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The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF; Arabic: قوات الحشد الشعبي, romanized: Quwwāt al-Ḥashd ash-Shaʿbī),[48] also known as the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), is an Iranian-backed paramilitary umbrella group[49] that operates within Iraq. Although formally and legally part of the Iraqi Armed Forces and reporting directly to the prime minister,[50] PMF leaders act independently from state control and, in reality, answer to the supreme leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei.[11][51][52]

Key Information

The PMF is composed of about 67 primarily Shia armed factions, almost all of which are Iranian-backed and openly pledge allegiance to Khamenei.[53][1][54] Chief of Staff of the PMF, Abu Fadak al-Mohammadawi, openly declared that the PMF takes orders from Khamenei.[55] PMF chairman Falih al-Fayyadh cooperates with the Iranian IRGC to implement Iranian instructions in Iraq and reinforce Iranian influence over the militias.[11] The PMF were formed in 2014 and fought in nearly every major battle during the War in Iraq (2013–17) against the Islamic State.[56] In December 2016, the Iraqi Council of Representatives passed a law that defined the PMF’s legal status and created the Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC; Arabic: هيئة الحشد الشعبي), which is a formal governmental agency that includes all PMF groups.[57]

Many of its main factions that belong to the Shia faction trace their origins to the "Special Groups", Iranian-sponsored Shia groups that previously fought in the Iraqi insurgency against the United States and the Coalition forces, as well as a sectarian conflict against Sunni Jihadist and Ba'athist insurgents.[53][58] Pro-Iran organizations in the PMF include the Badr Organization, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Kata’ib al-Imam Ali, Saraya Khorasani, etc.[59] Several militant groups received training and strategic aid from Hezbollah's Unit 3800.[60][61][62] It has been labeled the new Iraqi Republican Guard after it was fully reorganized in early 2018 by its then commander-in-chief Haider al-Abadi, previous prime minister of Iraq, who issued "regulations to adapt the situation of the Popular Mobilization fighters".[63]

Factions within the PMF are designated as terrorist groups by some states, including the United States, the United Arab Emirates, and Japan, and have been widely accused of promoting sectarian violence,[64][65][66] perpetrating ethnic cleansing and displacement of Iraqi Sunnis,[67][68][69] and carrying out war crimes, including abductions, forced disappearances, massacres, extrajudicial killings, and the destructions of villages in Anbar, Saladin, and Diyala,[68] as well as conducting anti-Sunni campaigns described as inherently genocidal.[70][71][72][73] During the 2019–2021 Iraqi protests, the pro-Iran groups were accused of being responsible for killing and wounding large numbers of protesters and activists.[74] Pro-Iran PMF groups have also fought against pro-Sistani and Sadrist PMF groups, and their increasing rivalry erupted into violent clashes in 2022.[75][76] Since 2020, Iranian-backed PMF groups have launched attacks against American forces and its allies in the region, claiming them under the name of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.[77][78][79][80][81][82]

Logos and flags

[edit]
PMF troops enter Fallujah after the Third Battle of Fallujah with flags of Iraq and the local militia

While the factions have their own flags,[64] a yellow or white flag with the phrase "Al-Hashd Al-Sha'bi" is also used by PMF[83] along with the Iraqi flag.[84][85][86][87] PMF factions frequently hold up Iranian flags and posters of Iranian religious figures such as Ruhollah Khomeini.[88]

Name

[edit]

With regard to the official native name, the Arabic word الشعبي (ash-Shaʿbī) translates as "people's" or "popular", as referred to the people; the Arabic word الحشد (al-Ḥashd) translates as "mobilization" or "Mass", as in the group of people mobilized rather than the process of mobilization. In other contexts, al-hashd may translate as other terms such as "crowd", "horde", "throng", "gathering".

Background and formation

[edit]
Further information: Special Groups (Iraq)

The PMF trace their origins to the so-called Special Groups, a US term to designate groups of the Iraqi insurgency which were Shiite, supported and funded by the Iranian Quds Force, as opposed to Ba'athist loyalist or radical sunni salafi jihadist insurgents. The Special Groups fought both the US-led Coalition forces, but also the afforementioned Ba'ath and sunni insurgent in a sectarian conflict.[58] Originally, there were seven forces in the PMF, which had been operating with Nouri al-Maliki's support since early 2014.[1]
Original seven groups:

Additional groups:


According to Faleh A. Jabar and Renad Mansour for the Carnegie Middle East Center, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki used these forces to combat the emergence of ISIL and maintain his influence in predominantly Sunni areas.[1]

PMF troops enter re-captured Fallujah

The People's Mobilization Forces (PMF) were formed by the Iraqi government on 15 June 2014 after top Iraqi Shia cleric Ali al-Sistani's non-sectarian[1] fatwa on "Sufficiency Jihad" on 13 June.[2] The fatwa called for defending Iraqi cities, particularly Baghdad, and to participate in the counter-offensive against ISIL, following the Fall of Mosul on 10 June 2014.[2][91] The forces brought together a number of Shia militias, most of which receive direct support from Iran, along with a small number of Sunni tribesmen by uniting existing militias under the "People's Mobilization Committee" of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior in June 2014.[92] The forces would fall under the umbrella of the state's security services and within the legal frameworks and practices of the Ministry of Interior. On 19 December 2016, Iraqi President Fuad Masum approved a law passed by parliament in November that incorporated PMU in the country's armed forces. The pro-Assad website Al-Masdar News reports that, with this incorporation, the PMU are now subject to the supreme commander of the national armed forces and will no longer be affiliated to any political or social group.[93][better source needed] However, many of these irregulars have continued to operate independently of the Iraqi state.[94]

On 21 March 2017, the PMU announced the launch of a special forces course, in order to create a Special Forces Division. The training program covered a variety of missions with direction from the Iraqi Special Operations Forces.[citation needed] On December 11, 2017, the PMU began to be entirely consolidated under the Iraqi Armed Forces, following a call by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to integrate.[56] However, as late as May 2018, this integration had yet to take place, and PMF members remained without the same wages and privileges as soldiers in the regular Iraqi Armed Forces.[95]

According to some sources, the Popular Mobilization Forces have made a fundamental difference on the battlefield, as they have undermined the superiority of ISIL at the level of guerrilla warfare, as well as at the level of the psychological operations.[96]

Structure

[edit]

The Tribal Mobilization forces are also a part of PMF.[97][98][99]

Unit Commander Parent militias, parties, and tribes
1st Brigade[100] Badr Organization and Liwa al-Imam Muhammad al-Jawad[100]
2nd Brigade[100] Imam Ali Combat Division (affiliated with Imam Ali Shrine in Najaf)[100]
3rd Brigade[100] Tashkil Asad Amerli[100] Badr Organization[100]
4th Brigade[100] Badr Organization[100]
5th Brigade (Tashkil al-Karar unit)[100] Abu Dergham al-Maturi (formerly)[100] Badr Organization[100]
6th Brigade[100] Ahmad al-Asadi[100] Kata'ib Jund al-Imam (Islamic Movement in Iraq)[100]
7th Brigade[100] Dagher al-Mousawi[100] Liwa al-Muntadhar[100]
8th Brigade[100] Abu Ahmed Khadhim al-Jabiri[101] Saraya Ashura [ar][100][102]
9th Brigade[100] Liwa Karbala' and Badr Organization[100]
10th Brigade[100] Badr Organization[100]
11th Brigade[100][103] Ali al-Hamdani[104] Liwa Ali al-Akbar[100]
12th Brigade[100] Akram al-Ka'abi[100] Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba[100]
13th Brigade[100] Qasim Muslih[100] Liwa al-Tafuf[100]
14th Brigade[100] Abu Ala al-Walai[105] Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada[100]
15th Brigade[100] Quwat al-Shaheed al-Sadr (Islamic Dawa Party) and Kata'ib al-Fatah al-Mubin[100]
16th Brigade[100] Turkmen Brigades and Badr Organization[100]
17th Brigade[100] Hassan al-Sari[106] Saraya al-Jihad[100]
18th Brigade[100] Ali al-Yasiri[107] Saraya al-Khorasani[100]
19th Brigade[100] Abd al-Zahra al-Swei'adi[100] Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya and Tashkil al-Hussein al-Tha'ir[100]
20th Brigade[100] Hashim Ahmad al-Tamimi[100] Liwa al-Taff[100]
21st Brigade[100] Badr Organization[100]
22nd Brigade[100] Abu Kawthar al-Muhammadawi[100] Badr Organization[100]
23rd Brigade[100] Badr Organization[100]
24th Brigade[100] Badr Organization[100]
25th Brigade[100] Quwat al-Shaheed al-Sadr (Islamic Dawa Party)[100]
26th Brigade[100] al-Abbas Combat Division[100]
27th Brigade[100] Badr Organization and Quwat al-Shaheed al-Qa'id Abu Muntadhar al-Muhammadawi[100]
28th Brigade[100] Jalal al-Din Ali al-Saghir[100] Saraya Ansar al-'Aqeeda [ar][100]
29th Brigade[100] Ahmad al-Fariji[100] Kata'ib Ansar al-Hujja[100]
30th Brigade[100] Sabah Salem al Shabaki[108] Shabak Militia and Badr Organization[100]
31st Brigade[100] Adnan al-Shahmani[100][109] Kata'ib al-Tayyar al-Risali (ar) (Risaliyun/The Upholders of the Message)[100]
33rd Brigade[100] Sami al-Masoudi[109] Quwat Wa'ad Allah (Islamic Virtue Party)[100]
35th Brigade[100] Quwat al-Shaheed al-Sadr (Islamic Dawa Party)[100]
36th Brigade[100] Lalish Regiment, Liwa al-Hussein, and Badr Organization[100]
39th Brigade[100] Harakat al-Abdal[100]
40th Brigade[100] Shabal al-Zaidi[100] Kata'ib al-Imam Ali (Islamic Movement of Iraq)[100]
41st Brigade[100] Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq[100]
42nd Brigade[100] Quwat/Liwa [al-Shaheed] al-Qa'id Abu Mousa al-Amiri (Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq)[100]
43rd Brigade[100] Saba' al-Dujail (Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq)[100]
44th Brigade[100] Hamid al-Yasiri[100] Liwa Ansar al-Marja'iyya [ar][100]
45th Brigade[100] Saraya al-Dafa al-Shaabi[110] Kata'ib Hezbollah[100]
46th Brigade[100] Saraya al-Difa' al-Sha'abi (Kata'ib Hezbollah)[100]
47th Brigade[100] Saraya al-Difa' al-Sha'abi (Kata'ib Hezbollah)[100]
50th Brigade[100][111][112] Rayan al-Kaldani[100] Babylon Brigade (Babylon Movement)[100]
51st Brigade[100] Salah al-Din Brigade[100]
52nd Brigade[100] Mahdi Taqi al-Amerli[100] Turkmen Brigades and Badr Organization[100]
53rd Brigade[100] Mukhtar al-Musawi[100] Liwa al-Hussein and Badr Organization[100]
55th Brigade[100] Tashkil Malik al-Ashtar.[100] Badr Organization[100]
56th Brigade[100] Hussein Ali Najm al-Juburi[100] Liwa Hashd Shuhada' Kirkuk (Union of National Forces Party)[100]
66th Brigade[100] Saraya Ansar al-Aqeeda[100]
88th Brigade[100] Sheikh Wanas al-Jabara[100]
90th Brigade[100] Ahmad al-Juburi[100] Fursan al-Jubur[100]
91st Brigade[100] Abd al-Raheem al-Shammary[100]
Abd al-Khaliq al-Mutlak al-Jarba[113]		 Nawader Shammar[100] (Shammar tribal force)[113]
92nd Brigade[100] Abd al-Rahman al-Luwaizi[100] Turkmen Brigades
99th Brigade[100] Sa'ad Sawar[100] Jaysh al-Mu'ammal[100]
110th Brigade[100] Badr Organization[100]
201st Brigade[100] Ninawa Guards[100]
313th Brigade[100] Saraya al-Salam[100]
314th Brigade[100] Saraya al-Salam[100]
14th Regiment[114] Omar Fadhil al-Alaf[114] Mosul natives (mostly from al-Arabi neighbourhood)[114]
38th Regiment ("Banners of Iraq")[115] Sheikh Faris al-Sab'awi †[115]
Sheikh al-Meqdad Faris[115]		 Sab'aween tribe[115]
39th Regiment[116] Qayyarah branch of the Jubur tribe[116]
41st Regiment ("Force of Determination")[117] Muhammad Ahmad Abdullah al-Waka ("Abu al-Karar")[117] Jubur tribe[117]
80th Regiment[118] Sinjar Resistance Units[118]
Wathiq al-Firdousi[119] Quwat al-Bairaq – Kata'ib al-Shahid al-Awwal

