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Balad Air Base (Arabic: قاعدة بلد الجوية) (ICAO: ORBD), is an Iraqi Air Force base located near Balad in the Sunni Triangle 40 miles (64 km) north of Baghdad, Iraq.

Key Information

Built in the early 1980s, it was originally named Al-Bakr Air Base. In 2003 the base was taken over by the 4th Infantry Division at the start of the Iraq War. It was called both Balad Air Base and Anaconda Logistical Support Area (LSA) by the United States Army before being renamed Joint Base Balad on June 15, 2008. The base was handed back to the Iraqi Air Force on November 8, 2011, during the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, after which it returned to being called Balad Air Base.[1]

During the Iraq War it was the second largest U.S. base in Iraq. It was also one of the busiest airports in the world with 27,500 takeoffs and landings per month, second only to Heathrow Airport.[2] Today it is home to the Iraqi Air Force's contingent of Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcons.

History

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Ba'athist Iraq

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Balad was formerly known as Al-Bakr Air Base, named in honor of Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, the president of Iraq from 1968 to 1979. It was considered by many in the Iraqi military to be the most important airfield of the Iraqi Air Force. During most of the 1980s, it operated with at least a brigade level force, with two squadrons of Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-23 fighters. Al-Bakr Air Base was especially well known for the large number of hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) built by Yugoslavian contractors during the Iran–Iraq War in the mid-1980s. It had four hardened areas—one each on either end of the main runways—with approximately 30 individual aircraft shelters.

U.S. military presence (2003–2011)

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The Sustainer Theater at Joint Base Balad where US movies were played.
Living quarters for NCOs, SNCOs and officers in the H-6 housing compound on JBB, referred to as "pods", circa Jan 2009

The base was captured by U.S. forces in early April 2003, renaming it Camp Anaconda and later Joint Base Balad (JBB).[3] The area was nicknamed "Mortaritaville" (in a play on Margaritaville), because of a high frequency of incoming mortars, at times every day, from Iraqi insurgents. Camp Anaconda has also been more colloquially-termed "Life Support Area Anaconda" or the "Big Snake".[4]

The U.S. Army 310th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) and the U.S. Air Force 332d Air Expeditionary Wing were headquartered at JBB. It was decided that the facility share one name even though it had differing names through its different occupants. Until mid-2008 the U.S. Army had been in charge of Balad but overall control was handed to the U.S. Air Force when it was designated a joint base. Balad was the central logistical hub for coalition forces in Iraq. Joint Base Balad also hosted a Level I trauma center Air Force Theater Hospital which boasted a 98% survival rate for wounded Americans and Iraqis.[5]

It housed 28,000 military personnel and 8,000 civilian contractors.[citation needed] Like most large bases in Iraq, LSA Anaconda offered amenities including a base movie theater (Sustainer Theater), two Base/Post Exchanges (BX/PX), fast food courts including Subway, Popeyes, Pizza Hut, Taco Bell (2007), Burger King, Green Beans Coffee, a Turkish cafe, an Iraqi bazaar, multiple gyms, dance lessons, an Olympic size swimming pool, and an indoor swimming pool.

The base was a common destination for celebrities and politicians visiting US troops serving in Iraq on USO Tours including the Charlie Daniels band (2005), Vince Vaughn (2005), Carrie Underwood (2006),Wayne Newton, Toby Keith, Gary Sinise, Chris Isaak, Neal McCoy, Oliver North, and WWE.[6]

Mortaritaville

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Starting in 2003, several mortar rounds and rockets were fired per day by insurgents, usually hitting the empty space between the runways, although there were isolated injuries and fatalities.[7][8][9][10] By mid-2006, this rate had dropped by about 40%.[11] Due to these attacks, the soldiers and airmen refer to the base as "Mortaritaville", though this name is shared with other bases in Iraq.[12]

Burn Pit

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Joint Base Balad had a burn pit operation as late as the summer of 2010. The pit, which was visible for miles, was in continuous use which resulted in 147 tons of waste burnt per day, some of which was considered toxic.[13][14] Respiratory difficulties and headaches were attributed to smoke inhalation from the burnt waste; however, according to research conducted on behalf of the US Department of Veteran Affairs, there is insufficient evidence to connect those symptoms to burn pits.[15][16] Despite this, the VA allows service members to file claims for symptoms they believe to be related to burn pit exposure.[17][18]

Black Jail

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A black jail, a U.S. military detention camp to interrogate high-value detainees, was established at Balad in summer of 2004, named the Temporary Screening Facility (TSF).[19][20][21] A British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) lawyer who visited a black jail, believed to be at Balad, described it as holding prisoners in wooden crates, too small to stand in or lie down, who were subject to white noise.[22] General Stanley McChrystal, commander of Joint Special Operations Command, regularly visited the site, reporting that the staff of interrogators and analysts was six times the number of detainees, enabling important detainees to be questioned through each shift.[23]

2007 AerianTur-M Antonov An-26 crash

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Main article: 2007 AerianTur-M Antonov An-26 crash

On 9 January 2007, an Antonov An-26 airliner operated by AerianTur-M on behalf of the U.S. Air Force crashed while attempting to land at the air base, killing 34 passengers and crew.

