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Mogilev Conference
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Date24–26 September 1941
LocationMogilev, German-occupied Byelorussia
TypeWehrmacht conference
ThemeSecurity warfare
Organised byMax von Schenckendorff, commander of Army Group Centre Rear Area
ParticipantsErich von dem Bach-Zelewski, HSSPF for Army Group Centre
Arthur Nebe, commander of Einsatzgruppe B
Hermann Fegelein, commander of the SS Cavalry Brigade
Max Montua [de], commander of Police Regiment Centre
Outcome16-page conference summary distributed to rear security units
Casualties
32 Jewish civilians shot in a field exercise

The Mogilev Conference was a September 1941 Wehrmacht training event aimed at improving security in the rear of Army Group Centre during the German invasion of the Soviet Union. The event was organised by General Max von Schenckendorff, commander of Army Group Centre Rear Area, in cooperation with the officials of the security and intelligence services of Nazi Germany—SS and the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service; SD)—operating in the same area. Ostensibly an "anti-partisan" training conference, the event marked an escalation of violence against Jews and other civilians in the areas under Schenckendorff's command.

Background

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Wehrmacht propaganda photograph of Jewish women in Mogilev, July 1941. Six thousand Mogilev Jews were murdered by SS forces and units of Police Regiment Centre in October 1941.[1]

In June 1941, the Axis Powers launched Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union and by 26 July 1941, Mogilev, Byelorussian SSR, had been occupied by the Wehrmacht. Army Group Centre Rear Area, commanded by General Max von Schenckendorff, established its headquarters there on 7 September,[2] but members of Einsatzgruppe B had entered the city in August and already begun murdering Jews.[3] A ghetto was later established in September; in October 1941, most of the inmates had been murdered as part of two operations.[4]

The Wehrmacht's aggressive security doctrine—and the use of the "security threat" to disguise genocidal policies—resulted in close cooperation between the army and the security apparatus behind the front lines. Einsatzgruppe B was the key killing unit that operated in the territory of Army Group Centre Rear Area, killing thousands of Jews, Communists and Soviet POWs handed over by the army for execution as well as other "undesirables", such as Roma ("Gypsies"), "Asiatics", and the mentally disabled. In July, Einsatzgruppe B commander Arthur Nebe reported that a "solution to the Jewish problem" was "impractical" in his region of operation due to "the overwhelming number of the Jews", that is there were too many Jews to be killed by too few men.[5] By August 1941, Nebe came to realize that his Einsatzgruppe's resources were insufficient to meet the expanded mandate of the killing operations, due to the inclusion of Jewish women and children since that month.[6]

The SS Cavalry Brigade, made up of the 1st and 2nd SS Cavalry Regiments, also participated in mass murder activities targeting Jews in the Byelorussian SSR. In July and August 1941, the unit carried out the Pripyat Marshes massacres resulting in the murder of over 11,000 Jewish civilians. The operation has since been considered a turning point in the transition from "selective mass murder" to the wholesale extermination of the Jewish population in occupied areas.[7] Units of Police Regiment Centre had, by that time, also conducted mass murder of Jews.[8]

In that environment, Schenckendorff, in cooperation with Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, the Higher SS and Police Leader for Army Group Centre, organised a three-day conference for security troops. Held in Mogilev, the meeting aimed to create an "exchange of experiences" for the Wehrmacht rear unit commanders.[9] Police Colonel Max Montua [de], commander of Police Regiment Centre, was in charge of planning and logistics.[10]

The conference

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The conference began on 24 September and focused on "combatting partisans" (Bekämpfung von Partisanen, later Bandenbekämpfung) and reflected Schenckendorff's views on the need for total eradication of the resistance to German forces as the only way to secure the occupied territories.[10] The minutes of the conference, if they had been taken, did not survive. What is known of the conference is based on the agenda, the list of attendees, after-action reports, and the summary distributed by Schenckendorff after the event.[8]

Attendees and speakers

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Invited officers were selected on the basis of their previous participation in security operations, and included representatives of the Army High Command and Army Group Centre.[11] The audience also included battalion commanders and higher-level officers from both SS-Police and the Wehrmacht, including its security divisions, the 221st, the 286th, and the 403rd.[12] In total, 61 officers participated, with 82 percent of attendees coming from Wehrmacht units. Of the attendees, 38 percent were battalion and company-level commanders.[13]

Many had already participated in mass atrocities. For example, the attendees included the commander of the 3rd Battalion in the 354th Infantry Regiment, 286th Security Division. A week prior to the conference, the battalion assisted Einsatzkommando 8 and directly participated in the murder of 1,000 Jews in the town of Krupki.[13]

The speakers included: Arthur Nebe, commander of Einsatzgruppe B; Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, as the representative of Heinrich Himmler; Max Montua, commander of Police Regiment Centre; Hermann Fegelein, commander of the SS Cavalry Brigade; and Gustav Lombard, commander of the 1st SS Cavalry Regiment.[14] The commander of the 2nd SS Cavalry Regiment, Franz Magill, was not invited, perhaps because he was not viewed as extreme enough on the "Jewish question", as he only massacred Jewish males, and not women and children.[8]

Lectures and sand-table sessions

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Presentations covered the evaluation of Soviet "bandit" organisations and tactics, why it was necessary to kill political commissars immediately upon capture, and gaining intelligence from local collaborators. Bach-Zelewski's session was entitled "The Capture of Kommissars and Partisans in 'Scouring-Actions'", referring to the activities of the SS Cavalry Brigade in the Pripyat Marshes massacres. Nebe's talk focused on the role of the SD in the fight against "partisans" and "plunderers". He also covered the "Jewish question", with particular consideration to the anti-partisan movement.[14] Company-grade officers gave short classes or led sand-table exercises on a variety of tactical situations that could be encountered in the field, such as securing a village.[13]