In February 2019, (PMF) raided a base belonging to Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Forces, during the raid the group's leader Aws al-Khafaji was arrested by Iraqi forces, the Popular Mobilization Forces claimed that the raid was part of an ongoing operation to crack down on fake groups claiming to be part of PMF in order to commit crimes. The group also never formally declared itself as part of PMF nor had it ever registered as part of PMF with the Iraqi government.[120]

In 2020, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada formed the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.

Composition and organization

[edit]

While there are no official data about the strength of the Popular Mobilization Forces, there are some estimates, differing significantly. Around Tikrit reports in 2015 suggested there were about 20,000 engaged militiamen, while the grand total ranges are from 2–5 million[121] to 300,000–450,000 Iraqi armed forces.[122] Higher estimates have included about 40,000 Sunni fighters in 2016,[123] a figure evolving from reports in early 2015, which counted 1,000 to 3,000 Sunni fighters.[124][125] By early March 2015 the Popular Mobilization Forces appeared to be strengthening its foothold in the Yazidis town of Shingal by recruiting and paying local people.[126]

The Popular Mobilization Forces consist of both new volunteers and pre-existing militias, which have been grouped within the umbrella organization formally under the control of the Ministry of Interior Popular Mobilization Units directorate.[127][128] Among these militias there are the Peace Companies (formerly known as the Mahdi Army), Kata'ib Hezbollah, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and the Badr Organization.[129]

Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi ordered on April 7, 2015, that the Popular Mobilization Forces be placed under the direct command of the prime minister's office,[130] thus giving a further official status to the militia.[131]

In 2015, the chairman of the Popular Mobilization Committee in the Iraqi government was Falih al-Fayyadh, who is also the National Security Adviser.[132] The Popular Mobilization Committee is under the Office of Prime Minister.[1] The PMF are said to have been led on the battlefields by Jamal Jaafar Mohammed, also known as Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the head of Kata'ib Hezbollah,[133][134] but the chain of command runs through pre-existing leaders.[135] According to Iraqi sources, as well as to the London-based pro-Saudi Asharq Al-Awsat, the different militias rely on their own chain of command, and rarely work together[121] or follow regular Iraqi Army's orders.[136]

The Laws and conduct by which the PMF should abide are those of the Iraqi Government since the Iraqi Prime Minister has the final control over the PMF. Nonetheless, Marja' Ali al-Sistani issued an "Advice and Guidance to the Fighters on the Battlefields" which included a 20 points form of how the PMF should conduct themselves. The main points were that the PMF should treat the liberated areas locals with the Islamic Law which is as quoted from the second point which is a Hadith of the Muslim Prophet Muhammed; "Do not indulge in acts of extremism, do not disrespect dead corpses, do not resort to deceit, do not kill an elder, do not kill a child, do not kill a woman, and do no not cut down trees unless necessity dictates otherwise".[137] Other points included the same aforementioned guidance when treating non-Muslims and also not to steal or disrespect people even if they are the families of the ISIS fighters.[137][non-primary source needed]

Alongside Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, other people in charge of the PMF include Qais al-Khazali, commander of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and Hadi Al-Amiri, the chief of the Badr Organization.[138] According to The New York Times, such organizational autonomy may present a challenge to the consolidation of Haider al-Abadi's authority.[139] Volunteers include Shia Arabs, and smaller numbers of Iraqi Christians, Sunni Arabs, and Shia Turkmen.[1]

The militias are trained and supported by military advisers from Turkey (for Sunni and Turkmeni troops),[140] Iran, and Hezbollah,[141] including prominent Quds Force figures, such as (until his 2020 death) Qasem Soleimani.[142] The PMF also appeared to have deployed at least a regiment under the command of Colonel Jumaa al-Jumaily in Al Anbar Governorate.[143] They are also said to have their own military intelligence, administrative systems,[121] a sort of "media war team" that provides morale boosting, battlefield updates and propaganda videos,[144] and a court of law.[145]

Shia Arab component

[edit]
PMF commanders with IRGC advisors during the Hawija offensive (2017)

According to a Sunni newspaper, there are three main Shia components within the Popular Mobilization Forces: the first are the groups that were formed following Sistani's fatwa, without political roots or ambitions; the second are groups that were formed by political parties or are initially the military wings of these parties, with definite political characterization; the third is the armed groups that have been present in Iraq for years and have fought battles against US forces and also participated in operations in Syria.[127]

According to Faleh A. Jabar and Renad Mansour for The Carnegie Foundation, the Popular Mobilization Forces are factionally divided into three Shia components: a component pledging allegiance to Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei; a faction pledging allegiance to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani; and the faction headed by Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.[1]

The most powerful groups within the Popular Mobilization Forces are the groups which maintain strong ties with Iran and pledge spiritual allegiance to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[1] The pro-Khamanei faction would consist of already established parties and of relatively small paramilitaries: Saraya Khurasani, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Kata'ib Abu Fadhl al-Abbas, the Badr Organization and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq. These groups serve as a kind of border guard—a sort of Iranian insurance policy against threats on its immediate border.[1] Their leaders publicly take pride in such affiliations, professing religious allegiance to Khamenei and his notion of Vilayat al-Faqih.[1]

According to Faleh A. Jabar and Renad Mansour, the pro-Sistani faction consists of those armed groups formed by Sistani's fatwa to defend Shia holy sites and by paramilitary of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq.[1] There are four major groups organized by Najaf: Saraya al-Ataba al-Abbasiya, Saraya al-Ataba al-Hussainiya, Saraya al-Ataba al-Alawiya, and Liwa 'Ali al-Akbar, corresponding to Shia holy sites in Kadhimiya, Karbala, and Najaf.[1] The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq also swears allegiance to Sistani. After the Badr Organization left the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, its leader Ammar al-Hakim formed new paramilitary units, including Saraya el-Jihad, Saraya el-'Aqida, and Saraya 'Ashura.[1]

Muqtada al-Sadr's Peace Companies (Saraya al-Salam) were founded in June 2014 from the Mahdi Army. According to Faleh A. Jabar and Renad Mansour, the Sadrists have largely been cut off from Iranian funding.[1]

According to Shia P.M.F. officials, the recruitment campaign is successful also because it is administered by the religious establishment and Shia religious scholars from the hawza are instrumental in recruitment.[146] Recruitment via Shia Islamist political party structures and even individual clerics or members of parliament is pursued more the official PMF Commission, which lacks recruitment offices.[1]

Sunni Arab component

[edit]

In early stages of the PMF, the Shia component was almost exclusive and the Sunni one was negligible since it counted only 1,000 to 3,000 men.[125] In January 2016, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi approved the appointment of 40,000 Sunni fighters to the Popular Mobilization Forces. According to Al-Monitor, his move was decided in order to give a multiconfessional image to the Forces; however, Sunni fighters began to volunteer even before the al-Abadi's decision. Adding Sunni fighters to the Popular Mobilization Units could set the stage for the force to become the core of the envisioned National Guard.[123] According to The Economist, as of late April 2016 the Hashd had approximately 16,000 Sunnis.[147]

It has been observed that the Sunni Arab tribes that took part in al-Hashd al-Shaabi 2015 recruitment are those which also had good relations with Nouri al-Maliki during his tenure as Prime Minister.[148]

According to Yazan al-Jabouri, a secular Sunni commander of anti-ISIS Liwa Salahaddin, as of November 2016, there were 30,000 Iraqi Sunnis fighting within the ranks of PMUs.[149]

Shia Turkmen component

[edit]

The Turkmen Hashd overall constitute around four thousand members and are called "Brigade 12".[150][page needed]

According to Faleh A. Jabar and Renad Mansour for The Carnegie Foundation, Shia Turkmen joined Popular Mobilization Forces in order to increase their local autonomy from the Kurdistan Region and in order to counter Sunni Turkmen, who joined the Islamic State.[1]

Christian component

[edit]

There are also Christian PMF units in the Nineveh plains.[150] The Imam Ali Brigades trained two Christian units called Kata’ib Rouh Allah Issa Ibn Miriam (Spirit of God, Jesus Son of Mary Brigade) and the Babylon Brigades.[151] The Babylon Brigades have been described as "psuedo-Christian", as they are led by a Christian commander but are mostly made up of Shabaks and Shia Arabs.[152][153] In March 2023 there was a brief clash between the Babylon Brigades and the Assyrians of Qaraqosh after the former attempted to take control of a base belonging to the Nineveh Plains Protection Units.[153]

Equipment

[edit]
Popular Mobilization Forces fire a mortar during the Hawija offensive in 2017.

