Hubbry Logo
Yun FengYun FengMain
Open search
Yun Feng
Community hub
Yun Feng
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Yun Feng
Yun Feng
Yun Feng
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

The Yun Feng (Chinese: 雲峰; lit. 'Cloud Peak'), officially designated Ching Tien (擎天), is a Taiwanese hypersonic land-attack cruise missile.[1][2]

Key Information

Design and development

[edit]

The missile was developed by the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology and has a range of about 1,200–2,000 kilometres (750–1,240 mi) kilometers. It has a ramjet engine with a solid rocket booster capable of a hypersonic speed of Mach 6 or 2,060 m/s (4,600 mph). It can carry a semi-armor piercing high explosive and fragmentation warhead. The missile is one of the few assets within Taiwan's arsenal which can reach targets in north and central People's Republic of China.[1][3] Development may have been started as far back as the Lee Teng-hui administration but official reports of its existence did not surface until 2012.[4] Test flights of the Yun Feng were concealed within the HF-3 supersonic anti-ship missile test flight program.[3]

In 2016, Ministry of National Defense (MND) denied reports that the missile program was terminated.[5][6] This speculation was based on a belief that the project would be cancelled as a goodwill gesture towards China.[4] The missile was publicly acknowledged for the first time by defense minister Chiu Kuo-cheng during a Legislative Yuan joint committee hearing in October 2021.[7]

The project received and was known by the codename Yun Feng. The missile is officially designated the Ching Tien (擎天).[8]

Variants

[edit]

In 2018, it was announced that NTD 12.4 billion (~ USD 390 million) had been allocated by the Ministry of Defense under the "Qilin Project” to both extend the range of the missile as well as to adapt it for satellite launch.[4]

Enhanced Yun Feng

[edit]

In August 2019, mass production of the enhanced Yun Feng cruise missile commenced with an initial order for 20 missiles and 10 mobile launch vehicles. The enhanced variant has been described as a high altitude ramjet powered cruise missile.[9]

Satellite launch vehicle

[edit]

The missile is being upgraded to function as a satellite launch vehicle by National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology. This vehicle will be capable of delivering satellites between 50 and 200 kilograms at a low Earth orbit of around 500 kilometers.[10][11] It is suspected that the upgrade program will extend the range of the missile to 2,000 kilometres (1,200 mi), which puts Beijing within its striking range.[3]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Yun Feng

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Yun Feng (雲峰; lit. 'Cloud Peak'), officially redesignated Ching Tien (擎天), is a family of land-attack cruise missiles developed by Taiwan's National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology to enable strikes on strategic targets deep within . Featuring a engine with solid-fuel booster for supersonic flight, early variants achieved operational status around with a range of approximately 1,200 kilometers, sufficient to threaten key infrastructure in northern and central regions of the . Subsequent advancements, including the hypersonic Yun Feng II, extend the reach to over 2,000 kilometers—potentially encompassing —and incorporate technology to evade advanced air defenses. Developed amid heightened cross-strait tensions, the secretive program underscores Taiwan's emphasis on indigenous asymmetric capabilities to deter invasion without relying on conventional force parity. Production clearance for enhanced versions was granted in recent years, reflecting ongoing refinements to counter evolving threats from Chinese missile deployments and electronic warfare systems.

Introduction and Capabilities

General Description

The Yun Feng (雲峰, "Cloud Peak") is a supersonic land-attack developed by Taiwan's National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST). Designed as a key element of Taiwan's asymmetric defense strategy, it targets strategic assets in , such as airports, harbors, and command centers, with a standard range of approximately 1,200 kilometers and an extended-range variant reaching up to 2,000 kilometers. Utilizing propulsion, the Yun Feng achieves high subsonic to supersonic speeds, improving its ability to evade detection and interception by enemy air defenses. The features a cylindrical body with an and is launched from ground-based platforms. Development occurred in secrecy, with flight tests integrated into programs for related Hsiung Feng missiles to maintain operational security. In August 2021, approved of the Yun Feng, enabling deployment as part of its indigenous standoff weapons inventory to counter potential invasions or blockades. The program's emphasis on extended reach addresses vulnerabilities in Taiwan's geographic position relative to potential adversaries.