Field exercises

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The conference included three field exercises. On the first day, the participants observed an operation by Police Regiment Centre that involved surrounding a village and distribution of leaflets.[15] On the second day, participants travelled to the village of Knyazhitsy [ru] (German: Knjaschitschi) in the vicinity of Mogilev. There, men of the Police Battalion 322 of Police Regiment Centre conducted a demonstration of how to surround and screen a village. According to the after-action report, "suspicious strangers" (Ortsfremde) or "partisans" could not be found. The screening of the population revealed 51 Jewish civilians, 32 of whom were shot by the police and SD troops.[16]

At dawn on the last day of the conference, participants observed another operation conducted by police troops. The goal was to "practically experience" the combing of the town for suspects who were identified as "partisans, commissars, and communists". After the roundup, the participants observed the interrogations then rejoined their respective units.[17]

Conference summary and aftermath

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A 16-page executive summary of the conference, under Schenckendorff's signature, was distributed to Wehrmacht troops and police units in the rear area. The document focused on tactics of security warfare, while also prescribing harsh measures, such as "the streets should be kept clear of 'wanderers'" who should be handed over to the Secret Field Police or sent to filtration camps for further screening. (Many sent to these camps were killed by the SS and SD troops.) The summary warned that the enemy was employing women, children and the elderly as agents.[18]

The summary proclaimed that "the enemy must be completely annihilated", while specifying that the distinction between a "partisan" and a "suspicious person" was not always possible, thus giving a carte blanche to the troops for the most brutal approach possible. The document was sent to all company-level units in the army group's area of operations, including to units that did not send representatives to the conference. The conference marked a dramatic increase in atrocities by the Wehrmacht units against Jews and other civilians in the final three months of 1941.[18]

The summary had an impact beyond the territory under the control of Army Group Centre Rear Area. The commander of the German army, Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch, issued "Guidelines for the Fighting of Partisans" in October 1941, one month after the conference. Underlining the importance of the event, the closing text of Schenckendorff's summary was reproduced verbatim:[19]

The constant decision between life and death for partisans and suspicious persons is difficult even for the hardest soldier. It must be done. He acts correctly who fights ruthlessly and mercilessly with complete disregard for any personal surge of emotion.

Assessment

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In the opinion of historian Waitman Wade Beorn, the Mogilev Conference was a key event that, in the Army Group Center Rear Area, helped incorporate the Wehrmacht into the Nazi genocide as part of "the anti-partisan war and the Jew-Bolshevik-partisan construct". Since the conference, the Wehrmacht rear units were instructed to cooperate fully with the SD detachments beyond simply providing logistical support. The Wehrmacht units also assumed direct responsibility for the murder of Jews in the territory under Schenckendorff's command. Jewish civilians were added to an approved list of enemies that the army's rear units would then destroy on their own initiative and without the participation of the SS Police or SD.[20]

Although the conference summary did not mention Jews, the field exercises demonstrated that the Wehrmacht was to target Jews in its anti-partisan actions. Beorn concludes that verbal instructions to this effect were, most likely, communicated during the sessions, given the speaker lineup, which included experienced mass murderers such as Bach-Zalewski, Nebe, Lombard, and Fegelein. The anti-Jewish policy had changed radically the month before, with the addition of women and children to the list of targets. This strained the limited resources of the SD and SS organisations. In addition, the German forces had to make room for Jews newly deported from elsewhere in occupied Europe, which was achieved by killing Soviet Jews already concentrated in ghettos. The size of territories under German control increased as well, which limited the activities of these units even further to major population centres.[21]

The conference led to a further conflation of more legitimate anti-partisan warfare against irregular fighters with genocide by identifying civilians as enemy combatants. Euphemistic language helped couch the actions; Wehrmacht reports frequently referred to targets as "stranger to the village", "wanderer", "suspect civilian", "partisan helper", "civilian without identification", and "women soldiers". The exercises during the conference put the punitive operations into military context, by breaking down the actions into something that soldiers could relate to, such as surrounding a village, guarding and escorting the suspects, interrogations, etc.[22]

In explaining the Wehrmacht's willingness to participate in the genocide, Beorn opines that the Wehrmacht's long history of harsh treatment of civilians, paranoia about a not-yet-existent partisan threat, institutional and individual racism, and its own criminal actions against Red Army commissars all predisposed the army towards accepting mass murder. This was done under the guise of anti-partisan warfare where Jews were targeted as Bolsheviks and thus partisan supporters. Consequently, the division between the Holocaust and the anti-partisan war still prevalent in historiography is a false one. Beorn concludes that "the Mogilev conference shows that these two were never separate, but intentionally connected in an effort to include the combat power of the Wehrmacht more efficiently in Hitler's genocidal projects in the east".[23]

References

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Mogilev Conference

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from Grokipedia
The Mogilev Conference was a three-day assembly of approximately 60 security division officers and police unit representatives convened from 24 to 26 September 1941 in the German-occupied city of , , to exchange operational experiences and devise standardized tactics for combating partisans in the rear areas of amid . Organized under the auspices of higher SS and police leader and rear-area commander , the event featured practical demonstrations of village encirclement, suspect interrogations, and summary executions, emphasizing the linkage between Jewish populations and partisan support as justification for their targeted elimination. The conference's proceedings underscored the Wehrmacht's deliberate integration into Nazi genocidal policies, with presentations portraying the of Jewish men, women, and children not merely as punitive measures but as a prerequisite for securing supply lines and eradicating perceived Bolshevik-Jewish threats in White Russia. It produced a 16-page operational guideline document that institutionalized ruthless annihilation tactics for subsequent anti-partisan campaigns, contributing to the escalation of mass killings in during 1941–1942 and evidencing the army's complicity in beyond auxiliary roles. Attendees included figures like and , whose units exemplified the blurred lines between military security and extermination. This gathering marked a pivotal shift in German occupation strategy, transforming anti-partisan warfare into a veneer for systematic , as empirical records from participant reports reveal a consensus on civilian targeting without qualms over legality or morality, challenging postwar narratives of innocence.

