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Bolshevism
Bolshevism
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Bolshevism (derived from Bolshevik) is a revolutionary socialist current of Soviet Leninist and later Marxist–Leninist political thought and political regime associated with the formation of a rigidly centralized, cohesive and disciplined party of social revolution, focused on overthrowing the existing capitalist state system, seizing power and establishing the "dictatorship of the proletariat".[1][2]

Bolshevism originated at the beginning of the 20th century in Russia and was associated with the activities of the Bolshevik faction within the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party led by Vladimir Lenin, Bolshevism's main theorist. Other theoreticians included Joseph Stalin, Leon Trotsky, Nikolai Bukharin and Yevgeni Preobrazhensky.[2] While Bolshevism was based on Marxist philosophy, it also absorbed elements of the ideology and practice of the socialist revolutionaries of the second half of the 19th century (Sergey Nechaev, Pyotr Tkachev, Nikolay Chernyshevsky) and was influenced by Russian agrarian socialist movements like the Narodniks.[3][4]

In October 1917, the Bolshevik Party won a majority in the revolutionary workers' councils (soviets) which had been formed throughout Russia following the February Revolution. It subsequently organized the October Revolution, which overthrew the Provisional Government and replaced it with a state power under the control of the soviets, led by the Bolsheviks along with other left-wing socialists.

Some researchers[5] attribute to Bolshevik theory the program of Joseph Stalin, who headed the All–Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and at the same time possessed full state power in the Soviet Union. However, others (both Stalin's contemporaries and later) do not confuse "Bolshevism" and "Stalinism" proper, considering them to be multidirectional (revolutionary and thermidorian) phenomena.[6]

The expression "Bolshevism", and later "Communism", has become established in Western historiography in the sense of a certain set of features of Soviet power in a certain political period. At present, the name "Bolsheviks" is actively used by various groups of Marxist–Leninists and Trotskyists.

Concepts

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Dictatorship of the proletariat

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Either the dictatorship of the landowners and capitalists, or the dictatorship of the proletariat [...] There is no middle course [...] There is no middle course anywhere in the world, nor can there be.

—Lenin, claiming that people had only two choices; a choice between two different, but distinct class dictatorships.[7]

Lenin, according to his interpretation of Marx's theory of the state, believed democracy to be unattainable anywhere in the world before the proletariat seized power.[7] According to Marxist theory, the state is a vehicle for oppression and is headed by a ruling class,[7] an "organ of class rule".[8] He believed that during his lifetime, the only viable solution was dictatorship since the war was heading into a final conflict between the "progressive forces of socialism and the degenerate forces of capitalism".[9] The Russian Revolution of 1917 was already a failure according to its original aim, which was to act as an inspiration for a world revolution.[9] As a result, the initial anti-statist posture and the active campaigning for direct democracy was replaced with dictatorship.[9] From the perspective of the Bolsheviks, the rationale for this change was Russia's lack of development, its status as the sole socialist state in the world, its encirclement by imperialist powers, and its internal encirclement by the peasantry.[10]

Marx, similar to Lenin, considered it fundamentally irrelevant whether a bourgeois state was ruled according to a republican, parliamentarian, or constitutionally monarchic political system because this did not change the mode of production itself.[11] These systems, regardless of whether they are ruled by an oligarchy or by mass participation, were ultimately all a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie by definition because the bourgeoisie, by the very condition of their class and its interests, would promote and implement policies in their class interests and thus in defense of capitalism.[12] There was a difference, though; Lenin, after the failures of the world revolutions, argued that this did not necessarily have to change under the dictatorship of the proletariat.[13] The reasoning came from wholly practical considerations: the majority of the country's inhabitants were not communists and the party could not introduce parliamentary democracy since that was inconsistent with their ideology and would lead to the party losing power.[13] He therefore concluded that "[t]he form of government has absolutely nothing to do with" the nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat.[13] Bukharin and Trotsky agreed with Lenin, both claiming that the revolution had only destroyed the old, but failing completely in creating anything sort of new.[14] Lenin had now concluded that the dictatorship of the proletariat would not alter the relationship of power between persons, but rather "transform their productive relations so that, in the long run, the realm of necessity could be overcome and, with that, genuine social freedom realised".[15]

It was in the period of 1920–1921 that Soviet leaders and ideologists began differentiating between socialism and communism; hitherto the two terms had been used to describe similar conditions.[15] From then, the two terms developed separate meanings. According to Soviet ideology, Russia was in the transition from capitalism to socialism (referred to interchangeably under Lenin as the dictatorship of the proletariat), socialism being the intermediate stage to communism, with the latter being the final stage which follows after socialism.[15] By now, the party leaders believed that universal mass participation and true democracy could only take form in the last stage, if only because of Russia's current conditions at the time.[15]

[Because] the proletariat is still so divided, so degraded, so corrupted in parts [...] that an organization taking in the whole proletariat cannot directly exercise proletarian dictatorship. It can be exercised only by a vanguard that has absorbed the revolutionary energy of the class.

— Lenin, explaining the increasingly dictatorial nature of the regime.[16]

In early Bolshevik discourse, the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" was of little significance; the few times it was mentioned, it was likened to the form of government which had existed in the Paris Commune.[15] With the ensuing Russian Civil War and the social and material devastation that followed, however, its meaning was transformed from communal democracy to disciplined totalitarian rule.[17] By now, Lenin had concluded that only a proletarian regime as oppressive as its opponents could survive in this world.[18] The powers previously bestowed upon the soviets were now given to the Council of People's Commissars; the central government was in turn to be governed by "an army of steeled revolutionary Communists [by Communists he referred to the Party]".[16] In a letter to Gavril Myasnikov, Lenin in late 1920 explained his new reinterpretation of the term "dictatorship of the proletariat";[19]

Dictatorship means nothing more nor less than authority untrammelled by any laws, absolutely unrestricted by any rules whatever, and based directly on force. The term 'dictatorship' has no other meaning but this.[19]

Lenin justified these policies by claiming that all states were class states by nature, and that these states were maintained through class struggle.[19] This meant that the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union could only be "won and maintained by the use of violence against the bourgeoisie".[19] The main problem with this analysis is that the Party came to view anyone opposing or holding alternate views of the party as bourgeoisie.[19] The worst enemy remained the moderates, however, which were "objectively" considered to be "the real agents of the bourgeoisie in the working class movement, the labour lieutenants of the capitalist class".[20]

Consequently, "bourgeoisie" became synonymous with "opponent" and with people who disagreed with the party in general.[21] These oppressive measures led to another reinterpretation of the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialism in general; it was now defined as a purely economic system.[22] Slogans and theoretical works about democratic mass participation and collective decision-making were now replaced with texts which supported authoritarian management.[22] Considering the situation, the party believed it had to use the same powers as the bourgeoisie to transform Russia, for there was no other alternative.[23] Lenin began arguing that the proletariat, similar to the bourgeoisie, did not have a single preference for a form of government, and because of that dictatorship was acceptable to both the party and the proletariat.[24] In a meeting with party officials, Lenin stated—in line with his economist view of socialism—that "[i]ndustry is indispensable, democracy is not", further arguing that "we do not promise any democracy or any freedom".[24]

Anti-imperialism

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Imperialism is capitalism at a stage of development at which the dominance of monopolies and finance-capital is established; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun; in which the divisions of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed.

—Lenin, citing the main features of capitalism in the age of imperialism in Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism.[25]

The Marxist theory on imperialism was conceived by Lenin in his book, Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism (published in 1917).[26] It was written in response to the theoretical crisis within Marxist thought, which occurred due to capitalism's recovery in the 19th century.[26] According to Lenin, imperialism was a specific stage of development of capitalism; a stage he referred to as state monopoly capitalism.[26] The Marxist movement was split on how to solve capitalism's resurgence and revitalisation after the great depression of the late-19th century.[27] Eduard Bernstein, from the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SDP), considered capitalism' revitalisation as proof that capitalism was evolving into a more humane system, further adding that the basic aims of socialists were not to overthrow the state, but rather to take power through elections.[27] On the other hand, Karl Kautsky, from the SDP, held a highly dogmatic view, claiming that there was no crisis within Marxist theory.[27] Both of them, however, denied or belittled the role of class contradictions in society after the crisis.[27] In contrast, Lenin believed that capitalism' resurgence was the beginning of a new phase of capitalism; this stage being created because of a strengthening of class contradiction, not because of its reduction.[27]

Lenin did not know when the imperialist stage of capitalism began, and claimed it would be foolish to look for a specific year, however he did assert it began at the beginning of the 20th century (at least in Europe).[25] Lenin believed that the economic crisis of 1900 accelerated and intensified the concentration of industry and banking, which led to the transformation of the finance capital connection to industry into the monopoly of large banks."[28] In Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin wrote; "the twentieth century marks the turning-point from the old capitalism to the new, from the domination of capital in general to the domination of finance capital."[28] Lenin's defines imperialism as the monopoly stage of capitalism.[29]

Despite radical anti-imperialism being an original core value of Bolshevism, the Soviet Union from 1939 onward was widely viewed as a de facto imperial power whose ideology could not allow it to admit its own imperialism. Through the Soviet ideological viewpoint, pro-Soviet factions in each country were the only legitimate voice of "the people" regardless of whether they were minority factions. All other factions were simply class enemies of "the people", inherently illegitimate rulers regardless of whether they were majority factions. Thus, in this view, any country that became Soviet or a Soviet ally naturally did so via a legitimate voluntary desire, even if the requesters needed Soviet help to accomplish it. The principal examples were the Soviet invasion of Finland yielding the annexation of Finnish parts of Karelia, the Soviet invasion of Poland, the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states, and the postwar de facto dominance over the satellite states of the Eastern Bloc under a pretense of total independence. In the post-Soviet era even many Ukrainians, Georgians, and Armenians feel that their countries were forcibly annexed by the Bolsheviks, but this has been a problematic view because the pro-Soviet factions in these societies were once sizable as well. Each faction felt that the other did not represent the true national interest. This civil war–like paradox has been seen in the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, as pro-Russian Crimeans have been viewed as illegitimate by pro-Ukrainian Crimeans, and vice versa.

