Hubbry Logo
Great UnityGreat UnityMain
Open search
Great Unity
Community hub
Great Unity
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Contribute something
Great Unity
Great Unity
Great Unity
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

Great Unity
Chinese name
Chinese大同
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu Pinyindàtóng
Bopomofoㄉㄚˋㄊㄨㄥˊ
Wade–Gilesta4t'ung2
Tongyong Pinyindàtóng
Wu
Romanizationda去 don平
Hakka
Romanizationtai55 tung11
Yue: Cantonese
Jyutpingdaai6 tung4
Southern Min
Hokkien POJtāi-tông
Vietnamese name
Vietnamese alphabetĐại đồng
Hán-Nôm大同
Korean name
Hangul대동
Hanja大同
Transcriptions
Revised Romanizationdaedong
McCune–Reischauertaedong
Japanese name
Kanji大同
Kanaだいどう
Transcriptions
Revised Hepburndaidō

The Great Unity (Chinese: 大同; pinyin: dàtóng) is a Chinese vision of the world explicitly based on the past period of "three dynasties"[1] as understood by the Confucian tradition. In this ideal historical model, everyone and everything was at peace and this model must be restored. It is found in classical Chinese philosophy as a model based on the past but beginning with Kang Youwei (1858 – 1927) it was often combined with utopian ideas.[2]

History

[edit]

Confucius said: “When the Great Way prevailed, it was shared by the whole world. (天下為公) The men of worth and ability were chosen; trust was spoken and harmony cultivated. Therefore people did not cherish only their own parents, nor nurture only their own children. The aged were able to complete their years, the strong had employment, the young were able to grow, and the widowed, the orphaned, the solitary, the childless, the disabled, and the sick were all provided for. Men had their proper roles, women their proper homes. Goods were disliked if they lay wasted upon the ground, yet it was not necessary that they be stored for one’s own use; strength was disliked if it were not exerted, yet it was not necessary that it be exerted for oneself alone. Hence schemes were shut away and did not arise; theft, robbery, and disorder did not occur. Therefore outer doors were left open and not closed. This was called the ‘Great Unity’ (Datong).” — Confucius, Book of Rites (Liji), “Liyun”[3]

The notion of the "Great Unity" appeared in the "Lǐyùn" (禮運) chapter of the Book of Rites, one of the Confucian Chinese classics.[4][5] According to it, the society in Great Unity was ruled by the public, where the people elected men of virtue and ability to administer, and valued trust and amity. People did not only love their own parents and children, but others as well. People also secured the living of the elderly until their ends, let the adults be of use to the society, and helped the young grow. Those who were widowed, orphaned, childless, handicapped and diseased were all taken care of. Men took their responsibilities and women had their homes. People disliked seeing resources being wasted but did not seek to possess them; they wanted to exert their strength but did not do it for their own benefit. Therefore, selfish thoughts were dismissed, people refrained from stealing and robbery, and the outer doors remained open.[6]

The concept was used by Kang Youwei in his visionary utopian treatise, The Book of Great Unity (Chinese: 大同書).[7]

The Great Unity is also often mentioned in the writings of Sun Yat-sen and is included in his lyrics of the National Anthem of the Republic of China, currently in official use in Taiwan.

This ideology can be reflected in the following examples, each from a national anthem of the Republic of China:

The concept was invoked in prominent occasions several times by Mao Zedong, including in his address On the People's Democratic Dictatorship in 1949, as the Communist Party prepared to assume control throughout mainland China.[8]

Religion And Great Unity

[edit]

The "World Harmony Launch Ceremony," themed "Religious Harmony and World Peace," was solemnly held at the Guanyin Temple in Pingzhen District, Taoyuan City.[9]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Bibliography