Strategic and Operational Context

Operation Barbarossa and the Eastern Front in 1941

, the code name for Nazi Germany's invasion of the , began on June 22, 1941, with a surprise assault along a 1,800-mile front from the Baltic to the , involving approximately 3 million German troops supplemented by , 3,600 tanks, and 2,500 aircraft. The operation's strategic aims encompassed the destruction of the Red Army's main forces west of the and Western Dvina Rivers within weeks, followed by advances to Leningrad, , and to secure resources and eliminate the Soviet regime as a perceived existential threat to German expansion eastward. German planners anticipated a swift campaign modeled on prior successes in and , underestimating Soviet industrial capacity, manpower reserves, and the logistical challenges of operating across immense distances and poor infrastructure. Army Group Center, under Field Marshal , formed the decisive central axis with nine infantry and three panzer divisions, rapidly penetrating Soviet defenses and encircling over 290,000 troops at by July 9, 1941, in one of the largest pockets of the war. The subsequent Battle of Smolensk from July 10 to September 10, 1941, saw further encirclements yielding around 300,000 Soviet prisoners, though at the cost of delaying the drive on and exposing German flanks to counterattacks. By mid-July, forces from Army Group Center reached the River near , which Soviet defenders held in a prolonged until its fall in late July, facilitating German logistics but highlighting emerging supply strains as divisions outran their lines over 600 kilometers deep. Initial German advances captured vast territories, including and much of , but inflicted irreplaceable losses on the while the , despite suffering nearly 4 million casualties by year's end—including over 3 million prisoners—began reconstituting forces through mobilization and anticipation. As autumn set in, Operation Typhoon launched on September 30, 1941, aiming to seize before winter, with Army Group Center resuming its offensive amid deteriorating weather and overextended supply chains that limited fuel and ammunition deliveries. German forces encircled additional Soviet armies at and in October, capturing 660,000 prisoners, yet failed to achieve decisive victory as mud and frost halted mechanized mobility, enabling Soviet reinforcements to mount a counteroffensive from December 5, 1941, that pushed Axis lines back 150-300 kilometers. The 1941 campaign thus transitioned the Eastern Front from German operational dominance to attritional stalemate, with total Soviet losses exceeding 4.5 million dead, wounded, or captured against German casualties of around 830,000, underscoring the invasion's underestimation of Soviet depth and resilience.

Emergence of Partisan Threats Behind German Lines

Following the launch of on June 22, 1941, German forces of Army Group Center rapidly advanced through , capturing key cities such as by June 28 and by early July, leaving behind pockets of encircled units and local Soviet activists. These remnants, numbering in the tens of thousands across the central sector, began coalescing into irregular guerrilla bands amid the chaos of retreat, supplemented by pre-war preparations and cells. Stalin's radio address on July 3, 1941, explicitly urged the formation of partisan detachments to conduct against German rear areas, marking the official Soviet impetus for organized resistance despite initial disarray and low popular support due to widespread disillusionment with Stalinist rule. By mid-1941, approximately 60 independent partisan detachments, each comprising 25-40 fighters primarily from bypassed soldiers and party cadres, operated in occupied , concentrating in forested and marshy terrains like the Pripyat Marshes that hindered German policing. In the Army Group Center rear area specifically, partisan strength reached around 10,000 by late 1941, including skilled units under figures like General Kulik, though early efforts remained fragmented without centralized command until later formations like the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement. These groups drew initial recruits from stragglers—estimated at tens of thousands scattered during the summer encirclements—and local civilians coerced or ideologically motivated, but their effectiveness was curtailed by supply shortages, poor training, and German countermeasures that exploited local anti-Soviet sentiments. Early partisan actions focused on disrupting German , with intensifying in 1941; over 15,000 rail break attempts were recorded that month behind Army Group Center, escalating to more than 20,000 demolitions on critical lines such as Brest-Litovsk-Minsk-Smolensk (903 incidents) and Minsk-Gomel by mid-September. Notable engagements included raids by remnants of the Soviet 32nd Kazakh Division on 6-7, which mined highways and demolished tracks, necessitating frontline German troops to intervene and protect supply routes. Such tactics—night marches, ambushes on convoys, and avoidance of pitched battles—imposed mounting attrition on isolated garrisons and extended supply convoys, though overall impact remained localized due to ineffective explosives and rapid German repairs. The partisan threat escalated by September 1941 as German occupation policies, including requisitions and executions that alienated potential collaborators, shifted local dynamics toward grudging support for guerrillas, compelling Center to divert combat divisions for rear security and highlighting doctrinal failures in anticipating prolonged insurgency. By year's end, hosted about 12,000 partisans in 230 units, inflicting disruptions that strained logistics during the push toward , though Soviet claims of strategic paralysis exaggerated the early scale relative to German operational tempo. German assessments acknowledged the vulnerability of overstretched lines but attributed initial underestimation to expectations of Soviet , a miscalculation compounded by inadequate security divisions.

