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Able Danger
Able Danger
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Able Danger was a classified military planning effort led by the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). It was created as a result of a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early October 1999 by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Hugh Shelton, to develop an information operations campaign plan against transnational terrorism.

According to statements by Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer and those of four others, Able Danger had identified two of three al-Qaeda cells active in the September 11 attacks; the 'Brooklyn cell' linked to "Blind Sheik" Omar Abdel-Rahman, including 9/11 leader Mohamed Atta, and three of the plot's other 19 hijackers.

In December 2006, a sixteen-month investigation by the US Senate Intelligence Committee concluded "Able Danger did not identify Mohamed Atta or any other 9/11 hijacker at any time prior to September 11, 2001", and dismissed other assertions that have fueled 9/11 conspiracy theories. The Senate Judiciary Committee first attempted to investigate the matter for the Senate in September, 2005. The Pentagon "ordered five key witnesses not to testify", according to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter. "That looks to me as if it may be obstruction of the committee's activities", Specter, R-Pennsylvania, said at the start of his committee's hearing into the unit.[1]

Attorney Mark Zaid, representing Lt. Colonel Anthony Shaffer and the other four Able Danger employees at the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing in September 2005, pointed out to the Committee that his clients had been forbidden by the Pentagon to testify to the committee. He also discussed the Defense Intelligence Agency's decision to suspend Lt. Colonel Shaffer's security clearance shortly after it became known that he had provided information to the 9/11 Commission on Able Danger. "Based on years of experience I can say categorically that the basis for the revocation was questionable at best."[2][3]

An investigation by the Defense Department Inspector General's office (IG) in September 2006 concluded that "the evidence did not support assertions that Able Danger identified the September 11, 2001, terrorists nearly a year before the attack, that Able Danger team members were prohibited from sharing information with law enforcement authorities, or that DoD officials acted against LTC Shaffer for his disclosures regarding Able Danger." However, some of the people questioned by the IG claimed their statements to the IG were distorted by investigators in the final IG's report, and the report omitted essential information that they had provided. Lt. Col Tony Shaffer has claimed that the DoD retaliated against him for speaking out publicly about the IG report's distortions.[4]

The Senate panel of investigators said there was no evidence DoD lawyers stopped analysts from sharing findings with the FBI before the attacks. Analysts had created charts that included pictures of then-known Al Qaeda operatives, but none including Atta. A follow-up chart made after the attacks did show Atta. The Senate Committee said its findings were consistent with those of the DoD inspector general, released in September 2006. [5] [6]

Overview

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The program used data mining techniques to associate open source information with classified information in an attempt to make connections among individual members of terrorist groups as part of its original "intelligence preparation of the battlespace". The objective of this particular project was to ascertain whether the data mining techniques and open source material were effective tools in determining terrorist activities, and if the resultant data could be used to create operational plans that could be executed in a timely fashion to interrupt, capture and/or destroy terrorists or their cells.[7][8]

According to statements by Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer and those of four others, Able Danger had identified 2 of 3 Al Qaeda cells active in the 9/11 attacks; the 'Brooklyn cell' linked to Blind Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman, including September 11 attacks leader Mohamed Atta, and three of the 9/11 plot's other 19 hijackers, as possible members of an al Qaeda cell linked to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.[9]

This theory was heavily investigated and researched by Republican Representative Curt Weldon, vice chairman of the House Armed Services and House Homeland Security committees. However, Defense Intelligence Agency leadership had already ordered the hurried destruction of mined data, source databases, charts and resultant documents on entirely spurious legal grounds. DIA also prevented key personnel from testifying to both the Senate Judiciary and Senate Intelligence Committees, though after numerous denials did admit the program's existence.[10]

In December 2006, an investigation by the US Senate Intelligence Committee concluded that assertions could not be confirmed. It stated that they were unable to find supporting evidence regarding "one of the most disturbing claims about the Sept. 11 terrorist strikes."[5] This report released by the Senate Intelligence Committee copied, nearly verbatim, the United States Department of Defense Inspector General's September 2006 report on Able Danger.

Assertion that Able Danger identified 9/11 hijackers

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The existence of Able Danger, and its purported early identification of the 9/11 terrorists, was first disclosed publicly on June 19, 2005, in an article[11] by Keith Phucas, a reporter for The Times Herald, a Norristown, Pennsylvania, daily newspaper. Eight days later, on June 27, 2005, Representative Curt Weldon, vice chairman of the House Armed Services and House Homeland Security committees and the principal source for the Phucas article, gave a special orders speech on the House floor detailing Able Danger:

Mr. Speaker, I rise because information has come to my attention over the past several months that is very disturbing. I have learned that, in fact, one of our Federal agencies had, in fact, identified the major New York cell of Mohamed Atta prior to 9/11; and I have learned, Mr. Speaker, that in September 2000, that Federal agency actually was prepared to bring the FBI in and prepared to work with the FBI to take down the cell that Mohamed Atta was involved in in New York City, along with two of the other terrorists. I have also learned, Mr. Speaker, that when that recommendation was discussed within that Federal agency, the lawyers in the administration at that time said, you cannot pursue contact with the FBI against that cell. Mohamed Atta is in the U.S. on a green card, and we are fearful of the fallout from the Waco incident. So we did not allow that Federal agency to proceed.[12]

Rep. Weldon later reiterated these concerns during news conferences on February 14, 2006. He believed that Able Danger identified Mohamed Atta 13 separate times prior to 9/11 and that the unit also identified a potential situation in Yemen two weeks prior to the October 12, 2000 attack on the USS Cole.[13] The Pentagon released a statement in response, stating that they wished to address these issues during a congressional hearing before a House Armed Services subcommittee scheduled for Wednesday, February 15, 2006.

Able Danger and the 9/11 Commission

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Curt Weldon's assertion that Able Danger identified the 9/11 hijackers was picked up by the national media in August 2005, after it was reported in the bimonthly Government Security News.[14] In addition to asserting that Able Danger identified the 9/11 hijackers and was prevented from passing that information onto the FBI, Weldon also alleged the intelligence concerning Able Danger was provided to the 9/11 Commission and ignored.[15] Two 9/11 Commission members, Timothy J. Roemer and John F. Lehman, both claimed not to have received any information on Able Danger.[14]

Following the GSN report, members of the 9/11 Commission began commenting on the information they had on Able Danger and Atta. Lee H. Hamilton, former vice chair of the 9/11 Commission, and Alvin S. Felzenberg, a former spokesman for the 9/11 Commission,[16] both denied that the 9/11 Commission had any information on the identification of Mohamed Atta prior to the attacks.[17] Hamilton told the media, "The Sept. 11 commission did not learn of any U.S. government knowledge prior to 9/11 of surveillance of Mohamed Atta or of his cell.... Had we learned of it obviously it would've been a major focus of our investigation."[18]

On August 12, 2005, Hamilton and 9/11 Commission chairman Thomas Kean issued a statement in response to media inquiries about the commission's investigation of the Able Danger program.[19] It stated the commission had been aware of the Able Danger program, and requested and obtained information about it from the Department of Defense, but none of the information provided had indicated the program had identified Atta or other 9/11 hijackers. They further stated that a claim about Atta having been identified prior to the attacks had been made to the 9/11 Commission on July 12, 2004, just days before the commission's report was released, by a United States Navy officer employed at DOD, but that

The interviewee had no documentary evidence and said he had only seen the document briefly some years earlier. He could not describe what information had led to this supposed Atta identification. Nor could the interviewee recall, when questioned, any details about how he thought a link to Atta could have been made by this DOD program in 2000 or any time before 9/11. The Department of Defense documents had mentioned nothing about Atta, nor had anyone come forward between September 2001 and July 2004 with any similar information. Weighing this with the information about Atta's actual activities, the negligible information available about Atta to other U.S. government agencies and the German government before 9/11, and the interviewer's assessment of the interviewee's knowledge and credibility, the Commission staff concluded that the officer's account was not sufficiently reliable to warrant revision of the report or further investigation.[19]

Congressman Curt Weldon issued a response to the 9/11 Commission[20] clarifying the mission of Able Danger, expressing concern over the statements made by various members of the 9/11 Commission, and promising to push forward until it is understood why the DoD was unable to pass the information uncovered by Able Danger to the FBI, and why the 9/11 Commission failed to follow up on the information they were given on Able Danger.