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Great Unity

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Great Unity (Chinese: 大同; : dàtóng), known as , constitutes an ancient Chinese philosophical ideal of a utopian society, as delineated in the "Liyun" chapter of the Confucian classic (Book of Rites), where the world functions as a shared under virtuous , free from private , social strife, and hierarchies, with universal provision for human needs ensuring harmony among all under heaven (). This vision posits leaders selected for moral excellence and competence, rather than or force, fostering a state in which the elderly are sustained until their natural end, able adults engage in appropriate labor, children receive nurturing , and the vulnerable—including orphans, widows, the disabled, and the diseased—receive comprehensive care without exception. Resources circulate freely without , motivated by communal welfare over self-interest, resulting in an absence of , , or conflict, such that doors need not be locked at night. Contrasting with the more modest "Small Tranquility" (xiaokang), which accepts regulated inequalities, the Great Unity represents an apex of moral and social evolution, though unrealized in historical practice and subject to diverse interpretations ranging from nostalgic retrospection to progressive . Throughout Chinese , it has profoundly shaped utopian thought, notably elaborated by late Qing reformer in his Datongshu (Book of the Great Unity), which envisions global federation, abolition of nations and families, and technological advancement toward perpetual and equality. While inspiring nationalist and socialist movements—including influences on and —the concept's radical communalism has sparked debates over feasibility, with critics highlighting potential erosions of individual incentives and empirical failures in approximating such ideals.

Origins and Textual Foundations

The Liji Passage and Early Context

The primary textual foundation for the concept of Great Unity (datong) appears in the "Liyun" (Evolution of Rites) chapter of the Liji (Book of Rites), a Confucian compilation assembled during the Western Han dynasty (206 BCE–9 CE) from materials originating in the late Warring States period (c. 475–221 BCE). The passage depicts an idealized state where the Great Way (da dao) prevails, rendering the world a shared commonwealth: "Men were righteous... Goods were abandoned without anyone's guarding them... This was called the Great Unity." In this vision, private accumulation ceased, doors remained unlocked, and social relations emphasized universal care—providing for the elderly until death, employment for the able-bodied, nurture for the young, and compassion for the vulnerable—without distinction based on kinship ties. Selection for roles occurred by ability rather than birth, contrasting sharply with the era's feudal hierarchies and interstate conflicts. This portrayal emerged amid the Warring States turmoil, marked by incessant warfare among seven major states and the breakdown of Zhou dynasty authority, which displaced millions and eroded traditional social bonds. The Liji passage posits Great Unity as an aspirational counterpoint to "small prosperity" (xiaokang), a lesser condition of kinship-centered stability where families guarded private interests, rituals reinforced lineage loyalties, and rulers prioritized statecraft over universal equity. Unlike the modest harmony of family and clan units that sustained partial order, Great Unity envisioned a transcendence of such divisions, with public goods serving all under Heaven (tianxia) through moral cultivation rather than coercive rule. The Liji's authorship remains uncertain, attributed to disciples of Confucius and later Ruist scholars like Dai De and Dai Sheng, whose versions were edited under imperial patronage in the Han era, but its core texts reflect pre-Qin oral and written traditions without a single authorial voice. As such, the Great Unity description functions primarily as a normative moral archetype—evoking a primordial harmony lost to historical decline—rather than a prescriptive governmental plan, emphasizing ethical transformation over institutional mechanisms.

Philosophical Core

Defining Features of the Ideal Society

In the Liji's Li Yun chapter, the Great Unity () emerges under the prevalence of the Grand Course, where a public and common spirit governs all under heaven, transcending private interests. Governance emphasizes the selection of individuals based on talents, , and ability, with sincere words and cultivated as foundational norms. This meritocratic approach ensures roles align with capability, fostering a without favoritism tied to lineage or self-advancement. Social provisions form a comprehensive safety net, securing competent care for the aged until , for the able-bodied, and support for the young to reach maturity. Compassion extends universally to widows, orphans, childless individuals, and those disabled by , guaranteeing their maintenance without regard to . Labor divisions respect sex-based roles, with males assigned to fieldwork and females to domestic duties, while resources are preserved collectively—valuables not discarded wastefully nor hoarded selfishly, and physical efforts directed toward communal benefit rather than personal gain. Such structures imply constrained , as goods circulate based on need and ability in a system of global sharing. The resulting harmony eliminates scheming, robbery, filching, and , rendering locks obsolete and outer doors perpetually open as symbols of trust. Absent these threats, aggressive warfare and internal strife vanish, marking the Grand Union as a pinnacle of structural . This utopian design contrasts sharply with the "Small Tranquility" (Xiaokang), a lesser state of familial , partial affections, and self-interested accumulation that breeds conflict and necessitates fortifications. thus elevates beyond kin-centric priorities to a higher, impartial ethical order.

