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Hazimism, also referred to as the Hazimi movement or known as the Hazimiyyah[1] or Hazimi current,[2] is an extremist movement within the ideology of Islamic State. The movement was derived from the doctrines of the Saudi-born Muslim scholar Ahmad ibn Umar al-Hazimi, which was adopted by many Tunisian recruits within ISIS.

Hazimis believe that those who do not unconditionally excommunicate (takfir) unbelievers are themselves unbelievers, which opponents argue leads to an unending chain of takfir.[3][1] Its spread within ISIS triggered prolonged ideological conflict within the group, pitting its followers against the moderate faction led by Turki al-Binali.[2] It has been described as "ultra-extreme" and "even more extreme than ISIS".[3][1] The movement was eventually branded as extremist by ISIS, who initiated a crackdown on its followers.

Due to al-Hazimi's reluctance to directly comment on the subject of politics, there exist varying beliefs among the Hazimi movement, leading some to argue that it does not present itself as a unique manhaj.[4] Hazimis spans from direct Salafi-jihadist elements currently aligned with Boko Haram and formerly associated with ISIS,[5] to those hesitating to explicitly criticise the Saudi monarchy. Hazimis regard participation in the democratic system or process as grounds for takfir and a nullifier of Islam, considering it equivalent to prostration to an idol.

Beliefs

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Contemporary Salafi-Jihadi movements base their beliefs on the teachings of theologians such as Ibn Taymiyyah and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. However, al-Hazimi asserted that the doctrines put forward by contemporary Salafi-jihadi thinkers were not to be blindly followed, challenging the consensual authority of Ibn Taymiyyah. This outlook would completely shake the ideological foundations of the Salafi-jihadi movement. Hazimi's doctrines were also highly influenced by the doctrines of the Egyptian militant Islamist ideologue Sayyid Qutb.[6]

Central to Hazimism is the doctrine of takfir al-'adhir ("excommunication of the excuser"). In his treatise Nullifiers of Islam, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab writes that those who do not excommunicate (takfir) unbelievers are themselves, unbelievers, whether that is because they doubt their disbelief (kufr) or otherwise. Hazimism differs from mainline Wahabbism by rejecting the concept of al-'udhr bi'l-jahl ("excusing on the basis of ignorance"), which asserts that those who doubt the disbelief of a disbeliever due to their own ignorance are not disbelievers. This concept is considered by jihadis to be a restraint on excessive takfir.[7]

To justify their claims, various Hazimi ideologues assert that Ibn Taymiyyah was against the principle of al-'udhr bi'l-jahl in affairs of shirk (polytheism).[8] Al-Hazimi categorically rejects al-'udhr bi'l-jahl for actions he considers to be of "greater polytheism" (al-shirk al-akbar) and "greater disbelief" (al-kufr al-akbar), such as voting in elections and supplicating to the dead. Al-Hazimi states that those who refuse to pronounce takfir on the performers of such actions on the basis of al-'udhr bi'l-jahl are themselves unbelievers.[9]

History

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Al-Hazimi in Tunisia

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Between December 2011 and May 2012, al-Hazimi delivered four lectures in Tunisia. He was supported by the Islamic Good Society and Hay al-Khadra' Mosques Committee. While the members of the former were arrested for financing terrorism, the latter had maintained links to Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST). With the aid of the committee, al-Hazimi founded the Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani Institute for Sharia Sciences, which promoted his teachings. His views were also amplified through AST's Facebook page.[3]

Hazimism in ISIS

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In the following years, several Tunisians who adopted al-Hazimi's views joined ISIS. During the group's conflict with the al-Nusra Front, the Tunisians remained loyal and were rewarded with senior administrative and religious posts. With increasing influence, however, their belief in takfir al-'adhir (excommunication of the excuser) became a source of concern for ISIS leadership.[3] Bahraini scholar Turki al-Binali, who led the group's Office of Research and Studies, prepared a series of lectures and pamphlets against the doctrine. He argued that while al-'udhr bi'l-jahl was invalid in instances of greater polytheism and disbelief, this does not necessarily mean that those who make excuses are disbelievers. In a tweet, he also described the belief as bidʻah (religious innovation). The Binalis, as they were later termed, also claimed the Hazimi view led to an "infinite regress of takfir" (al-takfir bi'l-tasalsul).[2]

In March 2014, audio leaked of several high-level Hazimi officials, including the wāli of Hasakah, pronouncing takfir on the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. A separate leak showed takfir being made on Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.[3] In late 2014, 50 Hazimis fled to Turkey while 70 were imprisoned and executed by ISIS after they made takfir on elements of its leadership which did not consider Ayman al-Zawahiri to be a disbeliever.[10] Following their arrest, a pro-Hazimi statement surfaced describing ISIS as a state of disbelievers and Jahmites.[11] Several Hazimi cells were formed afterwards; the breakup of one in Raqqa being featured in Dabiq where they were branded as Kharijites.[10] Despite the crackdown, several groups of Hazimis remained, including one led by a certain Abu Ayyub al-Tunisi and supported by the wāli (governor) of Aleppo.[3][12] In 2016, Hazimis fought against ISIS in the vicinity of Al-Bab and Jarabulus. Abu Muath al-Jazairi, a senior Hazimi, called ISIS the "Idols' State" and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi the "taghut" of Syria in his account of the incident.[11]

