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Sheberghan,[a] or Shibarghan, also known as Shaburghan or Shebirghan, and historically known as Shahpurgan, is the capital city of the Jowzjan Province in northern Afghanistan.

Key Information

The city of Sheberghan has a population of 175,599.[1] It has four districts and a total land area of 7,335 hectares.[3] The total number of dwellings in Sheberghān is 19,511.[3]

In 2021, the Taliban gained control of the city during the 2021 Taliban offensive.

Location

[edit]

Sheberghān is located along the Sari Pul River banks, about 130 km (81 mi) west of Mazar-i-Sharif on the national primary ring road that connects Kabul, Puli Khumri, Mazar-i-Sharif, Sheberghān, Maymana, Herat, Kandahar, Ghazni, and Maidan Shar. Sheberghān airport is situated between Sheberghān and Aqcha.

Etymology

[edit]

The city's name is a corruption of its classical Persian name, Shaporgân, meaning "[King] Shapur's town". Shapur was the name of two Sasanian kings, both of whom built a great number of cities. However, Shapur I was the governor of the eastern provinces of the empire, and it is more likely that he is the builder of a roadway between a few important cities. These include Nishapur and Bishapur in Iran, and Peshawar in Pakistan.

Ethnography

[edit]

After Maymana, Sheberghan is the second most populated city run by Uzbeks and Turkmens city in all of Afghanistan. Turkmen is the first language of a majority of its inhabitants. Large numbers of Tajiks, Hazaras, Pashtuns, and Arabs live in the city. In 1856, J. P. Ferrier wrote: "Sheberghān is a town containing 12,000 souls. Uzbeks being in the great majority." According to regional consensus of the Afghan government as of 2020, Turkmens made up majority of the inhabitants.

The Arabs of Sheberghan are mostly Persian-speaking, even though they claim to be of Arab descent, due to religious or historical reasons. There are other such Persian and Pashto-speaking Arabs to the east, with a lot residing in Mazar-i Sharif, Kholm, Kunduz, Kabul, and Jalalabad. Their self-identification as Arabs is largely based on their tribal identity, and may in fact point to the Arab migration of the 7th and 8th centuries migration to this and other Central Asian locales in the wake of the Islamic conquests of the region, as it is traditionally analyzed through their historical lineage.[4]

History

[edit]
Sheberghan palace in 1976
Circular fortress of Yemshi Tepe (to scale), and tumuli of Tillya Tepe, near Sheberghan.

Sheberghān was once a flourishing settlement along the Silk Road. In 1978, Soviet archaeologists discovered the famed Bactrian Gold in the village of Tillia Tepe outside Sheberghān. In the 13th century Marco Polo visited the city and later wrote about its honey-sweet melons. Sheberghān became the capital of an independent Uzbek khanate that was allotted to Afghanistan by the 1873 Anglo-Russian border agreement.

Sheberghān has for millennia been the focal point of power in the northeast corner of Bactria. It still sits astride the main route between Balkh and Herat, and controls the direct route north to the Amu Darya, about 90 km away, as well as the important branch route south to Sar-e Pol.

In 1856, J. P. Ferrier reported:

The town has a citadel, in which the governor Rustem Khan resides, but there are no other fortifications. It is surrounded by good gardens and excellent cultivation. The population of Shibberghan has a high character for bravery, and I may safely say it is one of the finest towns in Turkistan on this side of the Oxus, enjoying, besides its other advantages, an excellent climate. It is, however, subject to one very serious inconvenience: the supply of water, on which all this prosperity depends, comes from the mountains in the Khanat of Sirpool; and as there are frequent disputes between the tribes inhabiting it and those living in the town, a complete interruption of the supply is often threatened, and a war follows, to the very great injury of the place. Shibberghan maintains permanently a force of 2000 horse and 500-foot, but, in case of necessity, the town can arm 6000 men.[5]

The heavily fortified town of Yemshi-tepe, just five kilometres to the northeast of modern Sheberghān, on the road to Akcha, is only about 500 metres (550 yards) from the famous necropolis of Tillia Tepe, where an immense treasure was excavated from the graves of the local royal family by a joint Soviet-Afghan archaeological effort from 1969 to 1979. In 1977, a Soviet-Afghan archaeological team began excavations 5 km north of the town for relics. They uncovered mud-brick columns and a cross-shaped altar of an ancient temple dating back to at least 1000 B.C. Six royal tombs were excavated at Tillia Tepe revealing a vast amount of gold and other treasures. Several coins dated to the early 1st century C.E., with none dated later.

Sheberghān has been proposed as the site of ancient Xidun, one of the five xihou, or divisions, of the early Kushan Empire.[6]

Sheberghān was the stronghold of local Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum while vying with his Tajik rival General Mohammed Atta for control of northern Afghanistan in the early years of the Karzai administration.

