as "November criminals" responsible for capitulation on November 11, 1918, and provided ideological fuel for right-wing groups seeking to restore authoritarian rule and revise the treaty.[104] Right-wing agitation manifested through political parties and propaganda campaigns that rejected Weimar's parliamentary system as alien to German traditions. The German National People's Party (DNVP), established in December 1918 as a merger of conservative and monarchist factions, positioned itself as the foremost defender of nationalism, opposing the republic's democratic foundations and demanding abrogation of Versailles. In the June 1920 Reichstag elections, the DNVP captured 15.1% of the vote and 71 seats, capitalizing on anti-republican sentiment amid postwar chaos.[105][24] The party agitated via newspapers and rallies, promoting völkisch ideals of racial purity and anti-Semitism while allying sporadically with paramilitaries to intimidate opponents. Parallel to the DNVP, the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP), originally the German Workers' Party founded in January 1919, evolved under Adolf Hitler's leadership from 1921 into a radical agitator against the republic, blending ultranationalism with antisemitic scapegoating of Versailles' architects. Hitler's early speeches, such as those in Munich beer halls from 1920 onward, lambasted the Weimar government as a puppet of Jewish-Bolshevik forces and vowed national rebirth through dictatorship, drawing crowds amid economic distress.[106][107] The NSDAP's Sturmabteilung (SA), formed in 1921, engaged in street-level provocation to portray the republic as weak, though the party remained marginal electorally until the late 1920s, garnering just 2.6% in the 1928 elections before surging amid the Depression.[108] This agitation intensified cultural critiques, decrying Weimar's perceived moral decay and internationalism as symptoms of national decline, thereby normalizing calls for forceful overthrow.[24]Assassinations and Putsch Attempts
The Weimar Republic faced a wave of right-wing political assassinations in its early years, with extremists targeting prominent democratic politicians perceived as responsible for Germany's defeat in World War I or the Treaty of Versailles. Between 1919 and 1922, right-wing paramilitary groups, including the Freikorps and the Organisation Consul, carried out at least 354 politically motivated murders, far outnumbering left-wing killings.[109] These acts often received lenient judicial treatment, with average sentences for radical right-wing murderers amounting to four months imprisonment and nominal fines, reflecting sympathy among conservative elites and judicial elements.[110] On August 26, 1921, Matthias Erzberger, a Catholic Centre Party leader and signatory of the 1918 armistice, was shot dead near Baden-Baden by Heinrich Tillessen and Hermann Fischer, members of the Organisation Consul, in retaliation for his role in ending the war and his advocacy for the Versailles Treaty.[109] [111] Erzberger's assassination elicited mixed reactions, with public mourning overshadowed by right-wing celebrations that highlighted the republic's vulnerability to nationalist resentment.[112] The killers were convicted but served minimal time, underscoring the weak enforcement of laws against such terrorism.[109] The murder of Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau on June 24, 1922, in Berlin marked a peak of this violence; Rathenau, a Jewish industrialist who negotiated the Treaty of Rapallo with Soviet Russia, was ambushed and killed by Organisation Consul operatives Ernst Werner Techow, Erwin Kern, and Hermann Fischer using grenades and pistols from a convertible automobile.[113] [109] The assassins acted amid antisemitic conspiracy theories portraying Rathenau as part of a "Jewish-Bolshevik" cabal, though his diplomacy aimed at easing reparations burdens.[113] In response, the Reichstag passed the Law for the Protection of the Republic, criminalizing paramilitary organizations and incitement, though enforcement remained inconsistent.[109] Putsch attempts further destabilized the republic, beginning with the Kapp Putsch of March 13, 1920, when Wolfgang Kapp, a nationalist civil servant, and General Walther von Lüttwitz used Freikorps units like the Marinebrigade Ehrhardt to seize Berlin and depose the government for disbanding paramilitary forces per Allied demands.[109] The coup collapsed after four days due to a general strike organized by trade unions and Social Democrats, which paralyzed the economy, leading to Kapp's flight and Lüttwitz's exile without significant punishment for participants.[109] This event exposed divisions in the military, where monarchist officers sympathized with the putschists, eroding civilian control.[109] The Beer Hall Putsch, attempted on November 8-9, 1923, in Munich, represented another failed right-wing seizure of power; Adolf Hitler, alongside Erich Ludendorff and Bavarian nationalists, disrupted a meeting of government officials at the Bürgerbräukeller, declaring a "national revolution" against the Weimar regime amid hyperinflation and Ruhr occupation crises.[114] The march on the Odeonsplatz the next day met police resistance, resulting in 16 Nazi deaths and the plot's collapse, with Hitler arrested and sentenced to five years but released after nine months.[114] [115] Rather than deterring the Nazis, the trial provided Hitler a national platform to propagate his ideology, transforming the failure into propaganda capital.[114] These incidents, driven by revanchist opposition to the democratic order, contributed to a climate of impunity that weakened institutional trust, though immediate republican survival hinged on mass mobilization and legal countermeasures that proved insufficient against entrenched right-wing networks.[109]Foreign Affairs
Treaty Revision Efforts
Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann pursued a policy of Erfüllungspolitik from 1923, committing Germany to fulfill Treaty of Versailles obligations to demonstrate reliability and thereby secure diplomatic leverage for revisions.[116] This strategy contrasted with right-wing demands for outright repudiation, emphasizing negotiation to alleviate territorial, military, and economic burdens imposed in 1919.[117] Weimar diplomats leveraged treaty-mandated plebiscites to contest territorial losses. In Schleswig, the March 1920 vote returned the southern zone to German administration while ceding the north to Denmark. East Prussia plebiscites in July 1920 preserved German sovereignty over Allenstein and Marienwerder districts. The Upper Silesia plebiscite of 20 March 1921 yielded a 60% majority for Germany, prompting League of Nations arbitration that partitioned the region, granting Germany the majority of agricultural lands while Poland received key industrial areas.[118] Stresemann targeted early Allied withdrawal from the Rhineland, originally scheduled through 1935. Negotiations accelerated evacuation, with French and Belgian forces vacating the Cologne zone by December 1926 and completing full withdrawal from all occupation zones by June 1930, restoring German administrative control five years ahead of treaty timelines.[119][120] In the east, revision efforts focused on the Polish Corridor and Danzig, deemed violations of self-determination principles. Stresemann advocated minority rights protections and arbitration mechanisms, culminating in the 1928 German-Polish pact for non-aggression and dispute resolution, though territorial changes remained elusive amid Polish stabilization under Piłsudski.[121] These initiatives prioritized western rapprochement to enable future eastern adjustments, yielding incremental gains without military confrontation.[122]Locarno Pact and Eastern Policy