Relation to Confucian Ethics and Tianxia

The concept of Great Unity, or , forms an integral part of Confucian cosmology, particularly through its alignment with ("All Under Heaven"), which envisions a hierarchical yet inclusive civilizational order transcending discrete political states or boundaries. In this framework, tianxia represents a moral universe governed by Heaven's mandate (tianming), where unity emerges from the cultivation of virtue rather than enforced uniformity, positioning datong as the apex of harmonious integration among peoples, nature, and the cosmos. Confucian thinkers viewed tianxia not as a static empire but as a dynamic ethical domain where rulers and subjects alike participate in a shared moral fabric, with datong embodying the realization of this order through widespread benevolence (ren). Central to this relation is the Confucian ethical emphasis on ren (benevolence or humaneness) and li (ritual propriety), which underpin the transition to as a society of spontaneous accord. Ren fosters universal empathy and moral extension from self to family, community, and ultimately , while li structures social interactions to align with cosmic patterns, ensuring hierarchy serves harmony rather than domination. In , these virtues achieve full expression, obviating the need for coercive institutions like or familial exclusivity, as individuals internalize moral norms leading to voluntary ; this contrasts with mere political consolidation by positing ethical transformation as the causal mechanism for unity. The ideal of sage-kings' rule exemplifies this ethical foundation, with figures like Yao and Shun serving as historical archetypes whose virtuous governance prefigured datong's conditions. Yao, reigning circa 2350–2250 BCE in traditional chronology, and Shun, his successor around 2250–2200 BCE, are depicted in Confucian lore as rulers who prioritized over force, yielding eras of flood control, agricultural prosperity, and through personal exemplarity. Their abdication to merit rather than kinship—Shun selected for his filial piety and administrative acumen—illustrates a meritocratic aligned with tianxia's imperatives, where sagehood cultivates collective , fostering proto-datong stability without the artifices of later dynastic coercion. These anecdotes ground datong empirically in accounts of virtuous precedents, underscoring Confucianism's causal realism: moral leadership generates organic unity, as evidenced by the sages' attributed achievements in harmonizing diverse clans under ethical rites.

Historical Interpretations

Ancient and Imperial Era Views

In the (206 BCE–220 CE), the concept of Great Unity () from the Liji was occasionally invoked in cosmological and political discourse to legitimize imperial centralization, particularly under Emperor Wu (r. 141–87 BCE). (c. 179–104 BCE), a key Confucian advisor, reinterpreted feudal structures as administrative extensions of the central authority, aligning them with the "Great Unity" paradigm to emphasize cosmic harmony under a unified rule rather than decentralized enfeoffment. This framing subordinated the ideal to practical unification efforts, portraying it as a heavenly mandate for the emperor's expansive policies, including territorial conquests and economic monopolies like salt and iron. References to Great Unity remained sparse through the (618–907 CE), often serving as rhetorical flourishes in historiographical texts to idealize reunification after periods of division, such as the post-Sui chaos or the (755–763 CE). Emperors like Taizong (r. 626–649 CE) emphasized administrative consolidation and merit-based bureaucracy over utopian visions, treating as an aspirational echo of rather than a blueprint for social overhaul. The concept's abstract nature limited its role amid pragmatic governance focused on fiscal stability and border defense, with no evidence of systematic policy implementation tied to its egalitarian elements. During the Song (960–1279 CE) and Ming (1368–1644 CE) dynasties, Neo-Confucian scholars recast Great Unity as an extension of personal moral cultivation (xiushen) to societal harmony, prioritizing inner sagehood over literal institutional reform. Thinkers like (1130–1200 CE) integrated it into a metaphysical framework where li (principle) governed human relations, viewing datong as achievable through ethical self-perfection rather than coercive state action. This inward focus reflected a subordination to Mencian realism, which acknowledged human goodness but insisted on institutional checks like kingship and ritual to curb self-interest, rendering the ideal secondary to maintaining dynastic order amid threats like Mongol invasions or influence. Practical applications were thus confined to moral exhortations in imperial edicts, not transformative programs, as evidenced by the enduring emphasis on examinations rooted in Mencius's hierarchical ethics over datong's communalism.

