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Southern Cameroons
Southern Cameroons
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The Southern Cameroons was the southern part of the British League of Nations mandate territory of the British Cameroons in West Africa. Since 1961, it has been part of the Republic of Cameroon, where it makes up the Northwest Region and Southwest Region. Since 1994, pressure groups in the territory claim there was no legal document (treaty of union) in accordance to UNGA RES 1608(XV) paragraph 5, and are seeking to restore statehood and independence from the Republic. They renamed the British Southern Cameroons as Ambazonia (from Ambas Bay).

Key Information

History

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League of Nations mandate

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Following the Treaty of Versailles, the German territory of Kamerun was divided on 28 June 1919, between a French and a British League of Nations Mandate, the French, who had previously administered the whole occupied territory, getting the larger. The French mandate was known as Cameroun. The British mandate comprised two adjacent territories, Northern Cameroons and Southern Cameroons. They were administered from, but not joined to, the British territory of Nigeria through the British Resident (although some incumbents had the rank of District Officer, Senior Resident or Deputy Resident) with headquarters in Buea.

Applying the principle of indirect rule, the British allowed native authorities to administer populations according to their own traditions. These also collected taxes, which were then paid over to the British. The British devoted themselves to trade and to exploiting mining resources of the territory. South Cameroons students, including Emmanuel Mbela Lifafa Endeley, created the Cameroons Youth League (CYL) on 27 March 1940, to oppose what they saw as the exploitation of their country.

  • Delegates to the Bamenda conference on the future constitution of Southern Cameroons in front of the Bamenda social centre in May 1956.
    Delegates to the Bamenda conference on the future constitution of Southern Cameroons in front of the Bamenda social centre in May 1956.

Trust territory

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When the League of Nations ceased to exist in 1946, most of the mandate territories were reclassified as UN trust territories, henceforth administered through the UN Trusteeship Council. The object of trusteeship was to prepare the lands for eventual independence. The United Nations approved the Trusteeship Agreements for British Cameroons to be governed by Britain on 6 December 1946.

Southern Cameroons was divided in 1949 into two provinces: Bamenda (capital Bamenda, hence also thus named) and Southern (capital Buea). Yet the residential type of administration was continued with a single British Resident at Buea, but in 1949 Edward John Gibbons was appointed Special Resident, and on 1 October 1954, when political power shifted to the elected government, succeeded himself as first of only two commissioners.

Temporary Flag of British Southern Cameroons after its separation from Nigeria.

[1]

Following the Ibadan General Conference of 1950, a new constitution for Nigeria devolved more power to the regions. In the subsequent election thirteen Southern Cameroonian representatives were elected to the Eastern Nigerian House of Assembly in Enugu. In 1953, however, the Southern Cameroons representatives, unhappy with the domineering attitude of Nigerian politicians and lack of unity among the ethnic groups in the Eastern Region, declared a "benevolent neutrality" and withdrew from the assembly. At a conference in London from 30 July to 22 August 1953, the Southern Cameroons delegation asked for a separate region of its own. The British agreed, and Southern Cameroons became an autonomous region with its capital still at Buea. Elections were held in 1954 and the parliament met on 1 October 1954, with E.M.L. Endeley as Premier. As Cameroun and Nigeria prepared for Independence, South Cameroons nationalists debated whether their best interests lay with union with Cameroun, union with Nigeria or total independence. Endeley was defeated in elections on 1 February 1959 by John Ngu Foncha.

Referendums were held in 1959 and 1961 in the Cameroons to determine union with Nigeria or Cameroun. In 1961, Northern Cameroons voted for union with Nigeria and Southern Cameroons for union with (the formerly French) Cameroun.

Integration into Cameroon

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Main article: West Cameroon

Despite being united, the Anglophones in Cameroon did not feel represented in government politics.[4] In 1993, the All Anglophone Conference argued at their meeting that "the 1961 Foumban Accord. . .was hardly represented by the Francophone majority who ultimately scrapped the Federal Constitution and replaced it with a Unitary Constitution."[4] The Foumban Accord "was the basis of Cameroon's post-independence Federal Constitution".[4]

  • Augustine N. Jua's cabinet, 1965.
    Augustine N. Jua's cabinet, 1965.

Ambazonian independence movement

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Main article: Ambazonia
Flag of the Ambazonian independence movement.

Southern Cameroons became part of Cameroon on 1 October 1961. Foncha served as Prime Minister of West Cameroun and vice-president of the Federal Republic of Cameroun. However, the English-speaking peoples of the Southern Cameroons (now West Cameroun) did not believe that they were fairly treated by the French-speaking government of the country. Following a referendum on 20 May 1972, a new constitution was adopted in Cameroun which replaced the federal state with a unitary state. Southern Cameroons lost its autonomous status and became the Northwest Province and Southwest Province of the Republic of Cameroun. The Southern Cameroonians felt further marginalised. Groups such as the Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM) demanded greater autonomy, or independence, for the provinces.[citation needed]

States and Counties of Ambazaonia. Proposed by the Ambazonian IG.[5]

Pro-independence groups claim that UN Resolution 1608 21 April 1961, which required the UK, the Government of the Southern Cameroons and Republic of Cameroun to engage in talks with a view to agreeing measures for union of the two countries, was not implemented, and that the Government of the United Kingdom was negligent in terminating its trusteeship without ensuring that proper arrangements were made. They say that the adoption of a federal constitution by Cameroun on 1 September 1961 constituted annexation of the Southern Cameroons.

Representatives of Anglophone groups convened the first All Anglophone Conference (AAC1) in Buea from 2 April to 3 April 1993. The conference issued the "Buea Declaration", which called for constitutional amendments to restore the 1961 federation. This was followed by the second All Anglophone Conference (AAC2) in Bamenda in 1994. This conference issued the "Bamenda Declaration", which stated that if the federal state was not restored within a reasonable time, Southern Cameroons would declare its independence. The AAC was renamed the Southern Cameroons Peoples Conference (SCPC), and later the Southern Cameroons Peoples Organisation (SCAPO), with the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) as the executive governing body. Younger activists formed the Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL) in Buea on 28 May 1995. The SCNC sent a delegation, led by John Foncha, to the United Nations, which was received on 1 June 1995 and presented a petition against the 'annexation' of the Southern Cameroons by French Cameroun. This was followed by a signature referendum the same year, which the organisers claim produced a 99% vote in favour of independence with 315,000 people voting.[6]

Armed members of the SCNC took over the Buea radio station in Southwest Province on the night of 30 December 1999 and in the early hours of 31 December broadcast a tape of a proclamation of independence read by Judge Ebong Frederick Alobwede.