The Locarno Pact, negotiated primarily by German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann alongside French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand and British Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain, culminated in agreements signed on October 16, 1925, during the Locarno Conference from October 5 to 16.[123] [124] These treaties entered into force on December 1, 1925, after ratification.[125] The core mutual guarantee treaty involved Germany, France, and Belgium pledging to respect their common frontiers as defined by the Treaty of Versailles, including the demilitarization of the Rhineland, with Great Britain and Italy serving as guarantors against unprovoked aggression.[126] [127] Separate arbitration treaties were concluded by Germany with Poland and Czechoslovakia, committing parties to resolve disputes peacefully through mechanisms like the Permanent Court of International Justice, but these lacked the binding guarantees applied to the western borders.[127] This distinction deliberately excluded eastern frontiers from mutual guarantees, reflecting Stresemann's strategy of fulfilling western obligations to build international trust while preserving flexibility for potential revisions in the east, where Germany contested the Versailles settlements like the Polish Corridor and Danzig.[128] [123] The pact's western focus reassured France of security without invading Germany, as in the 1923 Ruhr occupation, and facilitated Germany's reintegration into European diplomacy, paving the way for its League of Nations admission in 1926.[127] In parallel, Weimar's Eastern Policy under Stresemann emphasized pragmatic engagement with both Poland and the Soviet Union to counter isolation and secure economic interests. Relations with Poland remained tense due to territorial disputes, including the German-Polish customs war starting June 1925, which imposed tariffs exacerbating economic friction over borders and minorities.[116] Stresemann viewed Polish control of the Danzig Corridor and Upper Silesia as unjust, advocating arbitration over force but signaling non-acceptance of eastern status quo, as Locarno's omission allowed.[116] Concurrently, Germany deepened ties with the USSR via the 1926 Treaty of Berlin, reaffirming the 1922 Rapallo Treaty for mutual neutrality and trade, bypassing League constraints and providing a counterweight to western powers and Poland.[70] This Ostpolitik aimed at balancing revisionist goals in Poland with stabilization elsewhere, though it yielded limited border concessions and fueled domestic nationalist criticism for compromising on Versailles without eastern gains.[116]Disarmament Conferences and Isolation
The Weimar Republic's participation in disarmament conferences was constrained by the Treaty of Versailles, which mandated a reduction of the German army to 100,000 men by July 1920 and prohibited conscription, heavy artillery, tanks, military aircraft, and submarines.[129] These clauses were enforced through Allied commissions, fostering resentment in Germany over the lack of reciprocal disarmament by victorious powers, whose armies remained substantially larger.[130] Early efforts, such as the 1920 Spa Conference, focused on implementing these restrictions alongside reparations and coal deliveries, but yielded no broader arms reductions.[130] Following Gustav Stresemann's foreign policy of integration, Germany joined the League of Nations in September 1926, enabling involvement in preparatory disarmament talks.[130] The League's Preparatory Commission for a Disarmament Conference, active from 1925 to 1930, debated qualitative and quantitative limits but produced only non-binding recommendations, highlighting divisions between Germany's demand for equality in armaments and France's insistence on security guarantees before reductions.[129] German diplomats argued that Versailles' discriminatory terms perpetuated insecurity, while other states evaded equivalent constraints, a position rooted in the treaty's failure to achieve general disarmament as promised in its preamble.[131] The World Disarmament Conference opened in Geneva on February 2, 1932, under League auspices, with over 60 nations seeking to fulfill Article 8 of the Covenant by limiting arms qualitatively (e.g., banning certain weapons) and quantitatively (e.g., army sizes).[132] Chancellor Heinrich Brüning, attending personally in April 1932, pressed for "equality of rights," proposing that Germany accept general limitations if Versailles' special restrictions were abolished, emphasizing that unilateral German disarmament had already occurred without reciprocal action.[133] [134] France countered with the Tardieu Plan in July, advocating supervised disarmament and an international force, which Germany rejected as reinforcing inequality by implying perpetual oversight of its military.[134] In response, the German delegation walked out on July 14, 1932, protesting the conference's refusal to grant equality, a move that underscored Weimar's strategic isolation amid economic crisis and domestic pressure for treaty revision.[134] Under Chancellor Franz von Papen, Germany briefly returned in late 1932 for five-power talks (with France, Britain, Italy, and the United States) but achieved no concessions, as proposals for conditional equality stalled over security concerns.[135] This impasse deepened Germany's diplomatic isolation, alienating it from the League's multilateral framework and fueling nationalist critiques that international bodies prioritized Allied interests over equitable peace, despite Weimar's earlier Locarno-era gains.[130] The conference's failure to produce binding agreements left Germany confronting perceived hypocrisy—other powers maintained superior forces while blocking its parity—exacerbating vulnerabilities exploited in subsequent political shifts.[134]Social Policies and Cultural Shifts
Welfare Expansion and Labor Reforms