Pre-Conference Rear Security Policies and Failures

Prior to the Mogilev Conference, German rear security policies for emphasized preemptive ruthlessness against perceived threats in occupied Soviet territories, rooted in directives that blurred military necessity with ideological aims. On May 13, 1941, issued the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order, which exempted Wehrmacht personnel from prosecution for crimes against civilians and authorized summary executions of suspected guerrillas, saboteurs, and politically unreliable elements without trial. Complementary OKW guidelines dated May 19, 1941, instructed forces to apply the harshest measures against Bolshevik agitators, irregular fighters, and , framing them collectively as existential dangers to rear stability. On July 2, 1941, directed units to liquidate saboteurs, explicitly linking such actions to the elimination of Jewish populations suspected of collaboration. Implementation relied on limited rear-area forces, including the 221st, 286th, and 403rd Divisions, which were understrength units of older reservists and territorial troops tasked with policing vast expanses—such as the 221st Division's responsibility for 35,000 square kilometers in . These divisions, supplemented by SS Cavalry Brigades in marshy regions like the Pripet, conducted sweeps and reprisals, often applying ratios like ten civilian executions per German casualty to deter resistance. Soviet partisan authorization occurred only on , 1941, yielding disorganized groups of about 1,162 ill-equipped individuals initially, posing negligible operational disruption. Despite policy mandates, actual partisan threats in Rear Area Center remained minimal through the summer, characterized as an "anti-partisan war without partisans," with organized guerrilla activity not materializing until later years. German reports exaggerated dangers, driven by command and racial that equated with inherent insurgency risks, even absent evidence of civilian involvement. Key failures stemmed from inadequate preparation: the OKH allocated insufficient specialized troops for the immense rear territories exposed by rapid frontline advances, leaving security divisions overstretched and reliant on violence rather than systematic intelligence or infrastructure control. This approach yielded disproportionate outcomes, such as ratios of one German killed to 30 partisans slain and 451 captured, indicating fabricated threats and ineffective deterrence that alienated populations without neutralizing real dangers. Conflation of security with genocidal targeting diverted resources from genuine , fostering long-term instability as early reprisals radicalized survivors and stragglers into future resistance networks.

Conference Preparation and Logistics

Selection of Mogilev as Venue

Mogilev, located in central Belarus, was chosen as the venue for the September 24–26, 1941, Wehrmacht conference primarily due to its strategic position within the rear security zone of Army Group Center, facilitating centralized coordination among units combating partisan activity in the region. As a key logistical hub recently brought under German control, the city offered accessible infrastructure for assembling officers from dispersed security divisions, including those from the 221st, 252nd, 286th, and 403rd Security Divisions, without requiring extensive travel through contested frontline areas. This selection aligned with the conference's focus on refining rear-area pacification tactics, as Mogilev's surroundings exemplified the hybrid threats of Soviet remnants, local irregulars, and early partisan formations that demanded immediate doctrinal adaptation. The city's capture during the Battle of in July 1941, part of the broader Smolensk offensive, underscored its tactical relevance; German forces, including the 78th Infantry Division, overcame stiff resistance, securing the area after weeks of and urban combat that resulted in over 250 casualties for that division on alone. By late summer, with the front having advanced eastward toward , had transitioned into a stabilized administrative under Rear Area command, providing a controlled environment for theoretical lectures, sand-table exercises, and field demonstrations without immediate risk of disruption. Its proximity to active partisan hotspots in White Russia further enabled practical integration of local intelligence and operations, allowing participants to draw on contemporaneous experiences rather than abstract scenarios. Logistical considerations also favored , as its rail connections and existing military facilities supported the influx of approximately 100–150 officers, including guest lecturers from and police units, minimizing resource strain on forward elements. Unlike more distant sites such as or , which faced ongoing administrative overload or vulnerability to Soviet counterattacks, balanced accessibility with operational focus, reflecting pragmatic priorities in adapting pre-invasion security doctrines to the Eastern Front's demands.

Objectives for Training and Doctrine Refinement

The Mogilev Conference, convened from September 24 to 26, 1941, under the auspices of Center's rear area command, aimed to address deficiencies in training for countering Soviet partisan operations that had intensified in the wake of Operation Barbarossa's advance into . A core objective was to standardize instruction for security division personnel, equipping mid-level officers with practical skills in , maneuvers, and village sweeps to disrupt partisan supply networks and ambushes targeting German routes. This training emphasized adaptation to local conditions, including the exploitation of terrain for defensive positions and the use of auxiliary forces drawn from collaborationist units to extend surveillance coverage. Doctrine refinement sought to evolve pre-invasion guidelines, which had proven inadequate against , into a more aggressive framework prioritizing preemptive pacification over mere containment. Participants analyzed early failures, such as unsecured rear zones leading to incidents reported in July and August, to advocate for integrated operations combining sweeps with punitive measures against suspected sympathizers. The promoted doctrinal shifts toward viewing partisans not as isolated bandits but as components of a Soviet-directed , necessitating coordinated efforts between units and SS-police battalions to achieve comprehensive area denial. This included refining protocols for fusion from interrogations and to predict and preempt attacks, with an explicit goal of restoring operational tempo for frontline advances by securing over 100,000 square kilometers of contested territory in . Training objectives extended to fostering among disparate units, including guest instructors from specialized police battalions, to disseminate uniform tactics that minimized resource diversion from the main offensive. Doctrine updates incorporated empirical data from initial encounters, such as the disruption of rail lines near in summer , aiming to reduce partisan-inflicted casualties—which had reached several hundred by —through enhanced doctrines and fortified outpost networks. The event underscored the need for psychological conditioning in regimens, preparing forces for the ideological framing of the conflict as a racial struggle, though primary focus remained on tactical efficacy to sustain Center's momentum toward .