The equipment of the Popular Mobilization Forces is a major issue. At the end of January 2015, a video showed a large Kata'ib Hezbollah convoy transporting several American-made military vehicles, including an M1 Abrams Tank, M113 armoured personnel carriers, Humvees, and MRAP vehicles as well as Iranian-made Safir 4×4s and technicals with Kata'ib Hezbollah's flags flying.[154] According to some sources, the Iraqi government is supplying U.S.-provided military equipment to the militias.[155][156] Iraqi minister of transportation, and the head of the Badr Organization, Hadi Al-Amiri criticized the U.S. for the lack of providing arms.[157] On the other hand, U.S. officials argue that the operators of heavy weapons allegedly taken over by Kata'ib Hezbollah were regular Iraqi soldiers who raised the Hezbollah flag merely in solidarity with the militant group, while the same source acknowledged that it is generally difficult to monitor U.S.-made weapons.[158]

Alongside U.S.-made military equipment handed over to or fallen into the hands of Popular Mobilization Forces, Iran is a major supplier. According to some sources, in 2014 Tehran sold Baghdad nearly $10 billion worth of weapons and hardware. Furthermore, there is a daily supply of Iranian weapons,[159] including Iranian-made 106 mm anti-tank guns as well as 120 mm, 82 mm and 60 mm mortars.[160]

In May 2015, the United States started delivering about $1.6 billion worth of military equipment under the supervision of the Government of Iraq. According to some sources, the major beneficiaries of the weapons deliveries are to be the Popular Mobilization Forces.[161]

Heavy armour seemed to be operated by Popular Mobilization Forces in the operations surrounding the battle of Mosul.[162]

History and major engagements

[edit]

The Popular Mobilization Forces have been involved in several battles of the military intervention against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant since their founding, the most important being the Second Battle of Tikrit. After the end of the battle of Tikrit, the complex of occupation forces handed over security issues to local police and security forces.[163]

On Monday April 6, 2015, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi said that, while being heavily involved in the conquest of Tikrit, the Popular Mobilization Forces will not join the planned Mosul conquest.[164] This statement was reversed in March 2016, when al-Abadi reportedly rejected calls by Nineveh's provincial council to prohibit Popular Mobilization Forces from taking part in retaking Mosul.[165]

Shia volunteers reportedly entered Al Anbar Governorate on the first days of May 2015, among heavy protests of Sunnite personalities,[166][167] with limited operations continuing in 2016.[168]

In Autumn 2016, they participated in the Mosul Offensive acting as left flank of the anti-IS forces, and by November had captured a number of smaller towns and villages from IS, expanding roughly along a line from Qayyarah to Tal Afar, while keeping a distance (20+ km) to the city of Mosul itself.

In October 2017, the PMF was part of the Iraqi government forces that recaptured Kirkuk,[169] which had been under Kurdish control since 2014.[170]

Engagement in Syria

[edit]

Khomeinist PMF militia factions loyal to the Iranian Supreme Leader have been heavily deployed in the Syrian civil war on the side of the Assad regime, often with the stated aim of defending Shi'ite shrines.[171] Although at the time of the formation of the PMF, most of its component groups were primarily engaged in Iraq against ISIL, after the reduction of the immediate ISIL threat in Iraq from 2015, many returned to Syria. For instance, in January 2015, pro-Iran Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada militant group announced the deaths of two of its fighters in defense of Sayyidah Zaynab Mosque in Damascus, and the militia's involvement in the 2015 Southern Syria offensive was documented by the Iraqi TV station Al-Anwar 2.[172] Between 2013 and early 2016, 1,200 Iraqi fighters died in Syria, including combatants of pro-Iran militias Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, among them senior commanders Abu al-Fadl and Abu Haider al-Nazari.[173]

On the other hand, pro-Sistani and Sadrist PMF militias wary of Iranian influence in Iraq are strongly opposed to the intervention in Syria and have been resisting recruitment attempts made by pro-Iran factions to send Iraqis to die on the side of Assad regime.[76]

Terrorism

[edit]

Kata'ib Hezbollah, one of the forces of the PMF, is listed by Japan's Public Security Intelligence Agency as a terrorist organization.[174] The United Arab Emirates also classifies it as terrorist.[175] Kata'ib Hezbollah was designated a terrorist entity in 2009 by the United States.[176] Its leader, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, was also designated a terrorist.[177] In March 2019, U.S. designated Harakat al-Nujaba and its leader Akram al-Ka'abi Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT). In 2020, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, a powerful Iran-backed militia, part of the PMF, was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States.[178] In November 2023, U.S. added PMF militia Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada to its list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists.[179] In June 2024, Ansar Allah al-Awfiya was designated as a terrorist organization, following several attacks on U.S. bases in the region including the Tower 22 drone attack.[180]

Involvement in 2019–2021 Iraqi protests

[edit]

During the 2019–2021 Iraqi protests, which called for the end of the sectarian political system, some militias associated with PMF took part in violently suppressing the protests by using live bullets, marksmen, hot water, hot pepper gas and tear gas against protesters, leading to over 1,000 deaths and over 30,000 injuries.[181][182][183][184]

Domestic criticisms and war crimes accusations

[edit]
See also: Sunni Arab genocide in Iraq

Some of the militias constituting the Popular Mobilization Forces have been accused of war crimes motivated by sectarian revenge. According to Amnesty International in 2014, Shia militias have abducted, tortured and killed numerous Sunni civilians[96][185] and, according to Western sources, in Tikrit militants have committed some violence, while being publicly praised;[125] In the wake of the conquest of Tikrit, Iraqi authorities declared that war crimes would be investigated and their perpetrators punished.[164]

High Shia authorities, such as Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Ayatollah Hussein Al-Sadr, called on the militants in the PMF to refrain from war crimes or other despicable behaviour.[186] In 2015, ad hoc government inquiry committees were established to investigate civilian deaths attributed to the militias.[187]

In 2016, Mosul Sunni dignitaries and officials accused the PMF of killings of Sunnis, takeovers of schools and forcing Sunnis to sell property in the prime real estate area close to the Mosul shrine. According to City council's deputy chairman Muzher Fleih, 650 Sunnis have disappeared. Militia leaders insist any abuses are isolated incidents,[145] and target only captured Islamic State's collaborators.[188]

Alongside war crimes accusations, concerns regarding the constitutionality and politicization of al-Hashd al-Shaabi have been raised. Sunni sources have called for depoliticization of the Popular Mobilization Forces, to be achieved under the proposed National Guard bill.[127] According to some critics in 2015, the Popular Mobilization Forces were not sanctioned by the Constitution of Iraq and nonetheless had a budget and were paid on regular basis by the Iraqi government, whilst the legally established Peshmerga had not received their wages.[189][190] The official status and actual dependence of the Popular Mobilization Forces on the Baghdad government and its help was not fully resolved as of late 2015.[191] However, by the end of 2016, a law was passed bringing the PMU under the auspices of the Supreme Commander of the Iraqi National Army, incorporating PMF units into the official army of Iraq and removing any official affiliation with any social, religious or political group.[93]

Recruitment of Yazidis in Kurdish areas has been deemed to go against official Kurdish policy against the move: in February 2015, Kurdistan Region President Massoud Barzani asked the Peshmerga minister to stop all militia activities in the area.[126]

Allegedly, clerics from the Najaf Seminary, including Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, also criticized the monopolistic conduct of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.[1]

Concerns about growth

[edit]

The Popular Mobilization Forces are accused of accruing a power base in Iraq and of being Iran's instrument to dominate Iraq.[192] The main fears are that the permanent militia would turn themselves into enforcers of Shia domination.[145] The Iraqi Police headquarters in the Muthanna Governorate announced that they were in the process of commissioning Popular Mobilization battalions with security tasks in early January 2016. These tasks included protecting public and private establishments in open desert areas, among others. Other reports indicate that Popular Mobilization is securing border outlets and controlling security in liberated cities.[193]

According to General Ali Omran, commander of the army's 5th Infantry Division, P.M.F. militias are too entrenched in politics and at risk of "coming to blows" with the Armed Forces. In February 2016, militiamen refused orders to vacate a building in a military base north of Baghdad.[145]

According to AP-interviewed government officials and militia leaders, due to the fear of a return to Sunni minority rule over the Iraqi Shia majority, PMF militias want to remain a permanent, independent armed force; Hamed al-Jazaeery, head of the al-Khorasani Brigades militia, stated that the model is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.[145]

National guard

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In 2016, Commander of the CJTF-OIR Lt Gen. Stephen J. Townsend described the PMF as "remarkably disciplined" allies since he arrived. He added that the PMF could make Iraq more secure—if they become a national guard-like force, and not a "puppet" of Iran.[194]

American-led airstrikes

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Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, a member of the PMF, stated that their forces were bombed by US planes on 7 August 2017, in Al Anbar Governorate near the Iraq–Syria border and that Hashd al-Shaabi forces suffered many casualties.[195] The Baghdad-based spokesman of the U.S.-led coalition, Army Col. Ryan Dillon, dismissed the allegation, saying on Twitter that no coalition airstrikes took place in the area at the time. According to the militia's deputy, Ahmed al-Maksousi, they were hit by artillery fire in Syria's Jamouna area, about 12 kilometers (about 7.5 miles) from the Iraqi border. Along with 40 killed, many militiamen were wounded, al-Maksousi added.[196]

On 22 August 2019, The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), blamed the United States and Israel for a number of bombings on their warehouses and bases. The group accused the US of permitting Israeli drones to join its forces for executing attacks on Iraqi territory. The group pledged to counter any attack in the future.[197] On 23 August, a fatwa issued by Ayatollah Kazem al-Haeri called for attacks against US troops in Iraq, "the presence of any US military force in Iraq is forbidden (haram) under any title: military training, advice or the rationale of fighting terrorism".[198]

On 29 December 2019, the United States bombed the headquarters of PMF member Kata'ib Hezbollah near Al-Qa'im, killing 25 militiamen.[199]

On 3 January 2020, PMF commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, PMF PR head Mohammed Redha al-Jabri,[200] and the Quds Force head, Qasem Soleimani, were among those killed in an assassination near Baghdad Airport.[201][202]

On 12 March 2020, the U.S. launched air raids against five Kata'ib Hezbollah weapons storage bases across Iraq in retaliation for the 2020 Camp Taji attacks.[203]

On 25 February 2021, a U.S. air raid killed one and wounded four while targeting PMF facilities on the Iraqi-Syrian border in Syria's eastern Deir ez-Zor Governorate. The facilities were used by PMF forces combatting ISIL in collaboration with the Iraqi and Syrian governments. U.S. officials described the PMF as an "Iranian-backed militia" and the air strike as a retaliation for purported Iranian military aggression against U.S. facilities in Iraq, while Iranian officials denied involvement. Iraqi officials repudiated any connection between the PMF and the insurgents who previously attacked U.S. facilities.[citation needed] The Pentagon asserted that the air raid followed consultation with the Iraqi government and other partners in the region,[204] but the Iraqi military denied providing the U.S. with information regarding locations within Syria.[205]

