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Electoral fusion in the United States
Electoral fusion in the United States
Electoral fusion in the United States
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Electoral fusion in the United States is an arrangement where two or more United States political parties on a ballot list the same candidate,[1] allowing that candidate to receive votes on multiple party lines in the same election.[2]

Electoral fusion is also known as fusion voting, cross endorsement, multiple party nomination, multi-party nomination, plural nomination and ballot freedom.[3][4]

Electoral fusion was once widespread in the U.S. and legal in every state. However, as of 2024, it remains legal and common only in New York and Connecticut.[5][6][7]

Overview

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In 2016, Business Insider wrote: "Fusion voting gives voters a chance to support a major candidate while registering their unhappiness with that candidate's party. A cross-endorsement from a smaller party like the Working Families Party can also help inform voters about where candidates stand on certain issues".[8]

In 2019, The Nation wrote: "Fusion is a response to the winner-take-all electoral system. It solves the 'wasted vote' or 'spoiler' dilemmas that otherwise plague third parties, and allows citizens who don't fit neatly into the Democratic or Republican boxes to nevertheless participate constructively in politics".[1]

Before the Civil War, fusion voting was a common electoral tactic of abolitionist forces, who formed a number of anti-slavery third parties, including the Liberty and Free Soil parties. These and other abolitionist third parties cross-nominated major party candidates running under the Whig label, fusing more than one party behind a single candidate.[9][10]

After the Civil War, agrarian interest groups and the political parties they founded continued to use fusion voting to form alliances between third parties and the weaker of the two major parties, usually the Democrats in the West and Midwest.[11] In the 19th and early 20th century, minor parties used fusion as a way to signal that their support for a major party candidate brought a meaningful number of voters to the candidate.[12] Votes for fusion candidates were tallied first by party, then added together to produce the outcome. Historian Peter Argersinger argues that this helped "maintain a significant third party tradition by guaranteeing that dissenters' votes could be more than symbolic protest".[11] Fusion allowed minor parties to avoid the "wasted vote" and "spoiler" dilemmas that small parties face in a non-proportional voting system.[13]

The People's Party (also known as the Populists) is regarded as the most successful third party of the era.[14] That success produced a counter-reaction from the dominant major parties, who then used state legislatures to enact bans against fusion in the late nineteenth and early 20th century.[11] In northern and western states, fusion was largely banned by Republican-led legislatures. One Republican Minnesota state legislator said: "We don't propose to allow the Democrats to make allies of the Populists, Prohibitionists, or any other party, and get up combination tickets against us. We can whip them single-handed, but don't intend to fight all creation."[15] In southern states, fusion was largely banned by Democrats who supported Jim Crow, in an attempt to prevent political alliances between newly-enfranchised Black voters and poor white farmers.[16]

Most states banned fusion by the early 20th century.[17] South Dakota banned the practice in 1999,[18] Delaware banned it in 2011,[19] and South Carolina banned it in 2022.[20] In Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party (1997), the US Supreme Court ruled that prohibiting electoral fusion does not violate the First Amendment of the Constitution.[21]

Electoral fusion was once widespread in the US, but as of 2024, it remains legal and common only in New York and Connecticut.[9] It is partially legal in three others: California allows fusion in presidential elections only, and Pennsylvania and Maryland permit it in certain elections, including but not limited to the judiciary.[22][page needed] In Oregon and Vermont, a system of dual-labeling exists, which allows a candidate to list multiple party endorsements on a single line, but disallows the traditional fusion system in which a minor party has its own ballot line and votes are tallied by party.[23] In New Hampshire, fusion is legal in rare cases when primary elections are won by write-in candidates.[24]

As of 2024, the Alianza de País in Puerto Rico, the New Jersey Moderate Party, the Common Sense Party in Michigan and the United Kansas Party are attempting to use litigation to bring back fusion voting in their areas.[9][25][26]

New Mexico,[27] Massachusetts,[28] and Rhode Island[29] had bills to allow fusion voting.

Historical examples

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Presidential elections

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In 1872, both the newly formed Liberal Republican Party and the Democratic Party nominated the Liberal Republican Horace Greeley as their candidate for US President: "If [the Democratic Party] was to stand any chance at all against Grant, it must avoid putting up a candidate of its own who would merely split the opposition vote. It must take Greeley."[30]

In the presidential election of 1896, William Jennings Bryan was nominated by both the Democratic Party and the Populist Party, albeit with different vice presidential candidates, Arthur Sewall for the Democrats and Thomas E. Watson for the Populists. This election led to the downfall of the Populist Party, especially in Southern states (such as Watson's Georgia, as well as North Carolina and Tennessee) where the Populist party had engaged in electoral fusion or other alliances with Republicans against the dominant Bourbon Democrats.[31][32]

In the 1936 and 1940, the American Labor Party nominated Franklin Roosevelt for president, and in 1944, the Liberal Party of New York cross-nominated Roosevelt, fusing with the ALP. Roosevelt won the state of New York in each election, but in 1940 and 1944 he would not have won New York without the support of votes gained via the fusion parties and their voters.[33]

Donald Trump appeared on the 2016 presidential ballot in California with two ballot labels by his name,[34] as the nominee of both the Republican Party and the American Independent Party, a small far-right party. Trump was the first fusion presidential candidate on the California ballot in at least eighty years.[35]

Connecticut

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Connecticut allows cross-endorsements, listing candidates on more than one ballot line. Minor parties include the Working Families Party and Independent Party. In 2010, Dannel Malloy won within the Working Families' margin.[36]

New York

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See also: Elections in New York (state) and Qualified New York political parties