Units

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54th Medavac Dust-off April 2003- April 2004 / Nov 2004 -Nov 2005

170th EFS F-16, from Springfield, Illinois, taking off from Joint Base Balad
777th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron C-130 Hercules at Balad AB Iraq getting a power wash of the engines to ensure that built-up dust does not get pulled into the intake during flight.
46th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron MQ-1B Predator UAV
Ground forces
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Aviation forces
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US Air Force
Army
  • 1st Battalion, 131st Aviation Regiment from September 2006.
  • Task Force 11th Aviation Regiment (United States Army Europe) from April 2003 until February 2004
  • 528 Quartermasters Ft. Lewis Washington 2003–2004
  • 172 Medical Logistics Battalion, Ogden, UT 2003-2004
  • M/158 Aviation Regiment (AVIM) (1-142 AVN BN)
  • 159th Combat Aviation Brigade Oct 2005 – Oct 2006

Current use

[edit]

On 8 November 2011, as U.S. forces were in the process of withdrawing from Iraq, Joint Base Balad was handed back to the Iraqi Air Force, after which it returned to being called Balad Air Base.[1] The base is home to the Iraqi Air Force's General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcons[24] of 9th Fighter Squadron (34 aircraft operating in 2023).[25]

Sallyport Global Human Rights Abuses and Corruption

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In 2014, Sallyport Global, subsidiary of Caliburn International (now called Acuity International), was awarded contracts to work on Balad Air Base in support of the Iraqi F-16 program.[26] Following reports alleging timesheet fraud, investigators found evidence of alcohol smuggling, human trafficking, security violations, and theft. The investigators were subsequently fired by the human resources personnel that they were originally sent to investigate, and removed from the base under armed guard.[27][28] Employees have also raised concern about racism, particularly from white South African security guards who made open endorsements of Apartheid and refused to work alongside Iraqis and other people of color. Former employees say that they feared for their safety at the base due to security failures. In one such report, a militia member shot a bomb-sniffing dog that had flagged their vehicle. It is also said that animals were intentionally starved, and the company withheld passports from employees who wished to leave.[29]

Sallyport is also being investigated by United States Department of Justice on allegations of bribing Iraqi officials for exclusive contracts.[30][31]

Islamic State attacks

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The base came under attack by ISIL militants in late June 2014, when the insurgents launched mortar attacks and reportedly surrounded the base on three sides.[32]

On January 4, 2020, the base came under a rocket attack, and no claims of responsibility have been made yet.[33] The attack wounded four people.[33] On 20 February 2021, four rockets targeted the base, in which one Iraqi contractor was wounded.[34]

Rockets fell in Iraq’s Balad air base on March 17, 2022 leaving no damage, 2 security forces wounded.[35]

See also

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References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Balad Air Base

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia

Balad Air Base is a military airfield operated by the Iraqi Air Force, situated approximately 68 kilometers north of Baghdad in Salah ad-Din Governorate, Iraq. Originally constructed in the 1980s during the Ba'athist regime as Al-Bakr Air Base to support Iraqi Air Force operations, including during the Iran-Iraq War and the 1991 Gulf War, it featured extensive runways and infrastructure capable of handling large fixed-wing aircraft. Following the U.S.-led invasion in , coalition forces captured the facility in April and rapidly expanded it into Balad (JBB), also known as Camp Anaconda for its adjacent components, transforming it into a primary hub for , , fighter operations, and sustainment across . At its peak from 2006 to 2009, JBB supported over 25,000 U.S. and coalition personnel, processed the majority of Iraq's air cargo and passenger traffic—equivalent to a small municipal —and hosted squadrons operating F-16 fighters, C-130 transports, and MQ-1 Predator drones, while enduring frequent attacks that necessitated advanced base defense measures. The base's scale, with self-contained utilities, housing "pods," and industrial-scale maintenance facilities, underscored its role as one of the largest U.S. installations abroad during the conflict, enabling sustained aerial support despite logistical strains and environmental hazards from burn pits and dust. U.S. operations at JBB concluded in late 2011 as part of the broader withdrawal from , with the base formally transferred to Iraqi sovereignty on November 18, 2011, in a ceremony marking the handover of key infrastructure to the Iraqi military. Since then, Balad has reverted to Iraqi control, serving as a for national air defense, though it has seen limited use and maintenance challenges amid Iraq's security transitions.

