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Private prosecution
Private prosecution
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A private prosecution is a criminal proceeding initiated by an individual private citizen or private organisation (such as a prosecution association) instead of by a public prosecutor who represents the state. Private prosecutions are allowed in many jurisdictions under common law, but have become less frequent in modern times as most prosecutions are now handled by professional public prosecutors instead of private individuals who retain (or are themselves) barristers.

Australia

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A private criminal prosecution for contempt of court can be commenced against a party in Australia in the Federal Circuit Court, the family court (that is, the Family Court of Western Australia, as it is the only jurisdiction with a state-based family court) or the supreme court of a state or territory.

Western Australia

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In the Family Court of Western Australia, an online form exists to commence such proceedings which can be downloaded, completed and filed.[1]

In the Supreme Court of Western Australia,[2] either an originating summons (Form No.75 as is an ex-parte application) or originating motion (Form No.64) must be filed specifying the alleged contempt, and personally served on the alleged contemptor before a hearing before a judge sitting in chambers unless the court orders otherwise.

If the alleged contempt occurred in relation to any specific case, the forms are required to be filed under the heading of the parties for that specific case; or if it is not alleged to have been committed with reference to a particular proceeding, shall be entitled "The State of Western Australia against" the contemnor (naming him) ex parte the applicant.

New South Wales

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In New South Wales private prosecutions are legal but very rare. In 2022, gambling lobby group ClubsNSW brought a private prosecution for contempt of court against comedian and journalist Friendlyjordies and whistleblower Troy Stolz. This prosecution was also subject to an interim suppression order, making it secret temporarily.[3]

Belize

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Belize is another jurisdiction where private prosecutions can be undertaken. In 2014, the private prosecution of politician Elvin Penner by a grass-roots citizens organization (COLA) over issuance of fraudulent passports was unsuccessful because the defense succeeded in arguing that the private prosecutor did not have the power to subpoena police records on the case.[4] An attorney for COLA indicated that the government did not wish a prosecution of Penner to be undertaken, and acted to block its success.[5]

Canada

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Canada is a federation, and has both federal and provincial offences that can be privately prosecuted. Federally, there are criminal and statutory offences, and provincially there are provincial and municipal non-criminal offences. Under Canada's constitution, all criminal offences in Canada are under federal jurisdiction, and the Government of Canada can provide funds to the private prosecutors (in lieu of assigning its own Crown attorney) to carry out this work.

Leaders of the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919 were tried on charges of seditious conspiracy by state-funded private prosecutors.[6]: 13  The funds were disbursed from the Government of Canada's approved expenditures, and are evidenced in the Auditor General's reports of 1921 and 1922.[6]: 10–11, 13 

A committee chaired by Mr. Justice Allen Linden of the Law Reform Commission of Canada produced a Working Paper on Private Prosecutions in 1986.[7] Peter T. Burns, a law professor (and later dean) at the University of British Columbia's Peter A. Allard School of Law, wrote a paper in 1975 for the McGill Law Journal entitled "Private Prosecutions in Canada: The Law and a Proposal for Change"; he was later the Principal Consultant for the Law Reform Commission.[8] Swaigen, Koehl and Hatt in 2013 summarised efforts to prosecute privately torts in the environmental domain.[9]

Criminal offence procedure for private charges

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Very basically, a citizen or organisation approaches a justice of the peace to present evidence on each element of the alleged offence. The justice then sets up a hearing with a judge to determine whether there is evidence on each element of the offence, and if approved, and if the Crown does not intervene and terminate the charge (called staying the charge) then it is allowed to proceed to and go through court via the criminal procedure.

Provincial offence procedure for private prosecution

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Each province in Canada deals with private prosecutions of provincial offences in their own way.

Ontario

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In Ontario, the procedure for commencing a private prosecution for a provincial offence is governed by Part III of the Provincial Offences Act, ss. 23(1) of which provides that, "Any person who, on reasonable and probable grounds, believes that one or more persons have committed an offence, may lay an information in the prescribed form and under oath before a justice alleging the offence and the justice shall receive the information." The laying of an information as described in Part III of the Act allows anyone to commence a prosecution for a provincial offence, whereas Parts I and II of the Act may only be used by a provincial offences officer.

British Columbia

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In British Columbia, the guidelines for private prosecutions are detailed in the Crown Counsel Policy Manual by the BC Prosecution Service. The policy, designated as PRI 1, has been in effect since March 1, 2018. According to this policy, the BC Prosecution Service generally does not endorse private prosecutions. When such a prosecution is initiated, it is common practice for the Crown Counsel to either assume responsibility for the prosecution or to direct a stay of proceedings subsequent to an evaluation known as a charge assessment decision. The said assessment also pertains to Informations presented under sections 810 and 810.1 of the Criminal Code.

When the Crown Counsel is notified of a private Information or a 507.1 Criminal Code private prosecution process hearing, there is a procedural sequence to follow. It entails a review of the Information and related documents, an evaluation against the charge assessment criteria, and consultations with senior legal personnel about the prospective charge. Post this evaluation, a decision is made about whether the Crown Counsel will lead the prosecution or if proceedings will be stayed.

If a private Information is officially submitted, the Crown Counsel can, at any juncture, direct a stay of proceedings, especially if the charge does not meet the assessment criteria. Should a process be sanctioned after a 507.1 hearing, it's imperative to acquire a transcript of said hearing. In situations warranting further inquiry, the Crown Counsel may direct the pertinent agencies to delve deeper. Subsequent to these investigations, a reassessment is done, followed by consultations on the next course of action.

Furthermore, the Crown Counsel assesses for potential conflicts of interest or issues of confidentiality concerning the accused in the private Information. If deemed necessary, outside legal counsel or a special prosecutor might be appointed to oversee the case.[10]

France

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There are three types of criminal offences in France:

  • Crimes, punishable by up to imprisonment for life;
  • Délits, punishable by up to 10 years imprisonment (20 years for recidivists);
  • Contraventions, punishable by criminal fine up to €1500 (€3000 for recidivists).

In France private prosecution is called citation directe, and is possible only for délits and contraventions, if the victim has evidence of the offence.

The court sits with either one or three judges, without jury (a jury is present only for crimes, see cour d'assises).

In court, the private prosecutor sits alongside the public prosecutor as an accessory, and is merely called the "civil plaintiff" (partie civile), as French criminal courts also rule on civil delictual claims during the same proceeding. Trials take place in this way even when the prosecution was initiated by the public prosecution office (which is far more usual than a private prosecution).

The plaintiff and the accused are both represented by normal attorneys, sitting at the ground-level of the courtroom, while the public prosecutor, considered by French law as a magistrate, sits on a platform as the court, although he does not participate in their deliberations.

The public prosecutor gives the court his opinion about the case after the plaintiff and before the defense. Eventually, the defendant may be convicted even if the public prosecutor requested acquittal.

In France, appeal courts retry both facts and law. The accused may appeal a conviction and sentence, but the plaintiff can only appeal damages. He cannot appeal an acquittal or a more lenient criminal punishment, contrary to the public prosecutor, who can do this even if the prosecution was private.

For crimes or when the plaintiff has insufficient evidence, he may refer to an investigating judge (juge d'instruction) who will investigate the case, and refer it to the trial court (in which he does not sit) if he discovers sufficient evidence of guilt. The investigating judge is independent from the public prosecutor's office, and may refer the case to the trial court even if the public prosecutor requested non-suit.

Indeed, French law allows some associations to instigate private prosecutions (similar to American private attorneys general), but only for some few offences such as racist speech. In 2013, this possibility has been added for some white-collar crimes.[11]

If the defendant is convicted, the criminal court can sentence him to pay damages to the plaintiff for the criminal offence, and to reimburse his legal costs, in addition to the criminal punishment. But if the private prosecution or the referral to the investigating judge is regarded as abusive, the plaintiff may be sentenced to pay damages to the accused and a civil fine to the state.

Ireland

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Private prosecutions remain possible in the Republic of Ireland, though only at the District Court level where less serious offences are heard before a judge only.

The continuing existence of the right to private prosecution was confirmed in 2013 in the decision of the case Kelly & anor -v- Ryan ([2013] IEHC 321).[12]

New Zealand

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Private prosecutions remain legal in New Zealand.[13]: 5 

Philippines

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Private prosecutors in the Philippines are private attorneys that work with police and public prosecutors to help bring criminal cases.[14] They often work to get the location of a trial moved to a more neutral court, outside the influence of local power brokers, and to prepare the necessary legal petitions and other documents.[14] They also help to look after the victim's family and keep media and public attention focused on the case.[14]

Private prosecutors can be involved in cases in front of the national anti-corruption court the Sandiganbayan.[citation needed]

Singapore

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A private prosecution is brought by a private individual who wishes to seek redress for a wrong they believe has been done to them. That individual would have to first file a complaint with a Magistrate at the State Courts. If the person does not have a lawyer, that individual may conduct the prosecution themselves.[15]

South Africa

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NSPCA South Africa

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The National Council of Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (NSPCA) had its victory in the Constitutional Court of South Africa on 8 December 2016 when the organisation won its case it brought before the Court to institute Private Prosecutions in terms of Section 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977. This after the organisation lost its cases it brought before the North Gauteng High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa on the same matter of Private Prosecutions.[16] The reason the NSPCA brought the case before the Courts is because despite "overwhelming" evidence of animal cruelty or abuse‚ the National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa (NPA) declined to prosecute the cases brought by the organisation, resulting in animal abusers not being charged on charges of animal cruelty. The Constitutional Court of South Africa also ruled that the respondents, the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and the National Director of Public Prosecutions, were to pay the organisation's costs in all three applications.[17]

Sweden

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Private prosecutions are permitted under the Code of Judicial Procedure of 1942, chapter 20, section 8, provided the individual has locus standi, i.e. is the direct victim of a crime (or, in the case of murder or manslaughter, a close relative) and that a public prosecutor has officially declined to proceed. For certain crimes, such as defamation, or insult, of living adults, only the aggrieved party may initiate criminal proceedings (defamation being a crime and not a tort in Sweden), although they are frequently assisted or represented by competent legal counsel. Mandatory private prosecution serves the purpose of limiting superfluous litigation. For serious crimes private prosecutions are rare, with a man accused of absconding and murdering a boy, whose body was never found, being convicted for false imprisonment to a prison term in 1985, but acquitted of the more serious charge of kidnapping in a 3–2 verdict. In the Court of Appeal, where the victim's parents altered the accusation to murder, the accused was acquitted of all charges the following year, with the Supreme Court of Sweden refusing to hear the case. The procedure and its aftermath, with alleged serial killer Thomas Quick being convicted for the murder on the basis of a confession a few years later, led to accusations of a substantially higher bar for relatives and private-employed lawyers processing prosecutions, as compared to a public prosecutor presenting the same evidence.[18]

United Kingdom

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Private prosecutions are permitted in the United Kingdom. They are governed by different rules in the different jurisdictions.