Peaceful coexistence

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The loss by imperialism of its dominating role in world affairs and the utmost expansion of the sphere in which the laws of socialist foreign policy operate are a distinctive feature of the present stage of social development. The main direction of this development is toward even greater changes in the correlation of forces in the world arena in favour of socialism."

Nikolay Inozemtsev, a Soviet foreign policy analyst, referring to series of events (which he believed) would lead to the ultimate victory of socialism.[30]

"Peaceful coexistence" was an ideological concept introduced under Khrushchev's rule.[31] While the concept has been interpreted by fellow communists as proposing an end to the conflict between the systems of capitalism and socialism, Khrushchev saw it instead as a continuation of the conflict in every area with the exception in the military field.[32] The concept claimed that the two systems were developed "by way of diametrically opposed laws", which led to "opposite principles in foreign policy."[30]

The concept was steeped in Leninist and Stalinist thought.[30] Lenin believed that international politics were dominated by class struggle, and Stalin stressed in the 1940s the growing polarization which was occurring in the capitalist and socialist systems.[30] Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence was based on practical changes which had occurred; he accused the old "two camp" theory of neglecting the non-aligned movement and the national liberation movements.[30] Khrushchev considered these "grey areas", in which the conflict between capitalism and socialism would be fought.[30] He still stressed that the main contradiction in international relations were those of capitalism and socialism.[30] The Soviet Government under Khrushchev stressed the importance of peaceful coexistence, claiming it had to form the basis of Soviet foreign policy.[30] Failure to do, they believed, would lead to nuclear conflict.[30] Despite this, Soviet theorists still considered peaceful coexistence as a continuation of the class struggle between the capitalist and socialist worlds, just not one based on armed conflict.[30] Khrushchev believed that the conflict, in its current phase, was mainly economical.[30]

The emphasis on peaceful coexistence did not mean that the Soviet Union accepted a static world, with clear lines.[30] They continued to uphold the creed that socialism was inevitable, and they sincerely believed that the world had reached a stage in which the "correlations of forces" were moving towards socialism.[30] Also, with the establishment of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and Asia, Soviet foreign policy-planners believed that capitalism had lost its dominance as an economic system.[30]

Socialism in one country

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The concept of "socialism in one country" was conceived by Stalin in his struggle against Leon Trotsky and his concept of permanent revolution.[33] In 1924, Trotsky published his pamphlet Lessons of October in which he stated that socialism in the Soviet Union would fail because of the backward state of economic development unless a world revolution began.[33] Stalin responded to Trotsky's pamphlet with his article, "October and Comrade Trotsky's Theory of Permanent Revolution".[34] In it, Stalin stated, that he did not believe an inevitable conflict between the working class and the peasants would take place, further adding that "socialism in one country is completely possible and probable".[34] Stalin held the view common amongst most Bolsheviks at the time; there was possibility of real success for socialism in the Soviet Union despite the country's backwardness and international isolation.[34] While Grigoriy Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev and Nikolai Bukharin, together with Stalin, opposed Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution, they diverged on how socialism could be built.[34] According to Bukharin, Zinoviev and Kamenev supported the resolution of the 14th Conference (held in 1925) which stated that "we cannot complete the building of socialism due to our technological backwardness."[34] Despite the rather cynical attitude, Zinoviev and Kamenev did believe that a defective form of socialism could be constructed.[34] At the 14th Conference, Stalin reiterated his position, claiming that socialism in one country was feasible despite the capitalist blockade of the country.[35] After the conference, Stalin wrote "Concerning the Results of the XIV Conference of the RCP(b)", in which he stated that the peasantry would not turn against the socialist system because he believed they had a self-interest in preserving.[35] The contradictions which would arise with the peasantry during the socialist transition, Stalin surmised, could "be overcome by our own efforts".[35] He concluded that the only viable threat to socialism in the Soviet Union was a military intervention.[36]

In late 1925, Stalin received a letter from a party official which stated that his position of "Socialism in One Country" was in contradiction with Friedrich Engels own writings on the subject.[36] Stalin countered, stating that Engels' writings 'reflected' "the era of pre-monopoly capitalism, the pre-imperialist era when there were not yet the conditions of an uneven, abrupt development of the capitalist countries."[36] From 1925 onwards, Bukharin began writing extensively on the subject, and in 1926, Stalin wrote On Questions of Leninism, which contained his best-known writings on the subject.[36] Trotsky, with the publishing of Leninism, began countering Bukharin's and Stalin's arguments, claiming that socialism in one country was possible, but only in the short-run, and claimed that without a world revolution it would be impossible to safeguard the Soviet Union from the "restoration of bourgeoisie relations".[36] Zinoviev on the other hand, disagreed with both Trotsky and Bukharin and Stalin, holding instead steadfast to Lenin's own position from 1917 to 1922, and continued to claim that only a defecting form of socialism could be constructed in the Soviet Union without a world revolution.[37] Bukharin, by now, began arguing for the creation of an autarkic economic model, while Trotsky, in contrast, claimed that the Soviet Union had to participate in the international division of labour to develop.[38] In contrast to Trotsky and Bukharin, Stalin did not believe a world revolution was possible, claiming in 1938 that a world revolution was in fact impossible, and claiming that Engels was wrong on the matter.[39] At the 18th Congress, Stalin took the theory to its inevitable conclusion, claiming that the communist mode of production could be conceived in one country.[39] He rationalised this by claiming that the state could exist in a communist society, as long as the Soviet Union was encircled by capitalism.[39] However, surprisingly, with the establishment of satellite states in Eastern Europe, Stalin claimed that socialism in one country was only possible in a large country like the Soviet Union, and that the other states, in order to survive, had to follow the Soviet line.[40]

History

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Bolshevism has existed as a current of political thought and as a political party since 1903.

— Vladimir Lenin. "Childhood Disease of "Leftism" in Communism". Full Composition of Writings. 41 (Vladimir Lenin ed.): 6.[41]

The concept of Bolshevism arose at the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (1903) as a result of the split of the party into two factions: supporters of Lenin and the rest.[K 1] One of the main reasons for the split was the question of a party of a new type. In the course of work on the Charter of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, Vladimir Lenin and Yuliy Martov proposed two different wordings of the clause on party membership. According to Lenin's wording, a party member is a citizen who recognizes the program and charter, pays membership fees and works in one of the party organizations. Martov suggested limiting the charter to the first two requirements. During the elections to the central organs of the party, the majority was won by supporters of the Leninist formulation, after which Lenin began to call his faction "Bolsheviks", while Martov called his supporters "Mensheviks". Although in the subsequent history of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, Lenin's supporters often found themselves in the minority, they were assigned the politically advantageous name "Bolsheviks".[K 2][42]

As Lenin's biographer Robert Service points out, the division of the newly created party into two factions "plunged Russian Marxists into a state of shock". All but the extreme left Petersburg Marxists disagreed with Lenin's party policy.[43]

At the Fourth Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in 1906, the organizational unity of the party was temporarily restored. At the Fifth Congress, the Central Committee was elected, which, due to disagreements between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, turned out to be unworkable, and the Bolshevik Center, headed by Vladimir Lenin, which was created during the Congress by Bolshevik delegates at one of its factional meetings, arbitrarily took over the leadership of the Bolshevik organizations of the party.

At the Sixth (Prague) Conference of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, held on January 18–30, 1912, which constituted itself as the all–party conference of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party and the supreme organ of the party, almost exclusively Lenin's supporters were represented. By this time, the central committee of the party had virtually ceased to exist (its last plenum was held in January 1910), and the party found itself without an official leading center. In this regard, a Bolshevik Central Committee was elected at the Prague Conference.

In 1916, Lenin wrote his work Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism, which was a major contribution to the development of classical Marxism in the new conditions. In this work the thesis about the unevenness of economic and political development of capitalism in the epoch of imperialism was expressed and theoretically grounded, which leads to the conclusion about the possibility of the victory of socialism initially in a few or in one single country, which is not yet economically developed enough – such as Russia – provided that the head of the revolutionary movement will be a disciplined avant–garde, ready to go all the way to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Immediately after the outbreak of the World War, Lenin and his supporters advanced the slogan of the defeat of tsarism in the war and the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war. It was with this that Lenin's criticism of the so–called "social–chauvinists", who supported their governments in the world war, was connected.[44][45] Lenin viewed the civil war as "an inevitable continuation, development and intensification of the class struggle".[46]

By the beginning of the February Revolution, the leading figures of the Bolshevik faction were mainly in exile or in emigration, and therefore the Bolsheviks did not take an organized part in it. The Bolshevik leaders who returned from exile, who, along with the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, became members of the Petrograd Soviet, at first tended to cooperate with the Provisional Government. From the very beginning, while still abroad, Lenin insisted on the immediate break of the Petrograd Soviet with the Provisional Government in order to actively prepare for the transition from the bourgeois–democratic to the next, "proletarian" stage of the revolution, the seizure of power and the end of the war. Returning to Russia, he came up with a new program of action for the Bolshevik party – the April Theses – in which he put on the agenda the demand for the transfer of all power to the Soviets in the interests of the proletariat and the poorest peasantry. Faced with resistance even among the representatives of "theoretical", "scientific" Bolshevism, Lenin managed to overcome it, relying on the support of the lower classes – local party organizations, adherents of immediate practical action.[47] In the course of the unfolding controversy about the possibility of socialism in Russia, Lenin rejected all the critical arguments of the Mensheviks, socialist revolutionaries and other political opponents about the country's unpreparedness for a socialist revolution due to its economic backwardness, weakness, lack of culture and organization of the working masses, including the proletariat, about the danger the split of the revolutionary democratic forces and the inevitability of a civil war.