Key Technical Specifications

The Yun Feng is a supersonic land-attack developed by Taiwan's National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST). It employs a propulsion system for sustained high-speed flight following a booster-assisted launch phase. Key performance parameters include a standard range of approximately 1,200 kilometers, with an extended-range variant under development capable of reaching up to 2,000 kilometers. The missile achieves supersonic cruising speeds, estimated at Mach 2.5 or higher, enabling high-altitude flight profiles to evade defenses. Physical dimensions are reported as roughly 10 meters in length and 1 meter in , facilitating ground-launched deployment from mobile transporter-erector-launchers. Guidance systems likely incorporate inertial navigation augmented by or terrain-reference matching for precision targeting, though exact details remain classified. Warhead configuration is not publicly detailed, but it is designed for high-explosive penetration against hardened land targets such as infrastructure or command facilities.
ParameterStandard Variant
Range1,200 km
SpeedMach 2.5+ (cruising)
PropulsionRamjet (post-booster)
Launch PlatformGround-mobile

Development History

Origins and Early Research

The Yun Feng missile program originated in the wake of the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, when the fired several ballistic missiles into waters near to intimidate the island during its presidential elections, highlighting vulnerabilities in Taiwan's defense posture. In response, Taiwan's National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST), the primary agency responsible for indigenous weapons development, launched a covert effort to create a supersonic land-attack with sufficient range to target strategic assets deep in . This initiative aimed to provide a credible deterrent through asymmetric capabilities, leveraging propulsion for high-speed, low-altitude flight to evade air defenses. Early research emphasized integration of solid-fuel boosters with engines, building on NCSIST's prior work in supersonic technologies, while concealing flight tests within Hsiung Feng III anti-ship missile program to maintain operational secrecy and avoid diplomatic repercussions. This subterfuge allowed engineers to refine stability, inertial navigation, and terrain-following guidance systems without separate, detectable launches, with initial prototypes focusing on ranges of approximately 1,200 to 2,000 kilometers. Development progressed discreetly through the early 2000s, incorporating testing and subscale models to validate aerodynamic performance under high Mach conditions. The program's momentum waned during President Ma Ying-jeou's administration (2008–2016), as improved cross-strait relations led to its temporary shelving to prioritize diplomatic engagement over escalation. Despite this pause, foundational advancements in propulsion and from the pre-2008 phase preserved technical knowledge, enabling rapid reactivation amid renewed tensions post-2016.

Testing Milestones and Official Confirmation

The development of the supersonic involved concealing flight tests within the program to maintain secrecy following the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Specific test dates prior to 2020 remain undisclosed, as the program was conducted under strict classification by Taiwan's National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST). A reported of the Yun Feng occurred in April 2020, conducted alongside other and rockets as part of broader evaluations. This test marked a key milestone in validating the 's , propulsion, and guidance systems, though details such as range achieved or success metrics were not publicly released. Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense provided the first official public confirmation of the Yun Feng's existence on October 6, 2021, acknowledging it as a medium-range capable of striking targets in . This disclosure followed years of indirect references and aligned with increased transparency on indigenous defense programs amid rising cross-strait tensions. In December 2022, Shih Chao-ming, former deputy director of NCSIST, further corroborated the 's capability to reach , estimating its range at up to 1,500 kilometers at speeds exceeding Mach 3. These confirmations emphasized operational readiness without revealing additional test data, prioritizing strategic deterrence over proliferation of technical specifics.