Historical Background

Ba'athist Era Construction and Operations (1970s–2003)

Balad Air Base, originally designated Al-Bakr Air Base in honor of former Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, was constructed in the early 1980s as a major facility for the Iraqi Air Force (IQAF) during the Ba'athist regime. The base served as the site of the Iraqi Air Force Academy and housed multiple fighter squadrons, primarily operating MiG-23 aircraft from units such as Nos. 49 and 63. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the base underwent significant expansions, including the construction of hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) by Yugoslav contractors to protect IQAF assets from aerial attacks. By the 1990s, Al-Bakr had become one of Iraq's largest airbases, featuring two parallel runways measuring approximately 11,300 feet and 11,200 feet in length, supporting a range of Soviet-supplied fighter and trainer aircraft amid the regime's military buildup under Saddam Hussein. The base played a key role in IQAF operations, focusing on pilot training at the academy and combat readiness for squadrons tasked with air defense and ground support missions, though specific engagements tied to Balad remain limited in declassified records. During the 1991 Gulf War, like many Iraqi facilities, it faced coalition airstrikes, contributing to the dispersal and degradation of IQAF capabilities, with much of the fleet sheltering in HAS or fleeing to Iran. In the lead-up to the 2003 invasion, the base remained operational for residual IQAF elements, but sanctions and prior conflicts had severely hampered maintenance and sortie generation.

U.S.-Led Coalition Occupation and Expansion (2003–2011)

U.S. forces captured Balad Air Base, originally known as Al-Bakr Air Base, in early April 2003 as part of the to overthrow Saddam Hussein's , promptly renaming it Camp Anaconda and later Joint Base Balad (JBB). The base's two 11,000-foot runways positioned it as the principal air hub for operations in , handling a peak of 27,500 takeoffs and landings per month in 2006, making it one of the world's busiest airports at the time. Significant expansions transformed the facility from dilapidated Iraqi into a sprawling and operational center spanning 16 square miles, accommodating up to 40,000 U.S. troops, contractors, and civilians by . Upgrades included resurfacing the crumbling runways, constructing new roads and sidewalks, erecting permanent structures, and replacing tents with modular trailers for housing. Billions of dollars were invested in these improvements, establishing JBB as headquarters for the U.S. Air Force's 332nd Expeditionary Wing and supporting daily air sorties, cargo movements exceeding 900 tons in peak months, and passenger throughput of over 86,000 annually. The base functioned as a critical "lily pad" for sustained presence, facilitating fighter, mobility, and operations while minimizing reliance on vulnerable ground convoys through its aerial port capabilities. Amenities such as base exchanges, fast-food outlets, and internal bus services were added to support personnel welfare amid the long-term occupation. JBB remained under U.S. control until November 9, 2011, when it was transferred to Iraqi forces following the withdrawal of the 332nd Expeditionary Wing, marking the end of major expansions.

Transfer to Iraqi Control and Subsequent Use (2011–Present)

was officially transferred to the on November 8, 2011, marking the completion of the U.S. military's withdrawal from one of its largest bases in . The occurred as part of the broader U.S. drawdown, with the final U.S. personnel departing shortly thereafter, leaving the facility—including its two 11,000-foot runways and extensive logistics infrastructure—under Iraqi control. This transition highlighted challenges in sustaining advanced air operations without coalition support, as noted in U.S. military assessments of the process. Following the transfer, Balad Air Base served as a key operational hub for the , hosting squadrons and supporting missions amid rising threats. Iraqi forces utilized the base for aircraft maintenance and deployments, though persistent issues with equipment upkeep and pilot training limited full operational capacity. In June 2014, militants launched an assault on the base, surrounding it on three sides in an attempt to seize control, but Iraqi defenders repelled the attack without losing the facility. Security incidents continued in subsequent years, with rocket attacks attributed to Iran-backed militias and ISIS remnants targeting the base. On April 18, 2021, multiple rockets struck Balad, wounding two Iraqi soldiers and underscoring vulnerabilities in perimeter defenses amid militia influence in the region. Similar barrages occurred in May 2021, aimed at areas hosting U.S. contractors supporting Iraqi operations, reflecting ongoing tensions between state forces and non-state actors. As of 2025, the base remains under Iraqi Air Force administration, integral to national air defense despite intermittent threats from pro-Iran groups.