In April 1917, the split of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party was finalized. During a heated discussion at the 7th All–Russian (April) Conference of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolsheviks) ( April 24–29), the April Theses received the support of the majority of delegates from the localities and formed the basis of the policy of the entire party. The Bolshevik faction became known as the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolsheviks).

The Russian Social Democratic Labour Party was renamed the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolsheviks) at the 7th (April) Conference in 1917. In March 1918, the party adopted the name of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks),[K 3] and in December 1925, the All–Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). At the 19th Congress in October 1952, the All–Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was renamed the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

In 1990, at the last, 28th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, during the legalization of political platforms within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Bolshevik Platform was formed, giving rise to several modern political parties and social movements.

Bolshevism and private property

[edit]

Realizing the Leninist slogan "plunder the loot", the Bolsheviks en masse carried out a complete confiscation (expropriation) from the owners of private property, which they considered acquired through the exploitation of the working people, that is, the robbery of the workers. At the same time, the Bolsheviks never found out whether private property was obtained through their own labor, or through the exploitation of other people, whether the owners adequately paid for hired labor, what part of the confiscated private property the owner created with his own labor.[48][49][50][51][52][53][54][55]

Bolsheviks and the Russian Revolution

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There is an opinion that the Bolsheviks strove for revolution, regardless of the political situation and historical realities. This is how the famous Social Democrat Alexander Parvus wrote about the topic in 1918:[56]

The essence of Bolshevism is simple – to ignite the revolution everywhere, not choosing the time, regardless of the political situation and other historical realities. Whoever is against is the enemy, and the conversation with the enemies is short – they are subject to urgent and unconditional destruction.

Bolshevik figures such as Anatoly Lunacharsky, Moisei Uritsky and Dmitry Manuilsky agreed that Lenin’s influence on the Bolshevik party was decisive but the October insurrection was carried out according to Trotsky’s, not to Lenin’s plan.[57]

Support for the Bolsheviks by the people

[edit]
Lenin at the Red Square, 1919

According to the British historian Orlando Figes, the opinion that the Bolsheviks were raised to the top of power by massive popular support for their party is not true and is a delusion. According to Figes, the October Uprising in Petrograd was a coup d'état supported by only a small part of the population. Figes explains the success of the Bolsheviks by the fact that the latter were the only political party that uncompromisingly advocated the slogan "all power to the Soviets", which gained great popularity in 1917 after the unsuccessful Revolt of General Kornilov. As Figes points out, in the fall of 1917, there was a stream of resolutions from factories, from villages, from army units, calling for the formation of a Soviet government. At the same time, the authors of the resolutions understood "the power of the Soviets" as the All–Russian Council with the participation of all socialist parties.[58]

Meanwhile, the commitment of the Bolsheviks to the principle of Soviet power was not at all so unconditional. In July 1917, when the Bolshevik Party was unable to obtain a majority in the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, it "temporarily removed" the slogan "all Power to the Soviets!". After the October coup, during the so–called "triumphal march of Soviet power" in those cases when individual Soviets did not agree to become the organs of the dictatorship of the Russian Social–Democratic Workers' Party (Bolsheviks), the Bolsheviks did not hesitate to disperse them and replace them by emergency bodies – revolutionary committees, military revolutionary committees, etc.[59]

Alexander Parvus wrote in 1918:[60]

The present Soviets terrorize not only the reactionaries and capitalists, but also the democratically inclined bourgeoisie and even all socialist workers' organizations that disagree with their opinion. They dispersed the Constituent Assembly and are holding on, having lost their moral authority in the eyes of the masses, exclusively with bayonets.

Supporters and opponents

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Program of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), 1919

The Bolsheviks were supported, although not without criticism of their political practice,[61][62] by left–wing theorists in Europe, such as Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht.

At the same time, this political trend rejected the centrist social democrats, for example, Karl Kautsky[63] and the extreme left supporters of "workers' council communism", for example, Otto Rühle[64][65] and Antonie Pannekoek.[66] The answer to the extreme leftist criticism was given by Lenin in the brochure "Childhood Illness of "Leftism" in Communism", in turn Antonie Pannekoek answered to Vladimir Lenin in the work "World Revolution and Communist Tactics".

In the 1920s and 1930s, the Left Opposition to Stalin adopted the self–designation "BolshevikLeninists", thereby emphasizing its continuity with the revolutionary tradition as opposed to Thermidorian Stalinism. After the political trials of the 1930s, most of the "Leninist Guards" were repressed. Proceeding from this, there is an opinion that Bolshevism as a phenomenon has left the historical scene:[2]

...[Stalin] managed to destroy almost all of Lenin's comrades–in–arms in Russia, becoming by 1928–1939 "the Russian Bonaparte–Robespierre" in the country, "especially double types of cultures of the pre–bourgeois order, that is, the cultures of the bureaucratic, serfdom" (and terrorist – we add), which Lenin feared so much, grew up in the country.[67][68]

But on the other hand, a number of scientists are of the opinion that Bolshevism has undergone changes over time, and as a phenomenon, it ended only in the early 1990s.[69]

Some modern scholars agree that Bolshevism:

...was a desperate attempt to escape from the world of the bourgeois and philistine. (This, incidentally, refutes the assertion that Bolshevism is equated with fascism. Fascism, unlike Bolshevism, was based on philistinism – its flesh and spirit).[69]

In Western political science, some authors analyze Bolshevism from the standpoint of similarities and differences with fascism and Nazism.[70][71]

According to sociologist Boris Kagarlitsky, one of the central contradictions of the post–revolutionary policy of the Bolsheviks is defined as a consequence of the historically developed socio–political situation in Russia:

But events did not develop at the will of one person or even one party. Both Lenin himself and his comrades were already hostages of the revolutionary process, which was moving forward according to its own logic. To win in the struggle that had begun, they had to do what they themselves did not expect of themselves, to build a state that only partially met their ideas about what to strive for, but which allowed the revolution to survive and win.[72]

In journalism, some authors also understand it as a synonym for extreme extremism, ideological fanaticism, intolerance, and a propensity for violence.[73]

Social democratic views

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Bolshevism was criticized by the Social Democrats. Thus, the famous Social Democrat Alexander Parvus wrote in 1918:[74]

If Marxism is a reflection of the social history of Western Europe, refracted through the prism of German philosophy, then Bolshevism is Marxism, emasculated by amateurs and refracted through the prism of Russian ignorance.

Criticism and historical estimates

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According to the philosopher and linguist Nikolay Trubetskoy:

The positive significance of Bolshevism may be that having removed the mask and showed everyone Satan in his undisguised form, he led many through confidence in the reality of Satan to faith in God.

— "We and Others", Eurasian Times, Berlin, 1925

The authors of The Black Book of Communism note:[47]

From the moment of its organizational formation in 1903, this party differed from all other currents of both Russian and world social democracy primarily by its voluntarist strategy of overthrowing the existing order and its concept of party organization – a rigidly structured, disciplined one, consisting of selected professional revolutionaries, parties are the antipode of vague mass parties, widely open to sympathizers, to the struggle of opinions and discussions, that is, the way the Russian Mensheviks and almost all European Social Democrats were.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, answering questions in the Federation Council on June 27, 2012, accused the Bolshevik leadership of betraying national interests – "the Bolsheviks committed an act of national betrayal..." as a result of which Russia lost the First World War – "...the result of the betrayal of the then government".[75][76]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Sources

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Bolshevism was the militant faction of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP), led by , which emerged from the party's 1903 congress split with the more moderate over organizational discipline and membership criteria, favoring a tightly knit cadre of professional revolutionaries committed to immediate proletarian insurrection against and bourgeois rule. Rooted in Marxist theory but adapted to Russia's underdeveloped industrial base, Bolshevik ideology stressed the party's monopoly on revolutionary truth, internal for debate followed by unified action, and rejection of parliamentary in favor of armed seizure of state power to impose socialist reconstruction. Amid World War I's devastation and the February 1917 revolution that toppled the tsar but left a weak , the Bolsheviks exploited worker and soldier unrest through slogans like "peace, land, and bread," orchestrating the in Petrograd where their stormed key sites, dissolving the government and claiming authority via soviets they dominated. In consolidating rule, the Bolsheviks—renaming themselves the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1918—dismantled democratic institutions, suppressed rival socialists and liberals, and launched the through the secret police, executing or imprisoning tens of thousands in a campaign of mass repression to eliminate counter-revolutionaries during the ensuing Civil War (1918–1921), which pitted their against White forces, nationalists, and foreign interventions, resulting in up to 10 million deaths from combat, famine, and disease. Policies like , involving forced grain requisitions and nationalization, triggered economic collapse, hyperinflation, and peasant revolts, yielding only temporary survival through the 1921 retreat toward limited markets. While enabling initial industrialization and gains under later five-year plans, Bolshevism's centralist dogma fostered one-party , purges, and engineered famines that claimed millions more lives, empirically demonstrating the causal pitfalls of vanguard monopoly and coercive collectivization in generating systemic inefficiency and human catastrophe rather than classless prosperity. Its legacy endures as the foundational blueprint for 20th-century communist regimes, whose utopian aims repeatedly devolved into authoritarian stagnation and mass suffering due to the unchecked power of ideological elites.