On 27 June 2021, U.S. forces bombed two locations after an increase in drone attacks. One location was a drone-making facility and the other a conventional weapons exchange depot. Four members of Kataib Sayyed al-Shuhada faction were claimed to have been killed in the action.[206]

On 4 January 2024, U.S. airstrikes on PMF's logistical headquarters killed two people, including the organization's deputy head of operations in Baghdad, Mushtaq Talib Al-Saeedi, and wounded five others.[207]

On 2 February 2024, U.S. airstrikes targeted the headquarters of the PMF in Akashat in Anbar Governorate, killing 16 fighters and wounding 25.[208][209]

2025 PMF Reform Bill

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In March 2025, the Iraqi parliament introduced a draft law aimed at reforming the PMF and more fully integrating them into the state security apparatus. A central provision of the proposed legislation is the formal subordination of the PMF to the authority of the Iraqi Prime Minister, who serves as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces - explicitly distancing the group from external influence, particularly from Iran. The bill also includes measures such as a mandatory retirement age for senior commanders, which could lead to the replacement of key figures with longstanding ties to Tehran. The initiative reflects growing U.S. pressure on the Iraqi government to assert national control over the PMF and curb Iranian influence within its ranks. In contrast, the close relationship between PMF leadership and Iran was underscored by a February 2025 visit by PMF Chairman Falih al-Fayyadh to senior Iranian officials - a move widely interpreted as an attempt to rally support from Tehran against the proposed legislation, especially among hardline factions that often operate with considerable autonomy.[210]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Popular Mobilization Forces

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The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), known in Arabic as al-Hashd al-Shaʿabi, is an Iraqi state-sanctioned paramilitary umbrella organization comprising dozens of predominantly Shia militias, formalized in 2014 following a fatwa by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani that mobilized volunteers to counter the Islamic State's (ISIS) territorial advances after its capture of Mosul. The PMF, estimated at 100,000 to 150,000 fighters across 40-60 brigades, integrated into Iraq's security apparatus in 2016 via parliamentary legislation, receiving state funding and nominal oversight from the prime minister, though many factions operate with de facto independence and close operational links to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force. While the PMF contributed decisively to ISIS's territorial expulsion from Iraq by 2017, coordinating ground operations in key battles like Tikrit and Fallujah alongside the Iraqi army and U.S.-led coalition air support, its post-victory conduct has fueled sectarian tensions through documented reprisals against Sunni populations, including property seizures and alleged mass executions in liberated areas. Iran-aligned PMF elements have since escalated regional provocations, launching drone and rocket attacks on U.S. bases and Israeli targets since October 2023, prompting retaliatory strikes and straining Iraq's sovereignty as these groups prioritize Tehran's geopolitical agenda over national cohesion. Economically entrenched via control of border crossings, oil smuggling, and reconstruction contracts, the PMF wields parallel power structures that undermine state monopoly on violence, positioning it as both a bulwark against jihadist resurgence and a vector for foreign subversion.

Name and Symbols

Designations and Terminology

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), rendered in Arabic as al-Ḥashd al-Shaʿbī (الحشد الشعبي), directly translates to "The Popular Mobilization" or "Popular Crowd," with ḥashd denoting mobilization or assembly and shaʿbī signifying popular or of the people. This terminology emerged in June 2014 following a fatwa by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani urging volunteer mobilization against the Islamic State offensive, initially framing the groups as a grassroots response rather than a formal military structure. English-language designations interchangeably use Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) or Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), with "Units" emphasizing the modular brigade-level subunits under the umbrella organization, while "Forces" highlights the collective paramilitary capacity integrated into Iraq's security apparatus via 2016 legislation as the 16th Division of the Iraqi Army. The PMF serves as an overarching term for roughly 40–50 predominantly Shia militias, including pre-existing groups like Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ib Hezbollah, formalized under state oversight but retaining operational autonomy in many cases. Alternative transliterations include Hashd al-Shaabi or Hashd Shaabi, reflecting phonetic variations in Arabic-to-English rendering, and the entity is occasionally termed a "state within a state" by analysts to its dual reporting lines to the Iraqi and, for Iran-aligned factions, the . Iraqi designates it officially as a branch under the Ministry of Defense, distinct from irregular militias, though Western governments and reports often classify constituent Iran-backed brigades as terrorist organizations under separate sanctions, such as U.S. designations for groups like Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba.

Logos and Flags

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), known in Arabic as al-Hashd al-Sha'bi, utilize a range of symbols, with the umbrella organization featuring a primary emblem often rendered as stylized gold Arabic calligraphy of the word "Hashd" (الحشد) on a black background in patches and insignia, representing mobilization and defiance. This design echoes elements of allied groups like Hezbollah, incorporating motifs such as rifles and territorial maps to signify armed resistance. Individual PMF brigades retain faction-specific flags, typically incorporating Shia religious , or fields, and slogans of to or Iran-aligned figures, while the collective entity employs banners with "Al-Hashd Al-Sha'bi" inscribed on white, , or red grounds; the red variant likely evokes blood and sacrifice. PMF forces commonly display the Iraqi alongside these, affirming state-sponsored status under the Popular Commission established in 2016. Some adaptations integrate the into the Iraqi tricolor, it in the stripe with phrases like "" denoting .

Background and Formation

Issuance of the Fatwa and Initial Mobilization

In June 2014, the and the (ISIS) launched a rapid offensive across northern , capturing , the country's second-largest city, on amid the collapse of , which fled en masse and abandoned significant U.S.-supplied equipment. This advance threatened and exposed the fragility of Iraq's post-2003 structure, prompting widespread among Iraq's Shia clerical in . On June 13, 2014, Grand Ayatollah , Iraq's preeminent Shia religious , issued a religious () through his in , calling on "all Iraqis who are able to carry arms and fight the takfiris [ISIS derogatorily labeled as such] and defend the and the " to enlist in the Iraqi armed forces. The emphasized a non-sectarian appeal, urging participation from all communities to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity against the existential threat posed by ISIS's sectarian atrocities and territorial gains, which by then encompassed roughly one-third of Iraq's land area. Sistani's directive explicitly framed the mobilization as a defensive jihad under state , distinguishing it from independent vigilantism and aiming to bolster the regular army rather than supplant it. The fatwa triggered an immediate surge in volunteers, with tens of thousands—predominantly Shia but including some Sunnis and other minorities—flocking to recruitment centers in , , , and within days. enlistments reached approximately 50,000 by mid-June, organized into units that coordinated with remnants of the Iraqi to halt ISIS's south of and in Diyala . These early formations drew from existing Shia militia , such as those affiliated with like the and , but operated under the fatwa's as "Popular Committees" (Lijan al-Hashd al-Sha'abi), formalized by the Iraqi on June 15, 2014, to channel the volunteer influx systematically. This rapid response stemmed ISIS's advance toward the capital, counteroffensives that reclaimed key areas like Jurf al-Sakhar by late 2014, though it also amplified reliance on Iran-backed groups for training and logistics due to the Iraqi army's disarray. Following Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani's on June 13, 2014, urging Iraqis to volunteer to defend the country against advances, issued a on establishing the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), or Hashd al-Sha'abi, as an . This framework created the Commission for the Popular Mobilization under the Office of the of the Armed Forces, tasked with recruiting, funding, and coordinating volunteers amid the Iraqi army's collapse in northern and central regions. The commission enabled state allocation of salaries and logistics to disparate groups, including pre-existing Shia militias and ad hoc tribal units, forming the basis for an estimated 40 brigades by late 2014. Early organization remained decentralized and operational-focused, with units deployed rapidly for defensive actions in areas like and Jurf al-Sakhar without standardized command hierarchies. Coordination occurred primarily through the 's office, bypassing regular military chains to expedite mobilization, though dominant factions such as the and exerted significant influence over brigade assignments and resources. By 2015, under , restructuring efforts centralized some oversight, numbering brigades sequentially (e.g., 1–50) and integrating them into joint operations against ISIS, while state funding reached approximately 1.5 billion USD annually to sustain roughly 100,000 fighters. Legal formalization advanced in July 2016 when al-Abadi ordered the PMF's recognition as a permanent, independent formation within the armed forces, subject to the . Parliament codified this on , 2016, via No. 26, integrating the PMF into the with provisions for ranks, pensions, and subordination to state command, though the brief three-article deferred detailed amid ongoing . This status affirmed the PMF's in defeating by 2017 but highlighted persistent challenges in enforcing unified command over ideologically aligned subunits.

Structure and Command

Hierarchical Organization

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) function as an umbrella organization encompassing approximately 50 to 70 distinct militias, primarily Shia factions, rather than a rigidly unified hierarchical entity, with command authority distributed across factional leaders and regional operational commands. The overarching body is the Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC), established by Iraqi legislation in 2016 to integrate the PMF into the state apparatus under the prime minister's nominal oversight as commander-in-chief of armed forces. The PMC chairman, Falih al-Fayyad, holds primary administrative and political authority, managing budgeting, recruitment, and coordination, while cooperating with Iranian entities to influence militia alignments. At the deputy level, Abdul-Aziz al-Mohammadawi (Abu Fadak) serves as operational , overseeing tactical deployments and inter-faction liaison, though his underscores the PMF's internal tied to Iranian Guard (IRGC)-backed groups like . Below this, the structure fragments into brigade-level units (e.g., the 13th Brigade under Qasim Musleh al-Khafaji in Anbar Operations Command) and regional commands, where factional prevails, often prioritizing loyalties to external patrons like Iran's Supreme Leader over centralized Iraqi directives. This decentralized model, formalized yet ambiguous under Law 26 of 2016, enables operational flexibility against threats like but perpetuates dual chains of command, with Iranian influence dominating key subunits. Efforts to impose stricter , such as a 2025 draft law proposing a general position, standardized salaries, and fuller integration into the , faced amid internal divisions and U.S. opposition, highlighting persistent tensions between state control and militia . In , the PMF's command remains a hybrid of formal bureaucracy and informal patronage networks, with Iranian-aligned factions like Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Badr Organization wielding disproportionate sway through parallel operational .

