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Class action
Class action
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A class action,[a] also known as a class action lawsuit, class suit, or representative action, is a type of lawsuit where one of the parties is a group of people who are represented collectively by a member or members of that group. The class action originated in the United States and is still predominantly an American phenomenon, but Canada, as well as several European countries with civil law, have made changes in recent years to allow consumer organizations to bring claims on behalf of consumers.

Description

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In a typical class action, a plaintiff sues a defendant or a number of defendants on behalf of a group, or class, of absent parties.[2] This differs from a traditional lawsuit, in which the plaintiffs sue one or more defendants, and all of the parties are present in court. For example, a group in a class action lawsuit could be any person who ever bought a specific dangerous product; in a traditional lawsuit, the plaintiff is a single individual person or business that bought the dangerous product.

Although standards differ between states and countries, class actions are most common where the allegations involve at least 40 people whom the same defendant has injured in the same way.[2] Instead of each individual person bringing their own lawsuits separately, the class action allows the claims of all class members—whether they know they have been damaged or not—to be resolved in a single proceeding through the efforts of the representative plaintiff(s) and appointed class counsel.[2]

History

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England and the United Kingdom

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The antecedent of the class action was what modern observers call "group litigation," which appears to have been quite common in medieval England from about 1200 onward.[3]: 38  These lawsuits involved groups of people either suing or being sued in actions at common law. These groups were usually based on existing societal structures like villages, towns, parishes, and guilds. Unlike modern courts, the medieval English courts did not question the right of the actual plaintiffs to sue on behalf of a group or a few representatives to defend an entire group.[3]: 38–40  Stephen C. Yeazell has theorized that the most likely reason is that the abysmally poor transportation, communications, and administrative apparatus of medieval England meant it was impossible for the English sovereign to manage the country in terms of individuals.[3]: 82–86  It was much easier for the Crown to bluntly impose obligations upon entire groups, to be enforced through the sporadic use of force.[3]: 82–86  Lawyers and judges did not question the right of a group to sue or be sued because to do so would bring into question the entire group-oriented society in which they operated.[3]: 82–86 

Engraving of the Star Chamber, published in "Old and new London" in 1873, taken from a drawing made in 1836

From 1400 to 1700, group litigation gradually switched from being the norm in England to the exception.[3]: 100  The development of the concept of the corporation led to the wealthy supporters of the corporate form becoming suspicious of all unincorporated legal entities, which in turn led to the modern concept of the unincorporated or voluntary association.[3]: 124–25  The tumultuous history of the Wars of the Roses and then the Star Chamber resulted in periods during which the common law courts were frequently paralyzed, and out of the confusion the Court of Chancery emerged with exclusive jurisdiction over group litigation.[3]: 125–32 

Chancery jurisprudence on group litigation became increasingly incoherent after 1700.[3]: 173–75  As the basis of this, Yeazell has pointed to the trends towards fragmentation and individualism in English society during that period; the resulting societal pressures ultimately led to the Reform Act 1832.[3]: 173–75  The underlying problem was the shift from representation based on the presumed or implied consent of a group to representation based on a common interest, such as holding shares of a corporation.[3]: 173–75 

By 1850, Parliament had enacted several statutes on a case-by-case basis to deal with issues regularly faced by certain types of organizations, like joint-stock companies, and with the impetus for most types of group litigation removed, it went into a steep decline in English jurisprudence from which it never recovered.[3]: 210–12  It was further weakened by the fact that equity pleading, in general, was falling into disfavor, which culminated in the Judicature Acts of 1874 and 1875.[3]: 210–12  Group litigation was essentially dead in the United Kingdom after 1850.

United States

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Associate Justice Joseph Story

Class actions survived in the United States thanks to the influence of Supreme Court Associate Justice Joseph Story, who imported the concept into US law through summary discussions in his two equity treatises as well as his opinion in West v. Randall (1820).[3]: 219–20  However, Story did not necessarily endorse class actions, because he "could not conceive of a modern function or a coherent theory for representative litigation."[3]: 219–20  Like most Americans of his time and ever since, Story took individualism for granted, which explains why he could not understand a rule allowing a court to bind an absent person to litigation purportedly conducted on that person's behalf.[3]: 220 

The oldest predecessor to the class-action rule in the United States was in the Federal Equity Rules, specifically Equity Rule 48, promulgated in 1842.

Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and cannot, without manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be all brought before it, the court in its discretion may dispense with making all of them parties, and may proceed in the suit, having sufficient parties before it to represent all the adverse interests of the plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit properly before it. But in such cases, the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all the absent parties.[4]

This allowed for representative suits in situations where there were too many individual parties (which now forms the first requirement for class-action litigation – numerosity).[5] However, this rule did not allow such suits to bind similarly situated absent parties, which rendered the rule ineffective.[3]: 221  This flaw was a direct result of Story's inability to comprehend the old English Chancery cases on group litigation.[3]: 221  However, Story's confusion was apparently typical of his time, as Harvard Law School dean Christopher Columbus Langdell also could not understand the old cases.[3]: 220 

Within ten years, the Supreme Court interpreted Rule 48 in such a way so that it could apply to absent parties under certain circumstances, but only by ignoring the plain meaning of the rule.[3]: 221–222  In the rules published in 1912, Equity Rule 48 was replaced with Equity Rule 38 as part of a major restructuring of the Equity Rules, and when federal courts merged their legal and equitable procedural systems in 1938, Equity Rule 38 became Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Modern developments

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A major revision of the FRCP in 1966 radically transformed Rule 23, made the opt-out class action the standard option, and gave birth to the modern class action. Entire treatises have been written since to summarize the huge mass of case law that sprang up from the 1966 revision of Rule 23.[3]: 229  Just as medieval group litigation bound all members of the group regardless of whether they all actually appeared in court, the modern class action binds all members of the class, except for those who choose to opt out (if the rules permit them to do so). Arthur Taylor von Mehren characterized the American opt-out class action as the "most extreme development of collective civil litigation in the modern legal world".[6]

The Advisory Committee that drafted the new Rule 23 in the mid-1960s was influenced by two major developments. First was the suggestion of Harry Kalven Jr. and Maurice Rosenfield in 1941 that class-action litigation by individual shareholders on behalf of all shareholders of a company could effectively supplement direct government regulation of securities markets and other similar markets.[3]: 232  The second development was the rise of the civil rights movement, environmentalism and consumerism.[3]: 240–244  The groups behind these movements, as well as many others in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, all turned to class actions as a means for achieving their goals. For example, a 1978 environmental law treatise reprinted the entire text of Rule 23 and mentioned "class actions" 14 times in its index.[3]: 244–245 

Businesses targeted by class actions for inflicting massive aggregate harm have sought ways to avoid class actions altogether. In the 1990s, the US Supreme Court issued several decisions that strengthened the "federal policy favoring arbitration".[7] In response, lawyers have added provisions to consumer contracts of adhesion called "collective action waivers", which prohibit those signing the contracts from bringing class-action suits. In 2011, the US Supreme Court ruled in a 5–4 decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion that the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 preempts state laws that prohibit contracts from disallowing class-action lawsuits, which will make it more difficult for consumers to file class-action lawsuits. The dissent pointed to a saving clause in the federal act which allowed states to determine how a contract or its clauses may be revoked.[8]

In two major 21st-century cases, the Supreme Court ruled 5–4 against certification of class actions due to differences in each individual members' circumstances: first in Wal-Mart v. Dukes (2011) and later in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend (2013).[9]

Companies may insert the phrase "may elect to resolve any claim by individual arbitration" into their consumer and employment contracts to use arbitration and prevent class-action lawsuits.[10]

Rejecting arguments that they violated employees' rights to collective bargaining, and that modestly-valued consumer claims would be more efficiently litigated within the parameters of one lawsuit, the Supreme Court, in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (2018), enabled the use of class action waivers. Citing its deference to freedom to contract principles, the Epic Systems opinion opened the door dramatically to the use of these waivers as a condition of employment, consumer purchases and the like. Some commentators in opposition to the ruling see it as a "death knell" to many employment and consumer class actions, and have increasingly pushed for legislation to circumvent it in hopes of reviving otherwise-underrepresented parties' ability to litigate on a group basis. Supporters (mostly pro-business) of the high court's ruling argue its holding is consistent with private contract principles. Many of those supporters had long-since argued that class action procedures were generally inconsistent with due process mandates and unnecessarily promoted litigation of otherwise small claims—thus heralding the ruling's anti-litigation effect.

In 2017, the US Supreme Court issued its opinion in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court (2017), holding that over five hundred plaintiffs from other states could not bring a consolidated mass action against the pharmaceutical giant in the State of California. This opinion may arguably render nationwide mass action and class action impossible in any single state besides the defendant's home state.

In 2020, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that incentive awards are impermissible. Incentive awards are a relatively modest payment made to class representatives as part of a class settlement. The ruling was a response to an objector who claimed Rule 23 required that the fee petition be filed before the time frame for class member objections to be filed; and payments to the class representative violates doctrine from two US Supreme Court cases from the 1800s.[11][12]

Statistics

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As of 2010, there was no publicly maintained list of nonsecurities class-action settlements,[13] although a securities class-action database exists in the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse and several for-profit companies maintain lists of the securities settlements. One study of federal settlements required the researcher to manually search databases of lawsuits for the relevant records, although state class actions were not included due to the difficulty in gathering the information.[13] Another source of data is US Bureau of Justice Statistics Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, which offers statistics for the year 2005.[14]

Advantages

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Proponents of class actions state that they offer a number of advantages[15] because they aggregate many individualized claims into one representational lawsuit.

First, aggregation can increase the efficiency of the legal process, and lower the costs of litigation.[16] In cases with common questions of law and fact, aggregation of claims into a class action may avoid the necessity of repeating "days of the same witnesses, exhibits and issues from trial to trial". Jenkins v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986) (granting certification of a class action involving asbestos).

Second, a class action may overcome "the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights". Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 388, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)). "A class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor." Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 617 (quoting Mace, 109 F.3d at 344). In other words, a class action ensures that a defendant who engages in widespread harm – but does so minimally against each individual plaintiff – must compensate those individuals for their injuries. For example, thousands of shareholders of a public company may have losses too small to justify separate lawsuits, but a class action can be brought efficiently on behalf of all shareholders. Perhaps even more important than compensation is that class treatment of claims may be the only way to impose the costs of wrongdoing on the wrongdoer, thus deterring future wrongdoing.

Third, class-action cases may be brought to purposely change behavior of a class of which the defendant is a member. Landeros v. Flood (1976) was a landmark case decided by the California Supreme Court that aimed at purposefully changing the behavior of doctors, encouraging them to report suspected child abuse. Otherwise, they would face the threat of civil action for damages in tort proximately flowing from the failure to report the suspected injuries. Previously, many physicians had remained reluctant to report cases of apparent child abuse, despite existing law that required it.

Fourth, in "limited fund" cases, a class action ensures that all plaintiffs receive relief and that early-filing plaintiffs do not raid the fund (i.e., the defendant) of all its assets before other plaintiffs may be compensated. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). A class action in such a situation centralizes all claims into one venue where a court can equitably divide the assets amongst all the plaintiffs if they win the case.