Origins

Formation of the Bolshevik Faction

The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) was established in 1898 as a Marxist aiming to unite disparate socialist groups in the , but it remained organizationally loose and ineffective against tsarist repression. By 1902, , a leading figure in the émigré revolutionary community, published , arguing for a centralized, disciplined party composed of professional revolutionaries to combat worker "spontaneity" and infuse , rather than relying on broad trade-unionist growth. This pamphlet laid the ideological groundwork for stricter , influencing the debates that would define the Bolshevik approach. The pivotal split occurred at the RSDLP's Second Congress, held from July 30 to August 23, , initially in before relocating to due to police interference. The congress sought to adopt formal party rules and consolidate the newspaper's editorial board, dominated by Lenin, Georgy Plekhanov, and . A key dispute arose over Article 1 of the party statutes, defining membership: Lenin's draft required active personal participation in a party organization and adherence to its directives, emphasizing a of committed activists; Martov's version allowed regular personal assistance under party direction, permitting a looser affiliation of sympathizers. Lenin's faction initially secured a (approximately 20-28 delegates) on this vote, earning the label "" (from the Russian for "majority"), while Martov's became "" ("minority"), though these terms originated from a later vote on the board and persisted despite fluctuating majorities. Tensions escalated over central committee elections and the composition of the editorial board, with Lenin's insistence on excluding opportunistic elements leading to walkouts and his temporary resignation from leadership roles. Plekhanov initially sided with Lenin but later aligned more with Mensheviks, highlighting personal rivalries alongside principled differences on organizational centralism versus democratic inclusivity. The Bolshevik faction, numbering fewer than 30 at the congress's end, coalesced around Lenin's vision of a combat party capable of leading proletarian revolution, distinct from the Menshevik preference for gradualist, alliance-based development toward socialism. This factional divide formalized within the RSDLP, with Bolsheviks publishing their own organs like Vperyod by 1905, though full organizational separation did not occur until the 1912 Prague Conference.

Lenin's Theoretical Adaptations

adapted Marxist theory to Russia's semi-feudal, agrarian conditions, where the industrial proletariat constituted less than 3% of the population in 1900, by emphasizing the necessity of a disciplined to overcome the limitations of spontaneous worker movements. In his 1902 pamphlet What Is to Be Done?, Lenin critiqued "," the tendency among Russian social democrats to limit activity to economic demands, arguing it fostered mere trade-union consciousness rather than full socialist awareness. He advocated for a centralized party of professional revolutionaries, organized on principles of strict discipline and conspiracy, to educate the masses in Marxism and lead them toward overthrowing the , diverging from Karl Marx's expectation of emerging organically from advanced proletarian in industrialized nations. This model addressed Russia's weak and pervasive tsarist repression, enabling covert operations by a select cadre while rejecting broader, less disciplined mass parties favored by . Lenin further refined party structure through , allowing internal debate but mandating unified action post-decision, as formalized in Bolshevik practice after the 1903 split. Amid , Lenin extended his adaptations in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916), defining as capitalism's monopolistic phase characterized by finance capital dominance, trans-national bank-industry mergers, capital export over goods export, and global territorial division among capitalist associations. He contended this stage intensified contradictions, transforming competitive free into parasitic, decaying monopoly rule, and positioned the war as a clash over colonial redivision that exposed 's vulnerability at its peripheries. By theorizing imperialism's uneven development, Lenin justified initiating socialist revolution in "" states like —despite its backward economy—rather than awaiting synchronized uprisings in Western metropoles, arguing that proletarian victory in one country could ignite global revolution through example and support for colonial liberation struggles. These innovations underpinned Bolshevik strategy, prioritizing immediate seizure of power over Menshevik insistence on bourgeois parliamentary development, as Lenin outlined in his 1905 work Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution.

Core Ideological Principles

Vanguard Party and Centralism

The vanguard party concept, central to Bolshevik theory, posits that a disciplined cadre of professional revolutionaries must lead the toward socialist revolution, as the alone develops only trade-union consciousness rather than full revolutionary awareness. In his 1902 pamphlet What Is to Be Done?, argued that spontaneous worker movements under yield merely economic demands, requiring external importation of socialist theory by an vanguard organization to foster and combat . This vanguard, composed of the most dedicated and ideologically advanced elements, functions as the proletariat's conscious detachment, guiding mass action while insulating itself from bourgeois influences through strict organization. This approach crystallized the 1903 schism within the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP), where Lenin's Bolshevik faction advocated a compact party of active revolutionaries—estimated at hundreds rather than thousands—to ensure secrecy and efficacy amid repression, contrasting Menshevik preferences for a looser, mass-based structure open to passive sympathizers. Bolsheviks viewed the vanguard as essential for centralized direction, enabling rapid response to revolutionary opportunities, as demonstrated in their 1905 preparations where Lenin prioritized professional agitators over broad recruitment. The principle rejected economism, insisting the party educate workers on imperialism and class struggle beyond workplace grievances. Complementing , emerged as the Bolsheviks' organizational method, combining internal debate with binding execution to maintain unity and combat factionalism. Lenin formalized elements of this at the 1905 Third Bolshevik Congress, mandating lower bodies' subordination to higher ones and prohibiting post-decision splits, a practice tested during the party's clandestine operations. By the 10th All-Russian Congress in March 1921, Lenin explicitly banned factions to preserve discipline amid civil war threats, declaring the party no mere discussion club but a unified command structure for proletarian dictatorship. In Bolshevik practice, this meant elected committees directing strategy—such as the Central Committee's seizure authorization—while suppressing dissent to prevent Menshevik-style diffusion, though critics later noted its evolution toward top-down control under conditions of isolation and scarcity.

Dictatorship of the Proletariat

The dictatorship of the proletariat constituted a core Bolshevik principle, denoting the political supremacy of the working class over the bourgeoisie during the transition to socialism, exercised through revolutionary organs to eradicate class exploitation. Vladimir Lenin, in his August-September 1917 pamphlet The State and Revolution, interpreted this as the proletariat's vanguard—embodied in the Bolshevik Party—smashing the bourgeois state apparatus and wielding state power as an instrument of class coercion, rather than a neutral arbiter, until capitalist remnants were eliminated. Lenin rooted this in Karl Marx's references to the Paris Commune of 1871 as a proletarian dictatorship prototype, but adapted it to insist on centralized party leadership to prevent counter-revolution, arguing that without such organization, the proletariat's numerical majority alone could not sustain power against organized bourgeois resistance. Lenin further clarified the concept's operational nature in subsequent writings, such as his September 11, 1919, speech to the Third All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions, where he described the as "the continuation of the class struggle of the in new forms," entailing not parliamentary but direct suppression of exploiters through soviets and armed detachments. This framework justified the ' rejection of multi-party systems, positing that bourgeois "" masked class domination and that true proletarian rule demanded intolerance toward ideological adversaries, including fellow socialists deemed insufficiently revolutionary. Lenin contended this phase would expand for the majority by abolishing , yet emphasized its inherently violent character, as "the exploiters inevitably resort to violence." In practice, after the October 1917 coup, the Bolsheviks proclaimed the Soviet government—led by the —as the embodiment of proletarian dictatorship, vesting authority in party-controlled soviets while sidelining broader worker input. This manifested in decrees nationalizing industry and land by mid-1918, alongside the creation of the (extraordinary commission) in December 1917 to combat "counter-revolutionaries," escalating into mass repressions under the from August 1918. The approach prioritized vanguard centralism, dissolving independent worker councils and suppressing strikes, such as those by Petrograd metalworkers in 1919, on grounds that factionalism undermined the dictatorship's unity against White armies and foreign interventions during the Civil War (1918-1921). Empirical outcomes revealed a consolidation of power within the Bolshevik elite, diverging from theoretical proletarian self-rule toward party monopoly, as non-Bolshevik socialists were expelled from soviets by 1918 and opposition parties banned, fostering conditions where internal party purges later intensified under .

Stages of Revolution and Imperialism

Vladimir Lenin characterized imperialism as the highest and final stage of capitalism, marked by the dominance of monopolies and finance capital, the export of capital surpassing commodity exports, the international merger of industrial and banking capital, the completion of the territorial division of the world among capitalist powers, and the formation of oligopolistic associations partitioning global markets. This stage, analyzed in his 1916 work Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, represented a transition from competitive free-market capitalism to monopoly capitalism, fostering economic parasitism, capital concentration in fewer hands, and inevitable inter-imperialist conflicts, as evidenced by the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Lenin argued that imperialism's uneven global development created "weakest links" in the capitalist chain, enabling proletarian revolution to erupt first in semi-peripheral or backward economies like Russia rather than solely in advanced industrial centers such as Germany or Britain. In Bolshevik theory, this imperialist framework justified adapting Marxist stages of revolution to Russia's conditions, where capitalism remained underdeveloped amid feudal remnants and autocratic rule. Lenin initially outlined a two-stage process in his 1905 pamphlet Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution: a preliminary bourgeois-democratic stage to dismantle tsarist absolutism, redistribute land from nobility to peasants, and establish democratic freedoms, led by the proletariat in alliance with peasantry against the bourgeoisie. This stage aimed to complete the unfinished bourgeois tasks of 1789-style revolutions, but under proletarian hegemony via a vanguard party, preventing liberal bourgeois dominance. By 1917, amid wartime collapse, Lenin's April Theses accelerated this into an "uninterrupted revolution," urging immediate transition to the socialist stage by transferring power to soviets (workers' councils) for expropriation of capitalist property and suppression of bourgeois resistance, bypassing prolonged capitalist development. The viewed imperialism's role as catalytic, intensifying exploitation and war weariness to fuse the democratic and socialist stages into a continuous process, with Russia's revolution sparking global proletarian uprisings against the imperialist system. This perspective, rooted in Lenin's analysis of monopoly capital's decay and the proletariat's revolutionary potential in oppressed nations, underpinned the October 1917 seizure of power, where forces dissolved the Provisional Government's bourgeois framework and decreed land nationalization on November 8, 1917 (October 26 by ). Critics, including some , contended this skipped necessary capitalist maturation, risking economic isolation, but Lenin countered that imperialism's contradictions rendered orthodox Marxist sequencing obsolete, prioritizing immediate soviet power as the . Empirical outcomes, such as the ' consolidation amid from 1918–1921, validated the theory's tactical flexibility for Lenin, though it assumed rapid international support that failed to materialize.