In 1936, labor leaders in New York City took advantage of fusion and founded the American Labor Party (ALP). Their immediate goal was to provide a way for New Yorkers who despised the Tammany Hall political machine to support Franklin Roosevelt without voting for the Democratic Party. In its first showing at the polls, the party garnered a significant amount of the vote in New York City but was not important with regard to Roosevelt's victory. In the 1937 election cycle, the ALP built on its past performance by electing members to the city council, and by delivering so many votes to Mayor Fiorello La Guardia that the New York Times ran a front page article declaring that the ALP held the balance of power in city and state politics. The importance of the ALP was demonstrated again in 1938 when the party provided the margin of victory for the Democratic candidate for Governor, and in 1940 when the ALP did the same for President Roosevelt. In the 1944 presidential election, fusion provided CIO unions in New York an opportunity to build and back a labor party, an uncommon occurrence in the US. Labor leaders knew that fusion permitted them to field candidates and win elections on the American Labor Party line in local elections, and to back Democrats in statewide or national races where they did not have the capacity to field successful candidates. Given the presence of fusion in New York, the Greater New York Industrial Union Council (GNYIUC), the CIO's local labor federation in New York, formally affiliated with the party making it the political arm of the New York CIO. This relationship would continue until 1948 when the GNYIUC opted to back Henry Wallace for president, instead of using fusion to back President Truman. This led to internal conflicts within the CIO and ultimately contributed to the decision by the national CIO to revoke the charter of the GNYIUC, thereby ending its relationship with the ALP.[12]

As of 2023, to obtain or maintain automatic ballot access, a party's candidate for Governor in midterm election years or President in presidential years must receive either 130,000 votes or 2% of votes cast (whichever is greater) on that party's line.[37]

Other parties, such as the Libertarian Party of New York and the Green Party of New York, have sought ballot access by first getting a gubernatorial candidate on the ballot via petition (by collecting 45,000 valid signatures of registered voters), and then by getting 130,000 votes for that candidate on their line. As a general rule, neither party uses electoral fusion, and both rely on their own candidates. The Green Party, which had first achieved ballot status in 1998, failed to gain 50,000 votes (then the requirement) and also lost its ballot status in 2002, but regained its line when the 2010 election results were certified. In 2018, Larry Sharpe, the Libertarian Party candidate for governor in New York, received over 90,000 votes, giving the party ballot status for the first time in its history.[38][39][40]

In July 2019, the New York Legislature passed a budget bill that included the creation of a Public Campaign Financing Commission, which was given authority to investigate and create rules for public financing of campaigns.[41] The Conservative Party of New York and the Working Families Party each filed lawsuits against the state in response, alleging that the commission was a disguised attempt to end fusion voting and thus the existence of New York's third parties.[42]

Oregon

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Prior to 1958, Oregon practiced a form of fusion that required the state to list multiple nominating parties on the candidate's ballot line. Sylvester Pennoyer was elected governor in 1886 and 1890 as a candidate of the Democratic and People's parties. In 1906, seven members of the Oregon House were also elected as candidates of the People's Party and either the Democratic or Republican parties. In 2008, a lawsuit was brought by the Independent Party of Oregon against the Oregon Secretary of State claiming that modifications to the ballot design statute in 1995 once again required the state to list multiple nominating parties on the candidate's ballot line. The lawsuit gave rise to legislation[43][non-primary source needed] to allow candidates to list up to three party labels after their name. This bill passed both houses of the Oregon legislature during the 2009 legislative session. Governor Ted Kulongoski signed the bill into law on 23 July 2009.[44]

Pennsylvania

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In Pennsylvania, fusion can occur when members of a party write in the name of a member of a different party in a primary election and secure enough write-in votes to nominate that party's candidate. For example, if Bob Jones is running for school board in a primary election as a Democrat and secures both enough votes from members of his own party as well as enough write-in votes from members of the Republican Party, then electoral fusion occurs, and Bob will appear on the ballot as both a Republican and a Democrat. Similarly, a member of one party may lose their own party's nomination in a primary election but gain enough write-in votes from members of the opposing party to win that party's nomination. For example, in May 2023, Stephen Zappala lost the Democratic primary for Allegheny County District Attorney to challenger Matt Dugan. However, although Zappala is a Democrat, he received the requisite number (500 or more) of write-in votes from Republicans to appear as a Republican on the ballot in November 2023.[45][46] Running on the ballot as a Republican, Zappala won the general election in November 2023, beating Dugan.

Vermont

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In Vermont, candidates can only run in one party primary, but can run write-in campaigns in others. Political science professor Jack Gierzynski said "When parties work together in a fusion sense, they're much more likely to be successful. ... [Progressives] running on a fusion ticket has had a big influence on moving the public policy needle to the left."[47]

Fusion voting had been at risk due to a sore loser provision of ranked-choice voting legislation.[48]

Wisconsin

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In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, during the heyday of the sewer socialists, the Republican and Democratic parties would agree not to run candidates against each other in some districts, concentrating instead on defeating the socialists. These candidates were usually called non-partisan, but sometimes were termed fusion candidates instead.[49][additional citation(s) needed]

See also

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Electoral fusion in the United States

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from Grokipedia
Electoral fusion, also known as fusion voting, in the United States permits multiple political parties to nominate the same candidate for a given office, enabling voters to support their preferred party's line while their vote contributes to the totals of each nominating party, thereby aiding minor parties in maintaining ballot access and influence without risking the election of opposing major-party candidates. Historically widespread in the U.S. for over a century, fusion facilitated coalitions such as the Populist Party's cross-nominations of Democratic candidates in the , allowing third parties to shape policy agendas and secure electoral leverage. Beginning in the late , however, most states progressively banned the practice through legislation enacted primarily by the dominant Republican and Democratic parties, who viewed it as a mechanism empowering rivals like labor and agrarian movements to siphon vote shares and bargaining power. Today, fusion remains legal in only a few states, including New York and , where it has enabled entities like to cross-nominate major-party candidates and extract policy concessions, such as on hikes, by leveraging their endorsement votes. Proponents argue it mitigates the spoiler effect and fosters multiparty competition, with empirical evidence from fusion-permissive jurisdictions showing increased minor-party viability and without diluting major-party dominance. Critics, often aligned with the two major parties, contend it complicates ballots and enables by fringe groups, though such bans face ongoing constitutional challenges asserting First Amendment violations by restricting associational rights. Recent advocacy efforts in states like and seek its restoration to counter duopoly entrenchment and voter dissatisfaction with binary choices.