Following the November Revolution of 1918, the Council of People's Deputies issued a decree on November 23 establishing the eight-hour workday as the legal standard, limiting daily labor to eight hours and weekly hours to 48, a measure aimed at fulfilling long-standing demands of the labor movement and stabilizing industrial relations amid revolutionary upheaval.[136] This reform built on the Stinnes-Legien Agreement of November 15, 1918, negotiated between major industrialists led by Hugo Stinnes and trade union leaders under Carl Legien, which granted formal recognition to free trade unions, prohibited employer support for company unions, and committed both sides to collective bargaining and arbitration councils to resolve disputes, thereby integrating labor into the republican framework while averting widespread lockouts.[137] In 1920, the Reich Works Council Law of February 4 mandated the election of works councils in enterprises employing 20 or more workers, granting them rights to co-determination in matters of workplace conditions, hiring practices, and economic planning, though without veto power over management decisions; this legislation, rooted in Article 165 of the Weimar Constitution, sought to institutionalize worker participation as a counter to radical council movements while preserving capitalist structures.[138] These early measures reflected Social Democratic influence in coalition governments, expanding labor protections inherited from the Imperial era but adapting them to republican ideals of social partnership. The 1920s saw further welfare expansions, including enhancements to Bismarck-era health and pension insurances through increased coverage and benefits; for instance, the 1922 Youth Welfare Law affirmed state responsibility for child development, funding educational and physical fitness programs.[139] Culminating these efforts, the Unemployment Insurance Act of July 16, 1927, introduced compulsory national unemployment benefits, financed by equal contributions from workers (3% of wages), employers, and the state, initially covering approximately 17 million insured workers and providing up to 26 weeks of support at 60-75% of prior earnings, depending on family status.[140][141] This system marked a significant extension of social insurance, responding to cyclical unemployment in the stabilized economy post-hyperinflation, though its funding strained public finances amid ongoing reparations and reconstruction costs.[139] Collectively, these reforms elevated Germany's social welfare provisions to among Europe's most comprehensive, with social spending rising from 10% of GDP in 1913 to over 20% by the late 1920s, driven by union advocacy and SPD-led policies that prioritized risk mitigation for industrial workers.[142] However, implementation faced resistance from employers and fiscal conservatives, who argued that rigid labor rules and benefit generosity hindered wage flexibility and investment, contributing to structural unemployment vulnerabilities exposed by the 1929 downturn.[142]Artistic Innovation and Moral Critiques
The Weimar Republic era marked a period of unprecedented artistic experimentation, driven by post-World War I disillusionment, urbanization, and economic flux, with Berlin emerging as a global hub for modernist expression. Innovations spanned visual arts, architecture, film, and performance, often reflecting societal fragmentation through abstraction and social critique. Expressionism, Dada, and New Objectivity dominated painting and graphics, as artists like George Grosz and Otto Dix satirized war's horrors and bourgeois hypocrisy in works such as Grosz's Eclipse of the Sun (1926), which depicted militaristic absurdity.[143][144] In architecture and design, the Bauhaus school, founded on April 1, 1919, by Walter Gropius in Weimar, revolutionized functionalism by integrating art, craft, and industrial production, emphasizing mass-producible forms stripped of ornamentation; its manifesto advocated spiritual renewal through creative unity, influencing international modernism before relocating to Dessau in 1925 amid political pressure.[145][146] Film advanced through German Expressionism, constrained by budget shortages that spurred ingenuity in lighting and sets; Robert Wiene's The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1920) pioneered distorted perspectives to evoke madness and authoritarianism, setting precedents for psychological horror, while Fritz Lang's Metropolis (1927) blended futuristic spectacle with class conflict themes via UFA studios.[147][148] Performing arts thrived in cabarets, where satirical revues and atonal music by Arnold Schoenberg and Kurt Weill critiqued capitalism and militarism, fostering a nightlife of jazz-infused experimentation that drew international audiences to venues like the Eldorado club.[149] These developments elicited sharp moral critiques from conservatives, nationalists, and traditionalists, who portrayed Weimar culture as emblematic of ethical decay and foreign-influenced "cultural Bolshevism" eroding German moral fiber. Detractors, including right-wing intellectuals and the Kampfbund für deutsche Kultur (formed 1927), condemned the era's embrace of sexual liberation, open homosexuality in urban scenes, and hedonistic excess—such as Berlin's proliferating sex clubs and prostitution—as symptoms of national weakening, contrasting it with pre-war Prussian virtues of discipline and family-centric piety; they argued this permissiveness, amplified by economic desperation, fostered alienation and undermined social cohesion.[150][151][152] Alfred Rosenberg, in writings predating Nazi power, lambasted modernist art as degenerative Jewish-led corruption, a view echoed in conservative press decrying cabaret vulgarity and abstract forms as assaults on realism and decency.[151] Such critiques, often rooted in völkisch ideology, gained traction amid hyperinflation and depression, framing cultural innovation not as progress but as causal contributor to moral relativism and political instability, though empirical links to societal collapse remain debated beyond ideological assertion.[153]Demographic Changes and Urbanization
The Weimar Republic inherited a population scarred by World War I, with approximately 2 million German soldiers killed in action, representing a direct military loss of about 3-4% of the pre-war population of 64.6 million in 1910.[154] [155] Civilian deaths from famine, disease, and the 1918-1919 influenza pandemic added further tolls, exacerbating a birth deficit estimated at 3.2 million fewer children born during and immediately after the war due to disrupted family formation and economic hardship.[156] This resulted in a pronounced gender imbalance, with a scarcity of men aged 20-40 persisting into the 1920s, which reduced marriage rates and contributed to a net reproduction rate below replacement levels.[157] Birth rates, which stood at 27.5 per 1,000 inhabitants in 1913, declined to 25.9 per 1,000 by 1920 and further to 14.7 per 1,000 by 1933, the lowest in Europe at the time, amid urbanization, women's workforce participation, and economic uncertainty.[158] These trends reflected a broader "demographic crisis" perceived by contemporaries, prompting republican family policies such as marriage loans and maternity benefits aimed at boosting fertility, though with limited success as cultural shifts toward smaller families and delayed childbearing took hold.[158] Regional disparities compounded the issue, with eastern agrarian areas experiencing overpopulation and underemployment, driving internal migration westward, while overall population growth stagnated, hovering around 62-65 million through the period. Urbanization accelerated modestly from pre-war levels, building on the German Empire's industrialization, as rural workers sought factory jobs in cities despite hyperinflation and the Great Depression's reversals.[159] The proportion of the population in localities exceeding 2,000 inhabitants, already rising from 36% in 1871 to around 60% by 1910, continued to grow, with large cities expanding at a 36% rate from 1910 to 1940 amid mechanized agriculture displacing rural labor. Berlin's population, for instance, increased from 3.8 million in 1919 to over 4 million by 1925, fueled by internal migration, though economic crises like the 1923 Ruhr occupation and 1929 crash prompted some counter-urban flows back to villages.[160] This shift strained urban infrastructure, heightened social tensions between rural conservatives and urban cosmopolitans, and amplified perceptions of moral decay in cities, where minority groups like Jews, already highly urbanized, concentrated further.[161] By the late 1920s, over half the population resided in urban areas, reflecting causal links to industrial demand but also vulnerabilities to cyclical unemployment that rural economies partially buffered.[159]Decline and Demise