Amnesty International has accused the Cameroun authorities of human right violations against Southern Cameroons activists.

Southern Cameroons, since then renamed to Ambazonia, is a member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) since 2005 and a charter member of the Organization of Emerging African States (OEAS).

Ambazonia County
County Capital Area (km2)[7]
Fako Victoria 2,093
Meme Kumba 3,105
Ndian Mundemba 6,626
Kupenguba Bangem 3,404
Lebialem Menji 617
Manyu Mamfe 9,565
Momo Mbengwi 1,792
Mezam Bamenda 1,745
Ngo-Ketundjia Ndop 1,126
Builand Kumbo 2,297
Boyo Fundong 1,592
Menchum Wum 4,469
Mantungia Nkambe 4,279
State Capital Area (km2) Population (2015)[8][9]
Equatoria (Atlantic) Kumba 15,228 2,618,138
Midland Widikum 13,719 2,454,795
Savannah Kumbo 13,763 2,733,032
F.R.A. Buea 42, 710 7,805,965

Complaint with the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights

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On 9 January 2003, the SCNC and SCAPO filed a complaint with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights against the Republic of Cameroun.[10] Among other allegations, the complainants alleged that the Republic of Cameroun is illegally occupying the territory of Southern Cameroons. The Complainants alleged that the Republic of Cameroon has violated Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7(1), 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17(1), 19, 20, 21, 22, 23(1), 24 of the African Charter.[11] The SCNC and SCAPO ultimately seek the independence of the territory of Southern Cameroons.[12] In a decision reached at its 45th Ordinary Session on 27 May 2009,[13] the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights found that the Republic of Cameroun has violated Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7(1), 10, 11, 19 and 26 the Charter. The Human Rights Commission determined that Articles 12, 13, 17(1), 20, 21, 22, 23(1) and 24 have not been violated.

The Human Rights Commission further recognized that under the African Charter and broad international law, Southern Cameroons meets the definition of a "people" under international law "because they manifest numerous characteristics and affinities, which include a common history, linguistic tradition, territorial connection, and political outlook". The Human Rights Commission declared itself incompetent rationae temporis, to rule on allegations that occurred prior to 18 December 1989, date on which the African Charter came into force for the Respondent State (Republic of Cameroun). Hence, the Human Rights Commission declared itself incompetent to rule on the complainants' allegations with respect to events that occurred from the 1961 United Nations plebiscite to 1972 when the Federal and Union Constitutions were adopted to form the United Republic of Cameroon during which the Complainants claim the Respondent State (Republic of Cameroun) "...established its colonial rule there, complete with its structures, and its administrative, military and police personnel, applying a system and operating in a language alien to the Southern Cameroon." The Human Rights Commission stated, however, that, if the Complainants can establish that any violation committed before 18 December 1989 continued thereafter, then the Commission shall have competence to examine it.

The Human Rights Commission addressed the question, whether the people of Southern Cameroons are entitled to the right to self-determination contextualizing the question by dealing, not with the 1961 UN Plebiscite, or the 1972 Unification, but rather the events of 1993 and 1994 on the constitutional demands vis-à-vis the claim for the right to self-determination of the Southern Cameroonian people. The Human Rights Commission stated that to invoke Self Determination as prescribed by Article 20 the African Charter, the Complainant must satisfy the Commission that the two conditions under Article 20(2), namely oppression and domination have been met. Based on events that occurred after 18 December 1989, the Human Rights Commission noted that the Complainants have not demonstrated if these conditions have been met to warrant invoking the right to self-determination. The Human Rights Commission also noted that in their submission, the Respondent State (Republic of Cameroun) implicitly accepted that self-determination may be exercisable by the Complainants on condition that they establish cases of massive violations of human rights or denial of participation in public affairs.

The Human Rights Commission noted that autonomy within a sovereign state is acceptable, in the context of self-government, confederacy, or federation while preserving the territorial integrity of a State party, can be exercised under the African Charter.

The Human Rights Commission recommended that the Respondent State (Republic of Cameroun) should among other things enter into constructive dialogue with the Complainants, and in particular SCNC and SCAPO, to resolve the constitutional issues, as well as grievances.

Bakassi Peninsula

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Main article: Bakassi conflict

Following the International Court of Justice ruling of 10 October 2002 that sovereignty over the Bakassi peninsula rested with Cameroon, SCAPO claimed that Bakassi was, in fact, part of the territory of Southern Cameroons. In 2002, SCAPO took the Nigerian government to the Federal High Court in Abuja to require it to take a case before the International Court of Justice to establish the right of the people of the Southern Cameroons to self-determination. The court ruled in their favour on 5 March 2002. On 14 August 2006, Nigeria handed over the Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon. SCAPO responded by proclaiming the independence of the Republic of Ambazonia, to include the territory of Bakassi.[14]

Leadership

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No. Portrait Name
(Birth–Death) 		Election Term of office Political party President
Took office Left office Time in office
Premier of British Southern Cameroons
1 E. M. L. Endeley
(1916–1988) 		1957 1 October 1954 1 February 1959 4 years, 153 days KNC
2 John Ngu Foncha
(1916–1999) 		1959 1959 1 October 1961 2 years, 212 days KNDP
Prime Minister of West Cameroon (Federal Republic of Cameroon)[15]
1 John Ngu Foncha
(1916–1999) 		1964 1 October 1961 13 May 1965 3 years, 224 days KNDP Ahidjo
2 Augustine Ngom Jua
(1929–1977) 		— 13 May 1965 1 September 1966 2 years, 243 days KNDP
(2) 1 September 1966 11 January 1968 UNC
3 Salomon Tandeng Muna
(1912–2002) 		1970 11 January 1968 2 June 1972 4 years, 143 days UNC

List of Parties

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See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Southern Cameroons

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Southern Cameroons, officially the British Trust Territory of the Southern Cameroons, was a trusteeship administered by the from 1946 to 1961, encompassing the southern portion of the former German colony of that had been mandated to Britain after . The territory, distinct from the adjacent Northern Cameroons, achieved internal self-government in 1954 under leaders such as E. M. L. Endeley before facing decisions on its post-trusteeship future. In a UN-supervised plebiscite on 11 February 1961, voters chose between achieving independence through union with or the Republic of , with 71% opting for the latter, resulting in the territory's incorporation as West Cameroon in the of effective 1 October 1961. This union, intended to be federal, dissolved in 1972 under President , centralizing power in favor of the Francophone majority and sparking enduring grievances over cultural, legal, and economic marginalization of the English-speaking region. Contemporary separatist movements, self-identifying as the of Southern Cameroons or , contend that the 1961 plebiscite stipulated a voluntary federation that was violated through unilateral abolition, constituting annexation, though international recognition of the original union persists.