In a statement published in Al-Naba in April 2017, ISIS' Central Office for Overseeing the Sharia Departments banned the discussion of al-'udhr bi'l-jahl and takfir al-'adhir, but warned that hesitation in takfir was inexcusable.[2] On 17 May 2017, ISIS' Delegated Committee issued a memorandum which condemned al-takfir bi'l-tasalsul but stated that takfir was from the "foundations of the religion", rebuking those who hesitate in making it and branding them as Murji'ites.[13] Shortly afterwards, al-Binali published a response to the memorandum and claimed its intent was to placate the Hazimis. On May 31, al-Binali was killed in a CJTF–OIR airstrike, followed by two other scholars who supported him. The timing was seen as suspicious by the Binalis, who accused the Delegated Committee of leaking their locations.[13] In September 2017, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi reportedly dismissed and detained several Hazimis, reshuffling the Delegated Committee.[2][14]

In 2019, Hazimi foreign fighters, including a large contingent of Tunisians, failed a two-day coup attempt against al-Baghdadi. ISIS alleged they were led by Abu Muath al-Jazairi and placed a bounty on him.[14][15]

Post-ISIS

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In 2017, it was estimated there were about a hundred Hazimis in the Netherlands.[1]

References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Hazimism

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Hazimism, also known as the Hazimi movement or al-Hazimiyya, is an ultra-extremist interpretation of Salafi doctrine centered on the unconditional () of all non-Muslims and Muslims who fail to declare against unbelievers, dismissing ignorance or doubt as valid excuses for (shirk). Originating from the teachings of Saudi Salafi scholar , who argued that is not restricted to qualified scholars but can be proclaimed by any believer, the ideology promotes a cascading or "chain" whereby hesitation to excommunicate leads to one's own . This stance positions Hazimism as more radical than mainstream Salafism, which often defers to authorities and maintains loyalty to rulers regardless of perceived deviations, and even diverges from the Islamic State's (ISIS) approach by deeming its leadership insufficiently absolute in applying . The movement emerged prominently within ISIS territories in Syria and Iraq around 2014, during the group's rapid expansion, as foreign fighters and local adherents disseminated al-Hazimi's lectures and writings, which critiqued leniency toward Muslim societies' lapses in monotheism. Al-Hazimi himself, a relatively obscure figure prior to his influence on jihadi circles, faced imprisonment in Saudi Arabia for his views but never aligned explicitly with ISIS, though his ideas fueled factionalism that pitted Hazimis against ISIS's official ulama like Turki al-Binali. Key controversies arose from this internal rift, including a 2017 ISIS memorandum elevating takfir as a core tenet—later retracted amid backlash—and a failed 2018 coup attempt by Hazimi leaders, resulting in assassinations, defections, and territorial command purges that eroded the group's cohesion even as it lost physical caliphate holdings. Despite its marginal status, Hazimism's emphasis on doctrinal purity over pragmatic governance highlighted vulnerabilities in ISIS's ideological framework, contributing to fragmentation that outlasted battlefield defeats and influencing splinter networks in Europe and beyond. Its defining characteristic remains an unrelenting focus on takfir as the litmus test of faith, rejecting intermediate categories like "excusable ignorance" that temper takfir in broader Salafi traditions, thereby fostering perpetual conflict within and against perceived apostate Muslim entities.

Origins and Founder

Ahmad al-Hazimi's Background and Early Influences

, a Saudi Arabian Salafi scholar, developed his distinctive interpretations of (the of Muslims deemed apostates) within the context of Saudi religious circles, where Wahhabi doctrines emphasizing () and strict adherence to prophetic traditions predominate. Al-Hazimi's teachings reject the traditional Salafi allowance for the "excuse of ignorance" ('udhr al-jahl), positing that failure to declare unbelievers as apostates renders the hesitator himself an unbeliever—a position known as takfir al-mu'adhir ( of the excuser). This stance diverges from mainstream Salafi quietism, drawing instead on selective literalist readings of medieval scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah, though al-Hazimi extends them to unconditional without evidentiary hurdles like establishing proof (hujjah). Al-Hazimi's early dissemination occurred through lectures and online content, including his YouTube channel where he expounded on core Salafi texts and grammar (nahw), reflecting a foundational education in Islamic sciences typical of Saudi clerical training. Not aligned with jihadist groups himself, he gained traction among radicals after delivering sermons in Tunisia shortly after the 2011 revolution, targeting post-uprising Salafi audiences receptive to anti-establishment rhetoric. These sessions emphasized immediate takfir obligations, influencing Tunisian recruits who later carried Hazimi ideas to Syrian battlefields. His non-jihadist profile—focused on doctrinal purity over armed struggle—contrasts with predecessors like the 1970s Takfir wal-Hijra group, yet echoes their extremism in broadening apostasy criteria beyond overt disbelief.