Administrative and Operational Framework

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) operate under a legal framework established by Iraq's Law No. 26 of 2016, which formalized the PMF as an independent military formation subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Iraqi Armed Forces, the Prime Minister, rather than the Ministry of Defense or Ministry of Interior. This law, passed on November 26, 2016, integrated the PMF into the state security apparatus while preserving its distinct status, enabling state funding and salaries for approximately 238,000 fighters but allowing operational flexibility for constituent brigades. Subsequent legislation, such as PMF Commission Law No. 40 of 2016, further defined administrative oversight through the Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC), a body responsible for planning, training, logistics, and ensuring alignment with national command, though its three-article brevity limits detailed regulation. Administratively, the PMC, chaired by figures like Falih al-Fayyadh, manages , budgeting—allocated around $3.6 billion annually from the national —and disciplinary measures, with the PMF divided into over 60 brigades grouped under regional commands or factional umbrellas. Despite this , remains uneven; Iran-aligned factions, such as those in the Iran-backed axis, often bypass full PMC oversight, maintaining parallel command chains tied to external actors like Iran's , which undermines centralized control. As of 2025, proposed amendments to enshrine the PMF as a permanent, autonomous under the Popular Mobilization Authority have faced amid domestic debates and U.S. opposition, reflecting tensions over formalizing militia from broader Iraqi integration. Operationally, PMF units coordinate through the Joint Operations Command for major campaigns, such as anti-ISIS efforts, but retain brigade-level autonomy for patrols, border security, and targeted strikes, with some conducting extraterritorial actions in without Baghdad's full approval. This dual framework—nominal state subordination paired with factional self-direction—enables rapid mobilization but fosters accountability gaps, as evidenced by independent attacks on U.S. targets post-2019, despite official directives to cease such activities. Reforms to enhance oversight, including brigade transfers to federal ministries, have progressed slowly, with only partial integration achieved by 2024, prioritizing administrative payroll over unified operational command.

Composition and Demographics

Shia Majority Components

The Shia majority components dominate the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), comprising the majority of its brigades and personnel, with operational and ideological ties to through the Islamic Guard Corps-Quds (IRGC-QF). These groups, many originating from the post-2003 or earlier, integrated into the PMF following its formalization by Iraqi in 2016, but retain autonomous command structures and external that undermine full state control. Iranian support includes , weaponry, and monthly stipends, these militias to function as proxies advancing Tehran's regional agenda alongside anti-ISIS efforts. Badr Organization, the largest Shia component, was founded in 1983 in Iran by the IRGC as a paramilitary force of Iraqi Shia exiles opposing Saddam Hussein. Led by Hadi al-Amiri, it grew to an estimated 18,000–22,000 fighters by 2019 and controls multiple PMF brigades, including Brigade 1. Badr forces participated in key anti-ISIS battles such as Tikrit in 2015 and Mosul in 2016–2017, while maintaining political influence through parliamentary seats and infiltration of Iraq's security apparatus. Its enduring loyalty to Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei prioritizes anti-Western operations over exclusive national allegiance. , formed in 2007 by merging smaller Shia cells, operates PMF Brigades 45–50 with 5,000– members. Under leader al-Hamidawi since the 2020 U.S. strike killing , it has conducted over 100 attacks on U.S. since 2023, including strikes on bases in and . The group received IRGC-QF and arms, deploying up to 2,500 fighters to by 2014, and remains designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. for its role in roadside bombings and . Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), an offshoot of Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army established in 2006, commands PMF Brigades 41–43 with 7,000–10,000 fighters. Led by Qais al-Khazali, AAH executed thousands of attacks on U.S. and coalition forces from 2006–2011 and contributed to recapturing areas like Tikrit and Mosul from ISIS. Funded by IRGC-QF at approximately $2 million monthly in 2014, it blends political activism via its al-Sadiqoun bloc with militia operations, often prioritizing Iranian directives. Other significant Shia factions include Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, formed in 2013 with around 10,000 members by 2019, active in both and under IRGC support, and Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, established in 2013 with over 2,000 fighters focused on cross-border operations. These groups collectively embed Iranian influence within the PMF, complicating Iraq's as they balance domestic roles with external proxy activities.

Minority and Non-Shia Elements

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) incorporate of non-Shia and minority elements, primarily to facilitate local recruitment in diverse regions and counter in Sunni-majority areas, though these groups remain subordinate to the Shia-dominated command structure. Sunni Arab components, known as Tribal Mobilization Forces or Hashd al-Ashairi, comprise the largest non-Shia segment, drawing from tribes in provinces like Anbar, al-Din, and ; by , these forces numbered approximately fighters integrated into PMF payrolls. Specific units include the (51st Brigade), a Sunni formation that operates alongside Shia groups despite Iranian support for the broader PMF. These Sunni elements often function locally, focusing on tribal areas to prevent ISIS resurgence, but face challenges including limited autonomy and tensions with Shia factions over resource allocation and command loyalty. Christian militias represent another minority presence, with groups like the Babylon Brigade (50th Brigade) formally under PMF auspices, led by Chaldean Christian figure Rayan al-Kaldani and active in the since 2014. This unit, numbering in the low thousands, has been criticized for aligning closely with Iran-backed Shia militias, enabling political influence over Christian parliamentary seats through alleged vote-buying and non-Christian proxies, rather than purely defending minority interests. Other Assyrian or Chaldean formations maintain loose PMF links but prioritize self-defense amid broader concerns over Iranian infiltration eroding Christian autonomy in disputed territories. Yazidi and other non-Muslim minorities contribute even smaller contingents, such as Yazidi units in affiliated with PMF frameworks, often numbering in the hundreds and focused on local security post-2014 genocide. Turkmen and forces, while ethnic minorities, are predominantly Shia-aligned (e.g., 16th Turkmen Brigade and 30th Brigade) and thus integrated more seamlessly into the Shia majority, with non-Shia subsets minimal and locally oriented. Overall, these non-Shia elements constitute less than 20% of PMF personnel, serving strategic inclusion purposes but frequently marginalized by the dominant pro-Iranian Shia brigades, leading to reports of coercion, demographic shifts, and intra-PMF rivalries. The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) encompass approximately 238,000 fighters as of 2025, structured into over 70 factions encompassing various brigades and administrative elements. This total reflects Iraqi figures, which have been criticized for potential to secure larger budgets, including non-combat personnel. Since its inception in 2014 with roughly 60,000 initial volunteers, the PMF has undergone rapid expansion, reaching 204,000 personnel by late 2023 through successive waves of enlistment and state funding. Growth has accelerated in recent years, with a reported 95% increase in budgeted personnel slots for 2023 alone, supported by allocations rising to $3.6 billion. This trajectory aligns with the PMF's formalization as a state under the , transitioning from militias to a subsidized parallel security apparatus. Recruitment began with mass volunteer mobilization following Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani's June 2014 urging Iraqis to defend against incursions, drawing primarily from Shia communities. Post-2016, it shifted to decentralized channels via pre-existing Shia militias, tribal , religious seminaries, and , often absorbing irregular fighters into ranks for legitimacy and pay. salaries—averaging competitive with Iraqi stipends—have driven sustained inflows, particularly in Shia-majority provinces, without mandatory , though some reports coercive practices by factions. Ongoing trends indicate stabilized but persistent growth amid 2025 legislative debates on deeper state integration, which could standardize recruitment and cap numbers under prime ministerial oversight while preserving factional autonomy. Proponents of reform cite the need to curb unchecked expansion, as the PMF now rivals the Iraqi army in manpower and funding, potentially straining national resources.

Equipment and Capabilities

Armaments and Logistics

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) rely on a diverse of armaments sourced primarily from captured , diversions from Iraqi state supplies, and direct transfers from , with the latter dominating for Iran-aligned factions such as and . include , PK guns, , and Iranian-made 106 anti-tank recoilless guns, often supplemented by mortars in 60 , 82 , and 120 calibers. Heavier systems encompass T-72 tanks acquired through battlefield captures or state allocation, supplemented by Iranian technical upgrades, alongside Soviet-era howitzers and multiple rocket like the BM-21 Grad. Vehicles feature U.S.-origin Humvees and M113 armored personnel carriers, originally provided to the Iraqi military but documented in PMF possession as of 2017, alongside Iranian-supplied trucks. Advanced capabilities include short-range ballistic missiles, such as and Qiam variants, transferred from to PMF militias since at least 2018, precision strikes beyond conventional range. Drone systems, predominantly Iranian-designed models like the Ababil and Mohajer series, have been paraded and deployed for and loitering munitions, with control vehicles showcased in PMF events as early as 2021. These assets reflect Iran's strategic arming of proxies, bypassing formal Iraqi channels to maintain deniability. Logistics for PMF units vary by faction, with Iran-aligned groups maintaining semi-autonomous supply lines routed through border crossings like al-Qaim, facilitating continuous inflows of ammunition, spare parts, and fuel independent of Baghdad's oversight. State-integrated brigades access Iraqi military depots, such as the Taji National Supply Depot, for and basic resupply, though and factional rivalries often lead to hoarding or diversion. Iran's extends to personnel and establishing forward depots in Iraq, enhancing operational sustainment amid intermittent U.S. sanctions on arms flows. This dual structure underscores PMF's hybrid , blending state resources with external to sustain roughly 150,000 fighters as of 2023 estimates.

Training and Operational Readiness

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) formalized training structures following their 2016 integration into Iraq's state framework under Prime Ministerial Order No. 91, aiming to align paramilitary units with Iraqi standards through centralized oversight by the PMF Commission. However, implementation has been uneven, with many brigades continuing ad hoc inherited from pre-2014 militia networks, including ideological alongside tactical drills. This integration sought to professionalize operations but preserved factional loyalties, limiting unified readiness across the estimated 40,000–100,000 active fighters. Iranian influence dominates PMF training, particularly for Iran-aligned factions comprising the majority of combat-effective units. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and Lebanese provide embedded advisors, weapons, and specialized instruction in asymmetric tactics, such as (IED) fabrication, drone piloting, and precision strikes, building on experience from the 2014–2017 anti-ISIS campaign. For instance, (KH, brigades 45, 56, 57) and (AAH, brigades 41–43), totaling around fighters, have undergone IRGC-QF programs enhancing capabilities like the May 2019 drone and missile attack on facilities. These efforts, conducted at IRGC-operated bases and training centers in western , prioritize proxy warfare proficiency over with Iraqi regular forces. Operational readiness remains heterogeneous, with elite Iran-backed brigades demonstrating high in sustained operations due to hardening against and access to advanced Iranian-supplied systems, including explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) and short-range ballistic missiles. Assessments indicate these units, such as KH's 10,000-strong controlling bases like Jurf as-Sakhr, maintain elevated through regular exercises and regional deployments, outpacing weaker Iraqi Army elements in . Broader PMF capabilities have expanded since 2020, incorporating enabler units for armor, , and under Badr Organization oversight, though systemic issues like factional rivalries and undermine overall cohesion. Supplementary programs, such as Geneva Call initiatives on , address disciplinary gaps but have impact on core .