Infrastructure and Facilities

Location, Layout, and Physical Features

Balad Air Base is situated near the city of Balad in Salah ad Din Governorate, central , approximately 68 kilometers north of within the . The base occupies coordinates 33.9402°N 44.3616°E and sits at an of 49 meters above mean sea level in an arid environment conducive to airfield operations. The facility encompasses roughly 25 square kilometers, making it one of Iraq's largest air bases by area. The layout centers on a primary airfield with two parallel concrete runways oriented 12/30 and 14/32, measuring 11,495 feet (3,504 meters) and 11,490 feet (3,503 meters) in length, respectively, each with a width of about 197 feet (60 meters). These runways support heavy fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles, flanked by extensive taxiways, aprons, and ramp areas for parking and maintenance. Hardened aircraft shelters, including 39 protective revetments such as trapezoidal "Yugo" structures at the runway ends, provide blast-resistant parking for combat aircraft. Physical features include reinforced bunkers, ammunition storage igloos, and fuel depots integrated into the perimeter, originally constructed during the Ba'athist era and expanded with modular housing units and support infrastructure during coalition occupation. The base's flat terrain and minimal natural obstructions facilitate high-volume air traffic, though dust-prone contributes to operational challenges like reduced during landings. Perimeter defenses, including berms and watchtowers, enclose the site amid surrounding agricultural and semi-urban areas.

Runways, Hangars, and Support Systems

The airfield at Balad Air Base features two parallel runways, oriented approximately 12/30 and 14/32, measuring 11,300 feet and 11,200 feet in length, respectively, with widths of around 150-200 feet. These runways, constructed during the Ba'athist era in the , were designed to accommodate heavy , including fighter jets and bombers, and underwent repairs and resurfacing by U.S. forces in 2006 to address foreign object debris issues, replacing over 3,500 feet of damaged sections. Post-2011, the has continued maintenance, including runway rehabilitation to support F-16 operations. Hangars and shelters include hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) built by Yugoslav contractors at each end of the main runway, featuring trapezoidal reinforced concrete structures intended to protect fighters from aerial attacks. These Ba'athist-era facilities housed Iraqi MiG and other combat aircraft prior to 2003. U.S. forces utilized and expanded aircraft maintenance hangars during occupation, while recent Iraqi developments include specialized F-16 support hangars equipped with monorail cranes, bridge cranes, power-operated doors, and climate-controlled environments for avionics and structural repairs. Support systems encompass extensive taxiways, aprons for parking multiple squadrons, storage and distribution networks capable of servicing high-tempo operations, and maintenance bays for engines, weapons, and ..pdf) During U.S. control, fuels specialists managed large-scale deliveries to aircraft, generators, and ground vehicles, with infrastructure supporting over 200 daily sorties. Current Iraqi operations rely on these systems for F-16 and other assets, bolstered by contractor logistics for field teams and parts sustainment, though challenges persist due to operational demands.

Operational Role and Significance

Coalition Air and Logistics Hub During the

Following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of , Balad Air Base was seized and transformed into Joint Base Balad (JBB), also known as Logistics Support Area Anaconda, emerging as a central hub for coalition air operations and sustainment. The base, located approximately 68 kilometers north of , featured two 11,000-foot runways that enabled it to function as the primary center for U.S. forces after the initial invasion, supporting the rapid deployment and maintenance of aircraft and ground assets. By 2004, it had become the second-largest U.S. installation in , hosting up to 30,000 personnel at peak strength and coordinating all coalition air activity nationwide. JBB served as the home of the , which provided , interdiction, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions critical to ground operations. Aircraft such as F-16 Fighting Falcons, A-10 Thunderbolt IIs, MQ-1 Predator drones, and Army AH-64 Apache helicopters operated from the base, contributing to around-the-clock coverage and a surge in air strikes during intensified phases like the 2007 troop increase. Air traffic controllers managed 18,000 to 20,000 operations monthly by 2007, positioning JBB among the world's busiest airfields and enabling non-stop flights that included HH-60 Pave Hawks for . This high-tempo activity supported top cover for U.S. and troops, with the base's strategic centrality facilitating rapid response to threats across central . As a logistics nexus, JBB processed over 44,000 tons of cargo and 86,000 passengers, primarily via C-130 Hercules transports, which minimized risky ground convoys and sustained forward-deployed units. The base integrated base operating support for air and ground forces, including the Theater Hospital that achieved a 98 percent for treated casualties. These capabilities underscored JBB's role in force projection and sustainment, with its infrastructure expansions—such as burn pits for waste and modular housing—accommodating the demands of prolonged operations until the U.S. withdrawal in December 2011. The transition of JBB to Iraqi control marked the largest military handover since , reflecting its pivotal contributions to coalition efforts.