Geography and Demographics

Physical Geography

Southern Cameroons comprises the , spanning approximately 50,000 square kilometers of diverse terrain along the country's western border with and the . The features a narrow , about 25-40 kilometers wide, backed by swamps and rising to low plateaus dominated by equatorial rainforests, with elevations averaging 457-610 meters. Inland, the landscape includes the Cameroon Volcanic Line, highlighted by , an active reaching 4,095 meters, the highest peak in sub-Saharan West and . The Northwest Region, encompassing the Bamenda Grassfields or Western Highlands, consists of undulating plateaus, rolling hills, abrupt escarpments, deep river valleys, and mountain peaks with elevations generally between 1,000 and 2,000 meters. This highland terrain forms part of the broader Cameroon Highlands, transitioning from montane forests at lower altitudes to grasslands and afro-montane vegetation at higher elevations. Climatically, the Southwest experiences a humid equatorial regime with bimodal rainfall patterns, annual often exceeding 2,000-4,000 mm near the and mountains, and mean temperatures of 24-27°C influenced by high and orographic effects. In contrast, the have a more temperate due to elevation, with cooler temperatures averaging 18-22°C, a pronounced from to , and annual rainfall of 1,500-2,500 mm supporting and agricultural landscapes. Major rivers, such as the Mungo in the southwest, originate from volcanic highlands and drain westward to the Atlantic, contributing to sediment deposition in coastal deltas.

Population and Ethnic Composition

The Northwest and Southwest , collectively known as Southern Cameroons, had a combined of approximately 3.15 million according to the 2005 national , with the Northwest region enumerated at 1,906,962 inhabitants and the Southwest at around 1.24 million. This represented about 18% of 's total of 17.46 million at the time. No official has been conducted since 2005, complicating precise updates, but pre-crisis projections suggested growth to roughly 5-6 million by the mid-2010s, driven by natural increase and rural-urban migration. The ongoing since 2016 has significantly impacted demographics, with over 334,000 internally displaced persons in the two regions and more than 76,000 refugees fleeing to as of 2023, leading to net population outflows and localized depopulation in conflict zones. Urban centers like (Northwest) and (Southwest) have seen partial returns amid ceasefires, but overall estimates remain uncertain without new data, with some analyses indicating a 10-20% effective reduction in resident population due to displacement and . Ethnically, Southern Cameroons hosts dozens of distinct groups within Cameroon's broader mosaic of over 250 ethnicities, primarily Semi-Bantu highlanders in the Northwest and Bantu forest peoples in the Southwest. The Northwest features Grassfields (Semi-Bantu) peoples such as the Nso, Kom, Bum, and various Tikar-related chiefdoms, known for decentralized kingdoms and agricultural economies centered on highlands. These groups emphasize patrilineal structures and fon (chief) authority, with linguistic ties to the Grassfields cluster. The Southwest comprises Bantu-speaking communities including the Bakweri (dominant in Fako division around ), Oroko (in Ndian and Meme), Bakossi, and Mbo, often organized around coastal and forest lineages with matrilineal influences in some subgroups. Inter-ethnic mixing occurs due to trade and migration, but traditional identities persist, with no single group exceeding 20-30% regionally.

Historical Background

Pre-Colonial and German Colonial Period

The territory that would later constitute Southern Cameroons was initially populated by Baka pygmy hunter-gatherers in the southern forested regions, with evidence of their presence dating back millennia as the earliest known inhabitants. Subsequent waves of Bantu-speaking peoples migrated into the area from the Cameroon-Nigeria borderlands, beginning around 1000 BCE and continuing over centuries, introducing ironworking, , and agricultural practices such as yam and cultivation that supported population growth and settlement. These migrations displaced or assimilated earlier groups, leading to the formation of diverse ethnic communities, including coastal peoples like the Bakweri and inland Grassfields groups such as the Kom and Nso, organized into decentralized chiefdoms with segmentary lineages, age-grade systems, and ritual kingship rather than centralized states. Pre-colonial societies in the region emphasized subsistence farming, trade in and slaves with coastal intermediaries, and spiritual practices tied to ancestor veneration and secret societies, fostering social cohesion amid over 250 distinct ethnic identities across broader but concentrated in localized polities within Southern Cameroons' highlands and littoral. Inter-group conflicts over and resources were common, resolved through warfare, alliances, or by titled elders, while the absence of large empires allowed for but limited large-scale coordination. German colonization began in 1884 when the German Empire formalized control over Kamerun through protection treaties signed with coastal rulers, including Kings Bell and Akwa of the Duala, following initial trader arrivals in 1862 and explorer Gustav Nachtigal's annexation mission in July of that year. The western coastal strip, encompassing future Southern Cameroons, fell under this protectorate, upgraded to a full colony by 1891, with administrative focus on Douala as the initial hub before inland expansion. German authorities imposed direct rule via district commissioners, suppressing local resistance through military expeditions, such as those in the 1890s against Grassfields chiefdoms, where explorer Eugen Zintgraff established outposts by 1891, integrating the western highlands through pacification campaigns that employed superior firepower and divide-and-rule tactics. Economically, the Germans prioritized export-oriented plantations in the fertile southwestern lowlands, cultivating rubber, palm oil, and cocoa on estates totaling over 100,000 hectares by 1914, reliant on coerced labor from indigenous populations via corvée systems and head taxes that drove recruitment of up to 50,000 workers annually. Infrastructure investments included the Douala-Buea railway line, completed in segments by 1910 to facilitate resource extraction, alongside ports at Victoria (modern Limbe) for shipping tropical goods to Europe, yielding annual exports valued at 10 million marks by 1913. Colonial policies disrupted traditional land tenure, alienating communal holdings for European firms and sparking revolts, such as the 1891 Bali uprising, though overall population remained stable at around 3 million due to limited settler immigration of only 1,500 Germans. German rule in Kamerun collapsed in 1916 amid World War I, as British and French forces invaded from the west and south, occupying the territory by September and partitioning it under League of Nations mandates.