Production and Recent Advancements

The initial production batch of the , officially designated Ching Tien and developed by Taiwan's National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST), consisted of 20 missiles and 10 mobile launchers, with manufacturing commencing in August 2019. The system achieved operational status around 2014, with deployments concentrated in northern and central to target strategic assets on the mainland. Advancements in the program include an extended-range variant under development, expanding the 's reach to 2,000 km from the baseline 1,200 km, while maintaining supersonic speeds for improved penetration against air defenses. integrated with other systems occurred in April 2020, validating performance post-initial concealment within the program. In late 2024, NCSIST initiated production of a hypersonic upgrade to the Ching Tien, incorporating advanced propulsion for Mach 6 speeds and ranges over 2,000 km, with small initial quantities delivered to the Taiwanese for deep-strike capabilities. This variant, termed Yun Feng 2, entered mass production on December 27, 2024, utilizing mobile launchers such as Czech Tatra or U.S. Oshkosh platforms to enhance survivability and rapid deployment. These developments align with Taiwan's indigenous initiative, which surpassed its 2026 production goal by delivering over 1,000 units across programs by 2024, bolstering deterrence amid regional tensions.

Design and Technology

Airframe and Guidance Systems

The Yun Feng supersonic features a ground-launched optimized for integration with a engine and solid-fueled booster, enabling sustained flight at speeds up to 1,030 m/s. The 's cylindrical body measures approximately 10 meters in length and 1 meter in diameter, providing the structural volume for propulsion components, fuel storage, and a 225 kg semi-armor-piercing high-explosive fragmentation while maintaining aerodynamic stability during high-speed cruise. This configuration supports ranges of 1,200 km in its standard variant and up to 2,000 km in extended-range models, with the 's design facilitating mobile launcher compatibility for rapid deployment. Detailed public information on airframe materials or control surfaces remains limited owing to classification by Taiwan's National Chung-Shan of Science and Technology (NCSIST), the program's developer. As a ramjet-powered system, the structure must incorporate heat-resistant elements to manage from supersonic travel, though specific alloys or composites employed are undisclosed. Guidance systems for the Yun Feng are not explicitly detailed in open sources, reflecting the missile's strategic sensitivity. Comparable NCSIST-developed cruise missiles, such as the , utilize inertial navigation augmented by GPS for mid-course guidance and terrain contour matching () for accuracy over extended distances, technologies that enable precision targeting despite potential jamming or denial of satellite signals. Given the Yun Feng's land-attack role against fixed infrastructure in contested environments, its guidance likely employs similar multi-mode inertial and terrain-referenced systems to achieve required without reliance on vulnerable external cues, though official confirmation is absent.

Propulsion and Performance Characteristics

The Yun Feng supersonic utilizes a propulsion system supplemented by a solid-fuel booster for initial launch and acceleration to supersonic speeds. The engine, which is air-breathing, operates efficiently at high velocities by compressing incoming air for combustion, enabling sustained powered flight without the need for onboard oxidizers beyond the initial booster phase. This design draws from established principles adapted for tactical applications, though specific fuel compositions—potentially liquid-based for the sustainment—remain classified and unconfirmed in open sources. Performance metrics indicate a cruising speed of approximately Mach 2.5 at high altitudes, with peak velocities reaching up to 1,030 m/s (roughly Mach 3 at equivalents). These speeds facilitate reduced flight times and enhanced penetration against air defenses compared to subsonic counterparts, though the 's likely involves a boost-glide or level cruise profile post-booster separation to optimize range and evade interception. The standard variant achieves an operational range of about 1,200 km, sufficient to target inland assets on the mainland Chinese coast from Taiwanese launch platforms, while an extended-range version under development extends this to 2,000 km, potentially placing within reach. High-altitude operation further contributes to its standoff capability, minimizing drag and improving during the ramjet-powered cruise phase. Limited public testing data, such as launches from the Jiupeng base in 2022, corroborates the system's supersonic sustainment, but precise thrust outputs, values, or endurance limits are not disclosed, reflecting the program's secretive nature. Estimates from defense analysts suggest the propulsion yields a compact, ground- or sea-launched platform weighing under 2,000 kg, balancing capacity—typically a conventional of several hundred kilograms—with aerodynamic efficiency. Ongoing Taiwanese efforts to refine integration aim to counter evolving threats, though independent verification of these parameters relies on indirect intelligence assessments rather than manufacturer disclosures.