Development of Hazimi Teachings in Saudi Arabia and Tunisia

Ahmad ibn Umar al-Hazimi, the originator of Hazimi teachings, was born in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, where he pursued a bachelor's degree in Islamic studies at Umm al-Qura University, specializing in Quran and Sunna. He further studied under Ethiopian scholar Muhammad Ali Adam at Dar al-Hadith and served as imam at the Badr Grand Mosque in Mecca's Al-Zahir neighborhood. Al-Hazimi's core doctrines, centered on a stringent interpretation of takfir that rejected excuses like ignorance for failing to adhere to monotheism's nullifiers, emerged through his lectures on aqidah, fiqh, and tafsir within Saudi Salafi circles. These views, disseminated via his website (alhazme.net) and YouTube channel, attracted a following among segments of Saudi Salafis despite official disapproval, though they remained marginal until broader jihadi adoption. The teachings gained significant traction in following al-Hazimi's visit from December 2011 to May 2012, during which he delivered four lecture series co-sponsored by the Hay al-Khadra’ Mosques Committee and the Islamic Good Society. These sessions emphasized works like Nawaqid al-Islam, advocating without mitigating factors such as jahl (ignorance), and were promoted online by Ansar al-Shari'a Tunisia (AST) through its platforms. In March 2012, al-Hazimi co-founded the Ibn Abu Zayd al-Qayrawani Institute for Sciences in Hay al-Khadra’, an institution dedicated to advancing his creedal positions amid post-revolutionary Salafi activism. Tunisian figures, including AST sharia committee member Abu Ja‘far al-Hatab, internalized these ideas, applying them to declare on fellow jihadis and contributing to ultra-extremist tendencies among Tunisian foreign fighters. Al-Hazimi's arrest by Saudi authorities on April 28, 2015, curtailed his direct influence in , where he has remained detained without public trial details. In , the doctrines persisted through recordings and adherents, fueling ideological rigidity post-2013 AST crackdown, though suppressed by state measures against Salafi networks.

Core Beliefs and Theology

Strict Interpretation of Takfir

Hazimism advocates a rigid application of takfir, the declaration of a Muslim as an apostate (kafir), predicated on the immediate and unqualified judgment of disbelief upon commission of major kufr (disbelief) or shirk (polytheism), without allowances for mitigating circumstances such as ignorance. This stance derives from Saudi Salafi scholar Ahmad ibn Umar al-Hazimi's teachings, disseminated through lectures emphasizing the nawaqid al-Islam (nullifiers of Islam), where failure to recognize and act on evident kufr—such as allegiance to non-Islamic governance or veneration of graves—renders the perpetrator an immediate apostate. Al-Hazimi's doctrine explicitly repudiates hujjat al-jahl (the excuse of ignorance), asserting that accessible Islamic knowledge in the modern era precludes claims of unawareness as a defense against takfir. Central to this interpretation is takfir al-ʿādhir, the excommunication of those who excuse (yuʿadhir) others' kufr through appeals to ignorance or incomplete evidence, thereby propagating a cascading chain of mutual takfir. Under this framework, not only the initial offender but also scholars, rulers, and ordinary Muslims who withhold takfir from polytheists or apostates become liable for excommunication themselves, as inaction equates to complicity in disbelief. This contrasts sharply with broader Salafi-jihadi positions, including those of the (ISIS), which typically require prior daʿwa (invitation to truth) and verification of obstinacy before takfir, aiming to preserve communal unity for governance. Hazimi adherents view such restraint as a dilution of divine command, prioritizing doctrinal purity over pragmatic alliances. Al-Hazimi's lectures, particularly those delivered in Tunisia between 2011 and 2012 under the auspices of groups like Ansar al-Sharia, codified this approach by framing takfir as an obligatory, foundational act akin to the shahada (declaration of faith), applicable even to self-proclaimed mujahideen who tolerate un-takfirid apostasy. This extremism manifested in demands for swift violence against declared apostates, bypassing extended repentance periods and extending takfir to entire societies for systemic failures, such as democratic participation or loyalty to taghut (tyrannical rulers). Within ISIS, this led to internal purges, as Hazimi-influenced factions—often Tunisian fighters—deemed even caliphate officials insufficiently rigorous, sparking ideological clashes by 2014.