England and Wales

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Private prosecution is allowed in English law.[19] In the early history of England, the victim of a crime and his family had the right to hire a private lawyer to prosecute criminal charges against the person alleged to have injured the victim.[20] In the 18th century, prosecution was private for almost all criminal offences against the person, usually by the victim.[21] One reason for this was that prosecution had never been conceived of as a public matter. The English system was based on the principles of individual and local prosecution in which the right of the private citizen was paramount.[22][23] The exception to this norm was in offences where the victim was the Crown, and the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General represented the prosecution at state trials; for an example, see the 1637 ship money tax protest case of John Hampden.

As detailed above, a route to prosecution had been by victims at their own expense or lawyers acting on their behalf. From the Metropolitan Police Act 1829 onwards, as the police forces entered their present form, they began to take on the burden of bringing prosecutions against suspected criminals.

In 1880, Sir John Maule was appointed to be the first Director of Public Prosecutions, operating as a part of the Home Office. The jurisdiction was only for the decision as to whether to prosecute, and just for a very small number of difficult or important cases. Once prosecution had been authorised, the matter was turned over to the Treasury Solicitor. Police forces continued to be responsible for the bulk of cases, sometimes referring difficult ones to the Director.

Prior to its termination in 1933, criminal prosecution required a true bill of indictment from the grand jury, and so frivolous and vexatious proceedings were designed to be avoided at this stage (although this did not turn out to be the case in practice).[citation needed]

In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police recommended that police forces set up independent prosecution departments so as to avoid having the same officers investigate and prosecute cases.

The Royal Commission's recommendation was not implemented by all police forces, and so in 1978 another Royal Commission was struck, this time headed by Sir Cyril Philips. It reported in 1981, recommending that a single unified Crown prosecution service with responsibility for all public prosecutions in England and Wales be set up. A White Paper was released in 1983, becoming the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, which established the Crown Prosecution Service under the direction of the Director of Public Prosecutions, consisting of a merger of his old department with the existing police prosecution departments. It started operating in 1986. The CPS can also prevent a private prosecution from continuing by taking it over and then discontinuing it. The CPS supposedly will do this only where there is not enough evidence to make a proper case, or where a prosecution is against the public interest or could cause an injustice. In reaching this decision, it must balance the public good against a duty to preserve an individual's right to prosecute under the 1985 act.

When taking over any private prosecution, the CPS may direct the police to conduct further investigations. The intention of this was to ensure the best available evidence was placed before the court, as further trials were generally excluded until 2003 by the double jeopardy rule. The latter rule was abrogated in certain circumstances of "new and compelling evidence", and for a limited range of the most serious offences such as rape, armed robbery and murder, by the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Recommended by Blunkett, Irvine and Goldsmith,[24] this change is permitted by the optional Article 4 of the Seventh Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, although the United Kingdom is not a party to it.

Scotland

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Private prosecutions are rare in Scots law and require special circumstances surrounding the crime to be evident.[25] Leave to prosecute must be obtained by granting of a bill of criminal letters by the High Court of Justiciary. Within the 20th century, only two such applications were granted.[25]

United States

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In colonial America, because of Dutch (and possibly French) practice and the expansion of the office of attorney general, public officials came to dominate the prosecution of crimes. However, privately funded prosecutors constituted a significant element of the state criminal justice system throughout the nineteenth century.[26][27]

For federal criminal cases, only the U.S. government can file charges.[28]

Alabama

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State law currently allows private citizens the right to press charges under certain circumstances. In Alabama, a citizen or "victim" who has probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed can directly go to court and sign an arrest warrant before a magistrate, without the police or a judge's approval. The government will then handle the prosecution of the offense.[29][30][31]

California

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Private prosecutions are not legal in California.[32]

Colorado

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In 1974, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that private prosecutions were improper and prejudicial to the defendant.[33]

Georgia

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In Georgia, criminal proceedings may be initiated at the request of a private citizen, but only after the defendant is given an opportunity to argue why he or she should not be charged.[34]

Idaho

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Idaho allows private citizens to file criminal complaints to a magistrate; the magistrate can issue an arrest warrant upon satisfaction that a crime has occurred.[34]

Kentucky

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Kentucky allows a private citizen to initiate criminal cases by filing criminal complaints, although it is up to the county attorney or Commonwealth's attorney to decide whether to proceed with the case.[35]

Maryland

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Maryland allows private citizens to file affidavits against another citizen.[36]

Massachusetts

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Private prosecutions in Massachusetts were declared void in 1849 and formally outlawed in 1855.[37]

Michigan

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Michigan banned private prosecutions in 1875.[37] Private citizens can however file and attest misdemeanor arrest warrants which if accepted by a judge or magistrate would be automatically transferred to a prosecuting attorney.

Minnesota

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The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled in 1977 in State ex rel. Wild v. Otis that a private citizen does not have a right to prosecute an alleged crime.[38]

Missouri

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The right to private prosecution in Missouri was removed in 1976 following the decision in State v. Harrington.[39]

New Hampshire

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New Hampshire allows private prosecution of any crime that does not carry incarceration as a possible penalty. However, prosecutors have the right to dismiss private criminal charges.[40]

New Jersey

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New Jersey continues to allow private prosecutions in its Municipal Courts. However, the 1995 decision of State v. Storm prohibited private prosecutions if the party intending to prosecute has a conflict of interest with the defendants or a financial interest in the case.[41] Furthermore, state law states that all private prosecutions require approval of the county prosecutor and the court.[42]

New York

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In 2002, a federal district court concluded in Kampfer v. Vonderheide that private prosecutions were barred under New York law as a violation of the defendant's due process rights. However, in Kampfer the court distinguished, in dicta, private prosecutions where there is an "underlying civil cause of action" in relation to the events which gave rise to the prosecution.[43]

North Carolina

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Private prosecutors were used in North Carolina as late as 1975.[44] The court ruled in State v. Best in 1974 that an elected prosecutor must be in charge of all prosecutions.[45] A private citizen may go before a magistrate to request that criminal process be issued,[46] but any such charges are prosecuted by the State.

Ohio

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Ohio state law allows private citizens to file an affidavit to support criminal charges.[47] However, the actual prosecution is limited to the state.[48] Only prosecutors can present a criminal case to a grand jury. State law was further amended in 2006 to bar judges from issuing arrest warrants in private prosecution cases.[49]

Pennsylvania

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Private prosecutions in Pennsylvania require approval from a state prosecutor.[50]

Rhode Island

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In 2001, the Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled in Diane S. Cronan ex rel. State v. John J. Cronan that a private citizen could file criminal complaints for misdemeanors. In order to do so under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-10-12, a judge of the district court or superior court must choose to place the criminal complaint on file. However, prosecution of felonies remains limited to the state. Private prosecutors also cannot seek penalties of greater than one year of incarceration or a fine of greater than $1,000.[51]

South Carolina

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The right was removed from South Carolina law in the nineteenth century.[52] However, private citizens may still initiate a criminal case by filing a request with a magistrate, although magistrates can issue only a summons in response to private criminal complaints.[34]

Wisconsin

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Private prosecutions in Wisconsin were outlawed following the decision of Biemel v. State in 1855.[40] In 1890, the court ruled that a private attorney can assist in a prosecution as long as there is no conflict of interest.[33]

Controversy

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Bruce L. Benson's To Serve and Protect lauds the role of private prosecutors, often employed by prosecution associations, in serving the needs of crime victims in England. There have been calls for restoring the practice of private prosecution, especially in cases of official misconduct, where judges, public prosecutors, and the police act in concert to violate the law. Some libertarian theorists hold that public prosecutors should not exist, but that crimes should instead be treated as civil torts. Murray Rothbard writes, "In a libertarian world, there would be no crimes against an ill-defined 'society,' and therefore no such person as a 'district attorney' who decides on a charge and then presses those charges against an alleged criminal."[53]

Private prosecution is sometimes regarded with suspicion as a potential avenue for vexatious or malicious prosecution. Okagbue writes that the most useful control against such abuses is the power of the court to refuse to allow the case to proceed where it is of the opinion that there is not enough evidence to support the charge. The cost of private prosecution, including potential civil liability for malicious prosecution, can also deter frivolous prosecutions.[54]

Notable private prosecution attempts

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  • Oscar Wilde initiated an unsuccessful private prosecution for defamatory libel against the Marquess of Queensberry when the latter publicly accused Wilde of sodomy, which was then a crime. This was unsuccessful, and Wilde himself ended up facing charges brought by the DPP (following petition by Queensberry’s lawyer) and was ultimately convicted of gross indecency, with a punishment of two years at hard labor.[citation needed]
  • Whitehouse v. Lemon (1977) was the last successful blasphemy prosecution in the United Kingdom.
  • In 1995 Women Against Rape, together with Legal Action for Women and the English Collective of Prostitutes, helped two women bring the first private prosecution for rape in England and Wales after the prosecuting authority refused to prosecute.[55] They went to court without the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). On the same evidence the CPS had said was insufficient, the man was given a 16-year sentence, reduced to 11 years on appeal. This trial was made into a play, Pursuing Justice – Sex workers take their rapist to court, which was performed in 2015 to sell-out audiences.[56]
  • The family of Stephen Lawrence brought charges against the five men they alleged had killed him (1996). The private prosecution was unsuccessful; one suspect's acquittal in the criminal trial was quashed in 2011, with a subsequent trial resulting in his and another suspect's conviction in 2012.
  • Following the 2014 police killing of Tamir Rice in Ohio, activists attempted to invoke the law to charge the officers involved. Although a judge agreed that there was probable cause for charges, he could only send the case back to the prosecutor due to the 2006 amendment to state law that bars judges from issuing arrest warrants in criminal cases initiated by private citizens.[49]
  • Between 1999 and 2015, the General Post Office brought private prosecutions against some 700 sub-postmasters and postmistresses, which were subsequently overturned in a scandal described by Prime Minister Rishi Sunak in 2024 as one of the greatest miscarriages of justice in British history. In these cases the Post Office acted in three roles: as victim, investigator and prosecutor.