Variants and Adaptations

Ching Tien (Enhanced Variant)

The Ching Tien enhanced variant represents an upgraded iteration of Taiwan's domestically developed Ching Tien hypersonic land-attack , originally designated under the Yun Feng program, with modifications aimed at achieving sustained hypersonic velocities and extended operational ranges. This version incorporates advanced propulsion and guidance enhancements to operate beyond Mach 5, reportedly reaching speeds up to Mach 6, which improves penetration against sophisticated integrated air defense systems. Key improvements in the enhanced variant include or advanced engines enabling high-altitude, sustained , contrasting with the baseline model's supersonic capabilities, thereby reducing flight time and intercept vulnerability. Range extensions target exceedance of the standard 2,000 km threshold, potentially surpassing this distance through optimized and lighter configurations, allowing strikes deeper into continental targets. Transition to mobile launch platforms, such as transporter erector launchers, further bolsters survivability by dispersing fixed-site vulnerabilities associated with earlier deployments. Developed by the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST), the variant builds on mass-produced Ching Tien units delivered to the starting in late 2024, with upgrade efforts reported as ongoing into 2025 to integrate hypersonic features without disrupting baseline production. Specific payload capacities remain classified, but estimates suggest compatibility with conventional unitary warheads similar to the original, weighing around 500 kg, optimized for precision strikes via inertial and . Details on testing milestones for the enhanced configuration are limited, reflecting Taiwan's policy of strategic ambiguity, though NCSIST has confirmed iterative advancements in materials for thermal resistance during hypersonic regimes. Operational assessments indicate the variant's design prioritizes asymmetric deterrence, with its high-speed profile complicating interception by systems like China's or S-400 equivalents, though real-world efficacy depends on electronic warfare resilience and integration, areas under continued refinement. Reports from Taiwanese defense sources emphasize its role in countering numerical disparities in inventories, but independent verification of performance claims is constrained by the program's opacity.

Potential Dual-Use Applications

The Yun Feng supersonic , developed exclusively for land-attack roles within Taiwan's asymmetric defense posture, exhibits limited potential for dual-use applications due to its specialized design and the classified parameters of the program. Technologies such as advanced propulsion and inertial navigation systems, while innovative, are tailored for high-speed, low-observable strikes over extended ranges up to 2,000 kilometers, with no verified civilian adaptations reported in open sources. The National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST), responsible for its development since the early , prioritizes defense R&D, and mass initiated around has focused solely on integration without disclosed technology transfers to commercial sectors. Broader missile technologies under regimes like the (MTCR) are recognized as having dual-use elements, such as guidance components applicable to aviation or UAVs, but Yun Feng's emphasis on penetrating advanced air defenses against PRC threats precludes such diversification. Taiwan's export controls on strategic high-tech commodities further restrict potential spillover, aligning with imperatives amid cross-strait tensions. Absent public evidence of spin-offs, any hypothetical benefits—such as materials for high-performance —remain speculative and unverified, underscoring the program's deterrence-centric rationale over commercial viability.

