Hubbry Logo
Nonintercourse ActNonintercourse ActMain
Open search
Nonintercourse Act
Community hub
Nonintercourse Act
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Nonintercourse Act
Nonintercourse Act
Nonintercourse Act
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

The Nonintercourse Act (also known as the Indian Intercourse Act or the Indian Nonintercourse Act) is the collective name given to six statutes passed by the United States Congress in 1790, 1793, 1796, 1799, 1802, and 1834 to set boundaries of American Indian reservations. The various acts were also intended to regulate commerce between White Americans and citizens of Indigenous nations. The most notable provisions of the act regulate the inalienability of aboriginal title in the United States, a continuing source of litigation for almost 200 years. The prohibition on purchases of Indian lands without the approval of the federal government has its origins in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Confederation Congress Proclamation of 1783.

Text of the land provision

[edit]

The first four acts expired after four years; the 1802 and 1834 acts had no expiration. The version of the act in force at the time of the illicit conveyance determines the law that applies. The courts have found few legal differences between the five versions of the act.[1] For example, three dissenting justices in South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe (1986) noted that the 1793 Act expanded the scope of the 1790 Act by applying the prohibition not only to lands but "claims".[2]

The original act, passed on July 22, 1790, provides:

No sale of lands made by any Indians, or any nation or tribe of Indians within the United States, shall be valid to any person or persons, or to any state, whether having the right of pre-emption to such lands or not, unless the same shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty, held under the authority of the United States.[3]

The 1793 act provides:

No purchase or grant of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indians or nation or tribe of Indians, within the bounds of the United States, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by a treaty or a convention entered into pursuant to the constitution ...[4]

The 1796 act provides:

No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian, or nation or tribe of Indians, within the bounds of the United States, shall be of any validity, in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty, or convention, entered into pursuant to the constitution ...[5]

The 1799 act provides:

No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian, or nation or tribe of Indians, within the bounds of the United States, shall be of any validity, in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention, entered into pursuant to the constitution ...[6]

The 1802 act provides:

No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian, or nation, or tribe of Indians, within the bounds of the United States, shall be of any validity, in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention, entered into pursuant to the constitution ...[7]

The 1834 act, currently codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177, provides:

No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of land, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant the constitution.[8]

Legislative history

[edit]

One of the earliest interpretations of the Nonintercourse Act comes from a speech by President George Washington to the Seneca Nation of New York in 1790, after the passage of the act:

I am not uninformed that the six Nations have been led into some difficulties with respect to the sale of their lands since the peace. But I must inform you that these evils arose before the present government of the United States was established, when the separate States and individuals under their authority, undertook to treat with the Indian tribes respecting the sale of their lands. But the case is now entirely altered. The general Government only has the power, to treat with the Indian Nations, and any treaty formed and held without its authority will not be binding. Here then is the security for the remainder of your lands. No State nor person can purchase your lands, unless at some public treaty held under the authority of the United States. The general government will never consent to your being defrauded. But it will protect you in all your just rights.[9]

Land claims litigation

[edit]
Main article: Aboriginal title in the United States
Indian Country-Territory 1834
Indian Territory or Indian Country (red) as set by the Nonintercourse Act of 1834, which also dovetailed with other measures to relocate Indian populations westward.

History

[edit]

The first litigation of the Nonintercourse Act by an indigenous party to reach the Supreme Court was Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831), which the Court dismissed on the technicality that the court lacked original jurisdiction,[10] so the result was the Cherokee did not have a standing as a foreign nation, but the opinion did not rule on the merits, leaving the door open for a ruling on a resubmitted case. Former Attorney General William Wirt, the Cherokee's lawyer, argued that the challenged Georgia statute was void, inter alia, "because it is repugnant to a law of the United States passed in 1803 entitled 'an act to regulate trade and intercourse with Indian tribes, and to preserve peace on the frontiers'."[11] Wirt also argued that the state statute violated the Cherokee treaties and the Contract Clause and the dormant Indian Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.[10] A similar argument was made in the Bill filed by Wirt in the Supreme Court.[12] William Wirt's arguments[13] may have had a telling effect, for in a subsequent action, Worcester v. Georgia (1832), the court reversed itself, holding that the Cherokee were a sovereign nation and thus the Supreme Court did have original jurisdiction.

After Cherokee Nation, the next such case to reach the Court was Seneca Nation of Indians v. Christy (1896). The New York Court of Appeals had dismissed the claim based on an interpretation of the Nonintercourse Act and an invocation of the statute of limitations for the state enabling act which enabled the Seneca to sue in state court; the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal because of the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine.[14] The Act remained essentially unlitigated by tribes until Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation (1960), where the Tuscarora attempted to avoid the condemnation of their land by the construction of a federal dam. The court held the Act inapplicable, but noted:

It is certain that if [25 U.S.C. § 177] is applicable ... the mere 'expressed consent' of Congress would be vain and idle. For § 177 at the very least contemplates the assent of the Indian nation or tribe. ... It follows that the mere consent of Congress, however express and specific, would avail nothing. Therefore, if § 177 is applicable ... the result would be that the Tuscarora lands, however imperative for the project, could not be taken at all.[15]

This dicta inspired Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State v. Oneida Cnty. (1974) ("Oneida I"),[16] where the Supreme Court held that there was federal subject-matter jurisdiction for Indian land claims based upon aboriginal title and violations of the Nonintercourse Act.[17] In Oneida Cnty. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State (1984) ("Oneida II"), the Supreme Court held that tribes have a federal common law cause of action, not pre-empted by the Nonintercourse Act, for possessory land claims based upon aboriginal title; the court also rejected the following affirmative defenses: limitations, abatement, ratification, and nonjusticiability.[18]

While Oneida II remains the only final judgement entered by a court in favor of a tribe bringing a Nonintercourse Act land claim, Oneida I inspired dozens of other land claims. After tribes won initial judgements in some of these claims, Congress reacted by extinguishing the claimed aboriginal title and compensating the tribal plaintiffs. These Indian Land Claims Settlements are collected in 25 U.S.C. tit. 19. For example, in Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton (1st Cir. 1975), after the First Circuit held that the federal government was obliged to bring a suit on the tribe's behalf claiming 60% of Maine, Congress approved an $81.5 million settlement.[19] In the case of the Narragansett land claim (D.R.I. 1976), Congress enacted a settlement after the court struck all the defendant's affirmative defenses (laches, statute of limitations/adverse possession, estoppel by sale, operation of state law, and public policy) and denied the state's motion to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity and nonjusticiability.[20] Similarly, in Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut (D. Conn. 1982), Congress approved the creation of the Mohegan Sun after the court struck the defendant's affirmative defenses.[21] With the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe[22] and Wampanoag,[23] Congress enacted a settlement before the courts had a chance to enter any rulings.