The 9/11 Commission has released multiple statements over the past week, each of which has significantly changed – from initially denying ever being briefed to acknowledging being briefed on both operation ABLE DANGER and Mohamed Atta. The information was omitted primarily because they found it to be suspect despite having been briefed on it two times by two different military officers on active duty. Additionally, the 9/11 Commission also received documents from the Department of Defense on ABLE DANGER.[20]

Congressman Weldon reiterated these statements in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on September 21, 2005.[21]

Able Danger data destroyed

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In his book Countdown to Terror, Weldon asserted that an Able Danger chart produced in 1999 identifying 9/11 hijackers Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi had been presented to then-Deputy National Security Advisor Jim Steinberg. Weldon went on to claim that he had personally presented the chart to then-Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley in 2001, days after the 9/11 attacks.[22]

He later stated that he was no longer sure that Atta's name appeared on that document.[23]

Congressman Peter Hoekstra, who was then chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, investigated the matter at Weldon's request, was reported to have cautioned against "hyperventilating" before the completion of a "thorough" probe. Pentagon officials said they were unaware that any Able Danger material named Atta. They declined to comment on the reports as they worked to clarify the matter.[23]

On August 14, 2005, Mike Kelly, a columnist for The (Bergen) Record (New Jersey), described a telephone interview, arranged by the staff of Rep. Curt Weldon, with a man who identified himself as a member of the Able Danger team, but asked that his name not be revealed. In the interview, the man claimed his team had identified Mohamed Atta and three other 9/11 hijackers as likely Al-Qaeda terrorists operating in the United States, but were prevented from passing this information on to the FBI by government lawyers. He also claimed he was ignored by the 9/11 Commission's staff when he approached them on two occasions to explain Able Danger's work.[24]

On September 15, 2005, Weldon asserted that he had identified an employee who had been ordered to destroy the 2.5 terabytes (TB) of data collected by Able Danger two years before the 9/11 attack.[25]

Weldon changes his story

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A Time magazine article dated August 14, 2005, reports that Weldon admitted he is no longer sure that Atta's name was on the chart he presented to Hadley and that he was unable to verify whether this was the case, having handed over his only copy, and that a reconstruction was used for post-9/11 presentations.[26] Weldon gave a talk at The Heritage Foundation with a chart he described as the one handed over on May 23, 2002. However, a week later he referred reporters to a recently reconstructed version of the chart in his office where, among dozens of names and photos of terrorists from around the world, there was a color mug shot of Mohamed Atta, circled in black marker.[citation needed]

Comments by members of the Able Danger team

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Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer

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After Weldon's assertions were disputed, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, a member of the Able Danger team, identified himself as Weldon's source. Shaffer claimed that he alerted the FBI in September 2000 about the information uncovered by the secret military unit "Able Danger", but he alleges three meetings he set up with bureau officials were blocked by military lawyers. Shaffer, who at the time worked for the Defense Intelligence Agency, claims he communicated to members of the 9/11 Commission that Able Danger had identified two of the three cells responsible for 9/11 prior to the attacks, but the Commission did not include this information in their final report.[27]

Shaffer specifically states that in January 2000, Able Danger data-mining revealed the existence of a 'Brooklyn' Al-Qaeda cell connected to the "Blind Sheik" Omar Abdel-Rahman, as well as two other cells overseas. Shaffer & Philpott examined this chart of Al Qaeda suspected operatives, containing names & photos, and Philpott pointed out one particular sinister and "scary looking dude" -- Mohammed Atta.[9] However, on December 22, 2006, a 16-month investigation by the Senate Intelligence Committee concluded that Able Danger, "did not identify Mohamed Atta or any other 9/11 hijacker at any time prior to September 11, 2001,".[28] The Defense Department's inspector general (DoD OIG) made a similar conclusion.[29][30]

Shaffer's lawyer, Mark Zaid, has revealed that Shaffer had been placed on paid administrative leave for what he called "petty and frivolous" reasons and had his security clearance suspended in March 2004, following a dispute over travel mileage expenses and personal use of a work cell phone.[31] According to the DIA, Shaffer came under investigation while deployed as a staff officer in Afghanistan due to a pattern of misconduct including obtaining a service medal under false pretenses, improperly flashing military identification while drunk, theft, and falsely claiming reimbursement for mileage and personal mobile phone charges.[32]

Congressman Weldon asked for a new probe into the activities undertaken to silence Lt. Col. Shaffer from publicly commenting on Able Danger and Able Danger's identification of the 9/11 hijackers. Weldon called the activities "a deliberate campaign of character assassination."[33] An investigation the Defense Department's inspector general concluded that "DIA officials did not reprise against LTC Shaffer, in either his civilian or military capacity, for making disclosures regarding Able Danger".[30]

Shaffer has also told the story of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) opposition to Able Danger, prior to 9/11, based on the view that Able Danger was encroaching on CIA turf. According to Shaffer, the CIA representative said, "I clearly understand. We're going after the leadership. You guys are going after the body. But, it doesn't matter. The bottom line is, CIA will never give you the best information from "Alex Base" or anywhere else. CIA will never provide that to you because if you were successful in your effort to target Al Qaeda, you will steal our thunder. Therefore, we will not support this."[34]

[edit]

Capt. Scott Phillpott confirmed Shaffer's claims. "I will not discuss this outside of my chain of command", Phillpott said in a statement to Fox News. "I have briefed the Department of the Army, the Special Operations Command and the office of (Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence) Dr. Cambone as well as the 9/11 Commission. My story has remained consistent. Atta was identified by Able Danger in January/February 2000", he was quoted as saying.[35]

James D. Smith

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Shaffer's claims were also confirmed by James D. Smith, a civilian contractor who worked on Able Danger. In an interview with Fox News, Smith reported that the project had involved analysis of data from a large number of public sources and 20 to 30 individuals.[36]

Smith stated that Atta's name had emerged during an examination of individuals known to have ties to Omar Abdel Rahman, a leading figure in the first World Trade Center bombing.

Major Erik Kleinsmith

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Major Erik Kleinsmith, who was with the Army and chief of intelligence for LIWA until February 2001, testified that he was ordered to destroy Able Danger's information. "I deleted the data", he said. "There were two sets, classified and unclassified, and also an 'all sorts,'" which contained a blend of the two, "plus charts we'd produced." Kleinsmith deleted the 2.5 terabytes of data in May and June, 2000, on orders of Tony Gentry, general counsel of the Army Intelligence and Security Command.[37]

Other witnesses

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The Defense Department announced its findings on September 1, 2005, after a three-week investigation into Able Danger. The statement announced the discovery of three other witnesses in addition to Shaffer and Phillpott who confirm Able Danger had produced a chart that "either mentioned Atta by name as an al-Qaeda operative [and/or] showed his photograph." Four of the five witnesses remember the photo on the chart. The fifth remembers only Atta being cited by name. The Pentagon describes the witnesses as "credible" but stated that the document which allegedly mentioned Atta could not be found.[38][39]

The wall

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Former chief assistant U.S. attorney Andrew McCarthy and others have asserted that the Able Danger intelligence was suppressed as a result of a policy of forbidding the CIA and FBI to share intelligence known as "the wall."[40] During the 9/11 Commission hearings, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft testified the wall was strengthened under the Clinton administration by Jamie Gorelick to prohibit sharing of terrorist intelligence within the federal government.[41]