Participants and Expertise

Commanders and Officers from Army Group Center

General der Kavallerie , commander of the Rear Area Army Group Center (Bereichsheeresgebiet Heeresgruppe Mitte) since May 1941, organized and hosted the conference to coordinate anti-partisan efforts amid escalating threats in the occupied Soviet territories. As the highest-ranking authority for rear security in the region, Schenckendorff emphasized ruthless measures against perceived partisans, framing the event as essential for doctrinal refinement and operational unity. Attendees from Army Group Center primarily consisted of officers from security and infantry units responsible for pacification behind the front lines, including regimental commanders and one representative per battalion. Over 50 percent held junior ranks such as captains or lieutenants, underscoring the conference's orientation toward tactical implementation rather than high-level strategy. These officers hailed from formations under Schenckendorff's direct oversight, such as security divisions and provisional units deployed in , where partisan activity and civilian resistance had strained supply lines and rear stability since Operation Barbarossa's advance stalled. The selection of these mid-level commanders reflected practical needs: they were directly accountable for executing orders in contested areas, where empirical reports indicated intertwined threats from Soviet remnants, local , and—per conference rhetoric— equated with Bolshevik . No comprehensive roster of individual names survives in declassified records, but the group's composition prioritized field expertise over elite staff, enabling dissemination of lessons to company-level operations across Center's rear zone. This structure facilitated causal linkages between theoretical directives and on-ground atrocities, as officers returned equipped to apply expanded definitions of "partisan" targets.

Security Division Representatives and Guest Lecturers

The Mogilev Conference, held from September 24 to 26, 1941, included approximately 60 officers, with the majority—around 82 percent or 49 attendees—drawn from the , particularly rear-area formations operating behind Army Group Center. Representatives from divisions formed a core group, reflecting the conference's focus on refining anti-partisan tactics in occupied Soviet territories; these units, such as the 221st, 286th, and 403rd Divisions, were tasked with pacification duties and bore direct responsibility for implementing harsh measures, including reprisals against suspected partisan supporters. About 38 percent of participants were or commanders from these divisions, providing operational expertise from frontline experiences in White Russia. Notable security division attendees included Major Johannes Waldow, commander of the 3rd , 354th , 286th Division, whose unit had collaborated with 8 in the execution of approximately 1,000 in Krupki earlier that month. Captain Balitzki of the 350th (affiliated with a security division in the region) also participated and later advocated for radical policies targeting Jewish populations as part of anti-partisan efforts. These officers contributed insights from their divisions' encounters with low-level and resistance, which the conference framed as interconnected threats from Bolshevik remnants, including political commissars and civilians. Complementing the security division contingent were guest lecturers from SS and police units, invited to share specialized knowledge on combating and integrating ideological imperatives into military operations. , commander of Einsatzgruppe B, delivered presentations on the "Jewish Question" and the necessity of Wehrmacht-SS cooperation in the anti-partisan war, emphasizing the linkage between Jewish elements, , and guerrilla activity. , Higher SS and Police Leader in , spoke on techniques for capturing commissars and partisans, drawing from ongoing operations. Additional guest contributions came from SS cavalry and police commanders: , commander of the , outlined lessons from sweeps against partisans; , commander of SS Cavalry Regiment 1, led the morning session on September 25, focusing on mobile anti-guerrilla tactics; and Max Montua, commander of Police Regiment Center, presented experiences in pacification efforts. These lectures underscored a consensus on expansive doctrines, where distinguishing combatants from non-combatants was deprioritized in favor of to deter resistance.

Core Activities and Content

Theoretical Lectures on Counterinsurgency

The theoretical lectures at the Mogilev Conference, conducted from September 24 to 26, 1941, in Mogilev, Belarus, provided doctrinal instruction on anti-partisan warfare for Wehrmacht officers from Army Group Center's rear areas. These sessions, delivered by senior Wehrmacht and SS representatives, focused primarily on "The Partisan, His Organization, and His Suppression," a key instructional document formalized on October 12, 1941. The lectures outlined partisan structures, including their reliance on local support networks, infiltration tactics, and operational patterns observed in Soviet rear areas since the launch of Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941. Counterinsurgency principles emphasized in the lectures prioritized rapid, overwhelming responses to partisan activity, rejecting restraint in favor of area-wide pacification. Instructors advocated of villages and populations suspected of aiding insurgents, arguing that individual identification was impractical amid widespread Bolshevik agitation and Jewish involvement in . This approach drew from pre-invasion guidelines but escalated them by integrating racial-ideological targeting, positing as inherent partisan enablers due to their alleged loyalty to Soviet commissars and propensity for guerrilla coordination. Lectures stressed that mass executions and village burnings deterred support, with examples cited from early 1941 operations in and where such measures reduced ambush incidents by disrupting supply lines. Doctrinal refinements included coordination between military and police units, with lectures recommending joint sweeps to encircle partisan bands while securing rear communications against rail sabotage, which had intensified by August 1941. Suppression tactics highlighted intelligence from interrogations and local collaborators, but warned against over-reliance on unreliable Soviet auxiliaries, advocating instead for preemptive demographic clearances in high-risk zones. These principles aligned counterinsurgency with broader war aims, framing partisans not merely as military threats but as extensions of Judeo-Bolshevik resistance, thereby justifying unrestricted violence to maintain logistical lines for the advance on Moscow. No verbatim transcripts survive, but conference agendas preserved in German military archives confirm the lectures' role in standardizing these harsh methods across security divisions.