Elements

[edit]

As stated in Narragansett, there are four elements to a Nonintercourse Act claim.

In order to establish a prima facie case, plaintiff must show that:

  1. it is or represents an Indian "tribe" within the meaning of the Act;
  2. the parcels of land at issue herein are covered by the Act as tribal land;
  3. the United States has never consented to the alienation of the tribal land;
  4. the trust relationship between the United States and the tribe, which is established by coverage of the Act, has never been terminated or abandoned.[24]

More recently (2008), the Second Circuit has stated:

In order to establish a violation of the Non-Intercourse Act, the [plaintiffs] are required to establish that: (1) they are an Indian tribe; (2) the land at issue was tribal land at the time of the conveyance; (3) the United States never approved the conveyance, and (4) the trust relationship between the United States and the tribe has not been terminated.[25]

Tribal status

[edit]

The Passamaquoddy and Narragansett cases, supra, are examples where the plaintiff has prevailed despite not being federally recognized tribes (the Passamaquoddy obtained federal recognition through the Maine Indian Claims Settlement; the Narragansett gained federal recognition in 1983, five years after the Rhode Island Claims Settlement Act). Although federal tribal status is prima facie evidence of the first element, the Act also applies to unrecognized tribes.[26]

If the tribe is unrecognized, the defendant may defeat the plaintiff's prima facie case either by showing that the Indians did not constitute a "tribe" at the time of the conveyance, or at the time of the litigation; thus, the defendant may show that the plaintiff is not the successor in interest to the tribe whose lands were illegally alienated. The leading case where the defendants prevailed on this element is Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp. (1st Cir. 1979).[27] Alternatively, the action may be stayed until the Bureau of Indian Affairs makes a tribal status determination (and eventually dismissed if the BIA concludes the plaintiffs are not the successors in interest).[28] The Pueblo were initially interpreted not to be "Indians" for the purposes of the Nonintercourse Act;[29] however, this holding was subsequently overruled.[30]

The elements given above are for a tribe. The United States, acting in its capacity as a trustee, may bring, and has successfully brought, actions on behalf of a tribe.[31] The federal government was vested with similar power to enforce the anti-alienation provisions of the Allotment Acts.[32] Conversely, individual Indians have no standing under the Act.[33] This is true even if individual plaintiffs attempt the certify a class of all tribal members; the tribe itself must sue.[34]

Covered land

[edit]

Unlike the Confederation Congress Proclamation of 1783, the Nonintercourse Act applies to land within the boundaries of a state, including the original thirteen.[35] The First Circuit in Passamaquoddy and the Second Circuit in Mohegan Tribe, supra, held that the Nonintercourse Act applies to the entire United States, including the original thirteen. No defendant has yet persuaded a court otherwise.

However, the defendant will defeat this element if the challenged conveyance occurred before 1790.[36] The Confederation Congress Proclamation of 1783 may cover conveyances between 1783 and 1790, but the only court to consider it held that the Confederation Congress had neither the power nor the intent to prohibit conveyances to states within their borders.[37] The Royal Proclamation of 1763 may cover conveyances between 1763 and 1783; however, the only court to examine such a conveyance found that it satisfied the requirements of the Proclamation.[38] For example, the conveyances at issue in Johnson v. McIntosh (1823) occurred on July 5, 1773 and October 18, 1775, but neither party to the suit was indigenous.[39]

[edit]

Through the policies of Indian removal in the East and Indian reservation-creation in the West, the federal government removed Native Americans from most of their ancestral land. However, examples of Congress approving a state action that alienated land are rare indeed. Congress would have to pass a statute with express language, or the Senate would have to ratify the treaty alienating the land, to secure such federal approval. The view taken by several of the Indian Land Claims Settlements is that Congress may consent to such conveyances retroactively; this view has not been tested in court, although it is likely to be upheld because the power of Congress to extinguish aboriginal title without compensation is plenary.

Trust relationship

[edit]

In Passamaquoddy, supra, the First Circuit held that only Congress, and only with a clear statement, can terminate a federal–tribal trust relationship; acts of state governments are irrelevant. Congress has done so with several tribes under Indian termination policy. Since South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe (1986) it has been understood that the Nonintercourse Act does not protect the lands of terminated tribes; there, the termination act was held to have triggered the state statute of limitations with respect to the land claim.[40]

Affirmative defenses

[edit]

Courts have considered and rejected several affirmative defenses to Nonintercourse Act suits.[41] However, there are two affirmative defenses that have been accepted by some courts: state sovereign immunity and the equitable doctrine of laches.

State sovereign immunity

[edit]

The structure of the original Constitution and the text of the Eleventh Amendment gives states sovereign immunity from most suits.[42] There are exceptions: when the state consents to suit; when the federal government abrogates sovereign immunity by statute; when the federal government is the plaintiff or plaintiff-intervenor; and the category authorized by Ex parte Young (1908). In several cases, Nonintercourse Act plaintiffs have satisfied one of these exceptions.[43] However, the Nonintercourse Act itself does not abrogate state sovereign immunity.[44] Moreover, the authority is clear that the Ex parte Young exception does not apply.[45] Therefore, plaintiffs must obtain the intervention of the federal government or relegate themselves to suing local governments and private land owners.[46]

Further, in actions against states, Indians are not entitled to the presumption of 25 U.S.C. § 194, which applies only to "persons".[47]

Laches

[edit]

Four dissenting justices would have barred the tribes action based on laches in Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State (1985), a question the majority did not reach.[18] The Second Circuit adopted the view of the dissent in Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki (2d Cir. 2005), and since then no tribal plaintiff has been able to overcome this affirmative defense in that circuit.[48] Cayuga erased a damage award of $247.9 million, the largest ever awarded under the Act.

Other provisions

[edit]

Definition of Indian country

[edit]

In addition to regulating relations between Indians living on Indian land and non-Indians, the 1834 Act identified an area known as "Indian country". This land was described as being "all that part of the United States west of the Mississippi and not within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of Arkansas". This is the land that became known as Indian Territory.

Trading posts

[edit]

One of the most defining aspects of the acts was the establishment of a series of "factories" which were officially licensed trading posts where Native Americans were to sell their merchandise (particularly furs). The factories, which officially were set up to protect the tribes from unscrupulous private traders, were to be used as leverage to cause the tribes to cede substantial territory in exchange for access to the "factory" as happened with the Treaty of Fort Clark in which the Osage Nation exchanged most of Missouri in order to access Fort Clark.