This assertion was disputed by former senator Slade Gorton (R-WA), a member of the 9/11 Commission, who said, "nothing Jamie Gorelick wrote had the slightest impact on the Department of Defense or its willingness or ability to share intelligence information with other intelligence agencies." Gorton also asserted that "the wall" was a long-standing policy that had resulted from the Church Committee in the 1970s, and that the policy only prohibits transfer of certain information from prosecutors to the intelligence services and never prohibited information flowing in the opposite direction.[citation needed]

Skepticism

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Two Attas theory

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Mickey Kaus of Slate, referring to Tom Maguire's "Two Attas" theory,[42][unreliable source?] speculates that "the 'Atta' fingered by Able Danger was really the first, 'Abu Nidal' Atta, and not the second, 9/11 'Al Qaeda' Atta", and that this may help explain this Able Danger issue.[43] Snopes clarified a widely circulated email that claimed the two Attas were one and the same.[44]

Another variation of the Two Attas theory reported by Kaus notes that Omar Abdel Rahman also had an associate with the name Mohamed El-Amir (a name sometimes used by Atta) who was not the Mohamed Atta involved in the 9/11 hijacking.[45]

However, Shaffer clarified that. He told 9/11 Commission staffers Able Danger identified three of the individuals in the terrorist cells that conducted the 9/11 attacks, to include Atta - Shaffer did not mention the names of any other of the 9/11 hijackers in his disclosure to the 9/11 staff. A fourth 9/11 terrorist came from the second cell.[46] Eric Umansky states the problem this way: "In fact, the two-Atta theory only leaves one major issue unexplained: What about the three other 9/11 hijackers that Able Danger purportedly fingered?[citation needed]

The Department of Defense released a report addressing the issue of two possible individuals with the last name of Atta and explaining that it was basically a clerical error.

When we reviewed INS records, they appeared to reflect two entries by Atta into the United States on January 10, 2001, which initially raised a question as to whether Atta had entered twice on the same day or whether a second person posing as Atta also entered on January 10, 2001. The NIIS printout for the first entry reflects that Atta entered with an admission period of January 10, 2001, to September 8, 2001 (admission number 68653985708). The second record reflects a second entry on January 10, 2001, with an admission period from January 10, 2001, to July 9, 2001 (admission number 10847166009). However, this occurred because the inspector at the Miami District Office who changed Atta's admission date failed to follow the proper procedure to ensure that the previous entry would be corrected, and a new entry was created in NIIS. The inspector sent the old I-94 and the corrected I-94 to the contractor which data enters I-94s for the INS. The May 2, 2001, transaction with Atta was data entered and then uploaded to NIIS as if it were a new entry by Atta. This happened because the inspector issued a new I-94 with a new admission number on it. To prevent two entries from occurring in NIIS, the inspector should have crossed out the admission number on the new I-94, made a reference to the previous admission number and noted that it was not a new entry.[47]

IG report is disputed by Lt. Col. Shaffer and other Able Danger team members, some of whom were never interviewed by the IG's office nor the 9/11 commission. Congressman Weldon also claims the report was a hurried, botched up investigation that was intended to close the books on the subject rather than report on the facts.

For example this lead was never followed: "Normen Pentolino, operations manager at the Hollywood store, said two cashiers told FBI agents they might have recognized Atta, but weren't certain. Sources inside the store said Atta may have held a BJ's membership card for more than two years."[48]

Timing

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Kevin Drum, writing for The Washington Monthly notes that reports of the precise date at which the information was allegedly passed to the FBI vary considerably. It is most unlikely that Able Danger would have identified a terrorist called "Mohamed Atta" before May 2000.

Since 9/11, of course, we have retrieved every scrap of information ever known about Mohamed Atta, so we know what information would have been available to the Able Danger data mining operation. And what we know is that Mohamed Atta sent his first email to friends in the U.S. in March 2000 and received his first U.S. visa on May 18, 2000. Moreover, that was the first time he had ever gone by the name "Mohamed Atta." His full name is "Mohamed Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed Atta", and prior to 2000 he went by "Mohamed el-Amir".

Congressional hearings

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Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter held a hearing on September 21, 2005, looking into the facts about Able Danger. However, Lt. Col. Shaffer and the other four members of Able Danger were ordered not to testify by the Department of Defense.[49] Senator Specter decided to go forward with the hearings anyway.

Senator Specter wondered if the Posse Comitatus Act may have been the reason Defense Department attorneys would not allow Able Danger to turn over information to the FBI. The Posse Comitatus Act prevents the military from being engaged in law enforcement activities, including gathering information on U.S. persons, despite the aliens were not specifically United States citizens. Speaking on behalf of Lt. Col. Shaffer, attorney Mark Zaid testified "Those within Able Danger were confident they weren't compiling information on US persons. They were potentially people connected to US persons."[50]

Zaid also strongly asserted on behalf of his clients,

"Let me emphasize two specific items for clarification purposes because they have been distorted and invited undue criticism from some.

At no time did Able Danger identify Mohamed Atta as being physically present in the United States.

No information obtained at the time would have led anyone to believe criminal activity had taken place or that any specific terrorist activities were being planned. Again, the identification of the four 9/11 hijackers was simply through associational activities. Those associations could have been completely innocuous or nefarious. It was impossible to tell which, and the unclassified work of Able Danger was not designed to address that question."[49]

He further added that

"unfortunately we are not aware of the continuing existence of any chart containing Mohamed Atta's name or photograph. The copies that would have been in the possession of the U.S. Army were apparently destroyed by March 2001. The copies within Lt Col Shaffer's files were destroyed by the DIA in approximately Spring 2004. The destruction of these files is an important element to this story and I encourage the Committee to investigate it further. It would appear, particularly given the Defense Department's outright refusal to allow those involved with Able Danger to testify today, that an obstructionist attitude exists. The question for this Committee is to investigate how far that position extends and why."[51]

Former Army Major Erik Kleinsmith, former head of the Pentagon's Land Warfare Analysis Department, testified at the hearing that he had been instructed to destroy data and documents related to Able Danger in May and June 2000. When asked whether the information could have prevented the attack on September 11 of 2001, he answered that he would not speculate to that, but that the information might have been useful.[52]

Subsequent investigations

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On February 14, 2006, Congressmen Curt Weldon charged that contrary to testimony, not all the data on Able Danger had been destroyed. Weldon claimed to be in contact with people in the government still able to do data-mining who got 13 hits on Mohamed Atta. Weldon also claimed that Able Danger information was found in Pentagon files as recently as two weeks prior to his statement and that a general was present when the files were taken from the cabinet.[citation needed] The next day, there was a joint committee meeting with the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities and the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, to discuss the Able Danger program.[53]

On September 21, 2006, The Washington Post reported that a Defense Department investigation into Able Danger found that Able Danger did not identify Mohamed Atta or any other hijacker before the September 11 attacks, and that a widely discussed chart was "a sample document passed to the military as an example of how to organize large amounts of data", and was created after 9/11.

Inspector General's report

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On September 18, 2006, the Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Investigations released a report stating that Shaffer was put on leave, that the crew responsible for removing any classified documents from his office to prevent his taking them home with him found that he did not have any of the Able Danger-related documents trusted to him he claimed he had,[54] and that despite the fact that the Army cleared him of any wrongdoing in the allegations "DIA officials would have taken action to revoke LTC Shaffer's access and clearance regardless of his disclosures to the DIA IG, the 9/11 Commission staff members, Members of Congress, or the media.[55]

The Department of Defense investigation concluded:

  • The anti-terrorist program, Able Danger, did not identify Mohamed Atta or any other 9/11 terrorists before the 9/11 attack.
  • Able Danger members were not prohibited from sharing intelligence information with law enforcement authorities or other agencies that could have acted on that information. In fact, Able Danger produced no actionable intelligence information.
  • The destruction of Able Danger documentation at LIWA and Garland was appropriate and complied with applicable DoD regulations.
  • The Able Danger program was not terminated prematurely. It concluded after it had achieved its objective and its work products were used in follow-on intelligence gathering efforts at USSOCOM."[56]