Strategic Role and Deployment

Integration into Taiwanese Defense Strategy

The Yun Feng supersonic cruise missile forms a critical component of Taiwan's asymmetric defense posture, emphasizing mobile, survivable strike capabilities to impose costs on a potential (PRC) invasion force. Developed by the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology, it enables precision strikes against high-value targets such as command centers, airfields, and ports deep in , up to 2,000 kilometers away, thereby extending Taiwan's defensive reach beyond the . This integration aligns with Taiwan's "porcupine strategy," which prioritizes numerous low-cost, hard-to-counter weapons over expensive symmetric platforms to deter amphibious assault by complicating PRC operational planning and logistics. Deployment of Yun Feng emphasizes mobility to evade preemptive strikes, with initial production including approximately 20 missiles and 10 truck-mounted launchers as of late 2019, integrated into or missile units alongside complementary systems like the and Hsiung Sheng. Its —reportedly approaching Mach 3 or higher—enhances penetration against PRC air defenses, supporting layered offensive operations that could disrupt staging areas in or farther inland during a conflict. Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense officially acknowledged the program's existence in October 2021, underscoring its role in bolstering deterrence without relying on vulnerable fixed infrastructure. In broader strategic terms, Yun Feng contributes to Taiwan's shift toward active denial capabilities, where offensive missiles counterbalance PRC numerical superiority in ships and by threatening escalation to the mainland, potentially raising the threshold for or . This approach, informed by lessons from conflicts like , favors distributed, concealable assets over concentrated forces, with Yun Feng's range enabling strikes on Beijing-area targets as a signaling mechanism of resolve. Production scaling, including enhanced variants, continues to integrate with indigenous drone and electronic warfare systems for coordinated salvos, though challenges persist in achieving full operational readiness amid resource constraints.

Operational Readiness and Production Scale

The Yun Feng missile, redesignated as Ching Tien, achieved initial operational capability around 2014 following successful testing of its propulsion system, though full-scale deployment has proceeded cautiously due to Taiwan's emphasis on indigenous production amid geopolitical sensitivities. Production approval for the 1,500 km-range variant was granted in 2021, enabling serial manufacturing at facilities managed by the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST). As of 2023, enhancements extended its range to potentially 2,000 km, with integration into truck-based mobile launchers to enhance survivability against preemptive strikes. Early production emphasized quality over quantity, with reports indicating an initial batch of approximately 20 missiles paired with 10 dedicated launchers by 2020, reflecting Taiwan's resource constraints and focus on precision deterrence rather than mass saturation. By 2024, Taiwan's broader missile production programs, including Yun Feng variants, exceeded targets two years ahead of schedule, supported by expanded NCSIST capacity and a defense budget allocation surpassing NT$100 billion (approximately US$3.1 billion) for precision-guided munitions. This acceleration addressed supply chain vulnerabilities exposed by international export restrictions, prioritizing domestic ramjet and booster component fabrication. However, exact inventory figures remain classified, with estimates suggesting limited stockpiles—likely in the low hundreds—sufficient for high-value targeting of People's Liberation Army assets in mainland China but insufficient for sustained attrition warfare. Operational readiness has been bolstered by integration into Taiwan's asymmetric defense posture, with exercises demonstrating compatibility with Hsiung Feng-series launch platforms and command systems as of 2022. Challenges persist in scaling hypersonic-grade materials production, where reliance on smuggled or licensed foreign has slowed maturation, though recent advancements in solid-fuel boosters indicate progress toward full-spectrum readiness by 2025. Taiwanese defense officials have confirmed the missile's role in deterring amphibious invasions, underscoring its strategic value despite opaque public disclosures intended to maintain uncertainty for adversaries.

Implications and Assessments

Deterrence Value Against PRC Threats

The Yun Feng supersonic enhances Taiwan's deterrence posture against (PRC) aggression by providing a standoff capability to strike high-value targets deep in , thereby imposing significant retaliatory costs on potential invaders. With an estimated range of 1,200 to 2,000 kilometers, the can reach strategic assets in northern and central regions, including command centers, airports, harbors, and possibly itself, complicating PRC and raising the threshold for cross-strait conflict. This capability aligns with Taiwan's "porcupine" strategy of asymmetric defense, emphasizing denial and attrition over symmetric confrontation, where the Yun Feng serves as a deep-interdiction tool to disrupt PRC , airfields, and leadership nodes during an scenario. By threatening to "hold at risk" through precise, survivable strikes—leveraging for reduced interception vulnerability—the missile discourages amphibious or air assaults by signaling that any attack on would trigger mainland devastation, potentially deterring escalation before it begins. Analyses from defense experts underscore its role in layered deterrence, where integration with shorter-range systems like the creates a graduated response spectrum, forcing PRC forces to contend with persistent threats across the and beyond. Production advancements, including scaled manufacturing reported as ahead of schedule by , bolster operational credibility, though exact deployment numbers remain classified to preserve uncertainty for adversaries. This uncertainty itself amplifies deterrence, as PRC planners must assume sufficient quantities to penetrate air defenses and exact measurable damage.