Sheberghān was the site of the Dasht-i-Leili massacre in December 2001 during the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in which 250 to 3,000 (depending on sources) Taliban prisoners were shot or suffocated to death in metal truck containers, while being transferred by American and Northern Alliance soldiers from Kunduz to a Sheberghān prison.[7][8]

On 7 August 2021, Taliban forces captured Sheberghan as part of their nationwide military offensive.[9][10]

Land use

[edit]

Sheberghān is a trading and transit hub in northern Afghanistan.[3] Agriculture accounts for 50% of the 7,335 hectares within the municipal boundaries.[3] 23% of the land is residential, and largely clustered in the central area, but well distributed through the four districts.[3]

Climate

[edit]

Sheberghān has a cool, semi-arid climate (Köppen climate classification BSk)[11] with hot summers and chilly, though variable, winters. There is moderate rainfall and some snowfall from January to March, but the rest of the year is dry, especially the summer.

Climate data for Sheberghan
Month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Year
Record high °C (°F) 22.4
(72.3) 		24.2
(75.6) 		30.9
(87.6) 		35.4
(95.7) 		41.5
(106.7) 		46.0
(114.8) 		47.5
(117.5) 		44.3
(111.7) 		40.6
(105.1) 		36.4
(97.5) 		30.6
(87.1) 		25.6
(78.1) 		47.5
(117.5)
Mean daily maximum °C (°F) 6.8
(44.2) 		9.3
(48.7) 		15.8
(60.4) 		23.7
(74.7) 		31.1
(88.0) 		36.9
(98.4) 		38.9
(102.0) 		37.2
(99.0) 		32.0
(89.6) 		24.0
(75.2) 		16.7
(62.1) 		10.6
(51.1) 		23.6
(74.5)
Daily mean °C (°F) 2.0
(35.6) 		4.9
(40.8) 		10.5
(50.9) 		17.3
(63.1) 		23.2
(73.8) 		28.8
(83.8) 		31.0
(87.8) 		28.6
(83.5) 		23.1
(73.6) 		16.4
(61.5) 		10.0
(50.0) 		5.4
(41.7) 		16.8
(62.2)
Mean daily minimum °C (°F) −1.3
(29.7) 		1.3
(34.3) 		5.7
(42.3) 		11.5
(52.7) 		15.1
(59.2) 		19.4
(66.9) 		22.2
(72.0) 		20.0
(68.0) 		15.1
(59.2) 		9.8
(49.6) 		4.6
(40.3) 		1.5
(34.7) 		10.4
(50.7)
Record low °C (°F) −20.5
(−4.9) 		−25.7
(−14.3) 		−9.4
(15.1) 		−7.5
(18.5) 		5.3
(41.5) 		8.5
(47.3) 		12.9
(55.2) 		11.6
(52.9) 		4.3
(39.7) 		−2.4
(27.7) 		−8.5
(16.7) 		−15.0
(5.0) 		−25.7
(−14.3)
Average precipitation mm (inches) 42.3
(1.67) 		44.3
(1.74) 		56.4
(2.22) 		25.9
(1.02) 		11.2
(0.44) 		0.2
(0.01) 		0.0
(0.0) 		0.0
(0.0) 		0.2
(0.01) 		6.6
(0.26) 		13.6
(0.54) 		29.8
(1.17) 		230.5
(9.08)
Average rainy days 5 6 9 6 3 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 38
Average snowy days 5 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 12
Average relative humidity (%) 78 76 71 65 47 34 31 32 35 46 61 74 54
Mean monthly sunshine hours 115.3 124.1 162.3 198.2 297.9 364.3 365.9 346.1 304.6 242.9 175.8 125.7 2,823.1
Source: NOAA (1964-1983)[12]

Economy

[edit]

Sheberghān is surrounded by irrigated agricultural land.

With Soviet assistance, exploitation of Afghanistan's natural gas reserves began in 1967 at the Khowaja Gogerak field, 15 kilometers east of Sheberghān in Jowzjan Province. The field's reserves were thought to be 67 billion cubic meters. In 1967, the Soviets also completed a 100-kilometer gas pipeline linking Keleft in the Soviet Union with Sheberghān.

To demonstrate how natural gas reserves could be used as an alternative to expensive petroleum imports, the United States Department of Defense spent $43 million on a natural gas filling station.[13]

Sheberghān is important to the energy infrastructure of Afghanistan:

See also

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Notes

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References

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Bibliography

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Sheberghan

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Sheberghan, also known as Sheberghān, is the capital city of in northern , located at coordinates 36°40′N 65°45′E and an elevation of 362 meters above . The city, with a projected population of 192,724 in 2020, functions as an administrative and economic hub in a multi-ethnic region dominated by , Turkmen, and . It is surrounded by irrigated agricultural lands supporting local farming, while its economy centers on the exploitation of reserves from the Sheberghan Area conventional gas field, operational since the 1960s with initial Soviet assistance and currently managed by the Afghan Gas Enterprise. Historically, Sheberghan's vicinity to the archaeological site underscores its ancient significance, where excavations in the 1970s uncovered over 20,000 gold ornaments and artifacts from 1st-century CE nomadic burials, reflecting Bactrian cultural exchanges along trade routes. The city's strategic position has also marked it in modern conflicts, including its capture by forces in August 2021 amid the Afghan government's collapse.