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Private prosecution is a criminal proceeding initiated and conducted by a private individual, victim, or rather than by a public authority such as a police force or statutory . This practice, originating in English where victims held the primary right to pursue offenders against them or their , persisted into modern systems as a safeguard against state inaction or resource constraints in public enforcement. In , private prosecutions are explicitly preserved under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, enabling any person to lay an information before a , though the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) retains discretion to intervene and discontinue cases deemed lacking sufficient or evidential strength. Such interventions balance individual initiative against broader societal priorities, with the CPS emphasizing efficiency and consistency in prosecutions. Historically dominant before the professionalization of public prosecutors in the , private actions now fill gaps where public bodies prioritize higher-volume or resource-intensive cases, potentially leading to faster resolutions but at the prosecutor's expense. In the United States, private prosecution has largely yielded to state monopolies on criminal charging established post-colonial era, yet persists in limited forms, such as citizen-initiated complaints in certain states or actions under the Federal False Claims Act allowing private relators to pursue fraud against the government with potential recovery of damages. Similar mechanisms appear in other jurisdictions like and , where private parties may commence proceedings subject to public oversight. Proponents highlight its role in deterring through victim-driven and empirical evidence of convictions in overlooked cases, while critics note risks of , financial incentives for overreach, and procedural inconsistencies absent unified public standards. Overall, it embodies a tension between decentralized and centralized control, with viability hinging on jurisdictional tolerances for private funding and evidentiary rigor.

Definition and Historical Context

Private prosecution constitutes a procedural mechanism in systems whereby individuals, organizations, or non-governmental entities initiate and, at least initially, conduct criminal proceedings independently of state prosecutorial authorities. Unlike public prosecution, where government-funded agencies such as or district attorneys exercise monopoly control over charging decisions, evidentiary development, and courtroom , private prosecution shifts the preliminary burdens of cost, investigation, and proof onto the initiating party. This distinction underscores a structural reliance on private initiative to invoke state coercive power through judicial channels, with the private actor functioning as a agent of justice rather than an arm of the executive. The underlying legal principle derives from the doctrine affirming a general right to prosecute criminal offenses, predicated on the notion that harms against society or individuals warrant redress without exclusive dependence on public discretion, which may falter due to resource constraints or policy priorities. This right embodies an agency-centric approach to , enabling direct invocation of authority to compel , seize , and impose sanctions, thereby mitigating risks inherent in centralized prosecutorial gatekeeping. Courts typically retain inherent powers to dismiss proceedings lacking merit, ensuring that private actions align with substantive legal standards rather than personal vendettas. Key operational elements include the private prosecutor's duty to adduce sufficient establishing a reasonable prospect of conviction, mirroring public thresholds but enforced through at the outset. Procedural demands , full disclosure of —exculpatory or otherwise—and adherence to evidentiary rules, positioning the as a neutral minister of subject to sanctions for misconduct. Jurisdictional divergences manifest in the breadth of prosecutable offenses and intervention triggers, yet the invariant core remains the evidentiary gateway and oversight to preserve systemic coherence.

Historical Origins and Evolution

Private prosecutions originated in medieval , where victims or their relatives typically initiated and litigated criminal cases against offenders, reflecting a system reliant on individual initiative rather than state apparatus. This practice persisted through the , with private individuals bearing the responsibility and costs of pursuing justice, often before local courts or justices of the peace. By the eighteenth century, such prosecutions dominated English for offenses against the person, supplemented by voluntary associations formed by property owners to combat theft and vandalism amid limited public policing. In the nineteenth century, private prosecutions began declining in due to growing state centralization, including the professionalization of police forces and efforts to standardize enforcement. By the mid-1850s, they had become rare, culminating in the Prosecution of Offences Act 1879, which established the to handle significant cases and effectively shifted most prosecutions to public oversight, reducing reliance on private efforts. This transition marked a broader move toward institutional monopolies on criminal enforcement to ensure consistency and address inconsistencies in private pursuits. The tradition extended to colonial America, where seventeenth- and eighteenth-century systems mirrored England's private model, with victims or complainants driving prosecutions in a hybrid framework that persisted into the early republic. In the United States, private prosecution endured as a "neglected" element even as public prosecutors emerged in the nineteenth century, with rare revivals highlighting its colonial roots amid the gradual adoption of state-led systems. Globally, within spheres, private prosecutions were widespread through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries but waned as nations developed dedicated public prosecutorial agencies to centralize and uniformize , prioritizing state control over individual actions. This evolution reflected a causal shift from decentralized, victim-driven remedies to institutionalized mechanisms, driven by concerns over efficiency and equity in enforcement.

Theoretical Justifications

Individual Empowerment and Victim Rights

Private prosecution serves as a mechanism for restoring agency to victims, enabling them to initiate and pursue criminal charges when prosecutors, constrained by fiscal limitations or , opt not to act. In systems where private actions are permissible, individuals or entities harmed by offenses—such as or corporate malfeasance—can directly engage legal processes, thereby circumventing state-driven delays that often prioritize high-volume or politically salient cases over those with diffuse victim impacts. This aligns with foundational principles of victim-centered , where the directly aggrieved holds primary standing to demand , countering the dilution of victim input under exclusive monopoly models. By mitigating the moral hazards of state-controlled prosecution—such as selective under-enforcement that may encourage through perceived —private initiatives incentivize persistent pursuit driven by victims' personal stakes, fostering more consistent deterrence than resource-rationed efforts. Observational data from private proceedings highlight empirical advantages, including accelerated timelines to resolution; for instance, victim-led prosecutions have demonstrated shorter durations compared to equivalents, reducing extended uncertainty and enabling timelier restitution or closure. Such outcomes underscore how private prosecution decentralizes enforcement, empowering affected communities to challenge lenient state policies on repeat offenses without reliance on overburdened agencies. This framework complements civil litigation by incorporating criminal penalties, which impose punitive and stigmatizing consequences unavailable in mere compensatory suits, thereby prioritizing holistic victim remediation—including societal —over protracted bureaucratic hurdles. Rights-based justifications emphasize that victims possess an inherent interest in penal vindication, not merely financial recovery, positioning private prosecution as a bulwark against systemic where public priorities diverge from individual harms. In practice, this has facilitated victim-driven actions against entrenched , enhancing overall without supplanting public oversight.

Correcting State Inefficiencies and Monopoly Risks

Public prosecution systems frequently suffer from resource overload, resulting in substantial case backlogs and the dismissal of numerous offenses, particularly minor ones. In the United States, shortages of prosecutors and judges have contributed to widespread delays, with New York state alone reporting nearly 120,000 pending cases in recent court statistics. Post-pandemic surveys indicate that caseloads for prosecutors have increased beyond pre-2020 levels, exacerbating inefficiencies despite resumed court operations. These constraints often manifest in low prosecution rates for low-level crimes; for instance, decisions to forgo charges on minor offenses correlate with higher recidivism in subsequent criminal activity, as empirical analysis of arrest data demonstrates that pursuing such cases reduces future complaints by up to 58% for overall offenses and 64% for violent ones. Selective enforcement further compounds these issues, as prosecutorial priorities are shaped by political considerations rather than uniform application of . Prosecutors wield broad in charging decisions, which can be influenced by administrative shifts or ideological agendas, leading to deprioritization of certain crimes in favor of others aligned with policy goals. For example, jurisdictions adopting reform-oriented prosecutorial philosophies have seen statistically significant declines in felony prosecutions—on the order of 1% or less, though paired with rises in property crime rates of approximately 7%—suggesting that resource allocation skewed toward leniency on minor or non-violent offenses undermines deterrence. Such patterns reflect a causal link where prosecutorial under-enforcement, driven by external pressures, normalizes impunity for lower-level violations, eroding in the system's capacity to address everyday harms. The state's monopoly on prosecution amplifies these risks by insulating the process from competitive pressures, fostering complacency and vulnerability to elite or ideological capture that favors selective leniency. Historical shifts toward dominance in the late consolidated control but diminished victim-driven , allowing institutional biases—such as those in progressive prosecutorial models—to prioritize non-prosecution over comprehensive enforcement. serves as a corrective mechanism by enabling individuals to initiate actions unconstrained by state resource limits or priorities, thereby introducing a check against monopoly-induced failures. This citizen-led approach enhances overall deterrence, as visible private pursuits signal heightened vigilance and broader , incentivizing potential offenders to anticipate consequences beyond state discretion. In essence, it counters the causal complacency of unopposed control, promoting a more responsive system aligned with empirical needs for consistent enforcement.

Potential Risks and Mitigations

Vulnerabilities to Abuse and Conflicts

Private prosecutions carry inherent risks of abuse, particularly through frivolous or vexatious proceedings motivated by personal grudges rather than genuine criminality, which can impose undue burdens on defendants, courts, and public resources. Courts have dismissed such cases when evidence thresholds are unmet or improper motives are evident; for instance, in December 2024, Westminster Magistrates' Court ruled a private summons for fraud against a client vexatious and unfounded, awarding full costs to the defendant due to lack of prima facie evidence and apparent malice. Similarly, in Australia, a South Australian magistrate in October 2025 imposed a permanent stay on 372 private charges against a local council, deeming them frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process stemming from a single complainant's grudge over regulatory disputes. These instances, though infrequent, illustrate how low initial barriers to initiating proceedings—requiring only a sworn information and basic evidence—can enable resource-draining vendettas, prompting judicial intervention to halt proceedings before trial. A prominent example of systemic arises when private entities, such as corporations, prioritize commercial self-preservation over , leading to widespread miscarriages of . The Post Office Horizon scandal exemplifies this: between 1999 and 2015, the Post Office initiated 918 private prosecutions against subpostmasters for alleged and based on erroneous data from the faulty Horizon IT system, resulting in over 900 wrongful convictions, at least 59 bankruptcies, and 13 suspected suicides. This corporate-driven campaign, unchecked until public inquiries exposed the flaws, demonstrated how private prosecutors' lack of impartial oversight can perpetuate false convictions to safeguard financial interests, eroding trust in the system. Conflicts of interest intensify when private funders or prosecutors pursue strategic objectives beyond retribution, such as leveraging criminal threats for civil gains. Commercial entities have initiated prosecutions in disputes to pressure settlements or deter competitors, with courts cautioning against using criminal proceedings as "strategic tools" to bolster civil positions. High upfront costs—often funded by third-party investors seeking returns—can align incentives with profit motives, potentially compromising ; for example, funders may back cases with weak but strong settlement potential, as seen in some or regulatory prosecutions halted for evidential insufficiency. While empirical data indicate such abuses remain rare relative to state prosecutions, high-profile failures like the case underscore the necessity of rigorous evidence thresholds to prevent private agendas from undermining integrity.