Rejection of the Excuse of Ignorance

A central tenet of Hazimism is the outright rejection of al-udhr bi'l-jahl (excusing on the basis of ) in matters of for major kufr or shirk, positing that any individual committing such acts—such as associating partners with or denying core tenets of —is an apostate regardless of their awareness of the prohibition. al-Hazimi argued that the innate human obligation to affirm precludes as a valid defense, drawing on interpretations of Quranic verses like Surah al-Nisa 4:165, which emphasize clear conveyance of the message without excusing subsequent disbelief. This position extends to viewing those who grant the excuse of , including established Salafi scholars, as themselves guilty of kufr for doubting the clarity of divine proofs. Al-Hazimi's lectures, particularly those disseminated online around 2013–2014, framed this doctrine as a return to unadulterated Salafi methodology, criticizing leniency toward "jahili" populations in Muslim-majority societies as a dilution of jihadist purity. He contended that modern contexts, saturated with accessible Islamic knowledge via media and efforts, render genuine ignorance implausible for adults, thus mandating immediate without probationary repentance or clarification. Followers applied this to broaden beyond rulers and military personnel to encompass ordinary civilians participating in democratic processes or allied with perceived apostate regimes, accelerating internal debates on combatant legitimacy. This rejection starkly contrasts with mainstream Salafi rulings, such as Shaykh Muhammad ibn Salih al-Uthaymin's allowance for excusing major shirk in cases of verifiable ignorance due to absent or corrupted dawah, as outlined in his fatwas emphasizing contextual evidence before takfir. Hazimi proponents countered such views as innovations (bid'ah), insisting that scriptural hudud (boundaries) for disbelief operate independently of subjective factors like education or scholarly misguidance. The doctrine's rigor fueled Hazimi adoption among Syrian jihadists circa 2013, yet precipitated clashes within ISIS by 2015, as it undermined operational pragmatism in conquering and governing territories with non-compliant populations.

Broader Doctrinal Positions on Jihad and Governance

Hazimism posits that is obligatory against Muslim rulers and societies deemed apostate through its stringent application of , rejecting any leniency based on ignorance of core Islamic tenets such as . Ahmad al-Hazimi's doctrine holds that ignorance does not excuse shirk or failure to affirm the oneness of , thereby mandating —and consequent —against those who persist in such errors without sufficient pursuit of knowledge. This extends to takfir al-'adhir, or the of those who excuse ignorance in others, creating a doctrinal escalation that justifies offensive not only against external enemies but also against insufficiently rigorous Muslim factions. In practice, this view fueled Hazimi adherents' initial alignment with the Islamic State's jihadist campaigns from 2013 onward, admiring its literalist approach while critiquing its restraint in application. However, al-Hazimi's emphasis that "everyone can proclaim " democratized , leading followers to declare against even ISIS leadership for failing to fully excommunicate rivals like , whom Hazimis labeled infidels for doctrinal deviations. This chain —where hesitation to invites itself—positioned as a purifying mechanism against internal impurities, resulting in intra-ISIS conflicts, including executions of Hazimi figures like Abu Umar al-Kuwaiti in 2014. Regarding governance, Hazimism deems all contemporary Muslim states illegitimate due to the apostasy of their rulers, who are takfired for upholding un-Islamic systems and failing to enforce strict . Al-Hazimi's rejection of ignorance as a "legitimate " implies that must be predicated on universal accountability to revealed truths, invalidating partial implementations or excuses for non-adherence. While some Hazimis provisionally endorsed the Islamic State's under as a step toward proper rule, others rejected it outright as apostate for permitting excused ignorance among converts and hesitating on comprehensive , fracturing the movement into pro-ISIS loyalists, defectors, and outright opponents by 2016. This stance prioritizes doctrinal purity over pragmatic , viewing any tolerating "excusers" as a form of shirk warranting overthrow.

Historical Spread and Adoption

Transmission to Syrian Jihadi Groups

al-Hazimi's teachings began disseminating to Syrian jihadi groups primarily through foreign fighters who had encountered his lectures in between 2011 and 2012, following the Arab Spring uprisings that facilitated Salafi proselytization there. Al-Hazimi, a Saudi Salafi scholar emphasizing unqualified without excuse of ignorance, addressed audiences affiliated with Ansar al-Sharia in (AST), a group that mobilized thousands toward in and . These lectures, disseminated via audio recordings and informal networks, resonated with AST members who viewed mainstream Muslim societies as apostate, prompting an exodus of approximately 6,000-7,000 to by mid-2013. Upon arrival in starting in late 2012, Tunisian recruits initially integrated into various factions, including Jabhat al-Nusra and the in Iraq and the (ISIL, precursor to ), carrying al-Hazimi's doctrine of immediate for monotheists failing basic creed tests. Key transmitters included figures like Abu Ja'far al-Hattab, a Tunisian who served on AST's committee and later joined ISIL's structures in , advocating ultra-strict that challenged the group's more pragmatic leadership. Another was Abu Musab al-Tunisi, who held positions in province under ISIL by 2014, using propaganda and internal debates to propagate rejection of "excuse of ignorance" (udhr bil-jahl), influencing mid-level commanders and fighters frustrated with ISIL's selective policies. The doctrine's appeal grew amid ISIL's territorial expansion in from 2013 onward, as Tunisian fighters—comprising up to 10% of ISIL's foreign contingent—filled roles in religious police, courts, and training camps, embedding Hazimi views through sermons and fatwas. By early 2014, Hazimi ideas had permeated ISIL's Syrian wilayats (provinces), particularly in and , where they justified broader of rival jihadis and even ISIL's own hesitant scholars, though initially tolerated as a fringe interpretation rather than official policy. This transmission occurred via personal networks, shared media from al-Hazimi's recordings, and debates in ISIL's delegated committees, contrasting with al-Qaeda-affiliated groups' rejection of such . Limited evidence suggests minor uptake in non-ISIL Syrian factions like , but primary adoption was within ISIL due to its openness to foreign doctrinal imports during rapid growth.