Geography

Location and Terrain

Sheberghan serves as the capital of Jowzjan Province in northern Afghanistan, positioned at coordinates 36°40′N 65°45′E near the border with Turkmenistan. The city is situated along the banks of the Safid River (Darya-e-Safid), which originates in the region and flows northward, irrigating local farmlands before drying up at the edge of the Karakum Desert. The terrain surrounding Sheberghan features predominantly flat plains covered in deposits, typical of the northern Afghan lowlands, with the at an elevation of 360 meters above . encompasses approximately 75% flat land and 25% semi-mountainous or mountainous terrain to the south, shaped by extensions of the Mountains and alluvial sediments including clay, silt, sand, and gravel. This semi-desert landscape supports primarily through river-based amidst subtropical conditions.

Climate

Sheberghan features a cold semi-arid climate (Köppen BSk), characterized by hot summers, cold winters, and low annual precipitation concentrated in the cooler months. Average high temperatures peak at 38.9°C in July during the dry summer season, when rainfall is negligible (0 mm in July and August), while lows remain warm at around 22.2°C. Winters are chilly, with January highs averaging 6.8°C and lows dipping to -1.3°C, accompanied by occasional snowfall on about 12 days annually, primarily in January (5 days). Spring brings moderate warming and the bulk of the 231 mm annual precipitation, with March seeing the wettest conditions at 56 mm over 9 rainy days out of 38 total annually. Humidity varies markedly, reaching 78% in January but dropping to 31% in July, reflecting the arid continental influences of the region's steppe environment. Sunshine hours are abundant in summer (up to 12.1 hours daily in June) but limited in winter (4.1 hours in December), contributing to the stark seasonal diurnal temperature swings typical of northern Afghanistan's plains. These patterns stem from the area's inland location, distant from moderating oceanic influences, resulting in low overall moisture and reliance on winter frontal systems for precipitation.

Natural Resources and Land Use

Sheberghan, located in Jowzjan Province, holds significant natural gas reserves, primarily in the Sheberghan Basin and surrounding fields such as Toti-Maidan and Yatimtaq, with estimated recoverable volumes reaching up to 5 trillion cubic feet across the province. Extraction efforts have intensified recently, including a $1 billion contract signed in October 2024 with a Uzbek company for exploration and production at the Toti-Maidan field, and practical operations commencing in September 2025. Natural gas from these fields supports local infrastructure, including the 200 MW Bayat Natural Gas Power Plant operational since 2018, which utilizes regional supplies for electricity generation. Limited petroleum resources also exist in the area, though gas dominates hydrocarbon production. Mining activities in Jowzjan contribute to provincial , with the local mines department reporting increased collections from operations involving minerals like and industrial materials, though specific outputs remain modest compared to gas. Natural gas processing and transmission infrastructure, including wells and pipelines, occupy dedicated land in the Sheberghan vicinity, with environmental assessments emphasizing sustainable resource use to mitigate impacts on local ecosystems. Land use in the region is predominantly agricultural and , though constrained by semi-arid conditions and recurrent droughts; approximately 48% of residents in Jowzjan derive primary income from farming excluding , focusing on crops such as amid challenges. Persistent shortages and pests have reduced yields in recent years, prompting calls for support from farmers in around Sheberghan. Gas fields and related facilities cover specialized industrial zones, while broader areas feature sparse and limited tree cover, reflecting low vegetative density typical of northern Afghanistan's terrain. rearing supplements , with overall land allocation prioritizing rain-fed and irrigated plots where feasible.

Demographics

Ethnic Composition and Social Structure

Sheberghan, the capital of , reflects the province's ethnic diversity, with comprising approximately 50% of the population, primarily Sunni Muslims who speak Uzbek and engage in farming and trade. form the next largest group at around 30%, also Sunni Muslims speaking Turkmen, historically semi-nomadic herders and traders who maintain distinct tribal identities descended from Oghuz Turkic tribes. account for about 15%, speaking and involved in agriculture and commerce, while make up roughly 5%, predominantly Shia Muslims speaking Hazaragi. Smaller communities include , (some claiming descent from historical Arab settlers but often Persian-speaking), Aimaqs, Balochis, and , alongside nomadic Kuchi groups. Social structure in Sheberghan and Jowzjan centers on networks and multi-generational households, which serve as the primary units for economic support, protection, and decision-making, with average family sizes ranging from 5.5 among to 6.2 among . Among the dominant and Turkmen populations, organization remains tribal and clan-based, with loyalties tied to genealogies traced patrilineally and local elders wielding influence over disputes and alliances. These structures historically facilitated semi-nomadic and but have adapted to sedentary urban life in Sheberghan, the province's commercial hub. Ethnic affiliations often supersede broader national ties, shaping political mobilization and resource access, as seen in Uzbek involvement in northern alliances and Turkmen neutrality in past conflicts. Inter-ethnic marriages occur but remain limited, reinforcing group and cultural preservation.