Revolutionary Events

Preconditions and February Revolution

The Russian Empire under Tsar Nicholas II maintained an absolute autocracy that resisted meaningful political reforms, exacerbating underlying tensions despite limited concessions like the 1905 Duma following revolutionary unrest. Nicholas, viewing himself as divinely appointed, dismissed liberal demands for constitutional change and centralized power further by assuming personal command of the army in September 1915, a decision that linked military failures directly to his prestige. Economically, Russia lagged with an agrarian system dominated by inefficient communal land tenure, while rapid but uneven industrialization from the 1890s created urban proletarian discontent amid low wages, long hours, and poor living conditions for millions of factory workers. Socially, peasants comprised over 80% of the population and faced chronic land shortages and debt, fueling periodic revolts, while ethnic minorities and intellectuals chafed under Russification policies. Russia's entry into in August 1914 intensified these strains, as the empire mobilized over 15 million men but suffered logistical breakdowns, equipment shortages, and defeats like the in 1914. By early 1917, Russian forces had incurred approximately 2 million military deaths and millions more wounded or captured, eroding morale and prompting desertions. Domestic repercussions included , with food prices rising 400% by 1916, rail disruptions prioritizing military needs over civilian supplies, and widespread in urban centers like Petrograd, where bread rations fell to under a pound per day. These failures discredited the regime, as government corruption and Rasputin's influence alienated even conservative elites, while strikes surged—over 1,000 in 1916 alone, often met with repression. The erupted spontaneously in Petrograd on February 23, 1917 (Julian calendar; March 8 Gregorian), triggered by demonstrations against food shortages that drew 7,000-10,000 protesters initially. By the next day, strikes paralyzed factories, involving 200,000 workers, and clashes with police escalated as crowds demanded an end to and . On February 26, the Petrograd garrison of 150,000 troops mutinied, refusing orders to fire on demonstrators and instead joining soviets forming among workers and soldiers, which accelerated the collapse of authority. Facing isolation, attempted to return from the front but was blocked by rail disruptions; on March 2 (Julian; March 15 Gregorian), he abdicated in favor of his brother, who declined, ending the Romanov dynasty after 304 years. The Duma's Provisional Committee established a liberal under Prince Lvov, promising elections and , while the emerged as a parallel power structure representing workers and soldiers. This dual authority, amid ongoing war and economic chaos, created a that radical groups, including who returned from under Lenin in April, later exploited, though the February events themselves lacked centralized Bolshevik orchestration and reflected broad anti-Tsarist sentiment.

October Coup and Immediate Aftermath

The Bolshevik Central Committee, under Vladimir Lenin's influence, resolved on October 10, 1917 (Old Style), to prepare an armed uprising against the Provisional Government, viewing the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets—scheduled for October 25—as a potential legitimizing cover, though Lenin advocated seizing power beforehand to preempt any moderate socialist compromise. Trotsky, as chairman of the Petrograd Soviet's Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC), directed the operation, coordinating with Red Guards, sailors from Kronstadt, and sympathetic garrison troops who had grown disillusioned with the war and Provisional Government inaction. On October 24 (O.S.), MRC forces began occupying key infrastructure in Petrograd, including bridges, railway stations, the post office, and telegraph office, facing negligible resistance as many troops defected or stood aside. By the evening of October 25, Bolshevik detachments surrounded the , seat of the under , with artillery from the issuing ultimatums; the assault commenced late that night, involving some naval gunfire and infantry entry, resulting in minimal casualties—estimates place total deaths in Petrograd at under a dozen, with no significant combat fatalities during the palace takeover itself. Kerensky fled the city earlier, attempting unsuccessfully to rally loyal Cossack and officer units from outside Petrograd. As the MRC secured the capital, the Second convened on , where and held a slim majority among delegates, but and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries denounced the actions as an illegal coup and walked out in protest before key votes. The congress ratified the power seizure, dissolved the , and established the (Sovnarkom) as the new executive, with Lenin as chairman, Trotsky as foreign affairs , and among others in minor roles. It immediately passed the Decree on Peace, calling for an immediate armistice on all fronts and a "peace without annexations or indemnities" to end , and the , which nationalized all arable land, abolished private ownership without compensation, and endorsed peasant seizures of noble estates already underway. In the days following, Bolshevik authority solidified in Petrograd and —where Red Guards suppressed brief anti-Bolshevik resistance by , incurring around 1,000 casualties—but provincial control remained fragmented, with many local Soviets dominated by Socialist-Revolutionaries or rejecting the coup. Kerensky's attempted counteroffensive with a small force near Petrograd collapsed by November 1 due to desertions and lack of support, signaling the Provisional Government's collapse. The new regime prioritized demobilizing the army, printing money to cover deficits (fueling ), and suppressing early opposition presses, while facing international isolation as Allied powers withheld recognition and continued pressing to fight . These measures bought time but sowed seeds for broader conflict, as non-Bolshevik socialists formed underground networks and White forces began coalescing.

Consolidation of Power

Civil War and War Communism

The erupted in late 1917 following the Bolshevik seizure of power, pitting the —loyal to the Bolshevik regime—against fragmented anti-Bolshevik forces known as , alongside peasant insurgencies (Greens) and separatist movements in regions like Ukraine and the Caucasus. The conflict intensified after the Bolsheviks signed the on March 3, 1918, exiting but ceding vast territories to , which alienated potential domestic allies and prompted foreign interventions by Allied powers including Britain, , the , and , who deployed troops starting in mid-1918 to safeguard supplies, counter German influence, and support White armies. By early 1918, the Red Guard had evolved into the under Leon Trotsky's command, growing from rudimentary militias to a force of approximately 3 million by 1920 through and centralized organization, contrasting with ' peak strength of under 1 million across uncoordinated fronts led by figures like Admiral in and General in the south. To prosecute the war, implemented in June 1918, a set of emergency measures centralizing economic control to prioritize military supply over civilian needs, including the of all large-scale industry, banks, and transport by mid-1918, alongside the abolition of private trade and the introduction of labor tying workers to factories and peasants to grain deliveries. Grain requisitioning (prodrazvyorstka), enforced by armed detachments from January 1919, seized fixed quotas from peasants at state-determined prices, often violently, to feed urban workers and the , while urban rationing and the partial replacement of money with barter aimed to eliminate market mechanisms deemed bourgeois. These policies enabled the Reds to outlast White offensives—such as Kolchak's advance halted by Red counterattacks in summer 1919 and Denikin's failed push toward in 1919—by securing , though White disunity and atrocities, including pogroms, further eroded their support among peasants. War Communism's rigid extraction exacerbated economic collapse, with industrial output plummeting to 20% of pre-war levels by 1920 and agricultural production disrupted by peasant resistance, culminating in widespread revolts like the Tambov Peasant Uprising (1920-1921) and the in March 1921 by disillusioned sailors demanding soviet democracy. The policy's culmination in the 1921-1922 famine, which killed an estimated 5 million due to requisition-induced shortages and drought, underscored its unsustainability, prompting Lenin to abandon it for the in March 1921, allowing limited private trade to avert total breakdown. By late 1920, Red victories had reclaimed most territory, with the war formally ending in November 1920 after General Pyotr Wrangel's evacuation from , though mopping-up operations continued into 1922, securing Bolshevik control at the cost of millions in military and civilian deaths from combat, disease, and starvation.