Finally, a class action avoids the situation where different court rulings could create "incompatible standards" of conduct for the defendant to follow. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A). For example, a court might certify a case for class treatment where a number of individual bond-holders sue to determine whether they may convert their bonds to common stock. Refusing to litigate the case in one trial could result in different outcomes and inconsistent standards of conduct for the defendant corporation. Thus, courts will generally allow a class action in such a situation. See, e.g., Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).

Whether a class action is superior to individual litigation depends on the case and is determined by the judge's ruling on a motion for class certification. The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 23, for example, states that mass torts are ordinarily "not appropriate" for class treatment. Class treatment may not improve the efficiency of a mass tort because the claims frequently involve individualized issues of law and fact that will have to be re-tried on an individual basis. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting nationwide class action against tobacco companies). Mass torts also involve high individual damage awards; thus, the absence of class treatment will not impede the ability of individual claimants to seek justice. Other cases, however, may be more conducive to class treatment.[citation needed]

The preamble to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, passed by the United States Congress, found:

Class-action lawsuits are an important and valuable part of the legal system when they permit the fair and efficient resolution of legitimate claims of numerous parties by allowing the claims to be aggregated into a single action against a defendant that has allegedly caused harm.

Criticisms

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There are several criticisms of class actions.[17][18][19] The preamble to the Class Action Fairness Act stated that some abusive class actions have harmed class members possessing legitimate claims and defendants acting responsibly; have adversely affected interstate commerce; and have undermined public respect for the country's judicial system.

Class members often receive little or no benefit from class actions.[20] Examples cited for this include large fees for the attorneys, while leaving class members with coupons or other awards of little or no value; unjustified awards are made to certain plaintiffs at the expense of other class members; and confusing notices are published that prevent class members from being able to fully understand and effectively exercise their rights.[20]

For example, in the United States, class lawsuits sometimes bind all class members with a low settlement. These "coupon settlements" (which usually allow the plaintiffs to receive a small benefit such as a small check or a coupon for future services or products with the defendant company) are a way for a defendant to forestall major liability by precluding many people from litigating their claims separately, to recover reasonable compensation for the damages. However, existing law requires judicial approval of all class-action settlements, and in most cases, class members are given a chance to opt out of class settlement, though class members, despite opt-out notices, may be unaware of their right to opt-out because they did not receive the notice, did not read it or did not understand it.

The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 addresses these concerns. An independent expert may scrutinize coupon settlements before judicial approval in order to ensure that the settlement will be of value to the class members (28 U.S.C.A. 1712(d)). Further, if the action provides for settlement in coupons, "the portion of any attorney's fee award to class counsel that is attributable to the award of the coupons shall be based on the value to class members of the coupons that are redeemed". 28 U.S.C.A. 1712(a).

A common critique is that class actions are a form of judicially sanctioned extortion.[21] The extortion thesis was first articulated by law professor Milton Handler, who published a famous law review article in 1971 calling the class action a form of "legalized blackmail".[21] It has garnered the support of a significant minority of the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, along with prominent judges like Henry Friendly and Richard Posner.[21] However, empirical studies have generally found the extortion thesis to be "overstated".[21]

Ethics

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Class action cases present significant ethical challenges. Defendants can hold reverse auctions and any of several parties can engage in collusive settlement discussions. Subclasses may have interests that diverge greatly from the class but may be treated the same. Proposed settlements could offer some groups (such as former customers) much greater benefits than others. In one paper presented at an ABA conference on class actions in 2007, authors commented that "competing cases can also provide opportunities for collusive settlement discussions and reverse auctions by defendants anxious to resolve their new exposure at the most economic cost".[22]

Advertising or otherwise soliciting to find lead plaintiffs may also be unethical, as the plaintiff may not genuinely be aggrieved.[23]

Defendant class action

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Although normally plaintiffs are the class, defendant class actions are also possible. For example, in 2005, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon was sued as part of the Catholic priest sex-abuse scandal. All parishioners of the Archdiocese's churches were cited as a defendant class. This was done to include their assets (local churches) in any settlement.[24] Where both the plaintiffs and the defendants have been organized into court-approved classes, the action is called a bilateral class action.

In the United States, only a few hundred defendant class actions have been filed (mostly in securities cases and constitutional challenges), and circuit courts are split as to whether injunctive relief is available against defendant classes at all.[25]

Mass actions

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In a class action, the plaintiff seeks court approval to litigate on behalf of a group of similarly situated persons. Not every plaintiff looks for or could obtain such approval. As a procedural alternative, plaintiff's counsel may attempt to sign up every similarly situated person that counsel can find as a client. Plaintiff's counsel can then join the claims of all of these persons in one complaint, a so-called "mass action", hoping to have the same efficiencies and economic leverage as if a class had been certified.

Because mass actions operate outside the detailed procedures laid out for class actions, they can pose special difficulties for both plaintiffs, defendants, and the court. For example, settlement of class actions follows a predictable path of negotiation with class counsel and representatives, court scrutiny, and notice. There may not be a way to uniformly settle all of the many claims brought via a mass action. Some states permit plaintiff's counsel to settle for all the mass action plaintiffs according to a majority vote, for example. Other states, such as New Jersey, require each plaintiff to approve the settlement of that plaintiff's own individual claims.

Class action legislation

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Argentina

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Class actions were recognized in "Halabi" leading case (Supreme Court, 2009).

Australia and New Zealand

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Class actions became part of the Australian legal landscape only when the Federal Parliament amended the Federal Court of Australia Act in 1992 to introduce "representative proceedings",[26] the equivalent of the American "class actions".[27]

Likewise, class actions appeared slowly in the New Zealand legal system. However, a group can bring litigation through the action of a representative under the High Court Rules which provide that one or a multitude of persons may sue on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons "with the same interest in the subject matter of a proceeding". The presence and expansion of litigation funders have been playing a significant role in the emergence of class actions in New Zealand. For example, the "Fair Play on Fees" proceedings in relation to penalty fees charged by banks were funded by Litigation Lending Services (LLS), a company specializing in the funding and management of litigation in Australia and New Zealand. It was the biggest class-action suit in New Zealand history.[28][29]

Austria

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The Austrian Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung – ZPO) does not provide for a special proceeding for complex class-action litigation. However, Austrian consumer organizations (Verein für Konsumenteninformation (VKI) and the Federal Chamber of Labour / Bundesarbeitskammer) have brought claims on behalf of hundreds or even thousands of consumers. In these cases, the individual consumers assigned their claims to one entity, who has then brought an ordinary (two-party) lawsuit over the assigned claims. The monetary benefits were redistributed among the class. This technique, labeled as "class action Austrian style", allows for a significant reduction of overall costs. The Austrian Supreme Court, in a judgment, confirmed the legal admissibility of these lawsuits under the condition that all claims are essentially based on the same grounds.

The Austrian Parliament unanimously requested the Austrian Federal Minister for Justice to examine the possibility of new legislation providing for a cost-effective and appropriate way to deal with mass claims. Together with the Austrian Ministry for Social Security, Generations and Consumer Protection, the Justice Ministry opened the discussion with a conference held in Vienna in June 2005. With the aid of a group of experts from many fields, the Justice Ministry began drafting the new law in September 2005. With the individual positions varying greatly, a political consensus could not be reached.[30]

Canada

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Provincial laws in Canada allow class actions. All provinces permit plaintiff classes and some permit defendant classes. Quebec was the first province to enact class proceedings legislation, in 1978. Ontario was next, with the Class Proceedings Act, 1992. As of 2008, 9 of 10 provinces had enacted comprehensive class actions legislation. In Prince Edward Island, where no comprehensive legislation exists, following the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Dutton, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534, class actions may be advanced under a local rule of court. The Federal Court of Canada permits class actions under Part V.1 of the Federal Courts Rules.

Legislation in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, and Nova Scotia expressly or by judicial opinion has been read to allow for what are informally known as national "opt-out" class actions, whereby residents of other provinces may be included in the class definition and potentially be bound by the court's judgment on common issues unless they opt out in a prescribed manner and time. Court rulings have determined that this permits a court in one province to include residents of other provinces in the class action on an "opt-out" basis.

Judicial opinions have indicated that provincial legislative national opt-out powers should not be exercised to interfere with the ability of another province to certify a parallel class action for residents of other provinces. The first court to certify will generally exclude residents of provinces whose courts have certified a parallel class action. However, in the Vioxx litigation, two provincial courts certified overlapping class actions whereby Canadian residents were class members in two class actions in two provinces.[31] Both decisions are under appeal.[needs update]

Other legislation may provide for representative actions on behalf of a large number of plaintiffs, independent of class action procedures. For instance, under Ontario's Condominium Act, a condominium's governing corporation may launch a lawsuit on behalf of the owners for damage to the condominium's common elements, even though the corporation does not own the common elements.

The largest class action suit in Canada was settled in 2005 after Nora Bernard initiated efforts that led to an estimated 79,000 survivors of Canada's residential school system suing the Canadian government.[32] The settlement amounted to upwards of $5 billion.[33]

Chile

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Chile approved class actions in 2004.[34] The Chilean model is technically an opt-out issue class action, followed by a compensatory stage which can be collective or individual. This means that the class action is designed to declare the defendant generally liable with erga omnes effects if and only if the defendant is found liable, and the declaratory judgment can be used then to pursue damages in the same procedure or in individual ones in different jurisdictions. If the latter is the case, the liability cannot be discussed, but only the damages.[35] There under the Chilean procedural rules, one particular case works as an opt-out class action for damages. This is the case when defendants can identify and compensate consumers directly, i.e. because it is their banking institution. In such cases, the judge can skip the compensatory stage and order redress directly. Since 2005 more than 100 cases have been filed, mostly by Servicio Nacional del Consumidor [SERNAC], the Chilean consumer protection agency. Salient cases have been Condecus v. BancoEstado[36] and SERNAC v. La Polar.[37]

France

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Under French law, an association can represent the collective interests of consumers; however, each claimant must be individually named in the lawsuit. On January 4, 2005, President Chirac urged changes that would provide greater consumer protection. A draft bill was proposed in April 2006 but did not pass.[citation needed]

Following the change of majority in France in 2012, the new government proposed introducing class actions into French law. The project of loi Hamon of May 2013 aimed to limit the class action to consumer and competition disputes. The law was passed on March 1, 2014.[38]

Germany

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Class actions are generally not permitted in Germany, as German law does not recognize the concept of a targeted class being affected by certain actions. This requires each plaintiff to individually prove that they were affected by an action, and present their individual damages, and prove the causality between both parties.

Joint litigation (Streitgenossenschaft [de]) is a legal act that may permit plaintiffs that are in the same legal community with respect to the dispute, or are entitled by the same factual or legal reason. These are not typically regarded as class action suits, as each individual plaintiff is entitled to compensation for their individual, incurred damages and not as a result of being a member of a class.

The combination of court cases (Prozessverbindung [de]) is another method that permits a judge to combine multiple separate court cases into a single trial with a single verdict. According to § 147 ZPO,[39] this is only permissible if all cases are regarding the same factual and legal event and basis.