Brüning to Schleicher Cabinets
Heinrich Brüning, a Centre Party politician, was appointed Chancellor on March 30, 1930, following the collapse of the grand coalition under Hermann Müller amid disputes over unemployment insurance funding during the onset of the Great Depression.[81] His administration pursued a deflationary austerity policy, including cuts to government spending, reductions in civil service salaries, higher taxes, and restrictions on credit to balance the budget and meet reparations obligations under the Young Plan.[162] These measures, implemented largely through Article 48 emergency decrees after the Reichstag rejected key legislation on July 16, 1930—leading to its dissolution—exacerbated economic contraction, with industrial production falling by over 40% from 1929 levels and unemployment rising from 1.3 million in 1929 to approximately 5 million by late 1931.[33] [163] Brüning's reliance on presidential authority under Paul von Hindenburg intensified political polarization, as the policy's unpopularity fueled gains for both Nazis and Communists in the September 1930 elections, where the NSDAP secured 107 seats.[81] Despite some stabilization in reparations via the Hoover Moratorium in June 1931, domestic hardship persisted, prompting Brüning to propose controversial agrarian protectionism and even float ideas of restoring the monarchy, which alienated his base.[162] Intrigue from military figures like Kurt von Schleicher and Franz von Papen contributed to his dismissal on May 30, 1932, after Hindenburg lost confidence amid accusations of Brüning's authoritarian drift and failure to curb extremism.[33] Franz von Papen formed a "cabinet of barons" on June 1, 1932, comprising aristocrats and conservatives without parliamentary majority, continuing rule by decree and lifting the ban on the SA paramilitary to appease nationalists.[164] His administration enacted limited reflationary steps, such as tax cuts and public works, but these were insufficient against peaking unemployment near 6 million, or about 30% of the workforce, in mid-1932.[162] Papen's most notorious action was the Preußenschlag on July 20, 1932, a coup dissolving the Social Democratic-led Prussian state government under Article 48, justified by alleged disorder but primarily to centralize conservative control and suppress left-wing influence.[164] The Reichstag's non-confidence vote on July 28 forced new elections in November, where Nazis became the largest party, yet Papen persisted until November 17, 1932, when Hindenburg replaced him amid Schleicher’s maneuvering.[163] Kurt von Schleicher, a Reichswehr general, assumed the chancellorship on December 3, 1932, aiming to form a cross-party "government of national concentration" by negotiating with Nazi dissident Gregor Strasser for a labor-focused coalition, while proposing modest rearmament and welfare expansions to undercut extremism.[165] These efforts failed as Strasser's bid for power collapsed on December 8, isolating Schleicher and highlighting the military's overreach in politics without broader support.[33] Governing via decrees amid ongoing economic distress—unemployment remained above 5 million—Schleicher dissolved the Reichstag on December 12 but could not secure a viable majority, leading Hindenburg to demand his resignation on January 28, 1933, paving the way for Adolf Hitler's appointment two days later.[162] [163] These cabinets, reliant on Hindenburg's emergency powers rather than parliamentary consent, underscored the Weimar system's vulnerability to executive overreach during crisis, accelerating democratic erosion.[165]1932 Elections and Nazi Surge
In the wake of Chancellor Heinrich Brüning's resignation on 30 May 1932, prompted by President Paul von Hindenburg's withdrawal of support amid ongoing economic austerity amid the Great Depression, Hindenburg appointed Franz von Papen as chancellor on 1 June. Papen's "cabinet of barons" commanded minimal parliamentary backing and pursued policies that exacerbated political instability, including lifting Brüning's ban on the Nazi Sturmabteilung (SA) paramilitary force, which intensified violent clashes with communist Red Front Fighters and contributed to a climate of disorder. With unemployment peaking at around 6 million—roughly 30 percent of the workforce—public discontent fueled extremist mobilization, as the Nazis capitalized on grievances over the Treaty of Versailles, hyperinflation's legacy, and perceived Weimar incompetence through relentless propaganda and mass rallies.[166][167][168][86] Papen dissolved the Reichstag on 4 July following its refusal to grant emergency decree powers, triggering federal elections on 31 July. The National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) surged to 37.3 percent of the popular vote (13.75 million ballots out of 37.1 million cast, with 84 percent turnout), capturing 230 seats in the expanded 608-seat chamber and displacing the Social Democratic Party (SPD) as the largest faction. This represented a more than doubling of the Nazis' 1930 share (18.3 percent, 107 seats), driven by disproportionate gains among Protestant rural voters, the middle class, and youth, alongside the party's organizational prowess in exploiting economic despair without yet dominating urban or Catholic strongholds. The SPD held 133 seats (21.6 percent), the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) 89 (14.3 percent), and the Centre Party 75 (12.4 percent), underscoring persistent fragmentation that prevented any stable coalition.[169][170]| Party | July 1932 Vote Share | July Seats (of 608) | Key Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| NSDAP | 37.3% | 230 | Largest party; gains from economic radicals |
| SPD | 21.6% | 133 | Loyal base but eroded by polarization |
| KPD | 14.3% | 89 | Gains among unemployed urban workers |
| Party | November 1932 Vote Share | November Seats (of 584) | Key Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| NSDAP | 33.1% | 196 | Plurality intact despite decline; no majority possible |
| SPD | 20.4% | 121 | Further weakening |
| KPD | 16.9% | 100 | Exploited Nazi dip among workers |
Hitler's Appointment and Enabling Act