Red Terror and Elimination of Opposition

The was a Bolshevik-initiated campaign of systematic , mass arrests, and executions targeting perceived class enemies and political opponents, officially proclaimed on September 5, 1918, through a decree by the in retaliation for on August 30 and the killing of Cheka leader on August 31. This policy formalized earlier sporadic violence by the , the Bolshevik secret police established on December 20, 1917, under , which had already conducted thousands of extrajudicial killings since its inception to suppress dissent during the . The terror's explicit aim, as articulated in Bolshevik rhetoric, was to eradicate "counter-revolutionary elements" through "organized terror," with Dzerzhinsky declaring in June 1918 that the stood for such measures to protect the revolution. Implementation involved widespread Cheka operations, including summary executions without trial, hostage-taking from families of suspects, and public displays of corpses to instill fear, peaking from late 1918 to 1920 amid the Civil War. Victims encompassed bourgeoisie, landowners, clergy, intellectuals, and military officers, often accused of aiding White forces, with quotas for executions issued in regions like Petrograd and Moscow to accelerate the process. Estimates of direct executions during the Red Terror range from 12,733 documented cases in official Soviet records to 200,000 or more, excluding deaths from related famines, forced labor, and concentration camps established by the Cheka. Methods included shootings, drownings, and torture in Cheka facilities, with reports of systematic rape and mutilation in some provinces to break resistance. The campaign systematically eliminated socialist and leftist opposition parties that had initially allied with or tolerated the Bolsheviks. faced arrests and dissolution of their organizations by mid-1918, with leaders like driven into exile after criticizing Bolshevik authoritarianism. The (SRs), former coalition partners, were targeted after their July 6, 1918, uprising in , which protested the Brest-Litovsk Treaty; hundreds were executed, and the party banned, marking a decisive of agrarian socialists. Anarchists, who controlled worker councils and communes in cities like , endured coordinated raids starting April 1918, with over 40 anarchist centers stormed, resulting in 40 deaths and mass imprisonments; by , surviving anarchists were either co-opted or liquidated. By formalizing one-party rule, the dismantled multi-party soviets and trade unions, banning strikes and independent press, while the January 1918 dissolution of the —where Bolsheviks held only 24% of seats—prefigured the terror's role in preventing electoral challenges. This repression extended to ethnic minorities and peasants resisting grain requisitions, contributing to over 5 million deaths from the 1921-1922 famine exacerbated by terror policies, though Bolshevik sources attributed casualties to White atrocities. The policy's legacy entrenched the Cheka's (later GPU/OGPU) unchecked power, setting precedents for Stalin-era purges.

Domestic Policies and Implementation

New Economic Policy Retreat

The New Economic Policy (NEP), introduced by Vladimir Lenin at the 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on March 15, 1921, represented a pragmatic retreat from the rigid centralization of War Communism, which had exacerbated economic collapse, widespread famine, and peasant uprisings such as the Tambov Rebellion (1920–1921). Lenin justified the shift as a temporary measure to revive production and stabilize the regime amid crises like the Kronstadt Rebellion in March 1921, where sailors demanded an end to Bolshevik authoritarianism and a return to market elements. Under NEP, the state relinquished forced grain requisitions in favor of a fixed tax in kind (later transitioning to monetary taxes), permitting peasants to sell surplus produce on open markets after payment; small-scale private enterprise and leasing of state land were authorized, though large industry, banking, and foreign trade remained state monopolies. This policy framework fostered rapid economic recovery: agricultural output rose from 50% of pre-World War I levels in 1921 to near parity by 1926, industrial production increased fivefold between 1921 and 1925, and was curbed through currency stabilization via the introduction of the gold-backed ruble in 1922. Urban food supplies improved, reducing deaths estimated at 5 million in 1921–1922, while consumer goods availability spurred limited private trade by "NEPmen"—merchants who filled market gaps but amassed wealth, prompting ideological unease among party hardliners who viewed them as capitalist exploiters. Lenin himself described NEP as a "strategic retreat" to build socialism's material base, acknowledging in 1922 that full required prior capitalist development stages, yet he warned against complacency, stating the policy demanded "learning to trade" while preserving proletarian . Despite these gains, NEP engendered tensions, including the 1923 "," where industrial prices outpaced agricultural ones, squeezing rural incomes and fueling peasant resistance to state procurements. Intra-party debates intensified, with left-wing critics like advocating "primitive socialist accumulation" by extracting peasant surpluses for , contrasting Lenin's more cautious approach. By Lenin's death in January 1924, NEP had restored stability but highlighted contradictions: market incentives boosted output yet widened social disparities, with urban workers facing spikes to 13% in 1926 and rural-urban migration straining resources. These dynamics sowed seeds for its curtailment, as accumulating grain shortages by 1927–1928 exposed vulnerabilities in relying on private peasant incentives amid ambitions for accelerated socialist transformation.

Shift to Forced Industrialization

The , which permitted limited market mechanisms and private enterprise in agriculture and small-scale industry from , faced increasing criticism within Bolshevik leadership for its perceived perpetuation of capitalist elements and insufficient pace toward . By 1928, , having consolidated power, abandoned NEP in favor of centralized command planning to achieve rapid heavy industrialization, viewing it as essential for military strength and ideological purity amid perceived external threats. The First Five-Year Plan, approved in 1928 and running through 1932, prioritized massive state investment in capital goods sectors such as steel, coal, machinery, and electricity, with targets for output increases like 200-300% in key industries, financed by squeezing agricultural surpluses to export grain for foreign machinery purchases. This shift enforced labor discipline through quotas, Stakhanovite incentives rewarding overfulfillment, and suppression of strikes, while consumer goods production was deprioritized, leading to widespread shortages. Soviet official data reported average annual industrial growth of 19.2%, establishing basic industries like steel works, but independent analyses indicate these gains masked inefficiencies, such as resource misallocation and reliance on coerced inputs, resulting in welfare losses equivalent to about 24% of aggregate consumption from 1928 to 1940. To extract rural surpluses, the regime launched forced collectivization in 1929, merging peasant holdings into state-controlled kolkhozy and sovkhozy, accompanied by campaigns targeting "kulaks"—prosperous labeled as class enemies. On December 27, 1929, called for the "liquidation of the kulaks as a class," leading to the , , to remote regions, or execution of an estimated 1-2 million individuals, with families totaling 5-10 million affected, disrupting agricultural expertise and incentives. Peasant resistance, including slaughter, caused output to plummet from 73.3 million tons in 1928 to 67.6 million in 1932, exacerbating shortages despite high quotas. The resultant 1932-1933 famine, particularly severe in (known as the ), stemmed from these policies' export demands and internal rationing that privileged urban and industrial workers, causing demographic losses of 3-5 million deaths in Ukraine alone through and related diseases. Empirical evidence from archival records shows procurements exceeded harvests in key regions, confirming policy-driven causation over natural factors like , with long-term effects including stunted Soviet agricultural recovery and persistent food insecurity. This coercive model, while forging an industrial base capable of wartime mobilization, relied on terror and inefficiency, contradicting Marxist predictions of proletarian prosperity and highlighting causal mismatches between central fiat and economic incentives.

Repressive Mechanisms

Political Purges and Show Trials

The political purges under Bolshevism intensified after Joseph Stalin's consolidation of power, targeting perceived internal threats through mass arrests, executions, and fabricated legal proceedings orchestrated by the secret police. These efforts, peaking during the (also known as the Yezhovshchina) from 1936 to 1938, eliminated rivals, , military officers, and ordinary citizens labeled as "enemies of the people," often based on quotas for repression issued by chief . The purges decimated the elite, with over 1,500 of 1,966 elected delegates to the 1934 Party Congress arrested by 1939, and roughly half of the members liquidated. Archival records indicate approximately 681,692 executions occurred in 1937–1938 alone, primarily by firing squad following brief interrogations or trials, though total deaths from purges, including those in custody, likely exceeded one million. The Moscow Show Trials formed the public spectacle of these purges, staging confessions to justify the elimination of prominent figures accused of Trotskyist conspiracies, sabotage, and collaboration with or other foreign powers—charges widely regarded by historians as fabricated to consolidate Stalin's absolute control. Confessions were coerced through prolonged , , threats to family members, and promises of leniency, as detailed in survivor accounts and declassified protocols; for instance, defendants were beaten and isolated until they recited scripted admissions of guilt. These trials, presided over by Soviet prosecutors like Andrei Vyshinsky, who demanded "mercilessly crush the enemies of the people," served propagandistic purposes, broadcast via radio and newspapers to portray the accused as traitors undermining socialist construction. The first Moscow Trial (Trial of the Sixteen), held August 19–24, 1936, indicted , , and fourteen other former Bolshevik leaders for allegedly plotting Stalin's assassination in collusion with and Nazi agents. All defendants publicly confessed to the charges despite their prior prominence in the 1917 Revolution, and on September 1, 1936, they were convicted, with sentences carried out by execution on August 25 (for the main figures) or shortly after. The second trial, January 23–30, 1937 (Trial of the Seventeen), targeted , , and fifteen industrial and transport officials accused of economic and ; thirteen were sentenced to death and executed, while four received prison terms, further eroding technical expertise in key sectors. The third and most prominent trial, March 2–13, 1938 (Trial of the Twenty-One), featured , , (former head), and eighteen others charged with forming a "Right-Trotskyist Bloc" responsible for murders, including that of in 1934, and plotting against the state. Bukharin partially recanted his confession during proceedings but was convicted alongside most co-defendants; eighteen received death sentences executed on March 15, 1938, while three were imprisoned. These trials eliminated nearly all surviving Lenin-era members opposed to Stalin, reshaping the party leadership into loyalists and instilling widespread fear that permeated Soviet society. Beyond the show trials, purges extended to the , where Order No. 00485 targeted "politically unreliable elements," resulting in the execution of three of five marshals, 13 of 15 army commanders, and over 30,000 officers by late 1938, severely weakening military readiness ahead of . Regional and ethnic quotas under led to "troikas" (three-person tribunals) bypassing courts to sentence kulaks, clergy, and minorities to death or camps without evidence, reflecting Stalin's paranoia over internal dissent amid external threats like the . The purges' scale stemmed from Bolshevik doctrinal intolerance for deviation, amplified by Stalin's , though post-1991 disclosures from Russian state archives have confirmed the mechanisms while highlighting how initial underreporting in Soviet records masked the full extent of state-orchestrated violence.