Iraqi Air Force Basing and Maintenance Challenges

Following the handover of Balad Air Base to the on November 8, 2011, the facility emerged as the primary hub for Iraq's F-16 Fighting Falcon fleet, intended to bolster national air sovereignty after the U.S. withdrawal. However, the (IAF) struggled with severe basing limitations, including inadequate sustainment infrastructure inherited from coalition operations, which required extensive repairs to runways, taxiways, and tarmacs degraded by years of heavy use. By the mid-2010s, these infrastructural deficits compounded operational basing challenges, as the IAF lacked sufficient pipelines for fuel and munitions storage, forcing reliance on external contractors whose presence was intermittently disrupted. Maintenance of advanced aircraft like the F-16s proved particularly problematic, with systemic at Balad eroding readiness; schemes involving IAF personnel siphoning and cannibalizing spare parts for black-market sales left most of the 34 delivered Vipers grounded by 2020, despite U.S. support exceeding $5 billion. Iraqi officers have admitted to mismanagement in protocols, including non-adherence to standards, resulting in accelerated deterioration and only a handful of jets achieving full mission capability rates below 20 percent as of 2021. This , centered at Balad, not only depleted parts inventories but also deterred international contractors, who faced risks from militia infiltration and were evacuated multiple times amid escalating rocket attacks. Security threats further hampered basing efforts, as Iran-backed militias repeatedly targeted Balad with rockets and drones, wounding personnel and damaging radar systems as recently as June 2025, which disrupted flight operations and maintenance schedules. The base's exposure to such assaults, coupled with internal political pressures favoring militia influence over professional military development, limited IAF training rotations and spare parts imports, perpetuating a cycle of low sortie generation—often fewer than 10 F-16 missions per month by the early 2020s. Despite attempts at remediation, including U.S.-funded sustainment contracts, these intertwined challenges of graft, expertise gaps, and external aggression have rendered Balad more a symbolic than functional asset for Iraqi air power projection.

Security Incidents and Threats

Insurgent Attacks During U.S. Presence

During the U.S.-led coalition's occupation of from 2003 to 2011, Balad Air Base—redesignated as Logistics Support Area (LSA) Anaconda—experienced frequent attacks from insurgents, including rockets, mortars, and occasionally small arms fire from surrounding rural areas. These assaults, often launched by Sunni militant groups such as , targeted the base's role as a major logistics and aviation hub supporting thousands of personnel and sorties. The volume of such incidents led U.S. troops to dub the facility "Mortaritaville," reflecting the near-daily threat that strained base defenses and contributed to hundreds of attacks over the period, though precise totals remain classified or dispersed across military after-action reports. Early attacks underscored the base's vulnerability post-invasion. On the night of July 3, 2003, U.S. forces at Balad repelled two separate insurgent assaults involving small arms and possible indirect fire, marking some of the initial post-liberation strikes in the region. By mid-2004, as the insurgency intensified, indirect fire became a hallmark tactic; a single barrage in April 2004 delivered 20 mortar rounds onto the base in one day, damaging infrastructure but causing limited casualties due to evasive measures like "rocket holes"—pre-dug foxholes for personnel. Notable lethal incidents highlighted the human cost. On June 16, 2004, three 127mm rockets impacted near a post exchange , killing three U.S. service members—including Maj. Paul R. Syverson III of the 5th Group—and wounding at least 25 others in a mass casualty event that overwhelmed initial medical response capabilities. Another rocket strike in July 2004 killed four personnel and injured 20, prompting accelerated deployment of counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM) systems like guns to intercept incoming projectiles. Insurgents adapted by firing from mobile launchers in nearby villages and farmland, complicating preemptive strikes under restrictive . U.S. responses evolved to include integrated defense strategies, combining ground patrols, intelligence-driven raids on launch sites, and base hardening, which reduced but did not eliminate threats; attacks peaked during 2004–2007 amid broader but persisted sporadically until coalition drawdown. Casualty figures from at Anaconda totaled dozens killed and hundreds wounded, though many impacts caused property damage or no injuries due to the inaccuracy of unguided munitions. Official assessments later critiqued early vulnerabilities, attributing them to the base's expansive 15-square-mile footprint and proximity to hostile populations, informing future expeditionary doctrines.