Fundamentals

Definition and Mechanics

Electoral fusion, also known as fusion voting or cross-endorsement, is an electoral practice in which multiple political parties nominate the same candidate for a given office, allowing that candidate to appear on the ballot under each nominating party's line. This mechanism enables minor or third parties to support a major-party candidate—or vice versa—without fielding a separate contender that might split votes and enable an undesired outcome, as votes cast for the fused candidate across party lines are aggregated toward a single total. In practice, parties conduct separate processes, such as conventions or primaries, to select and endorse the , with state laws typically requiring formal certification of nominations by deadlines preceding the general . On the , the 's name appears once per nominating , often in distinct columns or rows labeled by affiliation, permitting voters to select the via their preferred 's line while ensuring all such selections contribute to the 's overall vote count. For instance, if a receives 50,000 votes on the Democratic line and 20,000 on the line, the total of 70,000 votes determines the 's standing against opponents, potentially qualifying the supporting for continued based on vote thresholds in states permitting fusion. This pooling contrasts with single- systems, where duplicate listings are prohibited, and aims to reward coalition-building without diluting incentives. Fusion applies primarily to general elections, though nomination rules vary by state; it does not alter primary elections, where parties typically select distinct nominees unless state statutes explicitly allow cross-nominations at that stage. Proponents argue it mitigates the spoiler effect inherent in systems, as minor-party voters can endorse a viable while signaling ideological influence through line-specific tallies that parties monitor for future strategies. However, implementation requires statutory authorization, as most U.S. states ban the practice to prevent vote manipulation or party-line confusion, with fusion currently legal in full or limited form only in New York, , and as of 2023.

Comparison to Other Electoral Practices

Electoral fusion differs fundamentally from single non-transferable vote systems prevalent in the United States, such as first-past-the-post (FPTP) , where candidates compete under a single party nomination and the candidate with the most votes wins, often exacerbating the spoiler effect that disadvantages third parties by splitting votes from ideologically similar major-party candidates. In contrast, fusion permits multiple parties to nominate the same candidate, allowing vote aggregation across party lines in a single round, which enables minor parties to influence outcomes without risking vote wastage, as seen historically in New York where cross-endorsements boosted candidates like those from the . This mechanism preserves the winner-take-all structure of FPTP districts but mitigates its duopolistic tendencies by rewarding cross-party coalitions pre-election rather than relying solely on post-election bargaining. Unlike runoff elections, which require a second ballot round if no candidate secures a in the initial plurality vote—implemented in states like Georgia for general elections since 2018—fusion achieves majority-like support through simultaneous aggregation without additional costs or delays. Runoffs address vote-splitting by narrowing fields but can suppress participation due to fatigue, whereas fusion integrates minor-party support directly into the primary ballot line, potentially increasing third-party relevance in states like New York without necessitating sequential voting. Empirical analysis of New York congressional races from 1978 onward shows fusion candidacies enhancing minor-party leverage in major-party races, contrasting runoffs' focus on pairwise majorities among initial leaders. Fusion also contrasts with ranked-choice voting (RCV) or (IRV), where voters rank preferences and votes transfer from eliminated candidates until a majority emerges, as adopted in cities like since 2004. While both aim to reduce spoilers, RCV empowers individual voters to express nuanced preferences without party mediation, potentially electing more centrist candidates through preference exhaustion, whereas fusion relies on party elites to forge nominations, emphasizing organized alliances over voter rankings and maintaining separate lines for signal-sending. Studies indicate fusion provides clearer ideological information via party labels, aiding voter education, unlike RCV's complexity in exhaustion scenarios. In comparison to (PR) systems used internationally, such as party-list PR in countries like since , which allocate multiple seats in multi-member districts based on vote shares to reflect diverse interests, fusion operates within single-winner districts and does not inherently deliver seat proportionality. PR mitigates underrepresentation of minorities by design, often yielding coalition governments, but fusion—while enabling minor parties to "fuse" support behind winnable candidates—reinforces winner-take-all outcomes, serving more as a bridge to broader reforms than a direct substitute. Proponents argue fusion could evolve toward PR-like effects by encouraging proliferation and moderation, though it lacks PR's mathematical vote-to-seat linkage.

Historical Development

Early Adoption and 19th-Century Expansion

Electoral fusion, permitting multiple to nominate the same for , emerged in the United States during the early 19th century as a strategy for minor parties to amplify their influence amid dominant factional alignments. One of the earliest documented instances occurred in the , when the Workingmen’s Party of endorsed Jacksonian Democrats for local council elections, advocating reforms such as a 10-hour workday to consolidate working-class support against entrenched elites. This tactic allowed smaller groups to leverage broader voter bases without diluting their ideological appeals, marking an initial adoption in urban, labor-oriented contests. By the 1840s, fusion gained traction among anti-slavery advocates seeking to challenge pro-slavery majorities in northern states. In , the Liberty Party cross-endorsed Independent Democrat in legislative trials from 1845 to 1846, opposing ; this support contributed to Hale's election to the in 1846 and subsequently to the U.S. Senate. Similarly, in Ohio's 1848 elections, the fused with Whig candidates Joshua Giddings and Joseph Root, securing victories with 63% and 58% of the vote, respectively, while aiding Whig governor Seabury Ford's narrow win by less than 0.2%. In the following year, Free Soil nominee George Julian prevailed in a congressional race with Democratic cross-endorsement, winning by 154 votes out of 9,320 cast. The practice expanded throughout the mid-19th century as anti- coalitions proliferated, enabling third parties like the , Free , and Anti-Nebraska parties to align with Whigs or Independent Democrats against Democratic dominance on slavery issues. This fusion dynamic facilitated the 1850 election of to the U.S. Senate from via a Free Soil-Whig alliance and underpinned the Republican Party's formation in 1854–1855 by absorbing prior fusion groups, leading to northern electoral gains and Abraham Lincoln's 1860 presidential victory. By the 1860s and 1870s, fusion extended to post-Civil War reforms, such as Virginia's coalitions for and North Carolina's interracial alliances of Populists and Republicans pursuing economic and civil rights objectives until state-level bans curtailed it in the . These applications demonstrated fusion's utility in state and local races across diverse regions, fostering cross-ideological pacts that third parties used to secure legislative seats and policy concessions without supplanting major-party structures.