Late Qing and Republican Developments

In the wake of the (1839–1842 and 1856–1860) and the (1850–1864), which exposed the Qing dynasty's vulnerabilities to internal unrest and foreign incursions, Confucian scholars began reviving the ideal as a vision of moral and social renewal to counter perceived dynastic decay and Western aggression. Wang Tao (1828–1897), a mid-19th-century reformer, advocated integrating Western learning (yong) with Confucian essence (ti) to achieve universal peace (taiping), positioning as the ultimate outcome of such synthesis amid efforts like the (1861–1895), which emphasized practical reforms but often overlooked deeper ethical critiques of . Similarly, Taiping leader (1814–1864) fused with egalitarian principles, including communal property and , framing it as a corrective to Qing elitism and imperial disunity, though his movement's violent utopianism highlighted tensions between harmony and coercive implementation. During the Republican period (1912–1949), interpretations shifted toward activist agendas linking to national consolidation and institutional reform, critiquing factionalism as a deviation from Confucian unity while incorporating global influences like . (1873–1929), a key intellectual, invoked in advocating a to foster moral regeneration and curb warlord divisions, arguing in 1901 that such ideals aligned with socialist undertones for societal harmony against persistent foreign threats and internal strife. He emphasized tensions between 's emphasis on collective welfare and the factional incentives that undermined unity, as seen in his support for parliamentary structures to balance imperial legacy with modern governance. Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), founder of the Republic, integrated into his (nationalism, democracy, livelihood), portraying it in 1924 lectures as Confucius's aspirational world of unity to mobilize against and achieve egalitarian progress, though implementation faltered amid civil wars and ideological splits up to 1949. These developments marked a transition from passive imperial to pragmatic reformism, rooting in critiques of corruption as barriers to harmony while adapting it to republican experiments, yet revealing persistent challenges in reconciling abstract ideals with political realities.

Modern Political Applications

Kang Youwei's Utopian Expansion

(1858–1927), a leading intellectual and reformer during the late , transformed the ancient Confucian ideal of Great Unity () into an explicitly utopian vision in his Datong Shu (Book of the Great Unity), which he drafted primarily between 1901 and 1902 while in exile in following the failure of the . This manuscript, circulated privately among disciples before its partial serialization in 1918 and full posthumous publication in 1935, marked a departure from interpretive restraint toward a progressive, globalist blueprint for . Kang posited as the culmination of historical stages, progressing from primordial chaos through family- and state-centered societies to a borderless world order achieved via moral cultivation, technological innovation, and institutional dissolution. Central to Kang's framework was the synthesis of Confucian ethics—emphasizing universal benevolence (ren) and harmony—with socialist principles, including the abolition of , hereditary families, and sovereign nations. He advocated communal child-rearing in public nurseries, eugenic measures to enhance human stock through and medicine, and a global administration under elected "world presidents" sustained by automated production, eliminating scarcity and conflict. This vision drew direct inspiration from Bellamy's (1888), whose Chinese translation in 1891–1892 shaped Kang's teleological model of societal advancement toward stateless equity, adapting Bellamy's industrial to Confucian while extending it to racial amalgamation and perpetual . Kang first integrated datong advocacy into practical politics during the (June 11–September 21, 1898), memorializing Emperor Guangxu to enact sweeping modernizations—such as abolishing classical exam systems, promoting Western science, and fostering national unity—as steps toward Confucian . However, contemporaries, including reform skeptics within the Qing court, dismissed these proposals as detached from imperial power realities, with the coup led by on September 21, 1898, exposing Kang's underestimation of entrenched bureaucratic and military incentives against rapid change. Later analyses have echoed this, critiquing Kang's utopianism for presupposing elite benevolence and over empirical barriers like factional rivalries and resource constraints that historically thwarted similar idealistic reforms.