Post-2011 Militia and ISIS-Related Assaults

Following the U.S. transfer of Balad Air Base to Iraqi control on November 8, 2011, the facility faced significant threats from the and (ISIS) during its 2014 offensive. On June 24, 2014, ISIS militants launched a major assault, surrounding the base on three sides and attempting to seize aircraft and infrastructure in a bid to acquire air capabilities. Iraqi , supported by airstrikes, repelled the siege after intense fighting, preventing a full capture despite ISIS advances in surrounding areas like and oil fields in Salah ad Din province. This attack highlighted Balad's strategic value as a major Iraqi air hub north of , making it a priority target amid ISIS's rapid territorial gains following the fall of . Post-2017, after the territorial defeat of , residual elements conducted sporadic attacks on Iraqi sites, including Balad, as part of low-level tactics to disrupt government control. However, the base primarily encountered assaults from Iran-backed Shia militias, often affiliated with (PMF) factions like , which targeted facilities perceived to host U.S. advisors or coalition assets amid escalating U.S.- tensions. These groups framed attacks as retaliation for U.S. strikes on militia leaders or operations against Iranian interests, aiming to pressure foreign troop withdrawals. Notable militia assaults included a June 15, 2019, mortar barrage that ignited small fires in vegetation on the base, which housed U.S. personnel at the time; no were reported, but the incident underscored vulnerabilities in base defenses. In April 2021, multiple rocket attacks struck Balad, including one on April 5 landing nearby and another on April 18 wounding two Iraqi soldiers; these were attributed to pro-Iran factions protesting U.S. presence. A May 4, 2021, rocket salvo further targeted the site, coinciding with U.S.-Iraq talks on coalition drawdown. Such incidents, involving unguided rockets or mortars, typically caused limited damage but strained operations and highlighted influence within 's security apparatus, where PMF units integrated into state forces yet pursued independent agendas. By mid-2025, attacks persisted intermittently, with suspected Iran-backed militias launching strikes on Balad and similar bases amid regional escalations, including Israel-Iran conflicts spilling into Iraq; these were linked to broader efforts to deter perceived U.S. or allied influence. Iraqi officials often condemned the assaults as undermining national sovereignty, while attributing them to "outlaw" elements within militia networks, though enforcement remained inconsistent due to political patronage. Overall, post-2011 threats evolved from ISIS's conventional assaults to militia indirect fire, reflecting shifts in Iraq's security landscape from jihadist insurgency to proxy hybrid warfare.

Controversies

Waste Management Practices and Health Impacts

During the U.S.-led coalition's occupation of Balad (formerly Balad Air Base) from 2003 to 2011, relied heavily on open-air burn pits due to risks that precluded routine off-base of refuse. These pits incinerated unsegregated solid waste, including plastics, rubber, chemicals, medical materials, , munitions debris, and products, with daily volumes reaching up to 200 tons by 2007. The practice persisted until temporary incinerators were deployed in late , fully phasing out open burning by 2009. Exposure to burn pit emissions at Balad prompted immediate health complaints among service members, including eye and throat irritation, coughing, skin rashes, and acute respiratory symptoms, attributed to incomplete combustion byproducts like dioxins, particulate matter, and volatile organic compounds. Long-term epidemiological data link deployments to such sites with elevated risks: for instance, bases using unsegregated burn pits correlated with higher odds of asthma (adjusted odds ratio 1.23) and hypertension (1.18) among veterans, based on a 2025 cohort study of over 200,000 personnel. Recent VA analyses further quantify risks, showing a 1% increased asthma incidence and 4% rise in chronic obstructive pulmonary disease per 100 days of exposure, alongside potential associations with pulmonary fibrosis and reduced lung function. Veteran accounts and advocacy groups have emphasized chronic conditions like sarcomas, autoimmune disorders, and neurological impairments potentially tied to toxins in Balad's pits, though causation remains debated due to factors such as regional and stressors. A 2011 Institute of Medicine review found insufficient evidence for direct long-term links, reflecting military assessments that minimized risks to maintain operational focus. In response, the U.S. Department of launched the Airborne Hazards and Open Registry in 2014, documenting over 330,000 participant claims by 2024, many citing Balad exposures. Post-2011 operations at the base lack comparable public data on waste practices, with no verified reports of resumed open burning, though local remains limited.