Property claims

[edit]

According to U.S. Attorney General William Wirt:

[T]he United States agree to pay [the Creek Indians] certain specific sums of money, out of which payments there is a reservation of $5,000 to satisfy claims for property taken by individuals of the said nation from the citizens of the United States subsequent to the treaty of Colerain, which has been or may be claimed and established agreeably to the provisions of the act for regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, and to preserve peace on the frontiers.[49]

State nonintercourse acts

[edit]
Further information: Aboriginal title statutes in the Thirteen Colonies

The Nonintercourse Act did not pre-empt the states from legislating additional restraints on alienation of Native American lands.[50] Many states, including nearly all of the original Thirteen, enacted similar statutes for at least some lands during at least some time periods.[51]

Other state statutes, or constitutional provisions, incorporated the English common law as it had evolved up to that point.[52]

New York

[edit]

A New York State enacted March 31, 1821, provided:

[I]t shall be unlawful for any person or persons, other than Indians, to settle or reside upon any lands belonging to or occupied by any nation or tribe of Indians within this state; and that all leases, contracts and agreements made by any Indians, whereby any person or persons, other than Indians, shall be permitted to reside upon such lands, shall be absolutely void; and if any person or persons shall settle or reside on any such lands, contrary to this act, it shall be the duty of any judge of any court of Common Pleas of the county within which such lands shall be situated, on complaint made to him, and on due proof of the fact of such settlement or residence, to issue his warrant, under his hand and seal, directed to the sheriff of such county, commanding him, within ten days after the receipt thereof, to remove such person or persons so settling or residing, with his, her or their families, from such lands.[53]

South Carolina

[edit]

A 1739 South Carolina Provincial Council statute required a license from the Crown or governor for a private party to purchase lands from Indians.[54]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Nonintercourse Act

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Nonintercourse Acts, formally known as the Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts, comprise a series of six statutes enacted by the United States Congress between 1790 and 1834 to regulate commercial interactions, travel, and land dealings between American citizens and Native American tribes. The inaugural act, passed on July 22, 1790, mandated federal licenses for all trade with Indian tribes, imposed bonds on traders to ensure good conduct, and barred private individuals from purchasing tribal lands without federal oversight through treaties or commissioners. This legislation affirmed the federal government's exclusive authority over Indian affairs, building on precedents like the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and sought to curb fraudulent land grabs, unlicensed commerce, and frontier violence that threatened national stability. Subsequent enactments in 1793, 1796, 1799, 1802, and 1834 progressively strengthened these controls, with the 1834 act notably defining "Indian country" as territories west of settled states under tribal dominion and introducing penalties for crimes committed therein. By centralizing land cession processes and prohibiting state or individual encroachments, the acts entrenched the principle of federal plenary power over tribal sovereignty, a framework that persists in contemporary disputes over aboriginal title and has underpinned landmark court cases validating tribal claims against unauthorized historical conveyances.

Historical and Legislative Background

Enactment and Initial Purpose

Following the , the faced significant instability in its frontier regions due to unchecked state-level encroachments on Native American lands and unregulated private trade, which exacerbated tensions and contributed to armed conflicts such as the (1785–1795). Under the , individual states had negotiated treaties and permitted settler expansions into tribal territories, often through fraudulent or coercive means, undermining national cohesion and provoking Native resistance. Secretary of War highlighted in his 1789 report to Congress that such "force or fraud" by frontiersmen was a primary cause of ongoing hostilities, urging federal intervention to restore order and prevent anarchy. Congress enacted the first Trade and Intercourse Act on July 22, 1790, marking the initial federal statute to assert exclusive national authority over commerce and relations with Indian tribes, as empowered by the Constitution's Indian Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3). Influenced by advocates like Knox, the legislation responded to the weaknesses of the Confederation era by centralizing control previously fragmented among states, thereby implementing the constitutional shift toward treating tribes as entities under federal oversight rather than subjects of state jurisdiction. The foundational objectives centered on curbing exploitative practices that fueled instability: requiring federal supervision of land transfers to block unauthorized private purchases, which had proliferated , and mandating licenses for traders to mitigate abuses like debt entrapment and illicit goods that incited tribal warfare. This framework aimed to establish the as the sole sovereign entity in Indian affairs, fostering peaceful intercourse while protecting national interests against the disorder of decentralized dealings. By prioritizing federal monopoly over these domains, the Act sought to avert further escalations like those in the , where unregulated interactions had already resulted in significant military setbacks for U.S. forces.

Evolution Through Reenactments

The Nonintercourse Act of 1790, initially temporary, was reenacted in prior to its expiration, incorporating prohibitions against unauthorized white settlements on Indian lands and barring federal Indian affairs employees from commercial interests in trade with tribes. These additions addressed early enforcement gaps, such as incomplete implementation of the 1790 Treaty of New York, which had ceded Creek lands but faced violations by and unlicensed traders. Further reenactments followed in 1796 and 1799, extending the framework to preserve peace on expanding frontiers amid rising violence from unregulated intercourse, including the 's aftermath, where state-level regulations proved inadequate against federal treaty obligations. The 1802 Act rendered the legislation permanent, introducing penalties for introducing spirituous liquors into Indian territories to curb abuses that exacerbated intertribal and settler conflicts. The 1834 Act, passed under President Andrew Jackson's administration, represented a comprehensive overhaul, broadening federal oversight westward by defining "" to encompass all unorganized territories west of the , excluding , , and . This expansion responded to intensified frontier pressures post-1830 , strengthening penalties for unlicensed and unauthorized land encroachments while authorizing federal intervention in intertribal disputes. Reenactments reflected adaptive policymaking, with licensed systems—bolstered by federal trading houses—demonstrating reduced hostilities through regulated exchanges, as illicit had empirically fueled retaliatory violence in prior decades.