Usage in PRC Ideology Under Xi Jinping

Under , the concept of Great Unity (Datong) has been selectively incorporated into (PRC) ideology as a civilizational framework for domestic consolidation and international influence, drawing on Confucian roots to complement Marxist-Leninist principles while prioritizing national rejuvenation. This revival contrasts with the era, where class struggle dominated ideological discourse, rendering harmonious ideals like secondary to revolutionary antagonism, as Mao emphasized continuous class conflict even under to prevent capitalist restoration. shifted focus toward pragmatic national unity to underpin economic reforms, promoting ideological discipline and development to achieve modernization, though without explicit invocation of Datong as a utopian endpoint. Xi's usage gained prominence in the 19th National Congress report on October 18, 2017, where he advocated building a "community with a shared future for mankind," a phrase echoing 's vision of universal under a benevolent order, positioned as 's contribution to amid multipolarity. Official interpretations frame this as rooted in ancient ideals of "great unity under Heaven" (), fusing Confucian ethics with to project as the vanguard of a post-hegemonic world order. Domestically, informs "Chinese nation-building" efforts, with Xi stressing in September 2024 speeches that ethnic unity across 56 groups forms a "big family" sharing spiritual home and patriotic consciousness, as evidenced by national commendations for model ethnic initiatives. In foreign policy, Great Unity underpins the (BRI), launched in 2013, as a mechanism for mutual prosperity leading to shared destiny, with over 150 participating countries by 2023 linked through infrastructure investments exceeding $1 trillion, portrayed as realizing Datong's borderless harmony. Policies in regions like and are officially depicted as advancing this unity through integration—such as deradicalization programs in affecting over 1 million since 2017 to foster ethnic cohesion, and the 2020 Law in to restore stability post-protests—yielding reported reductions in and . However, international reports from organizations like document these as involving mass detention, surveillance, and suppression of dissent, raising questions about coercive underpinnings despite PRC claims of voluntary harmony-building. This tension highlights Datong's deployment as ideological justification for centralized control, with empirical outcomes measured in state metrics of stability rather than independent assessments of consent.

Realist Critiques and Empirical Challenges

Inherent Tensions with Human Incentives

The vision of Great Unity presupposes a society where is abolished and resources are held in common, with individuals motivated by universal virtue rather than personal gain. This arrangement conflicts with observable human incentives rooted in , as individuals tend to undercontribute to collective efforts when personal rewards are absent, leading to the where benefits are enjoyed without proportional input. Economic analysis further reveals that eliminating rights removes the incentives for , maintenance, and , as owners bear the full costs and risks of their efforts while gains are diffused across the group. In such systems, the emerges, where shared resources face overuse and depletion because no single actor internalizes the full consequences of exploitation. Empirical patterns from communal setups demonstrate reduced productivity compared to market-based economies, where property aligns with societal output, fostering sustained production through personal stakes. Communal experiments provide evidence of these disincentives in practice, as free-riding erodes discipline over time, with participants exerting minimal effort while relying on others' contributions. For instance, Israeli kibbutzim, voluntary collectives emphasizing shared labor and property, experienced declining membership and economic viability, prompting widespread by the and as younger generations rejected equalized outcomes lacking individual rewards. By 2006, only about 2% of Israel's population lived in fully kibbutzim, with most adopting differential wages and private holdings to restore and , underscoring how enforced equality undermines the drive for excellence and risk-taking inherent in . These outcomes align with broader economic observations that collectivist structures without personal incentives yield stagnation, contrasting with prosperity in systems where , channeled through , drives resource stewardship and growth. Philosophically, Great Unity's dependence on innate benevolence clashes with realist traditions skeptical of unchecked , as power concentrated in moral rulers invites absent institutional constraints. Legalist thinkers in ancient critiqued Confucian reliance on alone, arguing that inclines toward and , necessitating rigorous laws, administrative techniques, and coercive power to prevent decay into tyranny or disorder. Without such mechanisms to counter rulers' potential self-aggrandizement or subjects' shirking, the absence of divided creates a vulnerability where benevolent intentions erode under the causal pressures of ambition and frailty, as historical power dynamics illustrate that unmoored from incentives devolves into arbitrary rule. This tension highlights a core mismatch: utopian collectivism presumes aligned incentives through , yet causal realities of human agency demand safeguards against the very flaws it seeks to transcend.