Following the November 1932 federal election, in which the Nazi Party secured 33.1% of the vote and 196 seats in the Reichstag—making it the largest party but without a governing majority—political instability persisted as Chancellor Kurt von Schleicher's minority cabinet failed to stabilize the government.[169] President Paul von Hindenburg, initially averse to Adolf Hitler due to his view of the Nazi leader as unsuitable for high office, dismissed Schleicher on January 28, 1933, amid pressure from former Chancellor Franz von Papen, who advocated for a conservative-Nazi coalition to harness Nazi electoral strength while containing it through non-Nazi dominance in the cabinet.[174] On January 30, 1933, Hindenburg formally appointed Hitler as Reich Chancellor in a coalition government where Nazis occupied only three of eleven cabinet posts: the chancellorship itself, the Reich Ministry of the Interior (Wilhelm Frick), and the Prussian Ministry of the Interior (Hermann Göring as acting); the vice-chancellorship went to von Papen, with other key roles held by conservatives like Konstantin von Neurath (foreign affairs) and Alfred Hugenberg (economics and agriculture, leader of the German National People's Party or DNVP).[175] This arrangement reflected elite miscalculations that Hitler could be sidelined or controlled, leveraging Nazi popularity to sideline the left while preserving conservative influence.[176] The appointment triggered immediate Nazi efforts to consolidate power. On February 27, 1933, the Reichstag building burned in an arson attack attributed by the Nazis to communists, with Dutch communist Marinus van der Lubbe arrested at the scene; though van der Lubbe confessed and was executed, debate persists over whether Nazis orchestrated or merely exploited the event. The next day, February 28, Hindenburg signed the Reichstag Fire Decree—formally the "Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of People and State"—which invoked Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution to suspend civil liberties including habeas corpus, freedom of expression, press, and assembly, while authorizing indefinite preventive detention without trial and overriding state and local laws.[177] This measure enabled mass arrests of approximately 4,000 communists and other opponents by mid-March, effectively decapitating the Communist Party (KPD) leadership and preventing their participation in subsequent proceedings, while SA paramilitary units intensified street violence and intimidation against socialists and trade unionists.[178] Amid this repression, federal elections occurred on March 5, 1933, yielding the Nazis 43.9% of the vote (17.3 million ballots) and 288 seats in the expanded 647-seat Reichstag—their highest share yet, boosted by DNVP allies (8%, 52 seats) for a combined right-wing plurality of about 52%, though still shy of an absolute majority due to ongoing economic distress and voter turnout of 88.8%.[179] The vote took place under SA-orchestrated terror, with over 50 anti-Nazi protesters killed and thousands detained, alongside radio broadcasts and press control promoting Nazi narratives; opposition parties decried irregularities, but the results were certified, reflecting genuine but coerced support amid Weimar's polarization.[180] To secure dictatorial authority, Hitler sought the Enabling Act ("Law to Remedy the Distress of the People and the Reich"), introduced on March 21, 1933, which would empower the cabinet to enact laws—including those deviating from the constitution and bypassing the Reichstag—for four years without presidential countersignature after Hindenburg's term.[181] Passage required a two-thirds quorum and majority under Article 76, necessitating 432 affirmative votes from the 647 seats; with 81 KPD deputies arrested or in hiding and thus absent, Nazis and DNVP held 340 seats, compelling negotiations with the Catholic Center Party (Zentrum, 73 seats). The session convened March 23 at the Kroll Opera House, ringed by 150 SA men who barred non-voters and assaulted Social Democratic (SPD) delegates; after Hitler's assurances to Zentrum leader Ludwig Kaas of ecclesiastical protections (later ignored) and pressure via Papen, the Center voted yes alongside most nationalists.[182] The Act passed 444–94, with only the SPD's 94 deputies opposing amid shouts of "We vote as free men!" and subsequent arrests of its leaders; it formalized the shift to one-man rule, rendering subsequent parliamentary sessions ceremonial and enabling decrees like the April 7 Gleichschaltung law dissolving Länder autonomy.[181] This legal maneuver, while procedurally constitutional, dismantled Weimar democracy through intimidation and elite acquiescence, paving the way for totalitarianism without formal coup.[182]Causal Factors in Collapse
Institutional Design Flaws
The Weimar Constitution's electoral system utilized pure proportional representation across large constituencies, allocating Reichstag seats strictly in proportion to parties' national vote shares without any minimum threshold for representation beyond a nominal 60,000-vote hurdle in practice.[183] This design, intended to maximize voter representation and avoid wasted votes, instead fostered severe fragmentation, as even minor parties could secure seats, leading to parliaments divided among 10 to 15 or more groups per election and over 40 distinct parties across the republic's lifespan.[39][184] The absence of mechanisms like a 5% threshold—later adopted in West Germany's Basic Law to consolidate majorities—exacerbated coalition instability, with governments averaging less than a year in duration and requiring constant renegotiation among ideologically disparate allies, rendering decisive policy-making nearly impossible amid rising economic pressures.[185][183] Compounding this parliamentary weakness was Article 48, which empowered the president to suspend civil liberties, deploy the military domestically, and enact emergency decrees without Reichstag approval if public order or security was threatened.[29] Originally conceived as a limited safeguard for crises, the provision lacked clear boundaries or judicial oversight, enabling its routine invocation: President Friedrich Ebert alone issued over 130 such decrees, including 63 during the 1923 hyperinflation and Ruhr occupation turmoil to suppress uprisings and stabilize finances.[35] By the late 1920s and early 1930s, chancellors like Heinrich Brüning relied on Article 48 for governance amid legislative gridlock, issuing hundreds of decrees that bypassed the fragmented Reichstag and eroded democratic accountability, as parliamentary consent was required only retrospectively and often withheld ineffectually.[186][184] These institutional features interacted causally to undermine the republic's stability: proportional representation prevented stable majorities needed for legislative consent, driving reliance on Article 48's executive overrides, which in turn accustomed elites and the public to rule by decree over parliamentary deliberation.[187] This dynamic facilitated the shift to authoritarian presidential cabinets after 1930, culminating in President Paul von Hindenburg's use of emergency powers to appoint Adolf Hitler as chancellor on January 30, 1933, without a Reichstag majority.[186] While some analyses downplay PR's role relative to economic or external factors, the constitution's failure to incorporate safeguards against fragmentation—evident in the post-1949 system's success with thresholds—highlights how these design choices prioritized inclusivity over governability, amplifying vulnerabilities to extremist mobilization.[183][39]Economic Policy Errors