Mediation procedure

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A genuine extension of the legal effect of a court decision beyond the parties involved in the proceedings is offered under corporate law. This procedure applies to the review of stock payoffs under the Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz). Pursuant to Sec. 13 Paragraph 2 of the Mediation Procedure Act (Spruchverfahrensgesetz), the court decision concerning the dismissal or direction of a binding arrangement of an adequate compensation is effective for and against all shareholders, including those who have already agreed to a previous settlement in this matter.

Investor model case proceedings

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The Capital Investor Model Case Act (Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz) is an attempt to enable model cases to be brought by a large number of potentially affected parties in the event of disputes, limited to the investment market.[40] In contrast to US class actions, each affected party must file a lawsuit in its own name in order to participate in the model proceedings.

Model Declaratory Action

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Effective on November 1, 2018, the Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung) introduced the Model Declaratory Action (§ 606 ZPO) that created the ability to bundle similar claims by many affected parties efficiently into one proceeding.

Registered Consumer Protection Associations can file – if they represent at least 10 individuals – for a (general) judicial finding whether the factual and legal requirements for of claims or legal relationships are met or not. These individuals have to register in order to inhibit their claims. Since these Adjudications are more of a general nature, each individual must assert their claims in their own court proceedings. The competent court is bound by the Model Declaratory Action decision.

Associate Action

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German law also recognizes the associative action (Verbandsklage), which is comparable to the class action and is predominantly used in environmental law. In civil law, the associative action is represented by a foreign body in the matter of asserting and enforcing individual claims and the claimant can no longer control the proceedings.[41]

Class action with relation to the United States

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Class actions can be brought by Germans in the US for events in Germany if the facts of the case relate to the US. For example, in the case of the Eschede train disaster, the lawsuit was allowed because several aggrieved parties came from the US and had purchased rail tickets there.

India

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Decisions of the Indian Supreme Court in the 1980s loosened strict locus standi requirements to permit the filing of suits on behalf of rights of deprived sections of society by public-minded individuals or bodies. Although not strictly "class action litigation" as it is understood in American law, public interest litigation arose out of the wide powers of judicial review granted to the Supreme Court of India and the various High Courts under Article 32 and Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The sort of remedies sought from courts in public interest litigation go beyond mere award of damages to all affected groups, and have sometimes (controversially) gone on to include Court monitoring of the implementation of legislation and even the framing of guidelines in the absence of Parliamentary legislation.[42][43]

However, this innovative jurisprudence did not help the victims of the Bhopal gas tragedy,[citation needed] who were unable to fully prosecute a class-action litigation (as understood in the American sense) against Union Carbide due to procedural rules that would make such litigation impossible to conclude and unwieldy to carry out. Instead, the Government of India exercised its right of parens patriae to appropriate all the claims of the victims and proceeded to litigate on their behalf, first in the New York courts and later, in the Indian courts. Ultimately, the matter was settled between the Union of India and Union Carbide (in a settlement overseen by the Supreme Court of India) for a sum of 760 crore (US$90 million) as a complete settlement of all claims of all victims for all time to come.

Public interest litigation has now broadened in scope to cover larger and larger groups of citizens who may be affected by government inaction. Examples of this trend include the conversion of all public transport in the city of Delhi from diesel engines to compressed natural gas engines on the basis of the orders of the Delhi High Court; the monitoring of forest use by the High Courts and the Supreme Court to ensure that there is no unjustified loss of forest cover; and the directions mandating the disclosure of assets of electoral candidates for the Houses of Parliament and State Assembly.[44][45]

The Supreme Court has observed that the PIL has tended to become a means to gain publicity or obtain relief contrary to constitutionally valid legislation and policy. Observers point out that many High Courts and certain Supreme Court judges are reluctant to entertain PILs filed by non-governmental organizations and activists, citing concerns of separation of powers and parliamentary sovereignty.

Ireland

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In Irish law, there is no such thing as a "class action" per se.[46] Third-party litigation funding (champerty) is prohibited under Irish law.[47][48] Instead, there is the 'representative action' (Irish: gníomh ionadaíoch) or 'test case' (cás samplach).[49] A representative action is "where one claimant or defendant, with the same interest as a group of claimants or defendants in an action, institutes or defends proceedings on behalf of that group of claimants or defendants."[50]

Some test cases in Ireland have included:

Italy

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Italy has class action legislation. Consumer associations can file claims on behalf of groups of consumers to obtain judicial orders against corporations that cause injury or damage to consumers. These types of claims are increasing, and Italian courts have allowed them against banks that continue to apply compound interest on retail clients' current account overdrafts. Class action is regulated by art. 140 bis of the Italian consumers' code and has been in force since 1 July 2009.[52][53][54][55][56] On May 19, 2021, the reform of the Italian legal framework on class actions finally entered into force. The new rules, designed by Law n. 31 and published on April 18, 2019, (Law n. 31/2019), were initially intended to become effective on April 19, 2020, but were delayed twice. The new rules on class actions are now included in the Italian Civil Procedure Code (ICPC). Overall, the new class action appears to be a viable instrument which, through a system of economic incentives, could overcome the rational apathy of small-claims holders and ensure redress.[57]

Netherlands

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Dutch law allows associations (verenigingen) and foundations (stichtingen) to bring a so-called collective action on behalf of other persons, provided they can represent the interests of such persons according to their by-laws (statuten) (section 3:305a Dutch Civil Code). All types of actions are permitted. This includes a claim for monetary damages, provided the event occurred after 15 November 2016 (pursuant to new legislation which entered into force 1 January 2020). Most class actions over the past decade have been in the field of securities fraud and financial services. The acting association or foundation may come to a collective settlement with the defendant. The settlement may also include – and usually primarily consists of – monetary compensation of damages. Such settlement can be declared binding for all injured parties by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (section 7:907 Dutch Civil Code). The injured parties have an opt-out right during the opt-out period set by the Court, usually 3 to 6 months. Settlements involving injured parties from outside the Netherlands can also be declared binding by the Court. Since US courts are reluctant to take up class actions brought on behalf of injured parties not residing in the US who have suffered damages due to acts or omissions committed outside the US, combinations of US class actions and Dutch collective actions may come to a settlement that covers plaintiffs worldwide. An example of this is the Royal Dutch Shell Oil Reserves Settlement that was declared binding upon both US and non-US plaintiffs.[citation needed]

Poland

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Pozew zbiorowy or class action has been allowed under Polish law since July 19, 2010. A minimum of 10 persons, suing based on the same law, is required.[58]

Russia

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Collective litigation has been allowed under Russian law since 2002. Basic criteria are, like in the US, numerosity, commonality, and typicality.[59]

Spain

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Spanish law allows nominated consumer associations to take action to protect the interests of consumers. A number of groups already have the power to bring collective or class actions: certain consumer associations, bodies legally constituted to defend the "collective interest" and groups of injured parties.

Recent changes to Spanish civil procedure rules include the introduction of a quasi-class action right for certain consumer associations to claim damages on behalf of unidentified classes of consumers. The rules require consumer associations to represent an adequate number of affected parties who have suffered the same harm. Also, any judgment made by the Spanish court will list the individual beneficiaries or, if that is not possible, conditions that need to be fulfilled for a party to benefit from a judgment.

Switzerland

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Swiss law does not allow for any form of class action. When the government proposed a new federal code of civil procedure in 2006, replacing the cantonal codes of civil procedure, it rejected the introduction of class actions, arguing that

[It] is alien to European legal thought to allow somebody to exercise rights on the behalf of a large number of people if these do not participate as parties in the action. ... Moreover, the class action is controversial even in its country of origin, the U.S., because it can result in significant procedural problems. ... Finally, the class action can be openly or discretely abused. The sums sued for are usually enormous, so that the respondent can be forced to concede, if they do not want to face sudden huge indebtness and insolvency (so-called legal blackmail).[60]

United Kingdom

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England and Wales

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The Civil Procedure Rules of the courts of England and Wales came into force in 1999 and have provided for group litigation orders in limited circumstances (under Part 19.21–26, supplemented by Practice Direction 19B).[61] HM Courts and Tribunals Service maintains a public list of group litigation orders, and as of January 2025 there have been 124 orders granted.[62]

A sectoral mechanism was adopted by the Consumer Rights Act 2015, taking effect on October 1, 2015.[63][64] Under the provisions therein, opt-in or opt-out collective procedures may be certified for breaches of competition law.[65] This is currently the closest mechanism to a class action in England and Wales.

Scotland

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A similar approach exists in Scotland to bring group proceedings under Part 4 of the Civil Litigation (Expenses and Group Proceedings) (Scotland) Act 2018.[66] The Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service maintain a public list of group proceedings cases.[67]

United States

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In the United States, the class representative, also called a lead plaintiff, named plaintiff, or representative plaintiff, is the named party in a class-action lawsuit.[68] Although the class representative is named as a party to the litigation, the court must approve the class representative when it certifies the lawsuit as a class action.

The class representative must be able to represent the interests of all the members of the class, by being typical of the class members and not having conflicts with them. He or she is responsible for hiring the attorney, filing the lawsuit, consulting on the case, and agreeing to any settlement. In exchange, the class representative may be entitled to compensation (at the court's discretion) out of the recovery amount.

Standing

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In securities class actions that allege violations of Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, "officers and directors are liable together with the corporation for material misrepresentations in the registration statement."[69]

To have standing to sue under Section 11 of the 1933 Act in a class action, a plaintiff must be able to prove that he can trace his shares to the registration statement in question, as to which there is alleged a material misstatement or omission.[70][71] In the absence of an ability to actually trace his shares, such as when securities issued at multiple times are held by the depository trust company in a fungible bulk and physical tracing of particular shares may be impossible, the plaintiff may be barred from pursuing his claim for lack of standing.[72][73][74][75][71]

Federal courts

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In federal courts, class actions are governed by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23 and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d).[76] Cases in federal courts are only allowed to proceed as class actions if the court has jurisdiction to hear the case, and if the case meets the criteria set out in Rule 23. In the vast majority of federal class actions, the class is acting as the plaintiff. However, Rule 23 also provides for defendant class actions.[77]

Typically, federal courts are thought to be more favorable for defendants, and state courts more favorable for plaintiffs.[78] Many class actions are filed initially in state court. The defendant will frequently try to remove the case to federal court. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005[79] increases defendants' ability to remove state cases to federal court by giving federal courts original jurisdiction for all class actions with damages exceeding $5,000,000 exclusive of interest and costs.[80] The Class Action Fairness Act contains carve-outs for, among other things, shareholder class actions covered by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and those concerning internal corporate governance issues (the latter typically being brought as shareholder derivative actions in the state courts of Delaware, the state of incorporation of most large corporations).[81]

Jurisdiction
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Class actions may be brought in federal court if the claim arises under federal law or if the claim falls under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Under § 1332(d)(2) the federal district courts have original jurisdiction over any civil action where the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 and

  • any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant; or
  • any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or
  • any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state.[82]

Nationwide plaintiff classes are possible, but such suits must have a commonality of issues across state lines. This may be difficult if the civil law in the various states lack significant commonalities. Large class actions brought in federal court frequently are consolidated for pre-trial purposes through the device of multidistrict litigation (MDL).[83] It is also possible to bring class actions under state law, and in some cases the court may extend its jurisdiction to all the members of the class, including out of state (or even internationally) as the key element is the jurisdiction that the court has over the defendant.[citation needed]