Integration and Initial Acceptance in ISIS (2013–2015)

Hazimism entered through Tunisian foreign fighters, who formed one of the largest contingents of recruits during the group's expansion into beginning in 2013. These fighters, many of whom had studied Salafi doctrines in prior to the Arab Spring, encountered al-Hazimi's audio lectures emphasizing unconditional , which circulated widely among jihadi networks despite his imprisonment in since 2011. By mid-2013, as consolidated control over and surrounding areas, Tunisian recruits propagated these ideas among mid-level religious cadres and combat units, appealing to those seeking a more rigorous application of against perceived insufficiently puritanical Muslims. The doctrine found initial acceptance within because it reinforced the organization's existing ultra-takfiri orientation, which already rejected the "excuse of ignorance" (udhr al-jahl) for lapses in monotheistic practice—a position al-Hazimi absolutized by deeming non-takfiris themselves apostates. This alignment allowed Hazimi ideas to permeate training camps and committees without immediate opposition from leadership, as they bolstered ideological fervor amid rapid territorial gains, including the June 2014 capture of . Tunisian commanders, leveraging their numerical presence—estimated at over 3,000 by late 2014—integrated elements of Hazimism into local enforcement of punishments and internal policing, viewing it as a tool for maintaining doctrinal purity against rival factions like . By 2015, as formalized its structures, Hazimi adherents occupied positions in the Diwan al-Hisba (morality police) and religious oversight roles, where the doctrine's emphasis on broad justified purges of suspected "munafiqun" (hypocrites) within the ranks. Leadership under tolerated this factional growth initially, as it did not yet challenge core authority and aligned with the group's strategy of against other Sunnis, evidenced by fatwas against Sahwat tribes and apostate regimes. However, subtle tensions emerged in late 2015 over the scope of application, with some Hazimis questioning the loyalty of Iraqi-origin veterans who prioritized organizational over immediate of all non-adherents. This period marked the peak of informal acceptance, with no documented executions or official repudiations until the following year.

Conflicts and Suppression

Ideological Clashes within ISIS

The ideological clashes within ISIS over Hazimism centered on divergent interpretations of takfir, particularly the rejection of the "excuse of ignorance" (ʿudhr al-jahl), which Hazimis deemed invalid, insisting that disbelief in core Islamic tenets warranted excommunication regardless of awareness or exposure to proper daʿwa (propagation). This stance promoted "chain takfir" (takfir mutasalsil), whereby failure to excommunicate others sufficiently rendered one liable for takfir themselves, contrasting sharply with ISIS's official doctrine, which permitted the excuse for new converts, remote populations, or those inadequately reached by outreach to preserve operational cohesion and recruitment. Hazimi adherents, drawing from Ahmad al-Hazimi's teachings such as in his work emphasizing that ignorance offers no exemption in Islam, accused ISIS rank-and-file and leaders of hypocrisy for tolerating insufficiently puritanical practices. Prominent ISIS theologian Turki al-Binali, a key opponent, authored rebuttals defending conditional to counter what he viewed as destabilizing , arguing that blanket rejection of ignorance excused contradicted pragmatic governance and risked alienating supporters. These disputes emerged prominently around 2014 amid ISIS's territorial expansion in , as Hazimi ideas proliferated among foreign fighters, particularly , who formed a significant cadre pushing for broader internal purges. Clashes manifested in heated debates disseminated via internal forums, audio messages, and writings, with Hazimis infiltrating the hisba () to independently enforce stricter rulings, such as punishing members for minor infractions like using non-ISIS flags or participating in nasheeds deemed innovative. Specific flashpoints included accusations against leaders for decisions like permitting operations or overlooking local ' use of pre-ISIS courts, which Hazimis labeled as infidelity warranting execution. Figures like Abu Umar al-Kuwaiti exemplified the rift by publicly declaring portions of the leadership infidel for tolerating Sufi graves or insufficient application, prompting counter-accusations of factionalism from Binali-aligned scholars. By mid-2015, these tensions escalated into autonomous , with Hazimis forming cells that bypassed central authority, foreshadowing broader fragmentation as the group's ideologues prioritized doctrinal purity over unity.