Military Engagements Against ISIS

Key Battles and Contributions in Iraq

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) were mobilized following Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani's on June 13, 2014, urging Iraqis to join security forces against advances after the group's capture of on June 10, 2014, providing critical manpower amid the Iraqi army's collapse. By late 2014, PMF units had grown to tens of thousands, halting momentum toward through defensive operations in mixed-sect areas south of the capital. In the Battle of Jurf al-Sakhar, PMF-aligned militias participated in the October 24, 2014, offensive that recaptured the district southwest of Baghdad from ISIS control, where Iraqi forces reported killing approximately 500 militants and destroying key supply routes used by the group for attacks on the capital. This victory secured a strategic corridor, preventing further ISIS infiltration into Shia heartlands, though subsequent PMF dominance in the area raised concerns over sectarian displacement of Sunni residents. During the Second Battle of Tikrit in March 2015, PMF brigades, supported by Iranian Guard Corps advisors, led initial assaults to retake the city north of , deploying up to 20,000 fighters but stalling against ISIS defenses despite numerical superiority, prompting U.S. suspension of airstrikes over fears of revenge killings against Sunni civilians. Iraqi regular forces later assumed the lead, liberating Tikrit on April 1, 2015, with PMF contributions limited to flanking operations; the battle highlighted PMF operational independence but also coordination challenges with coalition partners. In the Fallujah offensive from May 23 to June 26, 2016, PMF units formed part of the joint force encircling and assaulting the Anbar city, contributing to the displacement of over 80,000 civilians and the reported deaths of hundreds of ISIS fighters, though Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service units bore the brunt of urban combat. The operation restored government control over a key ISIS stronghold, with PMF securing peripheral areas to prevent fighter escapes. PMF forces played a supporting in the campaign from 2016 to July 2017, operating on the city's western and southern flanks, capturing towns like in 2017 and disrupting ISIS routes from , which aided the main Iraqi army and coalition push into the urban core. Their efforts included independent advances southwest of starting April 2017, claiming to eliminate ISIS pockets and secure over 1,000 square kilometers, though exclusion from Mosul's old reflected tensions with U.S.-backed Iraqi command over potential militia excesses. Overall, PMF manpower—estimated at 100,000 by 2017—filled gaps in Iraq's fragmented military, contributing to the territorial defeat of ISIS by December 2017, but often through parallel command structures influenced by Iran.

Factors in Defeating ISIS Territories

The territorial defeat of the and () in , culminating in the liberation of on July 10, 2017, and the group's loss of all held territory by 2017, relied on a combination of factors involving the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Formed in response to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani's on June 13, 2014, urging Iraqis to defend the against advances, the PMF rapidly mobilized tens of thousands of predominantly Shia volunteers, filling the left by the Iraqi army's in northern . This surge in manpower enabled sustained ground operations where regular forces faltered, with PMF units participating in the recapture of key areas including Tikrit in March 2015, Ramadi in December 2015, and Fallujah in June 2016. Iranian support proved in enhancing PMF , providing through Quds Force advisors, advanced weaponry, and logistical that allowed militias to conduct coordinated assaults against fortified positions. Without this external backing, the PMF's volunteer-based would have struggled against 's tactical proficiency and heavy armament seized from Iraqi stockpiles. In battles like Fallujah, Iranian-supplied and militiaman expertise facilitated urban clearances that minimized reliance on overstretched national forces. Synergy with U.S.-led airstrikes was another critical factor, as precision strikes degraded command structures, supply lines, and fighting capabilities, creating opportunities for PMF ground advances. The conducted over 13,000 airstrikes in by mid-2017, often in direct support of PMF-led operations in Anbar province and during the campaign, where PMF forces secured southern and western flanks to prevent reinforcements. This air-ground integration compensated for PMF deficiencies in air support and intelligence, enabling the recapture of approximately 40% of 's territory previously under control by PMF-involved efforts. PMF fighters' high motivation, driven by perceptions of existential sectarian from ISIS's anti-Shia , sustained offensive momentum despite heavy estimated in the thousands during major engagements. Their willingness to absorb losses in human-wave tactics pressured ISIS into defensive postures, exacerbating the group's overextension and internal fractures. Collectively, these elements—mass mobilization, foreign augmentation, aerial enablement, and resolute ground commitment—dismantled ISIS's pseudo-state apparatus in , though PMF successes were unevenly distributed and often accompanied by reports of reprisals against Sunni populations.

External Operations

Involvement in Syria

Components of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), particularly Iran-aligned Shia militias such as , , and , began deploying fighters to Syria in 2012 to support the regime against predominantly Sunni rebel groups. These early efforts focused on defending Shia holy sites in , including the Sayyida Zaynab shrine, and countering advances by groups deemed takfiri threats by the militias. Operations were coordinated through the ' Qods Force, integrating Iraqi fighters with Syrian Arab Army units, , and Afghan Fatemiyoun brigades to form a sectarian auxiliary . In the 2016 Battle of Aleppo, Iraqi Shia militias played a pivotal role in the regime's offensive to recapture eastern Aleppo from rebel control. An estimated 5,000 foreign Shia fighters, including thousands from Iraq, massed for the assault, providing the bulk of ground infantry to encircle and assault rebel-held districts. Groups like and the Nujaba Movement led urban combat operations under Qods Force commander Qasem Suleimani's oversight, contributing to the regime's victory by December 2016 despite heavy casualties from rebel counterattacks and airstrikes. This involvement solidified a land corridor linking Iraq to Syria, facilitating arms transfers and militia rotations via border crossings like Al-Bukamal. PMF units extended operations to eastern Syria in 2017, participating in the lifting of the Islamic State (ISIS) siege of Deir ez-Zor. Iraqi militias advanced alongside regime forces and Russian air support to secure the city and Euphrates Valley, aiming to establish control over the Iraq-Syria border for strategic depth against ISIS remnants and to enable Iranian supply lines to Lebanon. Kata'ib Hezbollah, for instance, conducted cross-border logistics, smuggling weapons and reinforcements to sustain these efforts. Over the war's duration, thousands of Iraqi fighters rotated through Syria, though exact figures remain disputed due to unofficial deployments and high attrition rates from combat and executions by rebels. PMF presence persisted post-2017, with factions maintaining checkpoints and conducting anti-ISIS patrols in Deir ez-Zor while prioritizing regime stabilization against opposition holdouts. In November-December 2024, as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham-led rebels overran Aleppo and advanced southward, PMF mobilized up to 20,000 fighters along the Iraqi border, with reports of hundreds crossing via Al-Bukamal on December 2 to reinforce Assad's defenses in Damascus and northern Syria. PMF leadership denied official intervention, framing the buildup as preventive against spillover into Iraq, but military sources confirmed limited deployments under Iranian urging. Following Assad's ouster on December 8, 2024, remaining Iraqi militias withdrew en masse to Iraq, marking the end of their sustained operational role.

Other Regional Activities

Certain factions within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), such as and , have provided , logistical, and financial support to Yemen's Houthi (Ansar ) movement, including sessions on drone and operations hosted on PMF bases in . This cooperation, which dates back to at least 2015, involves PMF facilitation of arms routes to via and the , as well as subsidized supplies and campaigns for Houthi drone programs organized by groups like . In 2019, PMF-linked Iraqi militias coordinated with Houthis on the drone attack targeting facilities, sharing technical expertise on unmanned aerial systems. By March 2024, a operations under Iranian Guard (IRGC) oversight was established, incorporating PMF factions like to synchronize naval strikes against shipping in the , , , and Mediterranean. This led to at least six claimed attacks in June 2024, including operations targeting vessels bound for , though independent verification from entities like U.S. Central Command remains absent. Reports indicate deployments of PMF fighters to Yemen, with Iranian-backed PMF elements reportedly sent to bolster Houthi forces amid escalating regional tensions as of 2025. PMF leadership has publicly denied conducting operations outside Iraq, attributing external engagements to independent "resistance" networks rather than official PMF command structures. These activities align with broader coordination within Iran's "Axis of Resistance," though they have drawn U.S. responses, including airstrikes on PMF facilities linked to Houthi support.

Controversies and Abuses

Terrorism Designations and Justifications

Several Iran-aligned militias operating as brigades within the (PMF) have been designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) by the U.S. Department of State, primarily to their documented roles in and executing attacks on U.S. and coalition personnel, facilities, and interests in and the region. These designations, which impose severe financial and operational restrictions, target groups such as , designated in for conducting attacks against U.S. forces and seeking to destabilize through . Similarly, Harakat al-Nujaba was designated for pledging to Iran's Supreme Leader, issuing threats against U.S. bases, and receiving Iranian and logistical support to conduct operations. In September 2025, the U.S. State Department expanded FTO designations to include three additional PMF-affiliated groups: Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, for threatening U.S. and Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS personnel while receiving Iranian training, funding, and weapons; Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, linked to a January 2024 drone strike on Tower 22 in Jordan that killed three U.S. service members; and Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, for plotting attacks on U.S. facilities, facilitating anti-U.S. operations, and undergoing training in Iran and Lebanon. These actions are justified by U.S. authorities as part of broader efforts to counter Iran's use of proxy militias to project power, with evidence including intercepted communications, attack claims of responsibility, and financial trails tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force. Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, another PMF brigade, faces Specially Designated Global Terrorist status for similar rocket and mortar assaults on U.S. positions, though not elevated to full FTO listing as of late 2025. The Iraqi government has not designated any PMF components as terrorist entities, viewing the umbrella organization as a legitimate state-integrated force under the 2016 Popular Mobilization Law, despite U.S. concerns over their autonomy and Iranian influence. PMF leaders have expressed fears of a broader U.S. terrorist label on the entire apparatus, which could trigger asset freezes and travel bans, but no such comprehensive designation has occurred, reflecting the tension between Iraq's sovereignty claims and international security assessments. Justifications emphasize empirical incidents—such as over 170 attacks on U.S. targets since October 2023 attributed to PMF-linked groups—over ideological alignment alone, underscoring causal links between militia operations and loss of life among coalition forces.