Class certification under Rule 23
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For the case to proceed as a class action and bind absent class members, the court must certify the class under Rule 23 on a motion from the party wishing to proceed on a class basis. For a class to be certified, the moving party must meet all of the criteria listed under Rule 23(a), and at least one of the criteria listed under Rule 23(b).[76]

The 23(a) criteria are referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy.[84] Numerosity refers to the number of people in the class. To be certified, the class has to have enough members that simply adding each of them as a named party to the lawsuit would be impractical.[76] There is no bright-line rule to determine numerosity, but classes with hundreds of members are generally deemed to be sufficiently numerous.[85] To satisfy commonality, there must be a common question of law and fact such that "determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke".[86] The typicality requirement ensures that the claims or defenses of the named plaintiff are typical of those of everyone else in the class.[76] Finally, adequacy requirement states that the named plaintiff must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the absent class members.[76]

Rule 23(b)(3) allows class certification if "questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy."[87]

Notice and settlement
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Due process requires in most cases that notice describing the class action be sent, published, or broadcast to class members. As part of this notice procedure, there may have to be several notices, first a notice allowing class members to opt out of the class, i.e. if individuals wish to proceed with their own litigation they are entitled to do so, only to the extent that they give timely notice to the class counsel or the court that they are opting out. Second, if there is a settlement proposal, the court will usually direct the class counsel to send a settlement notice to all the members of the certified class, informing them of the details of the proposed settlement.[88]

State courts

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Since 1938, many states have adopted rules similar to the FRCP. However, some states, like California, have civil procedure systems, which deviate significantly from the federal rules; the California Codes provide for four separate types of class actions. As a result, there are two separate treatises devoted solely to the complex topic of California class actions.[89]{[full citation needed][90][full citation needed] As of March 2024, only Virginia and Massachusetts do not provide for any class actions.[91] Others, such as New York, limit the types of claims that may be brought as class actions.[88]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
A class action is a type of civil lawsuit in which one or more named plaintiffs sue on behalf of a larger group, or "class," of similarly situated individuals or entities harmed by the same alleged wrongdoing of a defendant. This mechanism, governed primarily by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requires certification based on criteria including numerosity of the class, commonality of factual and legal issues, typicality of claims, and adequacy of representation to ensure judicial efficiency and fairness. Originating from equity practices in English courts and formalized in the U.S. through 1966 amendments to Rule 23, class actions enable aggregation of small individual claims that might otherwise be uneconomical to pursue, facilitating challenges against powerful defendants such as corporations. Class actions have achieved significant outcomes, including multi-billion-dollar settlements that have compelled accountability in cases involving , environmental disasters, and , such as the $206 billion addressing health impacts from . These suits promote deterrence by imposing financial penalties and prompting behavioral changes in industries prone to systemic misconduct. However, empirical analyses reveal controversies, including frequent low or negligible compensation for class members—often limited to coupons or shares after administrative costs—while attorneys secure substantial fees, raising questions about whether the procedure primarily benefits lawyers rather than injured parties. Studies of consumer class actions indicate that actual payouts to individuals are minimal, with systemic issues like cy pres distributions diverting funds to third parties, fueling debates over procedural reforms to enhance claimant recovery and curb potential abuses. Despite these critiques, the device persists as a tool for addressing widespread harms where individual litigation would falter due to high costs relative to .

Definition and Fundamental Principles

A class action is a procedural device in civil litigation that enables one or more plaintiffs to file suit on behalf of a larger group, known as the class, whose members share common legal or factual issues arising from the same alleged wrongdoing by a . This mechanism aggregates multiple similar claims into a single proceeding, allowing resolution of disputes that might otherwise be uneconomical for individuals to pursue separately due to the high costs of litigation relative to potential recovery. In the United States, class actions are governed primarily by Rule 23 of the , which establishes strict criteria to ensure the procedure is used only when it advances judicial efficiency without compromising fairness. The fundamental prerequisites for class certification under Rule 23(a) require that: (1) the class be so numerous that of all members is impracticable; (2) there exist questions of or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties be typical of those of the class; and (4) the representative parties and their counsel fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. These elements ensure that the class action serves its core purposes: conserving judicial resources by litigating shared issues once, avoiding inconsistent verdicts across multiple suits, and providing a viable forum for claimants with modest damages who lack incentives for individual actions. Satisfaction of Rule 23(a) alone is insufficient; the suit must also qualify under Rule 23(b), such as in cases where separate actions risk materially adverse effects on the or class interests, or where common questions predominate and class treatment is superior to alternatives like individual litigation or . At its foundation, the class action embodies principles of representative governance and collective redress, rooted in the notion that uniform conduct by a warrants uniform treatment in to promote deterrence and compensatory . Courts conduct a rigorous at the certification stage to verify these principles, rejecting classes where individual issues overwhelm common ones, as this would undermine the procedure's efficiency gains and risk binding absent parties to unfair outcomes. This framework balances access to remedies against the due process rights of defendants and class members, though empirical studies indicate that most certified actions settle, often prioritizing attorney incentives over maximal client recovery.

Certification Prerequisites and Elements

Under Federal Rule of 23(a), certification of a class action in federal courts requires satisfaction of four prerequisites: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. These elements ensure that a class action is a superior mechanism to individual suits or , serving judicial economy while protecting absent class members' interests. Courts conduct a "rigorous analysis" at the certification stage, evaluating merits to the extent necessary to determine compliance, as established by the in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes (564 U.S. 338, 2011), rejecting reliance on mere allegations. Numerosity demands that the proposed class be "so numerous that of all members is impracticable." No strict numerical threshold exists, but federal courts often find numerosity satisfied with 40 or more members, considering factors such as , geographic dispersion, judicial economy, and the nature of claims. For instance, in cases involving widespread product defects, classes exceeding 100 members readily meet this bar, whereas smaller groups may require evidence of practical barriers to like member identification difficulties. Commonality requires "questions of or fact common to the class," meaning at least one central issue whose resolution would affect all or most members uniformly. This does not demand identical claims but a common contention capable of classwide proof, such as a defendant's uniform causing harm; individualized inquiries predominate otherwise, as in Dukes, where disparate decisions lacked commonality despite a shared . Commonality merges somewhat with later predominance analysis but serves as a threshold to filter cases unsuitable for treatment. Typicality mandates that the claims or defenses of the named representatives be "typical of the claims or defenses of the class." Typicality is established when representatives' injuries arise from the same event, practice, or course of conduct affecting the class, ensuring their incentives align without unique defenses undermining the . Courts assess whether representative-specific factors, like prior dealings with the defendant, would require separate proof that diverts from classwide issues. Adequacy of representation ensures named parties and will "fairly and adequately protect the s of the class," evaluating conflicts of among members and 's qualifications, resources, and experience. Inadequate representation arises from intra-class antagonism or 's incompetence, as scrutinized under Rule 23(g) for appointment standards emphasizing class knowledge and vigorous prosecution. Federal courts probe for economic incentives, such as bounty payments to representatives, that might prioritize settlements over maximal recovery. Beyond Rule 23(a), plaintiffs must satisfy one of three Rule 23(b) categories. Under 23(b)(1), certification applies where separate actions risk inconsistent rulings establishing incompatible standards or impairing non-parties' interests, common in limited-fund scenarios like mass torts with finite assets. Rule 23(b)(2) permits certification for claims seeking primarily declaratory or injunctive relief uniform to the class, such as civil rights challenges to discriminatory policies, without individualized damages. Most contentious are 23(b)(3) actions, requiring that common questions "predominate over any questions affecting only individual members" and that a class action be "superior" to alternatives, weighing manageability, member interests in control, and existing litigation. Predominance demands classwide proof of liability and, where damages vary, a reliable aggregation method, as clarified in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend (569 U.S. 27, 2013); superiority considers factors like notice feasibility and attorney incentives. Many circuits impose an additional "ascertainability" , mandating a class via objective criteria enabling administrative feasibility in identifying members without mini-trials on eligibility. Failures here, such as vague "all persons harmed" definitions reliant on subjective affidavits, defeat by risking overbroad inclusion or exclusion of non-injured parties. Upon , courts issue orders defining the class, claims, and appointing , with provisions for subclassing or decertification as facts evolve.

Historical Development

Origins in Equity and Early Precedents

The roots of class actions trace to the English , where equity jurisdiction permitted representative suits to resolve disputes among numerous parties sharing common interests, circumventing the common law's rigid requirement that all affected individuals be joined as parties. This pragmatic exception, known as the "bill of peace," emerged in the to prevent a multiplicity of similar actions, particularly in cases involving communal rights such as tithes, land tenures, or parish obligations. A foundational precedent is Brown v. Vermuden (1676), in which the allowed a to sue representatives of an entire to establish rights to tithes, binding the represented group despite not naming all parishioners individually. The court reasoned that the commonality of interest and impracticality of justified the representative proceeding, setting a model for future equity practice. This case illustrated equity's flexibility in adapting procedures to substantive justice, prioritizing resolution over formalism where group litigation efficiency was evident. These English equity principles were transplanted to the American colonies and formalized in early U.S. federal s, which exercised in equity under the Judiciary Act of 1789. Justice , in his Commentaries on Equity Pleadings (), articulated the doctrine permitting suits by or against one or more representatives of numerous persons with united interests, emphasizing that such actions were binding when the representative fairly litigated common claims. An early U.S. application occurred in West v. Randall (1820), recognized as the first American class action, where a permitted a representative suit by shareholders against corporate directors for mismanagement, leveraging equity's allowance for to avoid procedural chaos. These precedents underscored equity's role in enabling collective redress for diffuse harms, laying groundwork for codified class procedures without altering underlying substantive rights.

Evolution in the United States

Class actions in the United States originated in courts of equity, adapting English practices for representative suits involving numerous parties with aligned interests. The landmark case West v. Randall (1820) marked an early milestone, where Justice established principles allowing one party to sue on behalf of a group to avoid multiplicity of suits, emphasizing that all materially interested persons must be bound only if adequately represented. The Federal Equity Rules of 1842, under Rule 48, formalized such proceedings for cases with too many parties for . The , effective in 1938, codified class actions in Rule 23, distinguishing "true" classes (binding on all with common interests), "hybrid" classes (partial commonality), and "spurious" classes (limited to individual relief). This framework permitted judgments binding absent members in true classes but led to inconsistencies, as spurious classes often failed to bind non-parties, prompting criticism for inefficiency. Amendments to Rule 23 in 1966 transformed class actions into a robust procedural device, requiring numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation under subsection (a), with certification types under (b) including mechanisms for actions in (b)(3). These changes spurred growth in civil rights, antitrust, consumer, and securities litigation, shifting from permissive early applications to structured judicial oversight, including mandatory notice and settlement approvals. Supreme Court rulings shaped certification rigor; Hansberry v. Lee (1940) held that inadequate representation violates due process, preventing binding effects on dissenting class members. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (1974) mandated best practicable notice for (b)(3) classes, imposing costs on plaintiffs. Legislative responses addressed expansions and abuses: the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 heightened pleading standards for fraud claims, while the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 expanded federal jurisdiction for actions exceeding $5 million involving diverse citizens, aiming to curb forum shopping in state courts. In the 21st century, the intensified scrutiny, as in (2011), decertifying a massive class for lacking commonality under Rule 23(a)(2), requiring questions common to the class predominate over individual issues. Subsequent decisions like Corp. v. Behrend (2013) demanded damages models tied to class-wide proof for predominance under 23(b)(3). These developments reflect ongoing tensions between aggregating claims for efficiency and safeguarding individualized rights.