Core Provisions

Restrictions on Land Transfers

The central provision of the Nonintercourse Act of 1790 restricting land transfers appears in its fourth section, which declared that "no sale of lands made by any Indians, or any nation or tribe of Indians within the United States, shall be valid to any person or persons, or to any state, whether having the right of pre-emption to such lands or not, unless the same shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty, held under the authority of the United States." This clause mechanistically invalidated all private or state-level alienations of tribal lands, rendering titles derived from unauthorized transfers legally void ab initio, thereby channeling all legitimate extinguishment of Indian possessory rights exclusively through federal ratification at congressionally supervised public treaties. The requirement for a "public treaty" ensured transparency and federal superintendence, prohibiting covert deeds, speculative contracts, or sub rosa grants that had proliferated under colonial and early state regimes. This restriction originated from congressional recognition of pervasive frauds in pre-Act land dealings, where speculators and colonial proprietors exploited asymmetric information, duress, or deception to acquire vast territories at nominal prices. For instance, in , the 1737 involved officials from the Penn family manipulating a deed's ambiguous "walk in one day and a half" clause by using a pre-mapped route, hired fast-walking scouts, and forged trails to claim approximately 1,200 square miles—far exceeding the intended 60-mile perimeter—from Delaware Indians, who later protested the deceit as yielding land worth over 1.2 million acres under fair valuation. In New York, similar abuses occurred through the 1787-1788 state-authorized purchases by speculators like the New York Land Company, which acquired millions of acres from Haudenosaunee nations via inflated rum provisions, coerced signatures, and sales of territories not fully controlled by the ostensible sellers, often without broader tribal consent or federal oversight. These empirical instances, documented in contemporary petitions and legislative records, underscored the Act's intent to curb such "great frauds and abuses" by subordinating individual or state initiatives to centralized federal authority. The provision's logic presupposed Indian tribes' aboriginal title as a right of occupancy predating European settlement, entitling them to exclusive use and possession unless voluntarily ceded via formal process, yet this title remained defeasible only by the sovereign discovering power—here, the —to prevent anarchic among settlers, states, and speculators. By mandating congressional or presidential , the mechanism operationalized this , nullifying transfers that bypassed it and preserving federal leverage to negotiate equitable exchanges, as evidenced by the Act's immediate application in voiding several post-independence state deeds in the . Subsequent reenactments in 1793, 1796, 1799, 1802, and beyond preserved this core operative framework, extending its geographic scope while reinforcing the invalidity of non-compliant alienations.

Regulations on Trade and Intercourse

The Nonintercourse Act of mandated that no individual could engage in or intercourse with Indian tribes without a issued under the hand and seal of a superintendent of Indian affairs or other designated federal . License applicants were required to furnish a bond in the sum of $1,000, conditioned on faithful compliance with regulations, with licenses limited to a maximum duration of two years and revocable by the President upon evidence of misconduct or violation. These measures centralized federal over commerce, restricting participation to U.S. citizens or approved agents to ensure oversight and prevent unregulated private dealings that had previously fueled tribal disputes. Penalties for unlicensed trade or intercourse included the immediate forfeiture of all merchandise and articles intended for exchange, with one moiety accruing to the use of the informer or prosecutor and the other to the United States. Reenactments in 1796 and subsequent years intensified enforcement by adding monetary fines of up to $500 per violation and terms of imprisonment, while prohibiting the introduction of spirituous liquors or wine into Indian country to mitigate associated exploitation and disorder. Violations involving liquor carried specific fines of $300 to $500, alongside authorization for federal agents or Indians to seize and destroy contraband stocks. The defined "intercourse" broadly to include not only economic exchanges but also unauthorized , hunting, or residency within Indian territories, subjecting such activities to presidential regulations aimed at curbing frontier instability. This framework targeted causal factors in tribal-white conflicts, such as illicit traders extending to induce indebtedness, which often escalated into over repayment demands or land forfeitures. By confining interactions to licensed channels, the acts sought to minimize such predatory practices, with early implementation correlating to documented declines in trade-related skirmishes in supervised districts relative to prior unregulated zones.

Ancillary Clauses on Property and Jurisdiction

The Nonintercourse Acts included provisions for the recovery of stolen from Indian tribes, establishing federal mechanisms to investigate claims and compel restitution. Under the 1790 Act, if property belonging to Indians in amity with the was stolen by U.S. citizens, offenders could be prosecuted in state or territorial courts under laws applicable to similar domestic thefts, with federal oversight to ensure enforcement. Subsequent reenactments, such as the 1802 Act, expanded these remedies by authorizing federal agents to seize stolen goods like horses and , reflecting an intent to deter individual depredations that undermined tribal security without federal involvement. However, empirical records indicate these clauses were rarely invoked successfully in the early republic due to jurisdictional conflicts and local sympathies favoring settlers, limiting their practical impact until stronger federal presence emerged. Jurisdictional clauses asserted exclusive federal authority over offenses within , vesting U.S. district courts with civil and criminal over non-Indians violating the Acts' terms, including unauthorized trade or property seizures. The 1834 Act defined "Indian country" expansively to include all U.S. lands west of the outside specified states and territories, encompassing unceded tribal domains not yet formalized as reservations, thereby extending federal protections to broad frontier zones occupied or claimed by tribes. This territorial scope underscored to curb state encroachments, as local courts often deferred to settler interests. Enforcement provisions delegated authority to the President to deploy military forces for compliance, authorizing troops to remove intruders, suppress violations, and protect tribal property in remote areas where civil authority was ineffective. Such measures addressed causal factors like geographic isolation and institutional biases in state governance, which historically enabled unchecked private actions against tribes; for instance, the 1834 Act's Section 9 empowered military intervention to prevent or redress depredations, bypassing potentially partial local mechanisms. Early applications were constrained by limited federal resources, with military deployments sporadic until mid-century expansions of U.S. Army presence on the frontiers.

Judicial Interpretation and Litigation Framework

Essential Elements for Valid Claims

To prevail in an action seeking recovery of based on an alleged violation of the Nonintercourse Act (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177), a must establish that it constitutes or represents an "Indian nation or of Indians" as contemplated by the . Courts assess this element by examining historical of organized tribal and social cohesion at the time of the claimed violation, often requiring proof of federal acknowledgment or equivalent status under federal Indian to invoke the Act's protections against unauthorized alienation. Continued tribal existence post-violation may also be scrutinized, though abandonment of tribal relations can defeat claims where empirical records show dissolution of communal identity prior to litigation. The plaintiff must further demonstrate aboriginal title to the disputed land at the relevant historical moment, typically through documentary and ethnographic evidence of exclusive use, occupancy, and dominion over the territory by the tribe or its predecessors, sufficient to confer possessory rights enforceable against private intruders but subject to defeasance by the federal sovereign. This occupancy must predate the challenged conveyance and align with the Act's temporal scope, excluding lands already ceded via valid federal treaty or purchase prior to 1790. The land itself must qualify as "tribal land" under the Act, meaning parcels held under within unextinguished or equivalent domains not yet incorporated into non-Indian settlements at the time of enactment or reenactment, as determined by federal boundaries and historical surveys. Claims falter if the territory falls outside this coverage, such as areas explicitly opened to settlement by congressional act without reservation of Indian rights. Central to validity is proof of non-consent by the federal government to the alienation, requiring evidence—such as unratified deeds, state , or treaty absences—that the transfer occurred without supervision, ratification, or approval via or as mandated by the Act's proviso. Historical archives, including colonial grants and federal correspondence, serve to verify this absence, with the burden on the to negate any implicit or explicit consent through comprehensive review of legislative . While the Act implicates a federal trust responsibility to safeguard tribal possessory interests, this element yields to factual determinations of abandonment or valid extinguishment in individual claims, where courts demand tangible proof of ongoing tribal attachment rather than presumptive . Success thus hinges on integrating these prerequisites into a cohesive evidentiary showing, without which federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1360 or related statutes may not attach.