Lessons from Historical Attempts at Implementation

Efforts to realize Datong-inspired visions of societal harmony in China have historically encountered severe practical obstacles, often devolving into coercion and disorder despite initial egalitarian aspirations. The Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864), led by Hong Xiuquan, sought an egalitarian "Heavenly Kingdom" with communal land distribution and gender equality measures, drawing on millenarian ideals akin to unified harmony rhetoric, yet it resulted in an estimated 20–30 million deaths amid protracted civil war and internal purges. Similarly, echoes of Kang Youwei's Datong Shu (published posthumously in 1935 but circulated earlier) influenced early 20th-century Chinese anarchists, such as those in the 1910s–1920s Guangzhou communes, who experimented with stateless mutual aid societies aiming for classless unity; these initiatives fragmented amid factional violence and suppression by warlords and nationalists, yielding no sustainable model. In the , the (1958–1962) exemplified centralized mandates for collective unity overriding decentralized agricultural knowledge, as communes enforced uniform production quotas and resource pooling under Mao Zedong's vision of rapid egalitarian transformation, paralleling Datong's abolition of . This policy triggered widespread , with demographic analyses estimating 23–45 million excess deaths from starvation and related causes, corroborated by archival data on inflated grain reports and exaggerated yields. The campaign's failure stemmed from falsified local reporting to align with national unity directives, disrupting causal chains of food production and distribution. Under since 2012, invocations of "" and national rejuvenation have drawn on Datong-like themes of harmonious unity, achieving GDP growth averaging 6–7% annually through 2019 via state-directed and tech sectors, yet fostering rising urban-rural inequality with Gini coefficients hovering at 0.46 in recent years. Suppression of dissent, including and internment of over 1 million in since 2017, has maintained short-term political stability but exacerbated social fractures, as evidenced by declining birth rates (1.09 per woman in 2022) and capital outflows amid enforcement rigidities. These outcomes highlight enforced unity's capacity for aggregate economic advances but vulnerability to brittleness when ignoring granular incentives and feedback mechanisms.

Comparative Perspectives

Contrasts with Western Liberal Ideals

The vision of , articulated in the Liji as a stage of universal harmony under sage governance, subordinates agency to the welfare, envisioning the abolition of , nuclear families, and stratified classes to foster selfless cooperation. This holistic approach contrasts sharply with Lockean , which posits to life, liberty, and property as pre-political endowments that precede and constrain any arrangement, with legitimacy resting on explicit to protect these entitlements rather than to engineer societal unity. In Datong, authority flows from moral benevolence without mechanisms for revocation or dissent, enabling paternalistic interventions that prioritize order over personal freedoms, whereas Locke's theory embeds limits on power through veto and if rulers infringe core liberties. Datong shares superficial echoes with Marxist collectivism in rejecting bourgeois for communal ends, yet diverges from the empirical realism of capitalist systems, where decentralized market —such as profit motives and —have demonstrably accelerated innovation and growth. Post-World War II recoveries illustrate this: Western economies like West Germany's, leveraging competitive markets and private enterprise, achieved average annual GDP growth of 8% from 1950 to 1960 via the "" driven by currency reform and export , outstripping the Soviet bloc's centralized planning, which averaged 5-6% growth but suffered from misallocation and shortages due to top-down directives overriding local knowledge. Such outcomes underscore how Datong-like mandates for enforced harmony falter against structures that reward individual initiative, as moral exhortations alone prove insufficient to align dispersed economic actors without coercive . While Datong's emphasis on relational harmony offers potential insights for mitigating liberalism's atomistic excesses—such as through community-oriented policies—its outright dismissal of competitive harbors risks of stagnation, evident in imperial China's cyclical dynastic patterns of innovation followed by technological inertia, unlike Europe's during the , where secure property rights and fragmented polities spurred mechanization and sustained per capita income gains from 1500 onward. Pre-modern , despite early leads in inventions like and , stagnated under centralized bureaucracies that prioritized stability over disruptive , contrasting with Europe's competitive states, where rivalry and legal protections for inventors fostered cumulative advancements by 1800. This historical highlights the trade-off: Datong's order may curb conflict but at the cost of the dynamism that decentralized freedoms unlock, rendering hybrid adaptations challenging without diluting its anti-competitive core.