Tactical Simulations via Sand-Table Sessions

The Mogilev Conference, held from September 2 to 4, 1941, incorporated sand-table sessions as a key component of its practical training on rear-area security tactics. These exercises, led primarily by company-grade officers from participating security units, utilized physical terrain models constructed with sand, figurines, and markers to replicate the Belarusian landscape and simulate partisan operations behind German lines. The sessions emphasized small-unit maneuvers to counter threats such as ambushes on supply convoys, infiltration into rear areas, and of rail lines, drawing from recent field experiences in Center's sector where partisan activity had disrupted logistics following the initial advance of . Participants practiced encirclement tactics, including coordinated sweeps through villages and forests to flush out hidden guerrilla bands, with models illustrating the use of — platoons supported by limited or police auxiliaries—to minimize escapes while maximizing enemy casualties. Emphasis was placed on rapid response to intelligence from locals or patrols, reflecting directives to treat suspected partisans and their supporters without distinction, often incorporating the ideological framing of as inherent Bolshevik agents embedded in the civilian population. These simulations highlighted vulnerabilities in extended supply routes, where small partisan groups of 10-50 fighters could inflict disproportionate damage using hit-and-run methods, prompting discussions on fortifying garrisons and preemptive village burnings to deny cover. The sand-table work complemented theoretical lectures by allowing iterative problem-solving, where officers rotated roles as commanders or simulated partisan leaders to test flanking maneuvers and blocking positions. Outcomes from these sessions informed immediate refinements in doctrine, such as prioritizing over individual targeting to deter , though evaluations noted challenges in manpower shortages and unfamiliarity. Approximately 100-150 officers from security divisions, SS cavalry, and engaged in these exercises, fostering interoperability amid escalating threats that had already caused over 1,000 German casualties in the rear by late summer 1941.

Practical Field Exercises and Demonstrations

The practical field exercises at the Mogilev Conference, held September 24–26, 1941, formed a key component of the , shifting from theoretical discussions to live demonstrations of anti-partisan tactics by operational units. These hands-on sessions, observed by approximately 60 officers primarily from security divisions and SS-police formations, aimed to illustrate the execution of cordon-and-search operations, interrogations, and punitive measures against suspected partisan supporters in rural settings. On September 25, Police Battalion 322 staged a demonstration 14 kilometers northwest of , encircling a town, systematically searching homes, and interrogating residents for partisan activity. With no partisans located, the exercise proceeded to exemplary executions: 32 —13 men and 19 women—were shot by a supporting 16-man (SD) detachment, underscoring the preset integration of racial targeting into anti- protocols even absent direct threats. This operation highlighted tactics of collective deterrence, where civilian populations, particularly equated with Bolshevik-partisan networks, faced immediate to enforce compliance. The following day, September 26, Security Regiment 2 conducted a parallel exercise focused on population registration, seizure of alleged partisans or commissars, and targeted interrogations of former communists and forest-dwellers presumed to harbor guerrillas. This included "instruction" of the populace through displays of , emphasizing rapid sweeps, exploitation, and preemptive strikes on potential support bases to secure rear areas. Such demonstrations, drawn from ongoing operations in , reinforced a of total ruthlessness, where operational success metrics prioritized enemy annihilation over minimal , influencing subsequent large-scale sweeps like those modeled after the conference. These exercises, absent detailed minutes but evidenced in surviving agendas and unit reports, bridged doctrinal lectures with field application, training commanders to implement Schenckendorff's guidelines for partisan suppression amid escalating . While framed as necessities, they exemplified the fusion of with ideological extermination, targeting as inherent threats regardless of partisan involvement.

Resolutions and Directives

Key Takeaways on Pacification Strategies

The Mogilev Conference emphasized that effective pacification of rear areas demanded operations of equal priority to frontline combat, rejecting any distinction between forward and rear security zones. General , in his opening address on September 24, 1941, outlined that partisans relied extensively on civilian networks for intelligence, supplies, and shelter, necessitating measures to sever these links through systematic disruption of local populations. This approach codified , where villages suspected of aiding insurgents faced immediate reprisals, including and hostage executions, with ratios often set at 10 civilians per German casualty to deter . Conference resolutions advocated for integrated "large operations" (Grossunternehmen) involving Wehrmacht security divisions, SS, and police battalions to cordon and comb forested or rural zones, a tactic demonstrated in sand-table exercises and field reviews during the event. These sweeps prioritized ambushes, blockades, and rapid response units over static garrisons, with directives to exploit local auxiliaries—such as requisitioned villagers or captured Soviet POWs—for guides and labor, while maintaining strict oversight to prevent sabotage. Pacification metrics focused on reported "partisan" eliminations, which by late 1941 tallied over 80,000 in Army Group Center's rear, though German losses remained low at around 1,000, reflecting tactics that blurred combatants and non-combatants. A core takeaway integrated ideological framing into , positing and Bolshevik elements as inherent partisan enablers, thus justifying their preemptive removal from pacified areas as a imperative. Schenckendorff's post-conference guidelines, disseminated as "Directives for Combating s," formalized this by endorsing cooperation with SS units for "special tasks" targeting such groups, enabling complicity in exterminatory actions under the guise of rear-area stabilization. This shift marked a departure from pre-invasion planning, prioritizing total denial of resources to insurgents over minimal-force policing, with scorched-earth application—destroying crops, livestock, and infrastructure—to render territories uninhabitable for guerrilla sustainment. Implementation directives stressed relentless aggression, warning that hesitation invited escalation of threats; units were instructed to operate without restraint in "bandit-infested" regions, incorporating psychological terror via public executions and village razings to enforce compliance. While some officers noted logistical strains from dispersed forces, the consensus affirmed that pacification succeeded only through overwhelming force and , influencing subsequent operations like those modeled after the conference in . These strategies yielded short-term reductions in reported attacks but at the cost of alienating broader bases, as evidenced by rising actual resistance post-1941.