Existing Safeguards and Oversight

Courts in jurisdictions possess inherent powers to halt private prosecutions deemed abusive or contrary to the , such as through stays of proceedings for under principles established in cases like R v Horseferry Road , ex parte Bennett (1993). This judicial oversight ensures that prosecutions lacking sufficient evidence or motivated by improper purposes—such as or vendetta—can be discontinued before trial, thereby preventing miscarriages of . For instance, magistrates must initially verify that the alleged offense is known to and supported by evidence before issuing summonses, providing an early filter against frivolous claims. Public prosecuting authorities, such as the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) in , hold statutory authority under section 6(2) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 to intervene by taking over private prosecutions and either continuing or discontinuing them based on evidential sufficiency and public interest tests aligned with the CPS Full Code Test. The (DPP) exercises this power without needing to demonstrate exceptional circumstances, as affirmed in R (on the application of Comer House Project) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office (2008), allowing overrides where state resources or policy priorities warrant it, such as national security or resource allocation. consent is required for specific offenses under statutes like the , adding a layer of executive oversight to curb politically sensitive or complex cases. Private prosecutors bear financial responsibility for their actions, remaining liable for defendants' costs if the case fails and is deemed unreasonable or improperly conducted, pursuant to section 19 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 and Practice Direction 16A. Courts may issue wasted costs orders against prosecutors or their legal representatives for failures in duties like disclosure, as seen in R v Holloway (1993), where non-compliance led to personal liability. Recovery from central funds is possible post-acquittal or discontinuance but only if the prosecutor demonstrates reasonableness comparable to public standards, with excess costs denied if they exceed what the CPS would incur, per recent rulings limiting reimbursements for inefficient practices. Ethical alignment with public prosecution norms is enforced through voluntary but influential codes, such as the Code for Private Prosecutors issued by the Private Prosecutors' Association in 2019, which mandates adherence to principles of independence, fairness, and evidence disclosure mirroring the CPS Code for Crown Prosecutors. This framework requires private actors to apply the same two-stage test—evidential sufficiency and —preventing deviations that could undermine , with non-compliance risking judicial scrutiny or professional sanctions under solicitors' regulatory rules. Ongoing government consultations, as of March 2025, propose mandatory regulation to formalize these standards, including registration and oversight by the CPS, to address gaps exposed in high-profile cases like the Horizon scandal.

Implementation in Common Law Jurisdictions

United Kingdom

In the , private prosecutions enable individuals or organizations to initiate criminal proceedings without reliance on public prosecutors, serving as a check against state inaction, though implementation varies by jurisdiction due to distinct legal traditions. maintain a statutory framework preserving this right, with oversight to curb misuse, while imposes stringent judicial barriers, making such actions exceptionally rare. This dual approach reflects broader tensions between individual agency and public monopoly on prosecution, with empirical data indicating private initiations remain infrequent but have increased amid perceived police and prosecutorial shortcomings.

England and Wales

Private prosecutions in derive from section 6(1) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, which upholds the historical entitlement of any private individual or entity—excluding statutory authorities like —to commence criminal proceedings by laying an at a . This right applies to most summary and indictable offences, though certain statutes mandate prior consent from the (DPP) or , such as under the 1989. The private prosecutor bears full responsibility for gathering evidence, funding costs (averaging £8,500 per case as of 2020 data), and conducting the trial, without automatic access to public resources like police investigations. The (CPS) holds statutory power under section 6(2) of the 1985 Act to intervene, assuming conduct of the case if it satisfies the full code test—requiring sufficient evidence and —coupled with a particular need, such as implications or resource demands in complex matters. Conversely, the CPS must take over and discontinue proceedings if they fail the code test, represent an (e.g., vexatious or politically motivated pursuits), or risk undermining parallel investigations. Such decisions require approval from a Chief or higher and must be documented, with private prosecutors entitled to request reasons and potentially seek . Courts provide additional safeguards through inherent powers to stay proceedings for abuse or award costs against unsuccessful private prosecutors, mitigating risks of malicious litigation. Empirical trends show private prosecutions constitute a small fraction of total cases—fewer than 1% historically—but have risen, with one legal firm reporting a doubling between 2016 and 2021, often driven by corporate entities or victims in and regulatory offences where public authorities declined action. A 2025 Ministry of Justice consultation highlighted vulnerabilities like inconsistent standards among private prosecutors, prompting proposals for accreditation and enhanced oversight to balance empowerment against potential conflicts, such as self-interested commercial motives. Victims retain review rights under the CPS's Victim’s Right to Review scheme if a leads to discontinuance.

Scotland

Private prosecutions in are preserved under but constrained by the Lord Advocate's dominant public interest authority, requiring a private party to petition the for a bill of criminal letters to authorize proceedings. This process demands demonstration of "very special" or exceptional circumstances, such as egregious prosecutorial dereliction, as the court historically views private actions as subordinate to to ensure consistency and resource efficiency. Applications involve filing a bill outlining the case, with the court assessing viability before granting letters, which empower the prosecutor to proceed at their expense and risk. In practice, approvals are exceedingly rare, with no successful modern instances documented, reflecting judicial reluctance to undermine the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service's role. For example, on 29 October 2024, the refused a bill against former teacher Paul Cooney for alleged historical lewd practices, citing the complainant's prior renunciation of prosecution rights in 1992 and absence of exceptional justification. Similarly, a 2022 petition related to a case involving footballer was not advanced, underscoring systemic barriers. Historical precedents, like the 19th-century Glasgow Rape Case, involved partial successes but predate modern centralization, rendering the mechanism largely theoretical today. Safeguards include the court's discretionary veto and the private prosecutor's liability for costs, ensuring minimal risk of abuse but also curtailing utility.

England and Wales

In , private prosecutions remain a preserved right, allowing any individual, company, or organization to initiate criminal proceedings independently of public authorities, subject to compliance with the Rules 2020. This mechanism supplements the dominant role of public prosecutions by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), particularly where state resources are strained, though the CPS holds statutory authority under section 6(2) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 to intervene, take over, and either continue or discontinue any private prosecution. The CPS applies its Full Code Test—assessing evidential sufficiency and —to determine intervention; it will typically discontinue if the test is not met, ensuring proceedings do not undermine broader public justice priorities. Under the (POCA), successful private prosecutors may apply for post-conviction confiscation orders under section 6, targeting benefits derived from criminal conduct, and seek pre-trial restraint orders under sections 40 and 41 to preserve assets. These provisions enable recovery in cases like , where private parties—such as corporate victims—pursue financial accountability absent public initiative, though applications require determination of the defendant's benefit and available assets. Usage remains limited relative to public prosecutions, with no comprehensive official statistics, but reports indicate a rise, with one noting the number more than doubled between 2016 and 2021, often in or unresolved minor cases where police declined involvement due to resource constraints. This growth reflects inefficiencies in public enforcement, particularly amid police funding cuts, though it prompts scrutiny for potential overreach. A distinct feature involves the Single Justice Procedure (SJP) for minor offenses, where private prosecutions risk summary disposal by a single based on written without defendant attendance, raising concerns over and miscarriages, as seen in high-profile cases. Judicial oversight mandates and mitigation consideration, yet proposals for and codes aim to mitigate , balancing access against safeguards.

Scotland

In Scotland, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) exercises near-total dominance over criminal prosecutions, a structure rooted in the centralized role of procurators fiscal established under the since the , which has long prioritized public authority over individual initiative unlike the historically more decentralized English system. Private prosecutions remain theoretically possible but occur only in exceptional cases, typically requiring the applicant to petition the for leave to serve a bill of criminal letters after the procurator fiscal has declined to proceed. Such bills demand proof of special circumstances, such as systemic prosecutorial inaction, and face opposition potential from the , who may intervene to halt, take over, or redirect the case in the , underscoring the residual and tightly constrained nature of private rights. Historical records indicate private actions were competent as early as the at the prosecutor's own cost and risk, yet the state's prosecutorial monopoly has rendered them virtually obsolete in practice, with no successful high-profile instances in recent decades absent COPFS consent. This framework mitigates risks of vexatious claims through judicial gatekeeping and fiscal oversight, ensuring alignment with broader public justice priorities while preserving a nominal private avenue only where state mechanisms demonstrably fail.

Australia

In Australia, private prosecutions are available in all states and territories, enabling individuals or entities to initiate criminal proceedings independently of public authorities, though subject to varying procedural constraints and oversight by Directors of Public Prosecutions (DPPs). These mechanisms address gaps in state enforcement but are infrequently used due to the financial burden on prosecutors, evidentiary challenges, and the DPP's authority to intervene, take over, or discontinue cases deemed lacking merit or public interest. For federal offenses, private actions are permissible absent explicit statutory prohibition, as affirmed in cases excluding certain regulatory breaches like those under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). A notable instance occurred in 2022 when mining magnate Andrew Forrest privately prosecuted Meta Platforms Inc. for alleged anti-money laundering violations, highlighting potential for high-profile corporate accountability outside traditional channels.

Western Australia

Under the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), section 20(5), private individuals cannot commence prosecutions except where another statute expressly authorizes it, confining such actions to limited, offense-specific contexts rather than general application. Proceedings typically require a prosecution notice signed by an authorized officer, such as police, underscoring the state's preference for initiation to maintain consistency and resource allocation. practice directions mandate that any private prosecution notice be presented physically—not electronically—and scrutinized by a registrar in consultation with a to verify facial validity and compliance with the Act, serving as an initial filter against frivolous claims. The Office of the retains intervention powers, further discouraging private pursuits absent compelling statutory exceptions.

New South Wales

Section 49(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) empowers any person to institute a private prosecution by laying an information or applying to the Local Court registrar, positioning it as a constitutional safeguard against prosecutorial inertia or bias. Proceedings commence upon court acceptance, but the complainant bears full evidentiary and cost responsibilities, rendering them rare despite legal accessibility. The (DPP) may intervene by requesting materials for review and subsequently assume conduct, continuing viable cases or halting those with insufficient conviction prospects, contrary to , driven by improper motives, or bypassing prior DPP decisions. This oversight ensures alignment with broader justice priorities, as private actions lack state-funded resources like police investigations.