The Weimar government's decision to finance budget deficits by printing Papiermarks triggered the hyperinflation crisis of 1921–1923, peaking in 1923.[188] [189] Following the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr industrial region on January 11, 1923, due to missed reparations payments under the Treaty of Versailles, the Cuno cabinet subsidized passive resistance by workers through massive money creation, avoiding tax increases or spending cuts.[61] [190] This policy response, rather than fiscal restraint, caused the money supply to expand exponentially; by November 1923, prices doubled every 3.7 days, and the mark's value fell to 4.2105 trillion per U.S. dollar.[60] The hyperinflation eroded savings, particularly among the middle class, and undermined confidence in the republic's monetary management.[191] Stabilization efforts, led by Finance Minister Hans Luther, introduced the Rentenmark on November 15, 1923, a temporary currency backed by mortgages on land and industrial goods at a fixed value of 1 trillion old marks per Rentenmark.[60] This measure halted the inflation without defaulting on reparations outright, but it relied on asset backing rather than gold, reflecting a cautious approach to avoid foreign backlash.[192] The subsequent Rentenbank issued loans tied to real assets, facilitating the Reichsmark's adoption in 1924. However, the policy's success masked ongoing vulnerabilities, as reparations—fixed at 132 billion gold marks (equivalent to £6.6 billion) by the 1921 London Schedule of Payments—continued to strain finances, paid in stable foreign currencies while domestic revenues fluctuated.[193] [194] The government's adherence to these obligations, without aggressive renegotiation or domestic austerity earlier, perpetuated fiscal imbalances.[188] Post-stabilization, the Dawes Plan of 1924 restructured reparations into graduated payments funded by U.S. loans totaling 800 million Reichsmarks initially, fostering short-term recovery but creating dependency on foreign capital inflows averaging nearly 4% of national income annually.[68] [195] The Young Plan of 1929 further reduced the total to 112 billion Reichsmarks over 59 years, yet the 1929 Wall Street Crash prompted U.S. loan recalls, collapsing credit and exposing the economy's overreliance on external borrowing rather than building domestic resilience through balanced budgets or export diversification.[68] [196] In response to the Great Depression, Chancellor Heinrich Brüning's administration from March 1930 enforced deflationary fiscal policies, including wage cuts of up to 20%, tax hikes, and reductions in unemployment benefits and public spending, aiming to balance the budget and avert perceived inflationary risks from the 1923 trauma.[197] [198] These measures, implemented via emergency decree under Article 48 of the constitution, deepened deflation; industrial production fell 40% by 1932, and unemployment rose from 1.3 million in 1929 to 6 million (about 30% of the workforce) by early 1932.[84] [199] Brüning's refusal to pursue expansionary policies, such as deficit spending or debt monetization, contrasted with later Keynesian approaches and amplified the downturn, as rigid balanced-budget orthodoxy prioritized creditor interests over output stabilization.[200] [201] This contractionary stance, while fiscally conservative, failed to mitigate mass hardship and eroded support for democratic institutions.[202]Cultural and Ideological Polarization
The ideological landscape of the Weimar Republic was marked by sharp divisions between leftist proponents of socialism and internationalism and right-wing advocates of nationalism and traditionalism, with proportional representation in elections producing fragmented coalitions that hindered governance. The Social Democratic Party (SPD), as the largest party in early years, defended parliamentary democracy but faced rivalry from the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), which rejected compromise in favor of proletarian revolution and viewed the SPD as social fascists after 1928. Conversely, the German National People's Party (DNVP) embodied conservative nationalism, opposing the republic's legitimacy and seeking restoration of monarchical elements, while the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) radicalized these sentiments with antisemitic and anti-Bolshevik rhetoric, gaining traction amid economic distress. These fault lines prevented stable majorities, as evidenced by 20 governments between 1919 and 1933, each averaging less than a year in power.[105] This fragmentation fueled paramilitary violence, transforming ideological disputes into physical confrontations on the streets, particularly in industrial cities like Berlin and Hamburg. Communist-affiliated groups such as the Roter Frontkämpferbund clashed routinely with nationalist formations including the Nazi Sturmabteilung (SA) and the Stahlhelm, with over 100 deaths recorded in political brawls in Prussia alone during the first half of 1932. Such violence escalated after the 1929 onset of the Great Depression, as unemployed youth swelled the ranks of extremists; the KPD and NSDAP together captured 37% of the vote in the July 1932 election, reflecting mutual demonization where each portrayed the other as an existential threat to German society. Courts often treated leftist and rightist perpetrators leniently if aligned with establishment views, though data indicate right-wing violence increasingly dominated by 1930, with SA membership surging to 400,000.[52][55] Culturally, urban centers like Berlin epitomized modernist experimentation, with cabarets, jazz clubs, and avant-garde art challenging Victorian-era conventions; the Bauhaus school, founded in 1919, promoted functionalist design, while films like Fritz Lang's Metropolis (1927) explored technological alienation. Figures such as Magnus Hirschfeld advanced sexual science through his Institute for Sexual Research (established 1919), advocating decriminalization of homosexuality and influencing debates on gender roles. This "golden twenties" efflorescence, however, provoked backlash from rural and conservative strata, who decried it as Asphaltkultur—a decadent, cosmopolitan erosion of Germanic values tied to urbanization and Jewish intellectual prominence in media and academia.[203] Nationalist intellectuals amplified these critiques, framing modernism as symptomatic of civilizational decline; Oswald Spengler's The Decline of the West (vol. 1, 1918; vol. 2, 1922) posited cyclical historical patterns where Western culture succumbed to mechanistic "civilization," resonating with völkisch thinkers who linked cultural liberalization to Bolshevik and Jewish influences undermining folk traditions. Conservative revolutionaries like Ernst Jünger glorified martial heroism against perceived effeminacy, while agrarian lobbies protested urban hedonism amid rural depopulation—Germany's urban population rose from 40% in 1910 to 47% by 1933. This cultural chasm reinforced ideological entrenchment, as right-wing parties mobilized against "degenerate" art, prefiguring the 1937 Nazi exhibition of such works.[204][205]Elite Miscalculations and External Burdens