Adoption and Adaptation Worldwide

Following the ' 1966 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which formalized modern class actions, several jurisdictions adopted similar mechanisms in the early 1990s to facilitate collective redress for widespread harms. introduced federal class actions under Part IVA of the Act in 1992, enabling representative proceedings where class members are automatically included unless they opt out, akin to the U.S. model, though without and with courts scrutinizing settlements for fairness. followed suit provincially, with Ontario's Class Proceedings Act enacted in 1992 and coming into force in 1993, establishing certification requirements emphasizing commonality, preferability, and adequate representation; federal alignment occurred later through provincial dominance in civil litigation. Civil law countries pursued more cautious adaptations, often prioritizing opt-in participation to curb potential abuses associated with U.S.-style suits, such as attorney-driven litigation over meritorious claims. , influenced by its 1988 Constitution's emphasis on collective rights, enacted the 1985 Code and subsequent laws enabling ações coletivas (collective actions) for diffuse interests, resulting in high volumes—over 20,000 such suits annually by the —but with public prosecutors frequently leading cases to align with state oversight rather than private contingency fees. In , adoption accelerated post-2000 amid pressures, but regimes remain fragmented and restrained: introduced ações populares in 1995 for and environmental claims; the ' 2005 Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Claims (WCAM) facilitates settlements only with court approval; Germany's 2013 class action law limits to injunctive relief via opt-in; and France's 2016 action de groupe restricts to specific sectors like contracts, all eschewing broad and aggressive discovery to preserve norms. The European Union's 2020 Representative Actions Directive (Directive (EU) 2020/1828), effective from 2023 after transposition by member states, mandates cross-border collective redress for violations but permits only opt-in models in most cases, excludes punitive awards, and prohibits contingency fees in several jurisdictions to mitigate "legal transplant" risks from U.S. practices. The , post-Brexit, maintains opt-in Group Litigation Orders under since 1999 for coordinated claims, with limited for cases via the 2015 Consumer Rights Act, reflecting wariness of expansive liability; a 2023 ruling expanded potential in securities but upheld certification hurdles. These adaptations, adopted by over 20 countries by the mid-2010s, often yield lower settlement values and filing rates than U.S. counterparts—e.g., Australia's annual class actions number around 20-30 versus thousands in the U.S.—attributable to loser-pays costs, restricted funding, and narrower scopes focused on compensation over deterrence.

Procedural Mechanics

Initiation and Class Certification Process

A class action in the United States is initiated when one or more named plaintiffs file a in federal or state court, asserting claims on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of individuals who are alleged to have suffered similar harm from the defendant's conduct. The must identify the proposed class, outline the common legal or factual questions at issue, and provide a basis for why class treatment is appropriate, though formal certification occurs separately and is not presumed upon filing. In federal courts, such actions proceed under Rule 23 of the , which governs prerequisites and procedures, while state courts often adopt similar standards modeled on Rule 23. Following initiation, the named plaintiffs must file a motion for class certification, typically within 90 days of the complaint in some jurisdictions or after limited discovery, supported by affidavits, expert testimony, or other evidence establishing Rule 23's requirements. The court then evaluates the motion through a "rigorous analysis," as required by the U.S. Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes (564 U.S. 338, 2011), which demands resolution of any factual or merits-related disputes necessary to determine certification eligibility, rather than deferring them to trial. Defendants may oppose the motion with counter-evidence, and the court may hold hearings or permit targeted discovery on certification issues. Certification under Rule 23(a) requires four threshold prerequisites: (1) numerosity, where the class is so large that joining all members as individual parties would be impracticable (often 40 or more members, though no fixed number exists); (2) commonality, involving shared questions of or fact that generate common answers apt to drive resolution of the litigation; (3) typicality, ensuring the named plaintiffs' claims arise from the same course of conduct and rest on the same legal theory as the class's; and (4) adequacy of representation, confirming the named plaintiffs and their counsel lack conflicts, have sufficient incentive, and possess competence to vigorously prosecute on behalf of absent class members. Beyond these, the action must satisfy at least one Rule 23(b) category, such as (b)(3) for cases where common questions predominate over individual ones and class treatment is superior to alternatives like ; (b)(2) for claims seeking injunctive or declaratory relief applicable classwide; or (b)(1) to avoid incompatible standards of conduct or to absent parties. If granted, the court's certification order precisely defines the class and class claims, appoints class counsel under Rule 23(g) based on factors like work performed and experience in similar cases, and may direct notice to class members for rights in Rule 23(b)(3) actions. Certification is provisional and subject to modification or decertification if later developments show it no longer appropriate, per Rule 23(c)(1)(C). Denial of certification typically ends the class aspect, leaving named plaintiffs to pursue individual claims, though appeals may follow under Rule 23(f) in federal courts to review certification orders interlocutorily. This process ensures only cohesive, manageable cases proceed classwide, filtering out those lacking sufficient commonality or superiority.

Representation, Notice, and Participation

In class actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4), the representative parties—typically named plaintiffs—must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class, ensuring no fundamental conflicts of interest exist between representatives and absent class members that could undermine zealous advocacy. Courts assess adequacy through two primary inquiries: whether the representatives' claims or defenses align with those of the class without antagonism, and whether class counsel is qualified, experienced, and free from conflicts, as counsel effectively drives the litigation on behalf of absent members. A single representative may suffice for a large class if these standards are met, though courts may deny certification if representatives lack personal knowledge of the claims or pursue interests divergent from the class, such as prioritizing quick settlements over maximum recovery. Class , appointed by the under Rule 23(g), bears responsibility for fair and adequate representation, with selection criteria emphasizing 's litigation experience in similar cases, knowledge of applicable , and resources to commit to the action without conflicts. may appoint interim early in proceedings and replace if inadequacy arises, such as through inadequate investigation or failures, to safeguard class interests before . Notice to class members is mandated under Rule 23(c)(2)(B) for classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3)—those seeking primarily money damages—requiring the to direct to each reasonably identifiable member the best practicable under the circumstances, often combining individual mailed with broader where individual contact is infeasible due to cost or identification challenges. Such must concisely state the action's nature, class definition, claims or defenses, right to by a specified deadline (at least 90 days post-mailed in some contexts), binding effect of on non-excluded members, and procedures for intervention or appearance through counsel. For Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) classes—limited fund or injunctive relief actions— is discretionary, absent concerns, as these classes lack rights and bind all members to prevent inconsistent outcomes or prejudice. In settlement contexts, amended Rule 23(e) requires -approved of proposed settlements, emphasizing electronic methods where appropriate, to inform members of terms, or objection opportunities, and attorney requests. Participation rights vary by class type: under Rule 23(b)(3), class members may individually by timely request, preserving their ability to pursue separate claims while binding non- to any judgment or settlement, though opt-outs cannot represent others or initiate parallel class actions to exclude groups. Opt-outs remain rare empirically, averaging under 1% of class members in securities cases from 2019 to mid-2022, reflecting low individual incentives or notice effectiveness. In mandatory classes under (b)(1) or (b)(2), absent members cannot opt out but may object to settlements or appear via counsel, with courts scrutinizing objections for representativeness rather than permitting serial challenges. Individual claims require separate suits outside the class, but limits pre-certification solicitations by defendants to induce opt-outs, prohibiting threats or incentives that coerce exclusion. In consumer class action settlements, notices typically direct class members to a case-specific, court-approved settlement administration website where claim forms, deadlines, and payment terms are posted. Because these official settlement websites are distributed across thousands of individual cases and are often time-limited, third-party compilations have emerged that aggregate consumer-facing settlements and link to the corresponding official administration sites. Examples include Claim Depot and The Class Action Lawsuit, which summarize court-approved settlements and reference the underlying administrator-hosted claim pages.

Settlement, Judgment, and Distribution

In class action litigation under 23(e), settlements predominate over trials, with the vast majority of certified actions resolving through negotiated agreements rather than . The settlement process begins with parties submitting a proposed agreement to the for preliminary approval, where the assesses whether it appears fair, reasonable, and adequate based on factors including the strength of the plaintiff's case, negotiation risks, and class treatment. Upon preliminary approval, is disseminated to class members detailing the terms, opt-out , and objection procedures, typically via , , or . A fairness hearing follows, allowing objections; if satisfied, the grants final approval and enters incorporating the settlement, binding non- members. Judgments in litigated class actions, though infrequent, arise from trial verdicts or summary dispositions and extend binding effect to the certified class under Rule 23(c)(3), precluding relitigation of resolved claims. Courts evaluate and collectively, often using statistical sampling or formulas for individualized , with final judgment specifying remedies and any appeals limited to class representatives or objectors. Empirical data indicate trials comprise less than 1% of federal class actions, underscoring settlement's efficiency amid hurdles and evidentiary complexities. Distribution of settlement or judgment funds prioritizes class compensation through administrator-managed claims processes, where eligible members submit proofs for shares if funds are oversubscribed. Unclaimed residuals trigger cy pres distributions to third-party charities approximating the , a doctrine rooted in equity but criticized for diverting recoveries from injured parties to unrelated causes, potentially undermining deterrence incentives. Courts award class counsel fees from the fund under Rule 23(h), typically 20-45% of the total, determined by lodestar (hours billed) or percentage methods, though studies reveal median multipliers exceeding 2x lodestar, yielding attorneys disproportionate shares relative to class payouts. Empirical analyses of class settlements show median individual recoveries below $20, with distribution rates often under 10% of eligible class members due to failures, claim barriers, and administrative costs consuming 10-20% of funds. In securities cases, average settlements reached $42.4 million in 2024, yet residuals frequently via cy pres rather than revert to defendants, exacerbating critiques of inefficient remediation. These patterns reflect procedural incentives favoring gross fund maximization over net class benefit, as verifiable distribution data emerges in fewer than 20% of cases.