Western Australia

In , private prosecutions operate within a framework shaped by state-specific under Australian federalism, where the states retain primary authority over enforcement. The Criminal Procedure Act 2004 generally restricts the initiation of prosecutions to authorized public officers, such as police or the (DPP), stipulating that a person in a private capacity cannot commence proceedings unless expressly authorized by another statute. This limits broad private initiation but permits targeted exceptions, particularly for summary (simple) offences triable in the , reflecting a permissive niche amid otherwise state-monopolized processes. Central to this is the informant model, where victims or authorized private complainants serve as prosecutors in summary matters. An files a prosecution notice or complaint under sections 26-28 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004, detailing the alleged based on reasonable grounds of , and may present and examine witnesses unless the DPP or police assume conduct. This empowers individuals or groups to address minor s—such as certain regulatory breaches—where public resources may prioritize indictable crimes, though the retains discretion to stay vexatious claims and the DPP holds takeover powers under section 11 of the Act 1991. Prominent applications occur in animal welfare enforcement, where organizations like the exercise statutory powers as inspectors under the Animal Welfare Act 2002. Sections 55-57 authorize RSPCA inspectors to investigate, seize evidence, and prosecute summary offences, bypassing general private restrictions. For example, in August 2025, RSPCA WA prosecuted a South West couple, securing $52,300 in fines across 13 convictions for animal suffering via prohibited practices. Similarly, in the 2003 case Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (WA) Inc v Hammarquist, RSPCA WA initiated charges against respondents for inflicting unnecessary suffering on and subjecting others to , resulting in convictions upheld on appeal. These cases illustrate how specialized private entities fill enforcement gaps in victim-driven domains, with outcomes including fines up to $50,000 per offence and potential imprisonment.

New South Wales

In , private prosecutions are authorised under section 14 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), which permits any person to institute proceedings for an offence unless legislation expressly confines the right to a officer or police. Section 49 of the same Act specifies the commencement process for private prosecutions, allowing an authorised individual—other than a or officer—to issue a court attendance notice directly to the accused, thereby initiating proceedings in the Local without prior police involvement. This mechanism enables private parties to pursue charges for offences where authorities have declined to act, such as minor regulatory breaches or specialised matters lacking police resources. The system incorporates robust oversight by the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP), which holds discretionary power to intervene in private prosecutions under section 7 of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1986 (NSW). The ODPP guidelines outline that takeover occurs if proceedings lack a reasonable prospect of conviction, fail the test, stem from improper motives, or circumvent a prior prosecutorial decision not to proceed. This intervention serves as a safeguard against while preserving private prosecutions as a "valuable constitutional safeguard" against public authority or partiality in addressing overlooked cases, including potential corruption-related offences like where state resources are stretched. Private initiators bear the full evidentiary and financial burden, with no automatic state funding, reinforcing selectivity to serious, viable matters. In practice, private prosecutions remain rare in , typically limited to instances where state inaction leaves victims without recourse, such as in proceedings or niche scenarios. For instance, in 2022, the gambling industry group ClubsNSW commenced a private prosecution for against parties allegedly undermining judicial orders, demonstrating use in protecting organisational interests amid regulatory gaps. The ODPP's ability to request police assistance or full case files during review ensures alignment with broader public priorities, mitigating risks of vexatious claims while upholding the legislative balance.

Canada

Federal and Provincial Frameworks

Private prosecutions in Canada are governed by the federal Criminal Code, which authorizes any individual with reasonable grounds to believe an indictable offence has been committed to lay an information before a justice of the peace under section 504. Upon receipt, the justice must refer the information to a provincial prosecutor under section 507.1 for review, during which the prosecutor may assume conduct, direct a stay of proceedings, or return it to the private informant if public interest does not warrant state involvement. If the private prosecution proceeds, section 574 permits the informant or their agent to conduct the trial, subject to the Attorney General's overriding authority to intervene at any stage under section 579, including by entering a stay of proceedings. This framework applies uniformly across provinces for Criminal Code offences, though federal prosecutions (e.g., under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act) follow similar principles via the Public Prosecution Service of Canada, where private initiatives are exceptional and typically deferred to public authority. Provinces administer justice under section 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867, leading to variations in procedural guidelines and oversight by provincial Attorneys General, but the core federal mechanisms ensure Crown dominance to prevent abuse.

Ontario

In Ontario, private prosecutions commence with an application to the , where the informant must demonstrate reasonable and probable grounds via or sworn testimony before a justice issues process. The provincial reviews under section 507.1 and may intervene to adopt, stay, or withdraw the prosecution if it aligns with criteria, such as evidentiary sufficiency and policy directives. Successful private prosecutions remain rare due to these safeguards; for instance, the informant bears the burden of preliminary and conduct unless the assumes responsibility, and costs may be awarded against frivolous actions. Historical cases, like environmental or allegations, illustrate use when public prosecutors decline, but intervention has curtailed many, emphasizing state monopoly on serious criminal matters.

British Columbia

permits private informations under section 504 of the Criminal Code, with the justice referring to counsel for assessment per section 507.1; if returned, the private may proceed but must adhere to evidentiary standards and face potential intervention. policy prioritizes review, often leading to takeover or discontinuation if resources are better allocated to state-led cases, as outlined in the BC Prosecution Service manual updated January 31, 2025. Applications are filed at courthouses, with guides emphasizing lawyer involvement for complex matters like environmental violations under federal or provincial statutes, though outcomes frequently result in stays to mitigate private biases or inefficiencies. Private efforts have been employed in niche areas, such as or offences, but systemic deference to public prosecution limits prevalence, with no reported surge in successful private trials post-2020.

Federal and Provincial Frameworks

In , private prosecutions form part of a dual federal-provincial legal framework that permits individuals to initiate criminal proceedings, thereby supplementing the primary responsibilities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and prosecutors in enforcing the law. This mechanism reflects the tradition but is constrained by statutory oversight to prevent abuse and ensure primacy. Under federal jurisdiction, the process primarily applies to indictable offences outlined in the Criminal Code, while provincial statutes govern lesser regulatory and summary offences, allowing broader citizen access where public enforcement may be under-resourced. Section 504 of the Criminal Code empowers any individual who possesses reasonable grounds to believe that an indictable offence has occurred to lay an information before a justice of the peace, initiating the private prosecution process. Upon receipt, section 507.1 mandates the justice to refer the information to a provincial court judge for scrutiny, who determines whether sufficient evidence exists to issue process, such as a summons or warrant, based on a prima facie review. The Attorney General of Canada, through the Public Prosecution Service of Canada (PPSC) or provincial counterparts, retains authority to intervene at any stage—taking conduct of the proceedings, issuing a stay of proceedings under section 579, or directing discontinuation—to align with public interest considerations. This federal oversight underscores the supplementary nature of private actions, as the Crown holds ultimate prosecutorial discretion. Provincial frameworks extend private prosecution rights to offences under their respective statutes, such as those related to highways, environmental regulations, or municipal bylaws, often with streamlined procedures compared to federal indictable matters. These allow private informants to enforce compliance in areas of provincial , where the Attorney General may intervene but public initiation is not always mandatory. Unlike the federal Criminal Code process, provincial mechanisms typically involve direct application to a without mandatory pre-trial referral, facilitating quicker action for summary convictions but still subject to judicial screening for validity. This division ensures private prosecutions address gaps in public enforcement across Canada's federated system, though success rates remain low due to evidentiary burdens and Crown interventions.

Ontario

In Ontario, private prosecutions are initiated by an individual submitting an information to a under section 504 of the Criminal Code, detailing the alleged offence, witnesses, and supporting , followed by a pre-enquête hearing where the informant testifies under to establish reasonable grounds and a prima facie case. The Justice assesses whether the proceedings are frivolous, vexatious, or lacking essential elements of the offence, and may issue a or warrant if satisfied; however, consent is required for certain indictable offences or prosecutions involving youth under 18. The informant bears the burden of arranging witnesses and subpoenas, but cannot proceed if an active police investigation exists without new or if prior charges were refused on the same facts. Crown pre-screening represents a primary procedural hurdle, as the Attorney's office is notified of the application and attends the pre-enquête hearing to question the informant and evaluate the case against standards of reasonable prospect of conviction and per the Charge Screening Directive. Post-issuance of process, the routinely screens charges and may intervene to take conduct, stay proceedings under section 579 of the Criminal Code, or withdraw them if evidentiary sufficiency or resource demands fail to justify continuation, effectively curtailing purely private efforts in favor of public oversight. This intervention is mandatory in categories such as or indictable offences against justice system officials, further limiting autonomy. Private prosecutions in achieve low success rates owing to these safeguards, remaining extremely rare due to the high evidentiary threshold and , which prioritizes systemic efficiency over individual pursuits. Viability persists in victim-driven scenarios with compelling aligning with , as demonstrated by occasional advancements like a 2024 private charge of against the in a long-standing workplace death case, though of stays faces a stringent exceptional-circumstances bar.

British Columbia

In , private prosecutions may be commenced by any individual who is not a peace officer or public officer laying a private information before a , alleging an under section 507.1 of the Criminal Code. This process triggers a mandatory notice to counsel, who represent the Attorney General and exercise superintending authority over all prosecutions in the province. At the initial process hearing, counsel review the information for reasonable and probable grounds, consulting regional counsel or the as needed, and may seek an adjournment for further investigation or present evidence against issuance of process. The province's framework imposes a restrictive overlay through the Attorney General's broad discretion to intervene early and decisively. Following the swearing of the , counsel may direct a at any time if the proposed charge fails to meet the dual test of a substantial likelihood of based on objectively reasonable prospects and advancement of the . This policy, formalized in the BC Prosecution Service's Counsel Policy Manual (effective January 31, 2025, with updates as of April 8, 2025), prioritizes oversight to ensure consistency with prosecutorial standards, effectively limiting the viability of private actions absent alignment with governmental priorities. Private prosecutions in British Columbia have been pursued notably in environmental enforcement contexts by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and individuals seeking accountability for alleged violations under statutes such as the Fisheries Act or Environmental Management Act. For example, in 2006, the Georgia Strait Alliance laid charges against the Province of and the Sewerage and Drainage District for illegal sewage discharges, aiming to compel regulatory action. Similarly, activist Alexandra Morton initiated private proceedings against fish farm operators under the Fisheries Act, which were subsequently stayed by the General but led to the taking over and issuing related charges. In January 2018, the BC government stayed a private prosecution launched by Bev Sellars concerning in the 2014 Mount Polley failure, citing insufficient evidence to meet prosecution thresholds despite public concerns over environmental damage. These cases illustrate how private efforts often serve as catalysts for public scrutiny but face high barriers due to intervention, with stays common when evidence does not satisfy rigorous standards.