Contractor Operations and Alleged Misconduct

During the U.S.-led occupation of from 2003 to 2011, Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR), a of , served as the primary logistics contractor at Balad Air Base, then known as Joint Base Balad, handling extensive support operations including fuel supply, dining facilities, transportation, vehicle maintenance, and infrastructure setup for up to 2,252 personnel accommodations as part of the Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). Post-U.S. withdrawal, Sallyport Global Holdings (later acquired by Caliburn International and involved in subsequent mergers) assumed key roles under U.S. Air Force contracts supporting the Iraqi Air Force's F-16 program at the base, renamed Martyr Brigadier General Ali Flaih Air Base, providing base operations support, life support services, security, training, and maintenance assistance with contracts totaling over $1 billion since 2014, including a $127 million award in 2022 and a $235 million extension in 2023. Allegations of misconduct by KBR personnel at Balad included violent assaults on fellow employees, such as the 2009 case of Anna Mayo, a KBR worker who reported being drugged, raped, and beaten by a male KBR colleague at the base's facilities, amid broader claims of inadequate response to sexual violence complaints within the company's operations. KBR maintained that such incidents were handled per protocols and denied systemic failures, though lawsuits highlighted patterns of alleged cover-ups and retaliation against victims. Sallyport faced significant scrutiny in 2017 following whistleblower disclosures by internal investigators Kristie Cole and Robert King, who documented employee involvement in alcohol smuggling—despite base prohibitions due to aviation safety risks—prostitution rings involving trafficked Filipina women coerced into sex work under false job pretenses, timesheet fraud where workers claimed unworked hours costing the government millions, and theft of heavy equipment like excavators valued at up to $40 million, which was fenced on Iraq's black market. Management reportedly ignored repeated warnings, falsified audit responses to the Department of Defense, and retaliated against the whistleblowers through termination and threats, prompting a congressional joint letter on May 19, 2017, demanding documents on fraud, smuggling, and irregularities. Sallyport denied orchestrating the activities, attributing them to rogue employees, but acknowledged ongoing internal probes; no criminal charges resulted directly from the disclosures, though contracts persisted amid competitor protests over awards. Additional Sallyport allegations included workplace and bigotry against non-white employees, contributing to a toxic environment at the base, as reported in investigations tied to the same whistleblower accounts. These incidents underscore broader challenges in contractor oversight at Balad, where lapses potentially compromised base security and operational integrity in a post-withdrawal context reliant on private firms for Iraqi military sustainment.

Detention Facilities and Human Rights Allegations

During the U.S.-led occupation of , a Temporary Screening Facility (TSF) was established at Balad Air Base—also known as Camp Anaconda—in the summer of 2004 by (JSOC) units for the initial interrogation of high-value detainees captured in operations. The facility operated as a secretive "black site" with restricted access, housing detainees temporarily before transfer to other locations such as near or deportation to third countries. British intelligence personnel, including those from , visited the TSF and documented concerns over detainee conditions, including inadequate oversight and potential non-compliance with international standards. Human rights allegations centered on the facility's role in JSOC's broader detention practices, which included reports of physical mistreatment such as , stress positions, , and exposure to extreme temperatures—techniques applied during initial screening to extract intelligence. British SAS and SBS operators who handed over detainees to the TSF described systemic abuses in connected sites, with one witness stating that prisoners were subjected to "the full range of the unpleasant stuff" before transfer, though direct attribution to Balad-specific incidents remains limited in declassified accounts. A parliamentary inquiry noted that the TSF's operations evaded International Committee of the Red Cross inspections initially, contributing to unmonitored environments conducive to ill-treatment, and led to renditions where detainees faced further in nations with documented practices. No large-scale prosecutions or official U.S. investigations specifically targeted the Balad TSF, unlike Abu Ghraib or Camp Nama, where photographic evidence prompted wider scrutiny; allegations surfaced primarily through British inquiries and whistleblower accounts from coalition partners. The facility's closure aligned with the drawdown of JSOC presence by 2006-2007, amid shifting U.S. policy on high-value target detentions. Critics, including human rights organizations, have argued that the secrecy of such sites prioritized operational expediency over accountability, though U.S. military reviews maintained that techniques complied with legal limits at the time.