Purported Advantages

Access to Justice for Diffuse Harms

Class actions facilitate access to justice for diffuse harms, which involve widespread injuries where each affected individual suffers minimal economic loss—often mere dollars—insufficient to justify the fixed costs of separate litigation, such as discovery and expert testimony. In such scenarios, rational plaintiffs abstain from suing due to negative , leaving wrongdoers unaccountable absent aggregation. Under mechanisms like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, adopted in its modern form in 1966, claims are pooled to achieve , enabling certification where numerosity and commonality predominate, thus vindicating rights that would otherwise evaporate through underenforcement. This aggregation addresses market failures in private enforcement, particularly in and securities contexts, where harms like minor product defects or slight overcharges affect millions but yield per-person recoveries below litigation thresholds. For instance, in price-fixing conspiracies, individual antitrust claims rarely exceed filing fees, yet class treatment has yielded billions in collective recoveries, as seen in the vitamin cartel settlements totaling over $1 billion distributed across affected purchasers from 1999 onward. Proponents, including scholars, contend this mechanism compensates otherwise remediless victims and signals deterrence, with the class representative bearing upfront risks mitigated by potential fee awards. Empirical evidence, however, reveals tempered efficacy: while class actions generate settlements for diffuse claims, per-member distributions remain low, often requiring active claims processes that yield participation rates under 10%. An examination of 245 class settlements from 2006 to 2009 found median class-member payouts of $31, with 67% of cases providing no monetary and attorney fees consuming a substantial share. Similarly, a of 31 federal settlements approved in 2019–2020 reported class members capturing less than 30% of funds in claims-made structures, underscoring that access, though expanded beyond zero-recovery baselines, frequently delivers marginal net value after administrative hurdles and delay.

Deterrence of Systemic Wrongdoing

Class actions purportedly deter systemic wrongdoing by aggregating numerous small claims into liabilities substantial enough to offset the economic incentives for corporations to engage in widespread , such as defective products distributed en masse or fraudulent practices affecting broad classes. Where harms are diffuse and below the of litigation—often termed "negative value" claims—standalone suits fail to impose meaningful costs, allowing firms to externalize onto victims; class certification internalizes these costs, compelling executives to prioritize compliance through board-level assessments and internal controls. This mechanism aligns with rational actor models in , where anticipated aggregate penalties exceed gains from violations, as evidenced by corporate surveys indicating that 90% of Fortune 500 general counsels expect class actions for routine claims and 25% for novel theories. Empirical evidence supports both specific and general deterrence effects. Specific deterrence arises from settlement terms mandating behavioral reforms; analysis of federal class action settlements from 2006–2007 revealed behavior-modification provisions in approximately 25% of cases overall, rising to 75% in certain categories like , with enforceable changes such as reduced fees in banking multidistrict litigations (e.g., MDL 2072). General deterrence manifests in reduced misconduct rates under heightened class action exposure: a 1981 study of the bread industry found class action settlements deterred price-fixing more effectively than fines, with private recoveries ten times larger. In , four studies demonstrate statistically significant declines in fraudulent behavior as class action threats increase, including reduced earnings manipulation per Kedia et al. (2015). One antitrust study similarly links elevated threats to lower activity. Private class action enforcement outperforms public alternatives in scale and incentives; in securities, plaintiff firms recover ten times more annually than the SEC and four times more against overlapping wrongdoers, driven by contingency fees tying recovery to deterrence outcomes rather than fixed regulatory budgets. Critics alleging insufficient deterrence due to agency costs or low per-victim payouts overlook these cross-jurisdictional and industry-specific findings, where no empirical studies show increased wrongdoing under class regimes. For systemic issues like environmental harms or breaches impacting millions, this aggregate threat fosters proactive , as firms with greater litigation exposure adjust savings, , and disclosure policies to mitigate risks.

Empirical Evaluation of Benefits

Empirical assessments of class action benefits reveal substantial limitations in delivering compensation to class members and mixed on deterrence. A study analyzing 245 consumer class action settlements from 2006 to 2009 found that the payment per class member was $0, with over half of settlements providing no monetary and many distributing only coupons or injunctive of negligible value. In cases where was distributed, the average claimant's recovery was approximately $32 after attorney fees and costs, often requiring active claims filing that few pursued, resulting in unclaimed funds reverting to defendants or cy pres awards. These findings indicate that while class actions aggregate diffuse claims, the procedural barriers and low individual stakes frequently yield minimal net benefits, undermining claims of enhanced access to justice. On deterrence, evidence is inconclusive and often indirect. One analysis of securities class actions post-2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act suggested a reduction in earnings restatements and financial misreporting, attributing part of the decline to litigation threat, though isolating causal effects from regulatory changes proved challenging. However, a study of 352 class actions from 1990 to 1994 compared market reactions to class versus non-class filings and found no significant additional deterrent impact from class certification, with stock price drops similar across both, implying limited incremental behavioral change beyond standard risks. Critics note that settlements averaging 4-5% of alleged in cases provide weak incentives for compliance, as defendants often view payouts as a cost of rather than a signal to practices. Broader evaluations highlight opportunity costs. In small-claims consumer suits, distributions favored attorneys disproportionately, with fees capturing 20-50% of funds while class recoveries remained fractions of cents per member after allocation. A Federal Judicial Center report on class actions in four districts (1992-1997) observed that while some yielded behavioral adjustments like policy changes, many targeted ambiguous conduct without clear wrongdoing, diluting deterrence signals amid high dismissal rates (over 50% pre-certification). Collectively, these data suggest class actions achieve purported benefits unevenly, with structural features like requirements and fee-driven incentives often prioritizing resolution over maximal victim redress or systemic reform.

Criticisms and Empirical Realities

Agency Problems and Attorney Self-Interest

In class action litigation, a core agency problem arises from the misalignment between class counsel, who act as agents, and the absent class members they represent as principals. Class members typically lack the information, resources, or incentives to monitor attorneys effectively, creating opportunities for self-interested behavior such as prioritizing fee recovery over maximizing class value. This divergence is exacerbated by the contingent fee model, where attorneys bear litigation costs but receive a percentage of any settlement or judgment, often leading to decisions that favor quick resolutions over protracted fights that might yield higher per-member recoveries. Empirical analyses of fee awards reveal that attorneys frequently capture a disproportionate share of settlements relative to class distributions. For instance, in a study of class action settlements from 1993 to 2008, the mean attorney fee was 21.9% of the total recovery, with fees scaling downward for larger funds but remaining substantial even in mega-settlements. A broader review of 688 settlements totaling $33 billion found that attorneys received approximately $5 billion in fees, often through percentage-of-recovery methods that incentivize inflating settlement values via non-cash components like coupons or injunctive relief, which dilute actual member payouts. These structures can encourage attorneys to undervalue individualized harm assessments, as the fee emphasizes aggregate fund size over efficient distribution. Attorneys' self-interest further manifests in the pressure to certify classes and pursue settlements, even in marginal cases, due to defendants' aversion to the uncertainty and expense of battles. This dynamic fosters what critics term " settlements," where weakly meritorious suits leverage the threat of expansive liability to extract payments that primarily benefit , as class members receive nominal sums—often pennies per claim—while attorneys secure multimillion-dollar . For example, empirical reviews indicate that many consumer class actions yield average payouts of $13 to $90 per member, representing compensation rates as low as 6% of claimed losses, underscoring how attorney incentives prioritize extraction over class restitution. Such outcomes persist despite judicial oversight, as courts often defer to 's reported lodestars or benchmarks without robust adversarial testing from dispersed principals. Reform proposals, including auctioning lead counsel roles or enhancing objector scrutiny, aim to mitigate these issues by aligning incentives more closely with class interests, though implementation varies by . Nonetheless, the inherent barriers in class representation sustain vulnerabilities to attorney opportunism, as evidenced by persistent patterns in settlement data where fees exceed 25% in over half of cases, irrespective of case complexity or risk.

Low Value to Actual Class Members

In consumer class action settlements, individual recoveries are frequently negligible due to the aggregation of numerous small claims, low participation rates, and structural features that prioritize attorney compensation. A 2015 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau study of debt collection and credit reporting class actions found that the average payout to participating class members was $32, while class counsel fees often reached millions of dollars per case. Similarly, a Federal Trade Commission retrospective analysis of 10 consumer settlement campaigns revealed a median compensation of $69 per claimant, with mean values skewed higher by outliers but overall distributions remaining modest. Claims-made settlement structures compound the low value, as class members must submit forms to receive payment, resulting in median claims rates of just 9% in consumer cases according to FTC data; the majority thus obtain no recovery despite claim preclusion. An empirical examination of 245 resolved federal class actions from 2008 found that only one-third settled on a class-wide basis—half the rate of non-class federal litigation—and available distribution indicated minimal actual benefits to members, with many funds unclaimed or redirected. Undistributed settlement funds often to cy pres recipients such as nonprofits, rather than augmenting class payouts, further diluting individual value; in the FTC sample, cy pres awards absorbed significant portions where claims rates lagged. Across 15 small-stakes settlements studied empirically, compensation rates varied widely but averaged low when adjusted for rates and administrative hurdles, with non-claims-based distributions yielding higher effective payouts only in select instances. These patterns persist because the diffuse nature of harms incentivizes of oversized classes, spreading recoveries thinly while attorneys capture 20-30% of gross settlements as fees, per analyses of federal awards.

Economic and Innovation Costs

Class action litigation imposes significant economic burdens on defendants through direct expenditures on legal defense, discovery, and expert witnesses, as well as indirect costs such as managerial distraction and foregone business opportunities. A survey of major U.S. corporations revealed that the median cost of defending a single lawsuit exceeds $1 million for cases that reach advanced stages, with class actions often escalating these figures due to the complexity of certifying classes and managing notice procedures. In securities class actions specifically, empirical analysis indicates that stock price drops upon lawsuit announcements result in shareholder losses averaging $39 billion annually across cases, far outpacing the typical $5 billion in settlement payouts, representing a substantial to the . These costs are amplified by the "blackmail" dynamic, where even meritless claims prompt settlements to avoid unpredictable jury awards and prolonged uncertainty, diverting resources from productive investments. The aggregate economic toll extends to broader transaction costs and inefficiencies, as evidenced by studies of federal class action settlements totaling $33 billion across 688 cases from 1996 to 2007, with approximately 15%—or $5 billion—allocated to attorneys' fees rather than injured parties. Rising litigation costs, of which class actions form a notable component, increased at an average annual rate of 7.1% from 2016 to 2022, outstripping and contributing to higher prices as businesses pass on defensive expenses. For smaller or publicly traded firms, these burdens can precipitate financial distress, including reduced capital access and, in extreme cases, , particularly when aggregated claims amplify leverage against defendants irrespective of underlying merits. Regarding innovation, class action exposure fosters risk aversion among firms, particularly in R&D-intensive sectors, by elevating the perceived costs of novel activities that might invite scrutiny. An analysis of class action litigation shocks—such as court decisions altering liability standards—demonstrated a subsequent decline in corporate patenting and innovation output, as firms curtail investments to mitigate litigation probabilities. Innovative companies, proxied by high R&D spending and patent counts, face disproportionate targeting by class actions, including frivolous ones, which impose outsized economic penalties and influence decisions to pursue IPOs or aggressive growth strategies. Enhanced investor protection mechanisms, encompassing heightened disclosure mandates and class action risks, correlate with reduced innovation metrics, driven by the chilling effect on managerial experimentation and information sharing. This deterrence arises from causal links where anticipated legal liabilities exceed potential gains from breakthroughs, leading to underinvestment in high-uncertainty domains like technology and pharmaceuticals.