The Treaty of Versailles, imposed on June 28, 1919, extracted 132 billion gold marks in reparations from Germany via the 1921 London Schedule of Payments, equivalent to about twice the nation's annual GDP and exacerbating fiscal strain through mandatory transfers that consumed up to 2.5% of GNP annually in the early 1920s.[59] [206] These obligations, coupled with territorial losses comprising 13% of Germany's land area, 10% of its population, 48% of iron production capacity, and 16% of coal output, crippled industrial output and export competitiveness, fostering chronic trade deficits.[207] [208] French occupation of the Ruhr industrial region in January 1923, in response to delayed payments, prompted passive resistance that halted production and triggered hyperinflation, with the Reichsmark depreciating to one trillionth of its 1914 value by November 1923, eroding savings and public trust in republican governance.[209] [193] The Dawes Plan of 1924 restructured reparations into annuity payments tied to economic recovery and facilitated U.S. loans exceeding 800 million Reichsmarks by 1927, temporarily stabilizing finances but rendering Germany dependent on short-term foreign capital inflows vulnerable to global shocks.[74] The Young Plan of 1929 further reduced the total to 112 billion marks payable over 59 years, yet the Wall Street Crash of October 1929 precipitated the Great Depression, slashing U.S. lending and prompting capital flight that amplified domestic unemployment from 1.3 million in 1929 to over 6 million by February 1932, or roughly 30% of the workforce.[206] [76] This external economic contraction, independent of domestic policy, intensified polarization by discrediting centrist parties and boosting extremist vote shares, as Weimar's export-oriented economy contracted by 40% from 1929 to 1932.[48] German conservative elites, including President Paul von Hindenburg, Franz von Papen, and Kurt von Schleicher, miscalculated the risks of allying with the Nazis to counter communist threats and restore monarchical influence, underestimating Adolf Hitler's ideological intransigence and the NSDAP's organizational discipline.[210] Von Papen, as chancellor from June to November 1932, dissolved the Reichstag after failing to secure a majority and brokered backchannel deals with Hitler, convincing Hindenburg that a Hitler-led cabinet with conservative dominance—envisaging Nazis in only two of eleven posts—could be manipulated via emergency decrees under Article 48.[211] Von Schleicher's brief chancellorship from December 1932 to January 1933 collapsed amid intrigues, prompting Papen to advocate Hitler's appointment on January 30, 1933, under the delusion that the Nazis' 37% vote in July 1932 fell short of a mandate and could be outmaneuvered.[212] [213] This elite gambit ignored the Nazis' paramilitary strength, with the SA numbering 400,000 by early 1933, and Hitler's refusal to compromise, as evidenced by his rejection of coalition subordination; Hindenburg's senility and aversion to reappointing predecessors further blinded the camarilla to the peril of granting executive power without parliamentary safeguards.[210] Industrialists like Fritz Thyssen and Hjalmar Schacht provided financial backing to the NSDAP in 1932, anticipating deregulation and anti-union policies, yet their support legitimized Hitler's chancellorship without extracting binding concessions.[214] These misjudgments, rooted in class contempt for Weimar democracy and overconfidence in Prussian authoritarian traditions, enabled the Enabling Act of March 23, 1933, which dismantled constitutional checks amid the Reichstag Fire Decree's suspension of civil liberties.[215] External pressures had eroded legitimacy, but elite intrigue supplied the decisive internal catalyst for dictatorship.[216]Historiographical Perspectives
Early Interpretations and Versailles Myth
The stab-in-the-back legend, originating in late 1918 from military leaders like Erich Ludendorff, posited that Germany's undefeated army was betrayed by civilian politicians, socialists, and Jews, forcing an armistice on November 11, 1918, and acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles.[217] This narrative gained traction during the 1919 Weimar National Assembly investigations, where Paul von Hindenburg testified that the army had been "stabbed in the back" by domestic revolutionaries, shifting blame from battlefield failures—such as the collapse of the 1918 Spring Offensive and Allied breakthroughs—to internal subversion.[218] Endorsed by conservative and nationalist circles, the legend undermined the legitimacy of the Weimar government, which was stigmatized as the "November criminals" for signing the armistice and treaty, fostering widespread resentment that portrayed the Republic as a product of defeat rather than a sovereign choice.[48] Early interpretations of Weimar's instability, prevalent among right-wing politicians and veterans' groups in the 1920s, amplified the "Versailles myth" by attributing economic woes like the 1923 hyperinflation directly to the treaty's reparations clause, which demanded 132 billion gold marks (equivalent to about $442 billion in 2023 dollars) for war damages.[207] Proponents, including the German National People's Party (DNVP), argued the treaty's "war guilt" Article 231 and territorial cessions—such as Alsace-Lorraine to France and parts of Schleswig to Denmark—imposed an intolerable burden, eroding national morale and enabling communist and extremist agitation.[219] This view framed Versailles not as a negotiated peace but a "Diktat," with Weimar officials in the early 1920s propagating myths of unilateral Allied imposition to rally public opposition, as seen in campaigns against the 1921 London Schedule of Payments.[220] Empirical evidence, however, contradicts the myth's causal primacy: Germany paid only about 21 billion gold marks in reparations by 1932, a fraction of the total due to moratoriums and revisions like the 1924 Dawes Plan, which restructured payments and included U.S. loans totaling $200 million by 1925.[221] Hyperinflation stemmed primarily from the Reichsbank printing 400 billion marks to finance war deficits and post-armistice strikes, not reparations, which were negligible until 1921; military defeat was evident from supply shortages and 1.5 million desertions by October 1918.[222] These early interpretations, while resonant amid genuine hardships like 6 million unemployed by 1932, overlooked internal factors such as constitutional fragmentation under Article 48's emergency powers, which enabled 12 cabinets in 14 years, prioritizing the myth's external scapegoating over self-inflicted divisions.[223] Nationalist sources promoting the legend, often from biased military memoirs, exhibited selective recall, ignoring Allied documentation of German requests for talks in October 1918.[224] The myth's endurance into the early Nazi era, exploited by Adolf Hitler in Mein Kampf (1925) to decry Versailles as a Jewish-Bolshevik plot, contributed to delegitimizing democratic institutions, yet post-1933 historiography from Allied perspectives began critiquing it as propaganda that masked Germany's aggressive war initiation.[209] While Versailles exacerbated fiscal strains—evident in the 1923 Ruhr occupation after defaulted coal deliveries—causal analysis reveals it as a contributing but not sufficient condition for collapse, with Weimar's failure rooted more in elite polarization and policy intransigence than treaty terms alone. Academic sources from this period, often influenced by interwar diplomacy, sometimes overstated Versailles' leniency to justify containment policies, but primary economic data confirms reparations absorbed less than 2% of GDP annually post-1924.[225]Structuralist vs Intentionalist Debates