Purges and Executions of Hazimis (2016–2017)

Following the ideological clashes that emerged in prior years, the (ISIS) leadership under escalated purges against Hazimi adherents in 2016, targeting those who applied takfir (excommunication as infidels) to the caliphate's rulers and rank-and-file members for failing to fully reject the "excuse of ignorance" in matters of creed. Hazimis, predominantly foreign fighters from and former Soviet states, viewed ISIS practices such as suicide bombings, celebratory nasheeds (Islamic songs), and visible Muslim identifiers (e.g., beards or marks) as innovations warranting condemnation of the group's as apostates, prompting a "chain takfir" doctrine that deemed even non-Hazimi ISIS members infidels for tolerating such deviations. The crackdown involved widespread arrests in strongholds like , , and , , where security organs such as the Emni (internal security) conducted interrogations to identify dissenters, often using loyalty tests like refusing ritually impure food (e.g., chicken from non-halal sources) or probing views on al-Hazimi's teachings. Suspected Hazimis faced public confessions in propaganda videos before execution by beheading, shooting, or immersion, with the group releasing footage of Azerbaijani and other foreign fighters admitting to ultra-takfiri views prior to their deaths. Notable cases included the execution of Abu Umar al-Kuwaiti, a senior figure accused of declaring the leadership infidel. Estimates indicate ISIS arrested and executed thousands of such ultra-radicals during this period, contributing to internal paranoia and weakening cohesion as territorial defeats in (July 2017) and (October 2017) compounded the losses. Surviving Hazimis attempted flight toward the Turkish border or went underground, but the purges effectively marginalized the faction, with leadership framing them as khawarij (extremist secessionists) to justify the violence and reassert doctrinal uniformity. This suppression reflected ISIS's prioritization of organizational survival over ideological purity, though it exacerbated recruitment shortfalls among foreign contingents sympathetic to al-Hazimi's views.

Factors Leading to Marginalization

The Hazimi doctrine's uncompromising stance on , particularly its rejection of as a mitigating factor and endorsement of "chain " (where excusing unbelief itself warrants excommunication), posed a direct to ISIS leadership stability by enabling accusations against mid-level commanders and potentially senior figures like . This risked fracturing the group's command structure, as adherents began labeling fellow ISIS members as apostates for perceived leniency, fostering paranoia and defections amid ongoing territorial losses in and from 2016 onward. ISIS authorities, drawing on historical Salafi critiques of Kharijite , branded Hazimis as khawarij—hyper-extremists whose purism undermined operational unity—prompting systematic suppression to preserve hierarchical authority and combat effectiveness. During the critical period of military setbacks, including the Battles of (October 2016–July 2017) and (June–October 2017), Hazimi agitation exacerbated internal divisions, diverting resources from frontline defenses to internal policing and eroding morale among diverse foreign fighter contingents, many of whom rejected the movement's absolutism. On May 15, 2017, leadership formally retracted a prior memorandum accommodating Hazimi views and disbanded the Delegated Committee amid reshuffles to neutralize theological dissent, signaling a strategic pivot toward pragmatic cohesion over doctrinal purity. The faction's growth among Tunisian and Russian-speaking recruits, while initially tolerated for recruitment value, ultimately alienated mainstream elements, leading to widespread arrests and executions that decimated its ranks by late 2017. A failed coup attempt against al-Baghdadi in late 2018 near , —allegedly involving Hazimi figures like Abu Muath al-Jazairi—crystallized the movement's existential threat, accelerating its isolation as survivors fled to or went underground, rendering Hazimism a marginalized splinter incompatible with ISIS's post-territorial survival strategy. This suppression reflected broader jihadi : while Hazimi ideas appealed to ideological zealots, their application eroded the alliances and discipline essential for sustaining networks amid external pressures from coalition forces. By prioritizing survival over ultra-orthodoxy, ISIS effectively contained the ideology, limiting its influence to fringe online echoes rather than organizational revival.

Criticisms and Viewpoints

Critiques from Mainstream Salafi Scholars

Mainstream Salafi scholars, adhering to the established methodology of figures like Ibn Bāz and al-Albānī, have condemned Hazimism for its wholesale rejection of the ʿudhr bi-l-jahl (excuse due to ignorance), arguing that this principle is rooted in the practices of the al-Ṣāliḥ, who required the establishment of proof (tathbīt al-ḥujjah) before declaring takfīr on individuals or groups for creed-related errors. They contend that al-Ḥazimī's approach negates this foundational condition, permitting indiscriminate of Muslims who have not received clear daʿwah, thereby fostering fitnah and division akin to the Khawārij's hasty judgments. For instance, scholars emphasize that Ibn Taymiyyah and Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb conditioned takfīr upon negation of ignorance only after proof is established, a nuance al-Ḥazimī discards, leading to his views being labeled as extremist deviations (ghulūw). Shaykh Rabīʿ ibn Hādī al-Madkhalī, a prominent Salafi authority, has refuted al-Ḥazimī's positions as part of broader warnings against innovators who promote unchecked takfīr, associating such ideas with ḥaddādī (exaggerating) and khawārij tendencies that undermine scholarly consensus on caution in . Similarly, Shaykh ʿAlī al-Ḥalabī and others have critiqued al-Ḥazimī for misrepresenting Salafi texts to justify mass takfīr, arguing that his denial of as an excuse contradicts explicit statements from early scholars like Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, who excused lay from full accountability for unclarified doubts. These refutations portray Hazimism not as authentic Salafism but as a fringe innovation that isolates its adherents and invites for sowing discord. Shaykh Aḥmad Bāzmūl and Shaykh ʿAbdullāh al-Bukhārī have explicitly warned against al-Ḥazimī's doctrines, describing them as "wicked Takfīrī, Khārjī, and ḥaddādī" innovations that deviate from the balanced Salafi approach to and judgment. They argue that al-Ḥazimī's emphasis on the "third nullifier of " (denial of core beliefs without excuse) ignores contextual evidences from the Companions' era, where was often mitigated by lack of access to , as evidenced in ḥadīth narrations requiring before condemnation. This underscores a systemic concern among mainstream Salafis: Hazimism's rigorism erodes communal unity (waḥdah), prioritizing theoretical purity over practical tarbiyah, and has been linked to al-Ḥazimī's imprisonment in in 2001 for promoting such views, reflecting the kingdom's Salafi establishment's rejection.