Alleged evidence of IG cover-up

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Five witnesses who had worked on Able Danger and had been questioned by the Defense Department's Inspector General later told investigative journalists that their statements to the IG were distorted by investigators in the final IG's report, or the report omitted essential information that they had provided. The alleged distortions of the IG report centered around excluding any evidence that Able Danger had identified and tracked Atta years before 9/11. The witnesses reported to the journalists that the IG investigators got increasingly hostile in an effort to intimidate the witnesses into changing their testimony to drop any assertion that they had identified and tracked Atta, and this suggests a cover-up by the IG of Able Danger's findings. Witnesses reported telling Philip Zelikow, executive director of the 9/11 Commission, that Able Danger had identified Atta well before the 9/11 attacks, but Zelikow showed no interest in their testimony. Lt. Col Tony Shaffer also reported that the DOD has retaliated against him for speaking out publicly about the IG report's distortions.[4]

Movie

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The independent film Able Danger was released in 2008. The screenplay written by Paul Krik centers around a Brooklyn, New York coffee shop owner who receives a disk proving a tie between the CIA and the 9/11 attacks.[57]

Book

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Operation Dark Heart by Anthony A. Shaffer, released in September 2010,[58] includes memories of his time reporting to the 9/11 Commission about Able Danger's findings. The 10,000 copies of the books have not been released yet. The DOD's Defense Intelligence Agency reviewers identified more than 200 passages suspected of containing classified information.[59] "Specifically, the DIA wanted references to a meeting between Lt. Col. Tony Shaffer, the book's author, and the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, Philip Zelikow, removed".[60] DOD took the highly unusual step of purchasing all available copies of Shaffer's book at a cost of $47,000 and destroying them to deny the public the ability to read the book.[4]

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Able Danger was a classified military planning operation initiated by the U.S. Command (SOCOM) in 1999, in collaboration with the (DIA), focused on using data-mining techniques to identify and disrupt networks through analysis of open-source and classified intelligence data. The program developed innovative analytical tools for , including methods for linking disparate data sets to reveal potential threats, which were later adapted for broader use in operations despite its termination in early 2001 due to resource constraints and legal concerns over data handling. It gained significant attention in 2005 following public disclosures by participants, including Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, who alleged that the team had identified and other future 9/11 hijackers as threats as early as January 2000 but was prohibited from sharing findings with the FBI due to interagency restrictions and subsequent destruction of relevant charts containing information on U.S. persons. These claims prompted congressional hearings on intelligence-sharing barriers and investigations by the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which concluded there was no evidence that Able Danger had identified Atta or other hijackers prior to the September 11 attacks, nor that any actionable intelligence was suppressed; instead, the reviews affirmed that data destruction complied with privacy regulations and that the program's outputs did not yield pre-9/11 terrorist identifications as claimed. The controversy underscored longstanding challenges in pre-9/11 intelligence coordination between military and civilian agencies, contributing to post-attack reforms aimed at enhancing while balancing .

Program Origins and Operations

Establishment and Objectives

Able Danger was a classified program initiated in October 1999 by the U.S. Command (SOCOM) in collaboration with the (DIA). It originated as a planning effort to enhance U.S. military capabilities against emerging threats from , drawing on personnel from SOCOM's Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) at , , for . The program's formation responded to post-Cold War shifts toward asymmetric threats, with initial phases focused on developing proof-of-concept methodologies rather than immediate operational deployment. The core objectives centered on pioneering and techniques to map Al Qaeda's organizational structure, identify key operatives, and uncover potential cells operating within the and abroad. By aggregating and analyzing massive volumes of data—estimated at over 2.5 terabytes, including open-source materials, records, and unclassified —the initiative sought to reveal hidden associations and predictive patterns of terrorist activity. Proponents, including Representative , emphasized its goal of providing actionable to preempt attacks, framing it as a proactive tool for "detecting, fixing, and finishing" threats through network visualization and . While the program's architects intended it to bridge gaps in traditional collection by exploiting commercial data-mining software adapted for use, its scope was deliberately narrow to comply with protocols and resource constraints, limiting it to five-person teams rotating through focused iterations. Official Department of Defense reviews later acknowledged its contributions to broader toolsets, though they disputed claims of pre-9/11 breakthroughs, attributing successes to methodological innovations rather than specific threat identifications.

Data Mining Methodology

Able Danger utilized as its primary data mining technique to map relationships among Al Qaeda members and affiliates, enabling the identification of potential terrorist networks and cells. This method involved constructing visual charts and diagrams that connected entities such as individuals, organizations, and events based on shared attributes or interactions, facilitating the detection of patterns indicative of asymmetric threats. The approach drew on network analysis principles to prioritize high-value targets for disruption, capture, or elimination, with outputs informing operational planning by U.S. Command (SOCOM). Data inputs comprised approximately 2.5 terabytes from both open-source materials—such as , news reports, and commercial databases—and classified sources, aggregated to form comprehensive datasets on global Al Qaeda activities. Analysis occurred at facilities like the Information Dominance Center, where a core team of four analysts, led by figures including Dr. Eileen Preisser, processed this volume using specialized tools developed or supported by the Land Activity (LIWA) under U.S. Army and Security Command (INSCOM). The methodology emphasized scalable processing of to uncover hidden associations, testing analytical limits on large-scale datasets without relying on predictive modeling or algorithms common in later systems. Implementation spanned phases from late 1999 to early 2001, with initial efforts focusing on mapping before legal constraints halted . outputs, such as photographic charts linking known operatives, demonstrated the technique's efficacy in highlighting U.S.-based threats, though challenges arose from the era's computational constraints and data volume. This empirical, relationship-driven process contrasted with broader methods, prioritizing causal connections over probabilistic inferences to support targeted operations.

Pre-9/11 Threat Identification Efforts

Able Danger, initiated in late 1999 by the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), employed techniques to map 's global network and identify potential threats to U.S. interests, including domestic presence. The program, executed primarily by the Army's Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) at , , involved a small of analysts, including Major Erik Kleinsmith as liaison and Dr. Eileen Preisser as lead, focusing on analysis through associational link mapping. Objectives centered on fusing with classified data to visualize cells, enabling SOCOM to plan preemptive actions against threats akin to prior attacks such as the and the USS Cole incident. The methodology relied on advanced , compiling approximately 2.5 terabytes of data from public records, DoD databases, and unclassified sources to generate interactive charts tracing connections to known figures like . Analysts created "" models, prioritizing entities with multiple ties to terrorist leaders, which highlighted al-Qaeda's operational reach into the by early 2000. This approach identified five al-Qaeda cells worldwide, including one in Brooklyn, New York, described by team members as a hub of suspicious activity involving visa overstays and associations with radical networks. In January to February 2000, program participants, including Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer and Capt. Scott Phillpott, reported identifying —later the lead 9/11 hijacker—and three other eventual hijackers as part of the cell, using a grainy sourced from a contractor. These findings, plotted on wall-sized charts, indicated Atta as a high-risk operative linked to through associational patterns, prompting internal discussions on targeting the cell for disruption. However, efforts to share this intelligence with the FBI in September 2000—arranged three times by Shaffer—were blocked by DoD attorneys citing concerns over data involving U.S. persons. Data retention challenges emerged mid-2000, when approximately 2.5 terabytes of raw information, including U.S. person identifiers, were ordered destroyed in May or June under Regulation 381-10 to comply with intelligence oversight rules, without prior consultation with SOCOM leadership. Kleinsmith, who oversaw the purge during a program hiatus from April to September 2000, later testified that the destruction aimed to mitigate legal risks but preserved some analytical charts until later confiscation. These barriers limited operational follow-through, though the program's outputs informed post-USS Cole analysis for U.S. Central Command. Subsequent official reviews, including by the DoD Inspector General, found no recoverable evidence confirming the Atta identification, attributing discrepancies to and witness recollections.