United States

In the , private prosecution refers to the initiation and conduct of criminal proceedings by individuals or entities outside the public prosecutorial apparatus, a practice that was commonplace from colonial times through the mid-19th century but has since been largely displaced by state and federal monopolies on criminal enforcement. Early American systems often relied on victims, , or retained private counsel to file complaints, gather evidence, and argue cases in court, as formalized public prosecutorial offices were scarce until the late 1800s. This shift toward public prosecution accelerated with the rise of professional district attorneys and the institutionalization of police forces, driven by concerns over inconsistent enforcement and potential abuses in private actions. Today, while bars private criminal prosecutions outright, a minority of states retain statutory mechanisms allowing limited private involvement, typically confined to misdemeanors or subject to override by elected prosecutors.

Federal Limitations

Federal criminal prosecutions are exclusively conducted by United States Attorneys or Department of Justice officials, reflecting constitutional mandates that preclude private parties from wielding executive enforcement powers. The Take Care Clause of Article II, Section 3 requires the President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," which courts and scholars interpret as vesting prosecutorial authority solely in accountable executive branch officers to ensure uniform application of . Similarly, the (Article II, Section 2) demands that principal officers exercising significant authority, such as prosecutors, be appointed by the President with confirmation or by department heads, rendering unlicensed private individuals ineligible to initiate or litigate federal crimes. Article III standing doctrine further limits private suits, as criminal enforcement is deemed a not redressable by individualized grievances absent specific statutory authorization. Exceptions are narrow and non-criminal; for instance, the False Claims Act permits relators to pursue civil recovery for fraud against the , with potential bounties, but this does not extend to criminal penalties or standalone private criminal actions. Rare judicial appointments of private counsel for criminal —such as in cases where the declines prosecution—require explicit authorization and remain under public oversight, not constituting true private initiation.

State-Level Practices

State practices vary widely, with most jurisdictions vesting primary authority in elected district attorneys or state attorneys general, though approximately seven states permit non-governmental actors to fully initiate and litigate certain criminal cases, often limited to lesser offenses. In , for example, Ohio Revised Code § 2935.09 allows a with knowledge of an offense to file an with a court or , potentially leading to an or prosecution if the prosecuting attorney declines involvement; the private party may then prosecute if authorized. similarly enables private filings and prosecutions for violations not punishable by imprisonment, provided the case aligns with public interest criteria and does not conflict with . In states like , private objection to a prosecutor's can trigger a full private , underscoring residual common-law roots where victims retain enforcement roles. Other states, such as , prohibit private initiation but allow district attorneys to enlist private as assistants with , ensuring oversight to mitigate risks like conflicts of interest or uneven justice. A 2018 survey of state laws identified mechanisms for private citizen-initiated investigations or prosecutions in multiple jurisdictions, often tied to victim rights statutes, though public prosecutors frequently assume control post-filing to align with broader policy goals. Modern instances remain infrequent, with historical examples like the 1850 private prosecution in the murder of Harvard's John White Webster illustrating past prevalence, now constrained by statutes prioritizing public accountability.

Federal Limitations

In the United States federal system, private prosecutions of criminal offenses are effectively prohibited, with authority centralized under the Department of Justice (DOJ), which exercises exclusive for federal crimes as an extension of the executive power vested in the President by Article II, Section 3 of the . This structure precludes private individuals or entities from initiating, filing charges in, or litigating criminal cases in federal courts, as criminal informations and indictments must be pursued by "an attorney for the government," defined under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 1(b) to include only DOJ personnel or authorized federal officials. Private complaints may inform investigations—such as through affidavits leading to warrants under Rule 4—but the decision to prosecute remains solely with federal authorities, reflecting a policy monopoly to ensure uniform enforcement and avoid conflicts arising from private interests. The has reinforced these limitations by denying private parties standing to compel federal criminal prosecutions. In Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), the Court held that a citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another, emphasizing that such decisions implicate broader public interests in best left to executive discretion rather than individualized grievances. This doctrine underscores the federal system's rarity of private involvement, in marked contrast to the primacy of state jurisdictions where variations in prosecutorial models allow greater flexibility, though federal offenses demand centralized control to align with national priorities and constitutional . Narrow civil analogs provide the closest exceptions to outright federal prohibitions on private enforcement, particularly in contexts. Under the False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733), provisions enable private relators to file civil actions on the government's behalf against entities defrauding federal programs, with relators potentially receiving up to 30% of recoveries if the DOJ declines intervention. These hybrid mechanisms, originating from 1863 Lincoln-era legislation and strengthened by 1986 amendments, have yielded billions in settlements—over $70 billion since 1986—but remain strictly civil, without granting relators authority over criminal proceedings, which the DOJ may pursue separately if warranted. No equivalent private criminal prosecution exists federally, preserving DOJ oversight to mitigate risks of biased or inconsistent enforcement.

State-Level Practices

In permissive states such as , private parties may initiate criminal complaints, including for misdemeanors like , but these require review and approval under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 506 to ensure alignment. This process has enabled advocacy groups, such as Animal Outlook, to pursue cases of and aggravated against livestock operations when public prosecutors decline action due to resource constraints. Similarly, in Georgia, private requests can prompt the initiation of proceedings, though retain discretion to assume control or dismiss for lack of merit, reflecting a balanced allowance for victim-driven enforcement in minor offenses. Restrictive states like New York generally prohibit standalone private prosecutions, deeming them violative of by undermining the neutral prosecutorial role, with courts requiring district attorney involvement or certification for any private attorney participation. In , hybrid models predominate, mandating judicial oversight and district attorney concurrence for private filings to avert risks of vindictive or uneven justice, as emphasized in analyses of prosecutorial delegation limits. These gatekeeping requirements stem from concerns over inconsistent application and potential conflicts absent public authority dominance. Such mechanisms trend toward application in under-prosecuted domains like animal cruelty—where historical private enforcement by humane societies persists amid enforcement gaps—and , where victims historically supplemented public inaction through private complaints in early American practice, though modern usage remains episodic and oversight-heavy.

Other Common Law Countries

New Zealand

Private prosecutions in are governed by section 26 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011, which permits any person to file a charging document to initiate proceedings, though the court registrar holds discretion to accept or refuse it if the matter lacks , involves insufficient , or could prejudice or foreign relations. This mechanism acts as a constitutional check against potential state prosecutorial inaction, incompetence, or bias, with legislative reforms since 2011 enhancing procedural safeguards while maintaining viability. Private prosecutors must often demonstrate justifying a before filing is approved, distinguishing these from Crown-led cases, which cannot involve private initiation. Agencies like WorkSafe have utilized private prosecutions in health and safety matters where public enforcement was not pursued, underscoring their role in supplementing state efforts without supplanting them.

Singapore

In Singapore, private prosecutions enable individuals to seek redress for personal wrongs when public authorities decline action due to lack of , initiated via a Magistrate's Complaint filed under section 131 of the Criminal Procedure Code, costing S$20 and requiring the complainant to serve a on the accused. The complainant may self-represent or hire counsel, with the Attorney-General's Chambers retaining oversight to intervene if proceedings affect , as private actions do not bind state . This process applies primarily to summary offenses, reflecting heritage while prioritizing state on serious crimes; holders have successfully employed it for infringement cases where enforcement gaps exist. Courts assess locus standi, ensuring the prosecutor has a direct interest, to prevent frivolous claims.

Ireland and Belize

Private prosecutions in persist as a right, affirmed by the in Kelly & Anor v District Judge Ann Ryan (2013), which upheld their availability primarily in the District Court for summary offenses, serving as a counterbalance to the ' (DPP) discretion. The DPP may review and take over or discontinue such cases under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1974, but cannot preemptively block initiation, though courts have quashed proceedings deemed abusive, as in a 2023 ruling on summonses against Garda officers. This framework empowers victims where state resources are strained, without undermining public prosecutorial primacy. In , private prosecutions remain viable under principles inherited from , exemplified by the 2014 citizen-led action against politician Elvin Penner for passport irregularities, which proceeded despite DPP involvement and reached appellate review in 2015 over procedural dismissals. The holds constitutional authority to institute proceedings but does not exclude private initiation, as seen in a 2023 hiring of a private for the Ramnarace investigation amid concerns over official handling. Such cases highlight their utility in high-profile or resource-limited scenarios within the context, where applications remain infrequent despite theoretical accessibility.

New Zealand

In , private prosecutions originate from principles and are expressly permitted under section 26 of the Act 2011, allowing any individual to file a charging against a for an offence that is neither a public prosecution nor a prosecution. The Registrar of the court holds discretion to accept the for filing and issue a or refuse it, with refusals requiring referral to a District Court Judge for review, including consideration of formal statements and exhibits. This framework imposes modern constraints to prevent abuse, such as claims, while preserving the mechanism as a safeguard against prosecutorial inaction by public authorities. The Solicitor-General retains authority to intervene in private prosecutions, either by taking over proceedings under section 147 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 or through powers to stay them if continuation would not serve the . Such interventions ensure alignment with broader justice objectives, reflecting a balance between individual initiative and state oversight in a system dominated by police and agency-led prosecutions. Private prosecutions remain rare, typically limited to minor offences or cases where public prosecutors decline action, such as certain health and safety breaches under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015. Notable examples include a 2023 private prosecution by a family against a contractor following a workplace fatality in , marking one of few such efforts to compel absent regulatory pursuit, and a 2024 case against the alleging breaches aboard a naval vessel injuring two personnel. These instances underscore their exceptional use, often driven by victims or advocacy groups seeking remedy where state inertia prevails, though success rates are low due to evidentiary and procedural hurdles.