British League of Nations Mandate and Trusteeship

Following the Allied conquest of during , the territory was partitioned between Britain and France under provisional agreements in 1916 and formalized by the in 1919, which required to renounce its overseas possessions. Britain assumed control over the western strip adjacent to , comprising approximately 36,000 square miles and about one-fifth of the former 's area. On 20 July 1922, the approved a Class B mandate granting Britain administrative authority over this territory, known as the British Cameroons, with the objective of provisional recognition of independence while promoting development and suppressing and arms traffic. The British Cameroons mandate territory was divided into two administrative units: Northern Cameroons, integrated with Nigeria's Northern Provinces, and Southern Cameroons, attached to the Eastern Provinces, reflecting geographic and ethnic considerations along the 9th parallel north. This division was codified by a British on 26 June 1923, establishing Southern British Cameroons as a distinct entity under , with local chiefs retaining authority subject to British oversight. Administration emphasized English-language education, systems, and economic integration with , including the expansion of cash crop plantations such as cocoa and , which drove revenue growth from £50,000 in 1924 to over £200,000 annually by the late . After , the League of Nations mandates transitioned to trusteeships. The UN Trusteeship Agreement for the Cameroons under British administration was signed on 13 December 1946 and approved by the UN , maintaining Britain's role while introducing obligations for annual reporting to the Trusteeship Council and periodic visiting missions to assess progress toward self-government. Under trusteeship, political institutions advanced: the 1954 Southern Cameroons constitution established a House of Assembly with elected members, granting limited legislative powers over local matters. The Bamenda Conference of 1956 further refined constitutional arrangements, leading to the premiership of E.M.L. Endeley and the formation of political parties like the Kamerun National Democratic Party, amid growing debates on the territory's future alignment with Nigeria or . UN visiting missions in 1952 and 1955 documented improvements in and but highlighted economic dependence on and underdevelopment compared to , prompting recommendations for options. Trusteeship administration preserved distinct Anglo-Saxon legal and educational traditions, fostering a sense of separate identity in Southern Cameroons, with from about 500,000 in 1921 to over 1 million by 1953, driven by missionary activities and infrastructure like roads connecting to coastal ports. The period culminated in preparations for a UN-supervised plebiscite by 1961, as stipulated in trusteeship terms to resolve the territory's status.

1961 Plebiscite and Initial Reunification

As the British trusteeship over Southern Cameroons approached its end, the United Nations organized a plebiscite on February 11, 1961, to determine the territory's future, offering voters only two options: unification with the neighboring or with the Republic of Cameroon (formerly French Cameroun). This binary choice excluded outright , a decision rooted in UN assessments of the territory's limited viability as a , though it later fueled grievances among those preferring without absorption. The plebiscite campaigns highlighted deep divisions, with the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP), led by Premier John Ngu Foncha, advocating reunification with to preserve cultural and linguistic ties to the broader Kamerun heritage, while the Kamerun National Congress (KNC), under E. M. L. Endeley, pushed for integration with to align with existing administrative and economic links from the Nigerian federation. Foncha's KNDP had secured victory in the 1959 elections, shifting policy toward and enabling the pro-reunification stance. Voter turnout exceeded 90%, with approximately 70% of votes cast—233,571 for joining and 97,335 for —reflecting a clear majority for reunification despite Endeley's warnings of risks. The UN General Assembly endorsed the results via Resolution 1608 (XV) on April 21, 1961, affirming Southern Cameroons' independence by unification and setting October 1, 1961, as the effective date, while Northern Cameroons joined Nigeria. On that date, Southern Cameroons formally united with the Republic of Cameroon to form the Federal Republic of Cameroon, comprising two federated states: the State of Cameroon (East, French-speaking) and the State of Southern Cameroons (West, English-speaking, with Foncha as ). Ahmadou Ahidjo, president of the Republic of Cameroon, became federal president, with Foncha as vice-president, establishing a federal constitution that promised autonomy for the West Cameroon state in education, law, and administration to safeguard Anglo-Saxon legal traditions and bilingualism. Initial reunification proceeded amid optimism for federal balance, but early signs of imbalance emerged, as the East Cameroon state's larger population and resources granted it disproportionate influence in federal institutions, setting the stage for future tensions despite the plebiscite's democratic mandate. Post-plebiscite petitions from pro-Nigeria factions alleged ethnic biases in voter mobilization and called for partition, though these lacked sufficient evidence to overturn UN validation. The process reflected causal realities of colonial legacies—arbitrary borders and trusteeship constraints—prioritizing absorption over independence to avert instability, a choice substantiated by the majority vote but critiqued by separatist narratives as a of self-rule aspirations.

Post-Reunification Developments

Federal Republic Era

The Federal Republic of Cameroon was established on October 1, 1961, following the reunification of the British-administered Southern Cameroons, renamed West Cameroon, with the French-administered Republic of Cameroun, known as East Cameroon. This federation comprised two autonomous states under a central government headed by President , with as the federal capital and serving as the capital of West Cameroon. John Ngu Foncha, leader of the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP), assumed the roles of of West Cameroon and Vice-President of the federation from October 1, 1961, to May 13, 1965. During this period, West Cameroon maintained its own legislative assembly, judiciary, and administrative structures, preserving English as the official language and traditions inherited from British rule. However, early centralizing measures, such as Ahidjo's 1962 correspondence with Foncha proposing enhanced federal powers, signaled tensions over autonomy. In June 1966, political parties in West Cameroon, including KNDP under Foncha, the Cameroon People's National Convention under E.M.L. Endeley, and others, merged into the federal Cameroon National Union, establishing a one-party system. Foncha's tenure ended amid internal KNDP disputes, leading to his replacement by Augustine Ngom Jua as of West Cameroon on May 13, 1965, a position Jua held until January 11, 1968. Jua's administration emphasized West Cameroon's distinct identity, fostering local development initiatives while navigating federal pressures, including resistance to francophone dominance in national institutions. Jua's cabinet, formed in 1965, included key figures advocating for regional interests. By 1968, Ahidjo appointed Solomon T. Muna to replace Jua, perceived by some in West Cameroon as aligning more closely with central authority. Linguistic and cultural disparities exacerbated frictions, with French increasingly prioritized in federal affairs despite constitutional bilingualism, contributing to Anglophone grievances over assimilation. Economic imbalances persisted, as West Cameroon's resources, including agricultural exports, faced redirection toward federal priorities without proportional benefits. The federation dissolved via a May 20, 1972, , where voters approved Ahidjo's proposal to replace it with a , the United Republic of ; Ahidjo cited the federal structure's high administrative costs as a primary rationale, amid Cameroon's need for economic consolidation post-oil discoveries. This shift centralized power in , effectively ending West Cameroon's semi-autonomy.