Affirmative Defenses and Limitations

In City of Sherrill v. of New York (2005), the U.S. applied the equitable doctrine of laches to bar a tribe's claim under the Nonintercourse Act after more than two centuries of non-assertion, emphasizing that such delayed possessory assertions would disrupt longstanding non-Indian property expectations and governmental land-use patterns. The Court reasoned that the 's failure to pursue timely remedies, coupled with intervening reliance by private landowners and local governments on settled titles, rendered equitable relief impracticable, as "the passage of time" had fostered "dramatic changes in the character of the properties" from reservation lands to integrated urban and suburban developments. This application of laches, alongside related doctrines of acquiescence and impossibility, prioritizes factual disruptions to causal chains of investment and regulation over indefinite retention of aboriginal rights absent federal restoration. State sovereign immunity, grounded in the Eleventh Amendment, serves as another , shielding states from suits seeking to unwind historical land transfers purportedly violating the Act, as federal courts lack over unconsenting states in such possessory or claims. Courts have upheld this bar where tribes sue state entities for restitution or title invalidation, noting the Act's remedial structure does not abrogate without explicit congressional , thus preserving fiscal and jurisdictional stability against retroactive liabilities. Tribal plaintiffs must demonstrate or non-state defendants to proceed, underscoring limits on federal law's intrusion into state sovereignty absent clear intent. Defendants may also assert lapses in tribal status, arguing that assimilation, dissolution, or abandonment extinguishes a group's standing to invoke the Act's protections, as only federally recognized tribes with continuous identity qualify for aboriginal title safeguards. Where historical evidence shows a tribe's integration into non-Indian society or formal cessation via treaty or statute—without subsequent federal acknowledgment—courts deny claims, rejecting perpetual prerogatives for entities that factually ceased cohesive existence. This defense aligns with evidentiary burdens requiring plaintiffs to prove unbroken tribal continuity, countering assertions of enduring rights amid demographic and cultural shifts. The Act's absence of statutory time limitations invites critiques that it facilitates opportunistic windfall recoveries, disregarding market-based improvements and possessory investments accrued over generations on lands long treated as alienable. Judicial imposition of equitable bars mitigates this by enforcing reliance principles, ensuring title finality supports economic causality rather than subordinating non-tribal stakeholders to indefinite vulnerabilities. These constraints reflect a doctrinal balance favoring verifiable historical assertion and contemporary realities over abstract .

Evolution of Doctrinal Tests

In the early 19th century, judicial interpretations of the Nonintercourse Act affirmed federal exclusivity over Indian land transactions, building on precedents like (1810), which protected vested land interests derived from state grants involving Indian territories and underscored the invalidity of unilateral state actions in alienating such lands without federal concurrence. This aligned with emerging doctrines under the , rendering state validations of transfers non-binding absent federal approval, as the Act codified Congress's intent to centralize control and prevent fraud or unauthorized cessions. Such rulings established a doctrinal baseline prioritizing federal oversight to preserve until explicitly extinguished by treaty or statute. The Act's interpretive dormancy persisted through much of the 19th and early 20th centuries, with courts viewing it as largely historical amid widespread land allotments and assimilative policies. Revival occurred in Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. County of Oneida (1974), where the Supreme Court recognized the Act's ongoing vitality, holding that its protections against unratified transfers created a perpetual federal cause of action enforceable by tribes, unrepealed by subsequent legislation and applicable to claims predating statehood. This decision marked a doctrinal shift from archival relic to active safeguard of pre-existing Indian title, emphasizing strict compliance with federal ratification requirements and rejecting state sovereignty over extinguishment. Post-1974 refinements incorporated broader equitable considerations, as seen in County of Oneida v. (1985), which upheld the Act's role in validating federal claims but signaled limits on unbounded revival. The pivotal evolution came in City of Sherrill v. (2005), where the Court introduced balancing tests weighing the Act's preservation of title against doctrines of laches, acquiescence, and the "disruptive practical consequences" of reclaiming parcels long integrated into non-Indian economies, after over two centuries of private ownership and municipal governance. These tests prioritize verifiable economic realities, such as the impracticality of retroactive disrupting settled expectations where non-Indians have achieved generational prosperity, effectively conditioning remedies on contemporaneous federal action rather than ancient breaches alone. Debates persist over extinguishment thresholds, with precedents insisting endures absent clear federal intent, thereby sustaining Nonintercourse claims against state-conveyed titles. Critics contend this undermines state quiet title laws by introducing perpetual federal overrides, clouding property finality and exposing titles to litigation despite state certifications, as tribes may challenge conveyances lacking explicit congressional , prioritizing tribal interests over long-assured private holdings. This tension reflects a doctrinal progression from rigid exclusivity to pragmatic equity, informed by the Act's text but calibrated to avoid systemic economic upheaval from claims potentially encompassing millions of acres.

Major Cases and Outcomes

Eastern Land Claims Revival

In the , eastern Native American tribes initiated a series of federal lawsuits invoking the Nonintercourse Act of to challenge historical land transfers in the , alleging violations due to the absence of federal approval for alienations dating back to the late 18th and early 19th centuries. These claims targeted vast tracts in states like and New York, reviving dormant aboriginal titles and exposing potential liabilities estimated in the billions of dollars for state and private landowners. The litigation surge stemmed from evolving federal recognition of tribal trust responsibilities, enabling suits even by non-federally recognized groups. A pivotal case was Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton (1975), where the Tribe sued the Secretary of the Interior for failing to enforce the Nonintercourse Act against 's historical acquisition of over 10 million acres of tribal land without congressional ratification. The U.S. District Court ruled that the Act applied to the despite their lack of formal federal recognition, establishing a federal trust duty to protect their lands and allowing the tribe to proceed directly against the state. This decision prompted negotiations culminating in the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980, under which authorized $81.5 million in compensation to the and tribes, plus the transfer of approximately 300,000 acres of land, extinguishing all prior claims in the state. In New York, the filed a test case in 1970 against Oneida and Madison Counties, asserting that the state's 1795 purchase of 100,000 acres violated the Nonintercourse Act by lacking federal consent. The U.S. affirmed federal jurisdiction in Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida (1974), validating the claim's premise that pre-1802 transfers required congressional approval and remanding for damages assessment, marking an initial success in recognizing the invalidity of such historical sales. Similarly, Tuscarora Nation claims reinforced that New York was subject to the Act's restrictions, as federal courts rejected state exemptions from Nonintercourse requirements in challenges to post-colonial land dealings. These northeastern victories highlighted the Act's enduring force, spurring congressional scrutiny and eventual interventions, including 1990s measures to impose moratoriums on further eastern claims and facilitate targeted resolutions amid fears of widespread title disruptions.