War Crimes Accusations and Evidence

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) have faced repeated accusations of committing war crimes during operations against the (ISIS), including extrajudicial executions, , enforced disappearances, and the looting or destruction of civilian property, often targeting Sunni Arab communities suspected of with ISIS. These allegations, documented by organizations through testimonies, , and forensic , primarily stem from the 2014–2017 campaign to retake ISIS-held territories in . Critics, including (HRW) and , argue that such acts constitute violations of , potentially amounting to war crimes to their deliberate and widespread against non-combatants. PMF officials have denied systematic involvement, attributing isolated incidents to rogue elements or ISIS infiltrators, though investigations by Iraqi authorities have rarely led to . A prominent case occurred in following its recapture from in late March 2015, where PMF-affiliated militias, including and the , were accused of revenge killings against Sunni civilians and suspected ISIS sympathizers. HRW reported that militias executed at least 160-190 people, including women and children, in extrajudicial killings, with bodies bulldozed into mass graves near the city; satellite imagery confirmed earth-moving activity consistent with grave-digging in April 2015, and witnesses described systematic roundups and shootings. Looting and arson targeted over 200 homes and businesses, exacerbating sectarian displacement. The Iraqi government acknowledged some abuses but conducted no comprehensive probe, highlighting patterns of impunity for PMF units. Similar abuses were reported during the 2016-2017 Mosul offensive. In November 2016, near Tel Afar, fighters from the Iran-backed —a PMF brigade—executed 10 to 17 Sunni detainees without , dumping their bodies in the ; HRW verified the incident via accounts and noted it as a clear under the . documented additional cases of and unlawful killings by PMF forces in the same region, including public humiliations and forced confessions from Sunni men rounded up en masse. U.S. State Department reports from 2017 onward have corroborated ongoing , with PMF elements implicated in arbitrary arrests and killings of Sunnis, often under the pretext of counterterrorism, contributing to thousands of unresolved disappearances since 2014. In Fallujah (June 2016) and Hawija (September 2017), PMF units were accused of indiscriminate shelling, looting, and summary executions during post-liberation sweeps, displacing thousands and destroying Sunni-majority villages. HRW evidence included resident interviews and imagery showing deliberate property destruction, while UN reports from 2015 noted PMF involvement in abductions and killings that displaced over 100,000 civilians. These patterns, cross-verified across sources, suggest a sectarian motivation, with PMF factions like the Liwa al-Taf or tribal militias integrated into the force prioritizing revenge over due process. Despite calls for exclusion from operations, such as ahead of Mosul, Iraqi commands often integrated abusive units, perpetuating cycles of violence without judicial recourse.

Sectarian Practices and Human Rights Violations

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), composed predominantly of Shia militias, have faced repeated accusations of sectarian practices targeting Sunni communities, particularly of operations to liberate -held territories between and 2017. These allegations include extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and forced displacements, often framed by witnesses and investigators as reprisals for atrocities such as the in , where executed at least 1,700 Shia recruits. Human Rights Watch documented widespread destruction in Sunni areas of following its recapture in , including the burning of over buildings and homes, looting, and apparent summary executions of civilians by PMF-affiliated militias, with local officials and reporting bodies left in streets and mass graves unearthed containing scores of remains. Similar patterns emerged in other Sunni-majority regions. In Diyala province, PMF militias razed entire Sunni villages near Amerli in late 2014 and early 2015, displacing thousands through arson and intimidation, with satellite imagery confirming the systematic demolition of over 50 structures in areas like Sulagh and Ikrishat. Amnesty International reported that PMF units, armed with state-supplied weapons, facilitated abductions, torture, and summary killings across central and northern Iraq from 2015 onward, including instances where detainees—often Sunni men suspected of ISIS collaboration—were beaten, electrocuted, or executed without trial, as evidenced by survivor testimonies and forensic examinations. In one documented case during the 2016 Mosul offensive, tribal militias integrated into the PMF tortured and publicly humiliated Sunni detainees in al-Makuk and nearby villages, extracting forced confessions through beatings and mock executions. U.S. State Department assessments have corroborated these violations, noting that Iran-aligned PMF elements conducted unlawful killings and torture targeting Sunni Arabs during arrests and detentions, contributing to a cycle of sectarian resentment in provinces like Nineveh and Anbar. The Iraqi government has rarely prosecuted perpetrators, fostering impunity; for instance, despite UNAMI documentation of over 900 civilian killings in 2018 attributable in part to security forces including PMF, few cases advanced to accountability. PMF leaders have denied systematic abuses, attributing incidents to rogue elements or ISIS infiltrators, but independent evidence from eyewitness accounts, satellite data, and victim interviews consistently implicates militia command structures in authorizing or overlooking revenge-driven operations.

Political Role and Domestic Influence

Involvement in 2019–2021 Protests

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), particularly its Iran-aligned factions such as and , were implicated in the violent suppression of the Tishreen protests that erupted on , , across and southern Iraqi cities, targeting , , and foreign interference. Protesters demanded an end to militia dominance, including that of the PMF, which many viewed as extensions of Iranian influence undermining Iraqi . From to 5, , security forces including PMF elements used live , snipers positioned in buildings overlooking in , and canisters fired directly at crowds, resulting in at least 100 and over 3,000 injuries in the initial wave, with wounds to the head and chest predominant. The intensified in late and , with PMF militias operating in clothes or alongside federal police to conduct targeted shootings, abductions, and beatings against demonstrators and journalists. documented sniper from PMF-controlled sites in and other areas, contributing to a total of approximately 600 protester by early , many attributable to paramilitary groups cooperating with state forces despite denials. PMF leaders, including those from the , publicly justified the response as defending state institutions against "chaos," while from videos and accounts showed systematic coordination to disperse sit-ins. Into 2020 and 2021, as protests waned but sporadic demonstrations persisted, PMF-affiliated groups shifted to extrajudicial measures, including assassinations and intimidation campaigns against activists, with over 200 such killings reported by mid-2021, often claimed by or linked to factions like Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba. Amnesty International highlighted a pattern of impunity, with Iraqi investigations failing to hold PMF commanders accountable, allowing militias to consolidate control over protest hotspots and deter renewal of the movement. This involvement exacerbated sectarian tensions, as Sunni and youth-led protests framed PMF actions as Shia militia overreach protecting entrenched power.

Electoral Participation and Power Consolidation

The , serving as the primary political for the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), entered Iraq's parliamentary elections in 2018, capturing 48 seats in the 329-member of Representatives and positioning itself as a leading Shiite bloc behind only the Sadrist-led Saairun . This strong showing marked the PMF's transition from a wartime to a formalized political entity, leveraging its anti-ISIS credentials to garner voter support in Shiite-majority areas and secure influence over coalition-building processes. In the October 2021 snap elections, prompted by mass protests against corruption and militia overreach, Fatah's representation declined sharply to 17 seats, reflecting public disillusionment with PMF-linked groups amid allegations of electoral intimidation and economic patronage. Despite the setback, Fatah's integration into the Shiite Coordination Framework—a broader alliance of pro-Iran factions—enabled it to navigate the ensuing nine-month political deadlock, culminating in the Sadrist bloc's withdrawal from parliament on June 13, 2022, and the subsequent formation of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's on October 27, 2022. This maneuver solidified PMF factions' role in executive appointments, including security portfolios, thereby embedding their operational autonomy within state structures. Electoral gains have facilitated PMF power consolidation by providing legislative cover for its dual military-political identity, with Fatah MPs advocating for laws that entrench PMF funding—rising from approximately $1 billion in 2016 to over $2 billion by 2023—and vetoing reforms aimed at full subordination to the prime minister. Through parliamentary alliances and committee influence, PMF representatives have secured exemptions from demobilization mandates and expanded patronage networks, distributing state resources to loyalist communities while resisting disbandment pressures. Critics, including Sunni and Kurdish blocs, argue this hybrid model undermines democratic accountability, as PMF electoral success often correlates with reported vote-buying and militia-enforced turnout in contested districts. As approaches the November 11, 2025, parliamentary elections, continues to campaign on national defense themes, aiming to reclaim lost ground amid intra-Shiite rivalries and U.S.-led calls to bar groups from political contests under Iraqi prohibiting parties with military wings. Sustained participation reinforces the PMF's of hybrid legitimacy, blending ballot-box victories with coercive leverage to perpetuate influence over Iraq's fragmented power-sharing .

Concerns Over State Sovereignty and Expansion

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), formalized under Iraqi No. 40 of as a state-sponsored subordinate to the , have faced for maintaining operational that parallels or supersedes central command structures. Despite this legal framework, key factions such as and continue to receive state funding while prioritizing directives from Iranian-linked commanders over Baghdad's authority, effectively creating a within Iraq's apparatus. This arrangement raises alarms among Iraqi analysts and international observers that the PMF functions as a "state within a state," capable of deploying forces independently in domestic operations, such as suppressing the 2019–2021 protests, without full accountability to the national chain of command. Expansion of PMF influence extends beyond military roles into economic and territorial control, exacerbating sovereignty concerns. By 2025, the PMF oversees border crossings, airports, and smuggling routes in provinces like Diyala and Anbar, generating revenues estimated in the billions of dollars annually through unchecked enterprises, which divert funds from the central budget and undermine fiscal oversight. Political integration has further entrenched this power, with PMF-affiliated parties securing seats in parliament and influencing judicial decisions, such as rulings against Kurdish oil exports, thereby challenging federal authority and fostering sectarian imbalances that disadvantage Sunni and Kurdish regions. Critics, including voices from the Sunni and Kurdish blocs, argue this hybrid structure erodes the monopoly of force essential to state sovereignty, as militias pursue subnational agendas that conflict with national policy. In 2025, proposed amendments to PMF have intensified debates over formalizing this expansion. A draft law reviving the Popular Mobilization Authority seeks to grant the PMF independent status as a permanent , potentially exempting Iran-aligned units from full integration into the Iraqi and allowing continued external command influences. Iraqi Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's has pushed for subordination to state control amid U.S. warnings that such measures would entrench parallel militias, risking Iraq's alignment toward Iranian dominance and prompting potential sanctions or aid cuts. Proponents within Shia Coordination Framework parties defend the PMF as vital for national defense, yet evidence of non-compliance with 2016 integration mandates—such as unilateral deployments against U.S. forces—substantiates fears that expansion prioritizes militia loyalty over sovereign unity.

Reforms and Integration Debates

Proposals for National Guard Status

In February 2015, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's government proposed legislation to establish a comprising approximately 120,000 personnel, explicitly aiming to incorporate the emerging Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into a formalized, state-controlled provincial to counter while centralizing authority. This initiative drew on prior efforts to harness irregular militias for national defense, positioning the Guard as a mechanism for local recruitment and loyalty to Baghdad rather than factional commanders, with PMF units intended to form its core supplemented by Sunni and other recruits to balance sectarian representation. The proposal encountered significant opposition from Shia political blocs and PMF leaders, who viewed it as a to their operational and influence, fearing dilution of Shia dominance in the force amid concerns that provincial basing would empower Sunni-majority areas. Sunni and Kurdish parliamentarians supported the bill in for inclusive local forces but raised alarms over potential Shia vetoes and inadequate safeguards against PMF overreach in liberated territories. By mid-2015, parliamentary and internal divisions the bill, as PMF numbers swelled to around 60,000 fighters operating with , prompting critics to argue it undermined on violence. Subsequent analyses in 2017 and 2018 highlighted the PMF's evolution into a quasi-national guard in ISIS-liberated regions through local recruitment, but formal conversion efforts waned as the 2016 PMF Law (No. 26) instead enshrined the group as a parallel state entity under the prime minister's nominal oversight without full integration. In reform debates as of 2025, National Guard status resurfaced as one option for restructuring the PMF—alongside merger into ministries or dissolution—to curb factionalism and enhance accountability, though Iranian-aligned factions resisted amid pushes for greater autonomy. Proponents contended this hybrid model could preserve anti-ISIS capabilities while subordinating militias to civilian command, yet implementation remained stalled by entrenched interests prioritizing PMF preservation over decentralization.