Transition to Unitary State

On 6 May 1972, President announced in the his proposal to abolish the Federal Republic of Cameroon and establish a , contingent on approval via national . This move followed earlier centralizing reforms, including 1966 constitutional amendments that had curtailed federal powers and integrated the Cameroon National Union (CNU) as the sole legal party, limiting . Ahidjo framed the change as essential for accelerating , enhancing national unity, and overcoming administrative inefficiencies in the bicultural federation formed in 1961. The referendum occurred on 20 May 1972, presenting voters with a single ballot proposing adoption of a new constitution for a unitary United Republic of Cameroon. Official results reported 3,177,846 "yes" votes out of 3,179,634 registered voters, equating to 99.99% approval, with only 176 "no" votes recorded nationwide. In the former West Cameroon (Southern Cameroons), support exceeded 90% according to state tallies, though the one-party context and absence of viable alternatives have led some analysts to view the outcome as reflecting controlled political conditions rather than broad consensual preference. The approved constitution, promulgated on 2 June 1972, dissolved the two federated states—East Cameroon and West Cameroon—replacing them with centralized provincial administrations directly subordinate to . This restructuring eliminated West Cameroon's legislative autonomy, , and educational systems rooted in British traditions, integrating them into a francophone-dominated national framework under Ahidjo's expanded presidential authority. The United Republic of Cameroon retained the name until 1984, when it reverted to the of via presidential decree.

Emerging Grievances in the Anglophone Regions

Following the 1972 constitutional referendum on May 20, which dissolved Cameroon's federal structure in favor of a , the former Southern Cameroons—now reorganized into the Northwest and Southwest provinces—lost significant , including the dissolution of the West Cameroon House of Assembly and other regional governing bodies. Unlike the 1961 plebiscite restricted to Southern Cameroonians, the 1972 vote encompassed the entire population and secured approval from 716,774 of 731,850 registered voters for the new constitution, though Anglophone critics later characterized it as a mechanism for centralizing power under Francophone dominance without genuine regional consent. Centralization accelerated the appointment of Francophone civil servants, judges, prosecutors, and teachers to Anglophone regions, perceived as systematic "francophonisation" that undermined the bilingual commitments of reunification. In the legal domain, common law traditions from British rule faced erosion through policies favoring French civil law, including the post-1972 shift away from Southern Cameroons' company law toward Napoleonic Code elements, and later the 1997 adoption of OHADA uniform acts that diluted specialized common law training and procedures. Educational disparities emerged similarly, with French curricula and pedagogical methods imposed on English-medium schools, compromising the Anglo-Saxon system's emphasis on separate subsystems for GCE (General Certificate of Education) examinations and teacher training. Politically, Anglophones—approximately 20% of Cameroon's population—experienced underrepresentation in national bodies, with senior cabinet and administrative roles predominantly held by Francophones, reinforcing perceptions of exclusion from . Economically, the regions suffered relative neglect, including stalled development of like roads and the Limbe port, alongside deteriorating public services since the mid-1980s, despite resource wealth such as offshore oil that disproportionately benefited central coffers. These accumulating issues, voiced as early as the 1972 Cameroon National Union (CNU) congress by figures like Bernard Fonlon decrying marginalization, simmered through sporadic 1990s protests but gained momentum in the 2010s amid broader governance critiques. By November 2016, grievances crystallized in strikes by lawyers protesting decrees that enforced French in Anglophone courts and appointed insufficiently trained bilingual administrators, paralleled by teachers' unions opposing GCE board reforms aligning with Francophone standards. This sectoral unrest highlighted deeper causal tensions from post-1972 assimilation efforts, setting the stage for escalation beyond professional demands.

The Anglophone Crisis

Initial Protests and Government Response

The initial protests in Cameroon's Anglophone regions, comprising the Northwest and Southwest, erupted on October 11, 2016, when lawyers in and launched a sit-down strike organized by the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC). The lawyers objected to the appointment of French-speaking magistrates unfamiliar with traditions, the distribution of civil law textbooks in Anglophone courts, and efforts to standardize legal procedures under the French-influenced civil law system, which they viewed as an assault on the region's inherited British heritage. Their demands included the withdrawal of non- judges, recruitment of bilingual personnel, and preservation of Anglophone legal autonomy. Teachers escalated the unrest starting November 21, 2016, joining the strike through the in the Anglophone regions, protesting the deployment of unqualified French-speaking educators to English-medium schools and the imposition of French-language teaching materials. This led to the shutdown of nearly all schools and courts in the two regions, affecting hundreds of thousands of students and disrupting judicial operations for weeks. Protesters framed their actions as resistance to and marginalization within 's predominantly Francophone-dominated . The Cameroonian government initially characterized the strikes as an industrial dispute, dismissing participants as agitators and refusing concessions while deploying to maintain order. In response, authorities dismissed approximately 473 striking teachers in December 2016 and arrested over 100 protesters in on November 26, including lawyers and union members. used tear gas, batons, and live ammunition to disperse demonstrations, resulting in at least two confirmed deaths from the November 26 clashes and four more killed in subsequent confrontations around December 8, with dozens wounded. On December 9, government forces arrested CACSC leaders Agbor Balla and Fontem Neba, banning the as a subversive entity and charging them with rebellion and incitement. These measures, decried by groups as disproportionate, intensified grievances rather than resolving them.

Escalation to Armed Separatism

Following the government's deployment of and arrests of protest leaders in late 2016 and early 2017, Anglophone separatist activists began organizing under the Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front (SCACUF), an umbrella group advocating for independence. In response to perceived attacks on unarmed civilians, self-defense militias emerged in mid-2017, marking the shift from —such as "" shutdowns—to armed resistance. These early groups, including precursors to the (ADF), conducted ambushes on military patrols in the North-West and South-West regions, prompting Cameroon's government to label them terrorists and launch counteroffensives. On October 1, 2017, SCACUF's interim government, led by Julius Sisiku Ayuk Tabe, unilaterally declared the restoration of independence for the "Federal Republic of ," citing the 1961 plebiscite's alleged violation and ongoing marginalization. The declaration, broadcast via , triggered immediate clashes, with at least seven deaths reported that day from security force gunfire during independence commemorations. Cameroon's military intensified operations, deploying elite units like the (BIR), while separatists fragmented into over two dozen armed factions, including the ADF, Southern Cameroons Defence Forces (SOCADEF), and later groups like the Red Dragons. This escalation transformed sporadic skirmishes into sustained by late 2017, with both government forces and separatists employing tactics such as village raids, ambushes, and improvised explosive devices. By early 2018, the conflict had resulted in hundreds of combatant and civilian casualties, setting the stage for broader atrocities and displacement affecting over 700,000 people internally. Reports from monitoring organizations indicate that separatist groups justified arming as necessary against state aggression, while framed it as combating foreign-instigated rebellion. The proliferation of armed factions, often loosely coordinated under the Ambazonia Governing Council, further complicated de-escalation efforts amid mutual accusations of abuses.