The intentionalist school of historiography posits that Adolf Hitler's ideological convictions, as articulated in Mein Kampf (published in 1925) and earlier speeches, formed the blueprint for Nazi ascendancy and the collapse of the Weimar Republic, with the regime's actions reflecting deliberate pursuit of expansionist, antisemitic, and authoritarian goals from the outset.[226] Intentionalists, including historians like Karl Dietrich Bracher and early works by Alan Bullock, argue that Hitler's appointment as Chancellor on January 30, 1933, resulted from his calculated political maneuvering, including alliances with conservative elites who underestimated his resolve to dismantle democratic institutions via the Enabling Act of March 23, 1933.[227] They emphasize Hitler's personal agency, pointing to consistent rhetoric from the 1923 Beer Hall Putsch onward, where he outlined plans to overturn the Treaty of Versailles and establish a Führer-led state, as evidence that Weimar's fall was not accidental but engineered through intentional subversion of parliamentary norms amid the republic's proportional representation system, which fragmented coalitions and enabled the Nazi electoral breakthrough to 37.3% in July 1932.[228][227] In contrast, structuralists contend that the Nazi rise stemmed from systemic dysfunctions in Weimar's political and economic architecture, creating a "polycratic" environment of bureaucratic rivalry and radicalization that Hitler opportunistically navigated rather than masterminded.[226] Pioneered by scholars such as Martin Broszat and Hans Mommsen in the 1970s, this view highlights how Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution (allowing emergency decrees) and chronic instability—exemplified by six cabinets from 1930 to 1933 and unemployment peaking at 6 million in 1932—fostered elite miscalculations, such as Franz von Papen's underestimation of Nazi volatility, leading to Hitler's chancellorship as a perceived stabilizer against communism.[227] Structuralists cite the absence of detailed pre-1933 Nazi blueprints for total power seizure, arguing instead for "cumulative radicalization" driven by lower-level functionaries competing for Hitler's favor in a chaotic state apparatus, which amplified Weimar's inherent flaws like the lack of stable majorities (no party exceeded 30% in Reichstag elections until 1932).[229][226] The debate underscores tensions in attributing causality: intentionalists prioritize Hitler's volition, viewing structural weaknesses as enablers he exploited with foresight, while structuralists stress contingency, downplaying a singular "Hitler factor" in favor of broader institutional erosion from the 1919 constitution's design and post-Versailles economic burdens, such as reparations totaling 132 billion gold marks.[228][227] Later syntheses, like Ian Kershaw's concept of "working towards the Führer" (developed in his 1983 biography), reconcile the views by positing subordinates' initiatives aligned with Hitler's vague directives, explaining the rapid consolidation post-1933 without requiring a rigid preconceived plan.[226] This historiographical divide influences interpretations of Weimar's fragility, with intentionalists warning of ideological threats and structuralists emphasizing preventive institutional reforms, though both affirm the republic's 14-year lifespan (1919–1933) ended not through inevitability but specific conjunctures of crisis and agency.[227][229]Contemporary Lessons on Democratic Fragility
The collapse of the Weimar Republic illustrates how severe economic distress can rapidly undermine public confidence in democratic institutions, as hyperinflation in 1923 rendered savings worthless and associated democratic governance with financial ruin, paving the way for extremist appeals.[190] By late 1923, the exchange rate reached 4.2 trillion German marks per U.S. dollar, with prices doubling every 3.7 days, eroding middle-class support for the republic and fostering perceptions that any alternative authority might restore order.[190] This dynamic underscores a core lesson: fiscal and monetary mismanagement, particularly unchecked money printing to service debts or fund deficits, can delegitimize elected governments faster than ideological opposition alone, as citizens prioritize survival over procedural norms.[230] A second lesson emerges from Weimar's electoral framework, where proportional representation without effective thresholds fragmented the Reichstag into numerous parties, preventing stable majorities and yielding 20 governments in 14 years, many lasting mere months.[7] This system, intended to reflect diverse views, amplified gridlock during crises like the Great Depression, when unemployment soared to 30% by 1932, enabling veto players to block reforms and prolong paralysis.[231] In contemporary terms, pure proportional systems risk similar instability under economic strain, as they incentivize niche parties over broad coalitions capable of decisive action; post-Weimar Germany's 5% threshold adjustment demonstrates how safeguards can mitigate such vulnerabilities without sacrificing representation.[231] Polarization exacerbated Weimar's fragility, as communists and nationalists rejected compromise, with street violence and assassinations—such as the 1922 murder of Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau—normalizing extralegal tactics and alienating moderates from democratic participation.[7] The Nazi vote surged from 2.6% in 1928 to 37.3% in 1932 amid this divide, exploiting elite infighting and public disillusionment rather than inherent democratic flaws alone.[231] Modern parallels highlight the peril of affective polarization, where mutual demonization hinders governance; empirical studies of recent elections show economic downturns amplify such rifts, rewarding demagogues who promise rupture over incremental policy.[232] Finally, the republic's reliance on emergency decrees under Article 48, invoked over 250 times by 1932, blurred lines between crisis response and authoritarian consolidation, culminating in the Enabling Act of March 1933 that formalized Nazi rule.[231] This path warns against habitual circumvention of legislatures via executive fiat, even for legitimate threats, as it habituates publics to suspended norms and empowers opportunistic leaders; historical analyses emphasize that institutional trust erodes when such measures outlast immediate perils, fostering expectations of perpetual "exceptional" governance.[233] While external burdens like Versailles reparations contributed, internal policy choices—failing to balance budgets or build cross-partisan consensus—proved causally decisive, a reminder that democracies endure through resilient economic foundations and adaptive rules rather than mere procedural fidelity.[230]References
- https://www.deutschlandmuseum.de/en/history/[calendar](/page/Calendar)/1919-08-11-the-weimar-constitution/