Peak Influence in Populist and Labor Movements (1850s-1890s)

Electoral fusion enabled third-party movements rooted in agrarian discontent and labor organizing to exert substantial influence during the Gilded Age, when economic depression, deflation, and industrial monopolies fueled demands for reform. In the 1870s and 1880s, the Greenback Labor Party, advocating paper currency expansion and workers' rights, frequently fused with Democrats to avoid spoiling votes, securing 14 congressional seats in 1878 across states like Illinois, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, where fused tickets pooled anti-Republican support to pass local measures against banking interests. This strategy amplified labor voices, as seen in alliances with the Knights of Labor, which endorsed Greenback candidates to pressure major parties on wage protections and union recognition, though national presidential runs, such as James B. Weaver's in 1880, yielded only 3.3% without widespread fusion. The 1890s marked the apex of fusion's role in Populist politics, as the People's Party harnessed it to challenge Democratic and Republican hegemony in regions hit by farm foreclosures and railroad exploitation. Formed in 1891 from Farmers' Alliances, Populists fused locally to win governorships in states including (1892), (1892 and 1894), and (1892), where cross-nominations with Republicans or Democrats delivered majorities on platforms demanding , government ownership of utilities, and subtreasuries for farmers. In 1892, fusion arrangements in and propelled Populist-Republican coalitions to legislative control, enacting laws curbing corporate power, while James B. Weaver's presidential bid garnered 8.5% nationally amid state-level fusions that elected over 1,400 Populists to offices. North Carolina exemplified fusion's transformative potential, as Populists allied with Republicans—including Black voters alienated by Democratic poll taxes—to oust the "Redeemers" in 1894, capturing the state assembly, supreme court, and eight of nine congressional seats, alongside electing U.S. Senators Marion Butler (Populist) and Jeter Pritchard (Republican) in 1895. This coalition implemented reforms like a 6% cap, decentralized local , and increased public school funding, peaking in 1896 with Republican Daniel L. Russell's gubernatorial victory by a 52-47% margin, sustained by fused nominations that boosted turnout and policy leverage. However, internal divisions over race and silver diluted gains, paving the way for Democratic resurgence and fusion bans by 1900. Fusion's efficacy stemmed from vote aggregation without diluting third-party identities, allowing Populists to claim credit for influencing major-party platforms, as in the 1896 Democratic embrace of under , where Populist endorsement added 6.5% to his coalition in fusing states. Yet, it invited accusations of opportunism, with "antifusion" laws emerging post-1896 to preserve two-party control, curtailing the mechanism that had briefly empowered dissident coalitions against elite interests.

Decline Through Bans and Major-Party Dominance (1890s-1930s)

Following the 1896 presidential election, in which the Populist Party's fusion with Democrats amplified William Jennings Bryan's popular vote share to over 6.5 million—surpassing Republican William McKinley's 7.1 million—Republican-controlled state legislatures accelerated efforts to prohibit fusion, viewing it as a threat to their hegemony. These bans typically disallowed multiple party nominations for the same or prevented votes for a fused from counting toward minor parties' totals, effectively nullifying third-party leverage. The initial wave began with South Dakota's enactment of the nation's first explicit anti-fusion statute in 1893, which barred parties from nominating candidates already selected by another party. By 1895, four more states—Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Oregon—adopted similar prohibitions, often justified by major-party lawmakers as measures to reduce ballot confusion and streamline elections, though critics argued they primarily served to dismantle Populist coalitions that had secured governorships and legislative majorities in states like and during the early 1890s. Between 1896 and 1899, eight additional states followed, bringing the total to at least 13 with bans, as Republican dominance in post-election legislatures enabled swift passage amid fears of recurring farmer-labor alliances. In Southern states, Democratic legislatures imposed bans in the late 1890s to quash interracial fusions, such as the short-lived Populist-Republican coalitions in that elected a Fusionist in 1896 and controlled the . These measures, enacted alongside poll taxes and literacy tests, eliminated multi-party endorsements that had empowered Black voters and agrarian reformers, thereby consolidating white Democratic one-party rule and enabling Jim Crow disenfranchisement. The shift to state-printed Australian ballots, adopted nationwide by 1900 after pioneered it in 1888, provided the mechanism for enforcement by centralizing control over nominations and vote aggregation, rendering party-printed fusion ballots obsolete. By the early 1900s, over half of the 45 states had prohibited fusion, correlating with a precipitous drop in third-party vote shares—from Populists garnering 8.5% nationally in 1892 to under 1% by 1900—and the virtual extinction of independent movements like the Greenbackers and Prohibitionists as viable contenders. This entrenchment persisted through , as remaining fusions dwindled to isolated cases in states like New York, fostering a rigid two-party duopoly that marginalized labor, socialist, and regional parties despite economic upheavals like the , which saw socialist vote totals peak at just 0.9% in 1932. Major parties maintained dominance by absorbing policy demands once advanced via fusion, such as silver coinage and railroad regulation, without conceding electoral pluralism.

State-Level Statutes and Historical Bans

Electoral fusion, once a common practice in 19th-century U.S. elections, encountered systematic legislative resistance as third-party movements like the Populists leveraged it to challenge major-party dominance. Following the 1896 presidential election, where fusion between Democrats and Populists nearly secured victory for , Republican-controlled legislatures in several states moved to prohibit the practice, viewing it as a threat to their electoral . By the and 1920s, over 40 states had enacted bans, often embedding prohibitions in election codes that barred candidates from receiving nominations from multiple parties or required separate ballot lines without vote pooling. These historical bans typically manifested as statutory amendments to state election laws, criminalizing or nullifying cross-nominations and denying minor parties the ability to endorse major-party candidates effectively. For instance, codified its ban in 1922, rendering fusion nominations invalid and limiting parties to single-candidate endorsements. Similarly, widespread reforms during the Progressive Era, ostensibly aimed at curbing corruption, conveniently dismantled fusion mechanisms that had empowered agrarian and labor coalitions against urban machines and party bosses. The result was a solidification of two-party control, with states like and —former fusion strongholds—repealing permissive laws by the 1930s to prevent recurring third-party alliances. As of 2025, fusion voting persists legally in only five states: , , New York, , and , where statutes explicitly permit multiple party nominations for the same candidate, allowing votes to aggregate across lines. In , while authorized under election code provisions, the practice sees negligible use due to dominant two-party dynamics. Conversely, the remaining 45 states maintain outright bans, with recent reinforcements underscoring ongoing major-party efforts to preserve exclusivity; enacted House Bill 4919 in May 2022, explicitly prohibiting fusion to avoid diluting party designations, while passed House Bill 11 in 2011 to bar multiple nominations.
StateStatusKey Statute/Note
PermittedAllows multiple nominations; active in some local races.
Permitted (unused)Election code permits but rarely invoked.
New YorkPermitted § 6-122 authorizes cross-endorsements; historically significant.
PermittedORS 254.056 enables fusion ballots.
Permitted17 V.S.A. § 2355 allows multiple party lines.
In banned states, statutes generally stipulate that a candidate's nomination by one party precludes acceptance from another, enforced through restrictions and penalties for violations, thereby insulating major parties from third-party influence without necessitating federal intervention.