Empirical Evidence from Settlement Outcomes

Empirical analyses of class action settlements consistently demonstrate that individual class members derive limited financial benefit, with substantial portions of funds allocated to attorneys, administrators, and non-compensatory uses such as cy pres awards. A study by the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform reviewed 148 federal class actions filed or removed to federal in , revealing that only 33% (40 cases) settled on a classwide basis, while 35% were voluntarily dismissed—often enabling individual attorney-client deals without class relief—and 31% were dismissed on the merits, providing no compensation to the class. Among the settlements with available data, claims rates were exceedingly low, ranging from 0.000006% to 12%, resulting in average payouts per participating member as low as $25 or non-monetary items like in-game points, underscoring the negligible value delivered to the vast majority of class members who receive nothing. In consumer fraud class actions, distributions further highlight this disparity. An empirical review of 31 federal settlements approved in 2019 and 2020 found average attorney fees comprising 44.4% of total awards (rising to 63% in claims-made structures), with net funds available to class members averaging 43% overall but dropping to 24% in claims-made cases; claim participation rates averaged 4.91% (median 3.9%), yielding per capita recoveries as modest as $3.92 in examined instances. The Financial Protection Bureau's 2015 arbitration study, analyzing consumer financial settlements, reported average awards to prevailing class claimants at approximately $32, far below potential individual litigation values and dwarfed by attorney recoveries exceeding hundreds of millions annually across cases. Broader fee studies reinforce these patterns without contradicting low per-member outcomes. Research on 1993–2008 settlements calculated mean attorney fees at 23% of class recoveries (median 24%), with fees scaling inversely to settlement size—higher percentages in smaller funds—while administrative costs averaged 2.7–2.8%; total median recoveries reached $12.5 million per case, but diffused across massive classes (often millions), these equate to cents per member before unclaimed funds revert to cy pres or other non-distributive purposes. Such evidence supports critiques that settlements prioritize attorney incentives over class restitution, as low claim rates and residual allocations frequently leave most members uncompensated despite defendants' total payments in the tens or hundreds of millions.

Ethical and Incentive Issues

Conflicts Between Representatives and Class

In class action proceedings, conflicts between representatives—encompassing named plaintiffs and their counsel—and absent class members stem fundamentally from divergent incentives in the agency dynamic. Class counsel, remunerated via a contingency fee drawn from the settlement fund, often favor expedited resolutions to realize fees sooner, even if such outcomes undervalue claims that might yield higher recoveries through protracted litigation or trial. Absent class members, lacking veto power or direct oversight, rely on representatives whose personal stakes—fees for counsel, modest incentive awards for named plaintiffs—may prioritize certainty over maximization of collective value. This principal-agent misalignment persists despite procedural safeguards like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4)'s adequacy requirement, which demands that representatives and counsel fairly and adequately protect class interests, as enforcement varies and rarely probes deep into incentive structures. Empirical analyses underscore these tensions, revealing attorney fees consuming 20-35% of settlement funds in many cases, while class member recoveries remain dilute. A study of class actions from 1993 to 2008 found median fees at approximately 21.8% of recoveries, with no material decline over time and a scaling effect where larger funds yield proportionally lower percentages but still substantial absolute fees; in smaller settlements, fees can exceed 30%, amplifying the skew toward quick deals. Securities class actions exhibit similar patterns, where counsel's risk-adjusted fees correlate positively with effort but often outpace distributions to members, averaging under $0.01 per share claimed in some datasets. These outcomes reflect causal pressures: counsel's upside from fees incentivizes volume over rigor, while class members' rational —due to high monitoring costs—cedes control. Named representatives introduce further frictions through incentive awards, typically 5,0005,000-10,000, meant to offset reputational risks and time but creating side payments that may encourage with defendants for guaranteed payouts over class-wide gains. Pre-negotiated or sliding-scale awards exacerbate this, as representatives might accept undervalued settlements securing their bounty, conflicting with absent members' interests in higher aggregate relief; the Eleventh Circuit has prohibited such awards outright, citing inherent antagonism, while other circuits permit them under scrutiny, deepening a split. Objectors have successfully challenged settlements on these grounds, as in cases where counsel's of representatives and class fostered "sellouts" via holdout threats or selective payouts. Judicial interventions, such as subclass for intra-class divides or enhanced for opt-outs, aim to curb abuses, yet persistent reversals highlight failures—like a multibillion-dollar settlement vacated in 2023 for counsel's inadequate handling of subclass conflicts, where diverging timelines went unaddressed. In securities contexts, counsel's representation of overlapping "" classes or personal stakes in defendants can compound loyalties, prompting opinions urging waivers or separate , though compliance lags. These conflicts, rooted in information asymmetries and fee-driven agency costs, undermine the representational essential to class , often yielding outcomes where counsel extract disproportionate value absent robust class benefit.

Fee Awards, Cy Pres, and Misaligned Rewards

In class action settlements, courts typically award attorneys' fees using either the lodestar method, which multiplies reasonable hours worked by an hourly rate, or a percentage-of-the-fund approach, often ranging from 20% to 30% of the settlement value. Empirical analysis of 688 class action settlements from 1996 to 2006, totaling $33 billion in recovery, revealed that approximately $5 billion—about 15%—was allocated to plaintiffs' attorneys, with most courts applying the percentage method and observing a scaling effect where fees decrease as settlement size increases. A separate study of securities class actions found that lodestar cross-checks, intended to moderate awards, often inflate fees by encouraging excessive billing rather than efficient outcomes. These fee structures create misaligned incentives, as attorneys' compensation correlates more strongly with settlement totals than with per-class-member recovery, prompting to prioritize headline-grabbing large funds—even if claims processes deter participation—over maximizing value for absent members. In low-value-per-claim cases, such as or suits, this dynamic fosters between plaintiffs' and defendants, yielding quick approvals of inflated settlements where attorneys capture substantial shares while class members receive nominal coupons or nothing. Critics argue this agency problem persists despite judicial oversight, as lodestar multipliers reward hours invested over results achieved, potentially incentivizing protracted litigation to justify higher awards. Cy pres distributions, where unclaimed or undistributed settlement funds are redirected to charities approximating the class's interests, exacerbate these misalignments by diverting resources from harmed parties to third-party organizations, often selected through opaque processes favoring attorneys' networks or defendants' preferences. Empirical trends show cy pres awards rising in frequency and size since the 1980s, with settlements increasingly relying on them amid high rates and administrative costs that leave billions unclaimed. This practice heightens conflicts, as it allows counsel to claim fees on the full fund—including cy pres portions—without ensuring direct benefits to the class, raising ethical concerns over uninjured recipients and potential arrangements. U.S. scrutiny, as in Marek v. Lane (1985) and subsequent cases, has highlighted how cy pres can undermine standards by providing illusory relief, yet courts often approve them absent evidence of abuse, perpetuating rewards untethered to class restitution. Overall, these mechanisms misalign rewards by decoupling attorney gains from class welfare, with studies indicating that in many settlements, recover multiples of what members receive after fees, costs, and cy pres diversions. This structure, rooted in common-fund doctrine, prioritizes self-interest over deterrence or compensation, as evidenced by mega-settlements where fees scale disproportionately and unclaimed funds fuel non-compensatory distributions rather than returns or trial pursuits. Reforms proposed include stricter benchmarks for judges and mandatory reversion of residuals to defendants unless class exhaustion is demonstrated, to realign incentives with causal harm redress.

Defendant Class Actions

Defendant class actions permit a or group of plaintiffs to sue a class of s under the same procedural framework as plaintiff class actions, as authorized by Federal Rule of 23, which makes no distinction between the two. Certification requires satisfaction of Rule 23(a)'s prerequisites—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation—along with one of Rule 23(b)'s categories, such as where injunctive or declaratory relief is appropriate for the class as a whole under Rule 23(b)(2). However, defendant classes face heightened due to potential conflicts among defendants, who may lack unified interests in mounting defenses, unlike plaintiffs often aligned by shared harm. These actions are exceptionally rare in federal courts, comprising a minuscule fraction of class certifications, often likened to "unicorns" in complex litigation because defendants typically resist serving as class representatives, fearing broader liability or inconsistent defenses. Personal jurisdiction poses additional barriers, as absent defendant class members must be subject to the court's authority, complicating where defendants are dispersed geographically or have varying ties to the forum. Courts have denied in cases like suits, where individualized defenses undermine commonality. Potential applications include scenarios seeking uniform injunctive relief against numerous similar defendants, such as government officials or private actors enforcing allegedly unconstitutional laws, enabling private attorneys general to challenge systemic practices efficiently. A rare successful certification occurred in a 2015 federal case in , where victims of a certified a defendant class of investors who received fraudulent transfers, facilitating proceedings under uniform liability theories. Critics argue that such actions risk violations by binding non-representative defendants to judgments without adequate opt-out mechanisms or individualized , particularly under Rule 23(b)(3) for , though proponents contend they promote efficiency in limited, homogeneous contexts. Empirical data underscores their limited utility, with approvals far outnumbered by denials owing to adequacy and superiority concerns.

Mass Actions and Multidistrict Litigation

Mass actions, as defined under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11), refer to any civil action in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the grounds that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact, excluding certain securities class actions under section 1711(2). Unlike traditional class actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, mass actions do not require formal class certification, allowing plaintiffs to pursue joint trials without binding absent parties or necessitating findings on numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. This structure preserves individualized assessments of damages and for each claimant, making mass actions suitable for scenarios with varying injury severities, such as cases where some plaintiffs suffer minor harms while others face severe ones. CAFA deems qualifying mass actions removable to federal court as if they were class actions, expanding federal jurisdiction to prevent in state courts, though defendants must show that the claims are not predominantly for public rights or by government entities to avoid exceptions. In practice, mass actions often arise in mass tort contexts, where numerous individual lawsuits are filed separately but proposed for consolidated trials, avoiding the certification barriers that can derail class actions when individual issues predominate. For instance, the U.S. in Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp. (2014) clarified that the "100 or more persons" threshold counts only those whose claims are actually proposed for joint trial, not potential claimants, ensuring the provision targets only those actions functionally akin to sprawling class suits. This approach mitigates some class action criticisms, such as overbinding uninvolved parties, but introduces coordination challenges, as courts must manage separate verdicts without the unified judgment of a certified class. Multidistrict litigation (MDL), governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1407, enables the transfer of civil actions pending in different federal districts that share one or more common questions of fact to a single district for coordinated pretrial proceedings, promoting efficiency without merging the cases into a single action. The on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML), composed of seven federal judges appointed by the , evaluates transfer petitions and requires at least four members to concur for approval, focusing on whether centralization conserves judicial resources and avoids duplicative discovery. Enacted in , MDL applies to diverse civil matters like antitrust, pharmaceuticals, and disasters, with proceedings limited to pretrial phases—such as fact discovery, expert witnesses, and dispositive motions—after which cases remand to their originating districts for trial unless settled. Distinguishing MDL from class actions, the former coordinates existing separate lawsuits without altering their procedural status or binding non-participating s, whereas class actions consolidate claims under representative parties with effects on the entire class. MDLs thus serve as an alternative when class certification fails due to predominance of issues, allowing aggregation for efficiency while retaining in settlements or trials; for example, in pharmaceutical MDLs, lead counsel may negotiate global resolutions, but opt-outs preserve bargaining. Critics note that MDLs can pressure defendants toward early settlements to avoid protracted coordination costs, yet empirical patterns show over 90% of transferred cases resolve before remand, often via trials testing case strength. Both procedures overlap in torts, where MDLs frequently encompass actions or denied class suits, but MDL's federal exclusivity contrasts with class actions' availability in state courts.