Core Claims and Assertions

Identification of 9/11 Hijackers

Members of the Able Danger team asserted that efforts in early 2000 identified , the lead operational planner of the , along with three other future hijackers as linked to an terrorist cell in , New York. These identifications reportedly emerged from of open-source , commercial databases, and classified , producing a chart that highlighted the individuals as potential threats approximately 18 to 22 months prior to the attacks. Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, a liaison to the program, claimed that by mid-2000, the team had specifically named Atta and the others, based on associations with known figures tied to the . Shaffer and other participants, including a analyst, recalled attempting to disseminate this information but facing barriers under Department of Defense regulations prohibiting retention of U.S. person data. Rep. , who briefed congressional leaders on the matter in 2005, emphasized the Brooklyn cell linkage as occurring more than one year before 9/11, positioning it as of pre-attack threat detection. A 2006 Department of Defense investigation, however, concluded there was no credible evidence that Able Danger identified Atta or any 9/11 hijacker prior to the attacks, citing absence of the alleged chart, lack of supporting data, and potential reliance on post-9/11 recollections. The probe reviewed program records, interviewed personnel, and found the identifications unverifiable, attributing discrepancies to methodological limitations in or conflation with unrelated analyses. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's staff review aligned with these findings, determining that claims of pre-9/11 hijacker linkages could not be substantiated through available documentation or witness accounts, despite examining four specific allegations including the chart's existence. This assessment, confirmed by the DOD IG, underscored systemic issues in but rejected the identification assertions as unsupported.

Assertions by Representative Curt Weldon

Representative , a Republican congressman from serving as vice chairman of the House Armed Services and committees, first publicly asserted in June 2005 that the Able Danger program had identified and three other future 9/11 hijackers as part of an al-Qaeda cell in Brooklyn more than a year before the , 2001, attacks. He claimed this identification occurred in early 2000 through data mining techniques linking open-source information to terrorist networks, resulting in charts that explicitly named Atta alongside associates like and . Weldon stated that Able Danger team members, including Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, attempted to share this intelligence with the FBI but were blocked by Department of Defense attorneys citing privacy regulations that prohibited disseminating data on U.S. persons, even suspected terrorists. Weldon further asserted that critical Able Danger data, including the Brooklyn cell charts, was systematically destroyed in 2000 under orders to comply with retention policies for non-validated intelligence, preventing follow-up analysis or dissemination. He emphasized that the program had flagged Atta specifically on 13 separate occasions prior to 9/11, underscoring repeated opportunities for preemptive action that were missed due to bureaucratic barriers. In addition, Weldon claimed Able Danger detected anomalies in approximately two weeks before the October 2000 , providing early warnings of activity that were not acted upon. These assertions, drawn from briefings with Able Danger participants, prompted Weldon to demand investigations by the Department of Defense Inspector General and congressional committees, arguing that the program's suppression exemplified systemic intelligence-sharing failures. He maintained that had the cell information been shared with law enforcement in 2000, it could have disrupted the 9/11 plot, positioning Able Danger as evidence of pre-attack knowledge ignored by higher authorities. Weldon's advocacy continued through 2006, including calls for the to revisit its findings in light of these revelations.

Interactions with the 9/11 Commission

In 2003, personnel associated with Able Danger, including Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, attempted to provide the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States () with information regarding the program's pre-9/11 identifications of individuals later linked to the attacks. Shaffer, who had been detailed to Able Danger through the , contacted Commission staff to offer details and supporting documentation, asserting that the program had flagged and three other future hijackers as members of an cell in 2000. Commission staff, including senior counsel Dieter Snell—who led the team examining the operational details of the 9/11 plot—conducted interviews with several Able Danger participants, such as civilian analyst J.D. Smith, Lt. Col. Erik Kleinsmith, and Capt. Scott Phillpott, primarily in 2004. These sessions focused on claims of early identification of Atta via and , but participants provided varying accounts; for instance, some recalled Atta appearing on a depicting a Brooklyn-based network, yet emphasized that no formal nomination for threat status occurred due to legal restrictions on domestic data and the individual's U.S. residency status. The Commission found the recollections inconsistent, lacking corroborative records amid the program's data destruction in compliance with regulations, and concluded that Able Danger had not generated actionable intelligence on the hijackers as threats prior to , 2001. Shaffer later described a brief 25-minute meeting with Commission staffers, during which he offered charts and files but was told further documentation was unnecessary, as the inquiry deemed the information either redundant or untimely given the advanced stage of the report drafting. , finalized and released on July 22, 2004, omitted any reference to Able Danger, reflecting the staff's assessment that the program's outputs did not alter understandings of pre-9/11 intelligence failures. Following public disclosures by Rep. in 2005, the Commission reiterated its position in an August 2005 statement, affirming that interviews yielded no evidence of hijacker identification by Able Danger and highlighting discrepancies, such as Phillpott's later testimony clarifying that Atta was not specifically named or pursued as an operative. This stance aligned with subsequent Department of Defense reviews, which examined the program and found no substantiation for claims of pre-9/11 hijacker linkages beyond anecdotal recollections. Critics, including Shaffer and , attributed the dismissal to institutional reluctance or procedural oversights, though the Commission's findings rested on direct participant interviews and the absence of preserved data.

Data Destruction and Retention Policies

In May to June 2000, Major Erik Kleinsmith, chief of intelligence at the U.S. Army's Land Activity (LIWA), directed the destruction of approximately 2.5 terabytes of data collected for the Able Danger program, including electronic files, hard copies, and analytical charts. This action followed legal guidance from the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) General Counsel, prompted by concerns that the database contained information on U.S. persons gathered from open sources, exceeding authorized retention limits. The destruction adhered to U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and Army policies governing activities, primarily Army Regulation 381-10 (U.S. Army Activities), DoD Directive 5240.1-R (Counterintelligence Activities), and ( Activities). These regulations restrict the collection, retention, and dissemination of on U.S. persons—defined as citizens, permanent resident aliens, and certain U.S.-based entities—to protect constitutional and prevent domestic abuses. LIWA, as a non-designated unit focused on operations, was permitted only temporary retention of such for up to 90 days to evaluate whether it qualified for permanent storage under one of 13 authorized categories (e.g., foreign or threats); uncategorizable required purging. The Able Danger database, built from indiscriminate open-source harvesting, mapped networks and inadvertently included U.S. persons' details linked to locations like , New York, triggering oversight reviews. Although the program operated under U.S. Command (SOCOM), which could retain foreign intelligence data, LIWA's supporting role lacked equivalent authorization, leading to the purge without SOCOM consultation. Post-destruction, Able Danger resumed in September 2000 with restricted scope, shifting primary analysis to a contractor and excluding the original dataset. Critics, including Representative , argued the policies were overapplied to non-classified open-source data and potentially hindered threat analysis, though reviews affirmed compliance and found no evidence that retention rules impeded sharing foreign intelligence with . A separate incident in spring 2004 involved the destroying files related to Able Danger participant Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, but the rationale remained unspecified in congressional testimony.

Privacy Laws and the Intelligence Wall

The intelligence wall encompassed pre-9/11 legal and procedural restrictions designed to separate foreign collection from domestic criminal investigations, rooted in , the (FISA), and Department of Justice guidelines to safeguard U.S. persons' rights against unwarranted surveillance. These barriers, implemented through DoD Directive 5240.1-R ("Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Components that Affect Persons"), prohibited indefinite retention or unrestricted sharing of data incidentally involving U.S. persons—defined as citizens, permanent residents, or certain entities—unless specific retention criteria were met, such as evidence of foreign ties justifying further scrutiny. In the Able Danger program, these privacy regulations directly constrained operations, as the efforts aggregated open-source and commercially available information that inadvertently captured U.S. persons' details linked to networks. Army Regulation 381-10, implementing DoD 5240.1-R, mandated destruction of such data after a 90-day temporary if it did not qualify for permanent archiving, leading Major Erik Kleinsmith to delete approximately 2.5 terabytes of analysis files in May or June 2000—equivalent to about one-fourth the size of the Library of Congress's textual holdings at the time—following directives from INSCOM to comply with oversight rules and avoid potential legal violations. Kleinsmith later testified that the team had implemented safeguards to minimize U.S. persons' data exposure, but legal advisors overruled continuation, emphasizing that failure to destroy the material could result in jail time for personnel. Sharing restrictions compounded these issues, as the intelligence wall precluded seamless transfer of findings to agencies like the FBI without risking procedural taints or violations of principles limiting military involvement in domestic policing, though no direct Posse Comitatus breach occurred in Able Danger. In September 2000, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer arranged three meetings to brief FBI agents on identified threats, including the Brooklyn cell associated with , but DoD attorneys canceled each at the last minute, citing unspecified legal concerns tied to the program's handling of U.S.-linked data. Representative attributed these blocks to an entrenched "hyperlegal mindset" prioritizing compliance over threat dissemination, a echoed in congressional scrutiny but defended by DoD officials as necessary adherence to privacy protections. Post-9/11 reforms, including the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, dismantled key elements of the wall by easing FISA standards and authorizing broader information sharing between intelligence and , enabling protocols absent during Able Danger's tenure. Nonetheless, the program's encounters highlighted tensions between empirical threat detection via and stringent privacy safeguards, with DoD reviews later affirming the data destruction aligned with prevailing regulations despite retrospective questions about their proportionality.