Influence on Global Visions of Harmony

Chinese diplomatic efforts under Xi Jinping have promoted concepts rooted in the traditional ideal of datong (Great Unity)—envisioning a harmonious world order—through the framework of a "community with a shared future for mankind," first articulated in foreign policy contexts around 2013 and emphasized in United Nations addresses starting in 2015. This rhetoric integrates Confucian notions of universal harmony with contemporary multilateralism, positioning China as a proponent of global cooperation beyond zero-sum competition. However, critics argue it masks Sinocentric ambitions, prioritizing Chinese leadership in a hierarchical order rather than equal partnership, as evidenced by the emphasis on "Chinese wisdom" guiding international relations. In academic discourse, 's extension into (all-under-heaven) theory has sparked debates contrasting it with Westphalian , which emphasizes discrete, equal nation-states. Proponents, including Chinese scholars, portray as a universal, inclusive alternative fostering relational harmony over rigid borders, potentially applicable beyond . Opponents counter that its revival imposes cultural hierarchies, undermining sovereign autonomy by subordinating peripheral states to a central (implicitly Chinese) authority, as seen in hybrid applications where selectively invokes rhetoric while adhering to Westphalian norms for territorial claims. Empirically, the (BRI), launched in 2013, serves as a practical conduit for these visions, with over 150 countries signing agreements by October 2023 to enhance connectivity and mutual development as steps toward shared prosperity. Yet, implementation has faced resistance, exemplified by 's 2017 99-year lease of Hambantota Port to a Chinese firm amid $1.1 billion in , which fueled concerns and accusations of economic despite ongoing operations under local oversight. Such episodes highlight limits to -inspired unity, as recipient nations grapple with debt sustainability—China holding about 10-20% of in cases like —and resultant pushback, including project renegotiations in and . This suggests that while narratives gain traction in developing regions, structural incentives for constrain broader adoption of hierarchical models.