Rejections by Al-Qaeda and Other Jihadi Factions

Al-Qaeda leadership, including , rejected extreme methodologies akin to Hazimism, emphasizing restraint in to preserve jihadist unity and avoid alienating potential allies. In his , 2013, message "General Guidelines for Jihad," al-Zawahiri advocated proselytization () toward "deviant sects" such as Shia rather than immediate collective and violence, arguing that excessive declarations of unbelief foster division and undermine the broader struggle against non-Muslims. Usama bin Laden similarly prohibited among ranks to prevent internal strife, requiring extremists to undergo training before such rulings, a policy reflecting 's strategic prioritization of cohesion over puritanical rigor. Affiliates like Jabhat al-Nusra (later Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) echoed this opposition, with supporters in 2014 accusing figures promoting Hazimi-style unconditional —such as executed militant Abu Jafar al-Hattab—of emulating the Algerian GIA's 1996 , which justified mass killings of Muslims and eroded public support for . This critique highlighted Hazimism's potential to provoke endless infighting by nullifying excuses like ignorance ('udhr bil jahl) for non-adherence to strict doctrine, contrasting Al-Qaeda's approach of conditional based on evidence of willful rejection. Salafi scholars aligned with or influential in circles, such as Sheikh Ali al-Khudayr, directly targeted Hazimi interpretations in March 2016, disputing their expansive reading of the "third nullifier of "—the to deem unbelievers as such—as overly simplistic and prone to abuse, drawing on precedents from Saudi authorities like former bin Baz to argue for evidentiary hurdles in . Other jihadi factions, including those in 's orbit, viewed Hazimism as akin to Kharijite heresy, a label applied to broadly for similar reasons, as seen in their April 2020 documentary "Absolved Before Your Lord," which condemned puritanical excommunications that prioritize intra-Muslim purges over external enemies. These rejections stemmed from both theological concerns over methodological extremism and pragmatic fears of operational fragmentation, as Hazimism's mandate for without qualification eroded recruitment and alliances essential to sustained .

Defenses and Internal Justifications by Hazimis

Hazimis justified their ideology primarily through Ahmad al-Hazimi's teachings, which emphasized that ignorance (jahl) does not excuse acts of shirk (polytheism) or other nullifiers of Islam, mandating immediate and universal takfir without mitigation. They argued that the third nullifier of Islam—denying or mocking any aspect of the faith, including excusing polytheists—applies strictly to all Muslims aware of core doctrines, rejecting ISIS's allowance for gradualist approaches or excuses based on widespread deviation in the ummah. This stance was defended as a return to unadulterated Salafi principles, positing that al-Hazimi's lectures, such as those rejecting ignorance as a valid defense, aligned with foundational texts like those of Ibn Hanbal and early scholars who proclaimed takfir on innovators without delay. Internally, Hazimis portrayed their extreme takfir as essential for purifying the dawla (state), accusing ISIS leadership, including , of deviation by tolerating practices like participation in elections, use of government courts, or leniency toward Sufi graves, which they deemed immediate warranting chain takfir ( al-adhir, or excommunicating those who excuse apostates). They contended that empowering any Muslim—regardless of scholarly status—to issue democratized religious judgment, countering ISIS's hierarchical system as a (innovation) that shielded hypocrites. In clandestine communications and media outlets like the Nadhir al-Uryan Telegram channel, Hazimis framed their position as intellectually superior, claiming that ISIS's moderation stemmed from fear of alienating recruits rather than fidelity to (), and urged fighters to prioritize doctrinal purity over operational . Hazimis further defended their views by invoking al-Hazimi's assertion that constitutes a core pillar of faith, not merely a scholarly tool, thereby obligating rejection of all who failed to apply it rigorously, including within ISIS ranks. This included critiques of ISIS policies such as suicide bombings (viewed as impermissible ) and nasheeds (deemed musical innovations), which they argued compromised the caliphate's legitimacy. Despite purges, surviving Hazimi networks persisted in post-2017 fragments, justifying isolation from mainstream ISIS as necessary to avoid complicity in leadership's alleged kufr.