Restrictions on Sharing with Law Enforcement

The Able Danger program's efforts to share threat information with the (FBI) were repeatedly obstructed by Department of Defense (DoD) legal counsel, who cited concerns over the involvement of U.S. persons' data and potential violations of military involvement in domestic . In September 2000, DoD attorneys canceled three scheduled meetings between Able Danger personnel and FBI agents intended to discuss a suspected terrorist cell, including identified individuals like , despite much of the underlying data originating from open sources. These interventions were justified under DoD regulations prohibiting the direct transfer of raw data to civilian without prior sanitization to remove references to U.S. persons, as defined under and DoD Directive 5240.1-R, which limit the collection, retention, and dissemination of information on U.S. citizens or permanent residents absent specific foreign justifications. A key barrier was the (18 U.S.C. § 1385), which restricts the military's domestic operational role, leading DoD officials to interpret information sharing as potentially enabling unauthorized military assistance to activities. Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, who liaised with the FBI on behalf of Able Danger, reported that his attempts to convey threat linkage charts—containing names of foreign operatives potentially operating in the U.S.—were denied by lawyers, who argued the materials risked compiling unauthorized dossiers on individuals legally present in the country, including non-U.S. persons like visa holders. This reflected broader "intelligence wall" policies, established post-1970s reforms to segregate foreign gathering from domestic criminal investigations, ensuring compliance with Fourth Amendment protections against unwarranted surveillance of Americans. Army Regulation 381-10 further compounded these restrictions by mandating the purge of unvetted data involving U.S. persons after 90 days, effectively rendering shareable materials unavailable before transfer could occur; Major Erik Kleinsmith testified that this policy necessitated the deletion of approximately 2.5 terabytes of Able Danger data in 2000, including threat profiles that might have been disseminated had retention been extended. Proponents of the program, such as Rep. , attributed these blocks to overly cautious legal interpretations that prioritized privacy compliance over imperatives, though DoD officials maintained the actions adhered to statutory mandates designed to prevent intelligence abuses. No formal charges of illegality arose from these decisions, but they highlighted pre-9/11 silos between and entities.

Testimonies from Key Participants

Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer

Anthony Shaffer, a U.S. Army Reserve officer and civilian employee of the (DIA), served as a liaison to the Able Danger program beginning in 1999. In this capacity, he contributed to efforts aimed at identifying networks, utilizing open-source and classified intelligence to generate linkage charts of terrorist cells. Shaffer has asserted that these efforts produced actionable intelligence on potential threats within the prior to the , 2001, attacks. Shaffer testified that Able Danger identified , the lead 9/11 hijacker, along with three other future hijackers as members of a Brooklyn-based cell in early 2000, based on a grainy photograph and linkage analysis. He arranged three meetings in September 2000 with the FBI's Washington Field Office to share this chart and related data on the cell, but each was canceled by Department of Defense attorneys and Command officials citing legal barriers. Shaffer further claimed that a presentation of the Atta chart was made to then-Deputy Advisor , after which he believed the information had been disseminated appropriately. In October 2003, while stationed in , Shaffer met with staff members and provided details on Able Danger's identification of two al-Qaeda cells, including Atta, but the Commission's final report made no mention of the program. He followed up with the Commission in to offer additional documentation, receiving no response. Shaffer publicly disclosed his experiences in 2005, corroborating claims by Representative that Able Danger had flagged key terrorists pre-9/11. Following his disclosures, Shaffer's security clearance was suspended in 2004, and he was placed on administrative leave from DIA; his files related to Able Danger were reportedly destroyed around the same time. The Pentagon barred him from testifying at a September 21, 2005, Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on Able Danger, citing his lack of clearance. Shaffer faced disciplinary actions for alleged infractions, including obtaining a Bronze Star under false pretenses for his 2003 Afghanistan service, misusing his military ID while intoxicated in prior incidents, and minor thefts of office supplies, which he attributed to youthful errors and denied as retaliation for his Able Danger advocacy. Despite these measures, Shaffer maintained that the program's findings demonstrated missed opportunities to disrupt al-Qaeda plots due to interagency restrictions.

Capt. Scott Phillpott

Captain Scott Phillpott, a U.S. captain, directed the Able Danger program on behalf of the Pentagon's Command, overseeing data-mining efforts aimed at identifying networks and potential threats. In this capacity, he managed teams that analyzed open-source and other intelligence data to map terrorist "centers of gravity," including associations with known figures from the . In August 2005, Phillpott publicly corroborated claims that Able Danger analysts had identified by name as a possible operative in January or February 2000, roughly 18 months prior to the . He stated that program charts featured Atta's photograph alongside other suspected terrorists, supporting assertions that the unit had flagged at least four eventual 9/11 hijackers through pattern analysis of travel, associations, and activities. Phillpott emphasized that these identifications occurred before Atta entered the on a visa in June 2000, but military attorneys overruled proposals to share the findings with the FBI, citing concerns over data purity and laws prohibiting the use of information on U.S. persons. Phillpott's account aligned with that of Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, marking him as the second active-duty officer to affirm the program's pre-9/11 insights, though he declined to elaborate publicly beyond his chain of command due to restrictions. In July 2004, he met with staff and provided limited details on Able Danger's methodologies and outputs, but the commission's final report made no reference to these identifications. The Department of Defense barred Phillpott and other team members from open testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee in September 2005, invoking security protocols for classified programs, which prompted criticism from lawmakers like Rep. for obstructing oversight.

Major Erik Kleinsmith and Others

Major Erik Kleinsmith, a U.S. Major serving as Chief of at the Land Activity (LIWA) from March 1999 to February 2001, led the efforts supporting Able Danger starting in December 1999. His team at LIWA, utilizing tools at the Information Dominance Center, analyzed vast structured and unstructured data to identify linkages among entities, producing charts that mapped the organization as a global threat with a significant U.S. presence by 2000. Kleinsmith oversaw approximately 24 personnel focused on intelligence fusion to aid U.S. Command (SOCOM) planning. In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on September 21, 2005, Kleinsmith detailed how LIWA's involvement ceased in April 2000 due to intelligence oversight concerns over incidental collection of U.S. persons data, which triggered compliance with Department of Defense regulations limiting retention to 90 days. He stated that he and 3 Terri Stephens destroyed all Able Danger-related raw data, charts, and analytical products in accordance with these procedures, estimating the volume at an immense cache accumulated over months of collection. Support to SOCOM resumed by September 2000, including coordination with U.S. Central Command following the on October 12, 2000, though restricted from prior datasets. Kleinsmith reiterated these points in House Armed Services Committee testimony on February 15, 2006, emphasizing the efficiency of LIWA's tools in generating dozens of charts tracking hundreds of al Qaeda-linked names, but expressing no specific recollection of Mohamed Atta appearing on them. He attributed the May 2000 work stoppage and data deletion to legal barriers on handling domestic intelligence, noting frustration among the team but compliance with oversight mandates. Other LIWA participants, such as analysts under Kleinsmith's direction, contributed to the data visualization efforts but provided limited independent public testimony; 3 Terri Stephens assisted in the data destruction process as directed. Pentagon reviews in 2005 identified additional team members recalling charts depicting al Qaeda cells, though specifics on identifications varied and were not uniformly attributed to pre-9/11 hijackers in verified accounts.