2025 Reform Bill and Legislative Stalemate

In March 2025, the Iraqi Council of Representatives introduced a draft reform bill amending Law No. 26 of 2016, which governs the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), with the stated goal of formalizing their institutional role within the state security apparatus while affirming their status as a permanent entity under the PMF Commission reporting to the prime minister. The legislation proposed establishing the PMF as an autonomous security organization distinct from the Iraqi Army and federal police, including provisions for a dedicated military academy, enhanced financial autonomy, and expanded access to state intelligence and equipment procurement. Proponents, primarily PMF-aligned parliamentary blocs, argued that the bill would legitimize the forces' contributions against ISIS and align them more closely with national defense needs, potentially transforming them from a liability into a state asset. The bill advanced through initial readings in the spring and reached committee discussions by July , but encountered immediate opposition from Sunni and Kurdish lawmakers, who viewed it as entrenching sectarian Shia dominance and undermining unification efforts. External pressures intensified when the issued warnings in July, including a letter to Mohammed Shia al-Sudani threatening sanctions, reduced , and leverage over issues like the al-Hol detention camp if the bill passed, citing its potential to empower Iran-backed factions designated as terrorists by Washington, such as Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba. Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani publicly acknowledged these U.S. interventions as influencing the legislative process, highlighting tensions between Baghdad's sovereignty claims and bilateral security ties. A planned vote on August 5, 2025, descended into chaos amid disputes and protests, resulting in the bill's withdrawal and indefinite , with deferring it to the next legislative term in . This stalemate persisted into 2025, exacerbated by internal divisions—Shia Coordination Framework parties pushing for passage versus cross-sectarian resistance—and U.S. sanctions on PMF-linked entities, which underscored Baghdad's in balancing domestic political coalitions with . Critics within , including advocates, warned that to risked perpetuating PMF outside full state control, while supporters decried foreign interference as undermining 's post-ISIS . As of late 2025, the bill remained stalled, with no scheduled resumption amid the approaching end of the parliamentary session and looming national elections.

US and International Pressures for Dissolution or Control

The United States has exerted significant pressure on the Iraqi government to dissolve or subordinate Iran-backed factions within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), citing their role in attacks on U.S. personnel and alignment with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This pressure intensified in 2025 amid legislative efforts to formalize the PMF's status, with U.S. officials warning that institutionalizing these groups would embed terrorist entities within Iraq's state structure. On July 24, 2025, the U.S. sent a letter to Iraqi Prime Minister , threatening to terminate assistance and impose sanctions if a proposed PMF passed, which would have granted the organization independent outside full integration into the Iraqi armed forces. The faced opposition from Washington due to provisions that would Iran-aligned militias from disbandment and enhance their political and financial autonomy. In response to these warnings, the Iraqi government withdrew the bill on August 30, 2025, attributing the decision to internal divisions and external pressures, including from the U.S. Further escalating measures, the U.S. State Department designated four Iran-aligned militias operating under the PMF umbrella—Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Harakat al-Nujaba, Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, and Saraya al-Difa al-Shaabi—as Foreign Terrorist Organizations on September 17, 2025, building on prior sanctions against groups like Kata'ib Hezbollah. These designations aimed to isolate the militias financially and legally, pressuring Iraq to exclude them from state payrolls and official roles. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated in July 2025 that such laws would "institutionalize Iranian influence and armed terrorist groups," underscoring demands for their full disarmament or absorption under strict Iraqi military control. Complementing diplomatic efforts, the U.S. has conducted airstrikes against PMF-linked targets in response to militia attacks on American forces, with threats of intensified operations unless Iraq acts to disband rogue elements. In April 2025, U.S. officials informed Baghdad that failure to neutralize Iran-backed groups could lead to expanded strikes, prompting some militias to signal willingness to disarm to avert confrontation under a potential Trump administration return. Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani confirmed on October 25, 2025, that the U.S. applied "intense pressure" on Shiite leaders, including threats to withhold political and security support, to block PMF entrenchment. International pressures have largely aligned with U.S. , though less formalized, with entities like the echoing calls for dissolution amid regional concerns over Iranian . European partners have supported sanctions frameworks targeting PMF financiers, but primary leverage remains American to Iraq's reliance on U.S. and . These efforts reflect broader geopolitical aims to Tehran's proxy network, though Iraqi officials have resisted full compliance to avoid domestic backlash from PMF-aligned factions.

Iranian Ties and Geopolitical Implications

Direct Iranian Backing and Command Structures

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), particularly its Quds Force, provides direct financial, material, and advisory support to several prominent factions within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), enabling their operations and embedding Iranian influence in Iraq's security apparatus. This backing intensified following the 2014 rise of the Islamic State, with the IRGC mobilizing Shia militias responsive to its command, including groups like Kata'ib Hezbollah and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, which receive weapons, training, and funding routed through IRGC networks. Iranian support extends to operational coordination, where IRGC advisers are embedded alongside PMF units, conducting independent campaigns parallel to Iraqi state forces, as observed in joint actions against ISIS and subsequent activities. Command structures for Iran-aligned PMF factions often bypass full integration into Iraq's Chain of Command framework, instead aligning with IRGC-Quds Force directives, exemplified by pledges of allegiance from groups such as to Iran's Supreme Leader . Following the 2020 assassination of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, his successor Esmail Qaani assumed oversight, making multiple visits to Iraq—including in 2021 and 2025—to reinforce coordination and issue instructions to militia leaders amid regional tensions. These visits underscore Iran's role in directing PMF responses to geopolitical events, such as attacks on U.S. assets, where IRGC guidance shapes targeting and escalation decisions. While the PMF operates under the nominal authority of Iraq's as , Iran-backed units maintain dual loyalties, with IRGC-Quds Force exerting control over strategic operations through financial leverage—estimated at of millions annually—and ideological alignment, as evidenced by U.S. sanctions on IRGC-linked smuggling funding these groups as recently as 2025. This structure allows Iran to via PMF proxies, prioritizing Tehran's regional objectives over Iraqi national interests, despite formal state integration efforts.

Impacts on Iraq's Alignment with Iran vs. West

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), through its dominant Iran-aligned factions, have significantly bolstered Tehran's influence over Baghdad's decisions, constraining Iraq's to pursue independent alignment with Western powers. Many PMF brigades, such as and , maintain operational ties to Iran's (IRGC), receiving , , and directives that prioritize anti-Western objectives, including the expulsion of U.S. forces from . This integration has enabled pro-Iran elements within Iraq's Shia Coordination Framework to exert leverage, as evidenced by the PMF's control over key portfolios and its $2.6 billion state , which sustains parallel power structures resistant to Western-oriented reforms. PMF actions have directly escalated tensions with the , manifesting in over 160 attacks on U.S. positions in and since , 2023, including a , 2024, drone strike by in that killed three American service members. These incidents, often framed by PMF leaders as retaliation for U.S. support of , have prompted American airstrikes on PMF targets and demands for Iraqi accountability, yet Baghdad's reluctance to disband rogue factions—due to PMF veto power in —has stalled bilateral security . Following the U.S. killing of PMF deputy commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis alongside IRGC Quds Force head Qasem Soleimani on January 3, 2020, Iraq's passed a non-binding resolution to expel U.S. troops, driven by PMF pressure, which has repeatedly resurfaced in legislative debates and complicated the 2021-2025 U.S.-Iraq strategic dialogue on troop drawdowns. On the broader geopolitical front, PMF dominance has impeded Iraq's economic and diplomatic overtures toward the West and Gulf states, as militias control border crossings, oil infrastructure, and smuggling routes that undermine sanctions on Iran. For instance, PMF judicial allies have blocked Kurdish oil exports to Turkey since March 2023, forcing Erbil to seek Iranian alternatives and eroding Iraq's leverage in Western energy partnerships. This alignment manifests in Iraq's muted criticism of Iranian proxy activities, such as Houthi disruptions in the Red Sea, contrasting with U.S. expectations for counterterrorism collaboration, and has deterred foreign direct investment wary of militia extortion. U.S. sanctions on PMF entities, including designations of Kata'ib Hezbollah as a terrorist group, further strain ties, positioning Iraq as a reluctant buffer in the U.S.-Iran rivalry rather than a sovereign partner. In 2025, proposed legislation to entrench PMF autonomy under a new law—advanced through parliamentary readings in March and July—has intensified this tilt, with critics arguing it would institutionalize Iranian command over Iraqi security, prompting U.S. warnings of severed military aid and sanctions if passed. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's balancing act, amid PMF electoral gains of 101 provincial seats in December 2023, underscores the forces' role in vetoing pro-Western initiatives, such as full demobilization, thereby perpetuating Iraq's de facto subordination to Tehran at the expense of diversified alignments.

US Airstrikes and Counteractions

The has executed precision airstrikes targeting infrastructure and personnel affiliated with Iran-backed factions of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), such as (KH), in direct retaliation for drone, rocket, and missile attacks on U.S. and coalition forces in . These operations, often classified as self-defense measures, escalated following the , 2023, Hamas attack on Israel, which prompted a surge in assaults by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition including PMF units—resulting in over 170 attacks on U.S. positions by early 2024. Notable strikes include those on , 2023, against three KH facilities in , conducted after a drone attack wounded three U.S. service members at Erbil . On , , U.S. forces hit sites used by Iranian-backed militias, including KH headquarters, storage, and training locations for rockets, missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles, following repeated assaults on American troops. Further actions occurred on , , in Babil province near Musayib, targeting militants preparing attacks, marking the first confirmed U.S. strike in since of that year. These operations have degraded capabilities but not halted militia activities, with U.S. officials emphasizing they target threats outside formal Iraqi state integration. In response, PMF factions like KH have alternated between temporary suspensions of operations and vows of escalation, often tying actions to broader U.S. support for . KH announced a halt to attacks on U.S. forces in and on January 30, 2024, amid de-escalation signals after U.S. retaliatory strikes, though officials downplayed the impact while hinting at restraint to avoid wider conflict. By April 2024, these groups resumed drone and rocket assaults on U.S. bases, perpetuating a cycle of retaliation. In June 2025, KH explicitly threatened to target U.S. military installations if Washington intervened directly in potential Israel-Iran hostilities, framing such moves as defensive against perceived aggression. Iraqi government statements have routinely condemned the strikes as violations of sovereignty, though PMF units have not mounted large-scale conventional counteroffensives.

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