Independence Declaration and Ongoing Conflict

On 1 October 2017, the Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front (SCACUF), an umbrella group of Anglophone civil society organizations chaired by Julius Ayuk Tabe (also known as Sisiku Ayuk Tabe), unilaterally declared the independence of the Federal Republic of , comprising Cameroon's Northwest and Southwest regions, formerly known as Southern Cameroons. The declaration, issued symbolically in on the anniversary of the 1961 reunification with French Cameroun, cited long-standing grievances over cultural, linguistic, and political marginalization as justification for secession. No foreign government has recognized the declaration, which remains internationally viewed as illegitimate under Cameroonian sovereignty. The Cameroonian government, led by President , responded by deploying troops to the Anglophone regions and labeling the separatists as terrorists, arresting Ayuk Tabe and several SCACUF leaders in January 2018 in , where they were extradited to . Clashes on the declaration day resulted in at least 17 deaths, with security forces firing on protesters and separatists emerging to conduct ambushes and roadblocks. This marked the transition from non-violent protests—sparked in 2016 over common-law lawyers' and teachers' demands for and judicial systems—to organized armed insurgency. The conflict has since evolved into a low-intensity guerrilla war, with over 50 separatist factions, including the (ADF) and groups like the Red Dragons and Bambalang Warriors, controlling rural territories through tactics such as "ghost towns" (enforced shutdowns), kidnappings, and attacks on military posts. Government forces have conducted counteroffensives, including village razings and alleged massacres, contributing to mutual atrocities documented by monitors. By mid-2025, the violence has claimed over 6,500 lives, including at least 6,000 civilians killed by both sides since late 2016, though underreporting likely inflates the true toll. Displacement affects over 700,000 internally within and more than 70,000 refugees in , with economic sabotage including separatist bans on exports exacerbating humanitarian needs. Ceasefire attempts, such as the Swiss-led "Major National Dialogue" in 2019 and intermittent "flags down" truces by separatists, have failed amid distrust and leadership fractures, including the 2023 killing of ADF spokesperson Ivo Mbah. As of October 2025, the stalemate persists, with separatists rejecting reforms as insufficient and the government prioritizing military containment over negotiated autonomy.

Key Controversies and Perspectives

Claims of Marginalization and Assimilation

Anglophone Cameroonians, constituting approximately 20% of the in the Northwest and Southwest regions formerly known as Southern Cameroons, have long claimed political marginalization stemming from the centralization of power after the 1972 that abolished the federal structure established in 1961. The , which passed with over 95% approval, transformed into a , eliminating the autonomous West Cameroon House of Assembly and integrating regional governance under national control, a move Anglophone leaders described as a reversal of reunification promises and an unconstitutional imposition by the Francophone-dominated government. This shift allegedly resulted in underrepresentation, with Southern Cameroons allocated 20% of parliamentary seats despite comprising about 22% of the , and key positions like regional governors appointed exclusively from Francophone backgrounds by presidential decree. Claims of economic neglect highlight disparities in and development, particularly given that around 90% of Cameroon's oil production in 2016 originated from the Anglophone regions, yet and investment favored Francophone areas, exacerbating perceptions of exploitation without proportional returns. Anglophone advocates argue this reflects systemic exclusion, with limited federal for roads, schools, and hospitals in their regions compared to the national average, contributing to higher rates and . Assimilation efforts are cited as eroding Anglophone cultural and legal identity, including the progressive replacement of the English system with French civil law procedures in courts, where trials in English are rarely accommodated and detainees often forced to sign untranslated French documents. In , French-medium instruction has dominated curricula and training, marginalizing English-language and leading to claims of cultural dilution, as evidenced by the African Commission's 2009 ruling acknowledging against Anglophones. These grievances, articulated by groups like the Southern Cameroons National Council, portray a pattern of forced integration that prioritizes Francophone norms, treating Anglophones as second-class citizens despite constitutional bilingualism.

Atrocities and Human Rights Violations

Human rights violations in the Anglophone regions of , encompassing the former Southern Cameroons, have been perpetrated by both and armed separatist groups since the crisis escalated in late 2017, resulting in at least 6,000 deaths as of 2023. These abuses include extrajudicial killings, , arbitrary detentions, , and attacks on infrastructure, with both sides employing tactics that violate . Independent monitors such as and have documented patterns of impunity, noting that forces often target perceived separatist sympathizers while separatists impose coercive control over local populations through violence. Cameroonian security forces, including the army, , and police, have conducted operations involving unlawful killings and widespread destruction of villages, particularly in the North-West and South-West regions. For instance, in 2022, forces were implicated in summary executions and attacks that displaced thousands, with reports of soldiers burning homes in retaliation for ambushes. documented over 20 cases of and enforced disappearances in the North-West region between 2021 and 2023, including beatings and of detainees suspected of separatist ties, often without . Pro-government militias, such as vigilante groups, have also committed rapes and lootings, exacerbating civilian suffering amid claims of collaboration with official forces. The U.S. State Department reported persistent arbitrary arrests, with thousands held incommunicado in facilities like those in , where conditions include overcrowding and denial of medical care. Armed separatist factions, operating under groups like the and others proclaiming independence for "," have systematically targeted civilians, including through attacks on education and enforcement of "ghost towns" via lethal force. Since 2017, separatists have killed at least 100 teachers and students, burned over 700 schools, and abducted hundreds in efforts to disrupt schooling perceived as promoting assimilation. In June 2022, fighters from one faction killed seven civilians, including a pregnant , and raped a during a raid in the South-West . Notable incidents include a November 2023 by separatists that killed at least 20 people, mostly laborers, in the South-West, and ongoing forced of youth, with reports of executions for refusal. These groups have also imposed taxes and blockades, punishing non-compliance with mutilations or killings, contributing to famine-like conditions in rural areas. The cumulative impact includes over 700,000 internally displaced persons and 70,000 refugees in neighboring as of 2023, with limited accountability on either side despite calls from the for investigations into atrocity crimes. While government denials often attribute abuses to separatists, and separatist leaders claim defensive actions, empirical evidence from on-site investigations reveals mutual escalations driven by territorial control rather than proportionate response.