Integration of Ideological and Military Approaches

The Mogilev Conference, held from September 2 to 4, 1941, under the direction of General , commander of Rear Area, Army Group Center, explicitly linked Nazi racial ideology to tactics by framing as manifestations of a "Jewish-Bolshevik" inherent to the enemy population. Lectures by SS and police officials, including Higher SS and Police Leader , instructed attendees that partisans could not be separated from their ideological base, necessitating the destruction of entire villages and suspect groups without distinction, as "where the partisan is, there is the Jew, and where the Jew is, there is the partisan." This integration manifested in directives that merged military operations—such as large-scale sweeps (Grossunternehmen) and sand-table simulations—with ideological imperatives to eradicate perceived racial threats, effectively redefining anti-partisan warfare as a tool for implementing the in the rear areas. The "Jew-Bolshevik-partisan calculus" was codified, portraying as natural allies of and thus legitimate targets in security operations, which blurred combatant-civilian lines and justified the Wehrmacht's cooperation with SS in mass executions reported as partisan killings. Attendees, including regimental commanders, were trained to view restraint as counterproductive to the war's ideological goals, leading to orders for ruthless pacification that prioritized elimination over mere suppression. Practically, this fusion extended to field exercises demonstrating combined arms with ideological vetting, where captured "partisans" were to be interrogated for Bolshevik affiliations before execution, reinforcing the narrative that military victory required ideological purity in occupied territories. The conference's outcomes, disseminated via Schenckendorff's reports, embedded this approach in Army Group Center's doctrine, resulting in operations like those in October 1941 that systematically incorporated SS units for targeting Jewish populations under the anti-partisan pretext. While some Wehrmacht officers initially resisted the ideological overlay due to traditional military ethics, the prevailing directives prioritized total war against an ideologically defined enemy, contributing to the escalation of atrocities in Belarus.

Implementation and Consequences

Dissemination of Conference Lessons to Units

Following the Mogilev Conference of September 24–26, 1941, General , commander of Center Rear Area, compiled a 16-page of the proceedings, emphasizing ruthless tactics, including the targeting of civilians such as the elderly, women, and children as potential partisan scouts, and the systematic elimination of all perceived enemies without quarter. This document explicitly linked Jews to partisan activity, with presentations like Arthur Nebe's on "The Jewish Question as a Partisan Question" framing Jewish populations as inherent threats requiring extermination to secure rear areas. The summary was disseminated widely within Center Rear Area, reaching down to -level commands by October 12, , to ensure uniform application of the conference's operational and ideological guidelines across , SS, and police units. It was retransmitted in November specifically to police s for reinforced implementation, promoting closer -SD collaboration in "pacification" efforts. Attendees, including and commanders (comprising 38% of the roughly 60 participants), returned to their units with direct instructions, such as the maxim "where there is a Jew, there is a partisan," which justified preemptive killings. Implementation was immediate and evident in field operations; for instance, two officers from the 1st Battalion, 691st Regiment, who attended the conference, ordered of approximately 150 in the village of Krucha on , 1941, applying the disseminated linkage between and partisans. Units like the 339th Division incorporated SD guidance on "solving the Jewish Problem" into routine sweeps by early November 1941, while the 286th Security Division exhibited a marked surge in civilian violence, particularly against , starting in . These actions reflected the conference's core directive to treat anti-partisan warfare as , blurring lines between combatants and non-combatants to achieve rear-area security.

Short-Term Effects on Anti-Partisan Operations

The Mogilev Conference, held from 24 to 26 September 1941, directly influenced the escalation of German anti-partisan operations in by standardizing brutal practices among security divisions. Participants, including officers from Rear Area Army Group Center under General , shared field experiences that emphasized treating entire villages and Jewish populations as potential partisan supporters, justifying reprisals such as mass executions and village burnings to deter resistance. This approach, framed as (bandit combat), was disseminated through follow-up directives, leading to immediate application in sweeps across occupied territories. In the months following the conference, from October 1941 to March 1942, German security forces reported heightened operational tempo, with units like the 286th Security Division conducting cordon-and-search actions that killed thousands of civilians under suspicion of aiding partisans. German casualties from partisan attacks remained modest at approximately 1,993 soldiers over this period—averaging 200 per month—yet responses involved disproportionate reprisals, including the systematic targeting of as ideological carriers of , aligning anti-partisan warfare with emerging extermination policies. These measures achieved short-term suppression of partisan activity in key rear areas during the 1941-42 winter, as German pacification efforts disrupted Soviet guerrilla organization amid harsh weather and supply shortages. However, the reliance on indiscriminate violence fostered resentment, sowing seeds for partisan resurgence by spring 1942, while prioritizing terror over sustainable control. The conference's legacy in this phase underscored a causal shift toward genocidal , where military security rationales masked broader ideological extermination goals.

Long-Term Outcomes for German Control in Belarus

The Conference's directives, which advocated for the destruction of villages and collective punishments to sever partisan logistics and support bases, were disseminated to units in , resulting in operations that razed over 5,000 settlements and killed an estimated 345,000 civilians between 1941 and 1944. These measures, rooted in equating partisan activity with Jewish-Bolshevik , temporarily cleared some areas but provoked broader civilian alienation, as reprisals often targeted non-combatants unrelated to resistance, fostering recruitment into Soviet-led groups. Despite such efforts, partisan forces expanded dramatically, from fragmented units numbering in the low thousands in late to 374,000 fighters by summer 1944, with over 1,200 detachments operating across Belarusian forests and swamps. German operations, including large-scale sweeps like those in 1942-1943, inflicted heavy short-term losses on partisans but failed to dismantle their , as mobile units evaded encirclements and exploited terrain for ambushes on supply convoys, which accounted for up to 10% of logistical disruptions in the rear. By 1943-1944, the commitment of 10-25 German divisions—roughly 15% of Center's strength—to anti-partisan duties diluted frontline reserves, exacerbating vulnerabilities amid Soviet offensives. This resource drain, combined with partisan intelligence and sabotage aiding advances, culminated in the collapse of German control during (June-July 1944), where was liberated in weeks, with retreating forces suffering over 400,000 casualties and the loss of 28 divisions. The conference-inspired strategy thus yielded pyrrhic tactical gains but accelerated strategic defeat by entrenching a cycle of escalating resistance that outpaced German pacification capacity.