Key Supreme Court Precedents

In County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York (1985), the Supreme Court held that Indian tribes retain a federal common-law right to sue for damages arising from wrongful possession of aboriginal lands alienated in violation of the Nonintercourse Act, affirming that the Oneida's 1795 land conveyance to New York State lacked required federal approval under the 1793 Act and thus established the counties' liability for trespass. The Court remanded for determination of damages and consideration of equitable defenses, such as laches, while rejecting arguments that the claim was barred by statutes of limitations or ratification, emphasizing that the Act's protections extend to preserving tribal possessory interests against unauthorized transfers. The decision in City of Sherrill v. of New York (2005) delimited the practical scope of such claims by invoking equitable doctrines to prevent revival of ancient possessory rights through unilateral assertions over repurchased parcels. The ruled that the could not evade local property taxes or reassert sovereign governance on open-market acquisitions of former aboriginal lands after more than two centuries of non-Indian occupancy and integrated municipal use, as this would engender "chaos" by upending long-settled titles and reliance interests, including taxpayer-funded infrastructure like roads, sewers, and schools developed on the properties. Rejecting a "restitutionary default" that would automatically restore fee possession for historical wrongs, the ruling prioritized doctrinal realism, holding that dormant claims yield to inequity absent evidence of ongoing violations, thereby balancing tribal with the imperatives of title finality and economic continuity.

Recent Developments and Settlements

In the Onondaga Nation's land claim against New York, filed in 2005 seeking declaratory relief for approximately 2.5 million acres of allegedly illegally transferred territory, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the action in 2010 on grounds of Indian law laches, citing the tribe's two-century delay in asserting despite awareness of the claims, which would disrupt settled land titles and local expectations of finality. This ruling reduced the viable scope to minimal remnants and upheld equitable penalties for non-assertion, effectively barring revival of ancient claims without extraordinary justification. Subsequent efforts to reignite broader litigation, including a 2025 push for parcels, faced similar procedural hurdles, though the Nation secured transfer of about 1,000 acres from International in October 2024 via a federal environmental addressing pollution liabilities rather than direct Nonintercourse Act enforcement. The Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe's attempts to pursue Nonintercourse Act claims for lands in and New York, including parcels in Bridgeport sold without federal approval, were dismissed repeatedly post-2005 due to to establish tribal status under federal criteria, a prerequisite for standing. The U.S. Department of the Interior's denied federal acknowledgment in 2005 and reaffirmed the denial in subsequent reviews, precluding claims as the tribe could not demonstrate continuous or political required for Nonintercourse protections. In , the 1980 Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act resolved Nonintercourse-based aboriginal title disputes for tribes like the and through congressional ratification of state conveyances and $81.5 million in compensation, with no significant post- reopenings or successful challenges altering the finality of those transfers. Federal courts have upheld the settlement's preemptive effect, preventing collateral attacks on implemented land allocations. Broader trends since reflect a judicial pivot toward equitable defenses like laches and the "impossibility of restoration" doctrine from City of Sherrill v. (), favoring negotiated resolutions over remedies to avoid economic disruption. Tribes have increasingly pursued voluntary buybacks, fee-to-trust applications under the , or co-management agreements for specific sites, as evidenced by the Department of the Interior's Cobell settlement extensions and targeted land acquisitions totaling over 1.5 million acres returned or consolidated by 2023 without upending private titles. These approaches, documented in annual reports, prioritize minimal interference with non-Indian property interests while addressing fractional interests on reservations.

State-Level Counterparts and Federal Preemption

New York Nonintercourse Act

The New York Constitution of 1777, in Article 37, prohibited private purchases of lands from Indians without the consent of the state legislature, establishing a state monopoly on such transactions to prevent , ensure orderly acquisition, and promote peace with tribes including the Haudenosaunee Confederacy. This provision extended colonial-era policies, such as a 1684 requiring gubernatorial approval for land deals, but positioned the legislature as the exclusive intermediary for all Indian land cessions within state boundaries. On March 18, 1788, the New York legislature enacted a to enforce Article 37, declaring any unauthorized leases or purchases of Indian lands null and void while imposing severe penalties on violators, including property forfeiture, fines up to £100, and for up to twelve months. These measures aimed to centralize control and curb speculative encroachments by individuals or companies, yet they facilitated state-directed acquisitions that prioritized interests, as evidenced by rapid post-Revolutionary treaties ceding vast Haudenosaunee territories to New York between 1785 and 1790. Despite these restrictions, empirical patterns of dispossession persisted, with speculators exploiting legal ambiguities and state agents negotiating under duress, leading to the loss of millions of acres without adequate tribal consent. Following of the U.S. Constitution in , which vested exclusive federal authority over Indian commerce and affairs in Congress under Article I, Section 8, New York's 1777 and 1788 enactments were rendered infringing on national supremacy, as states lacked independent power to regulate tribal land alienations. The Supremacy Clause and subsequent federal of 1790 onward preempted unilateral state actions, invalidating transfers made without U.S. oversight; early New York treaties, though initially overlooked, were later deemed defective in principle, as federal prohibited states from extinguishing absent congressional . Landmark litigation, including the Oneida Indian Nation's suits against New York counties, underscored these preemption conflicts by challenging 1795 conveyances as violations of federal restrictions, revealing how state oversight failed to align with national policy and exposed tensions between subnational expansionism and federal protections for tribal possessory rights. New York's aggressive pre-Constitutional assertions, by undermining confederated oversight under the 1783 Proclamation and , causally prompted federal intervention via the 1790 Act, yet the state's laws inherently favored settler-driven development, as demonstrated by unchecked encroachments and the near-total erosion of Haudenosaunee holdings despite regulatory intent.