Criticisms, Limitations, and Debates

The Yun Feng supersonic has faced from Taiwanese analysts for its extended range of up to 2,000 kilometers, which some argue conflicts with Taiwan's constitutionally mandated defensive posture by enabling strikes deep into , potentially escalating cross-strait tensions and undermining international sympathy for Taiwan's defense. This offensive capability is seen as provocative, possibly inviting preemptive Chinese responses or straining alliances, as it shifts from porcupine-style area denial to targeting. A key limitation is the missile's vulnerability to China's advanced integrated air defense systems, including S-400 surface-to-air missiles and fighter interceptors, which could intercept supersonic cruise missiles flying at high altitudes, reducing its penetration effectiveness despite speeds exceeding Mach 3. Taiwan's limited intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) infrastructure further hampers precise targeting of mobile or hardened sites on the mainland, as real-time data for strikes over 1,000 kilometers remains inadequate without external support. Debates persist over the Yun Feng's strategic utility, with proponents viewing it as an asymmetric deterrent to impose costs on staging areas, while skeptics question its accuracy—estimated at several meters in theory but unproven in combat—and scalability, given Taiwan's constrained production rates and reliance on indigenous components amid export controls. Critics also highlight the risk of an spiral, as expanded Yun Feng deployments may accelerate China's hypersonic and anti-access/area-denial advancements, complicating Taiwan's overall deterrence calculus.

Geopolitical Context and International Perspectives

The development of the Yun Feng supersonic occurs amid escalating tensions in the , where the (PRC) maintains its claim over as a breakaway province and has intensified military exercises, aircraft incursions, and amphibious capabilities since 2016, including over 1,700 PLA aircraft crossings of the median line by mid-2023. 's pursuit of indigenous long-range strike systems like Yun Feng, with an estimated range of 1,200 to 2,000 kilometers enabling strikes on PRC command centers, ports, and airfields in northern and central regions, reflects a shift toward asymmetric deterrence to counter the PRC's numerical superiority in conventional forces and short-range missiles such as the DF-17. This capability addresses 's historical reliance on U.S. arms sales, constrained by production delays and political uncertainties, positioning Yun Feng as a hedge against potential isolation in a conflict scenario. From the PRC's perspective, Taiwan's Yun Feng program represents an escalatory threat to its core interests, prompting condemnations and warnings of severe repercussions; following a 2022 statement by a Taiwanese affirming the missile's ability to reach , PRC state media asserted that any such use would lead to Taiwan's "demise" and accelerated PLA deployments of counterforce assets like hypersonic glide vehicles. frames these developments as provocative , justifying its own expansions under the guise of "reunification" deterrence, though empirical assessments indicate PRC air defenses, including S-400 systems, may limit Yun Feng's penetration efficacy against hardened targets. Western analysts offer mixed evaluations: U.S.-based think tanks such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) highlight Yun Feng's potential to impose costs on PRC invasion forces by targeting inland logistics, enhancing Taiwan's "porcupine" strategy, yet caution that offensive deep-strike assets risk alienating allies by blurring defensive lines and inviting preemptive PRC responses in a spiraling regional arms race. Carnegie Endowment reports on Indo-Pacific missile dynamics underscore escalation risks from reciprocal deployments, recommending transparency measures to mitigate miscalculation, while noting Taiwan's program as a rational response to PRC gray-zone coercion rather than unprovoked aggression. Limited reactions from other actors, such as Japan or Australia, focus on broader alliance implications, viewing Taiwan's self-reliance as stabilizing against unchecked PRC dominance without direct endorsements of the weapon's deployment.