Key Supreme Court and Federal Precedents

The landmark U.S. decision on electoral fusion is Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997), which upheld the constitutionality of state bans on the practice. In that case, the Area New Party sought to nominate Andy Dawkins, a state representative already nominated by the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, for the same office under law, which prohibits candidates from appearing on the ballot for more than one (Minn. Stat. §§ 204B.06, subd. 1(b); 204B.04, subd. 2). Election officials rejected the nomination petition, prompting the New Party to challenge the anti-fusion statutes as violations of its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to political association and expression. The , in a 6-3 decision authored by , held that Minnesota's ban imposed only a modest burden on the New Party's associational , as it did not prevent endorsements, financial support, or voter mobilization for the but merely barred dual ballot listings. The majority applied a flexible balancing test rather than , reasoning that states possess broad authority to regulate elections to safeguard ballot integrity, fairness, and efficiency. Key state interests cited included preventing voter confusion from multiple party labels, avoiding the dilution or distortion of votes (such as inflated major-party totals from minor-party fusion), discouraging intraparty factionalism that could splinter cohesive governance, and preserving a stable to facilitate without excessive fragmentation. The Court concluded these interests were sufficiently compelling to justify the restriction, noting that most states historically prohibited fusion for similar reasons. Justice John Paul Stevens filed a partial concurrence and dissent, joined in part by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and David Souter, arguing that the ban severely restricted the party's ability to select and promote its preferred nominee, effectively silencing its voice on the ballot. Justice Souter dissented separately, contending that the state's asserted interests lacked empirical support and that fusion could enhance rather than undermine electoral clarity by allowing minor parties to build coalitions without spoiling major-party chances. Timmons established that anti-fusion laws face deferential review under federal constitutional standards, effectively endorsing state discretion to prohibit the practice absent evidence of severe, unjustified burdens on core political rights. Federal courts have since applied Timmons to uphold fusion bans in multiple jurisdictions, reinforcing its precedential weight. For instance, in a 2025 Third Circuit decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed New Jersey's prohibition on fusion voting, ruling that it did not unconstitutionally burden minor-party associational rights and served legitimate state goals of ballot order and voter comprehension, directly citing Timmons as controlling. Lower federal courts in states like and have similarly rejected challenges to anti-fusion statutes post-Timmons, consistently finding no violation of the First or Fourteenth Amendments where states demonstrate rational bases for avoiding perceived electoral distortions. No subsequent Supreme Court ruling has overturned or substantially limited Timmons, leaving federal precedent permissive of state-level bans on electoral fusion as of 2025.

Recent Litigation and Challenges (2000s-Present)

In the and , challenges to state bans on electoral fusion largely stalled at the federal level following the U.S. Supreme Court's 1997 decision in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, which upheld such prohibitions under the First and Fourteenth Amendments as serving legitimate state interests like ballot clarity and preventing voter confusion, without burdening associational rights excessively. Subsequent federal litigation shifted focus to related issues, such as primary systems in Clingman v. Beaver (2005), but did not revisit fusion bans directly. Instead, advocates pursued state court actions, arguing violations of state constitutional provisions on free speech, association, and equal protection, often claiming bans suppress influence without the federal deference to state regulatory authority. A prominent recent challenge arose in New Jersey, where fusion has been banned since 1911. In 2022, the Moderate Party sought to cross-nominate then-Rep. Tom Malinowski (D) for his U.S. House seat alongside the Democratic primary winner, but state law barred dual nominations. Plaintiffs in In re Tom Malinowski contended the ban infringed on voters' rights to associate with preferred parties, equal protection by disadvantaging minor parties, and free speech by limiting ballot expression of coalitions. The New Jersey Superior Court rejected the claims, and on February 26, 2025, the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the prohibition rationally advances state interests in simplifying ballots and avoiding dual-candidate confusion, without violating the state constitution's free speech or assembly clauses. Appellants petitioned the New Jersey Supreme Court for review in June 2025, emphasizing fusion's historical role in empowering third parties, though as of October 2025, no decision had issued. In , which banned fusion in 1915, a bipartisan coalition of voters and the nascent United Wisconsin party filed United Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Elections Commission on April 29, 2025, in Dane County Circuit Court. The suit alleges the ban contravenes the state constitution's guarantees of free speech, association, and equal protection by preventing minor parties from nominating major-party candidates, thus denying voters the ability to signal preferences across party lines without wasting votes. Plaintiffs seek a invalidating the prohibition, arguing it lacks historical precedent in Wisconsin's fusion-tolerant past and burdens core political rights more severely than federal standards permit. The case remains pending, with advocates highlighting fusion's potential to reduce polarization, while opponents cite administrative burdens and risks of vote dilution. Similar scattered efforts in states like , where a 2025 district court upheld the ban against minor party claims of undue restriction, underscore courts' consistent validation of anti-fusion statutes as reasonable election regulations.