Other State Efforts and Conflicts

In the 1830s, southern states pursued legislative measures to assert greater control over Indian lands amid ongoing removals and territorial expansions, often clashing with federal restrictions under the Nonintercourse Acts. Georgia's acts of December 1829 and 1830 extended state civil and criminal jurisdiction over territory, distributed tribal lands via lottery to white citizens, and nullified Cherokee laws, directly contravening federal treaties and the 1834 extension of the Nonintercourse Act that reserved land alienation to federal oversight. These state initiatives reflected local pressures from settlers and speculators seeking rapid acquisition, but they triggered jurisdictional conflicts resolved through . The U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in (1832) invalidated Georgia's extensions, holding that federal authority over Indian tribes, grounded in the and treaties, preempted conflicting state laws, thereby affirming the Nonintercourse framework's supremacy. South Carolina similarly enacted regulations in 1835 addressing residual Indian holdings post-federal removals, attempting localized oversight of transactions involving tribes like the Catawba, but these yielded to federal dominance as evidenced in later tribal-federal relations overriding state claims. Such efforts underscored federalist tensions, where state ambitions for economic gain frequently undermined uniform protections against unauthorized sales. In northern states like , earlier regulations paralleled federal nonintercourse principles but operated under colonial precedents later preempted nationally. A 1694 provincial act prohibited land purchases from Indians without gubernatorial license, supplemented by 1713-1741 resolves governing proprietor meetings and sales in Indian enclaves such as the Praying Towns. The 1780 state law appointed commissioners to scrutinize prior sales by tribes like the Stockbridge-Munsee, aiming to validate or void fraudulent transfers, yet post-1790 centralized approval processes, curtailing state autonomy. Historical records document states' inconsistent enforcement prior to federal centralization, with lax oversight enabling widespread illegal conveyances through coerced or unapproved deeds, as settlers exploited local sympathies and administrative gaps. This underenforcement, evident in pre-1790 southern and eastern land rushes, justified federal intervention to impose causal safeguards—requiring presidential to mitigate biases toward expansionist interests and ensure empirical verification of tribal consent in transactions. thus resolved clashes by prioritizing treaty-based protections over state variability, as demonstrated in removal-era overrides where national policy supplanted local assertions despite shared removal goals.

Criticisms, Debates, and Broader Impacts

Challenges to Property Rights and Title Finality

Claims under the Nonintercourse Act of 1790, which voids land transfers from Native American tribes without federal approval, have engendered persistent uncertainty in property titles held by non-Indians, often described as a "cloud on title" that hampers marketability and development. Such litigation, as in actions challenging 19th-century conveyances, retroactively questions the validity of sales once deemed consensual and lawful under contemporaneous understandings, thereby subordinating long-settled private ownership to selective assertions of tribal sovereignty. This undermines the finality essential to the , where titles rely on chain-of-title presumptions rather than indefinite vulnerability to historical reinterpretations. The U.S. in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation (2005) highlighted these risks, ruling that ancient aboriginal possessory rights, even if unextinguished, cannot unilaterally reclaim or immunity after centuries of dormancy, as such revival would inflict "disruptive practical consequences" on non-Indian landowners and local economies predicated on title certainty. The decision invoked doctrines of laches and to preclude immediate reassertion, recognizing that tribes' prolonged non-assertion of claims—spanning over two hundred years in Sherrill—implied effective abandonment, allowing intervening generations to invest and develop lands under the reasonable belief of secure tenure. Absent such limits, perpetual title challenges disregard the causal progression of land from tribal hunting grounds to integrated private and municipal uses, where non-enforcement eroded any practical dominion. Empirically, these claims have yielded tangible economic burdens, including foregone tax revenues and elevated transaction costs from and to mitigate litigation risks. In the Oneida disputes preceding Sherrill, local counties like Oneida and Madison confronted potential multimillion-dollar annual losses from asserted exemptions on fee lands, prompting compensatory fiscal adjustments and partial tribal reimbursements that strained public budgets. Broader Nonintercourse Act suits have similarly deterred investment by encumbering parcels within expansive claim areas—sometimes encompassing millions of acres—with unresolved aboriginal overlays, inflating legal fees for defenses invoking abandonment or , though aggregate litigation expenditures remain underquantified in federal records. These effects prioritize historical remediation over contemporary stability, contesting the evolved reality where tribal inaction facilitated societal reliance on alienated lands.

Balancing Tribal Interests with Economic Realities

The Nonintercourse Act facilitated negotiated settlements in several land claims, delivering substantial capital to tribes while averting widespread ejectments that could disrupt local economies. For instance, the 1980 Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, resolving claims implicating Nonintercourse protections, allocated $81.5 million to the Passamaquoddy Tribe, Penobscot Nation, and Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians for land purchases, , and , enabling targeted investments without invalidating longstanding non-Indian titles. This approach provided verifiable tribal benefits, such as expanded trust lands totaling over 300,000 acres by the 1990s, supporting fisheries, forestry, and small-scale enterprises that generated revenue streams independent of prolonged federal oversight. Critics argue that broad applications of the Act in contemporary disputes exacerbate tribal dependency on federal litigation and bureaucracy, undermining principles embedded in later reforms. Expansive readings, such as those requiring for 19th-century state grants, have extended claims into modern eras, prolonging court battles that divert resources from productive uses and perpetuate a wardship model where tribes await judicial or congressional validation rather than exercising direct economic agency. Empirical analyses of reservation economies reveal that litigation uncertainties correlate with higher rates—averaging 25-40% on affected lands—compared to settlements yielding quicker capital infusions for self-sustaining ventures. In , initial settlement funds spurred short-term gains, but statutory limits on post-1980 federal programs have constrained growth, with tribal per capita income lagging national Indian averages by 20-30% due to restricted access to sovereignty-enhancing policies. Post-1934 policy evolution, particularly the , highlighted trade-offs by prioritizing tribal constitutions and fee-simple options over perpetual trust dependencies, fostering environments where tribes could leverage private markets for development rather than litigate historical voids. This causal shift from assimilation-era protections to empowerment models underscores the Act's diminishing fit: while early safeguards aligned with nascent federal authority, modern enforcement often prioritizes doctrinal continuity over economic pragmatism, as evidenced by settlements resolving 80% of analogous claims through to bypass inefficient trials. Balanced implementation thus requires weighing preserved tribal equities against investment deterrence, with data favoring hybrid resolutions that inject capital promptly while clarifying title stability to encourage broad-based prosperity.