Skeptical Perspectives and Counterevidence

Identification Discrepancies

The primary identification discrepancies in Able Danger center on conflicting accounts regarding , the lead 9/11 hijacker, and associated operatives. Proponents, including Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer and contractor James D. Smith, asserted that the program identified Atta by name and photograph as early as February 2000, linking him to a , New York-based terrorist cell through of open-source and classified information. These claims extended to three other hijackers—, , and possibly —allegedly flagged as threats prior to their U.S. entry or activities. In contrast, the Department of Defense Inspector General's 2006 report, based on interviews with over 80 personnel and review of recovered documents, determined that Able Danger produced no verifiable identification of Atta or the other hijackers as specific threats before , 2001, deeming participant recollections "not accurate" due to lack of supporting records or contemporaneous documentation. A recovered linkage chart, intended to depict networks including the Brooklyn cell, omitted Atta's photograph or any reference to him, despite four of five key witnesses recalling such an image; the fifth witness did not. Pentagon officials attributed this to potential misremembering, noting the chart's photo depicted an individual resembling Atta but confirmed as a different person unaffiliated with the hijackers. These variances highlight interpretive differences in "identification": Able Danger's associative yielded broad network patterns, such as Brooklyn addresses tied to suspects, but lacked nominative confirmation of Atta as the Egyptian hijacker, whose U.S. visa and entry occurred in June 2000—postdating early claims. Congressional advocate later claimed Atta surfaced in Able Danger databases 13 times, yet this was unsupported by the IG's empirical review, which prioritized verifiable artifacts over retrospective testimony. Such gaps underscore challenges in pre-9/11 , where unconfirmed linkages were not escalated as actionable threats.

Timeline and Feasibility Challenges

The alleged identification of by Able Danger in early 2000, specifically as part of a cell around January, conflicts with established timelines of Atta's pre-9/11 activities. Proponents such as Rep. asserted that the program flagged Atta over a year before the , implying detection in 2000 based on of open-source and intelligence information. However, Atta did not enter the until June 3, 2000, when he arrived at Newark International Airport from , Czechoslovakia, marking his first documented presence in the country. Prior to this, Atta was primarily in , including and the , with no verified U.S. connections that would align with a Brooklyn-based cell identification months earlier. This temporal mismatch undermines the feasibility of linking Atta to domestic threats via Able Danger's methodologies, which relied on pattern analysis of historical and from 1999 onward but lacked evidence of predictive links to individuals not yet active in the U.S. The staff dismissed related reports due to inconsistencies with Atta's known itinerary, noting that aspects of the claims did not match immigration and travel records. Similarly, the Pentagon's review found no supporting documentation for pre-9/11 identifications, attributing any purported charts or linkages to possible misidentifications rather than actionable intelligence on Atta himself. Additional feasibility concerns involve the technological limitations of at the time. Able Danger operated with early link-analysis tools on modest datasets, compiling information primarily from and limited classified feeds between 1999 and 2001, which constrained the scope for accurately isolating and verifying transnational threats like Atta amid vast noise. Critics argue that without Atta's U.S. footprint until mid-2000, any earlier "hit" would require improbable foresight or beyond the program's documented capabilities, further eroding claims of prescient detection.

DoD Inspector General Findings

The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) launched an investigation in 2005 into allegations surrounding the Able Danger program, including claims of pre-9/11 identification of hijackers, data suppression, and retaliation against whistleblowers like Anthony Shaffer. The probe, case number H05L9790521, culminated in a joint report released on September 25, 2006, titled "Alleged Misconduct by Senior DoD Officials Concerning the Able Danger Program and Anthony A. Shaffer, U.S. Army Reserve." The OIG examined over 15,000 pages of documents and interviewed more than 30 individuals, including Able Danger participants such as Major Erik Kleinsmith and Capt. Scott Phillpott. It found no credible evidence that the program identified or any other 9/11 hijacker prior to the attacks; purported sightings, such as a 2000 chart or photo arrays, were deemed unsubstantiated or based on erroneous recollections, with Atta's name absent from verified outputs. On data handling, the report determined that the 2000 deletion of approximately 2.5 terabytes of Able Danger files adhered to DoD Directive 5100.1 and regulations prohibiting retention of unverified U.S. persons data without oversight approval. As an experimental planning effort under U.S. Command, the program lacked formal collection authority, making the purge a compliance measure rather than a deliberate of terrorist links. The OIG cleared senior officials of misconduct, including any orchestration of information suppression or barriers to sharing with the FBI, attributing non-sharing to standard legal restrictions on . Shaffer's 2004 security clearance revocation was upheld, linked to independently verified issues like unauthorized classified disclosures, unreported foreign contacts, and improper TDY reimbursements totaling over $13,000, predating his Able Danger advocacy. These conclusions aligned with a concurrent U.S. Select Committee on review, which independently verified no hijacker identifications and no institutional obstruction beyond routine policy adherence. Proponents like Shaffer disputed the OIG's witness handling and emphasis on documents over testimony, but the report prioritized verifiable records amid inconsistent participant accounts.

Investigations and Official Responses

Congressional Hearings

The Senate Judiciary Committee conducted a hearing on "Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing" on September 21, 2005, to examine claims that the program had identified operatives, including , prior to the , 2001 attacks, and to assess barriers to intelligence sharing. Witnesses, including Representative , asserted that Able Danger team members had linked Atta to networks in charts produced in early 2000, based on open-source , and that efforts to share related information with the FBI were blocked three times in September 2000 by Department of Defense lawyers citing legal restrictions on domestic intelligence activities. Former Army Major Erik Kleinsmith testified that he destroyed approximately 2.5 terabytes of Able Danger data in May-June 2000 in compliance with Army Regulation 381-10, which limited retention of information on U.S. persons to 90 days without oversight approval, though he noted the data included foreign terrorist linkages that might have warranted further analysis. Mark Zaid, representing Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer and J.D. Smith, described how Able Danger's identification of Atta occurred via a cell chart but emphasized that the photo used differed from post-9/11 images and that no evidence indicated Atta was then in the U.S. or actively plotting attacks. FBI Executive Assistant Director Gary Bald and Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense William Dugan addressed post-hearing improvements in interagency sharing but confirmed that DoD had additional Able Danger files destroyed by the in spring 2004. Senators, including Chairman , questioned the DoD's rationale for canceling FBI meetings, potential violations of interpretations, and why the staff dismissed Shaffer's 2004 outreach on the program, highlighting broader concerns over bureaucratic silos impeding pre-9/11 threat detection. On February 15, 2006, the House Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities held a joint hearing with the Strategic Forces Subcommittee to scrutinize Able Danger's operations and claims of early identification of 9/11 hijackers. Subcommittee Chairman Jim Saxton opened by noting the session's focus on the program's techniques and potential to uncover threats, including a detected issue in two weeks before the in October 2000. Representative testified that Able Danger had identified Mohamed in its databases on 13 separate occasions prior to 9/11, underscoring repeated opportunities for action that were missed due to data handling restrictions. The hearing probed DoD witnesses on the program's methodologies and institutional responses but yielded no new declassifications or policy shifts, amid ongoing debates over the veracity of the identifications.