Current Implementation

States Permitting Fusion Voting

As of 2023, fusion voting remains permitted in five U.S. states, though its implementation varies between full fusion—where candidates appear multiple times on the ballot under different party lines and votes are aggregated—and partial fusion, where candidates appear once with multiple party affiliations listed but votes are not disaggregated by line. These states are , , New York, , and . In the remaining 45 states and the District of Columbia, fusion is generally prohibited by statute or practice, often to prevent vote-splitting or maintain major-party dominance, with exceptions limited to certain local offices or historical allowances.
StateType of FusionKey Details
Full (disaggregated)Candidates listed separately under each nominating party; votes tallied and aggregated per line. Used by minor parties like the in state elections.
Full (disaggregated)Statutorily allowed under Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-313, but rarely utilized in practice as of 2023 due to lack of active minor-party engagement. Applies to partisan offices.
New YorkFull (disaggregated)Candidates appear on multiple ballot lines; highest vote total across lines determines winner. Extensively used, e.g., Democratic candidates often cross-nominated by , influencing outcomes like the 2018 gubernatorial race.
Partial (aggregated)Enacted via 2021 legislation (Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.056); candidate listed once with all endorsing parties noted, but single vote pool. Intended to aid minor parties without separate lines.
Partial (aggregated)Candidate appears once with multiple party labels; votes not split by affiliation. Progressive Party frequently fuses with Democrats, as in the 2022 elections where fused candidates won multiple legislative seats.
In full-fusion states like , New York, and , the disaggregated format allows voters to select a via a preferred party's line, potentially amplifying minor-party influence without risking spoiler effects, as all votes count toward the 's total. Partial-fusion states such as and prioritize ballot clarity by avoiding duplicate listings, but this limits the strategic signaling value of party lines compared to full fusion. Usage patterns show fusion most active in New York and , where it has sustained minor parties like the Working Families and Progressives, respectively, by enabling vote pooling in close races; in contrast, 's allowance has seen negligible application since the early 20th century. No significant statutory changes to these permissions have occurred as of 2025, amid ongoing litigation in states like and seeking to restore fusion but facing entrenched bans dating to the 1890s-1920s.

Patterns of Usage in Active Jurisdictions

In New York, fusion voting is most actively employed, with candidates appearing on multiple party lines and votes aggregated separately per line, enabling minor parties to deliver targeted turnout without spoiling major-party chances. The (WFP), a progressive organization founded in 1998, frequently cross-nominates Democratic candidates in state legislative, congressional, and local races, often providing the margin of victory in competitive districts. For instance, in elections as of November 2025, fusion allows WFP-line votes to count fully toward endorsed Democrats, a tactic promoted to amplify progressive support in mayoral and council contests. The Conservative Party similarly fuses with Republicans, bolstering conservative candidates in upstate and suburban areas; historical data from congressional races show minor-party lines swaying outcomes in approximately 10-15% of close contests between 1976 and 2022. This pattern reinforces ideological pulls on major parties, with WFP advocating left-leaning policies like labor protections and the Conservative Party emphasizing traditional values, though fusion's overall frequency has declined from 19th-century peaks due to major-party consolidation. Connecticut mirrors New York's full fusion model but with sparser usage, concentrated in gubernatorial, congressional, and municipal elections where minor parties like the or independents align with Democrats or Republicans. Cross-nominations occur in roughly 5-10% of competitive races analyzed from 1976 to 2022, typically adding 2-5% vote shares to major candidates and enhancing minor-party thresholds. Examples include 2022 state senate races where fusion lines from working-class or environmental groups tipped narrow Democratic victories, though the practice remains episodic compared to New York, limited by stronger two-party dominance and fewer entrenched minor organizations. Vermont utilizes partial fusion, listing candidates once with multiple party labels rather than separate lines, which facilitates alliances between the (VPP)—a left-leaning group—and Democrats in legislative and statewide races. The VPP, active since 1999, fuses in over 20% of its endorsements, securing seats for progressive policies on issues like universal healthcare; for example, in the 2024 general assembly elections, fused VPP-Democrat tickets held multiple house and senate positions, allowing the party to maintain influence despite averaging under 10% standalone votes. This approach contrasts with full fusion states by reducing ballot clutter but still enables minor parties to claim credit for wins and pressure majors leftward, with fusion evident in 15-25% of legislative races since 2000.

Empirical Effects and Case Studies

Impacts on Election Outcomes and Voter Behavior

Electoral fusion impacts election outcomes primarily by enabling minor parties to augment major-party candidates' vote totals through cross-endorsements, potentially tipping results in closely contested races without the spoiler effects associated with independent third-party runs. Historical data from the late 19th century show that fusion alliances between Populist and Democratic parties increased Democratic vote shares by 5-15% in fusion states like and during the 1892 elections, contributing to the defeat of Republican incumbents and the election of fusion-supported governors. In New York, the Liberal Party (1944-2002) provided decisive margins in multiple contests, including up to 10% of total votes in mayoral races, such as aiding John Lindsay's 1965 victory as a fusion Republican-Liberal candidate. Similarly, contemporary use by the has added 2-5% to Democratic totals in state legislative races, making outcomes more competitive or reversing apparent losses based on major-party lines alone. These added shares often accentuate winner-take-all dynamics but can shift results where margins are narrow, as minor-party lines capture voters who might otherwise abstain or defect. On voter behavior, fusion reduces incentives for by permitting individuals to select a minor-party line for a fused , ensuring their vote contributes to the overall tally while signaling ideological preferences. This mechanism mitigates the "wasted vote" , encouraging higher expression of third-party support; empirical analysis of New York congressional elections indicates that fusion-nominated receive 3-7% additional votes from minor lines, drawn from voters who prioritize policy alignment over perceived viability. A survey experiment simulating fusion found that participants reported greater in their selections (by 12% on average) and lower regret over choices, attributing this to the informational cues from multiple nominations, though 15-20% noted initial confusion from duplicate listings. Minor parties' independent campaigns under fusion further mobilize niche constituencies, fostering turnout among otherwise disengaged groups via targeted outreach, as observed in higher minor-line participation rates in fused New York races compared to non-fusion states. Overall, these effects promote greater minor-party leverage post-election, as fused candidates face pressure to align with endorsing parties' agendas to retain future support, evidenced by policy concessions from New York Democrats to priorities like hikes following strong minor-line performances in 2010-2014 cycles. However, fusion's aggregation of votes toward major parties can reinforce two-party dominance, limiting independent third-party breakthroughs despite enhanced voter expressiveness.