Population Dynamics

The population of Sheberghan was recorded at 19,511 in 's 1979 national census, the last comprehensive enumeration conducted in the country. By 2017, estimates from the Central Statistics Organization (now part of the National Statistics and Information Authority) indicated a of 184,964, reflecting nearly tenfold growth over nearly four decades. This expansion equates to an average annual growth rate exceeding 7%, attributable to sustained high fertility rates characteristic of rural Afghan demographics, repatriation of refugees following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the fall of the regime in 2001, and net in-migration drawn by employment in the province's extraction industry. Projections for the Sheberghan capital district reached 192,724 by 2020, based on National Statistics and Information Authority models incorporating vital registration and sample surveys amid the absence of updated censuses. Within , of which Sheberghan constitutes the largest urban center, approximately 22% of the 579,833 residents in lived in urban areas, underscoring the city's role as a migration hub from surrounding rural districts. Conflict-induced displacements have intermittently disrupted this trajectory; for instance, around 15,000 persons were displaced into the province in the two years prior to due to insecurity elsewhere in northern . As of 2022, Jowzjan's provincial population was estimated at around 800,000, with internally displaced persons accounting for roughly 7.5% and returnees from abroad or other regions comprising 13%, highlighting persistent volatility from ongoing instability and economic pressures such as . These inflows have strained local resources, including water and health services, while out-migration to neighboring countries or urban centers like persists among youth seeking better prospects. Data reliability remains limited by the lack of post-1979 censuses, reliance on projections vulnerable to underreporting in conflict zones, and challenges in tracking nomadic or displaced groups.

Etymology

Origins of the Name

The name Sheberghan derives from the Šābuhrgān (or Shapurgān), signifying "town of Shapur" or "[King] Shapur's town," in reference to a Sasanian ruler. This etymology reflects the city's historical ties to the (224–651 CE), during which Persian kings bearing the name Shapur—particularly (r. 309–379 CE), who conducted military campaigns extending into eastern territories encompassing modern northern —likely established or patronized settlements in the region to consolidate control over Central Asian frontiers. Phonetic evolution occurred as the name passed through Turkic and Arabic linguistic influences following the Sasanian decline and subsequent Islamic conquests, yielding variants like Shaburghan or Shebirghan in medieval sources such as those by geographers (d. 1229 CE). These adaptations retained the core Šābuhr- element, denoting royal foundation, while adapting to local Uzbek and pronunciations dominant in by the medieval period. No primary archaeological inscriptions directly confirm the Sasanian attribution, but the toponym's persistence aligns with patterns of Persian imperial naming in conquered or administered territories, as seen in other gān suffixes (e.g., denoting "place of").

History

Pre-Modern Period

The region around Sheberghan formed part of ancient , a culturally rich area known for its position astride trade routes linking the Mediterranean, , and . Archaeological excavations at , situated approximately 20 kilometers north of Sheberghan in , uncovered six elite burials dating to the CE, during a transitional phase between the and the early . These tombs, belonging to nomadic aristocrats, contained over 20,000 gold and silver artifacts, including jewelry, weapons, and horse harnesses, which exhibit syncretic styles blending Hellenistic, Iranian, and steppe nomadic elements, indicative of the area's role in facilitating cultural and economic exchanges along proto-Silk Road paths. Prominent finds from include folding crowns with lunar and solar motifs, as well as a featuring opium poppy capsule pendants from tomb 2, associated with a noblewoman aged around 20-30 years. Residue analysis on these pendants and related artifacts confirms the presence of alkaloids, pointing to the cultural and possibly medicinal significance of in the region's elite society by the CE. Such evidence underscores Sheberghan's oasis location as a hub for , , and transregional in commodities like narcotics, metals, and textiles. Adjacent sites like Yemshi Tepe reveal fortified structures suggesting defensive settlements from potentially earlier epochs, such as the Achaemenid Persian period (6th-4th centuries BCE) or Hellenistic era following the Great's conquest of in 329 BCE. These fortifications align with 's historical role as a Persian satrapy valued for its irrigation-based and strategic passes, which supported urban centers and outposts amid interactions with Central Asian nomads. By the early centuries CE, the area's integration into broader empires facilitated the persistence of settled communities amid shifting nomadic influences, though detailed records of continuous occupation at Sheberghan proper remain sparse prior to Islamic times.