References

  1. https://journals.uni-lj.si/as/article/view/7014
  2. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228278268_The_Concept_of_%27Datong%27_in_Chinese_Philosophy_as_an_Expression_of_the_Idea_of_the_Common_Good
  3. http://www.chinaknowledge.de/Literature/Diverse/datongshu.html
  4. https://www.chinaknowledge.de/Literature/Classics/liji.html
  5. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313120535_Yearning_for_the_Lost_Paradise_The_Great_Unity_datong_and_Its_Philosophical_Interpretations
  6. https://www.academia.edu/96850960/The_Concept_of_Datong_in_Chinese_Philosophy_as_an_Expression_of_the_Idea_of_the_Common_Good
  7. https://open.library.ubc.ca/cIRcle/collections/ubccommunityandpartnerspublicati/52387/items/1.0404466
  8. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/early-china/article/new-light-on-the-li-ji-the-li-ji-and-the-related-warring-states-period-guodian-bamboo-manuscripts/90F3CB3265150D20F2871F34CA5A3F2D
  9. https://ctext.org/liji/li-yun
  10. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2059436417725213
  11. https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.14318/hau2.1.015
  12. https://deepchina.substack.com/p/the-voice-of-nishan-what-is-the-tianxia
  13. https://hub.hku.hk/bitstream/10722/143448/2/Content.pdf
  14. https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/14/8/1036
  15. https://www.encyclopedia.com/environment/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/yao-and-shun
  16. https://factsanddetails.com/china/cat2/sub1/entry-5386.html
  17. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/early-china/article/yao-shun-and-prefiguration-the-origins-and-ideology-of-the-han-imperial-genealogy/439C088D30B64A6F2281CDC1E0C58AE0
  18. https://brill.com/display/book/9789004468221/BP000013.xml
  19. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249577923_%27The_one_that_pervades_the_all%27_in_ancient_Chinese_political_thought_The_origins_of_%27The_Great_Unity%27_paradigm
  20. https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/721453
  21. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4528850
  22. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/song-ming-confucianism/
  23. https://iep.utm.edu/mencius/
  24. https://insidestory.org.au/a-chinese-constitutionalist-and-the-state-of-the-nation/
  25. https://libmonster.com/m/articles/view/KANG-Yu-WEI-S-WORK-THE-BOOK-OF-GREAT-UNITY-A-HISTORY-OF-RESEARCH
  26. https://globalpoliticaltheoryproject.pages.wm.edu/2022/05/17/kang-youwei/
  27. https://ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/jsd/article/view/48145
  28. https://www.academia.edu/124771104/Edward_Bellamy_and_Kang_Youwei_s_Utopian_Society_Comparative_Analyses
  29. https://www.teachingaboutasia.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/wong-1992-kang-youwei-and-reform-movement-of-1898_0.pdf
  30. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d736/46334f52f1f4a769ab484a4e69961407c8b9.pdf
  31. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2158775
  32. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/deng-xiaoping/1985/102.htm
  33. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm
  34. https://www.e-ir.info/2024/09/09/deciphering-xi-jinpings-community-of-shared-future-for-mankind/
  35. https://www.economist.com/china/2023/11/02/xi-jinping-is-trying-to-fuse-the-ideologies-of-marx-and-confucius
  36. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202409/25/content_WS66f3a54fc6d0868f4e8eb3fd.html
  37. https://en.qstheory.cn/2025-09/30/c_1129977.htm
  38. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative
  39. http://english.scio.gov.cn/m/topnews/2023-10/29/content_116781298.htm
  40. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-rider/
  41. https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/05/property-rights-and-the-tragedy-of-the-commons/257549/
  42. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tragedy-of-the-commons.asp
  43. https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.1101933108
  44. https://www.hoover.org/research/two-failures
  45. https://volokh.com/2007/09/07/israeli-kibbutzim-and-the-failure-of-socialism/
  46. https://china-journal.org/2016/05/07/law-in-imperial-china-confucianism-legalism/
  47. https://www.ibiblio.org/chinesehistory/contents/03pol/c03s02.html
  48. https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/peter-zarrow-anarchism-and-chinese-political-culture
  49. https://journals.uni-lj.si/as/article/view/7015
  50. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC1127087/
  51. https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/chinas-great-leap-forward/
  52. https://www.prcleader.org/post/xi-jinping-s-mixed-economic-record
  53. https://www.rieti.go.jp/en/special/policy-update/115.html
  54. https://merics.org/en/2-xis-policies-serve-strategic-national-goals-beyond-growth
  55. https://www.jri.co.jp/en/MediaLibrary/file/english/periodical/rim/2022/83.pdf
  56. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/
  57. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11712-009-9136-7
  58. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1957955
  59. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/great-divergence-modernity-china-onset-industrial-revolution
  60. https://www.aei.org/economics/why-didnt-china-have-an-industrial-revolution-before-europe-did/
  61. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/market-disintegration-pre-cursor-great-divergence
  62. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202501/t20250127_11546599.html
  63. http://english.scio.gov.cn/topnews/2020-09/21/content_76724089.htm
  64. https://www.ciis.org.cn/english/COMMENTARIES/202103/t20210304_7792.html
  65. https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/2022-09/pr-21-02877-7-chinas-strategic-vision-part-three-envisioning-a-sinocentric-world.pdf
  66. https://www.allazimuth.com/2021/07/17/tianxia-all-under-heaven-an-alternative-system-or-a-rose-by-another-name/
  67. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/global-constitutionalism/article/traditional-empiremodern-state-hybridity-chinese-tianxia-and-westphalian-anarchy1/379C92432B4AE3C04119C23D6DBD725D
  68. https://behorizon.org/us-china-relations-adrift-between-conflict-and-tianxia/
  69. https://chinapower.csis.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative/
  70. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2021/06/05/questioning-the-debt-trap-diplomacy-rhetoric-surrounding-hambantota-port/
  71. https://www.cfr.org/blog/rise-and-fall-bri
  72. https://thediplomat.com/2024/10/debt-or-diplomacy-inside-chinas-controversial-loans-to-sri-lanka-laos-and-malaysia/
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
Contribute something
User Avatar
No comments yet.