New York as a Primary Example

New York remains one of approximately five states where fusion voting—allowing multiple to nominate the same candidate and pool votes on separate ballot lines—continues to operate without statutory . This system has enabled minor parties such as the (WFP), which emphasizes progressive labor and economic policies, and the Conservative Party, which prioritizes traditional values and , to maintain by achieving at least 2% of the statewide vote in gubernatorial or presidential elections. These parties frequently cross-endorse major-party candidates, providing additional vote shares that can determine narrow victories while granting leverage for policy concessions. Empirical analysis of New York congressional elections from 1992 to 2012 demonstrates that fusion endorsements from minor parties boosted fused candidates' vote shares by an average of 2-5 percentage points, particularly in competitive districts, by mobilizing niche voter bases without splitting the major-party vote. For instance, in the 1994 gubernatorial race, Republican defeated incumbent Democrat by fewer than 100,000 votes (a 2% margin), with the Conservative Party line contributing over 450,000 votes—exceeding the victory margin and illustrating how fusion can tip outcomes in closely contested statewide races. Similarly, historical data from the mid-20th century show the Liberal Party delivering decisive margins for both Democratic and Republican candidates in mayoral and gubernatorial contests, such as aiding Fiorello La Guardia's 1937 reelection with supplemental progressive votes. In contemporary usage, fusion has influenced voter behavior by allowing supporters to select minor-party lines for major-party candidates, signaling ideological preferences without risking vote waste; surveys and data indicate this practice increases among minor-party identifiers by 3-7% through targeted and the informational cue of multiple listings. The WFP's endorsements, for example, have pressured Democratic nominees to adopt platform commitments on issues like paid family leave and hikes, as seen in its support for Bill de Blasio's 2013 New York City mayoral win, where the WFP line garnered about 4% of votes and correlated with subsequent policy shifts toward expanded . This dynamic fosters intra-party competition, with minor-party vote hauls post-election serving as bargaining chips; however, it can also entrench major-party dominance by absorbing dissident votes, occasionally widening margins in safe districts rather than fostering new challengers. Overall, case studies from New York reveal fusion's causal role in enhancing minor-party viability and policy influence—evidenced by sustained for ideologically distinct groups—while empirical models control for confounders like incumbency and show net positive effects on electoral competitiveness in 20-30% of fused races, though critics note potential for conservative bias in historical applications favoring Republican-leaning endorsements.

Evidence from Other States and Historical Instances

In the late 19th century, electoral fusion enabled coalitions between the People's Party (Populists) and Democrats to challenge Republican dominance in Midwestern states, yielding electoral victories and policy reforms. In Nebraska, fusion arrangements between Populists and Democrats resulted in the election of fusion candidate J.H. Powers as governor in 1890, followed by another fusion success in 1892 under Lorenzo Crounse, with the alliance securing control of the legislature by 1891. This control facilitated the establishment of a state railroad commission in 1893 to regulate rates and the adoption of the Australian secret ballot in 1893, aimed at curbing electoral fraud. Similarly, in Kansas, Populist-Democratic fusion tickets elected Lorenzo D. Lewelling as governor in 1892, enabling legislative majorities that pursued monetary reforms, including support for free silver coinage and taxation adjustments targeting railroads and corporations. These outcomes demonstrated fusion's capacity to aggregate third-party votes with major-party lines, amplifying influence without fragmenting support. Fusion's role extended to other regions, where it fostered unlikely alliances and held the balance of power in legislatures. In , a bi-racial fusion between white Populists and Black Republicans captured the governorship in 1896 under Daniel L. Russell and majorities in both legislative houses in 1894, leading to expanded public education funding and challenges to Democratic machine control before the coalition's overthrow amid 1898 election violence and subsequent anti-fusion laws. Across non-Southern states from 1874 to 1892, minor parties via fusion achieved vote shares of 20% or more in over half of gubernatorial races, often tipping outcomes and prompting Republican-led bans on the practice by the early 1900s to preserve two-party stability. In contemporary states beyond New York, fusion has sustained minor-party leverage in close races and policy negotiations. Connecticut's , qualifying via 1% vote thresholds, has fused with Democratic candidates, contributing to the 2011 passage of a paid sick leave law after making endorsements contingent on legislative support; in U.S. Senate races, fusion lines from minor parties accounted for 20% of the winning Democrat's vote share in 1992 and 26% in 1994. Analysis of congressional races from 1976 to 2022 shows fusion associated with 1.6 to 2.8 percentage point increases in turnout, alongside minor parties adding 2% to 7% to major-party totals, enhancing competitiveness without consistent spoiler effects. In , the Progressive Party routinely fuses with Democrats, as seen in David Zuckerman's elections, where third-party lines boost mobilization and provide ideological signaling to voters, though empirical data on outcomes remains sparser than in . South Carolina permits fusion for select offices, with 14 congressional candidates utilizing it from 1976 to 2022, occasionally influencing legislative races by consolidating conservative or independent support. These instances indicate fusion's potential to integrate minor-party voters into major coalitions, yielding modest empirical gains in participation and policy concessions.