Gulag System and Mass Repression

The system, formally known as the Main Camp Administration (Glavnoye Upravleniye Lagerey), was a network of forced labor camps in the designed to exploit prisoner labor for industrial and infrastructure projects while serving as a tool for . It originated from early Bolshevik concentration camps established in 1918–1919 to detain class enemies, counter-revolutionaries, and perceived threats during the , evolving into a centralized apparatus under the OGPU (United State Political Administration) by the late 1920s and formalized in 1930 to support Stalin's First Five-Year Plan through penal labor extraction. The system's purpose blended economic utility—such as canal construction and —with ideological aims of "reforging" prisoners via harsh labor, though mortality rates from , , and undermined any rehabilitative pretense. Prisoner populations expanded rapidly amid collectivization and purges, reaching approximately 2.5 million by 1933 and peaking near 2.9 million in 1939 before wartime fluctuations; archival records indicate a total of around 18–28 million individuals passed through the camps from the to 1956. Documented deaths in facilities totaled about 1.05 million from 1934 to 1953, excluding labor colonies and underreported cases from transfers or escapes, with overall estimates suggesting 1.5–2 million fatalities due to systemic neglect and brutality. Conditions involved quotas for output under armed guards, minimal rations (often 300–500 grams of bread daily for underperformers), and exposure to extreme climates in remote sites like , where yielded high yields but decimated inmate health. Mass repression extended beyond camps via the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs), which enforced Bolshevik class-war doctrines through arbitrary arrests, torture-induced confessions, and executions targeting kulaks, intellectuals, ethnic minorities, and even loyal party members. During the (1936–1938), mandated quotas for repressing "anti-Soviet elements," resulting in over 800,000 executions and 1.5 million arrests, with regional operatives fabricating evidence to meet targets. Earlier Bolshevik foundations included the Cheka's (1918–1922), which executed 12,000–50,000 individuals without trial to eliminate opposition, setting precedents for quota-driven terror. Dekulakization (1929–1933) alone deported 2–3 million peasants, many to Gulag precursors, causing excess deaths through famine and transit hardships, while ethnic operations like the 1937 Polish Affair liquidated 111,000–150,000 as "spies." These mechanisms, rooted in Lenin's endorsement of concentration camps for "hostile classes," prioritized ideological purity over evidence, fostering a of denunciations and that permeated Soviet society.

International Extension

Comintern and Global Revolutionary Efforts

The Communist International (Comintern) was founded by Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin during its First Congress, convened in Moscow from March 2 to 6, 1919, attended by 53 delegates from 29 countries. The organization's manifesto declared the need for violent proletarian revolution to dismantle capitalist states globally, rejecting the Second International's parliamentary reformism in favor of centralized direction from Moscow to coordinate communist parties as national sections of a single world party. This structure subordinated affiliated groups to the Comintern's Executive Committee, which issued binding tactical instructions, provided financial aid, and trained cadres at facilities like the University of the Toilers of the East established in 1921. Initial revolutionary efforts targeted Europe's post-World War I turmoil, with the Comintern endorsing uprisings modeled on the Bolshevik seizure of power. In , it backed the Spartacist League's January 1919 revolt in , suppressed by militias with over 150 communists killed, including leaders and . Similarly, it supported Béla Kun's , proclaimed on March 21, 1919, which nationalized industry, requisitioned food, and mobilized a but collapsed by August 1 after Romanian invasion and internal economic collapse, resulting in 5,000 executions during the ensuing White Terror. These failures, amid broader setbacks like the Bavarian Soviet Republic's May 1919 defeat, prompted tactical shifts at subsequent congresses; the Second Congress (July–August 1920) imposed the 21 Conditions for membership, requiring parties to expel reformists, arm proletarian militias, and propagate Bolshevik methods, leading to splits in social democratic organizations across Europe. By the Third Congress in June–July 1921, amid revolutionary retreats, the Comintern pivoted to "" tactics, urging temporary alliances with social democrats to build mass influence, though implementation varied and often alienated potential allies due to Moscow-dictated ultra-left turns, such as the German Communist Party's aborted 1923 . Under Joseph Stalin's dominance from the mid-1920s, the Comintern aligned with Soviet state priorities, emphasizing "" over Trotsky's doctrine; the Sixth Congress (1928) formalized class-against-class policies isolating communists from broader anti-fascist coalitions, while the Seventh Congress (1935) reversed to popular fronts, aiding Soviet diplomacy but yielding mixed results, like electoral gains in yet failures to prevent Hitler's 1933 rise amid prior tactical rigidity. Globally, it extended operations to and , funding parties in (where it directed the disastrous 1927 abandonment of allies) and India, but local adaptations were overridden by Comintern fiat, fostering dependency and purges. The Comintern's dissolution was decided on May 15, 1943, by its and announced publicly on May 22, as a wartime concession to Britain and the , with citing the need to dispel Allied suspicions of Soviet interference in their domestic affairs and affirming that national communist parties should pursue independent paths suited to local conditions. Over 24 years, despite dispatching thousands of agents, millions in subsidies, and ideological , the Comintern achieved no additional proletarian state formations, its top-down control exacerbating divisions in the workers' movement and enabling fascist consolidations in interwar through alienated ultra-left adventurism.

Doctrinal Conflicts with Other Marxists

The Bolshevik-Menshevik schism within the (RSDLP), formalized at the party's Second Congress in August 1903, crystallized doctrinal divergences rooted in interpretations of Marxist revolutionary strategy. , led by , advocated a tightly disciplined vanguard party composed of professional revolutionaries committed to uncompromising class struggle, viewing broader party membership as prone to opportunism and dilution of proletarian goals. In contrast, , under , favored a more inclusive mass party open to workers and sympathizers, emphasizing gradual development through legal agitation, trade unions, and collaboration with bourgeois democrats to achieve democratic preconditions for socialism. This split reflected Bolshevik insistence on immediate revolutionary preparation via centralized control to implant socialist consciousness externally into the —against what Lenin termed "spontaneous trade-unionism" limited to economic demands—while trusted organic worker maturation under . Bolshevik doctrine further clashed with the reformist tendencies of Western European social democrats affiliated with the Second International, whom Lenin lambasted as "opportunists" for prioritizing parliamentary over violent insurrection. In works like Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1917), Lenin argued that monopoly capitalism necessitated immediate global , rejecting social democrats' faith in electoral paths to as capitulation to bourgeois legality. Bolsheviks dismissed alliances with liberal governments, as seen in their opposition to Menshevik support for the post-February 1917, insisting instead on "all power to the Soviets" as the sole organ for proletarian . This stance positioned Bolshevism as a rupture from orthodox Marxism's anticipated bourgeois-democratic phase in , advocating "skipping" stages through peasant alliances and worker-peasant soviets to directly transition to . Prominent Marxists like offered pointed critiques of Bolshevik centralism, warning in her 1918 pamphlet The Russian Revolution that Lenin's model risked substituting party bureaucracy for mass initiative, potentially stifling proletarian spontaneity essential to . Luxemburg praised ' October 1917 seizure of power as a blow against but condemned their dissolution of the in January 1918—elected with Bolshevik support at only 24%—as undermining democratic mandates, alongside policies like rejecting national that alienated potential allies. She contended that true socialist transformation demanded broad worker self-activity rather than top-down imposition, foreseeing Bolshevik isolation in a backward economy as fostering over genuine class rule. These objections highlighted a core tension: Bolshevik prioritization of disciplined seizure and defense of power versus other Marxists' emphasis on decentralized, participatory revolution to avoid degeneration into .

Empirical Failures and Criticisms

Economic Disasters and Incentive Destruction

The implementation of from June 1918 to March 1921 involved of industry, forced grain requisitioning from peasants, and abolition of private trade, which eradicated market incentives and rights. These measures prompted peasants to withhold surplus production, as outputs were confiscated without compensation, causing agricultural collapse and contributing to the 1921-1922 that killed approximately five million people. Industrial production plummeted by about 70 percent from 1913 levels by 1921, reflecting the absence of profit-driven efficiency and reliance on coercive labor allocation. Forced collectivization of agriculture, accelerated from 1929 as part of the First Five-Year Plan, dismantled individual farms into state-controlled , stripping farmers of ownership and personal gain from output. This destroyed incentives for cultivation, as collective members received minimal rewards while facing arbitrary quotas, leading to a sharp decline in grain production; total Soviet agricultural output remained below 1928 levels for most of the 1930s. Grain harvests fell to around 50 million tons in 1932 from pre-collectivization peaks near 80 million tons annually in the late 1920s, exacerbating food shortages despite ample prior yields. The resulting famine of 1932-1933, known as the in , caused 5.7 to 7 million deaths, primarily from starvation due to enforced procurements that left rural populations without seed or sustenance. Central planning under Bolshevism eliminated market prices for capital goods and inputs, rendering rational economic calculation impossible, as planners lacked objective valuations to allocate resources efficiently—a problem identified in 1920 as inherent to without private ownership and exchange. Soviet managers, incentivized by output quotas rather than profits or , prioritized gross volume over quality, hoarded materials to meet targets, and neglected maintenance, fostering chronic shortages and waste. Fixed prices distorted signals, preventing adaptation to scarcity; for instance, goods production lagged despite industrial expansion, as resources funneled into ignored civilian needs. While the First Five-Year Plan (1928-1932) achieved reported industrial growth of 250 percent in heavy sectors through coerced labor and resource reallocation, this masked underlying inefficiencies: actual productivity gains were eroded by poor-quality outputs unfit for use and agricultural devastation that undermined food supplies for workers. Long-term, the absence of competitive incentives led to stagnation; Soviet per capita GDP growth averaged below Western rates post-1960, with near zero due to bureaucratic rigidities and lack of innovation. These systemic failures stemmed from causal mismatches between policy and human motivation, where suppressing yielded misallocated efforts and persistent underperformance relative to market economies.