Economic and Resource Disputes Including Bakassi

The Southwest Anglophone region, encompassing key oil-producing areas in the Rio del Rey basin, generates a substantial portion of Cameroon's revenues, with offshore fields near Limbe supporting the Société Nationale des Hydrocarbures and contributing billions of CFA francs annually to national coffers. Despite this, local communities report minimal reinvestment, with funds centralized in for distribution that disproportionately favors Francophone regions, exacerbating perceptions of economic extraction without development returns. and timber from both Northwest and Southwest regions further bolster national GDP—accounting for over 20% of Cameroon's economic output prior to the crisis—but infrastructure deficits, such as poor roads and limited , persist, attributed by separatist advocates to deliberate . These grievances intensified with the marginalization discourse, where Anglophone leaders argue that post-1972 reforms centralized resource control, diverting oil windfalls—discovered in the 1970s—from federal-era promises of equitable sharing. Independent analyses highlight how the Northwest and Southwest, despite hosting 40% of and major export crops like cocoa and rubber, receive under 10% of budgetary allocations relative to their contributions, fostering claims of . Separatist groups frame this as causal to conflict escalation, positing that resource opacity enables in , though government officials counter that expenditures justify centralization. The Bakassi Peninsula dispute amplifies these tensions, as its hydrocarbon reserves—estimated to hold significant untapped oil and gas—and fisheries were awarded to Cameroon by the in 2002, based on colonial-era treaties, with formal handover from via the 2008 Greentree Agreement. Administratively part of the Southwest region and historically tied to British Southern Cameroons trusteeship until 1961, Bakassi's integration into unitary Cameroon has prompted separatist assertions of sovereignty over it as Ambazonian territory, leading to hybrid criminal-separatist operations targeting oil platforms since at least 2010. Local Obanliku and Efik communities, displaced or stateless post-handover, report unfulfilled Cameroonian development pledges, while separatists exploit the vacuum to levy "taxes" on and , underscoring unresolved resource access amid ongoing clashes. Yaoundé's military deployments have secured extraction but alienated locals, with no verified equitable revenue sharing to mitigate grievances.

Political Leadership and Organizations

Historical Political Figures

Emmanuel Mbela Lifafa Endeley (10 April 1916 – June 1968) emerged as a prominent political leader in Southern Cameroons during the , serving as Leader of Government Business from and becoming the territory's first Premier upon the adoption of in 1957. As head of the Kamerun National Congress (KNC), Endeley advocated for Southern Cameroons to join the rather than reunify with French Cameroun, reflecting concerns over cultural and linguistic assimilation. His party secured victory in the legislative elections, but internal divisions and competition from pro-reunification factions eroded support. Endeley lost the premiership following the 1 February 1959 elections to John Ngu Foncha's Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP), after which he shifted toward reunification but maintained opposition roles. John Ngu Foncha (21 June 1916 – 10 April 1999), a teacher-turned-politician from the Nkwen fondom, founded the KNDP in 1955 as a breakaway from the KNC, emphasizing reunification with the Republic of Cameroun to preserve ethnic identities distinct from Nigeria's Igbo-dominated east. Foncha's victory in the 1959 elections made him Premier of Southern Cameroons, a position he held until unification on 1 October 1961, following the UN-supervised plebiscite where 71% voted for Cameroun over Nigeria. As Prime Minister of the State of West Cameroon from 1961 to 1965 and Vice-President of the Federal Republic until 1970, Foncha initially supported federalism but later decried the erosion of Anglophone autonomy under President Ahmadou Ahidjo's centralizing policies; in 1994, he led a Southern Cameroons National Council delegation to the UN advocating self-determination. Augustine Ngom Jua (24 November 1924 – 30 December 1977), a key KNDP figure from Kom, succeeded Foncha as of West Cameroon on 13 May 1965 amid rising tensions over federal imbalances. Jua protested central government encroachments on regional powers, including during Ahidjo's 1967 visit, and prioritized infrastructure development while navigating the shift from . His tenure ended on 11 January 1968, replaced by Salomon Tandeng Muna, as Ahidjo consolidated control leading to the 1972 unitary referendum. Salomon Tandeng Muna (1912 – 22 January 2002), representing the Cameroon Union (CU) and later aligning with KNDP, served as Minister of Finance before becoming Prime Minister of West Cameroon from 11 January 1968 to 2 June 1972. Muna facilitated administrative integration during the federation's dissolution, including diplomatic efforts at the UN for Southern Cameroons' status, though critics attribute his role to enabling the unitary state's imposition, which dissolved West Cameroon's autonomy by 1 May 1972. He later became Vice-President of the National Assembly.

Separatist Leaders and Groups

, a former university administrator from Manyu division, emerged as a central figure in the separatist movement by proclaiming the independence of —encompassing Cameroon's Northwest and Southwest regions—on October 1, 2017, and establishing himself as the first president of the self-declared Interim Government of Ambazonia (IG). He was arrested in in January 2018 alongside nine associates, known as the "Nera 10," and extradited to , where a military tribunal sentenced him to life imprisonment in August 2019 on charges including terrorism, secession, and insurrection. Despite his detention in Yaoundé's Kondengui prison, Ayuk Tabe retains influence over the "IG Sisiku" faction, which has engaged in ceasefire discussions with the Cameroonian government, including pre-talks as recent as July 2020. Following Ayuk Tabe's arrest, Samuel Ikome Sako, a U.S.-based former , assumed the role of acting interim president of the IG in early 2018, later styling himself as president of the Federal Republic of . A rift formalized in 2019, splitting the IG into the pro-Ayuk Tabe faction and Sako's Ambazonia Coalition Team (ACT), which includes field commanders like Oliver Lekeaka and has pursued separate dialogue tracks, such as the stalled "Swiss process" initiated in late 2019. Sako's group coordinates elements of the Ambazonia Restoration Forces, though command structures remain fluid amid internal disputes. Rivaling the IG factions is the Ambazonia Governing Council (AGC), led by Cho Lucas Ayaba from , which aligns with Ayuk Tabe's supporters but operates independently and claims coordination over diaspora efforts. The AGC's armed wing, the (ADF), is headed by Benedict Kuah and has been active primarily in the Northwest region, engaging in operations against government forces while implicated in civilian attacks. Additional leaders include Ebenezer Derek Mbongo Akwanga, who heads the African People’s Liberation Movement and its Southern Cameroons Defence Forces (SOCADEF) from the U.S., focusing on guerrilla tactics. The movement encompasses numerous localized armed groups under loose IG or AGC umbrellas, such as the Bui Warriors (led by figures like " Talk and Do"), Red Dragons, Terminators of Ambazonia, and Buffaloes of Bali, many of which splintered from parent factions—e.g., the Bui Unity Warriors breaking from Bui Warriors in January 2022. Fragmentation has proliferated these entities to over 50 groups by 2023, driven by leadership disputes, resource competition, and funding disputes, resulting in an 83% increase in inter-factional clashes that year and undermining centralized control. Coordination attempts, such as the Self-Defence under the IG, have faltered amid mutual accusations of betrayal and civilian harm.