Comparisons to Individual or Aggregate Litigation

Class actions differ from individual litigation primarily in their mechanism for aggregating claims, enabling resolution of disputes that would otherwise be impractical due to the negative value of individual suits—where litigation costs exceed potential recovery. In individual actions, each bears the full expense and risk, often deterring pursuit of small claims, whereas class certification under Federal Rule of 23 allows representative parties to litigate common issues on behalf of a group, promoting procedural economy by avoiding repetitive on shared facts or . However, this aggregation binds absent class members to the outcome, limiting their control and potentially resulting in uniform remedies that fail to account for individual variations in harm or evidence strength, unlike individual suits where plaintiffs retain autonomy in settlement or decisions. Empirical data from courts indicate that certified class actions settle at rates of 53% to 100%, compared to 20% to 66% for non-certified or cases, reflecting the settlement pressure exerted by aggregated liability but also highlighting certification's role in weeding out weaker claims. Median recovery per class member ranges from $315 to $3,341 across studied districts, often comprising coupons or minimal cash, with claims-made settlements yielding participation rates around 9% as noted in analyses of consumer cases—far below full redress potential and contrasted with higher per-plaintiff awards possible in actions for viable claims. Attorney fees typically consume 24% to 30% of gross settlements, and in cases lacking net monetary distribution to the class (e.g., certain injunction-focused actions), fees can reach 80% to 96% of funds, underscoring a divergence from litigation where fees align more directly with client recoveries. Relative to other aggregate procedures like multidistrict litigation (MDL), class actions offer greater binding finality through , adjudicating common questions for all members and precluding relitigation, which enhances efficiency for homogeneous harms but risks over-inclusivity for diverse damages. MDL, governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1407, consolidates pretrial proceedings across districts without certifying a class, preserving each case's for settlement or and accommodating varied individual proofs—advantages over class actions in flexibility, as MDL avoids Rule 23's predominance and superiority hurdles that can delay or deny . Yet MDL lacks class actions' stare decisis effect, potentially leading to inconsistent rulings or prolonged satellite litigation, though it mitigates class-specific risks like coerced global settlements by allowing plaintiffs to exit or pursue separate paths. Empirical contrasts are limited, but MDL's structure supports higher customization in mass torts (e.g., with differing injury severities), where class treatment often fails , yielding outcomes more tailored than class-wide averages.

Jurisdictional Variations

United States Federal and State Frameworks

Class actions in the federal courts are governed by Rule 23 of the , which establishes prerequisites for class certification under subsection (a): the class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable (numerosity); there must be questions of or fact common to the class (commonality); the claims or defenses of the representative parties must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class (typicality); and the representative parties must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (adequacy). Subsection (b) delineates three types of certifiable classes: (b)(1) for cases where separate actions risk inconsistent rulings or impair nonparties' interests, typically mandatory without opt-out; (b)(2) for injunctive or declaratory relief applicable to the class as a whole; and (b)(3) for cases where common questions predominate over individual ones and a class action is superior to other methods, allowing opt-out rights. Certification requires a rigorous judicial analysis, often involving evidentiary hearings, with appeals permitted under Rule 23(f) to prevent irreparable harm from erroneous decisions. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), enacted on February 18, 2005, broadened federal jurisdiction over class actions by relaxing diversity requirements to minimal diversity (at least one and one from different states) and raising the amount-in-controversy threshold to $5 million in aggregate, excluding interest and costs, for cases filed after that date. CAFA facilitates removal from state to federal court for qualifying multistate actions, aiming to curb perceived abuses in state courts, while preserving exceptions such as for cases primarily involving local parties or interests under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). It also imposes procedural safeguards, including scrutiny of settlements to limit coupon awards and ensure fair notice to class members. State frameworks generally parallel federal Rule 23 but exhibit variations in certification standards, procedural details, and substantive limitations, reflecting each jurisdiction's or statutes. For example, California's Code of § 382 permits class actions for common questions of or fact without explicitly codifying all federal prerequisites like predominance, allowing broader certification in some consumer and employment disputes compared to the more rigorous federal predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3). Other states, such as under Rule 42 of its Rules of , impose stricter ascertainability requirements, mandating that class members be identifiable through objective criteria to prevent speculative claims. Multistate class actions in state courts often face challenges from varying state laws on liability and damages, potentially defeating predominance if material differences exist, though some states like apply a single state's more readily than federal courts under choice-of-law principles. Certain states, including and until reforms in the 2010s, historically restricted class actions via statutory bans or heightened pleading standards, though most now permit them with federal-like frameworks to handle mass harms efficiently. These divergences can influence forum selection, with plaintiffs favoring states perceived as more permissive and defendants seeking removal under CAFA where applicable.

Common Law Jurisdictions (Canada, Australia, UK)

In , class proceedings are governed primarily by provincial legislation, with Ontario's Class Proceedings Act, 1992 serving as a model adopted across most provinces and territories following the Uniform Class Proceedings Act drafted by the Uniform Law Conference of . Certification requires that the pleading disclose a , an identifiable class exist, common questions of law or fact predominate, the class proceeding be the preferable procedure for resolution, and the representative plaintiff be suitable. Courts apply a "some basis in fact" threshold for commonality and preferability, rejecting overly stringent predominance tests akin to U.S. Federal Rule 23(b)(3). Proceedings operate on an basis, with mandatory to class members upon certification, allowing absent members to be bound by judgments or settlements unless they exclude themselves. The Federal Court maintains a parallel regime for matters within its , such as and claims, emphasizing representative applicants and class management. Settlements require court approval to ensure fairness, with awards distributed after costs and fees, though contingency fees remain controversial and are capped in some provinces at 33% of recovery. Australia's representative proceedings, introduced under Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 in 1992, enable claims by seven or more persons sharing common questions of law or fact, applicable across the Federal Court's broad jurisdiction including consumer, competition, and securities matters. Unlike broader U.S. certification, Australian courts assess whether claims raise sufficiently common issues without requiring predominance, focusing instead on efficiency and justice; no formal "certification" motion exists, but courts may decline or limit proceedings if unmanageable. The system is opt-out, with courts directing notice to the group defined by shared characteristics, binding non-excluders to outcomes. State supreme courts offer analogous regimes, such as Victoria's group proceedings, while Western Australia enacted a new opt-out framework in 2023 managed via a dedicated Representative Proceedings List. Settlements and distributions demand court scrutiny for adequacy, with litigation funding common but subject to disclosure and fairness reviews; the regime has facilitated over 245 actions by 2012, often yielding multimillion-dollar resolutions in product liability and financial misconduct cases. In the United Kingdom, collective redress lacks a unified opt-out class action mechanism for damages claims, relying instead on Group Litigation Orders (GLOs) under Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) Part 19 III, which consolidate multiple individual claims sharing common issues for case management, including lead cases, discovery coordination, and judgment application across registered claimants. GLOs are opt-in, requiring claimants to register explicitly, and courts register them via schedules listing issues, with over 20 active GLOs as of 2024 addressing emissions scandals, data breaches, and equal pay disputes involving thousands of participants. Representative actions under CPR 19.8 permit one party to sue on behalf of others with the "same interest," but this is narrowly interpreted for non-adversarial contexts, excluding most damages claims due to varying individual entitlements. Recent trends show proliferation of GLOs and joint claims, sometimes bypassing GLOs for efficiency, as in the 1.2 million-claimant Post Office Horizon GLOs resolved via settlements exceeding £1 billion by 2024. Settlements bind only registered parties, with costs risks borne individually unless funded collectively, and contingency fees prohibited, favoring "no win, no fee" conditional agreements under CPR 7.2. This opt-in structure contrasts with U.S. and Commonwealth opt-out models, prioritizing claimant agency over aggregation efficiency, though opt-out pilots for competition claims under the 2014 Consumer Rights Act have certified few actions due to strict "follow-on" requirements from regulatory findings.

Civil Law Adaptations (EU, Germany, France)

In civil law jurisdictions of the , traditional mechanisms for collective redress differ markedly from the opt-out class actions prevalent in systems, emphasizing representative entities over individual aggregation to mitigate risks of abusive litigation while facilitating access to for mass harms. The EU's Representative Actions Directive (EU) 2020/1828, adopted on November 25, 2020, and requiring transposition by s by December 25, 2022 (with extensions granted to some until mid-2023), establishes minimum standards for qualified entities—such as associations or public bodies—to pursue injunctive measures or redress (including damages) on behalf of consumers affected by infringements of specified EU laws, primarily in areas like unfair commercial practices and product safety. This directive mandates participation for redress claims to respect procedural autonomy of member states and avoids or contingency fees to curb incentives for frivolous suits, reflecting a cautious adaptation influenced by concerns over U.S.-style litigation excesses. Cross-border actions are enabled by designating qualified entities in one member state to act EU-wide for violations with transnational effects, though implementation varies, with only limited cases filed as of 2024 due to the directive's recency and procedural hurdles. Germany maintains a restrictive approach to collective actions, eschewing broad opt-out mechanisms in favor of declaratory and limited redress procedures tailored to high-volume disputes. The Model Declaratory Action (Musterfeststellungsklage), introduced on November 1, 2018, under the Capital Markets Model Case Act in response to the Dieselgate scandal, allows qualified or investor associations to seek court declarations of liability for up to 10 model claims in or matters, enabling affected individuals to pursue follow-on individual suits within specified time limits if they opt in. This opt-in process, governed by the Act on Model Declaratory Actions for Claims under Law, excludes punitive elements and applies the German loser-pays , with courts selecting representative claims to test liability efficiently. To comply with the Representative Actions Directive, enacted the Consumer Rights Enforcement Act on October 18, 2023, introducing the Redress Action (Abhilfeklage), which permits qualified entities to claim compensatory damages directly for consumers in designated consumer disputes, such as defective products or misleading advertising, while retaining the model declaratory action as an alternative. These tools remain confined to civil claims without discovery akin to U.S. procedures, prioritizing evidence-based resolutions over expansive litigation, with approximately 200 model actions filed by 2024, mostly in automotive and financial sectors. France's "action de groupe," established by the Hamon Law on March 17, 2014, initially for material from contractual breaches or , represents an early EU adaptation of collective redress, requiring approved associations with at least five years of existence to initiate two-phase proceedings: first establishing liability, then quantifying and distributing compensation to opt-in victims via . Subsequent expansions via ordinances in 2016 and 2017 extended scope to (2016), environmental harms (2017), and data protection (2018), though moral remain largely excluded to limit scope. The framework, transposed to incorporate the EU Representative Actions Directive through the Law of April 30, 2025, unifies procedures across sectors, lowers barriers by allowing groups in some cases, and permits loser-pays cost-shifting with judicial discretion for low-value claims, yet retains opt-in requirements and caps attorney fees to deter speculation. As of 2024, over 300 actions have been initiated, predominantly in and fields, with settlements averaging €1-5 million, though success rates hover below 20% due to evidentiary thresholds and challenges, underscoring a balanced mechanism that avoids U.S.-level proliferation.

References

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