Inspector General Report Details

The Department of Defense Office of (DoD IG) released its report on September 21, 2006, titled "Alleged Misconduct by Senior DoD Officials Concerning the Able Danger Program and Anthony A. Shaffer." The investigation, initiated in 2005, examined claims that Able Danger had identified and other 9/11 hijackers prior to the attacks, as well as allegations of retaliation against Shaffer for publicizing these assertions. The report's included interviews with over 20 Able Danger participants, review of program documents, and analysis of data handling procedures, concluding that recollections of pre-9/11 identifications were inconsistent and unsupported by evidence. A central finding was that Able Danger "did not identify Mohammed Atta or any other 9/11 hijackers prior to , 2001." The IG determined that chart depictions allegedly showing Atta resulted from post-9/11 reconstructions or misidentifications, not predictive intelligence; for instance, a photograph linked to Atta was actually of an innocent individual with a similar name. Regarding data destruction, the report affirmed that approximately 2.5 terabytes of Able Danger data were deleted in early 2000 as part of a routine compliance purge under DoD Regulation 5240.1-R, which mandates destroying non-operational intelligence after 90 days unless retained for specific purposes—no evidence indicated improper suppression or . The investigation addressed four specific allegations of misconduct against senior officials, including improper denial of Shaffer's and professional retaliation; it found no substantiation for these claims, attributing Shaffer's clearance issues to standard administrative reviews unrelated to Able Danger disclosures. Efforts to share Able Danger findings with were deemed appropriately limited by legal counsel due to intelligence oversight rules protecting U.S. persons' data, with no violation of sharing protocols identified. While some participants, including Shaffer, contested the IG's conclusions as overlooking classified details, the report emphasized exhaustive searches of DoD records yielded no corroborating evidence of hijacker identification. The Senate Select Committee on later endorsed these findings, stating no evidence supported the premise of pre-9/11 hijacker detection by Able Danger.

Allegations of Institutional Resistance

Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer alleged that in early 2000, he was explicitly warned by (DIA) superiors against pursuing contacts with the FBI regarding Able Danger's findings on potential operatives in the United States, citing concerns over legal restrictions on sharing intelligence involving U.S. persons. Shaffer further claimed that despite multiple attempts by the Able Danger team to brief FBI personnel, these efforts were thwarted by DoD legal advisors who invoked regulations prohibiting the dissemination of domestically collected data, even when it pertained to foreign terrorism threats. Following public disclosures about Able Danger in 2005, Shaffer reported experiencing retaliation from the DIA, including the revocation of his in September 2004—predating but allegedly linked to his —and the denial of his medical benefits, which he attributed to efforts to silence discussion of the program's pre-9/11 identifications. The DoD initiated an investigation into these claims of by senior officials toward Shaffer, though the report's findings on retaliation remain contested, with Shaffer maintaining that bureaucratic self-preservation motivated the actions rather than legitimate security concerns. In September 2005, directed four current and former DoD personnel, including Shaffer, not to testify at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on Able Danger and intelligence sharing, citing classification and ongoing reviews as reasons, which critics like Shaffer's attorney described as an obstruction of . This restriction limited the hearing to lawyers and non-participants, prompting allegations that the Department of Defense prioritized compartmentalization over transparency, potentially to avoid scrutiny of pre-9/11 intelligence failures. Shaffer proceeded to provide testimony through his legal representative, reiterating claims of systemic barriers within that impeded interagency collaboration.

Broader Implications and Legacy

Impact on Intelligence Practices

The Able Danger program validated the effectiveness of and techniques for , utilizing open-source data to identify potential networks as early as 1999–2000. These methodologies were subsequently transferred to other U.S. agencies, enhancing and operational planning. In 2006, Undersecretary of Defense for Cambone testified that Able Danger "demonstrated that it's possible to make use of those tools, and do so in a way that's effective," contributing to improved inter-agency on and analysis. However, the program's execution revealed entrenched legal and procedural barriers to intelligence sharing, including Army Regulation 381-10 and DOD Directive 5240.1-R, which required destruction of data on U.S. persons after 90 days unless deemed essential for foreign . This resulted in the deletion of approximately 2.5 terabytes of Able Danger data in 2000 and the cancellation of three planned briefings with the FBI in September 2000, citing concerns over domestic involvement. These issues, scrutinized in 2005 Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, spurred calls to amend restrictive regulations to permit greater and inter-agency coordination while addressing safeguards. Although the DOD Inspector General's 2006 review concluded there was no deliberate withholding of actionable information on 9/11 hijackers, Able Danger's legacy emphasized the shortcomings of pre-9/11 silos, reinforcing post-9/11 initiatives like expanded Joint Terrorism Task Forces and policy shifts toward "share by rule, withhold by exception."

Policy Reforms and Criticisms of Bureaucracy

The Able Danger program highlighted significant bureaucratic impediments to effective intelligence, including stringent limits and prohibitions on interagency sharing. In compliance with Army Regulation 381-10, the program's analysts destroyed approximately 2.5 terabytes of data in May-June 2000—equivalent to about one-quarter of the collection—after exceeding a 90-day retention period for information involving U.S. persons, despite its potential value in tracking networks. These rules, derived from Department of Defense Directive 5240.1-R and , prioritized privacy protections over operational utility, even when data was derived from open sources. Attempts to mitigate these barriers faltered; in September 2000, Able Danger personnel sought to share identification charts of suspected terrorists, including Mohammed Atta, with the FBI but were blocked by DoD legal advisors citing concerns over incidental U.S. person data. Critics, including Rep. , argued this reflected a broader culture of and compartmentalization that undermined pre-9/11 threat detection, with institutional resistance manifesting in the revocation of security clearances for whistleblowers like Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer and prohibitions on their congressional testimony. Senator attributed such dysfunction to congressional overreach in crafting "crazy rules" and to lawyers' excessive interpretation of oversight mandates, which prioritized compliance over imperatives. These revelations prompted calls for policy adjustments during the September 21, 2005, Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, including scrutiny of applications and revisions to intelligence-sharing protocols to adopt a "share by rule, withhold by exception" approach, as later implemented by the FBI. However, Lt. Col. Shaffer testified in February 2006 that the core bureaucratic and policy obstacles—such as siloed operations and legal hurdles—persisted without substantive fixes, limiting the program's legacy to amplifying pre-existing post-9/11 reform debates rather than driving discrete legislative changes.

Cultural and Media Depictions

In Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer's 2010 memoir Operation Dark Heart: Spycraft and Special Ops on the Frontlines of ... and the Path to Victory, the author, a former officer involved in Able Danger, recounts the program's data-mining efforts that allegedly identified as a terrorist threat prior to the , 2001 attacks, portraying bureaucratic obstacles as preventing actionable intelligence sharing. The U.S. Department of Defense responded by invoking classification to redact significant portions of the manuscript and purchasing approximately 10,000 copies of the initial printing for destruction, an action Shaffer and critics described as an effort to suppress discussion of intelligence lapses. This incident itself became a focal point in media commentary on transparency, with outlets framing it as evidence of institutional resistance to scrutiny over pre-9/11 warnings. A 2008 independent film titled Able Danger, directed by Michael Kirk, depicts a fictional centered on a woman uncovering evidence of U.S. intelligence complicity in the , drawing thematic inspiration from the real program's whistleblower claims of identifying hijackers in advance. The , which received mixed reviews and a 4.9/10 user rating on , emphasizes themes of cover-ups and ignored warnings but fabricates plot elements unrelated to verified Able Danger operations. No major Hollywood productions or network television episodes have directly adapted the Able Danger saga, limiting its presence in mainstream entertainment to niche discussions in books and low-budget cinema. Documentary-style media portrayals are sparse, primarily consisting of interviews with Shaffer in outlets like channels and podcasts, where he reiterates allegations of data destruction orders and interagency silos hindering threat response. These appearances, often in skeptical of official narratives, have sustained interest among audiences questioning post-9/11 intelligence reforms but lack peer-reviewed corroboration beyond Shaffer's testimony. Overall, cultural depictions frame Able Danger as emblematic of systemic failures in U.S. , though empirical validation remains contested by official investigations dismissing early identification claims.

References

  1. https://en.wikinews.org/wiki/Update:_U.S._Army_intelligence_had_detected_9/11_terrorists_year_before%2C_says_officer
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