Impact and Legacy

Effects on ISIS Cohesion and Operations

The infiltration of Hazimism into ISIS ranks, particularly among Tunisian foreign fighters, precipitated a profound ideological that eroded the group's internal unity starting around 2014. Adherents, who espoused "chain "—a mandating the excommunication of any Muslim not aggressively declaring others apostates—clashed with ISIS's official stance, which sought to balance extreme purism with pragmatic governance to maintain operational viability. This tension pitted Hazimis against a more restrained faction led by figures like , fostering accusations of insufficient zeal against ISIS leadership and triggering mutual that fragmented loyalty among mid-level commanders and rank-and-file fighters. By 2015, the discord escalated into systematic purges, with security apparatus executing thousands of suspected Hazimis and other ultra-takfiris deemed threats to . These crackdowns, intensifying through 2016–2017, involved public beheadings, imprisonment, and forced suicide deployments for dissenters, involving several thousand fighters overall in the ultra-radical networks. The campaigns created an atmosphere of , as internal policing diverted intelligence and enforcement resources from external battlefields, while survivors went underground or defected, further sowing distrust and reducing cadre cohesion. Operationally, the infighting hampered ISIS's military effectiveness by undermining command reliability and amid concurrent territorial pressures from coalition forces. Fighters preoccupied with vetting peers for sympathies exhibited heightened , including sporadic attacks on ISIS's own security units, which strained and front-line deployments in and . The resultant fragmentation not only amplified vulnerabilities during key losses like the 2017 Mosul offensive but also compelled leadership to expend ammunition and personnel on internal suppression rather than offensive maneuvers, accelerating the caliphate's unraveling.

Persistence in Post-Caliphate Extremist Networks

Despite the extensive purges and executions targeting Hazimis between and , elements of the ideology persisted in fragmented form within ISIS's decentralized post-caliphate networks following the group's territorial defeat in 2019. Hazimi-influenced cells, often comprising jihadists who had internalized al-Hazimi's strict doctrines during lectures in from December 2011 to May 2012, maintained underground activities amid ISIS's shift to and virtual . These remnants emphasized of those excusing unbelief, continuing to challenge mainstream ISIS positions on even after the retraction of the Hazimi-favored memorandum on September 15, 2017. Specific Hazimi-aligned groups, such as those under Abu ‘Abd Allah al-Tunisi and Abu Ayub al-Tunisi, survived the caliphate's collapse by operating in low-profile networks, leveraging prior infiltration tactics that evaded earlier crackdowns in 2014. Defectors from both Hazimi and opposing Binali factions fled to post-2019, where they issued public critiques of leadership, exacerbating internal divisions and hindering unified operations in regions like and . This persistence manifested in sporadic ideological disputes rather than large-scale organized activity, as communication platforms like Telegram faced intensified restrictions starting November 2019, limiting coordination. The ongoing factionalism introduced by Hazimism has been identified as a structural for ISIS affiliates, potentially amplifying risks of further splintering in affiliate branches, though its influence remains marginal compared to core ISIS doctrine. Analysts note that while Tunisian recruits' ultra-extremist leanings fueled early adoption, post-caliphate survival relies on to clandestine structures, with no of Hazimism spawning independent major entities by 2025.

Analytical Assessment of Strengths and Failures

Hazimism's primary ideological strength lies in its uncompromising application of takfiri principles, rejecting the Salafi doctrine of al-‘udhr bi’l-jahl (excusing ignorance) and instead mandating immediate excommunication of those who fail to declare unbelievers as apostates, thereby emphasizing a purist interpretation of tawhid (monotheism) unadulterated by contextual excuses. This stance appealed to hardline factions within ISIS, particularly Tunisian recruits, by positioning Hazimism as a bulwark against doctrinal dilution, fostering intense commitment among adherents who viewed mainstream Salafi-jihadist leniency as a betrayal of scriptural imperatives. Analytically, this rigor aligns with a literalist reading of Wahhabi theology, potentially motivating sustained militancy in isolated cells by eliminating perceived internal hypocrisies. However, Hazimism's core failure manifests in its endorsement of takfir al-‘adhir (excommunication of the excuser), which triggers takfir bi’l-tasalsul (chained or infinite regress takfir), rendering collective action untenable as it inevitably deems even fellow ideologues apostates for any hesitation in judgment. This doctrinal absolutism eroded ISIS's operational cohesion, sparking violent infighting that culminated in the execution of prominent Hazimis like Abu Ja‘far al-Hattab and Abu ‘Umar al-Kuwaiti in 2014, and broader purges between 2016 and 2017 after ISIS's Delegated Committee briefly endorsed Hazimi views in a May 2017 memo—only to rescind it on September 15, 2017, under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's directive amid backlash from figures like Turki al-Bin‘ali. Empirically, such internal fragmentation weakened ISIS's governance and military capacity during its territorial peak, as the movement's refusal to accommodate graduated takfir alienated pragmatic elements necessary for state-like administration over diverse recruits. Ultimately, Hazimism's analytical shortcomings stem from its causal disconnect between theoretical purity and practical viability: while it reinforces individual zeal, it precludes the hierarchical stability required for sustained or caliphate-building, as evidenced by its marginalization within and limited persistence beyond executed cadres. This mirrors broader jihadist patterns where unchecked spirals undermine alliances, contrasting with more adaptive ideologies like al-Qaeda's that prioritize strategic restraint over exhaustive .

References

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