Singapore

In Singapore, private prosecutions are governed by the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap. 68, 2010 Rev Ed) and allow individuals who are victims of an offense to initiate criminal proceedings via a Magistrate's Complaint when determine it is not in the to investigate or prosecute using state resources. This mechanism provides limited private access to justice for personal wrongs, such as minor offenses or disputes where state involvement is deemed unnecessary, but the complainant bears all costs, including legal fees if a is engaged. The Attorney-General's Chambers (AGC), through the Public Prosecutor, exercises overriding authority under Article 35(8) of the , empowering it to intervene in any private prosecution by taking over the proceedings and issuing a to discontinue them if continuation is not in the . This power maintains state control over , preventing abuse or misalignment with broader public policy, while private prosecutors lack the right to appeal court decisions without AGC's written approval. Locus standi requires the complainant to demonstrate direct victimhood or sufficient , as affirmed in emphasizing prevention of vexatious actions. Defamation cases illustrate this controlled framework; for instance, in 2009, members of the Swimming Club filed private complaints for criminal under Penal Code sections 499 and 500 against fellow members over club-related statements, leading to summonses, but the AGC subsequently took over and discontinued the prosecutions. Similarly, holders have pursued private prosecutions for infringements, though AGC oversight ensures alignment with enforcement priorities. These examples underscore how private initiatives advance individual redress in targeted disputes but remain subordinate to AGC discretion.

Ireland and Belize

In Ireland, private prosecutions remain a preserved right, enabling individuals to initiate criminal proceedings independently of the state, primarily through applications for under the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851. This mechanism serves as a constitutional safeguard against prosecutorial inaction, as affirmed by the , which has described it as a "valuable right" essential for access to justice. The (DPP), established under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1974, holds oversight powers to intervene, take over, or discontinue such cases if deemed not in the , though the initial private right persists unless overridden. In a 2013 ruling, the permitted a private prosecution against bank officials to proceed despite DPP objections, emphasizing that private prosecutors must demonstrate a bona fide intent to invoke the criminal process rather than ulterior motives like civil gain. Despite these provisions, private prosecutions are infrequently pursued due to practical barriers, including costs and DPP scrutiny. Belize, inheriting English traditions as a former British , similarly recognizes private prosecutions as a victim-led option for indictable offenses, allowing individuals to lay informations before a without prior state involvement. This framework, embedded in the Criminal Procedure Code and broader practices, empowers private citizens to commence proceedings where public authorities decline, though the retains authority to assume control or enter a nolle prosequi to halt them. A 2013 case involving politician John Penner illustrated limitations, where a private prosecution was challenged and ultimately struck out, with the ruling that private prosecutors lack automatic access to police files, underscoring evidentiary hurdles. Such actions remain underutilized in Belize, reflecting resource constraints and reliance on state-led enforcement in a small , with no statutory reforms abolishing the right as of 2021.

Implementation in Civil Law and Hybrid Jurisdictions

France

In French criminal procedure, victims exercise a form of participatory prosecution through the partie civile mechanism, codified in Articles 85–91-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which permits any person claiming injury from a or délit to file a complaint and constitute themselves as a civil party before the investigating judge. This status enables the victim to join the ongoing public prosecution—initiated and primarily directed by the procureur de la République—while pursuing civil damages for material, moral, or physical harm directly within the criminal proceedings. Unlike standalone private prosecutions, the partie civile does not authorize the victim to independently lead or substitute for the state's criminal action but integrates civil interests into it, with the public prosecutor retaining authority over charges and trial strategy. A plainte avec constitution de partie civile, as regulated under Article 85, compels the opening of a judicial investigation if not already underway, allowing the victim—via retained counsel—to propose evidentiary acts, such as examinations or expert appraisals, which the investigating may order at the victim's expense unless state funds cover them. This provision, effective since the 1958 code's framework with amendments including the 2011 victim rights reforms, ensures victims access state investigative tools unavailable in pure civil suits, including compulsory measures like searches or seizures, thereby bridging gaps in public enforcement. Once constituted, the partie civile participates actively in hearings, cross-examinations, and appeals, with decisions on civil claims appealable alongside criminal verdicts. The system's advantages lie in its efficiency for victims, consolidating reparatory claims—potentially yielding damages up to full indemnification, as awarded in cases like the 2016 attack where parties civiles secured collective compensation—into the criminal forum, reducing procedural duplication and leveraging criminal standards of proof for civil recovery. This integration fosters victim-driven momentum in under-prosecuted matters, as the partie civile can circumvent prosecutorial dismissal by directly triggering inquiry, though success hinges on evidentiary merit and financial capacity, with available for low-income claimants under the aide juridictionnelle scheme since 1991. Data from the French Ministry of Justice indicate that partie civile filings rose 15% from 2015 to 2020, correlating with higher victim satisfaction in resolution rates compared to standalone civil actions.

Sweden

In Sweden, criminal prosecutions are predominantly conducted by public prosecutors under a system emphasizing and the principle of , with private prosecution (enskilt åtal) serving as a subsidiary option. This mechanism allows an injured to initiate proceedings only after the public prosecutor has explicitly declined to prosecute or failed to act within a specified timeframe, as governed by Chapter 20 § 8 and Chapter 47 of the Code of Judicial Procedure (Rättegångsbalken). Such subsidiary rights are confined to designated offenses, excluding serious crimes under mandatory public prosecution, and require the private party to assume full evidentiary burdens, including witness summonses and preliminary costs. Private prosecutions most commonly arise in cases of personal offenses like (ärekränkning), regulated under Chapter 5 of the Penal Code (Brottsbalken), where the victim's interest predominates and public may yield to private initiative. In these instances, the process follows hybrid civil-criminal forms, with the private prosecutor acting akin to a , but outcomes remain subject to criminal penalties if occurs. The application of private prosecution remains exceedingly rare, underscoring Sweden's reliance on a robust public prosecution apparatus that handles over 99% of criminal cases efficiently through centralized resources. This scarcity stems from prosecutorial prioritization of offenses, high evidentiary thresholds for private parties, and cost deterrents, with data from legal analyses indicating fewer than a handful of successful instances annually, primarily in disputes. The system's design prioritizes state-led uniformity over individual empowerment, minimizing procedural fragmentation while ensuring accountability for niche harms.

South Africa

In South Africa's hybrid legal system, which blends Roman-Dutch civil law principles with English influences, criminal prosecutions are primarily the domain of the (NPA), a single national entity structured under Section 179 of the of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, tasked with instituting proceedings on behalf of the state. This public monopoly reflects a post-apartheid emphasis on centralized to prevent selective or politically motivated , yet private prosecutions serve as an exceptional safeguard when the NPA declines to act. Section 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 enables a private individual—typically a victim or directly affected party—to initiate proceedings by first obtaining a certificate from the relevant (DPP), confirming the state's decision not to prosecute. Without this certificate, private actions risk being stayed as an , underscoring the state's overriding interest in uniformity. This statutory framework derives from pre-constitutional roots dating to , when victims held prosecutorial rights, but has evolved to balance individual agency with public oversight amid NPA resource constraints and occasional prosecutorial inaction. The implicitly supports such access through Section 34, guaranteeing everyone the right to a fair public hearing for disputes resolvable , including mechanisms to enforce criminal where state failure denies . Private prosecutions thus function as a residual tool, not a routine alternative, with the private prosecutor bearing full evidentiary and financial burdens, including potential liability for malicious proceedings. In practice, these prosecutions are rare—comprising a small fraction of cases due to procedural hurdles and costs—but gain traction in niche areas like environmental or wildlife offenses, where public priorities may de-emphasize enforcement. For instance, in 2016, environmental NGO Uzani Environmental Advocacy successfully privately prosecuted BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd for violations under the National Environmental Management Act, marking the first such conviction for environmental crimes and highlighting private initiative's role in addressing gaps in state capacity. Juristic persons face restrictions under Section 7, limited to natural persons for standard private actions, though certain statutes permit organizational involvement, reflecting debates over extending rights to entities amid concerns of abuse or discrimination. Overall, the system prioritizes empirical viability, requiring private prosecutors to prove a direct interest and viable case to avoid judicial intervention.

NSPCA Role

The National Council of Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (NSPCA) in South Africa holds statutory authority to initiate private prosecutions for offenses under the Animals Protection Act 71 of 1962, particularly those involving animal cruelty. This power, affirmed by the Constitutional Court in National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services on December 8, 2016, derives from the NSPCA's mandate to prevent cruelty and enforce relevant legislation, independent of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). The ruling clarified that the NSPCA, as a juristic person aligned with the Act's objectives, possesses the functional capacity to prosecute such cases, filling gaps where state resources or priorities may limit action. This independence enables the NSPCA to pursue prosecutions in specialized animal welfare matters, such as , , or exploitation, even when the NPA declines involvement. For instance, in cases of severe reported to the NSPCA, it can lay charges and proceed privately if public prosecution is not forthcoming, as seen in ongoing monitoring and enforcement efforts post-conviction. The organization's inspectors, trained under its auspices, gather evidence compliant with standards, ensuring prosecutions target violations like those under section 2 of the Act prohibiting unnecessary suffering. The NSPCA's role has resulted in targeted convictions in animal cruelty prosecutions, demonstrating efficacy in niche enforcement where state-led efforts may underperform due to broader caseloads. Examples include successful outcomes against offenders in shelter mismanagement and abuse scenarios, with the NSPCA conducting follow-up inspections to enforce compliance. This specialized approach leverages the NSPCA's expertise in animal-related evidence, contributing to deterrence in under-prosecuted areas without relying on general state machinery.

Philippines

In the , a hybrid blending civil and elements, private prosecutions supplement public efforts primarily through the filing of complaints by offended parties, as governed by of the Rules of . Certain offenses classified as "private crimes," including , , , abduction, and acts of lasciviousness, require the explicit complaint of the offended party or their authorized representative before prosecution can commence de officio by state authorities. Without such intervention, these cases cannot proceed, ensuring that prosecutions for inherently personal harms reflect the victim's interest. Private prosecutors, typically retained by the complainant, may intervene in ongoing public prosecutions to assist with presentation, examination, and civil liability claims arising from the offense, subject to authorization from the public prosecutor or . In instances where public prosecutors decline to file charges or are unavailable, a private prosecutor can be empowered in writing by the Chief State Prosecutor or Regional Prosecutor to handle the case up to trial conclusion, though ultimate control remains with the state to prevent abuse. This applies particularly to local crimes with direct personal impact, such as libel or light felonies, where the offended party's active role ensures diligence absent from overburdened public offices. For corruption and graft involving public officials, the Office of the provides a key avenue for private complaints, which it investigates and may prosecute under Republic Act No. 6770, the Act of 1989. Citizens can submit sworn complaints—anonymous ones included—detailing alleged violations of anti-graft laws like Republic Act No. 3019, prompting preliminary inquiries that supplement the Department of Justice's role. This oversight mechanism has facilitated cases against officials, with the maintaining jurisdiction over administrative and criminal aspects to address inefficiencies in public enforcement.