Policy Debates

Arguments Favoring Restoration

Proponents argue that restoring fusion voting would enable minor parties to exert influence without the spoiler dilemma that discourages voter support under current single-nomination rules, as evidenced by historical instances where fused nominations allowed third parties to contribute decisive vote shares to major-party candidates. In New York, the Working Families Party's cross-endorsements of Democratic candidates have added 3-5% of total votes in key races, such as the 2018 gubernatorial election where fusion lines helped secure progressive policy concessions without splitting the vote. This mechanism permits voters aligned with niche issues—like or —to bolster viable candidates while tallying support for the endorsing party, fostering long-term organizational growth rather than marginalization. Empirical analyses indicate that fusion strengthens third-party sustainability by converting potential protest votes into bargaining leverage, countering Duverger's Law's tendency toward two-party dominance in winner-take-all systems. For instance, pre-ban fusion in the late enabled the People's Party to fuse with Democrats in several states, amplifying agrarian voices and altering platforms without electoral waste, a pattern replicated in modern New York where minor-party endorsements have shifted candidate positions on issues like hikes. Unlike pure third-party runs, which often yield under 5% nationally and dissipate resources, fusion allows parties to build —through get-out-the-vote efforts and —while their vote totals influence nominations and primaries. Restoration advocates contend that fusion promotes electoral moderation by incentivizing cross-ideological coalitions, potentially mitigating polarization as moderate or issue-specific parties attract voters disillusioned with major-party extremes. Surveys show over 60% of favor a third , yet fusion's absence perpetuates vote-splitting fears; in active jurisdictions, it has correlated with higher minor-party and policy responsiveness, as seen in New York's Liberal Party era (1940s-1970s), where fused votes exceeded 10% in mayoral races, pressuring both parties toward centrist reforms. This contrasts with non-fusion states, where third-party votes rarely exceed 2% and fail to translate into leverage, suggesting causal links between fusion availability and reduced two-party entrenchment. Critics of the 1890s-1910s bans, often tied to major-party efforts to consolidate power via Australian ballot reforms, highlight how fusion's stifled competitive pluralism; reinstating it could restore voter agency by providing ballot-line options that signal preferences without nullifying impact, as demonstrated by increased turnout among minor-party identifiers in fusion-permissive elections.

Arguments Against Fusion

Opponents of electoral fusion argue that it undermines the stability of the by enabling minor parties to exert disproportionate influence through strategic coalitions, as evidenced by the widespread state-level bans enacted in the late 1890s. Following the 1896 presidential election, in which the Populist Party's fusion with Democrats nearly defeated Republican , Republican-controlled legislatures in over 20 states passed "anti-fusion" laws to prohibit multiple nominations for the same candidate, motivated by the desire to neutralize third-party threats that could siphon votes or form cross-party alliances against major-party dominance. These measures were justified as necessary to preserve clear partisan lines and prevent electoral chaos, with historical analyses noting that fusion had allowed insurgent movements like the Populists to amplify their impact beyond their core support. A primary concern is voter arising from ballots listing the same candidate under multiple party lines, which can overwhelm voters and obscure candidate affiliations. Election law expert Jerry Goldfeder has highlighted how this multiplicity leads to ballot fatigue and misinformed choices, particularly in states like New York where candidates appear repeatedly, complicating straightforward decision-making. While some studies find no systematic evidence of heightened compared to standard ballots, defenders of bans, such as New Jersey officials, maintain that it risks diluting voter intent by encouraging selections based on party labels rather than candidate merit. Fusion is also criticized for fostering corruption and patronage networks, as minor parties can trade endorsements for political favors, jobs, or campaign support without bearing full electoral accountability. In New York, State Sen. Diane Savino has contended that it allows minor parties to "hijack" major-party candidates, pulling them toward ideological extremes and weakening moderate voices within dominant parties. Suffolk County Executive Steve Bellone attributed the corruption scandal involving former District Attorney Tom Spota to fusion, arguing that votes from minor-party lines shielded him from scrutiny, as voters lacked a direct mechanism to reject his conduct through the primary party responsible for his nomination across three cycles. Similarly, Democratic leader Jay Jacobs has claimed it erodes major-party cohesion by fragmenting loyalty and enabling undue leverage by fringe groups. Additionally, fusion facilitates potential manipulation, such as major-party actors creating sham minor-party nominations to confuse opponents or votes, a risk cited in legal defenses of bans. New Jersey appellate arguments emphasized this, noting scenarios where a major-party could field a under a minor-party line to dilute rival support, thereby distorting competitive outcomes. Critics further argue that it reduces party , as fused may prioritize the endorsing minor party's demands over broader constituencies, leading to policy distortions without corresponding voter mandates. These concerns collectively portray fusion as a mechanism that, while empowering smaller entities, introduces inefficiencies and risks to and systemic predictability.

Broader Implications for Two-Party Stability

Electoral fusion mitigates the spoiler effect inherent in , allowing minor parties to endorse major-party candidates and aggregate votes toward shared ideological goals, which theoretically weakens the psychological incentives of that discourage support for non-viable parties and perpetuate two-party dominance. In jurisdictions permitting fusion, such as New York, minor parties have sustained organizational viability by cross-nominating Democratic candidates in over 80% of instances from 2000 to 2020, enabling them to secure automatic through vote thresholds (e.g., 50,000 votes statewide) while influencing policy without fragmenting the left-leaning vote. This dynamic has increased minor-party vote shares—reaching 10-15% of total ballots in some cycles—but primarily bolsters the endorsed , as fused candidacies yield net gains for Democrats, with fusion lines contributing an average of 5-7% additional votes per election. Historically, fusion facilitated third-party leverage during the , as seen in Populist-Democratic alliances that propelled candidates like in the 1896 presidential election, where fused tickets captured 46.7% of the popular vote and pressured major parties on agrarian reforms. The subsequent bans on fusion in 40 states by 1900, often enacted by state legislatures controlled by the two majors, correlated with the decline of national third-party viability, reducing their presidential vote share from highs of 20% in the to under 5% post-1912, thereby entrenching bipolar competition. Empirical analyses indicate that fusion's restoration could revive such influence without inducing systemic instability, as evidenced by stable two-party outcomes in New York and since the 1990s, where minor-party fusions have not produced coalition governments but have heightened intra-party competition on issues like . Broader evidence suggests fusion promotes conditional multipartism, where minor parties act as ideological factions allied with majors, enhancing voter expression and policy responsiveness—such as the Working Families Party's role in advancing hikes in New York from $7.25 to $15 by 2019—while preserving the two-party core by discouraging independent third-party runs that risk spoilers. Critics argue this absorption effect limits true destabilization, as minor parties rarely fuse across the major-party divide, with cross-ideological fusions comprising fewer than 5% of cases in active states, potentially reinforcing partisan polarization rather than fostering centrist alternatives. Nonetheless, fusion's allowance for vote pooling aligns with causal mechanisms that sustain minor-party survival rates 2-3 times higher in permitting states compared to nationwide averages, offering a pathway to incremental erosion of two-party rigidity without requiring overhaul.

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