References

  1. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/yun-feng/
  2. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2024/12/29/2003829294
  3. https://interestingengineering.com/military/taiwan-hypersonic-missile-china-challenge
  4. https://www.twz.com/secretive-taiwanese-cruise-missile-able-to-strike-deep-in-china-may-have-broken-cover
  5. https://militarnyi.com/en/news/taiwan-develops-hypersonic-cruise-missile-with-range-of-over-2000-km/
  6. https://defense.info/global-dynamics/2021/08/taiwans-yun-feng-missile-part-of-the-defense-against-the-prc/
  7. https://dominotheory.com/taiwans-beijing-targeting-cruise-missile/
  8. https://www.militaryperiscope.com/weapons/missilesrocketsbombs/land-attacktheater/yun-feng-cruise-missile/overview/
  9. https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/taiwan/yunfeng.htm
  10. https://dominotheory.com/taiwans-long-range-missile-targets-chinas-leadership/
  11. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/thanks-yun-feng-missile-taiwan-can-hold-china-risk-180925/
  12. https://www.twz.com/taiwan-official-warns-supersonic-cruise-missile-can-strike-beijing
  13. https://militarnyi.com/en/news/the-yun-feng-supersonic-cruise-missiles-might-reach-beijing-taiwan-stated/
  14. https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202110060012
  15. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3203682/taiwan-has-missiles-able-hit-beijing-former-head-islands-top-weapons-builder-confirms
  16. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/4755415
  17. https://asiatimes.com/2025/01/taiwan-hypersonics-aim-for-deep-strikes-on-the-mainland/
  18. https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/10/taiwans-missile-programs/
  19. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/meet-sun-feng-missile-taiwans-ultimate-policy-against-china-165106
  20. https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2025/taiwan-deploys-new-qingtian-hypersonic-missile-to-counter-chinas-growing-missile-capabilities
  21. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/6003860
  22. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/6184180
  23. https://www.asianmilitaryreview.com/2025/09/taiwan-seeks-low-cost-cruise-missiles-via-foreign-tie-ups-foc/
  24. https://asiatimes.com/2023/08/taiwans-secret-missile-for-striking-deep-in-china/
  25. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-11/Chapter_4--Dangerous_Period_for_Cross-Strait_Deterrence.pdf
  26. https://globaltaiwan.org/2018/01/reassessing-taiwans-pursuit-of-a-deep-interdiction-capability/
  27. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/2204_hgvs_and_hcm_challenges_for_the_mtcr.pdf
  28. https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/op32-taiwan-export-control.pdf
  29. https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/deemed-exports/deemed-exports-faqs/cat/19-missile-technology-faqs
  30. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-good-taiwans-new-hypersonic-missile-101402/
  31. https://tnsr.org/2021/12/a-large-number-of-small-things-a-porcupine-strategy-for-taiwan/
  32. https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2101&context=jss
  33. https://www.twz.com/this-is-how-taiwans-military-would-go-to-war-with-china
  34. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2021/10/13/2003765999
  35. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID4089303_code5165781.pdf?abstractid=4089303&mirid=1
  36. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2023/11/13/2003809084
  37. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/serious-business-why-taiwans-new-cruise-missile-means-they-arent-fooling-around-136867
  38. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/thanks-yun-feng-missile-taiwan-can-hold-china-risk-180925
  39. https://ipdefenseforum.com/2025/04/taiwan-sharpens-porcupine-capabilities-to-deter-ccp-invasion-threat/
  40. https://www.businessinsider.com/china-taiwan-new-missile-can-strike-deep-into-china
  41. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/10/indo-pacific-missile-arsenals-avoiding-spirals-and-mitigating-escalation-risks?lang=en
  42. https://www.newsweek.com/taiwan-china-missile-threat-targeting-beijing-1843172
  43. https://www.newsweek.com/china-taiwan-relations-military-missiles-taipei-beijing-1715957
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.