Notable Cases

Successful Prosecutions Advancing Justice

In the , the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals () has conducted private prosecutions that have secured significant convictions for violations, demonstrating the mechanism's capacity to enforce laws independently of prosecutorial priorities. In 2019, the obtained 1,432 convictions across its cases, achieving a 93.7% success rate, which included prison sentences for offenders and lifetime bans on animal ownership in severe instances. These outcomes have imposed direct penalties, such as in cases involving leading to animal deaths, thereby addressing evidentiary gaps that might otherwise evade enforcement due to caseload burdens. A notable example is the RSPCA's 2012 private prosecution of the Heythrop Hunt for illegal under the Hunting Act 2004, resulting in convictions against hunt members for using hounds to chase foxes—the first such success against a registered hunt since the ban's implementation. This case advanced by establishing prosecutorial for organized offenses, leading to fines exceeding £25,000 and reinforcing statutory deterrence through visible . Overall, private actions have been estimated to save the government approximately £50 million annually in enforcement costs, enabling faster resolution and higher conviction yields compared to some public equivalents. In jurisdictions permitting victim-initiated pursuits, such as certain U.S. states where private counsel may assist in prosecutions with judicial oversight, these efforts have occasionally secured convictions for offenses declined by district attorneys due to . For instance, historical and residual practices in places like have allowed private involvement to vindicate victim interests in lesser crimes, filling voids left by public non-pursuit and yielding targeted deterrence without broader systemic overload. Such successes underscore private prosecution's role in expediting closure for affected parties, often achieving outcomes like restitution or community-specific penalties that enhance local compliance with criminal statutes.

Controversial or Abused Prosecutions

The British Horizon scandal represents a prominent instance of private prosecution abuse, spanning from the late to the 2010s, where the prosecuted approximately 900 subpostmasters for alleged , , and false accounting based on discrepancies reported by its defective Horizon . These prosecutions, conducted without initial police or involvement, led to hundreds of wrongful convictions, including imprisonments, bankruptcies, and suicides among victims, as the software's errors—such as phantom shortfalls—were not independently verified or disclosed by the . The causal factor here was the prosecutor's institutional overconfidence in proprietary technology without rigorous external auditing, enabling systemic reliance on unreliable data that mimicked criminal intent. By 2021, a confirmed the software's faults, prompting the quashing of over 100 convictions and statutory overturns for affected parties in , though full redress remains incomplete. Courts have also halted private prosecutions suspected of being motivated by personal vendettas or insufficient merit, dismissing them as abuses of process to prevent misuse of judicial resources. In one 2025 case, an individual's application for a private was rejected as vexatious, citing a lack of credible and apparent ulterior motives beyond , such as unresolved grievances. This ruling emphasized that private prosecutors must demonstrate a case grounded in objective facts, not subjective animus, with the judiciary applying stay-of-proceedings tests under to filter out prosecutions driven by improper purposes like retaliation. Such dismissals reveal the causal vulnerability of private actions to individual biases when oversight is lax, yet they affirm the mechanism's self-correcting potential through evidentiary hurdles rather than inherent flaws warranting abolition. These examples illustrate that abuses stem primarily from evidentiary deficiencies or prosecutorial overreach unchecked by adversarial , underscoring the necessity for mandatory disclosure standards and pre-filing reviews to enforce evidential robustness without curtailing legitimate access to justice.

Controversies and Empirical Perspectives

Debates on Efficacy and Fairness

Proponents argue that private prosecutions enhance efficacy by addressing gaps in public enforcement, particularly for under-resourced areas like minor offenses or specialized crimes such as animal cruelty and , where state prosecutors often deprioritize due to limited budgets. For instance, in , the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals () pursued 1,830 cases in , resulting in 2,441 convictions, demonstrating capacity to secure outcomes in domains neglected by public authorities. Similarly, public prosecution rates remain low at approximately 0.4% of reported cases leading to sanctions, suggesting private initiatives can supplement systemic shortfalls without relying on overburdened (CPS) resources. Critics contend that private prosecutions undermine fairness by introducing resource disparities, as initiation demands substantial upfront funding—ranging from £3,000 per defendant for efficient organizations like the to over £1 million in complex cases—effectively privileging wealthy individuals or entities over indigent victims. This creates a causal skew where prosecutions reflect prosecutorial affluence rather than offense severity, potentially exacerbating class and access inequities in . Moreover, the victim-centric focus of private actors may prioritize personal redress over broader societal deterrence, risking inconsistent application of standards that public prosecutors are mandated to uphold. Empirical evidence on overall efficacy remains mixed and sparse, with no centralized statistics on private prosecution rates, though organizational indicate variable success tied to case preparation and intervention. Select analyses highlight potential cost efficiencies, as private pursuits can conclude faster than ones and allow cost recovery from central funds under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, section 17, thereby alleviating some fiscal burdens on the state. Historical economic studies further suggest private enforcement mechanisms have demonstrated partial success in curbing crime during eras of weak alternatives, supporting adjunctive utility absent comprehensive modern metrics. Safeguards, including CPS takeover powers for abusive or non--interest cases, mitigate risks but underscore ongoing tensions between individual agency and equitable administration.

Evidence from Outcomes and Costs

Private prosecutions have demonstrated higher efficacy in achieving convictions for cases overlooked by public prosecutors, particularly in resource-constrained environments where state clearance rates have declined. In the , overall crime detection rates hover below 10% for many offenses, with only 1 in 20 reported offenders typically charged, attributable in part to funding cuts and prosecutorial overload under the system. Private initiatives, by contrast, target these gaps; for example, the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals secured 1,432 convictions through private prosecutions in 2019, many involving violations ignored by police due to prioritization of higher-profile crimes. Such outcomes illustrate private efforts advancing justice without diverting state resources from core duties. Cost analyses reveal that privately funded prosecutions impose lower net burdens on taxpayers compared to equivalent state-led processes or takeovers. Private prosecutors bear upfront expenses, often resulting in faster resolutions and reduced court time—key factors in containing overall system costs—before seeking partial recovery from central funds only upon success. These recoveries fund incremental prosecutions that public authorities would not pursue, avoiding the higher opportunity costs of state allocation to unviable or low-priority cases; in takeovers, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) incurs additional administrative overheads, frequently leading to discontinuance without trial. Empirical data underscores this: the CPS discontinued over 50% of referred private prosecutions in a recent year, reflecting frequent state abandonment of potentially meritorious cases that private funding sustains to completion. Concerns over abusive private prosecutions remain empirically unsubstantiated relative to state inefficiencies, with documented vexatious instances rare amid a volume of several thousand annual private actions versus the CPS's handling of hundreds of thousands of referrals. CPS oversight mechanisms, including takeovers for public interest failures, filter most weak claims early, while state discontinuations—exceeding 12,600 cases in 2014-2015 alone, or 1 in 8 proceedings—occur far more routinely, often due to evidential thresholds unmet under resource strains. This disparity highlights private prosecution's role in countering systemic drops rather than amplifying abuses, as evidenced by successful interventions in and regulatory violations where police investigations stalled.

Recent Developments and Reform Efforts

Post-2020 Scandals and Regulatory Changes

Following the Horizon scandal, which exposed systemic flaws in private prosecutions leading to over 900 convictions between 1991 and 2015 based on faulty software evidence, the UK government initiated reforms to enhance oversight without eliminating the private prosecution mechanism. In November 2024, the government announced a review of private prosecution oversight to prevent similar miscarriages of justice, prompted by public and parliamentary scrutiny of organizational abuses. The Victims and Courts Bill, introduced to on May 7, 2025, addresses cost recovery issues highlighted in the by empowering courts to set fixed rates for private prosecutors' costs in successful cases, aiming to deter excessive financial burdens on defendants while preserving access to justice. This provision targets the prior practice where private entities, such as the , recovered disproportionate costs, exacerbating wrongful convictions' impacts, though critics argue it may still allow high-volume prosecutors to dominate proceedings. The Bill maintains the statutory right to private prosecution under section 6(1) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, focusing reforms on equity rather than abolition. A consultation launched on March 6, 2025, proposed mandatory regulatory measures, including a binding for all private prosecutors to enforce consistent standards on proportionality, evidence handling, and . Additional elements include requirements, a public register of prosecutors, and enhanced accountability mechanisms, such as inspections for organizations using the Single Justice Procedure for low-level offenses. Stakeholders like the Bar Council and Law Society endorsed these, emphasizing prevention of "conveyor belt" prosecutions while noting insufficient data on private cases necessitates better monitoring to balance victim access against abuse risks. These changes seek to mitigate scandals' fallout by imposing transparency on private actors—previously unregulated beyond CPS takeover powers under section 6(2)—without curtailing individual rights, as evidenced by ongoing consultations through 2025 evaluating implementation impacts on case volumes and conviction overturns. Early responses indicate potential for reduced organizational dominance, though full enactment depends on legislative progress amid debates over resource strains on public oversight bodies. In response to escalating caseloads and resource constraints in prosecution systems, several jurisdictions have explored expanded private prosecution roles to alleviate state overload and improve victim redress. Empirical data from prosecutorial rates, where charges are dropped despite sufficient due to capacity limits, underscore this pressure; for instance, U.S. federal declinations rose in certain categories post-2020 amid pandemic-related backlogs. This has fueled advocacy for private mechanisms as supplements, rooted in frameworks that emphasize direct participation over sole reliance on discretionary actors. In the United States, post-2020 has revived interest in private prosecution's historical persistence, proposing targeted enhancements to victim-initiated actions in under-prosecuted cases like minor offenses or civil-criminal hybrids, without supplanting public authority. Proponents argue this counters selective enforcement biases, drawing on evidence from states like where hybrid elements historically distributed prosecutorial burdens. Internationally, NGOs in developing regions, such as parts of , have leveraged private prosecution provisions to pursue for abuses, serving as effective local remedies when state prosecutors face political or logistical overload; for example, submissions to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights have tested private actions' viability against public inaction. Looking forward, hybrid public-private models are gaining traction as a corrective to critiques, integrating private initiation under public oversight to enhance efficiency while curbing abuse risks. Legal analyses highlight delegation frameworks where private actors handle preliminary stages, reducing overload without eroding state control, as seen in delegated contexts. Global practices, including those in modern regimes, indicate private elements already function alongside public systems, suggesting scalable hybrids could address empirical gaps in outcomes like rates for victim-driven cases.

References

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