19th and Early 20th Centuries

During the mid-18th century, Sheberghan emerged as the capital of an independent , established around 1751 amid the decline of larger Central Asian polities following the fragmentation of the Uzbek confederations. This , centered in the fertile plains of what is now , was governed by local Uzbek mirs who exercised control over Turkmen and other Turkic tribes, maintaining autonomy through alliances and tribute systems with neighboring powers like . The region's strategic position along trade routes facilitated economic activity, though it remained peripheral to the major Afghan emirates in and during the turbulent period. The khanate's independence ended in 1873, when the Anglo-Russian border agreement—aimed at demarcating spheres of influence to prevent direct confrontation between the and —awarded Sheberghan and surrounding territories to the . This delineation placed northern , including Sheberghan, firmly under Kabul's nominal , though local Uzbek rulers initially retained authority amid the weak central control following the Afghan Civil War (1863–1868). Under (r. 1880–1901), known as the "Iron Amir," Sheberghan was integrated more tightly into the state through military campaigns that subdued northern principalities and tribal resistances. In 1881, Abdur Rahman suppressed Uzbek uprisings across northern , employing harsh measures such as executing rebel leaders by cannon to break local autonomy and enforce taxation and conscription. These efforts centralized administration in Jowzjan, transforming Sheberghan from a seat into a provincial outpost loyal to , with Uzbek elites co-opted into the emir's bureaucracy. In the early 20th century, during the reigns of (r. 1901–1919) and (r. 1919–1929), Sheberghan experienced relative stability as part of , avoiding direct involvement in the Third (1919). Tribal structures persisted among its Uzbek and Turkmen inhabitants, supporting agriculture and minor trade, while Kabul's modernization initiatives—such as limited infrastructure development—had minimal impact on the remote north before Amanullah's in 1929. The region remained insulated from British incursions, reflecting its position beyond the primary theaters of Anglo-Afghan conflicts.

Soviet Influence and Civil War Era

During the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989), Sheberghan emerged as a stronghold for pro-communist Afghan forces in northern , bolstered by Soviet military and economic interests in Jowzjan province's fields near the city. , an ethnic Uzbek from the region who had begun his career in a state-owned gas refinery in Sheberghan in 1970 before enlisting in the Afghan army, rose rapidly through the ranks by organizing local militias loyal to the communist government. By the mid-1980s, Dostum commanded the Jowzjani militia, which effectively suppressed activities in the province, maintaining control over key infrastructure and the border with Soviet despite widespread rural resistance elsewhere in the country. Soviet forces integrated Dostum's irregular units into formal structures, formalizing them as the 53rd Infantry Division headquartered in Sheberghan, numbering up to 40,000 fighters by the late 1980s and equipped with Soviet weaponry including tanks and artillery. This division conducted operations that secured gas extraction sites vital for Soviet energy needs, with production from the Sheberghan fields continuing amid the occupation. As Soviet troops withdrew under the Accords in –, the 53rd Division assumed primary responsibility for defending the northern front against advances, sustaining the Najibullah regime's hold on Jowzjan even as other regions collapsed into rebellion. Following the Soviet exit, Sheberghan remained under Dostum's control as part of the communist government's collapsing defenses, but in May 1992, he defected to the mujahideen coalition, aligning his forces with Ahmad Shah Massoud and others to overthrow Najibullah in Kabul. This shift enabled Dostum to consolidate power in the north, founding the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (Junbish-i-Milli) and using Sheberghan as its political and military base, where he governed through ethnic Uzbek tribal networks and former communist loyalists. During the ensuing Afghan Civil War (1992–1996), Dostum's militias clashed with factions led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and others vying for Kabul, while defending Jowzjan against Islamist incursions, though internal alliances shifted amid resource scarcity and power vacuums. By the mid-1990s, escalating factional violence drew Sheberghan into broader northern skirmishes, with Dostum's forces repelling probes from emerging groups while navigating uneasy pacts with the Rabbani government. The city's strategic gas infrastructure and Dostum's command of heavy armor provided a defensive edge, allowing relative stability in Jowzjan compared to chaotic , though reports of abuses and forced marked the era. This period solidified Sheberghan's role as a semi-autonomous enclave under rule, reliant on and aid to sustain operations amid national fragmentation.

Post-2001 Conflicts and Taliban Resurgence

Following the U.S.-led overthrow of the regime in late 2001, Abdul Rashid Dostum's Junbish forces, allied with commanders and American special operations units, secured Sheberghan as a key northern stronghold against residual elements. The city served as Dostum's operational base, hosting militia units that conducted counterinsurgency patrols and maintained control over amid the initial phase of NATO's (ISAF) deployment. Relative calm prevailed in Sheberghan during the mid-2000s, as activity concentrated in Pashtun-dominated southern and eastern regions, though sporadic attacks on supply routes highlighted growing insurgent ambitions in the north. By 2011, the Taliban intensified efforts in Jowzjan through "Operation Badr," establishing shadow governance in rural districts like Khamab and Aqcha while launching ambushes near Sheberghan to disrupt Afghan National Army (ANA) convoys. Dostum's militias, integrated loosely into the ANA structure, repelled multiple assaults, but recruitment among disenfranchised locals and cross-border support from enabled sustained pressure. Escalation peaked in 2017–2018, with insurgents overrunning an ANA base in Aqcha district on October 29, 2019, killing dozens of government forces and prompting airstrikes that temporarily halted advances. Dostum, then first until fleeing rape allegations in 2017, directed reinforcements from Sheberghan, yet provincial forces suffered from desertions and supply shortages, allowing control over 40–50% of Jowzjan's territory by 2020. The 's resurgence culminated in the offensive following the U.S.- withdrawal agreement. in Jowzjan disintegrated rapidly due to collapsed morale, unpaid salaries, and absent , enabling insurgents to encircle Sheberghan by early August. On August 7, , fighters overran the city after minimal resistance from the ANA and police, capturing the provincial capital—the second to fall after —and Dostum's former palace, which they converted into a military barracks. This swift takeover reflected broader systemic failures in the Afghan republic's defense apparatus, including ethnic fractures that undermined unified command in Uzbek-majority areas like Sheberghan.