Empirical Outcomes and Policy Efficacy

The Nonintercourse Acts facilitated centralized federal control over Indian land transactions, which correlated with a decline in decentralized colonial-era conflicts and a shift toward treaty-based resolutions in the early . While major Indian wars persisted into the 1890s, with over 40 documented U.S. conflicts post-1776, the policy's emphasis on federal oversight reduced the frequency of unregulated private encroachments that fueled pre-1790 hostilities, such as the (1715–1717). By the 1830s, following implementations like the of 1830, large-scale eastern warfare diminished as tribes were relocated westward under federal auspices. Federal trust management under the Acts has preserved a substantial base, with the holding approximately 56 million surface acres in trust for tribes and individuals as of recent estimates. This represents a core outcome of the policy's on unapproved alienations, maintaining communal holdings amid historical pressures. However, from subsequent allotment policies has complicated management, contributing to underutilization in some areas. Litigation surges in the 1970s–2000s, invoking Nonintercourse protections for claims, resulted in limited net gains for eastern tribes, with courts applying laches and equitable doctrines to bar most suits due to centuries-long delays and reliance interests of non-Indian owners. Post-City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation (2005), federal courts effectively curtailed such claims, dismissing over 80% on grounds of dormancy and disrupting settled expectations, yielding restorations of less than 1% of disputed eastern lands in successful cases. The policy's enduring rigidity in restricting land alienations without federal consent has hindered tribal , as trust status limits market-driven development and private ownership incentives. Economic analyses indicate that federal assimilation-era policies, building on Nonintercourse frameworks, oscillated between isolation and forced integration but often perpetuated communal tenure, correlating with lower household-level economic outcomes compared to fee-simple alternatives. Reforms emphasizing tribal to convey lands, akin to reversals of allotment-era , have been proposed to enhance efficacy by promoting assimilation through property rights.

References

  1. https://www.statutesandstories.com/blog_html/indian-non-intercourse-acts-and-the-treaty-of-new-york/
  2. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/context/wmlr/article/4026/viewcontent/wmlr65_no5_p1117_berger.pdf
  3. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/na024.asp
  4. https://www.chickasaw.tv/events/indian-trade-and-intercourse-act
  5. https://www.mitsc.org/library/non-intercourse-act-1790
  6. https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/americas-first-conquest
  7. https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/report-on-indian-affairs/
  8. https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S8-C3-9-1/ALDE_00012976/
  9. https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/us-congress-act-regulate-trade-and-intercourse-indian-tribes
  10. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/trade-and-intercourse-acts
  11. https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1619&context=ailr
  12. https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1147&context=ghj
  13. https://ndnhistoryresearch.com/2020/04/25/how-the-trade-and-intercourse-acts-aided-colonization-of-native-lands/
  14. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/namenu.asp
  15. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-4/pdf/STATUTE-4-Pg729.pdf
  16. https://www.britannica.com/event/Walking-Purchase
  17. https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/state-of-new-york-treaties-and-land-transactions-with-the-oneida-onondaga-and-cayuga.htm
  18. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-2/pdf/STATUTE-2-pg139.pdf
  19. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-1/pdf/STATUTE-1-Pg137.pdf
  20. https://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5376&context=etd
  21. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-2/pdf/STATUTE-2-Pg139.pdf
  22. https://scholarship.law.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2332&context=lawreview
  23. https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.opengov.ibmcloud.com/files/uploads/M-37029.pdf
  24. https://digitalprairieok.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Trade-Act-of-1834.pdf
  25. https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep414/usrep414661/usrep414661.pdf
  26. https://www.tickanwaticnation.com/assets/files/Nonintercourse-Act_25U.S.C.177.pdf
  27. https://www.narf.org/nill/documents/nlr/nlr4-1_2.pdf
  28. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/414/661/
  29. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/544/197/
  30. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-855
  31. https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1138&context=ailr
  32. https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1094&context=lawineq
  33. https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2066&context=mlr
  34. https://turtletalk.blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/fort-disruption-and-impossibility.pdf
  35. https://lawweb.colorado.edu/profiles/pubpdfs/krakoff/KrakoffTulsaLR.pdf
  36. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/10/87/
  37. https://www.yalelawjournal.org/article/beyond-the-indian-commerce-clause
  38. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/470/226/
  39. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/03-855
  40. https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/131.7_Blumenthal_dgwk4a7b.pdf
  41. https://socialchangenyu.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Theodore-Max_RLSC_11.3.pdf
  42. https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2064&context=mlr
  43. https://www.gao.gov/assets/rced-94-157.pdf
  44. https://www.mitsc.org/library/passamaquoddy-v-morton---district-court-decision-1975-judge-gignoux
  45. https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/388/649/2313203/
  46. https://www.congress.gov/96/statute/STATUTE-94/STATUTE-94-Pg1785.pdf
  47. https://www.mitsc.org/mitsc-narrative-summaries/summary-of-the-maine-indian-land-claims-act-of-1980
  48. https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2022/07/land-claims-cases-of-indigenous-nations-in-new-york/
  49. https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1315&context=ailj
  50. https://www.onondaganation.org/uncategorized/2024/onondaga-nation-reclaims-1000-acres-of-ancestral-land/
  51. https://www.bia.gov/as-ia/opa/online-press-release/golden-hill-paugussett-connecticut-fail-meet-mandatory-requirement
  52. https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7030596/golden-hill-paugussett-tribe-of-indians-v-weicker/
  53. https://www.doi.gov/ocl/indian-gaming-0
  54. https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3421&context=buffalolawreview
  55. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/25/177
  56. https://www.jstor.org/stable/42623406
  57. https://columbialawreview.org/content/the-specter-of-indian-removal-the-persistence-of-state-supremacy-arguments-in-federal-indian-law/
  58. https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2626&context=nrj
  59. https://salemdeeds.com/NAD/focuspoints3.aspx
  60. https://www.westfield.ma.edu/historical-journal/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Hannan-Summer-2001-complete.pdf
  61. https://www.nanations.com/land/massachusetts_land_cessions.htm
  62. https://iltf.org/land-issues/history/
  63. https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/indian-removal-act-and-trail-tears/
  64. https://www.nyfedstatetribalcourtsforum.org/pdfs/Oneida_Nation_v_County.pdf
  65. http://www.tickanwaticnation.com/assets/files/Nonintercourse-Act_25U.S.C.177.pdf
  66. https://democrats-naturalresources.house.gov/download/scip-hrg-091422_-testimony_-hon-rupnick_
  67. https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1699&context=ailr
  68. https://docs.house.gov/meetings/II/II24/20220331/114558/HHRG-117-II24-Wstate-FrancisK-20220331-SD007.pdf
  69. https://www.mainememory.net/sitebuilder/site/845/display?use_mmn=1
  70. https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5229&context=wlr
  71. https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3779&context=articles
  72. https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/economic-and-social-impacts-restrictions-applicability-federal-indian-policies
  73. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt46nr85.7
  74. https://priceschool.usc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Sanchez.pdf
  75. https://www.legendsofamerica.com/na-indianwartimeline/
  76. https://history.army.mil/Research/Reference-Topics/Army-Campaigns/Brief-Summaries/Indian-Wars/
  77. https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1138&context=ailr
  78. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10023008/
  79. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/studies-in-american-political-development/article/strange-career-of-federal-indian-policy-rural-politics-native-nations-and-the-path-away-from-assimilation/40CB361ACC66DF627EF1738C156B831D
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.