References

  1. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/balad-ab.htm
  2. https://ph.health.mil/PHC%2520Resource%2520Library/U_IRQ_Balad%2520POEMS%25202003-2009.pdf
  3. https://ph.health.mil/PHC%2520Resource%2520Library/U_IRQ_Balad%2520POEMS%25202009-2011%28Close%2520of%2520BC%29.pdf
  4. https://www.army.mil/article/63874/moving_day_in_iraq_for_402nd_army_field_support_brigade
  5. https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/112122/jb-balad-wraps-up-operations/
  6. https://media.defense.gov/2017/Jun/19/2001764983/-1/-1/0/AP_1203_MILINER_INTEGRATED_DEFENSE.PDF
  7. https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/884430/the-final-days-of-joint-base-balad/
  8. https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Balad_Air_Base
  9. https://www.dvidshub.net/news/1243/history-lsa-anaconda
  10. https://www.facebook.com/groups/103547769566/posts/10159342991494567/
  11. https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Joint_Base_Balad
  12. https://www.quora.com/Why-did-the-Baathist-Iraqi-Air-Force-perform-so-poorly-against-the-USs-Air-Force-Navy-Air-Wings-to-the-point-Saddam-had-to-bury-his-airframes-to-try-and-save-his-air-force-for-after-the-war
  13. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/huge-us-air-base-returned-to-iraqi-control-idUSTRE7A82KG/
  14. https://www.npr.org/2007/10/12/15184773/u-s-builds-air-base-in-iraq-for-the-long-haul
  15. https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/124827/balad-aerial-port-bests-cargo-movement-record/
  16. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/baladreturnedtoiraqis/
  17. https://www.afcent.af.mil/News/Article/218955/the-final-days-of-joint-base-balad/
  18. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/AD1018864.pdf
  19. https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/newsisis-rebels-occupy-joint-base-balad-in-iraq-4302404/
  20. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/18/multiple-rockets-hit-iraqi-airbase-wounding-two-soldiers
  21. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/4/rockets-target-iraqi-base-hosting-us-contractors
  22. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/06/iraqi-military-bases-targeted-in-overnight-strikes.php
  23. https://metar-taf.com/airport/ORBD-balad-southeast-airport-joint-base-balad
  24. https://ourairports.com/airports/orbd/runways.html
  25. https://www.ksl.com/article/264043/life-at-balad-air-base-in-iraq
  26. https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/130928/runway-repair-reduces-fod-at-balad/
  27. https://www.sosi.com/case-studies/logistics-training-case-studies/repairing-and-rebuilding-airfield-infrastructure-for-the-government-of-iraq/
  28. https://www.contrackwatts.com/case-studies/f-16-support-facilities-package-6/
  29. https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/134512/fuels-airmen-cultivate-balad-farm/
  30. https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/v2x-f-16-iraq-services/
  31. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/lsa-anaconda.htm
  32. https://archive.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168-general/37142-war-and-occupation-in-iraq-chapter-10-english.html
  33. https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/130974/balad-remains-one-busy-airfield/
  34. https://www.af.mil/News/Article/127572/balad-air-traffic-controllers-maintain-safer-skies-for-iraq/
  35. https://www.jbsa.mil/News/News/Article/463704/lackland-airmen-make-history-in-iraq/
  36. https://www.iraqoilreport.com/news/iraqs-failing-f-16-program-highlights-corruption-at-balad-airbase-42995/
  37. https://jummar.media/en/9209
  38. https://www.twz.com/38594/the-iraqi-air-forces-f-16-fleet-is-on-the-brink-of-collapse-despite-showy-flybys
  39. https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2021/05/11/iraqs-air-force-is-at-a-crossroads/
  40. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0207desert/
  41. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_casualties_june04.htm
  42. https://thefallen.militarytimes.com/army-maj-paul-r-syverson-iii/263061
  43. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/06/isis_advances_on_oil_fields_in.php
  44. https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/iraq-turmoil/iraqi-militants-attack-massive-air-base-u-s-advisers-arrive-n140376
  45. https://www.businessinsider.com/r-militants-attack-iraq-air-base-us-assessment-teams-deploy-2014-25
  46. https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/kata%25E2%2580%2599ib-hezbollah
  47. https://www.timesofisrael.com/mortars-fired-at-iraqi-base-housing-us-troops/
  48. https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2021/04/18/rockets-hit-balad-air-base-2-iraqi-security-forces-wounded/
  49. https://thearabweekly.com/rockets-hit-near-iraqs-balad-base-talks-us
  50. https://nap.nationalacademies.org/read/13209/chapter/4
  51. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8816568/
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  55. https://www.research.va.gov/currents/0524-VA-Study-Documents-Health-Risks-for-Burn-Pit-Exposures.cfm
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  58. https://www.militarytimes.com/2013/03/29/burn-pit-at-balad-raises-health-concerns-troops-say-chemicals-and-medical-waste-burned-at-base-are-making-them-sick-but-officials-deny-risk/
  59. https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/112193/study-finds-no-evidence-of-health-problems-from-burn-pits/
  60. https://www.asbca.mil/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=mINgrKpwd5U%253D&portalid=143
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  62. https://news.clearancejobs.com/2022/07/22/sallyport-global-awarded-127m-contract-for-iraq-f-16-program/
  63. https://virginiabusiness.com/reston-contractor-lands-235m-extension-for-iraq-base-support/
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