Economy

Energy Resources

Sheberghan, the capital of , serves as the epicenter of Afghanistan's production, with key fields including Jorqaduk, Khowaja Gogerak, and Yatimtaq located within approximately 20 miles of the city. These fields were discovered during Soviet-era exploration in the and , leading to initial production that supplied domestic needs and exports to the via pipeline until the withdrawal in 1989. Post-1989 disruptions halted large-scale output due to conflict, though intermittent extraction occurred; by 2020, operations resumed at a Sheberghan field well at 1,500 meters depth, yielding 150,000 cubic meters daily. Current production from the Sheberghan fields supports local power generation and (CNG) stations, with potential output estimated at up to 500,000 cubic meters per day, though the gas is sour and requires processing. Infrastructure developments include the Sheberghan-Mazar-i-Sharif gas , initiated in 2023 to double capacity and enhance supply to northern regions, alongside amine treatment plants for gas purification. In , adjacent Toti-Maidan fields are undergoing exploration and extraction under a 25-year with an Uzbek firm, aiming to reduce import dependence and enable exports, with investments projected at $1 billion over ten years as of 2024. While dominates, minor oil reserves exist in northern Jowzjan, contributing to broader Basin potential assessed by international surveys, though development lags due to and technical challenges. No significant renewable or coal resources are documented specifically in the Sheberghan area, with energy focus remaining on extraction amid Afghanistan's overall reserves of approximately 16 trillion cubic feet of nationwide.

Agriculture and Trade

Agriculture in Jowzjan Province, centered around Sheberghan, relies primarily on the cultivation of staple crops such as , , corn, , and , which form the backbone of local farming activities. Approximately 80% of the province's population is engaged in and livestock rearing, with fertile lands along the River supporting irrigated and rain-fed systems despite a . Winter grains like dominate production in northern , including Jowzjan, contributing to national efforts. Livestock integration, including forage crops, complements crop farming and provides supplementary income through dairy and wool products. Recurrent droughts pose severe challenges to agricultural output, with leading to significant losses; for instance, in 2023, about 70% of crops in Jowzjan were reported destroyed due to insufficient , exacerbating dependency on neighboring provinces for . Similar threats persisted into 2025, threatening yields amid pest infestations and limited . Efforts to mitigate these include recent infrastructure developments, such as the of a 100-metric-ton standard cold storage facility for fruits in Sheberghan, completed in September 2025 at a exceeding 33 million Afghanis, aimed at preserving produce like melons and grapes to enable better market timing and pricing for local gardeners. Trade in Sheberghan revolves around local bazaars where agricultural goods, including grains, , and fruits, are exchanged, serving as a regional hub due to the city's proximity to and borders. , a key , supports ginning and textile-related activities with potential for export to Central Asian markets, though volumes remain modest compared to energy exports from the province. Processed agricultural products, such as fruits and derivatives, contribute to informal cross-border , bolstered by programs like the Regional Agricultural Development Program-North, which targeted productivity gains in Jowzjan to enhance and profitability. Overall, while agriculture sustains livelihoods for nearly half of residents, is constrained by gaps and environmental vulnerabilities, limiting export scale beyond subsistence and regional exchanges.

Post-2021 Economic Challenges

Following the takeover in August 2021, Sheberghan and encountered acute economic contraction, aligned with the national GDP decline of approximately 27 percent, driven by the collapse of international aid, asset freezes, and disrupted banking operations. Local in Sheberghan, historically tied to gas-related industries and cross-border trade with , stagnated amid liquidity shortages that prevented businesses from accessing funds or importing goods. surged, particularly among former workers and youth, as jobs evaporated and private enterprises scaled back due to Taliban-imposed restrictions on financial transactions and women's participation in the workforce. The province's fields, centered around Sheberghan and supplying most of Afghanistan's domestic needs, grappled with underutilization owing to obsolete pipelines, insufficient , and barriers to foreign from sanctions and non-recognition of the regime. Production hovered at low levels—around 200-300 million cubic meters annually pre-takeover, with no significant increase immediately after 2021—exacerbating regional despite untapped reserves estimated in trillions of cubic meters. Efforts by the -controlled Afghan Gas Enterprise to sustain output were hampered by technical gaps and illicit diversions, though contracts signed in 2024 with Turkish firms for new wells and Uzbek partners for the Totimaidan field signal attempts to revive extraction, potentially yielding 100 megawatts of power generation. Agricultural productivity in Jowzjan, dependent on , , and , deteriorated further from recurrent droughts, reduced access, and disrupted supply chains, compounding food insecurity for rural populations around Sheberghan. These pressures fueled , culminating in protests in Jowzjan in late July 2024 over soaring living costs, joblessness, and inadequate Taliban responses to economic woes. National poverty rates climbed from 44 percent in 2021 to over 65 percent by , with similar trends in the province hindering recovery despite modest GDP growth of 2.5 percent in , which failed to improve household welfare amid persistent and aid dependency.