Human Atrocities and Demographic Losses

The Bolshevik implementation of class warfare and state repression began with the , decreed by Lenin on September 5, 1918, which authorized mass executions without trial by the secret police to eliminate perceived counter-revolutionaries, including clergy, intellectuals, and kulaks. This campaign, lasting until 1922, resulted in an estimated 200,000 deaths from direct executions and related violence, as documented in analyses of Bolshevik policies during the period. The terror targeted not only armed opponents but also civilians, with policies explicitly calling for hostage-taking and summary killings to deter resistance, reflecting a doctrinal commitment to coercive elimination of class enemies. Under Stalin's forced collectivization from 1929 onward, the regime's seizure of private farms and grain requisitions engineered widespread famines, most notably the in from 1932 to 1933, where policies of export quotas amid harvest shortfalls led to deliberate starvation. Demographic studies estimate 3.9 million excess deaths in alone during 1932–1934, with total famine losses across affected regions reaching 5–7 million, including and , as rural populations were denied food while urban areas and exports were prioritized. These outcomes stemmed from Bolshevik insistence on rapid industrialization funded by agricultural extraction, ignoring of productivity collapse under state control, with internal reports confirming authorities' awareness of mass dying yet enforcing blockades on starving villages. The Great Purge of 1936–1938 intensified repression through show trials and operations, executing party members, military officers, and ordinary citizens accused of sabotage or . Archival data reveal 681,692 documented executions in 1937–1938, with broader purges contributing to 700,000–1.2 million deaths from shootings and immediate post-arrest fatalities, decimating the Red Army's officer corps (over 35,000 purged) and engineering elite turnover to consolidate Stalin's power. forced-labor system, expanded from Lenin's camps, held millions in subarctic conditions for political offenses, with mortality from starvation, disease, and overwork estimated at 1.5–1.7 million between 1930 and 1953, peaking during wartime when prisoner numbers exceeded 2 million. Deportations of ethnic groups, such as 1.5 million Poles, , and others in the 1930s–1940s, added 450,000–566,000 deaths from transit and settlement hardships. Aggregate demographic losses from Bolshevik rule (1917–1953) are estimated by historians at 20 million excess deaths, encompassing executions, famines, camps, and deportations, though some analyses reach 50 million when including indirect and policy-induced mortality. These figures derive from declassified Soviet archives and demographic reconstructions, contrasting with earlier Soviet denials; revisions in post-1991 , less influenced by ideological constraints, affirm the regime's causal role in demographic collapse through ideologically driven policies that prioritized utopian goals over human costs. Lower estimates from some Western academics, often citing incomplete data, have been critiqued for understating , as evidenced by consistent patterns of targeted deprivation across episodes.

Theoretical Flaws and Causal Mismatches

The Bolshevik theoretical framework, extending Marxist , assumed that centralized planning by the vanguard party could supplant market mechanisms to rationally direct production toward communal abundance, but this overlooked the impossibility of economic calculation without in . demonstrated in 1920 that eliminates monetary prices formed through voluntary exchange, depriving planners of objective data on resource scarcities and consumer preferences, thus rendering decisions arbitrary and inefficient compared to capitalist trial-and-error via profits and losses. Bolshevik adaptations, such as Gosplan's directive targets from 1921 onward, theoretically compounded this flaw by relying on administrative fiat rather than dispersed knowledge aggregation, as later elaborated by in 1945, who argued that no central authority can process the tacit, localized information essential for coordination. A core causal mismatch arose from the doctrine's deterministic view of historical materialism, which predicted proletarian revolution in advanced industrial societies where capitalist contradictions would mature productive forces sufficiently for socialism, yet the Bolsheviks seized power in agrarian Russia on November 7, 1917, where pre-capitalist feudal remnants predominated and industrial proletariat numbered under 1 million workers. This deviation necessitated Lenin's New Economic Policy in 1921 to restore limited markets amid collapse, contradicting the theory's insistence on immediate expropriation without transitional incentives, and exposing the causal oversight that underdeveloped economies lack the technological base Marx deemed prerequisite for classless society. Stalin's 1924 pivot to "socialism in one country" further mismatched internationalist predictions by prioritizing national autarky over global upheaval, theoretically rationalized as dialectical necessity but causally rooted in isolation after failed 1919-1923 European revolts. Lenin's vanguard party model, outlined in What Is to Be Done? (1902), theorized an elite cadre to instill in a purportedly trade-unionist , but this engendered substitutionism wherein the party preempted worker agency, undermining the Marxist of self-emancipation and paving theoretical grounds for perpetual rather than the state's predicted withering away. Critics like contended in 1904 that such centralism stifles spontaneous mass action, fostering bureaucratic alienation over proletarian , a flaw Bolshevik practice amplified by fusing party and state apparatuses post-1917. This theoretical prioritization of conspiratorial discipline over organic dialectics mismatched causal realities of human motivation, as the absence of competitive incentives and exit options entrenched authoritarian inertia, diverging from the doctrine's utopian endpoint of uncoerced cooperation.

Long-Term Legacy

Soviet Dissolution and Policy Abandonment

initiated , an economic restructuring program emphasizing decentralization and market elements, and , promoting political openness and reduced censorship, in 1985 to address stagnation in the Soviet economy and bureaucracy. These reforms, intended to salvage the system, instead amplified underlying inefficiencies by exposing historical repressions and economic distortions without resolving incentive problems inherent in central planning, fueling demands for autonomy among republics. 's partial led to shortages and as state controls loosened without adequate rights or competition, eroding public support for Bolshevik-style command economics. An attempted coup by hardline communists on August 19–21, 1991, against Gorbachev's policies failed amid resistance led by , discrediting the Communist Party of the (CPSU) and accelerating centrifugal forces. The coup's collapse prompted the banning of the CPSU on August 24, 1991, by the , effectively dismantling the one-party monopoly central to Bolshevik governance. On December 8, 1991, leaders of , Ukraine, and Belarus signed the Belavezha Accords in Belarus, declaring the USSR dissolved and establishing the (CIS) as a loose . Gorbachev resigned as Soviet president on December 25, 1991, and the formally terminated the union on December 26, 1991, ending 69 years of Bolshevik-derived state structure. Following dissolution, Yeltsin, as Russia's first president, implemented "shock therapy" reforms starting January 2, 1992, including price liberalization, ending state subsidies, and rapid of enterprises previously under Bolshevik principles. These measures repudiated core Bolshevik policies of collectivization and central allocation, introducing market pricing and private ownership to restore incentives destroyed by decades of , though they triggered peaking at 2,500% in 1992 and a GDP contraction of about 40% from 1991 to 1995. By 1993, Russia's enshrined multiparty and property rights, formally abandoning Leninist vanguard party rule and proletarian . This shift reflected empirical recognition that Bolshevik economic doctrines had produced chronic shortages and technological lag, as evidenced by the USSR's inability to sustain growth rates above 2% annually in the despite resource abundance. Subsequent leaders, including from 2000, retained elements of state intervention but did not revive comprehensive Bolshevik planning, prioritizing stability over ideological purity.

Historiographical Shifts Post-Cold War

The in December 1991 facilitated the gradual opening of state archives, including those holding Bolshevik-era documents, which had been inaccessible to most Western scholars during the . This access, beginning in earnest around 1992, marked an "archival revolution" that shifted from reliance on émigré accounts, partial declassified materials, and ideological inference toward empirical verification using internal party records, files, and correspondence. Scholars could now cross-reference claims about early Soviet policies, revealing the Bolsheviks' systematic use of violence and coercion from 1917 onward, rather than viewing repression as a later Stalinist deviation. For example, operational logs confirmed executions numbering in the tens of thousands during the of 1918–1922, aligning with pre-archival estimates by historians like while refuting minimization by Soviet apologists. Post-Cold War scholarship increasingly emphasized continuity in Bolshevik governance, portraying Lenin's regime as foundational to totalitarian structures rather than a provisional phase disrupted by . Archival evidence documented Lenin's directives for "mass terror" against class enemies, including the order to "securely execute" hostages, which prefigured the scale of purges and famines. This undermined revisionist narratives from the 1970s–1980s that attributed Soviet to bureaucratic inertia or external pressures like , instead highlighting ideological drivers rooted in Marxist-Leninist doctrine. In , the shift was stark: official historiography abandoned mandatory praise of the as a proletarian triumph, with post-1991 textbooks acknowledging Bolshevik suppression of alternatives like the and the role of German funding in Lenin's return. Works like Stéphane Courtois's (1997), drawing on newly available data, quantified Bolshevik-era deaths at over 4 million from executions, famines, and camps, influencing a broader reassessment of communism's human cost. Despite these empirical advances, debates persisted over interpretive frameworks, with some social historians using archives to explore Bolshevik "bargaining" with peasants or workers, yet often downplaying causal links between and outcomes. Critiques emerged of lingering biases in academia, where pre-1991 revisionism—prioritizing "from below" dynamics—resisted full integration of evidence showing top-down control, such as Lenin's suppression of intra-party dissent via the 1921 ban on factions. Overall, the post-Cold War privileged causal realism, attributing Bolshevik failures not to contingent errors but to inherent flaws in vanguard-party rule and war communism's incentive-destroying policies, as corroborated by economic ledgers revealing deliberate grain requisitions exacerbating the 1921–1922 famine that killed 5 million. This evidenced-based turn diminished , fostering a that views Bolshevism as a seizure of power through calculated ruthlessness rather than organic popular will.

References

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