Evaluations and Debates

Measures of Operational Success Against Partisans

German assessments of operational success in anti-partisan campaigns in , influenced by tactics standardized at the Mogilev Conference, centered on body counts of alleged partisans and suspected supporters, often encompassing civilians labeled as "bandits." Reports tallied kills during sweeps, with examples including 389 partisans eliminated in Operation Swamp Fever (1942) and 1,674 in Operation Hamburg (1942), reflecting a focus on high elimination rates to claim pacification. These figures prioritized confirmed and unverified deaths over verified combatant status, enabling inflated success narratives despite inclusion of non-combatants such as and villagers. Additional metrics included destruction of partisan infrastructure and temporary area control, measured by villages burned, bases razed, and "dead zones" established where populations were evacuated or annihilated to deny support. In 1943's Operation , for instance, 9,500 bandits or suspects were reported killed alongside clearance of extensive swamp regions, while Operation Hermann claimed 4,199 kills and evacuation of 25,934 inhabitants from 15 communities under the 221st Security Division. German casualty ratios underscored perceived efficacy, with one analysis of White Russia operations yielding approximately 30 partisans killed per German loss and one German death per 451 prisoners taken, indicating low troop attrition relative to claimed enemy reductions. Longer-term evaluations, however, revealed limitations, as partisan forces expanded from around 150,000 in to over 100,000 by late , suggesting that kill tallies did not translate to sustained suppression amid growing Soviet coordination and . Operations post-Mogilev emphasized ideological framing of all resistance as eliminable threats, but empirical data on reduced or secured supply lines remained anecdotal, with rear-area security deteriorating as partisan attacks intensified. Historians note that while short-term sweeps yielded numerical "victories," systemic overcounting of civilians as combatants undermined claims of strategic success, prioritizing terror over precise .

Criticisms of Brutality and Civilian Targeting

Historians have critiqued the Mogilev Conference for endorsing anti-partisan tactics that systematically blurred the distinction between combatants and , thereby enabling widespread reprisals against non-combatants under the pretext of operations. The event's presentations, including field demonstrations of village burnings and executions, formalized the treatment of Jewish populations as inherent partisan supporters, integrating racial extermination into . This approach, as analyzed by George C. Browder, represented a pivotal escalation in Wehrmacht-SS , adding to an official list of enemies for systematic elimination in rear areas like White Russia, where empirical evidence from occupation records shows civilian targeting far outstripped verifiable threats. The brutality disseminated from the conference contributed to staggering civilian casualties in , where German forces conducted operations resulting in over 300,000 deaths between 1941 and 1944, predominantly among unarmed villagers through collective punishments such as hostage shootings and the destruction of 5,295 settlements. These figures, derived from German military reports and forensic analyses, indicate that ratios often exceeded 100 civilians per confirmed partisan, prioritizing terror over tactical efficacy and exacerbating local resistance rather than pacifying it. Critics like highlight how such excesses, rooted in the conference's ideological framing, undermined any pretense of measured by equating entire communities with Bolshevik-Judeo threats. Internal reservations, voiced by rear-area commanders such as General , decried the SS-led methods promoted at as excessively radical, arguing they alienated potential collaborators and swelled partisan ranks from roughly 30,000 in late 1941 to over 370,000 by 1944. Despite these pragmatic critiques, documented in occupation diaries and orders, the conference's directives prevailed, subordinating operational concerns to Nazi racial imperatives and rendering civilian protections illusory. Post-war evaluations, including those from the International Military Tribunal, further condemned these practices as violations of warfare conventions, with evidence from survivor testimonies and perpetrator confessions underscoring the deliberate orchestration of civilian suffering.

Alternative Perspectives on Necessity vs. Excess

Some military historians contend that the conference's emphasis on integrating SS-police and efforts against partisans reflected tactical necessities in a vast, hostile theater where rear-area disruptions threatened supply lines critical to the Eastern Front advance. , in his keynote address on September 24, 1941, argued for uncompromising violence against perceived "Jewish-Bolshevik" networks, claiming that half-measures invited escalation from irregular fighters embedded in civilian populations; this view aligned with pre-conference reports of , such as attacks on rail infrastructure, which numbered in the dozens by late summer 1941. Counterarguments, supported by operational data from security divisions, highlight the measures' excess relative to the actual threat: the 286th Security Division, for example, recorded only 18 German deaths and 50 wounded from partisans between June and , against 8,131 prisoners taken, indicating a low-intensity inflated to justify broader targeting. Post-conference executions, including the 691st Regiment's killing of at least 150 in Krucha village under the rationale "where there is a Jew, there is a partisan," shifted focus from verifiable combatants to preemptive , blending military directives with Nazi racial ideology. Empirical outcomes further underscore counterproductive excess: while short-term sweeps like Operation Pripet Marshes in July-August 1941 claimed 14,178 lives, partisan forces expanded from roughly 30,000 in 1941 to 150,000 by mid-1942, fueled by reprisals that destroyed 8,526 villages and killed 550,000 alongside 400,000 other civilians, radicalizing neutral populations and amplifying —such as 21,300 rail incidents in August 1943 alone. Analyses of dynamics suggest that indiscriminate terror, though deterring some collaboration, eroded long-term control by generating widespread enmity, contrasting with more targeted approaches that might have isolated genuine guerrillas.

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