Politics and Governance

Ethnic and Tribal Power Dynamics

Sheberghan, as the capital of , reflects the province's ethnic composition, which is dominated by and Turkmen, comprising the majority of the population alongside smaller , Tajik, and other minorities. form the largest group, estimated at over 40% in the province, with Turkmen also significant, particularly in rural districts, while constitute a minority often concentrated in urban or specific enclaves. This demographic reality has historically shaped local power structures, where Uzbek and Turkmen communities leveraged ethnic militias and alliances to maintain influence against central Pashtun-dominated governments in . Prior to the 2021 Taliban resurgence, ethnic power dynamics in Sheberghan emphasized Uzbek-Turkmen solidarity, enabling control over local , , and through non-state armed groups rooted in communal ties rather than formalized tribal confederacies typical of Pashtun regions. These groups often mediated disputes via and clan networks, fostering stability amid national fragmentation but also perpetuating patronage-based authority. Pashtun minorities, while integrated in trade, held limited political sway, reflecting the north's resistance to Pashtun-centric policies. Following the 's August 2021 takeover, power shifted toward Pashtun-led administration, marginalizing Uzbek and Turkmen elites despite their demographic weight, leading to reported evictions of over 1,000 Uzbek and Turkmen families in Jowzjan by late 2023. Arrests of ethnic Uzbek commanders, such as in early 2022, sparked localized clashes, underscoring tensions between Taliban centralization and entrenched ethnic autonomies. Tribal elements remain secondary, with dynamics driven more by ethnic identity and militia legacies than Pashtun-style tribal jirgas, though inter-ethnic accommodations persist to mitigate insurgency risks from groups like ISKP.

Influence of Abdul Rashid Dostum

, an ethnic Uzbek born in 1954 in Khwaja Du Koh village near Sheberghan, initiated his rise to prominence in by joining the state-owned gas refinery in the city around 1970, where he engaged in union activities amid the government's arming of workers against threats. By the early 1980s, he had assembled and commanded a of over 20,000 fighters, predominantly recruited from Jowzjan's Uzbek population, which operated as the 53rd Division under Soviet support and effectively countered insurgent advances in northern Afghanistan. Dostum's forces, including Unit 374 stationed in Jowzjan, distinguished themselves as one of the communist regime's most reliable units, securing control over Sheberghan and surrounding gas fields that provided economic leverage through resource extraction and export revenues funneled to his network. After the 1992 collapse of the Najibullah government, Dostum consolidated authority in Sheberghan as the base for his Junbish-i Milli (National Islamic Movement), exercising governance through armed patronage that distributed food, fuel, and protection to local communities, thereby embedding his influence in the region's tribal and economic fabric. This control extended to printing currency for local use and maintaining militias that defended against incursions, preserving Sheberghan's status as a northern stronghold until temporary losses in the late . Post-2001, as first under multiple administrations, Dostum retained sway in Jowzjan via Junbish loyalists who dominated provincial politics and security, including the construction of a fortified in Sheberghan symbolizing his enduring power projection. Dostum's influence manifested in ethnic mobilization, rallying —who form the majority in Jowzjan—to counter Pashtun-dominated central governance and threats, while his return in August 2021 to personally lead defenses in Sheberghan highlighted the city's role as his political and military before its fall on August 7, 2021. This system, reliant on resource rents and enforcement, shaped Sheberghan's stability amid national turmoil but also perpetuated localized power asymmetries favoring Dostum's allies.

Taliban Administration

The Taliban captured Sheberghan, the capital of , on August 7, 2021, marking the second provincial capital to fall during their rapid offensive against the Afghan government forces. The city, historically a stronghold associated with Uzbek , saw minimal reported resistance as government troops withdrew, allowing fighters to occupy key sites including the governor's office. Post-takeover administration in Sheberghan operates under the ’s centralized Islamic Emirate structure, with provincial governance directed from and enforced through sharia-based courts and security apparatus. The appointed a series of governors for Jowzjan, reflecting efforts to consolidate control in a non-Pashtun dominated region; by April 2025, Gol Haidar Shafaq held the position, overseeing local offices in Sheberghan. Key activities include routine enforcement of decrees on moral policing, restrictions on women's public roles, and implementation for former officials, though selective purges persist to eliminate perceived loyalties to the prior regime—such as the dismissal of 211 former police and administrative employees in July 2025. Security under Taliban rule in Sheberghan has focused on countering residual threats from Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-K), which historically contested northern areas including Jowzjan, though no major IS-K incursions in the city have been reported since 2021. The governor's office has engaged in limited external outreach, exemplified by hosting a Turkish clerical in Sheberghan in 2025 to discuss religious and cultural ties. Overall, administration emphasizes ideological uniformity and resource extraction from local gas fields, with reports indicating stabilized basic order compared to pre-2021 factional violence, albeit at the cost of curtailed .