Government Representatives

The primary government representatives overseeing the Northwest and Southwest Regions—comprising the former Southern Cameroons—are governors appointed by President to enforce central authority, coordinate security operations against separatist insurgents, and implement development initiatives amid the . Bernard Ngoh Okalia Bilai, appointed Governor of the Southwest Region on March 14, 2012, has managed regional administration, including economic recovery efforts in a tourism-dependent area severely impacted by conflict-related disruptions. Adolphe Lele Lafrique, appointed Governor of the Northwest Region in 2012, has prioritized security measures to address pockets of instability, reporting relative calm in parts of the region while emphasizing end-of-year safety protocols and oversight during elections. These governors, both long-serving as of 2024, function as key intermediaries between and local stakeholders, consulting with the on defense and reconstruction while navigating accusations from separatist groups of enabling repression—claims echoed in reports from sources critical of the but unverified in independent judicial findings. Complementing regional , Anglophone loyalists hold national cabinet positions to promote integration policies. Paul Atanga Nji, from the Northwest Region and appointed Minister Delegate for Territorial Administration in March 2018, chairs the National Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Committee, facilitating government outreach to ex-separatists since 2019. Nalova Lyonga, also from the Southwest, serves as Minister of since 2018, advocating school reopenings to counter separatist boycotts that have closed over 70% of institutions in the regions since 2016. Under the 2019 special status legislation, which devolves limited powers to the Anglophone regions including and common-law courts, governors retain oversight of regional assemblies comprising elected councillors and government-appointed delegates, ensuring alignment with national policy despite low participation rates in 2020 elections due to separatist threats. These structures aim to address grievances but have been critiqued by independent analysts for insufficient autonomy, with executive decisions still centralized in .

International Dimensions

In 2003, members of the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), including Kevin Mgwanga Gunme and thirteen others, submitted Communication 266/2003 to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), alleging that the Republic of had systematically marginalized the Anglophone population of Southern Cameroons through discriminatory policies, , and denial of the right to under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. The complainants argued that the 1961 plebiscite, supervised by the , resulted in an unlawful union because Southern Cameroons voters were denied an option and the subsequent federal structure was unilaterally dissolved in 1972, violating the terms of UN Resolution 1608 (XV) which endorsed the plebiscite outcomes while implying preservation of distinct identities. On May 27, 2009, the ACHPR issued its decision, finding Cameroon in violation of several Charter articles, including Article 2 (non-discrimination), Article 3 (equal protection), Article 4 (), Article 5 (dignity and protection from degradation), Article 6 (liberty and security), Article 7 (fair trial), and Article 11 (), based on evidence of unequal resource allocation, cultural suppression, and arbitrary arrests targeting Anglophone advocates. Regarding under Article 20, the Commission affirmed the right to internal —encompassing participation in governance and cultural preservation—but rejected external or , stating that Southern Cameroons residents could not unilaterally secede absent total state collapse, occupation, or gross abuses threatening existence, conditions not deemed met at the time. The ACHPR recommended constitutional reforms for greater , such as effective or a return to , and offered its services, though implementation has been limited amid ongoing conflict. Subsequent complaints include a 2010 individual submission to the UN Human Rights Committee by Sisiku AyukTabe (SNA v. Cameroon, Communication No. 1962/2010), claiming violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights through arbitrary detention and restrictions on movement linked to separatist activities, but the Committee focused on personal remedies without addressing collective self-determination claims. In 2017, Kum Bezeng and 75 others filed Communication 650/2017 with the ACHPR, alleging ongoing Anglophone marginalization and rights abuses, which was declared admissible for seizure but remains unresolved as of 2023. No rulings from the International Court of Justice directly address Southern Cameroons' status, as attempts to invoke jurisdiction—analogous to the 1963 Northern Cameroons case (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), where the ICJ declined due to post-trusteeship mootness—have failed on grounds of consent and timing. Separatist advocates continue to contest the 1961 plebiscite's validity, citing the absence of an ballot as contrary to UN principles under General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), though no international body has invalidated the union or endorsed remedial . These legal efforts highlight tensions between state and minority but have yielded no authoritative ruling granting , with bodies like the ACHPR prioritizing internal remedies over territorial .

Foreign Involvement and Diplomatic Stances

The has upheld the results of the 1961 plebiscite, in which Southern Cameroons voted by 61% to 49% to achieve by joining the Republic of Cameroon, rejecting subsequent separatist petitions for a new self-determination vote as incompatible with the process it supervised. In addressing the since 2016, UN officials, including the Secretary-General, have called for inclusive national dialogue to resolve grievances without endorsing claims, while the Security Council convened a single Arria-formula meeting in December 2019 to highlight humanitarian impacts and urge political solutions. The has maintained Cameroon's territorial integrity as paramount, issuing statements condemning violence by both government forces and separatists, and recommending mediation through regional bodies like the Economic Community of Central African States, though without imposing sanctions or direct intervention. Similarly, the —where Cameroon holds associate membership—has echoed calls for cessation of hostilities and dialogue, reflecting mild diplomatic pressure amid concerns over escalating atrocities. France, Cameroon's primary bilateral partner with longstanding military cooperation agreements, has backed Yaoundé's security operations against separatist groups, providing training and equipment while rejecting external mediation offers that could legitimize secessionist demands. The , as former trustee power for British Southern Cameroons, has condemned abuses by all parties, committed aid for counter-terrorism and stabilization efforts, and advocated non-violent resolution through talks, without recognizing Ambazonian independence aspirations. The has urged the Cameroonian government and armed separatists to halt violence, release detainees, and engage in unconditional dialogue, as stated in a 2020 Senate resolution and ongoing State Department engagements focused on governance and , while suspending some military aid pending accountability improvements. , hosting over 40,000 refugees from the crisis as of 2023, officially opposes Ambazonian separatism to safeguard its own territorial unity but contends with cross-border arms smuggling and alliances between Cameroonian fighters and Nigerian groups like the , prompting joint patrols without formal support for Yaoundé's crackdown. No state provides or material aid to separatist entities, with international efforts limited to humanitarian access facilitation and sanctions threats against perpetrators of atrocities.

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