Controversies and Conflicts

Dasht-i-Leili Massacre

The Dasht-i-Leili massacre occurred in late November 2001, shortly after the Northern Alliance captured Mazar-i-Sharif from Taliban control on November 9. Forces under General Abdul Rashid Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek warlord allied with the United States, took custody of approximately 2,000 surrendering Taliban prisoners, including many foreign fighters from Arab, Pakistani, Chechen, and Uzbek backgrounds. These prisoners were transported from the Sheberghan area in sealed metal shipping containers loaded onto trucks, leading to widespread suffocation due to lack of air; survivors who reached the Dasht-i-Leili desert site were reportedly shot or beaten to death by Dostum's militiamen. Casualty estimates vary, with a 2002 U.S. State Department report citing around 1,500 deaths, while (PHR) assessments suggest up to 2,000 based on witness accounts and site analysis. In 2002, PHR forensic teams exhumed remains from a near Sheberghan, conducting autopsies on three bodies that confirmed death by asphyxiation consistent with overcrowding in sealed containers; later documented efforts to conceal the site with bulldozers. Dostum's forces denied intentional killings, attributing deaths to accidental suffocation or combat-related causes, though multiple eyewitness reports from survivors and locals described deliberate overcrowding and executions. U.S. operatives, embedded with Dostum's troops as part of , witnessed the prisoners' transport conditions but prioritized maintaining the alliance against the , providing no intervention despite Geneva Convention obligations for prisoner welfare. Early inquiries by the FBI, International Committee of the Red Cross, and groups were discouraged by the Bush administration, citing Dostum's CIA payments and the need to stabilize post- governance under . In 2009, President Obama directed a of the incident and alleged cover-up, but no full public investigation or prosecutions followed, with the later closing the matter without releasing details. PHR and other organizations continue to classify the events as a potential , urging Afghan authorities to secure the site and pursue accountability.

Warlordism and Human Rights Abuses

, an ethnic Uzbek strongman, established de facto control over Sheberghan and through his Junbish-i-Milli since the late , exemplifying warlordism characterized by personal loyalty networks, private armies, and opportunistic alliances rather than accountable . This system prioritized ethnic Uzbek dominance, often marginalizing and other groups, with militias enforcing rule through intimidation and extralegal means, undermining central state authority even during periods of nominal government oversight. Human rights abuses under Dostum's influence in the region included targeted violence against perceived rivals and ethnic minorities, particularly , following the 2001 U.S.-led ouster of the . Reports documented killings, rapes, arbitrary detentions, looting, and forced displacements by Junbish forces in northern areas including Jowzjan, often as reprisals for Taliban affiliations. In one prominent case in November 2016, Dostum's guards abducted Ahmad Ishchi, the former Jowzjan governor and a political rival, subjecting him to severe beatings, with a barrel, and other tortures in a private detention site near Sheberghan, actions that highlighted within structures. Such patterns persisted despite international scrutiny, with Dostum's militias integrated into official forces yet retaining operational autonomy, enabling continued abuses like village terrorization and land grabs. and other monitors attributed these violations to weak accountability mechanisms, noting that perpetrators rarely faced prosecution, perpetuating cycles of ethnic tension and local resentment. In 2020, Dostum received Afghanistan's highest amid unresolved accusations spanning decades, underscoring the entrenchment of warlord .

Recent Developments

Taliban Takeover and Aftermath

The captured Sheberghan, the capital of , on August 7, 2021, marking the second provincial capital to fall to the group within 24 hours during their nationwide offensive. The militants overran the city after heavy fighting that included temporary seizure of the governor's compound on , followed by the withdrawal of Afghan government . Local officials, including the deputy governor, confirmed the 's control, with reports indicating minimal prolonged resistance in the urban center compared to surrounding districts. In the immediate aftermath, Taliban forces consolidated authority by securing key sites such as government buildings and imposing their administrative structure, aligning with broader provincial governance under appointed emirs. No large-scale organized resistance emerged in Sheberghan post-takeover, unlike in areas such as Panjshir Province, though sporadic clashes with remnants of pro-government militias occurred in Jowzjan's rural districts into late 2021. The city's fall facilitated Taliban advances northward, contributing to the collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces in the region. Under Taliban rule as of 2025, Sheberghan has seen enforcement of strict Islamic edicts, including public floggings ordered by local courts; on February 28, 2025, the Jowzjan governor's office announced the whipping of 13 individuals—five women and eight men—for offenses such as and , conducted openly in the city. This reflects the regime's emphasis on punishments, with no verified reports of significant local uprisings or external interventions disrupting control. Economic stagnation and dependency, tied to national sanctions and isolation, have affected the area, though specific data on Sheberghan's post-2021 metrics remains limited amid restricted reporting.

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